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---

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## PREFACE

The organization and principles of selection of the papers contained in this Supplement are essentially the same as described in the preface to *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2. The only important variation to be noted is the inclusion of a section dealing with Latin America in continuation of the one included in Supplement 1 for 1917.

The most important omission from the record is that, in Part I, of the minutes of the Supreme War Council, on account of the objections to their publication on the part of the foreign governments concerned, as explained in the preface to Supplement 2 for 1917. It is believed that the exclusion of these minutes does not greatly impair the record of development of American policy, as the United States was not fully represented in the main council prior to the armistice negotiations, and as the complete minutes themselves were not currently received in the Department of State. The summary telegraphic reports by the American Diplomatic Liaison Officer of discussions and recommendations involving American policy, or questions in which the American Government assumed an active interest, are included. These are, unfortunately, fragmentary and sometimes defective, yet they constitute a valuable record supplementary to the minutes. Occasional reports of the Military Representative are also included, although, as explained in the preface to the preceding Supplement, no attempt is made at a comprehensive treatment of military affairs. For the armistice negotiations, in which Colonel House participated as Special Representative, the telegraphic record is somewhat more adequate and necessarily formed the sole available basis for the Government's decisions. This Supplement is brought to a conclusion, save for occasional papers, at the date of the armistice with Germany.

For the general principles followed in compilation, reference is made to the preface to *Foreign Relations*, 1914, Supplement.

Brackets, [ ], occurring in the text enclose editorial insertions. These are of two main types: (1) words or phrases, in ordinary type, supplied to fill in omissions or replace obviously garbled passages in telegrams; and (2) suggested corrections, in italics, following words or phrases which appear to be incorrect. When there is not sufficient evidence to indicate what has been omitted or garbled, or when the words which might be suggested would so

seriously affect the sense of the document that supplying them would involve more than an editorial responsibility, notice is taken of defects in the text by the insertion, within brackets, of "omission," "garbled groups," or "*sic.*" Insignificant words are corrected or inserted without distinguishing marks.

Parentheses, ( ), occurring in the text are in the documents themselves. Besides their ordinary use for punctuation, these marks were also employed, in the deciphering and decoding of telegrams, to enclose words or phrases suggested by the decoders as possibly the intended readings of garbled groups which yielded unintelligible or no results. When so employed they have been allowed to stand, unless comparison with other documents has shown the suggested reading to have been obviously either correct or incorrect. In the latter case the text within parentheses has sometimes been replaced by an editorial insertion within brackets.

Translations as found in the files have been revised and corrected if found faulty by comparison with texts in the original language or other available versions, but care has been taken to avoid altering in any significant respect important texts that were acted upon or used as sources of information in their existing form.



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- ADLER, Viktor, Austrian Social Democratic leader.
- ALFONSO XIII, King of Spain.
- ALLENBY, Gen. Edmund H. H., Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces in Egypt and Palestine.
- ALLIZÉ, Henri, French Minister to the Netherlands.
- ANDRÁSSY, Count Julius, Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 26 to November 2.
- ANGELESCU, Dr. Constantin, Rumanian Minister at Washington to March 16.
- APPONYI, Count Albert, President of the Hungarian Independence Party.
- ASQUITH, Herbert Henry, former British Prime Minister.
- AUCHINCLOSS, Gordon, Assistant to the Counselor for the Department of State of the United States.
- AVERESCO, A., Rumanian President of the Council, February 9 to March 12.
- BADEN, Prince Max of, German Imperial Chancellor, October 3 to November 9.
- BAILLY-BLANCHARD, Arthur, United States Minister to Haiti.
- BAKER, Newton D., Secretary of War of the United States.
- BAKHMETEFF, Boris A., Russian Ambassador at Washington.
- BALFOUR, Arthur James, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- BARCLAY, Colville, British Counselor of Embassy at Washington.
- BARUCH, Bernard M., Chairman of the War Industries Board of the United States.
- BELDEN, Perry, United States Secretary of Legation in Colombia; Chargé d'Affaires.
- BENEŠ, Edward, General Secretary of the Czecho-Slovak National Council; Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior in the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government constituted September 26.
- BERNSTORFF, Count Johann H. A. von, former German Ambassador at Washington.
- BETHMANN HOLLWEG, Theobald T. F. A. von, former German Imperial Chancellor and Prussian Minister President.
- BIRCH, Thomas H., United States Minister to Portugal.
- BLISS, Robert Woods, United States Secretary of Embassy in France; Chargé d'Affaires in the Netherlands, September 21 to November 22.
- BLISS, Gen. Tasker H., United States Military Representative on the Supreme War Council.
- BONILLA, Policarpo, Honduran Minister on Special Mission at Washington.
- BONILLAS, Ygnacio, Mexican Ambassador at Washington.
- BORET, Victor, French Minister of Agriculture and Supplies; member of the Inter-Allied Food Council.
- BRATIANO, J. J. C., Rumanian President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs to February 9.
- BRUN, Constantin, Danish Minister at Washington.
- BÜLOW, Prince Bernhard von, German Rear Admiral.
- BUNDY, Richard C., United States Second Secretary of Legation in Liberia; Chargé d'Affaires.

- BUBIÁN VON RAJECZ, Count Stephen, Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance to April 15; Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 17 to October 18.
- CADORNA, Gen. Luigi, Commander in Chief of the Italian Armies to July 12; Italian Military Representative on the Supreme War Council to February 8.
- CALDWELL, John L., United States Minister to Persia.
- CALONDER, Felix L., President of the Swiss Confederation.
- CAPELLE, Admiral Eduard von, German Secretary of State for the Navy.
- CARLSSON, G., Swedish Shipping Representative in Great Britain.
- CAVE, Sir George, British Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
- CECIL, Lord Robert, British Minister of Blockade to July 19; Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from July 19; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.
- CHADBOURNE, Thomas L., Counselor of the War Trade Board of the United States.
- CHADBOURNE, W. A., United States War Trade Board Representative at Madrid.
- CHAIKOVSKI, Nicholas, President of the Government of Northern Russia, August 1 to September 16.
- CHICHERIN, George V., Acting Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, March 13; Commissar for Foreign Affairs, May 30.
- CHURCHILL, Winston L. S., British Minister of Munitions; member of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
- CLEMENCEAU, Georges, French Premier and Minister of War.
- CLÉMENTEL, Etienne, French Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Posts and Telegraphs; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.
- CLYNES, J. R., British Food Controller from July 9; member of the Inter-Allied Food Council.
- COLBY, Bainbridge, Commissioner of the United States Shipping Board; member of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation.
- CONSTANTINE, former King of the Hellenes.
- COTTON, J. P., member of the United States Food Administration.
- CRAVATH, Paul D., Advisory Counsel of the American mission to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance.
- CRAWFORD, Sir Richard, Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy at Washington.
- CROSBY, Oscar T., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury of the United States; President of the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance.
- CURTIS, Charles B., United States Secretary of Legation in Honduras; Chargé d'Affaires, February 9 to October 1.
- CZERNIN VON CHUDENITZ, Count Ottokar, Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs to April 15.
- DA GAMA, Domicio, Brazilian Ambassador at Washington.
- DANIELS, Josephus, Secretary of the Navy of the United States.
- DATO, Eduardo, Spanish Minister of State, March 22 to November 6.
- DAVIS, Norman H., United States Special Financial Delegate in Spain.
- DE ALHUCEMAS, Marqués García Prieto, Spanish Prime Minister and Minister of State to March 19, and November 10 to December 3; Minister of the Interior, March 22 to November 6.
- DE BEAUFORT, W. H., Netherland Counselor of Legation at Washington.
- DE BILLY, Edouard, French Deputy High Commissioner at Washington.
- DE BON, Admiral, French Naval Representative on the Supreme War Council.
- DE BUNSEN, Sir Maurice, head of the British Shipping Mission to South America.
- DE CÉSPEDES, Carlos Manuel, Cuban Minister at Washington.

- DE PENA, Dr. Carlos Maria, Uruguayan Minister at Washington to April 30.
- DIAZ, Gen. Armando, Chief of the General Staff of the Italian Army.
- DI ROBILANT, General, Italian Military Representative on the Supreme War Council from May.
- DMOWSKI, Roman, President of the Polish National Committee.
- DODGE, H. Percival, Special Agent to Serbia (at Corfu) of the Department of State of the United States.
- DRESEL, Ellis L., United States War Trade Board Representative at Berne.
- DROPPERS, Garrett, United States Minister to Greece.
- DYE, Alexander V., United States War Trade Board Representative at Christiania.
- EBERT, Friedrich, member of the German Reichstag; Chancellor of the German Provisional Government from November 9.
- EDWARDS, Paul L., United States Commercial Attaché and War Trade Board Representative at The Hague.
- EISNER, Kurt, Bavarian Socialist leader; Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Bavarian Republic from November 9.
- EKENGREN, W. A. F., Swedish Minister at Washington.
- ELLIS, Sir Charles Edward, British Director General of Ordnance Supply; member of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
- ERZBERGER, Matthias, member of the German Reichstag; Secretary of State without portfolio in the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden.
- ESTRADA CABRERA, Manuel, President of Guatemala.
- FAISAL, Emir, son of the King of the Hejaz.
- FERDINAND I, King of Rumania.
- FISHER, Thomas, Representative at Washington of the British Ministry of Shipping.
- FLETCHER, Henry P., United States Ambassador to Mexico.
- FOCH, Ferdinand, French Marshal, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in France from April 3.
- FOERSTER, Friedrich Wilhelm, German political economist.
- FRANOHET D'ESPÉREY, Gen. A.-L., Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies in the East from July.
- FRANCIS, David R., United States Ambassador to Russia.
- FRAZIER, Arthur Hugh, United States First Secretary (later Counselor) of Embassy in France; Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council.
- FREYRE Y SANTANDER, Manuel de, Peruvian Minister at Washington.
- FULLER, Paul, jr., Director of the Bureau of War Trade Intelligence of the United States War Trade Board.
- FÜRSTENBERG, Prince von, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Spain.
- GARRETT, John W., United States Minister to the Netherlands; accredited also to Luxemburg.
- GARY, Hampson, United States Diplomatic Agent and Consul General at Cairo.
- GAY, Edwin F., representative of the United States Shipping Board on the War Trade Board.
- GEDDES, Sir Auckland C., British Minister of National Service.
- GEDDES, Sir Eric C., British First Lord of the Admiralty; Head of the British Naval Mission to the United States.
- GOMPERS, Samuel, President of the American Federation of Labor.
- GONZALES, William E., United States Minister to Cuba.
- GOTO, Baron Shimpei, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, April 23 to September 24.



- GRANT-SMITH, Ulysses, United States Counselor of Legation in Denmark; Chargé d'Affaires.
- GREW, Joseph C., Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of the Department of State from March 14.
- GREY, Sir Edward, Former British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- GRIMPEL, Maj. Maurice, member of the French High Commission at Washington.
- GROEBER, Hermann, German Secretary of State without portfolio in the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden.
- GVOSDENOVITCH, Gen. Antoine, Montenegrin Minister at Washington from September 20.
- HADJI-MISCHEFF, P., Bulgarian Minister to the Netherlands.
- HAIG, Field Marshal Sir Douglas, Commander in Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces in France.
- HARRIS, Ernest L., United States Consul General at Irkutsk.
- HARRIS, F. Leverton, Parliamentary Secretary to the British Ministry of Blockade from July 19.
- HAUSSMANN, Conrad, member of the German Reichstag; Secretary of State without portfolio in the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden.
- HELFFERICH, Karl, German Ambassador to Russia, July 23 to September 23.
- HELLNER, J., Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- HERDERSON, Arthur, British Labor Leader.
- HERTLING, Count Georg F. von, German Imperial Chancellor to September 30.
- HINDENBURG, Field Marshal Paul von Beneckendorff und von, Chief of the General Staff of the German Army.
- HINTZE, Paul von, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, July 9 to October 3.
- HOOVER, Herbert C., United States Food Administrator; chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium.
- HOETON, George, United States Consul General at Saloniki.
- HOUSE, Edward M., personal representative of President Wilson in Europe.
- HURLEY, Edward N., Chairman of the United States Shipping Board; President of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation.
- HURLEY, George, United States War Trade Board Representative at Copenhagen.
- HUSSAIN IBN ALI, King of the Hejaz.
- HUYSMANS, Camille, French labor leader; Secretary of the Socialist International Bureau.
- HYMANS, Paul, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- IRIGOYEN, Hipolito, President of Argentina.
- JEFFERSON, Benjamin L., United States Minister to Nicaragua.
- JEFFERY, Robert E., United States Minister to Uruguay.
- JOFFRE, Joseph J. C., Marshal of France.
- JOHNSON, Stewart, United States Third Secretary of Legation in Costa Rica; Chargé d'Affaires to December 5.
- JONG VAN BEEK EN DONK, Baron, former Director of the Netherland Ministry of Justice.
- JUSSERAND, J. J., French Ambassador at Washington.
- KARL I, Emperor of Austria to November 12, King of Hungary to November 16.
- KÁROLYI, Count Michael, Hungarian Liberal statesman.
- KEENA, Leo J., United States Consul General at Valparaiso.
- KRAMÁŘ, Karel, President of the Czech National Committee in Prague; Czechoslovak Prime Minister from November 14.
- KÜHLMANN, Richard von, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Count von Hertling's Cabinet.

- LAMMASCH, Heinrich, Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister, October 28 to November 13.
- LANSING, Robert, Secretary of State of the United States.
- LAUGHLIN, Irwin B., United States Counselor of Embassy in Great Britain; Chargé d'Affaires, May 18 to July 17 and October 3 to December 17.
- LAW, Andrew Bonar, member of the British War Cabinet; Chancellor of the Exchequer.
- LAY, Julius G., Acting Foreign Trade Adviser of the Department of State of the United States from February 18.
- LAY, Tracy, United States Consul at Paris.
- LEAVELL, William H., United States Minister to Guatemala.
- LEBRUN, A., French Minister of Blockade.
- LEFFINGWELL, Russell C., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.
- LIAPCHEFF, Andrew, Bulgarian Minister of Finance from June 21.
- LLOYD GEORGE, David, British Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.
- LONG, Breckinridge, Third Assistant Secretary of State of the United States.
- LOUCHEUR, Louis, French Minister of Munitions; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.
- LOUDON, Jonkheer J., Netherland Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- LUDENDORFF, Gen. Erich F. W., First Quartermaster General of the German Army.
- MACCHI DI CELLERE, Count Vincenzo, Italian Ambassador at Washington.
- MACLAY, Sir Joseph P., British Shipping Controller; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.
- MACMURRAY, John V. A., United States Counselor of Embassy in Japan to July 1; Chargé d'Affaires in China, July 1 to October 11.
- MALINOFF, Alexander, Bulgarian Prime Minister from June 21.
- MARGHILOMAN, Alexandre, Rumanian President of the Council and Minister of the Interior, March 12 to November 9.
- MASARYK, Thomas Garrigue, President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council; President and Minister of Finance of the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government constituted September 26.
- MCADOO, William Gibbs, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States.
- MCCORMICK, Vance C., Chairman of the War Trade Board of the United States.
- McFADDEN, George, United States War Trade Board Representative at Paris.
- McMILLIN, Benton, United States Minister to Peru.
- MEHDI KHAN, Persian Minister at Washington to April.
- MÉNDEZ, Joaquín, Guatemalan Minister at Washington.
- MENOCAL, Mario G., President of Cuba.
- MÉNOS, Solon, Haitian Minister at Washington to October 14.
- MERCIER, Désiré, Belgian Cardinal, Archbishop of Malines.
- MICHAILOVITCH, Lioubomir, Serbian Minister at Washington.
- MILNE, Sir George Francis, Commander in Chief of the British Army in the Balkans.
- MILNER, Alfred, Viscount, member of the British War Cabinet; Secretary of State for War from April 19; member of the Supreme War Council.
- MONNET, M., French representative on the Allied Maritime Transport Council.
- MORGAN, Edwin V., United States Ambassador to Brazil.
- MORGAN, Henry H., United States War Trade Board Representative at Habana.
- MORRIS, Ira Nelson, United States Minister to Sweden.
- MORRIS, Roland S., United States Ambassador to Japan.
- MOTONO, Ichiro, Viscount, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to April 23.
- MUNIZAGA VARELA, G., Chilean Counselor of Embassy at Washington.

- MUNSON, Frank C., representative of the United States Shipping Board on the War Trade Board to August 31.
- MURPHY, Dominic I., United States Consul General at Sofia.
- NANSEN, Fridtjof, Norwegian Minister on Special Mission at Washington.
- NAÓN, Rómulo S., Argentine Ambassador and Financial Commissioner at Washington.
- NAVA, Signor, Italian Under Secretary of War; member of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
- NITTI, Francesco S., Italian Minister of the Treasury.
- NORTHCLIFFE, Alfred, Viscount, British Minister in Charge of Propaganda.
- NUBAR, Boghos, President of the Armenian National Delegation at Paris.
- OEDERLIN, Frederick, Commercial Adviser of the Swiss Legation at Washington.
- ORLANDO, Salvatore, Italian Commissioner of Mercantile Marine Construction; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council to May.
- ORLANDO, Vittorio E., Italian Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.
- OWEN, William H., United States War Trade Board Representative at Stockholm.
- PADEREWSKI, Ignace Jan, representative in the United States of the Polish National Committee.
- PAGE, Thomas Nelson, United States Ambassador to Italy.
- PAGE, Walter Hines, United States Ambassador to Great Britain.
- PAGET, Sir Ralph Spencer, British Minister to Denmark.
- PARRAVICINI, K., Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- PASHITCH, Nikola P., Serbian President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affairs to February 27, and from November 17.
- PAYER, Friedrich von, German Imperial Vice Chancellor.
- PERCY, Lord Eustace, British Secretary temporarily attached to the Embassy at Washington.
- PERGLER, Charles, Commissioner at Washington of the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government.
- PERSHING, Gen. John J., Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe.
- PÉTAIN, Gen. Henri P., Commander in Chief of the French Armies in the field.
- PHILIPS, August, Netherland Minister at Washington, February 19 to April 9.
- PHILLIPS, William, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States.
- PICHON, Stephen, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- POLK, Frank Lyon, Counselor for the Department of State of the United States.
- PROTITCH, Stoyan M., Serbian Minister of Finance.
- RADOSLAVOFF, Vassil, Bulgarian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the Interior to June 16.
- RAPPARD, Chevalier W. L. F. C. van, Netherland Minister at Washington to February 19.
- READING, Earl of (Rufus Daniel Isaacs), British High Commissioner and Ambassador on Special Mission at Washington.
- REINSCH, Paul S., United States Minister to China.
- RHONDDA, David Alfred Thomas, Lord, British Food Controller (died July 3).
- RIAÑO Y GAYANGOS, Don Juan, Spanish Ambassador at Washington.
- RIBOT, Alexandre F. J., former French Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- ROSEN, Baron Fr., German Minister to the Netherlands.
- ROUSSOS, Georges, Greek Minister at Washington.
- RUBLEE, George, United States Shipping Board Representative at London; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.



- RUPPRECHT, Crown Prince of Bavaria.
- SACKVILLE-WEST, Maj. Gen. Charles J., British Military Representative on the Supreme War Council from April 11.
- SCAVENIUS, Erik, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SCHEIDEMANN, Philipp, Vice President of the German Reichstag; later, Secretary of State without portfolio in the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden.
- SCHMEDEMAN, Albert G., United States Minister to Norway.
- SCHOENFELD, H. F. A., United States Second Secretary of Legation in Norway; Chargé d'Affaires, July 7 to October 20.
- SHARP, William G., United States Ambassador to France.
- SHEA, Joseph H., United States Ambassador to Chile.
- SHELDON, L. P., United States War Trade Board and Food Administration Representative at London.
- SIMS, Admiral William S., Commanding United States Naval Operations in European Waters.
- SKINNER, Robert P., United States Consul General at London.
- SMUTS, Gen. Jan C., Minister without portfolio in the British War Cabinet.
- SOEF, Wilhelm, German Secretary of State of the Colonial Office in Count von Hertling's Cabinet, and of the Foreign Office in the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden.
- SONNINO, Baron Sidney, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
- SOUTHARD, Addison E., United States Consul at Teheran from May.
- SPENCER, Willing, United States Secretary of Embassy in Japan; Chargé d'Affaires, June 19 to October 15.
- SPRING RICE, Sir Cecil Arthur, British Ambassador at Washington to February.
- STABLER, Jordan H., Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs of the Department of State of the United States.
- ŠTEFÁNIK, Milan R., Vice President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council; Minister of National Defense in the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government constituted September 26.
- STETTINIUS, Edward R., Second Assistant Secretary of War of the United States; member of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
- STEVENS, Raymond B., Vice Chairman of the United States Shipping Board; member of the Allied Maritime Transport Council.
- STEWART, W. A. W., United States War Trade Board Representative at Rome.
- STIMSON, Frederic Jesup, United States Ambassador to Argentina.
- STOVALL, Pleasant A., United States Minister to Switzerland.
- SULZER, Hans, Swiss Minister at Washington.
- SUMMERS, Leland L., Chairman of the United States War Industries Board Mission in Europe; member of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.
- SUSSDORFF, Louis A., jr., United States Secretary of Legation in Paraguay; Chargé d'Affaires.
- SWINDEREN, R. de Marees van, Netherland Minister to Great Britain.
- TANAKA, Tokichi, Japanese Counselor of Embassy at Washington to November.
- TARDIEU, André P. G. A., French High Commissioner at Washington.
- TAYLOR, Alonzo E., representative of the Secretary of Agriculture on the War Trade Board.
- THOMAS, Albert, French Socialist deputy, formerly Minister of Munitions.
- TISZA, Count Stephen, former Hungarian Premier.
- TOWNLEY, Sir Walter B., British Minister to the Netherlands.
- TRIMBORN, Herr, member of the German Reichstag; Secretary of State for the Interior in the Cabinet of Prince Max of Baden.
- TRUMBIC, Ante, President of the Yugo-Slav National Committee.

- VENIZELOS, Eleutherios K., Greek Premier and Minister of War.
- VENTOSA, J., Spanish Minister of Finance to February 28; Minister of Supplies, August 31 to November 6.
- VOLLENHOVEN, Joost van, Netherland Shipping Representative in Great Britain.
- VOPICKA, Charles J., United States Minister to Rumania.
- WALLENBERG, Marcus, member of the Swedish special commission at London.
- WALLRAF, Max, German Secretary of State for the Interior in Count von Hertling's Cabinet.
- WEKERLE, Alexander, Hungarian Premier and Minister of the Interior to October 24.
- WEMYSS, Admiral Sir Rosslyn, British First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff.
- WHITLOCK, Brand, United States Minister to Belgium.
- WILLARD, Joseph E., United States Ambassador to Spain.
- WILLIAM II, German Emperor, King of Prussia; abdicated November 9.
- WILSON, Sir Henry H., British Military Representative on the Supreme War Council.
- WILSON, Hugh R., United States Secretary of Legation in Switzerland; Chargé d'Affaires to March 4.
- WILSON, Woodrow, President of the United States.
- WOOLLEY, Clarence M., representative, on the United States War Trade Board, of the Secretary of Commerce and the War Industries Board.
- WOOLSEY, Lester H., Solicitor for the Department of State of the United States.

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85	Nov. 11	From the Special Representative (tel.): to the President	Quotes Germany's instructions to its plenipotentiaries to sign armistice, at same time to request modification for purpose of revictualing.	493
96	Nov. 11 [Rec'd Nov. 12]	From the Special Representative (tel.)	Armistice terms as finally signed same as formerly cabled Department except for changes described.	494

## COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ALLIED POWERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF SHIPPING: THE ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL

REPRESENTATION OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL—FIRST AND SECOND MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL, MARCH 11-14, APRIL 23-25—RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM COMMITTEES, APRIL 25—DISCUSSION OF THE UTILIZATION OF GERMAN SHIPS CHARTERED BY FRANCE FROM BRAZIL—APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT FOR EQUAL DIVISION OF CHARTERED NEUTRAL TONNAGE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES—FRENCH REPRESENTATIONS AGAINST THIS AGREEMENT—PROPOSED REAPPORTIONMENT UNDER AN ALLIED CHARTERING COMMITTEE: REFUSAL OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENTER INTO THE PROPOSED ARRANGEMENT

3018	Jan. 2	To the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Inquiry regarding French use of 30 steamers obtained from Brazil. Equal division of tonnage advocated.	498
42	Jan. 11 [Rec'd Jan. 12]	From the Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy	Great Britain agrees to principle of equal division of chartered neutral tonnage; application to Norwegian ships.	499
3060	Jan. 19 [Rec'd Jan. 21]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Text of Foreign Office note stating reasons why France should not give back any part of Brazilian tonnage.	500
6411	Feb. 1	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Appointment of U.S. representative to inter-Allied shipping council (Allied Maritime Transport Council).	501
	Feb. 18	From the British Ambassador on Special Mission	Certification against U.S. liability in requisitioning of certain ships by Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.	501
	Feb. 19	To the British Ambassador on Special Mission	U.S. endorsement of agreement of Jan. 30 between Shipping Board and British Treasury on payment for certain requisitioned ships.	502
	Feb. 25	The Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy to the Chairman of the War Trade Board	British authorization for final settlement in division of Norwegian tonnage between Great Britain and the United States.	503
9060	Mar. 14	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): from Stevens	Allied delegates in Maritime Transport Council have agreed upon tonnage dispositions making possible sending of coal to Italy.	504

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## COOPERATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF SHIPPING—Continued

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
3322	Mar. 16	To the Ambassador in France (tel.)	The United States will withdraw from negotiations with Brazil for German vessels. Instructions to inquire if France will use them in best interests of Allies.	504
3413	Mar. 20 [Rec'd Mar. 21]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	French assurance that Brazilian vessels will be used to meet most urgent transportation needs of the war.	506
9180	Mar. 22 [Rec'd Mar. 23]	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Sheldon to W.T.B.	French representations for modification of proposed division of chartered neutral tonnage.	506
7201	Apr. 9	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Requests names of representatives on Allied Maritime Transport Council, its functions, and character of subjects it considers.	507
	Apr. 10 [Rec'd Apr. 11]	From the French High Commissioner	Request for U.S. adherence to proposed reapportionment of neutral tonnage by Inter-Allied Chartering Committee. Presidency offered to U.S. representative.	508
9450	Apr. 11	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Membership and purpose of Maritime Transport Council.	509
7261	Apr. 12	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): W. T. B. to Sheldon	Tentative plan for equal distribution of Dutch and Norwegian tonnage.	510
7362	Apr. 20	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Hurley to Stevens	Refusal of the United States to enter into proposed plan for reallocation of neutral tonnage.	511
3738	Apr. 29, 30 [Rec'd Apr. 30, May 1]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Stevens to the President	Recommendations of Maritime Transport Council in second meeting, and general statement of import and tonnage situation.	512
1584	July 25	To the Ambassador in Italy (tel.); the same to the Ambassadors in Great Britain and France	Advisable that Japan be represented on Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council in London.	517
438	July 27	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); to repeat to Paris and Rome	Appointment of Rublee as co-member with Stevens on Allied Maritime Transport Council.	518
1127	Aug. 31	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	U.S. policy of drastic reduction of imports in order to release tonnage for military purposes.	519

## PART I

## COOPERATION IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF SHIPPING—Continued

THIRD MEETING OF THE ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL, AUGUST 29-30: DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY THE PROGRAMS FOR TRANSPORTATION OF AMERICAN TROOPS AND OF FOOD—REQUEST OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS FOR THE SUBMISSION OF AMERICAN IMPORT PROGRAMS TO GENERAL SCRUTINY—FOURTH MEETING OF THE ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL, SEPTEMBER 30—OCTOBER 2—COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO THE SUBMISSION OF ITS IMPORT PROGRAMS—ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL SHIPPING FOR AMERICAN ARMY TRANSPORT AT THE EXPENSE OF EUROPEAN IMPORTS

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	Undated [Rec'd Aug. 31]	From the British Ambassador on Special Mission (tel.)	Describes tonnage difficulties and requests presence of U.S. specialists in consultation at London.	520
1525	Aug. 31 [Rec'd Sept. 2]	From the Ambassa- dor in Great Brit- ain (tel.): Stevens and Rublee to Hur- ley	Reports third meeting of Mari- time Transport Council. Ob- servations on import program and 80-division plan.	521
	Sept. 2 [Rec'd Sept. 3]	From the French Ambassador	Joins in British request that U.S. delegates be sent to Lon- don to assist in early settle- ment of tonnage question.	523
1619	Sept. 4 [Rec'd Sept. 5]	From the Ambassa- dor in Great Brit- ain (tel.): Sheldon to W.T.B.	Allies' request for submission of American import programs for general scrutiny.	524
18840/ C-1	Sept. 6	From the Italian Ambassador	Italy supports British position regarding the U.S. request for cargo tonnage.	525
1710	Sept. 7 [Rec'd Sept. 8]	From the Ambassa- dor in Great Brit- ain (tel.)	Shipping Mission's report on decisions reached by Mari- time Transport Council, Aug. 29 and 30, on food program, tonnage, etc.	525
2425	Oct. 26	To the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Baker to Reading	A.E.F. needs stated and maxi- mum assignment of tonnage requested.	528
2445	Oct. 26	To the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	Notification of transfer to British control, by Shipping Board, of Norwegian sailing vessels off coast of South America.	529
2533	Oct. 31	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	Proposed arrangement be- tween Great Britain and the United States for supplying coal to South America.	529
3256	Oct. 31 [Rec'd Nov. 1]	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Sheldon to W.T.B.	Quotes telegram to Baker on inadequacy of U.S. import restrictions; also quotes Bak- er's commitment of the United States to participation in program committees.	532
2689	Nov. 7	To the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	British obligation under agree- ment to supply River Plate district with coal.	534
2706	Nov. 8	To the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	Situation with regard to im- port restrictions and position of W.T.B. in relation thereto will be explained.	534



## PART I

## COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ALLIED POWERS IN THE SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD: THE FOOD COUNCIL

## AMERICAN MEASURES TO MEET THE ALLIES' NEED OF WHEAT—EFFORTS OF THE FOOD ADMINISTRATION TO SECURE ACCEPTANCE BY THE ALLIES OF INCREASED SHIPMENTS OF PORK PRODUCTS

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	Jan. 1	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Quotes his letter to Robson: Estimate of Canada's wheat export surplus; further advance from the United States to be replaced by Canada if needed.	535
	Jan. 14	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Measures to secure wheat for the Allies.	536
103	Jan. 17	The F.A. Representative at London to the Food Administrator (tel.)	Text of British Food Controller's note on imperative need of Allies for wheat.	536
	Jan. 23	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Message for British Food Controller promising greater endeavor to conserve wheat for export.	536
	Feb. 22	British and Italian Ambassadors and French High Commissioner to Food Administrator	Arrangements for carrying meat products to seaboard. Appeal for sufficient grain from reserves to load full cargoes.	537
	Feb. 26	The Food Administrator to the British Ambassador on Special Mission	Arrangements for shipments of wheat and corn involving shortage in the United States.	538
	Mar. 2	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Text of his letter to Reading proposing Allied purchase of U.S. surplus pork products; instruction to present to Food Controller.	539
	Mar. 4	The British Ambassador on Special Mission to the Food Administrator	Efforts to give large order for pork. Alarm shown at U.S. shortage of breadstuffs.	540
	Mar. 5	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Crisis in prices of livestock; increased consumption permitted; definite program of Allied requirements needed.	541
	Mar. 21	The Food Administrator to the British Ambassador on Special Mission	Figures showing grain export including an advance which was to be liquidated by Canadian wheat.	541
78	Mar. 28	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Measures adopted for conservation of wheat.	544
	Mar. 29	The Food Administrator to the British Food Controller (tel.)	Five hundred leading hotels resolve to abolish use of wheat products until next harvest.	544

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## COOPERATION IN THE SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD—Continued

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
139	Mar. 30	The F.A. Representative at London to the Food Administrator (tel.)	British Food Controller sends message of appreciation of U.S. conservation of wheat.	545
	Mar. 30	The British Ambassador on Special Mission to the Food Administrator	Misunderstanding regarding wheat export figures and replacement from Canada. Further discussion proposed.	545
	Apr. 3	The Food Administrator to the British Ambassador on Special Mission	Reaffirmation of attitude regarding Canadian replacements of wheat exported for the Allies.	547
	Apr. 16	The British Ambassador on Special Mission to the Food Administrator	Wheat Executive agrees to allocation of Canadian wheat to the United States as final settlement.	549
	Apr. 24	The Food Administrator to the British Ambassador on Special Mission	Attention is called to fact that allocation of Canadian wheat is for month of May and not final settlement.	549
89	May 4	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Message for British Food Controller: Improved outlook for future flour shipments.	550
160	May 8	The F.A. Representative at London to the Food Administrator (tel.)	British Food Controller offers congratulations on success of wheat export.	550
	May 8	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Instructions to secure program of monthly requirement of pork products imports into England during summer months.	550

MISSION OF THE FOOD ADMINISTRATOR TO EUROPE—CONFERENCE OF FOOD CONTROLLERS AT LONDON: RESOLUTION OF JULY 20, PROVIDING FOR AN INTER-ALLIED FOOD COUNCIL, COMMITTEE OF REPRESENTATIVES, EXECUTIVES, AND PROGRAM COMMITTEES

	May 20	The Food Administrator to the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Program for next year's food supplies to Allies can be discussed when mission goes to Europe.	551
168	May 20	The F.A. Representative at London to the Food Administrator (tel.)	Report on British meat situation and prospects for increased pork orders.	551
95	May 22	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	Estimate of supplies of beef and pork available for export to Allies in summer and fall.	553
176	June 1	The F.A. Representative at London to the Food Administrator (tel.)	Questions of securing tonnage and of financing meat exports. Inquiry regarding lard.	555

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## COOPERATION IN THE SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD—Continued

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	June 4	The Food Administrator to the F.A. Representative at London (tel.)	British pork program to be discussed when mission goes to London. Reply to inquiry regarding lard.	555
	June 12	The British Ambassador on Special Mission to the Food Administrator	Invitation to be guest of British Government while on visit to England.	556
	June 14	The Food Administrator to the British Ambassador on Special Mission	Mission to coordinate problems of production, transportation, and supply. Invitation to be guest of Great Britain accepted.	556
229	July 27 [Rec'd July 28]	The F.A. Secretary to the Acting Food Administrator (tel.)	Resolution of Food Controllers of Associated Powers for economy and elimination of waste in foodstuffs. Publicity requested.	556
	July 29	Resolutions of U.S. and Allied Food Controllers	Formation of Inter-Allied Food Council, Committee of Representatives, executives and committees for coordination of food programs.	557

COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ALLIED POWERS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS: THE MUNITIONS COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVES AND PROGRAM COMMITTEES

BRITISH-AMERICAN TANK AGREEMENT, JANUARY 22—PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTER-ALLIED METALS CONFERENCE—CONSIDERATION OF THE FORMATION OF A MUNITIONS COUNCIL—PLANS FOR A SYSTEM OF PROGRAM COMMITTEES; RECOMMENDATIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES BE REPRESENTED ON THEM—AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR A TIN EXECUTIVE

3082	Jan. 23	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	U.S. representation at a metals conference in Paris is requested.	559
3148	Feb. 6	To the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Instruction to request Pershing to assign one of his staff to attend metals conference.	559
6557	Feb. 13	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); to repeat to Rome and Paris	War Department quoted as agreeing to cooperate in measures adopted by munitions committee of inter-Allied conference of Nov. 1917 in Paris.	559
8076	Jan. 22 [Rec'd Feb. 23]	From the Ambassador in Great Britain	Forwards original signed agreement between the United States and Great Britain for joint manufacture of tanks.	560
3530	Apr. 5 [Rec'd Apr. 6]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	Permanent Inter-Allied Metal Committee; its functions. Approval of his connection therewith requested.	562
3621	Apr. 15 [Rec'd Apr. 16]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	Metal Conference urges U.S. cooperation in control of wolfram.	563

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## COOPERATION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS, ETC.—Contd.

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
3609	Apr. 19	To the Ambassador in France (tel.); <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , to the Ambassador in Great Britain	Necessity for direct negotiations with British and French representatives for control of tin, tungsten, and other raw materials.	564
3692	Apr. 24	To the Ambassador in France (tel.): W.T.B. to McFadden	Authorization to act as representative of W.T.B. upon Metals Committee on questions relating to import and export licensing only.	564
	Apr. 27 [Rec'd Apr. 29]	From the French Ambassador	Proposed formation of a munitions council. U.S. representation desired.	565
9877	May 6	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Stevens to the President	Information on Allied executives or program committees. U.S. representation thereon recommended.	566
3874	May 13	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	French Minister of Munitions proposes sending mission to Washington to discuss all subjects relating to munitions.	568
3875	May 13 [Rec'd May 14]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Cravath to Crosby	Recommends U.S. representation on proposed inter-Allied munitions council.	569
3902	May 15 [Rec'd May 16]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	Inter-Allied Metal Conference discusses distribution of wolfram and approves of conference at Washington on non-ferrous metals and alloys.	569
7911	May 23	To the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Crosby to Cravath	Consideration of request for U.S. representation at proposed munitions council.	571
7942	May 25	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Woolley to Sheldon	War Industries Board quoted on negotiations for procurement and distribution of tin.	571
10246	May 25	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Stevens to Hurley, McAdoo, etc.	Functions of proposed program committees. U.S. representation on each committee urged.	572
10248	May 26	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Cravath to Crosby and Leffingwell	Inter-Allied program-making committees for every important class of purchases and imports approved by Great Britain.	574
4009	May 28	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	Inter-Allied Munitions Council definitely decided upon; its composition, functions, and general activities. Pichon quoted.	575
10357	May 31	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Cravath to Crosby	Desirability of U.S. representation at first meeting of Munitions Council.	577
4292	May 31	To the Ambassador in France (tel.): Woolley to McFadden	Direct negotiations approved in dealing with tungsten and other raw materials.	578



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## COOPERATION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS, ETC.—Contd.

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
10373	May 31	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Sheldon to W.T.B.	Great Britain unwilling to relinquish control of tin or to grant any but general powers to conclude agreement in Washington.	579
4074	June 4 [Rec'd June 5]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	France and Great Britain insist that permanent council dealing with munitions remain in Paris. U.S. representation urged.	580

## FORMATION OF THE INTER-ALLIED MUNITIONS COUNCIL, JUNE 4—DISCUSSION OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATION ON THE MUNITIONS COUNCIL AND THE PROGRAM COMMITTEES—AMERICAN EFFORTS TO CONDUCT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

4084	June 4 [Rec'd June 5]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	Reports having unofficially attended formal meeting of Munitions Council.	581
	June 5	To the French Ambassador	Proposed mission to Washington to discuss all subjects relating to munitions will supersede original plan.	581
4113	June 6	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	Inter-Allied Metal Conference to be permanent subcommittee of Munitions Council which will sit in London or Paris.	582
4130	June 8 [Rec'd June 9]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	Memorandum of Munitions Council calling attention to points regarding supply of munitions and urging U.S. representation on Council.	583
4127	June 8 [Rec'd June 9]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): McFadden to W.T.B.	Organization and functions of Inter-Allied Munitions Council.	584
10583	June 12 [Rec'd June 13]	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.)	Report from Stevens, Sheldon, and Cravath listing Allied program committees, their powers, personnel, etc., and urging U.S. representation thereon.	587
4525	June 13	To the Ambassador in France (tel.): Woolley to McFadden	Draft of plan for inter-Allied control of tin, which was submitted direct to France. No reply received.	591
8410	June 24	To the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	American representation on various program committees is receiving consideration.	593
10836	June 24	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Sheldon to W.T.B.	Suggests that W.T.B., London, could render assistance on program committees until War Industries Board is properly represented.	593

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## COOPERATION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS, ETC.—Contd.

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1	July 1	From the Chargé in Great Britain(tel.): Sheldon to W.T.B.	Cases cited of lack of inter-Allied coordination. Presence of officials of War Industries Board in London or Paris necessary.	594
32	July 3	To the Chargé in Great Britain(tel.): Woolley to Sheldon	Statements to prove that War Industries Board has not caused delay in establishing executive committees in London or Paris.	595

AMERICAN MEMORANDUM ON COORDINATION OF PROGRAMS, JULY 12—APPOINTMENT OF AN AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE MUNITIONS COUNCIL—MISSION OF THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD TO EUROPE—AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN THE MEETING OF THE MUNITIONS COUNCIL, AUGUST 14—FORMATION OF THE TIN EXECUTIVE—REQUESTS FOR THE SUBMISSION OF AMERICAN PROGRAMS TO THE COMMITTEES

184	July 12	To the Chargé in Great Britain(tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	Proposed plan for formulation and execution of coordinated programs by Associated Governments.	597
	July 16	To the British Ambassador on Special Mission; <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , to the French and Italian Ambassadors	Transmits memorandum of the Secretary of War, July 11, on American participation in meetings of Munitions Council. Comments.	599
5175	Aug. 1	To the Ambassador in France (tel.); to repeat to the Ambassador in Great Britain	Mission of the War Industries Board to Europe.	600
4784	Aug. 15 [Rec'd Aug. 16]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Report on meetings of Munitions Council.	600
1451	Aug. 28 [Rec'd Aug. 29]	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Text of formal agreement for control of tin, signed by Great Britain.	601
1514	Aug. 31 [Rec'd Sept. 1]	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Coordination of transportation programs.	604
1571	Sept. 3	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch	French and Italian representatives have signed inter-Allied tin agreement.	604
5021	Sept. 10	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Reports activities of Munitions Council. Possible withdrawal of the War Department from active participation.	605
1809	Sept. 11	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Report on activities of the Maritime Transport Council.	606

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## COOPERATION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS, ETC.—Contd.

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
5054	Sept. 12 [Rec'd Sept.13]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Indications that War Department will submit program to Munitions Council. Perfection of organization of program committees needed.	606
1853	Sept. 13	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Maritime Council requests submission to committees of U.S. statement of necessary imports, including certain stocks on hand, etc.	607
5159	Sept. 22 [Rec'd Sept.23]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Program for shells will be reduced; increase in railway construction necessary.	607
1693	Sept. 28	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Baruch to Summers	No statistics on domestic stocks will be submitted to program committees.	608
5224	Sept. 28 [Rec'd Sept.29]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Importance of shipment of rails to Pershing, France, Italy and Belgium. Measures necessary for supplying shell steel.	608
2338	Sept. 30	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Urges that data be submitted to program committees; opposes compensation to British for handling Australian wool.	608
5248	Sept. 30 [Rec'd Oct. 1]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Resolutions of Munitions Council regarding steel requirements.	609
2369	Oct. 1	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch and Legge	Position taken in regard to submitting data to program committees may have to be changed.	610

ENGAGEMENT TO DISCLOSE AMERICAN PROGRAMS, MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR, OCTOBER 2—DISCUSSION OF POST-WAR ECONOMIC COOPERATION; REFUSAL OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO COMMIT ITSELF

2404	Oct. 2	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch	Secretary of War's commitment of the United States to disclose its programs to Maritime Transport Council.	610
2684	Oct. 10	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): Summers to Baruch, Legge, etc.	Attitude of British Raw Materials Department regarding leather, wool, and flax.	611
	Oct. 15	From the Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy	Observations on British policy in relation to post-war economic problems.	612
	Oct. 23 [Rec'd Oct. 25]	From the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy	Member of the Japanese Embassy at London detailed to act with the inter-Allied tin committee.	614
5639	Oct. 30 [Rec'd Nov. 1]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Cotton to Hoover	Post-war plan to place enemy tonnage under Allied Maritime Transport Council and food supplies under Food Council.	615

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## COOPERATION IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS, ETC.—Contd.

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
20	Nov. 8	To the Special Representative (tel.)	Text of Hoover's refusal of U.S. consent to proposed Allied post-war economic control, as transmitted to the Embassy at London.	616

## COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ALLIED POWERS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF OIL AND OIL-WELL EQUIPMENT

550	May 21 [Rec'd May 23]	From the British Ambassador on Special Mission	Consideration of political and economic features in distribution of mineral-oil products from Eastern sources.	617
	Aug. 21 [Rec'd Aug. 23]	From the British Embassy	Solicits U.S. cooperation in distribution of oil and in supplying of oil-well equipment to Eastern companies.	619
1113	Aug. 31	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	Inquires whether the British Government controls the Royal Dutch Shell Co.	621
2013	Sept. 18	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Text of Foreign Office note stating Royal Dutch Shell group is not controlled by the British Government.	621
1608	Sept. 25	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	Will permit exportation of supplies required to increase production of petroleum.	622
2265	Sept. 27	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): Sheldon to W.T.B.	Recommends granting of licenses for exportation of oil-well supplies.	623
1803	Oct. 4	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.): W.T.B. to Sheldon	Licenses will be granted for export of oil-well supplies where needed to continue production.	623
305	Nov. 7	To the British Chargé	Steps taken to provide supplies for operation of oil fields in the East and Trinidad.	624

## THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO THE WAR

## DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSPORTATION OF CHINESE TROOPS TO EUROPE—NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING THE PURCHASE OF SHIPS FROM JAPANESE BUILDERS AND THE EXPORT OF STEEL TO JAPAN—NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE CHARTERING OF JAPANESE SHIPS—ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING THE DEPORTATION TO AUSTRALIA OF GERMAN SUBJECTS IN CHINA—ASSURANCES TO CHINA REGARDING TREATMENT AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

	Jan. 6 [Rec'd Jan. 7]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.): Crosby to McAdoo	Question of transportation of Chinese troops to war zone discussed by France and Great Britain.	624
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## THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO THE WAR—Continued

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	Jan. 10	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Inquiry regarding report that Japan has replaced military with civil administration in South Sea islands.	625
3055	Jan. 11	To the Ambassador in France (tel.); McAdoo to Crosby	Instructions to urge concurrence of French and British Governments regarding Chinese cooperation in the war.	625
	Jan. 15	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); from Crosby to McAdoo also	U.S. proposal on Chinese question is adopted in principle by Great Britain.	625
365/ C-1	Jan. 14 [Rec'd Jan. 16]	From the Italian Ambassador	His Government has been informed of U.S. desire to negotiate alone for Japanese tonnage.	626
8298	Jan. 18	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); from Crosby to McAdoo also	France assents in principle to movement of Chinese troops to war zone.	626
	Jan. 20 [Rec'd Jan. 21]	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	No transfer of South Sea islands from military to civil administration effected or contemplated by Japan.	627
	Jan. 21 [Rec'd Jan. 22]	From the Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy	British memorandum of Aug. 24, 1917, regarding U.S. acquisition and employment of Japanese tonnage.	627
	Jan. 30	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Negotiations regarding purchase of ships from Japanese builders and export of steel to Japan.	627
	Feb. 9	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Terms of American proposal to charter Japanese tonnage.	628
	Feb. 10 [Rec'd Feb. 11]	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Pursuant to investigation of shipping conditions in Japan, offers recommendations regarding U.S. purchases.	629
	Feb. 11	To the Minister in China (tel.)	U.S. guaranty to China against enemy demands as result of deportation of enemy subjects, and assurance of consideration at peace conference.	630
	Feb. 14	To the British Embassy; similar note to the French Embassy	Assurances such as Great Britain requests for China have been given in independent note to China.	631
	Feb. 20	From the Minister in China (tel.)	British suggestion that expense of enemy deportation from China be shared by the United States.	632
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3129	Feb. 5	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Feb. 3 from the Associated ministers at Jassy on efforts to counteract the peace movement.	753

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3156	Feb. 6 [Rec'd Feb. 7]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Feb. 5 from Associated ministers at Jassy conveying Rumania's appeal that Allies uphold their engagements.	754
3173	Feb. 9	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Feb. 8 from Associated ministers at Jassy on Rumania's attitude toward German ultimatum.	755
	Feb. 12	From the French Ambassador	Transmits message of Allied ministers in Rumania to French Foreign Minister on probability of separate peace if Entente guaranties denied.	756
	Feb. 12	From the French Ambassador	Continuation of message from Allied ministers in Rumania proposing further assurances of support for Rumania.	757
33	Feb. 9 [Rec'd Feb. 12]	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Further efforts to prevent separate peace. The Queen's appeal.	757
	Feb. 15 [Rec'd Feb. 16]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram from Associated ministers at Jassy on Germany's demands upon Rumania.	758
163	Feb. 21	To the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Independent assurances of support to Rumania.	758
3246	Feb. 25	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Feb. 24 from Allied ministers at Jassy stating that peace is inevitable.	759
3259	Feb. 27	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Feb. 26 from Allied ministers at Jassy on interview of representatives of Central Powers with Rumanians.	759
46	Mar. 1 [Rec'd Mar. 3]	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Reports situation in Rumania and inquires attitude to be taken on separate peace.	760
3293	Mar. 5 [Rec'd Mar. 6]	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Mar. 1 from Allied ministers at Jassy on demands of Central Powers, the alternatives, prospect of revision of peace terms.	761
47	Mar. 5 [Rec'd Mar. 6]	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Rumanian peace imminent. Safe-conduct through Russia requested for military and medical staffs.	763
175	Mar. 8	To the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Department has endeavored to secure safe conducts for military and Red Cross missions through Russia.	763
176	Mar. 8	To the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Representations regarding peace may not be made but U.S. assurances may be reiterated.	764

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3328	Mar. 11	From the Ambassa- dor in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Mar. 9 from Allied ministers at Jassy: Rumania gives assur- ance that no demand has been made by Germany for sup- plies.	765
3327	Mar. 11 [Rec'd Mar. 12]	From the Ambassa- dor in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Mar. 9 from Allied ministers at Jassy suggesting pressure upon Rumania to prevent war material falling into hands of Germans.	765
54	Mar. 12 [Rec'd Mar. 13]	From the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Allied military attachés will see that no ammunition in Rumania is delivered to Ger- mans.	766
	Mar. 15	To the Rumanian Minister	Assurances have already been conveyed to Rumania in the grave situation which con- fronts it.	767
3470	Mar. 29	From the Ambassa- dor in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Mar. 27 from Allied ministers at Jassy regarding measures taken by Germany to isolate Rumania.	767
183	Apr. 4	To the Minister in Rumania (tel.)	Instructions regarding his stay in Rumania should tele- graphic communications be cut.	767
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3627	Apr. 15 [Rec'd Apr. 16]	From the Ambassa- dor in France (tel.)	Quotes joint telegram of Apr. 14 from Allied ministers at Jassy suggesting U.S. public declaration of intention to continue the war until vic- torious.	768
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ITS TERMS—RULINGS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AS TO THE INTERNATIONAL  
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	June 13	To the Director of the Bureau of En- emy Trade, W.T.B.	Rumania is considered terri- tory occupied by the enemy so far as postal service and remittances are concerned.	780
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	June 3 [Rec'd June 4]	From the Special Agent at Corfu (tel.)	Serbian Premier believes that, with U.S. aid, national aspirations of his people will be achieved.	809
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6417	July 11 [Rec'd July 26]	From the Ambassador in France	Statements of Beneš on political and economic conditions in the Balkans.	818
1587	July 27	To the Ambassador in Italy (tel.); to repeat to Corfu	Statement issued on fourth anniversary of Austria's declaration of war against Serbia.	821
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1670	Sept. 7	To the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Requests report on Italian attitude toward territorial aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs.	825
	Sept. 17 [Rec'd Sept. 18]	From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)	Japan's recognition of Czecho-Slovak Army as Allied army under its National Council.	825
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2056	Sept. 27 [Rec'd Oct. 1]	From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Interview with Foreign Minister on Jugo-Slav problem and Italy's attitude.	826
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1005	Sept. 17 [Rec'd Oct. 14]	From the Chargé in Italy	Forwards report on Italian attitude toward the Jugo-Slavs.	832
	Oct. 14 [Rec'd Oct. 15]	From the Serbian Chargé	Request for a declaration in favor of freedom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary and their union with Serbia.	842
1135	Oct. 14 [Rec'd Oct. 16]	From the British Chargé	Copy of agreement of Sept. 3 between the British Government and the Czecho-Slovak National Council.	844
	Oct. 16	From the President of the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government	Submits draft of Czecho-Slovak declaration of independence.	846

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	Oct. 29	From the President of the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government	Denunciation of Austro-Hungarian duplicity.	858
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PART I  
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## PART I

### THE CONTINUATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE WAR—PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES

#### THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR—DISCUSSIONS OF PEACE AND CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICES

Speeches on War Aims by the British Prime Minister, January 5, and by President Wilson (the Fourteen Points), January 8; Comment in Associated and Enemy Countries—Speech of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, January 13—Unofficial Austro-German Advances Regarding Peace to the American Professor Herron

File No. 763.72119/1065

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *January 2, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received January 4, 4.22 a. m.*]

2339. I discussed with British Minister conversation [with] Shipkoff reported under Bulgarian affairs in my 2315, December 28, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> British Minister informs me to-day his Government telegraphed him exceedingly interested in my impression concerning Bulgaria's attitude and would be very grateful if I ascertained with more distinctness how Bulgaria feels towards discussion of separate peace and what arrangement might be acceptable.

If Department approves, I can discreetly offer an opportunity to Shipkoff and Bulgarian Minister through reliable non-official to make more definite statement.<sup>2</sup>

WILSON

File No. 763.72119/1073

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *January 4, 1918, 8 p. m.*

[*Received January 6, 6 a. m.*]

1777. The Teutonic peace offensive is making itself felt on every hand. A telegram from Berne via Budapest alleges negotiations

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<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 512-514.*

<sup>2</sup> Answered by telegram No. 1301, Jan. 5: "Department approves suggestion in second paragraph."

for an armistice on the western front; the Danish public entertains high hopes of an early peace. On the 2d instant the German Minister, I am reliably informed, stated to a Pole whom he sees frequently that [1] Germany was prepared to cede Lorraine to France and to allow Alsace to take a plebiscite to decide to whom she would belong; (2) Germany wanted her colonies back; (3) Germany wanted a free hand economically in Russia; (4) if these were agreed to it would be easy to arrange terms of peace; (5) he added that "France had better accept this time as those who ask too much risk all."<sup>1</sup>

[GRANT-SMITH]

File No. 763.72119/1078

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, January 6, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received January 7, 9.15 a. m.]

8166. I assume that Prime Minister's speech on war aims of yesterday afternoon appears in American newspapers in full. It was carefully gone over in full Cabinet meeting. He conferred with best leaders of all parties and all sections of British opinion and with colonial leaders and the speech is regarded here as the deliberate expression of the convictions and aims of the Empire. More importance is put on it than on any British utterance since the war began.

PAGE

*Address of the British Prime Minister (Lloyd George) before the Trade Union Conference at London, January 5, 1918*<sup>2</sup>

When the Government invite organized labor in this country to assist them to maintain the might of their armies in the field, its representatives are entitled to ask that any misgivings and doubts which any of them may have about the purpose to which this precious strength is to be applied should be definitely cleared. And what is true of organized labor is equally true of all citizens in this country, without regard to grade or avocation.

When men by the million are being called upon to suffer and die, and vast populations are being subjected to sufferings and privations of war on a scale unprecedented in the history of the world, they are entitled to know for what cause or causes they are making the sacrifice.

<sup>1</sup> In a memorandum of Jan. 6, the British Embassy communicated practically the same report concerning German conditions of peace, as transmitted by the British Legation in Denmark (File No. 763.72119/1082).

<sup>2</sup> Text published by the *New York Times*, Jan. 6.

It is only the clearest, greatest, and justest of causes that can justify the continuance, even for one day, of this unspeakable agony of the nation, and we ought to be able to state clearly and definitely not only the principles for which we are fighting, but also their definite and concrete application to the war map of the world.

We have arrived at the most critical hour in this terrible conflict, and before any government takes a fateful decision as to the conditions under which it ought either to terminate or to continue the struggle, it ought to be satisfied that the conscience of the nation is behind these conditions, for nothing else can sustain the effort which is necessary to achieve a righteous end to this war.

I have, therefore, during the last few days taken special pains to ascertain the view and attitude of representative men of all sections of thought and opinion in the country.

Last week I had the privilege not merely of perusing the declared war aims of the Labor Party, but also of discussing in detail with labor leaders the meaning and intention of that declaration.

I have also had opportunity of discussing this same momentous question with Mr. Asquith and Viscount Grey. Had it not been that the Nationalist leaders are in Ireland engaged in endeavoring to solve the tangled problem of Irish self-government, I should have been happy to exchange views with them, but Mr. Redmond, speaking on their behalf, has, with his usual lucidity and force, in many of his speeches made clear what his ideas are as to the object and purpose of the war. I have also had an opportunity of consulting certain representatives of the great dominions overseas.

I am glad to be able to say, as a result of all these discussions, that, although the Government are alone responsible for the actual language I purpose using, there is a national agreement as to the character and purpose of our war aims and peace conditions, and in what I say to you today, and through you to the world, I can venture to claim that I am speaking not merely the mind of the Government, but of the Nation and of the Empire as a whole.

We may begin by clearing away some misunderstandings and stating what we are not fighting for.

We are not fighting a war of aggression against the German people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations, bent on the destruction of Germany. That is not so. The destruction or disruption of Germany or the German people has never been a war aim with us from the first day of this war to this day.

Most reluctantly, and indeed quite unprepared for the dreadful ordeal, we were forced to join in this war, in self-defense of the violated public law of Europe and in vindication of the most solemn treaty obligations on which the public system of Europe rested and



on which Germany had ruthlessly trampled in her invasion of Belgium. We had to join in the struggle or stand aside and see Europe go under and brute force triumph over public right and international justice.

It was only the realization of that dreadful alternative that forced the British people into the war, and from that original attitude they have never swerved. They have never aimed at a breakup of the German people or the disintegration of their state or country. Germany has occupied a great position in the world. It is not our wish or intention to question or destroy that position for the future, but rather to turn her aside from hopes and schemes of military domination.

Nor did we enter this war merely to alter or destroy the Imperial Constitution of Germany, much as we consider that military and autocratic Constitution a dangerous anachronism in the twentieth century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic Constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that her old spirit of military domination has, indeed, died in this war and would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad, democratic peace with her. But, after all, that is a question for the German people to decide.

We are not fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital or the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are predominantly Turkish.

It is now more than a year since the President of the United States, then neutral, addressed to the belligerents a suggestion that each side should state clearly the aims for which they were fighting.<sup>1</sup>

We and our allies responded by the note of January 10, 1917.<sup>2</sup> To the President's appeal the Central Empires made no reply, and in spite of many abjurations, both from their opponents and from neutrals, they have maintained complete silence as to the objects for which they are fighting. Even on so crucial a matter as their intention with regard to Belgium they have uniformly declined to give any trustworthy indication.

On December 25 last, however, Count Czernin, speaking on behalf of Austria-Hungary and her allies, did make a pronouncement of a kind. It is, indeed, deplorably vague.

We are told that it is not the intention of the Central Powers to appropriate forcibly any occupied territory or to rob of its independence any nation which has lost its political independence during the war.

It is obvious that almost any scheme of conquest and annexation could be perpetrated within the literal interpretation of such a

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<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1916, Supplement, pp. 97-99.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 1917, Supplement 1, pp. 6-9.

pledge. Does it mean that Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania will be as independent and as free to direct their own destinies as Germany or any other nation? Or does it mean that all manner of interferences and restrictions, political and economical, incompatible with the status and dignity of free and self-respecting people, are to be imposed? If this is the intention, then there will be one kind of independence for the great nation and an inferior kind of independence for the small nation.

We must know what is meant, for equality of right among the nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental issues this country and her allies are fighting to establish in this war.

Reparation for the wanton damage inflicted on Belgian towns and villages and their inhabitants is emphatically repudiated. The rest of the so-called offer of the Central Powers is almost entirely a refusal of all concessions. All suggestions about the autonomy of subject nationalities are ruled out of the peace terms altogether. The question whether any form of self-government is to be given to the Arabs, Armenians, or Syrians is declared to be entirely a matter for the Sublime Porte. A pious wish for the protection of minorities, "in so far as it is practically realizable," is the nearest approach to liberty which the Central statesmen venture to make.

On one point only are they perfectly clear and definite. Under no circumstances will the German demand for the restoration of the whole of Germany's colonies be departed from. All principles of self-determination, or, as our earlier phrase goes, government by the consent of the governed, here vanish into thin air.

It is impossible to believe that any edifice of permanent peace could be erected on such a foundation as this. Mere lip-service to the formula of no annexations and no indemnities or the right of self-determination is useless. Before any negotiations can even be begun the Central Powers must realize the essential facts of the situation.

The days of the treaty of Vienna are long past. We can no longer submit the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decisions of a few negotiators trying to secure by chicanery or persuasion the interests of this or that dynasty or nation.

The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore, it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war. For that reason, also, unless treaties be upheld, unless every nation is prepared, at whatever sacrifices, to honor the national signature, it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper on which it is written.

The first requirement, therefore, always put forward by the British Government and their allies, has been the complete restoration, po-

litical, territorial, and economic, of independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and provinces.

This is no demand for a war indemnity, such as that imposed on France by Germany in 1871. It is not an attempt to shift the cost of warlike operations from one belligerent to another, which may or may not be defensible. It is no more and no less than an insistence that before there can be any hope for stable peace, this great breach of the public law of Europe must be repudiated and so far as possible repaired.

Reparation means recognition. Unless international right is recognized by insistence on payment for injury, done in defiance of its canons, it can never be a reality.

Next comes the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania. The complete withdrawal of the allied (Teutonic) armies, and the reparation for injustice done is a fundamental condition of permanent peace.

We mean to stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand it makes for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871, when, without any regard to the wishes of the population, two French provinces were torn from the side of France and incorporated in the German Empire.

This sore has poisoned the peace of Europe for half a century, and, until it is cured, healthful conditions will not have been restored. There can be no better illustration of the folly and wickedness of using a transient military success to violate national right.

I will not attempt to deal with the question of the Russian territories now in German occupation. The Russian policy since the revolution has passed so rapidly through so many phases that it is difficult to speak without some suspension of judgment as to what the situation will be when the final terms of European peace come to be discussed.

Russia accepted war with all its horrors because, true to her traditional guardianship of the weaker communities of her race, she stepped in to protect Serbia from a plot against her independence. It is this honorable sacrifice which not merely brought Russia into the war, but France as well.

France, true to the conditions of her treaty with Russia, stood by her ally in a quarrel which was not her own. Her chivalrous respect for her treaty led to the wanton invasion of Belgium, and the treaty obligations of Great Britain to that little land brought us into the war.

The present rulers of Russia are now engaged, without any reference to the countries whom Russia brought into the war, in separate negotiations with their common enemy. I am indulging in no re-



proaches. I am merely stating the facts with a view to making it clear why Great Britain cannot be held accountable for decisions taken in her absence and concerning which she has not been consulted or her aid invoked.

No one who knows Prussia and her designs upon Russia can for a moment doubt her ultimate intention. Whatever phrases she may use to delude Russia, she does not mean to surrender one of the fair provinces or cities of Russia now occupied by her forces. Under one name or another (and the name hardly matters) those Russian provinces will henceforth be in reality a part of the dominions of Prussia. They will be ruled by the Prussian sword in the interests of the Prussian autocracy, and the rest of the people of Russia will be partly enticed by specious phrases and partly bullied by the threat of continued war against an important army into a condition of complete economic and ultimate political enslavement to Germany.

We all deplore the prospect. The democracy of this country means to stand to the last by the democracies of France and Italy and all our other allies. We shall be proud to stand side by side by the new democracy of Russia. So will America and so will France and Italy. But if the present rulers of Russia take action which is independent of their allies, we have no means of intervening to arrest the catastrophe which is assuredly befalling their country. Russia can only be saved by her own people.

We believe, however, that an independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of western Europe.

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that a break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for a removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened the general peace.

On the same grounds we regard as vital the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of the Italians for union with those of their own race and tongue. We also mean to press that justice be done to the men of Rumanian blood and speech in their legitimate aspirations. If these conditions are fulfilled, Austria-Hungary would become a power whose strength would conduce to the permanent peace and freedom of Europe instead of being merely an instrument to the pernicious military autocracy of Prussia that uses the resources of its allies for the furtherance of its own sinister purposes.

Outside of Europe we believe that the same principles should be applied. While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at



Constantinople, the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalized and neutralized, Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are, in our judgment, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions.

What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred.

Much has been said about the arrangements we have entered into with our allies on this and on other subjects. I can only say that as the new circumstances, like the Russian collapse and the separate negotiations, have changed the conditions under which those arrangements were made, we are, and always have been, perfectly ready to discuss them with our allies.

With regard to the German colonies, I have repeatedly declared that they are held at the disposal of a conference whose decision must have primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies. None of those territories are inhabited by Europeans. The governing consideration, therefore, must be that the inhabitants should be placed under the control of an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or Governments.

The natives live in their various tribal organizations under chiefs and councils who are competent to consult and speak for their tribes and members and thus to represent their wishes and interests in regard to their disposal. The general principle of national self-determination is, therefore, as applicable in their cases as in those of the occupied European territories.

The German declaration that the natives of the German colonies have through their military fidelity in war shown their attachment and resolve under all circumstances to remain with Germany is applicable, not to the German colonies generally, but only to one of them, and in that case, German East Africa, the German authorities secured the attachment, not of the native population as a whole, which is and remains profoundly anti-German, but only of a small warlike class, from whom their *askaris*, or soldiers, were selected. These they attached to themselves by conferring on them a highly privileged position, as against the bulk of the native population, which enabled these *askaris* to assume a lordly and oppressive superiority over the rest of the natives.

By this and other means they secured the attachment of a very small and insignificant minority, whose interests were directly opposed to those of the rest of the population and for whom they

have no right to speak. The German treatment of the native populations in their colonies has been such as amply to justify their fear of submitting the future of those colonies to the wishes of the natives themselves.

Finally, there must be reparation for the injuries done in violation of international law. The peace conference must not forget our seamen and the services they have rendered to and the outrages they have suffered for the common cause of freedom.

One omission we notice in the proposal of the Central Powers which seems to us especially regrettable. It is desirable and essential that the settlement after this war shall be one which does not in itself bear the seed of future war. But that is not enough. However wisely and well we may make territorial and other arrangements, there will still be many subjects of international controversy. Some, indeed, are inevitable.

Economic conditions at the end of the war will be in the highest degree difficult owing to the diversion of human effort to warlike pursuits. There must follow a world shortage of raw materials, which will increase the longer the war lasts, and it is inevitable that those countries which have control of raw materials will desire to help themselves and their friends first. Apart from this, whatever settlement is made will be suitable only to the circumstances under which it is made, and as those circumstances change, changes in the settlement will be called for.

So long as the possibility of a dispute between nations continues—that is to say, so long as men and women are dominated by impassioned ambition and war is the only means of settling a dispute—all nations must live under a burden, not only of having from time to time to engage in it, but of being compelled to prepare for its possible outbreak.

The crushing weight of modern armaments, the increasing evil of compulsory military service, the vast waste of wealth and effort involved in warlike preparation—these are blots on our civilization of which every thinking individual must be ashamed. For these and other similar reasons we are confident that a great attempt must be made to establish, by some international organization, an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes.

After all, war is a relic of barbarism, and, just as law has succeeded violence as a means of settling disputes between individuals, so we believe that it is destined ultimately to take the place of war in the settlement of controversies between nations.

If, then, we are asked what we are fighting for, we reply, as we have often replied, We are fighting for a just and a lasting peace, and we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for three

conditions must be fulfilled: First, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed, and, lastly, we must seek, by the creation of some international organization, to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war. On these conditions its peoples are prepared to make even greater sacrifices than those they have yet endured.

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*Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, January 8, 1918*

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: Once more, as repeatedly before, the spokesmen of the Central Empires have indicated their desire to discuss the objects of the war and the possible bases of a general peace. Parleys have been in progress at Brest-Litovsk between Russian representatives and representatives of the Central Powers to which the attention of all the belligerents has been invited for the purpose of ascertaining whether it may be possible to extend these parleys into a general conference with regard to terms of peace and settlement.<sup>1</sup> The Russian representatives presented not only a perfectly definite statement of the principles upon which they would be willing to conclude peace but also an equally definite programme of the concrete application of those principles. The representatives of the Central Powers, on their part, presented an outline of settlement which, if much less definite, seemed susceptible of liberal interpretation until their specific programme of practical terms was added. That programme proposed no concessions at all either to the sovereignty of Russia or to the preferences of the populations with whose fortunes it dealt, but meant, in a word, that the Central Empires were to keep every foot of territory their armed forces had occupied,—every province, every city, every point of vantage,—as a permanent addition to their territories and their power. It is a reasonable conjecture that the general principles of settlement which they at first suggested originated with the more liberal statesmen of Germany and Austria, the men who have begun to feel the force of their own peoples' thought and purpose, while the concrete terms of actual settlement came from the military leaders who have no thought but to keep what they have got. The negotiations have been broken off. The Russian representatives were sincere and in earnest. They can not entertain such proposals of conquest and domination.

The whole incident is full of significance. It is also full of perplexity. With whom are the Russian representatives dealing? For whom are the representatives of the Central Empires speaking? Are they speaking for the majorities of their respective

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 244, 253, 258, 405-408.



parliaments or for the minority parties, that military and imperialistic minority which has so far dominated their whole policy and controlled the affairs of Turkey and of the Balkan states which have felt obliged to become their associates in this war? The Russian representatives have insisted, very justly, very wisely, and in the true spirit of modern democracy, that the conferences they have been holding with the Teutonic and Turkish statesmen should be held within open, not closed, doors, and all the world has been audience, as was desired. To whom have we been listening, then? To those who speak the spirit and intention of the resolutions of the German Reichstag of the 9th [19th] of July last,<sup>1</sup> the spirit and intention of the liberal leaders and parties of Germany, or to those who resist and defy that spirit and intention and insist upon conquest and subjugation? Or are we listening, in fact, to both, unreconciled and in open and hopeless contradiction? These are very serious and pregnant questions. Upon the answer to them depends the peace of the world.

But, whatever the results of the parleys at Brest-Litovsk, whatever the confusions of counsel and of purpose in the utterances of the spokesmen of the Central Empires, they have again attempted to acquaint the world with their objects in the war and have again challenged their adversaries to say what their objects are and what sort of settlement they would deem just and satisfactory. There is no good reason why that challenge should not be responded to, and responded to with the utmost candor. We did not wait for it. Not once, but again and again, we have laid our whole thought and purpose before the world, not in general terms only, but each time with sufficient definition to make it clear what sort of definitive terms of settlement must necessarily spring out of them. Within the last week Mr. Lloyd George has spoken with admirable candor and in admirable spirit for the people and Government of Great Britain. There is no confusion of counsel among the adversaries of the Central Powers, no uncertainty of principle, no vagueness of detail. The only secrecy of counsel, the only lack of fearless frankness, the only failure to make definite statement of the objects of the war, lies with Germany and her allies. The issues of life and death hang upon these definitions. No statesman who has the least conception of his responsibility ought for a moment to permit himself to continue this tragical and appalling outpouring of blood and treasure unless he is sure beyond a peradventure that the objects of the vital sacrifice are part and parcel of the very life of society and that the people for whom he speaks think them right and imperative as he does.

There is, moreover, a voice calling for these definitions of principle and of purpose which is, it seems to me, more thrilling and more

<sup>1</sup> See *ibid.*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 139-140.



compelling than any of the many moving voices with which the troubled air of the world is filled. It is the voice of the Russian people. They are prostrate and all but helpless, it would seem, before the grim power of Germany, which has hitherto known no relenting and no pity. Their power, apparently, is shattered. And yet their soul is not subservient. They will not yield either in principle or in action. Their conception of what is right, of what it is humane and honorable for them to accept, has been stated with a frankness, a largeness of view, a generosity of spirit, and a universal human sympathy which must challenge the admiration of every friend of mankind; and they have refused to compound their ideals or desert others that they themselves may be safe. They call to us to say what it is that we desire, in what, if in anything, our purpose and our spirit differ from theirs; and I believe that the people of the United States would wish me to respond, with utter simplicity and frankness. Whether their present leaders believe it or not, it is our heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be opened whereby we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace.

It will be our wish and purpose that the processes of peace, when they are begun, shall be absolutely open and that they shall involve and permit henceforth no secret understandings of any kind. The day of conquest and aggrandizement is gone by; so is also the day of secret covenants entered into in the interest of particular governments and likely at some unlooked-for moment to upset the peace of the world. It is this happy fact, now clear to the view of every public man whose thoughts do not still linger in an age that is dead and gone, which makes it possible for every nation whose purposes are consistent with justice and the peace of the world to avow now or at any other time the objects it has in view.

We entered this war because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they were corrected and the world secured once for all against their recurrence. What we demand in this war, therefore, is nothing peculiar to ourselves. It is that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us. The programme of the world's peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the

political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the governments and peoples associated together against the Imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

For such arrangements and covenants we are willing to fight and to continue to fight until they are achieved; but only because we wish the right to prevail and desire a just and stable peace such as can be secured only by removing the chief provocations to war, which this programme does remove. We have no jealousy of German greatness, and there is nothing in this programme that impairs it. We grudge her no achievement or distinction of learning or of pacific enterprise such as have made her record very bright and very enviable. We do not wish to injure her or to block in any way her legitimate influence or power. We do not wish to fight her either with arms or with hostile arrangements of trade if she is willing to associate herself with us and the other peace-loving nations of the world in covenants of justice and law and fair dealing. We wish her only to accept a place of equality among the peoples of the world,—the new world in which we now live,—instead of a place of mastery.

Neither do we presume to suggest to her any alteration or modification of her institutions. But it is necessary, we must frankly say, and necessary as a preliminary to any intelligent dealings with her on our part, that we should know whom her spokesmen speak for when they speak to us, whether for the Reichstag Majority or for the military party and the men whose creed is imperial domination.

We have spoken now, surely, in terms too concrete to admit of any further doubt or question. An evident principle runs through



the whole programme I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. Unless this principle be made its foundation no part of the structure of international justice can stand. The people of the United States could act upon no other principle; and to the vindication of this principle they are ready to devote their lives, their honor, and everything that they possess. The moral climax of this the culminating and final war for human liberty has come, and they are ready to put their own strength, their own highest purpose, their own integrity and devotion to the test.

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File No. 763.72119/1086

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, January 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received January 9, 5.13 a. m.]

1342. Italian press comments on Lloyd George's speech generally considered as very favorable though giving varied interpretations. Clerical press very favorable, points out similarities with Pope's peace note. Socialist *Avanti!* is heavily censored but remainder is critical, also other Socialist papers. Conservative or Government press praises speech, holding that it helps greatly by defining and clearing situation while adhering to known Allied claims. Public men so far appear to be shy about expressing opinions.

NELSON PAGE

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File No. 763.72119/1093

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, January 10, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 6.27 p. m.]

8218. For Secretary and President:

The President's address to Congress was received here too late for extended comment in morning's papers, but yesterday's afternoon and this morning's papers all contain the most appreciative and laudatory editorials. There is a general acknowledgment of the very high idealism of the address. It puts the aims of the United States in the war on the highest basis of justice and disinterestedness, its effect is most cheering.

In minor key there is expressed a British doubt of the practicability of free seas for merchant ships in future wars but even this is accepted in principle by most of the comment.



The general feeling of depression with which the new year began has been dissipated by Prime Minister's speech and Haig's report and especially by the speech of the President which the labor organs in common with other press in Great Britain accept with enthusiasm. Our war aims and our unchangeable resolution are now most clearly understood and the moral tonic effect of the President's noble program cannot be exaggerated.

PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1097

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, January 10, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received January 11, 11 a. m.]

1346. Discussing informally with Baron Sonnino President's message which he had evidently studied and is studying carefully, he expressed conviction that Germany will use situation to try to disintegrate forces against her. He believes she will play the game played for a year past and will probably indicate sufficient breaking down in program to force to apparent discussion of terms, temporizing and trusting to undermining war spirit of Italy and also in France beyond power of renewal. He feels that whatever the Central Empires may say the Allies must not relax for a moment their military efforts or they will find themselves betrayed.

Germany will yield only before menace of future defeat. He expects Germany and Austria to answer through the Pope; he evidently has information on this point.

Adverting to certain points, he says that Italy's future as an independent power is irrevocably bound up with her being secured against Austrian overmastery from the eastern shore of the Adriatic to which Italy's western [*eastern*] shore is exposed.

He fears that President's hopes of possibility in Russia under present regime will not be realized. Europe he states will hardly be brought to think it possible.

Evening papers here, generally more important than morning, have not yet appeared. Latter however give importance to message which they publish fully and appear to approve but state with reserve that in hurried editorials they have not had time enough to arrive at a mature opinion of it.

They endeavor to interpret President's references to Italy's aspirations as being as definite as those regarding Alsace-Lorraine. They also state that they assume that not only Italy's preponderance in Adriatic, which they hold necessary for Italy's future safety, but other interests claimed by Italy to be essential and which they assert to be guaranteed by Pact of London, are provided for in President's program. *Il Tempo*, considered as veiled Giolitti organ, suggests

that American political solidarity with Russia is probably most important future move in North American political game.

The Russian Ambassador of old Government and the Swedish Minister have spoken in highest terms of the message.

Accept my own profound appreciation of what this message means for mankind.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1099

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 10, 1918, midnight.

[Received January 11, 11.48 a. m.]

3019. The message of President Wilson has been received by everybody in Paris with the greatest satisfaction. Words of warm approval are heard on all sides where the message has been the sole topic of conversation since an outline was first given in the afternoon papers of yesterday. The full text printed in the Paris press today has created a great demand for copies. The most prominent space has been reserved in its columns for the message.

It is assuredly considered as the most important document bearing on the issues of the war that has appeared since the message of President Wilson on the 4th [2d?] of last April.<sup>1</sup> Its entire lack of ambiguity and the comprehensive manner in which the issues at stake are set forth constitute perhaps the chief features which are most remarked upon as defining the position of the Allies in the war. Naturally the most enthusiastic praise and the most touching appreciation is given to the President's reference to the restoration of Alsace and Lorraine. I can think of no event that has so moved the French people as this championship of that which France has come to recognize as being almost the sole test of allegiance to her cause. Members of the Government and civilians of prominence have throughout the day expressed to me their heartfelt gratitude [for] the President's adherence to this cause.

[Coming] next in order in interest and calling for the highest commendation is the President's reference to the cause of Russia. In this connection a touching incident occurred late yesterday afternoon when Mr. Maklakoff, the Russian Ambassador, after reading the declarations made in the message concerning Russia, hastened over to my home and there with great emotion expressed to me his profound gratitude for what President Wilson had said in behalf of his country. In words of bitterness he contrasted the President's attitude towards Russia with that recently taken by Lloyd George whose declarations he said could not help but result in the greatest

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 1, pp. 195-203.

harm to his country as well as to the general situation of the Allies. He also deplored the hasty action with which France and England had recognized the independence of Finland [before] the rights of Russia in her relations to Finland could be properly defined and safeguarded.

To my own mind the President's position on Russia has been a masterful political stroke executed at the right time. The wide open [door] which he has left for the entrance of Germany into negotiations for peace has most effectually deprived that country of any possible advantage which its peace maneuverings with Russia, in which the Allies have been invited to join, might have upon the German people.

Taken all in all the message has had a most strengthening and heartening effect upon the French people.

In selecting the following quotations appearing today in the principal papers of the Paris press I am pleased to call particular attention to the lofty sentiments expressed by the noted writer, Gustave Hervé, in *La Victoire*, as fairly illustrative of the very exuberance of the new confidence and hope which the President's message has inspired. The words quoted from *L'Information* from Albert Thomas are significant as he is the recognized leader of the United Socialists in Parliament and wields great influence among his followers. I quote as follows:

*La Victoire*. "The Wilson Peace," by Gustave Hervé.—All men of good will upon earth will read today with profound emotion President Wilson's declarations as to the war aims of the great American Republic. Once again the worthy successor of George Washington and of Abraham Lincoln has spoken as if he were already president of the society of nations for whose realization millions of men have been suffering and dying for forty months, or as if he were the just impartial judge of the international tribunal which some day will prevent wars among the reconciled nations. Let those who have hitherto denied that the Allies are fighting for the peace of right, for the cause of justice, meditate upon this speech which will remain with our declaration of the rights of man as one of the immortal charters of humanity. It is with gratitude that we greet Mr. Wilson's words as clear as those of Mr. Lloyd George about reparation for the great injustice committed in 1871 against France and against her children in Alsace-Lorraine. The original feature of Mr. Wilson's speech is the high serenity overflowing with kindness and brotherly spirit with which he speaks to Russian Revolutionaries and to the German people themselves. After Lloyd George, President Wilson notifies the German people that Alsace-Lorraine returned to France and Poland resurrected are the corner stones for the great edifice which twentieth century nations are building with their flesh and blood to offer a shelter of peace to the humanity of the future. This speech is for the Allies a new victory of the Marne.



*L'Information.* "Lloyd George and Wilson," [by] Albert Thomas.—It will be to the honour of President Wilson to have by his repeated messages obliged the nations of the Entente to make their national aspirations conform with justice. In spite of its faults, its weakness and its abandonment of alliances, it will be to the honour of the Russian Revolution to have led the Western Powers into cleansing their peace propositions of all imperialism. The review of the war aims is now an accomplished fact. Today the moral force of the Entente is incomparable. In spite of a few slight shades of thought and a few divergencies of text it is clearly revealed in the two documents of London and of Washington. The same principles are proclaimed by both the judicial and abstract mind of President Wilson and the realistic imagination of Mr. Lloyd George.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/8112

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *January 10, 1918, 6 p.m.*

[Received *January 11, 12.34 p.m.*]

3016. I have received a letter under date of December 29 from Professor George D. Herron, temporarily residing at Geneva, in which, after stating that he had recently had two or three experiences in German mentality and method, [indicating] that country's determination to secure a peace that would be to her advantage before America can reach Europe in adequate force, he writes as follows:

A former Dutch Minister of Justice, Doctor B. de Jong van Beek en Donk, now settled at Berne and equipped with everything necessary for his work, is carrying on an urgent propaganda for a German peace. He asked a British military attaché, who is also my intimate friend, for an introduction to me and made an appointment at my house. When he sent up his card I went down to find him accompanied by Mr. Haussmann, the leader of the Progressive or Liberal Party of Germany and for thirty years a member of the Reichstag and one of the most influential German politicians; also by Mr. Meinel, one of the most powerful financiers of the Austrian Empire and very close to the Emperor Charles. I let them speak for an hour without interruption.

Professor Herron then goes on to say that his callers had announced at the outset that Germany and Austria were very anxious for peace. They had learned many lessons from the war and now wanted to resume normal relationships with the world, and enter a league of nations; that, on account of Germany's strong position at the present time, with every reason to expect still further military gains, too many concessions should not be expected; that America is



naturally a pacifist nation, engaged in a war that is unnatural to her people, and ought to be the first to persuade the Allies to come to terms with Germany. Mr. Herron then states that he replied that if Germany really wanted peace all she had to do was to openly transmit her request to the Allies through any neutral agency acceptable to them, and to state specifically and unreservedly her terms, that the Allies might consider them; that Germany did not need to be undermining the world with subterranean intrigues nor besieging unofficial individuals such as himself; that if she wants peace she can never obtain it by assuming the rôle of victor or seeking it by her present indirect methods; that she was laboring under a delusion as regards America, that though it was a pacifist nation, having once drawn the sword it would never sheath it until either the thing called Germanism or we ourselves were destroyed.

Mr. Herron also states that after considerable further talk, the discussion finally resolved itself into this question on the part of his visitors: If Germany now takes the initiative, if Germany makes a great *beau geste* proposing what she would regard as definite and generous terms of peace, what would be the attitude of President Wilson and the Government at Washington? Germany might be ready now to take this initiative, so they said, if she knew in advance that she would not be turned down by America. Mr. Herron states that he told the gentlemen that there was only one way to ascertain the attitude of America and that was to make their proposition; that he himself was only a private citizen, did not know the attitude of Washington and had no authority to express any opinion. Some other talk was indulged in by him along the same lines.

The callers then wanted to know if he would undertake to find out the probable American attitude, to which he replied that such a proposition was absurd, saying in substance that if Kaiser William and Chancellor Hertling wished to know what President Wilson and Secretary Lansing would think, under certain circumstances, their business was to transmit their inquiry directly to our President and our Secretary of State.

Mr. Herron said that they left with him this last interrogation: "Suppose we do come back to you with a mandate signed by either the Kaiser or Chancellor Hertling, a confidential mandate, of course [predicating] a confidential answer, inquiring as to the probable attitude of Washington if Germany should take the initiative in proposing definite and generous terms of peace, would you take or transmit that imperially signed and confidential question?"

Mr. Herron adds: "I submit the whole interview to you asking your immediate and urgent judgment about the matter. If the utterly incredible thing should happen, [if these men . . . should,]

as the Americans say, 'call my bluff,' should I transmit the question to you or should I flatly refuse to receive both the question and the men? I certainly should have refused to see them in the first place had I known they were coming as they did or what they had to propose.

"I suppose they sought me out rather than some other American for the reason that I have written so much for the European press in defense and interpretation of President Wilson and America's action that I am to their minds an available or obvious person to see unofficially; possibly they imagine that I possess some personal power or authority which I do not in the least possess."

I have not answered Mr. Herron's letter and of course could only say that I have no authority whatever to give him advice concerning the matter [about] which he writes me. I am transmitting in the next pouch a copy of the letter in full which covers seven pages.<sup>1</sup> Professor Herron had written me undoubtedly because [of] having called to see me while he was in Paris during the stay of Mr. House. He told me many interesting things regarding the situation existing in Germany and Austria, as he learned it, at short range. Concerning one of his interviews with Professor Foerster, having to do with that gentleman's negotiations with Emperor Charles of Austria, I wired the President on December 1.<sup>2</sup>

All the straws now blowing from the direction of Germany and Austria would seem to indicate that there is a greatly accentuated desire on the part of the German Government to bring about a speedy cessation of the war. But great as is this desire every sign points to the fact that it has been much more intensified among the masses of the German people. How to effectuate these desires, by what methods and through what channels voice can be given to them without facing danger of too much loss of prestige at home or rejection of their concessions by the Allies, is the problem now acutely facing those Governments.

SHARP

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File No. 763.72119/1146a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands  
(Garrett)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1918, 5 p. m.*

907. Please endeavor to obtain from the same source which supplied comments at end of your cablegram 1656 of November 19,

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 332 et seq.*

1917,<sup>1</sup> and illuminating statement enclosed with mail despatch 334 of November 27,<sup>2</sup> an account of the reaction of the German Liberals to the President's statement of peace terms. Reply by cable.

POLK

File No. 763.72119/1098

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *January 11, 1918.*

[Received 6.55 p. m.]

1867. German press comment on President's speech:

*Kölnische Zeitung* of 10th prints full text and terms speech "Wilson's clumsy trap." The most critical hour for the Entente has now arrived, the Russians are on point of making separate peace and becoming friends of Centrals. Where then is the dynamite wherewith to blow the negotiators apart? The old arguments had lost their effect, so it was decided to proclaim the ideals of unselfish defence of the weak, the protection of the rights of humanity and the establishment of lasting peace, especially since there were political parties in Germany which had subscribed to those ideals. The only trouble with the plan was that the rapacious instinct of the Entente couldn't be suppressed either in Lloyd George's or Wilson's speech. It is unnecessary to examine in detail all the foolish and impudent proposals. It would be the dying hour of the German people should it have to sign the peace proclaimed by Lloyd George and Wilson. Under the false label of Society of Nations, Anglo-American world domination would be permanently reestablished and central Europe would be as poor and powerless as after the Thirty Years' War. There is no warm-blooded German who doesn't feel that President's message is insult to his patriotic feeling, but happily the peace of the world isn't dependent on intrigues and tricks but on deeds and blows of destiny.

They have brought us together with the Russians at Brest and will complete there what is ready for completion. After that, deeds alone will have the floor until they are crowned with success in the west also.

*Frankfurter Zeitung* prints brief summary of speech, which it states deliberately distorts facts and reveals Wilson's intention to stir up the German people. His insinuations that first German proposals at Brest originated with statesmen, whereas second proposals were dictated by military authorities, is ridiculous. The opponents of Hertling's, Kühlmann's and Czernin's policy have

<sup>1</sup> Kurt Hahn, German Liberal leader; see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 311-316.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



attacked the latter program with the same vigor as the former. President has evidently thoroughly informed himself concerning press discussions in Germany and taken good advantage of the Pan-German campaign against the Government which has shown such indifference to all national interests, but he confuses two entirely different matters.

*Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* writes that Mr. Wilson's veiled praise of Kühlmann and Czernin and open denunciation of German military authorities intended to create dissension among German people, but the people will not go into his trap. They have unlimited confidence in their military leaders and it is to be expected that the Reichstag Majority will take an early occasion to withdraw its mistaken peace resolution and reject Wilson's arrogance in a new manifesto.

*Düsseldorfer General-anzeiger* writes that Wilson's demands cannot be distinguished from Lloyd George's. They are unacceptable for Germany, Austria and Turkey. The history of the German peace offer has repeated itself. No agreement with the leaders of the enemy is possible at the conference table. The battlefields alone can bring the agreement.

*Freisinnige Zeitung* writes, the Russians will take Wilson's assurances of help at the same value as the English will take his conditions relative to freedom of seas.

*Vossische Zeitung* speaks of Anglo-Saxon danger and states that Wilson's speech is necessary tactical complement to Lloyd George's speech in great strategic campaign of Anglo-Saxons.

*Vorwärts* writes that two circumstances impair effect of Wilson's world peace program: first, the indignation of German public opinion at President's former violent speeches, and second, the suspicion that the idealistic flights of the speech are only a diplomatic move to make the Russians look at the will-of-the-wisp of general peace and plunge themselves anew into the bloody morass of general war.

*Tägliche Rundschau* writes that one part of speech is devoted to Russia and the other to fomentation of internal political strife in Germany, with the hope of reaching an Anglo-Saxon peace. All the points of the peace program are unacceptable.

*Volkszeitung* writes Wilson's program conforms in the main to Lloyd George's and is equally unacceptable for us. Wilson demands even more boldly than Lloyd George the separation of Alsace-Lorraine, which is nine-tenths German. In veiled language he demands the separation of parts of Prussia inhabited by Poles. The difference between this and earlier messages of Wilson is that formerly the tone, but now the demands themselves amount to brutal challenge to Prussia.

*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* writes that the fourteen points of the program conflict with the title Wilson gives them. They aren't a program of world peace but a real symphony of the will



for discord. It starts in with encouraging motifs about free navigation and other things, concerning which the whole world is agreed, although perhaps not as to the manner in which the principles are to be realized. Interference by Wilson on this point was unnecessary. When he had an opportunity to bring about peace on that basis he neglected it. In appealing to the right of self-determination, he arrogates to himself the right to meddle with the internal affairs of Austria-Hungary and proclaims violence to nations without duly considering their history and the actual facts. With like ingeniousness he finds a motive for the division of Turkey, which can only be used by those whose policy is directed towards the incitement against each other of nations and parts of nations which belong together and are fully conscious of the fact.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/1113

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, January 11, 1918.

[Received January 12, 6.45 p. m.]

1353. Press comments on President's note [*message*] show generally apprehension lest his words regarding Italy may exclude her claim to control of eastern Adriatic as only possible safeguard of eastern coast of Italy. Some also insist on Italy's right as great power to proportionate interest in eastern Mediterranean guaranteed to Italy by pact of London. The comments are chiefly concerned with Italy's essential interests. They generally agree that Russia's condition is impossible of redemption. Only Clerical and Socialist press praise note without above reservation. Chief Vatican organ approves note highly and says it should have appeared in August as it accords so with Pope's note.<sup>1</sup> Giolitti's organ *Stampa* attacks covertly President's reference to freedom of sea which it intimates America disregards. It says the question of the Dardanelles, like the question of the Panama Canal, is ripe today.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1120

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, January 13, 1918, 4 a. m.

[Received January 14, 6.25 a. m.]

1880. Your 907, January 11, 5 p. m. Person mentioned in my despatch 334, November 27,<sup>2</sup> was in Holland on Thursday making

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 161-164.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see footnote 1, *ante*, p. 24.

arrangements for lecture by Professor Delbrück at Utrecht on January 28 and gave following information concerning German Moderate views of peace program proclaimed by the President:

Point 1 perfectly acceptable. Point 2 probably acceptable but further explanations required regarding exclusion of certain nations from use of high seas under certain conditions. Point 3 fully acceptable. Point 4 acceptable. Point 5 not clear but if it is a matter rightly interpreted in accordance with principles set down by Solf in his recent speech, then it is acceptable. In this connection criticism is made of the President's message on the ground that although he stipulates evacuation of occupied territory by Germans, no mention is made of evacuation of former German colonies. Point 6—Matter will probably be decided along these lines at Brest Litovsk although the purpose of President's remarks in this connection [is] not clear. Point 7 acceptable. Point 8 acceptable as to occupied territory; acceptable as far as Alsace-Lorraine is concerned provided that territory is made an autonomous state within the German Empire. In this connection it is acknowledged that Germany has not always accorded proper treatment to Alsace-Lorraine. There are two ways of looking at matter:

(1) The French point of view which disregards question of nationality and considers matter only as a question of honor. If this view is to prevail it means a fight to the end.

(2) The European point of view, Alsace-Lorraine has already been granted Parliament with equal suffrage and now should be made autonomous but as 88 per cent of inhabitants are Germans, this autonomous state should be incorporated in German Empire. This view is in opposition to Pan-German aim which is to divide Alsace between Baden, Bavaria and Prussia.

Point 9 not acceptable. Italy has broken her treaty with Germany, cannot expect to receive compensation for this act. Point 10—This state of affairs should and will come about, but it will be delayed owing to pressure from without. Point 11—This clause is interpreted to mean that the [Balkan states?] are not to be fully restored but are to be made independent. The national aspirations of Bulgaria must be regarded and Servia may receive an [outlet] to the sea by combining with Montenegro. Point 12 probably cannot be brought about but regarded favorably by the Moderates. Point 13 acceptable, provided it does not mean the giving up of a portion of Prussia and provided an agreement can be reached regarding the River Vistula which fulfills the principles of free access to the sea. Point 14 acceptable.

In general, informant stated that many things said by Wilson are acceptable but as Lloyd George is making similar statements in an apparently different spirit, the Germans are not sure what to believe.

He stated that the main difficulty at present was Lloyd George; that owing to impression created by Lloyd George in Germany, it would be as easy for Germany to make peace with England while Lloyd George is in power as it would be for England to make peace with Germany if Tirpitz were in power.

Informant believes that further public statements regarding peace aims are utterly useless unless they are preceded by informal conversations between the representative men of countries at war who would attempt to prevent misunderstanding of statements when published in different belligerent countries. He hopes that some such conversations may take place before the commencement of the great offensive which the Germans are now preparing. He states that the preparations for this offensive are so far beyond anything which has been attempted as yet that it is not possible to disregard the claims of the military leaders which are lending and will continue to lend power to the demands of the Pan-Germans.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/1125

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 14, 1918.

[Received January 15, 3.46 a. m.]

3032. Following the speech of Mr. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Chamber, the following order of the day was adopted by 377 [397] yeas to 133 [145] nays:

The Chamber, approving the Government's declarations and confident in it for pursuing, thanks to an energetic conduct of the war, the complete reparation of the abuse of might, the establishment of the reign of justice in international relations, and the triumph of democracy, passes to the order of the day.

Answering certain interpellations in the Chamber of Deputies among which were three proposed by Mr. Albert Thomas, leader of the United Socialist Party, Mr. Pichon took up first the question of passports. He said substantially while willing that relations and [conversations] might be established by French and Russian Socialists, yet the handing of passports was a question of [opportune-ness, and] request was made at so dark an hour that it could not be granted by the Government. He said also that he was opposed to the idea of the international workingmen's conference; that while it was true that question did not enter into the definite plan of the Socialist group, yet they had declared that it would be raised and would be examined. Mr. Pichon said that such a conference would be still more dangerous than negotiations with the Maximalists for it would



risk throwing disorder into public opinion, replacing the authority of the Government by private initiative, and disorganize the Government's defensive forces. Besides, there would be the scandals of reunions in which French patriots would meet with the instigators and the accomplices of those [aggressions] and calamities from which the world is suffering today. He concluded his reference to such a conference by saying it now serves as resource in Russia for those who seek to work against France. He declared that the French Government did not want in any way to mix in Maximalist discussions for it had proof that Germany was trying to draw the Allies into them. His declaration that there could be no question whatsoever of the French Government treating [on] such affairs with the usurping power which had invested itself in Petrograd called for applause.

Discussing the objects of French delegates Mr. Pichon said:

For what are we fighting? A just and durable peace. Three conditions are necessary: the sacred character of the respect of treaties, a territorial regulation based on the right of nations to dispose of themselves, the limitation of armaments. That is our program. It is also the program developed by Mr. Lloyd George. As for the society of nations, victory alone can bring it to realization. Mr. Lloyd George has declared this and it is our own program too. Mr. Wilson also asserts that there is no divergence between the principles affirmed by him and by the Allies. Mr. Wilson asks for the suppression of economic barriers, the evacuation of Russian territories, the evacuation of our territories, the restitution of Belgium, of Roumania, of Serbia, the reparation of the harm done to France in 1871. Coming after those made by Mr. Lloyd George these declarations give a world wide character to our claims. What we want is the just peace consecrated by the restoration of our right violated in 1871, higher than all hypocritical plebiscites. All the declarations of the Allies are in accord.

Mr. Pichon closed his speech [with] an arraignment of the acts of the Maximalists, in the following words:

First of all there was a marked recoil [on] the part of the Maximalists, Trotzky proclaimed the negotiations broken off, then he proposed to transfer them to a neutral country. Germany refused, Trotzky returned to Brest-Litovsk. The great wrath of the Maximalists against the German plenipotentiaries was appeased. On the one hand the Allied countries through their Governments have made known the principles of a just and durable peace towards which they are tending, equity, liberty, independence, right reparation of damages, institutions intended to prevent the return of war and they have declared themselves formally to be ready to examine among themselves the propositions which might come from their adversaries. Our former allies have repudiated—I speak merely of the Maximalists and not of Russia taken as a whole—their obligations, and you now ask us to leap with them in their adventure



and compromise ourselves in their bargain. No, we will not do this. They are going their way and we ours. Unless events which unfortunately are very improbable should occur, these ways cannot meet at all. However, the advent of a normally elected Constituent Assembly working freely and regularly might change this situation. Have we reached this point? I fear not. Their design would appear to be not to open but perhaps to wind up the Constituent Assembly. May these indications be proved untrue by developments! That is what I wish. The Allies could then apply the instructions given to their ambassadors and proceed with the regular Government to examine the conditions of a just and durable peace. We wait with hope for circumstances to allow the fulfillment of this program. Until then we can but maintain our attitude towards a Government which is in fact and perhaps without intention serving the cause of our enemy and lacks even the excuse of resting upon the national will of its country.

As a rather interesting illumination upon an event now a matter of history bearing on the attitude of the French Government [toward] President Wilson's appeal to the Allied Powers to state their aims, I quote as follows from Mr. Briand, who during the discussion of the interpellations arose to explain his position as Premier at the time:<sup>1</sup>

I was called upon at a period of the war when circumstances were different to hand to Mr. Wilson a reply in the name of the Allies. This has been mentioned in the course of the present debate. That reply was difficult to draw up, it was handled, and I think I may say—and M. Albert Thomas who was then my collaborator and was aware of its terms will not contradict me—that we had to face a double event. First a peace offensive coming from Germany in ill-defined conditions which necessitated a negative reply; this reply was made. Then President Wilson turned to the belligerents and said: "Acquaint us with your war aims." We then thought that we must have confidence in the President of the great Republic of the United States. We drew up our war aims in conformity with the circumstances and the exigencies of the moment. Today we may say it would have been better if certain agreements had not been made but consider that if certain agreements had not been made under the pressure of the time, today perhaps the question of France's success would not exist because she would have remained in the battle alone before her aggressor. The essential thing was to group all friendly [forces] against the common enemy. This confidence which we had in President Wilson allowed him, holding our detailed reply in his hand, to turn back towards the Central Empires which had spoken of peace without making any predictions [*precisions?*] and to say: "Here is what France and the Allies have handed me; what have you to say?" The Central Powers did not reply. Then the United States knew on which side good faith existed. I claim that a note drawn up in those conditions was done in the service of France and in her interest.

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1916, Supplement, pp. 97-99, and *ibid.*, 1917, Supplement 1, pp. 6-9.

The Paris papers quote with approval extracts from Mr. Pichon's address. They give particular emphasis to the fact that it is in entire accord with the speech of Lloyd George and the message of President Wilson. In most of them the opposition of the Socialist group is condemned in strong terms. In several of the papers in-dorsement is given to Mr. Pichon's refusal to in any way recognize the Maximalists or compromise the Government by dealing with them.

While proclaiming the determination of the Government to use its entire might to a quick prosecution of the war, and I am sure the country has never been more united for that purpose than now, yet considering the speech in its entirety I have been impressed with the moderation of its tone and its announced willingness to entertain and consider propositions of the enemy upon which a durable peace might be secured.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/8112

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 15, 1918, 8 p. m.

3074. Your 3016.<sup>1</sup> You may inform Professor Herron that the position which he has taken has our cordial approval. This Government cannot receive and consider any proposals from the enemy and at the same time promise to keep them from the Allied Governments. Proposals, if made, should be forwarded through official channels.

LANSING

File No. 763.72Su/5

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 18, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received January 19, 4.12 p. m.]

3061. To the Secretary of State and Colonel House:

Referring to my 3014, January 10,<sup>2</sup> Frazier reports to me as follows:

Special meeting projected for 17th or 18th now postponed for a week or ten days. British representative has draft of resolution to be considered at regular meeting and the [at an?] early date for forming a general reserve to be placed under the Supreme War Council which will not be in executive command but which would

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

have power to refuse or approve of applications from the commanders-in-chief for the use of all or of any part of it, the idea being that as the operations for the beginning of this year will probably be of a defensive character, a massed attack or attacks might cause each of the commanders-in-chief to use up all his reserves in order to keep his front intact. The general reserve would thus be kept at the disposal of all the commanders-in-chief.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1155

*The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*

No. 5384

LONDON, *January 10, 1918.*

[*Received January 21.*]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a statement on behalf of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, the Executive of the Labor Party, and the Co-operative Representative Committee, setting forth in terms of cordial approval their views on the President's speech on war aims. This unreserved approval of the British Labor organizations should be noted as a matter of great political importance.

The statement was made public on January 10, 1918.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT P. SKINNER

[Enclosure]

*Statement Published by British Labor Organizations,  
January 10, 1918*

A joint meeting of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress, the Executive of the Labour Party, and the Co-operative Parliamentary Representation Committee yesterday afternoon issued the following statement:

We warmly welcome President Wilson's authoritative declaration of Allied war aims. Within the last few days the whole international situation has been transformed, first by the speech of the Prime Minister to the Conference of Trade Congress Delegates, and secondly by the great pronouncement of President Wilson. The moral quality and breadth of vision exhibited in the latter's address to Congress are particularly evident in the declaration that the peace negotiations, when they begin, must be absolutely open and that they shall involve or sanction no secret understanding of any kind. This is the only kind of diplomacy that the democracies of the world can tolerate. Humanity has had to pay dearly for the secret covenants entered into by governments, and we rejoice that Mr. Wilson has so decisively proclaimed the democratic doctrine of open diplomacy. The leaders of revolutionary Russia, as Mr. Wilson recog-



nizes, have initiated new methods of diplomacy, the results of which are apparent not only in the knowledge we have of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, but in Mr. Wilson's frank approval of the claim that the Russian representatives have acted wisely and justly in insisting upon the conference being held with open doors and with the whole world as audience.<sup>1</sup>

British Labour will also welcome very heartily Mr. Wilson's expression of sympathy with Russia's agonized effort to achieve full freedom. He has responded, as we believed he would, to Russia's appeal for countenance and support by earnest affirmation of the heartfelt desire and hope that some way may be open by which we may be privileged to assist the people of Russia to attain their utmost hope of liberty and ordered peace. Let us take care that this message reaches the ears of Russia. The British democracy desires nothing more earnestly than that the Russian democracy shall be convinced that the whole of the Allies are with them in their struggle for peace and freedom, and in their effort to conserve the beneficent fruits of the Revolution. In our judgment, these two declarations of President Wilson, in favour of open diplomacy and support of revolutionary Russia, will make the Congress speech one of the classic utterances of Allied statesmanship during the war. In the detailed programme of world peace outlined by Mr. Wilson we find no point upon which there is likely to be any disagreement among the Allied democracies.

The reference to the "freedom of the seas" is to be welcomed on the ground of its lucidity and breadth of definition. It embodies the doctrine of freedom of navigation both in peace and war, except so far as it may be necessary to close the seas in whole or in part by international action for the purpose of enforcing international obligations violated by any nation. With that interpretation of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas, to which the Central Powers attach so much importance, we all freely agree; and the Central Powers cannot challenge it, if, indeed, they are sincere in their repudiation of aggressive intentions. No other formula that we have seen meets so fully the stipulation that an island power like Great Britain is bound to make to ensure its safety and that of the Empire in time of war. It seems to us to be a natural corollary to the League of Nations that freedom of navigation must be denied to any nation that violates international covenants for the maintenance of peace.

We welcome, too, President Wilson's assertion of the moral issues involved in the claim that Belgium must be evacuated and restored. No other single act, as he justly says, will do more to restore confidence among the nations in the integrity and sanctity of treaties and the obligations resting upon all nations, individually and severally, to maintain inviolate the principles of international law. Mr. Wilson's pronouncement in favour of equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace, and the abolition of economic barriers, is a step in the direction of universal free trade, which Cobden insisted was a necessary condition of universal peace.

<sup>1</sup> For papers concerning the Brest-Litovsk negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 404 *et seq.*



Russia, in the midst of negotiations which at the moment seem to be a menace to the integrity of her national patrimony, will be strengthened by Mr. Wilson's demand that Russian territory must be evacuated, and all questions affecting her must be settled in a manner that will ensure her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity to determine her political development, and a sincere welcome into the society of free nations. That is the test of the full faith of governments in democratic principles—that they will be willing and eager to recognize the fact of, and the effect of, the Russian Revolution, and be ready to give her every kind of help she needs to consolidate the Revolution and to establish a true democratic self-government in accordance with her own peculiar genius for freedom.

Finally we may say in a sentence that President Wilson's programme is in essential respects so similar to that which the British Labour Party has put forward that we need not discuss any point of difference in detail. The spirit of this historical utterance is a spirit to which democracy all over the world can respond, and if it reaches the people of the Central Powers we believe it will reinvigorate the popular movement towards peace in those countries now under the yoke of Prussian military autocracy, and give their demand for peace a weight and authority that cannot be denied. In fact, we may say that peace negotiations have now begun, and that the world waits for the proof that the Central Powers are sincere in their desire to carry them to a conclusion which will be acceptable to the peoples of the world.

The statement is signed by Mr. C. W. Bowerman, secretary of the Parliamentary Committee, Trades Union Congress; Mr. Arthur Henderson, for the National Executive of the Labour Party; and Mr. H. J. May, secretary of the Cooperative Parliamentary Representation Committee.

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File No. 763.72119/1148

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *January 21, 1918, 12 p. m.*

[Received *January 22, 9.31 a. m.*]

1913. The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me tonight that the Austro-Hungarian Minister, the day before yesterday, came to see him and [said] he had received telegram from Count Czernin informing him that he had read the fourteen clauses of President Wilson's message with great interest and that he found some of them sensible or sound (the word he used was *gesund*). Loudon asked Szechenyi if he intended him to convey Czernin's statement to anyone, for instance to the American Minister; the Austro-Hungarian Minister said he did not so intend, but he had no objection as Czernin's telegram was most unusual and he could not but think that it was meant to go further.

Loudon believes that relations between Vienna and Berlin are not very cordial and that it is possible that Austria-Hungary may be seeking a means of expressing her wishes.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72/8592

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, January 21, 1918, noon.

[Received January 22, 10.03 a. m.]

1372. Prime Minister Orlando left last night suddenly for London supposedly to urge on Lloyd George personally Italy's asserted right to possession of Trieste and eastern coast of Adriatic.

Italian press discussing warmly, even critically, since Lloyd George's speech to workmen, omission of reference to Italy's rights. It says that omission repeated becomes commission. They speak as if Italy's rights are unquestioned and could be got for the asking.

Baron Sonnino said to me Saturday in informal conversation that President's reference to Italy, to satisfy Italy's imperative requirements for security, ought to be extended to include Italy's geographically defensive frontier.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/8595

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, January 21, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received January 22, 11.25 a. m.]

1373. I learn from an intelligent Italian general of standing just arrived from the front, who has been always most friendly to Allies, that the Italian Army is asking now, "What are we fighting for if Trent and Trieste are not to be Italy's?" He says that the Army is ready to fight to the end for these, which are watchwords like Alsace-Lorraine, but will stop if this hope and inspiration be taken away; for they will consider Italy betrayed by England and France. He says that they do not feel the same way about the Istrian-Dalmatian coast, and Trieste as free coast would meet situation if within Italian borders.

He adds Orlando has gone Paris and London to inform both that Italian [Government] will make peace unless their agreement with her is carried out. Last information may not be so well founded as first but I believe that he knows the Army.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1158

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *January 22, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received 10.54 p. m.]

1357. For the President:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs in an informal and confidential conversation this morning stated that yesterday Count Hadik, the Austrian Minister, had told him that Count Czernin was practically in entire accord with the views expressed in the President's message; that as to Alsace-Lorraine it was after all a purely German question, and one in which Austria was not concerned.

Upon my asking if he thought the Austrian Minister was authorized to make such a statement he smiled, and replied that he did not consider him the kind of man to speak of such matters without being sure of his ground.

MORRIS

File No. 763.72Su/8

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *January 24, 1918, 11 a. m.*

[Received 4.34 p. m.]

3087. Frazier reports to me that a joint note on the subject of 1918 campaign was signed by military representatives of Supreme War Council yesterday.<sup>1</sup> Following is the substance of the main conclusions reached in this note:

1. It was assumed that Great Britain was safe from serious invasion.

2. It was agreed that the safety of France could also be assured, provided that French and British forces in France were continuously maintained at their present total aggregate strength, and received the expected reinforcements of no less than two American divisions per month, provided that a substantial and progressive increase took place in the total Allied equipment in guns of all calibers, machine guns, airplanes and tanks, with necessary personnel to man them, and the most effective coordinate daily employment of these and all other mechanical devices, provided every possible measure be taken for strengthening and coordinating the Allied system of defenses, especially in sectors most liable to heavy attack, pro-

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<sup>1</sup> Joint note No. 12 containing these conclusions was dated Jan. 21, 1918.

vided that the transportation by rail be coordinated and improved, provided that the whole Allied front in France be treated as a single strategic field of action.

3. It was also agreed that Italy was safe, provided that the Italian Army be reformed, trained and equipped with artillery before May 1, and that several positions in the rear of the present line be constructed on modern principles, provided that the power of rapid rail transport be increased both in the interior of Italy itself and between Italy and France in order to secure strategic unity of action over both transportation [systems], provided that in addition to the necessary measures taken against pacifism by the Italian Government itself the Allies should assist Italy by the provision of coal, wheat and other necessaries, as well as financially, in order to prevent the creation of economic conditions which might weaken the resistance of the interior.

The military representatives consider that if the assumptions of 1, 2, 3 are accepted, the enemy cannot gain a definite military decision in 1918 in the main theatres which would enable it to break finally the resistance of any of the Allied Powers. After reviewing the changed conditions in the western theatres due to the Russian collapses, the military representatives reached the conclusion that, pending such a change in the balance of forces as they may hope to attain in 1919 by the steady influx of American troops, guns, airplanes, tanks, etc., and by the progressive exhaustion of the enemy's staying power, they should strive to inflict such a crushing series of defeats upon the Turkish armies as would lead to the final collapse of Turkey and her elimination from the war. The military representatives are of the opinion that the present condition of Turkey is one of almost complete material and moral exhaustion; they believe that the Turkish forces are now 250,000 men at the utmost, and that they would dwindle even more rapidly if seriously attacked owing to the entire lack of reserves.

Therefore after studying the entire situation the military representatives reached the final conclusion that, while it will not be within the power of the enemy to reach a decision adverse to the Allies in the main western theatres if certain conditions are fulfilled, the Allies themselves can not expect in the main theatres to obtain a real decision against the enemy apart from certain contingencies at present unforeseen. They are therefore of the opinion that a decisive offensive against Turkey should be undertaken with a view to the collapse of resistance through the annihilation of its armies.



File No. 763.72Su/9

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 24, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 10.31 p. m.]

3088. Referring my 3061, 18th.<sup>1</sup> Frazier reports to me as follows:

The military representatives of the Supreme War Council in session yesterday passed a resolution of which the following is the substance:

It is the opinion of the military representatives that the formation of a general reserve for the whole of the Allied forces on the western front for both France and Italy is imperative. They therefore express the wish that, on account of its urgency, a decision upon this subject be reached at the next meeting of the Supreme War Council, and that as preparation for such decision the respective Governments acquaint their military representatives, as soon as possible, with the views of their commanders-in-chief and chiefs of staff upon this question, especially as regards the amount this reserve, its location and the commanders thereof.

At the same session the military representatives agreed to the creation of a committee of supply in addition to committees of aviation, transportation and tanks, such committee to occupy itself with the question of supply of nitrates for Great Britain, France and Italy, as well as the question of remounts and mechanical transport vehicles, in view of the stoppage of the imports of both for a period of three months from January 1918. It is probable that this committee will also discuss the priority of various supplies required by Italy. It is now probable that the Prime Ministers will not sit at War Council meeting on 29th instant.

SHARP

Speeches of the German Chancellor (Hertling) and the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Czernin), January 24

File No. 763.72119/1167, 1168

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, January 24, 1918.

[Received in sections January 25, 5.20 a. m. and 7.40 a. m.]

1932, 1933. Hertling addressed Reichstag Committee today as follows:<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 31.<sup>2</sup> For readability the necessary articles and connectives have been inserted in the telegraphic text.

When I last appeared before the Committee on January 3, we were confronted, it seemed, with an incident which had happened at Brest. I then expressed the opinion that we should await the settlement of this incident quietly. The facts have borne me out—the Russian delegation has again arrived at Brest, negotiations have been resumed and are proceeding slowly. They are extraordinarily difficult. I pointed out the last time the particular circumstances causing these difficulties. In fact there was often room for doubt whether the Russian delegation was serious with peace negotiations, and various wireless messages sent forth with most remarkable contents only strengthened these doubts. Nevertheless, I hold to the hope that we shall soon arrive at a favorable result with the Russian delegation at Brest. Our negotiations with the Ukrainian representatives are proceeding favorably, but there still remain difficulties to be overcome. The prospects, however, are good. We hope soon to reach a conclusion with Ukrainia which will suit the interest of both sides and will be advantageous in an economic direction. A result was reached January 4.

As you all know, the Russian delegation proposed in December to issue an invitation to all belligerents to participate in negotiations as a basis for which the Russian delegation made certain proposals of an abstract nature. We then agreed to invite all belligerents to negotiations on condition that a time limit for the validity of the invitation was set. That time limit expired January 4 without any reply being received. The result is that we are no longer bound in any way as regards the Entente, that we have a free hand for separate negotiations with Russia, and that as a matter of course we are no longer bound, as far as the Entente is concerned, to those general peace proposals submitted to us by the Russian delegation.

Instead of the reply then expected but not forthcoming, two manifestations by enemy statesmen have been made meanwhile as you all know: the speech of the English Minister, Lloyd George, of January 5,<sup>1</sup> and President Wilson's message next day.<sup>2</sup> I gladly acknowledge that Lloyd George has changed his tone, but I cannot admit, as many other voices from neutral countries, that a serious will for peace or even a friendly feeling can be read in this speech of Lloyd George. He no longer scolds and seems to wish to prove his qualifications as a negotiator which I formerly questioned. It is true he declares he doesn't wish to destroy Germany. He even finds respectful words for our political, economic and cultural position, but between all of this the view asserts itself that judgment must be passed on Germany as guilty of all kinds of crimes. In feelings of this sort we are unable to find any serious will for peace.

This prompts me to review briefly the conditions and events preceding the war. The establishment of the German Empire in 1871 put an end to the old disunity, by consolidating its races. The German Empire acquired that position in Europe which corresponds to its economic and cultural achievements and the aspirations founded thereon. Bismarck crowned his work by the alliance with Austria. This was a purely defensive alliance; in the course of a decade, not even the slightest idea of its abuse for aggressive purposes ever appeared, but often danger threatened the unity of the Central

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Message of Jan. 8, *ante*, p. 12.

Powers from enemy coalitions. The dream of coalitions became a reality through King Edward's encirclement policy. The rising and [growing] German Empire stands in the way of English imperialism and this British imperialism found great assistance in the French idea of revenge and in Russian expansion efforts, and thus conditions dangerous to us were prepared.

The geographical situation of [Germany] has always presented us with the danger of war on two fronts. Now that danger grew ever more clearly. An alliance was formed between Russia and France and the two partners to this alliance had a combined population double those of the German Empire and Austria-Hungary together. Republican France lent Czarist Russia thousands of millions for the development of strategic railways in the Kingdom of Poland, and these railways were intended to facilitate the assembly of force against us. The French Republic summoned every last man to three years' service with the colors. Thus side by side with Russia, France organized for herself an armament which reached the very limit of her capacity. Both countries were pursuing objectives which our opponents would now describe as imperialist. It would have been neglect of duty had Germany quietly looked on at this game; if we had not also endeavored to build up armaments to protect ourselves against future enemies. Perhaps I may recall to your attention that as a member of the Reichstag I frequently spoke of these matters and pointed out at the time of new appropriations for armament that the German people in voting these appropriations merely wished to carry on a policy of peace.

And now as to Alsace-Lorraine. Lloyd George speaks again of the wrong done by Germany to France in 1871. As is well known, Alsace-Lorraine includes for the most part purely German territory detached from the German Empire by violence continued through centuries until in 1789 the French Revolution swallowed the last remnants. When we demanded in the war of 1870 the return of the strips of land torn from us, that was no conquest of foreign territory, but really what is today called disannexation, and this disannexation was expressly recognized by the French National Assembly, March 29, 1871, by a large majority. In England also the language used at that time was quite different from that of today. I can refer to a classical witness, Thomas Carlyle, who wrote in a letter to the *Times* in December 1870: "No nation has such a bad neighbor as Germany had in France during the past forty years. Germany would be crazy should she not think of erecting a frontier wall between herself and her French neighbor." Recognized English papers spoke in the same sense.

I now come to Wilson. I acknowledge here also that the tone has completely changed, at any rate there is no longer any talk of oppression of the German people by an autocratic Government, and earlier attacks on the Hohenzollern are not repeated. I shall not dwell upon the statements regarding German policy but discuss one by one the points submitted by Wilson.

He formulates his peace program in no less than fourteen points. The first point demands there shall be no secret international agreements. History teaches that we can be the first to declare our readiness for wide publicity of diplomatic agreements. [Our] defensive agreements with Austria-Hungary have been known to the world



since 1888, whereas the aggressive agreements between the enemy countries did not see the light of publicity until [they were revealed] by the Russian Revolutionists. The fully public negotiations at Brest prove further that we can quite easily declare our readiness to accept this proposal.

In point 2 Wilson demands freedom of the seas. The complete freedom of navigation on the seas in war and peace is made one of the first and most important demands of the future by Germany. Although there are thus no differences of opinion on this point, the limitation inserted by Wilson at the end is not fully intelligible and in part is superfluous and could best be dropped. It would be highly important for freedom of navigation in the future to have the strongly fortified naval bases at the most important international highways of the seas, as England [has at] Gibraltar, Malta, Hong-kong, Aden, the Falklands and many other places, done away with.

Point 3, abolition of all economic barriers. We also fully agree to removal of all economic barriers unnecessarily restricting trade. We condemn economic war which would with certainty form the cause of future warlike complications. Point 4, the idea of limitation of armaments, too, is quite discussable, as declared by us at an earlier date. The financial situation of all European countries after the war should effectively aid a satisfactory solution.

It can be seen, therefore, that an understanding could be reached without difficulty on the first four points of the program.

I now take up the fifth point, adjustment of all colonial claims and disputes. The practical application in the world of reality of the principle here set up by Wilson will encounter some difficulties. I believe at any rate that it might be left to England, the greatest colonial Empire, to discuss first of all this proposal of her ally. We shall then see what might be obtained by us in peace negotiations, judging from such agreements between England and America, since we shall certainly advocate a readjustment of the colonial possessions of the world.

Point 6. Now that the Entente has refused to join in negotiations between Russia and the Quadruple Alliance during the time limit, I am bound to reject in the name of the latter any subsequent interference in the matter of evacuation of Russian territory. These are questions which concern Russia and the four Allied Powers alone.

Point 7 relates to the Belgian question. It has been repeatedly declared by my predecessors that at no time during the war has the forcible attachment of Belgium to Germany formed a point of the program of German policy. The Belgian question belongs to a complex of questions the details of which will have to be arranged by peace negotiations. As long as our adversaries do not unreservedly take the ground that the integrity of the territory of the Allies can alone form the basis of peace negotiations, I must adhere to the standpoint regularly adopted heretofore and reject the idea of taking up the Belgian matter before the general discussion.

Point 8, liberation of French territory. The occupied parts of France are a valuable object of exchange. Their annexation does not form part of a logical German policy. The conditions and formality of evacuation, which must take into consideration Germany's vital interests, are to be arranged between Germany and



France. I can only emphasize again that there can never be any talk of cession of Imperial territory.

Points 9, 10 and 11 affect the interests of Austria, to whom we must yield preference in reply. As regards point 12, the integrity of Turkey is a vital question of the German Empire. The Turkish reply should not be anticipated. Point 13. The Entente never took up the cause of Poland. The settlement of these questions must be left to Austria, Germany and Poland. [Point 14.] We have sympathy with the idea of a league of nations. If proposals are based on the spirit of humanity we shall be ready to study the question.

We have heard the speeches of Lloyd George and Wilson. They contain certain principles for general world peace to which we also can agree, but where concert [*concrete*] questions come up which are of decisive importance for us and our allies there are fewer signs of a will for peace. Only a victor speaks to the vanquished in such language. Our military situation was never so favorable as at present. Let the Entente bring new proposals. We shall then seriously study them. Lasting peace is impossible unless the integrity of the German Empire is recognized.

Chancellor closed with reference to heroic patience shown by people in enduring privation and with admonition to set aside all differences of opinion. . . .

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/1192a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands*  
(Garrett)<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 25, 1918, 7 p. m.

949. Cable at earliest possible moment comments of German Socialist papers on Hertling's address. Also comments of leading Liberal organs, such as *Frankfurter Zeitung*, *Berliner Tageblatt*, *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*. Cable comments of individual papers as soon as received, without waiting to present full summary. Also, if possible, obtain statement from person mentioned in your cable No. 1880 of January 13<sup>2</sup> on Hertling's address.

POLK

File No. 763.72/8648

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, January 25, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 7 p. m.]

1382. I have just seen a copy of the secret treaty, April 25 [26], 1915, between Italy, France, England and Russia; presume that you

<sup>1</sup> Similar telegram, on the same date, to the Minister in Switzerland, No. 1401 (File No. 763.72119/1192b).

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 26.

have seen it as it appeared in Russia<sup>1</sup> and in the English magazine *New Europe*. It has not been published in Italy nor, I believe, in France. Prime Minister Orlando has gone to England accompanied by Minister of War and Crespi, Food Commissioner to Paris, to seek a reaffirmation of this secret treaty in view of the speeches by the President and Lloyd George. It is reported that Orlando and Sonnino had a stiff quarrel; the latter refused to go to England saying that he had the Allies' written promise and he was against discussing the matter.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1166

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the French  
Ambassador (Jusserand)*

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Referring to the inquiry which Mr. Sartiges of your Embassy telephoned to my office a few days ago, regarding the interpretation of item number 10 in the peace program outlined by the President in his address to Congress on January 8, I hasten to confirm the telephone message with Mr. Sartiges this morning to the effect that the President has replied to an inquiry submitted to him that the statement meant "that we wish the place of the *peoples* of Austria-Hungary safeguarded and assured."

I am [etc.]

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

File No. 763.72119/1177

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

LONDON, January 26, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 11.07 p. m.]

8406. To the Secretary and President:

The British press regards German Chancellor's speech as the voice of Hindenburg to which is added an effort to induce every belligerent to enter into separate negotiations—France about Alsace-Lorraine, the United States about freedom of seas, and so on. Their comments show that they do not regard this speech as bringing peace any nearer. The milder tone of Austrian Foreign Minister is noted but the substance of his speech is thought to show the same guiding hand in Berlin.

PAGE

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 497-500.

File No. 763.72119/1180

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, January 26, 1918.

[Received January 27, 1.45 a. m.]

1942. Wolff's Bureau reports German press comment on Hertling's speech.

*Kölnische Zeitung*: We do not believe Wilson is honest with his peace program. We consider it a trap with which he will mislead his own peace friends and destroy unity in the Quadruple Alliance, but why not put him to the test? We can place our peace program against his and if he is in earnest with the negotiations, he and his allies, he can simply come to the table at which negotiations are going on; our war aims remain the same with this understanding, that they reasonably combine with the map of the world as it is after three and a half years of the most terrible struggle. Our existence as a people can be guaranteed in 1918. Our just vital interests, as from that hour until now had been the only purpose of our struggle, cannot be defended on the terms of map of 1914 simply. Count Czernin has expressed simultaneously in a well thought out and clever speech <sup>1</sup> the needs which arise for Austria from the new situation in the world, for her defense as a great power, and, as is clear with countries so closely allied, they can be fully endorsed by Germany.

*Norddeutsche*: Wilson's fourteen questions got their fourteen answers. Germany's war aims after Hertling's new speech lie open and clear. It had again to be explained to the Allies and the German people after what had taken place recently, that he had not lost his character which had allowed it to come to a struggle of the people and that had caused the great successes. The requirement to make the negotiations and the results of these public must not be addressed to the Central Powers but to the Entente who are only drawn together by dark plans. For Hertling the policy of the Centrals is not the means for achievement of a purpose, but the kernel of our present policy. What was said at commencement of the first year of war, viz.: that we were not imbued with any desire of conquest, that is still of effect; that inviolability of territory is of value for us in the first place, who there yonder have been robbed of colonies, and where in stupid wilfulness it is desired to cut out a piece of our Empire, the people decline this plan with indignation and disgust. Hertling gave a clear explanation of his ideal for the building of a temple of peace. He drafted a sketch of this, just as that approved

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<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 54.

by the Majority of the Reichstag and the German people, by a united Government, and by all who are working for peace. People, Government and Army were never more unanimous, they never have had to rely upon each other in greater measure than in this time of final decision. The Government is helping the people to a peace which they have fought for themselves and which must be won with power by the universal franchise, putting our future out of danger.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/1175

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *January 26, 1918, 7 p. m.*

[Received January 27, 9.36 a. m.]

1949. German private individual closely identified with Government circles in Germany and in sympathy with Moderates states that Hertling and Czernin conferred together before making their speeches; that it was their intention to indicate willingness to continue exchange of views along the lines of Lloyd George's speech and particularly in accordance with President Wilson's message; that in view of the fact that Czernin spoke before public it was considered advisable for him to state this intention more clearly than Hertling and that therefore Czernin's speech should be taken as the clearer statement of the aims of the Central Powers. The informant states that Hertling's position was very strong.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72/8669

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *January 26, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[Received January 27, 6.10 p. m.]

1859. The general strike in Austria which constitutes the most interesting event in the Central Empires during the past ten days received little comment in the German press. The official Austrian telegrams regarding the workmen's movement and the pressure exerted on the Government which appeared in the Danish press were evidently suppressed by the German censor. Their contents however were evidently known to the editorial staffs of the papers. The *Tageblatt* published an account four days old from its Vienna correspondent sketching the events in Austria, which may have been the grounds for its threatened suspension which was however raised



at the last moment. The *Vorwärts* was suppressed for publishing Adler's speech to the Austrian Socialists. But the full effects of the strong stand adopted by the Austrian Social Democracy will probably not show themselves for some time.

It may be of the greatest significance that such full reports concerning the strikes and the negotiations of the Socialists with the Austrian Government were sent out by the Imperial Telegraph Bureau in Vienna and that no attempt has been made officially to minimize their importance. It almost seems as if the Vienna Government instead of endeavoring to conceal and nullify the effects of the movement were anxious to use it as a means of exercising further pressure on Berlin. The refusal of the Germans to allow their ally's official announcements to appear in the German press lends support to this theory.

Furthermore the Vienna *Fremden-blatt's* attack on Bülow, which called forth such particular expressions of indignation from the Pan-Germans that no doubt can exist at whom it was directed, has apparently not been followed by any official or other rectification or denial of its semiofficial nature. As the Austrian Government undoubtedly fears the rumored Pan-German ascendancy in Berlin they might in desperation exploit the popular demand for peace to show the German leaders that Austria was in no condition to follow where they realize such leadership would lead them. With the Austrian Government and people so evidently supporting them the German Moderate forces may be enabled to maintain their position and even to gain some ground, although the recent dismissal of Valentini as chief of the Emperor's civil Cabinet is generally regarded as favorable to the militarists.

In general, the tone of the Socialist press during the last few weeks has been increasingly determined, but whether this is the result of the growing fear of complete militarist domination and a feeling that a strong stand is necessary or from a consciousness of power, it is impossible to say with certainty. In purely internal affairs Prussian electoral reform remains the center of interest. The decision to consider the reactionary "reform" of the Herrenhaus before the universal suffrage bill for the Lower House is a further sign that the Junkers are determined to oppose the Government measure to the utmost. The bitterness of this opposition indicates how greatly they fear the introduction of a popularly elected Lower House. Even though its powers are curtailed in the universal suffrage bill, [it] is evidently doomed to failure. The extent and manner in which the covert Socialist threats of extreme pressure are carried out will serve as an indication of the Socialists' willingness and ability to employ their potential powers of coercion.

[GRANT-SMITH]

File No. 763.72119/1184

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, January 27, 1918.

[Received January 28, 7.24 a. m.]

2513. German press comment on Chancellor's speech.

*Berliner Tageblatt*, 25th: Despite emphatic warning of Pan-Germans, Chancellor discussed Wilson's peace programme in detail. Extremely doubtful, however, whether this discussion will lead to general peace. His statement that Belgium not to be annexed is highly welcome, but regrettable that he modified it by declaring details of question can only be arranged at peace negotiations. His attitude on this question still too hesitating and not sufficiently unequivocal. Czernin's speech<sup>1</sup> undoubtedly great event which perhaps may lead to still more important events. Declarations of Czernin that no opposition of interests between Austria and America and his belief that peace between Vienna and Washington is easiest, lead to conviction that these statements have been made in conjunction with Berlin. Many signs show that especially in the last weeks the desire for war in America has abated; want of coal has caused large retrenchments and prevented equipment of army. Czernin speech [will] strengthen opponents of warlike policy and increase atmosphere of peace. Hertling's speech alone will scarcely conjure up peace, but possible that Czernin may yet lead Hertling thereto.

*Vorwärts*, January 25: Speech of Chancellor might have been world-freeing act if it had clearly stated that behind German expressions of peace desires there lay concealed no egotistic ambitions for power. It has not done this and unfortunately in parts was calculated to increase the enemies' distrust in sincerity of German peace declaration. This is especially true of statements regarding treatment of Poland and Belgium. Right of Russia to have a voice regarding Poland actually recognized in Brest Litovsk negotiations. Lasting Wilson peace can only come if the whole situation is taken as basis and any changes based on general sanction. Regarding Belgium, Chancellor does not even meet desires radical English peace advocates who demand unconditional return. The conditions under which evacuation of occupied French territory is granted will awaken suspicion in enemy; he might at least have declared that no aspirations to annex Longwy and Briey existed. Speech of Chancellor masterwork in finding elastic formulas in which journalists can read what they want, but of such we have had enough. Scheidemann criticism pointed out our mistakes and weakness of speech and millions of the people support him.

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 54.

When enemies are ready for true democratic peace, a permanent peace neither shameful for us or for them, they can count on immense majority of German people which, though it will continue to fight for its rights, wants nothing save peace and what was theirs before war. The existing current must become strong enough to make resistance to it on the part of those in power impossible.

*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 25th: Speeches of Hertling and Czernin leave impression that way to peace is open. However, speech of Chancellor has not brought clarity necessary to thwart reports of annexionistic politicians. We greatly regret this because attempts to force Government into policy of senseless annexations rob us of internal quiet for necessary reorganization at home and support doubts of enemies as to good faith of our peace desires. Hertling preserves hope that it is possible to lead as one all parties of German people and to postpone moment of separation. This is a fatal illusion as he will soon learn. The fact that the German Chancellor and his German [*Austrian*] colleague in Vienna have discussed and found acceptable part of Wilson's programme and have invited a reconsideration of terms will alienate Military Party. Therefore it would have been better to have taken the inevitable step and clearly broken away from this party. Chancellor summarized in three words what Germany expects to gain from the war as a basis of a lasting peace: integrity of the German Empire, security for our vital interests and the honor of our Fatherland. We would have wished that he had spoken more clearly relative to Belgium and occupied portion of France and still more categorically closed door to possibility of annexations. However, our opponents have it in their power to settle once and for all Belgian problem by guaranteeing integrity of territory of Central Powers.

We hope that what Chancellor has said relative Germany's aims will be still more clearly defined in following speeches. The fact remains, however, that the Chancellor holds to a peace of reconciliation. What statesman would have the courage to be responsible for the continuation of the war for possible military success who can obtain a good peace through negotiation? Such a peace we believe to be possible. The two speeches of Thursday strengthen us in this conviction and we believe that after some delay same conviction will be reached in Washington and London.

*Volksstimme*, Mannheim, 25th: Chancellor failed absolutely in two main objects required: first, to counteract excellent impression left on neutrals, English and Entente peoples by speeches of Lloyd George; second, to make that clear declaration regarding Central Powers' war aims absolutely essential for successful defense. Wilson against Entente's propaganda [*programme?*], and necessary to re-



move hindrances to early reconciliation. While speech neither Pan-German nor annexationistic, nor destructive all bridges for possible reconciliation, it is generally weak, and although will scarcely cause much damage it will hardly prove beneficial. Hertling should have briefly and emphatically declared Germany still holds to Reichstag war objects resolution and, while unable accept all of Lloyd George's and Wilson's proposals, finds them sufficient basis for immediate peace negotiations. Such declaration would have forced Entente to peace and caused excellent impression upon German and Austrian people. Such impression not created by Hertling's speech and therefore Social Democrats cannot support Chancellor's policy.

*Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, 25th, states full clarity and precision so necessary after late occurrences Berlin sadly missing in speech. It omits all mention of two opposite camps Germany and gives only idea of official peace policy but all indications point to existence unofficial peace policy with unknown aims. Wilson's speech gives better handle for serious discussion than Lloyd George's, and Chancellor has not closed door for reconciliation if honest desire therefor really exists other side of ocean. Same paper, 26th: Wilson's message showed desire to discover basis for agreement. Chancellor should have formulated answer clearly and promptly. This he has not actually succeeded in accomplishing. The indefiniteness in many of the most important parts of the speech is understandable in view of its antecedents which forced upon it character of compromise as in case of so many earlier official declarations of Chancellors concerning non-annexation Belgium and France. [Omission] Wilson encouraging and we welcome it especially as it will infuriate Pan-German press. However, speech contains no positive statement of war aims or regarding Belgium's future and relations to Germany. Any statesman who would allow such indefiniteness regarding Belgium to shatter peace prospects would undertake more serious responsibility, assuming that Germany's other vital interests are secured.

WILSON

File No. 763.72119/1191

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *January 28, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received 10.41 p. m.]

1961. I learn that Hertling told the Dutch Minister at Berlin in answer to a question that he could not have spoken otherwise than he did [about] Belgium; that public opinion would not let him promise the liberation of Belgium until promises had been made of the restoration of the German colonies.



File No. 763.72119/1222

*The Greek Legation to the Department of State*

[Translation]

No. 94

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Upon examination of the speeches delivered by the President of the United States of America and His Excellency Mr. Lloyd George defining the war aims of the Allies, the Royal Government has the honor to submit to the consideration of the Government of the United States the remarks suggested thereby.

The Royal Government thinks it would be beneficial to let the small Allied states be represented at any meeting of the representatives of the great Allied Powers for the purpose of finally determining the Entente's peace terms or at the very least to give them an opportunity to be heard before those terms are specifically defined.

The Royal Government, standing upon the repeated declarations of the Entente great Powers that they are fighting for the good and freedom of the small nationalities, holds that plain justice demanded that the latter should be allowed to expound the bases of their claims. Some of those nationalities, Serbia and Roumania for instance, have desiderata which on certain points do not accord with those of some of the great Allied Powers. It is, therefore, imperative that the several questions which will lie at the foundation of the peace proposed by the Entente Powers should be jointly discussed by all the parties concerned in order to stave off any cause for future misunderstanding.

With special reference to Greece the Royal Government feels bound to add that she entered the conflict unconditionally. There is more: The double-dealing perfidious policy imposed upon Greece by the fallen régime deprived her of the opportunity to present her standpoint which other states were able to do after entering the war. Greece, relying on her great allies and the policy outlined by them, never had occasion to define it. She feels sure that her national interests will be safeguarded when peace comes. But the Royal Government thinks it ought to be heard so as to define its ideas and national claims that must be settled. The head of the Royal Government, Mr. Venizelos, has always given evidence of great moderation, and the Powers may therefore rest assured that they will have in no wise to deal with demands inconsistent with the principles upon which their policy is based or impossible of realization.

The Royal Government, convinced that the Entente great Powers sincerely desire to bring about a settlement that will insure lasting peace, has no doubt that they will accede to its request for at least a previous hearing.

The Royal Government in any event thinks it necessary to clear a point which the above-mentioned speeches have left in the dark. The uncertainty in which the east Macedonia question remains has created in Greece a suspicion that it is not the Allies' concern. The unofficial explanations offered by the Allied Governments have dispelled that impression but public opinion in Greece is still under the influence of the remark that while the fallen régime secured through Germany's pledge the integrity of Greek territory without any part taken in the war by Greece, her joining in the struggle on the Allies' side might result in sacrificing that national integrity to the advantage of an enemy whose only title is that it will become the Prussia of the East and enthrall, directly or indirectly, the other Balkan peoples.

What would be needed to dispel this uneasy feeling is a declaration that the enemies of the Entente shall be compelled to evacuate Allied territory occupied by them and that the deported inhabitants shall be reinstated in their homes.

The Royal Government further calls attention to the fact that while the non-Turkish population living in Turkey has been given, particularly in Mr. Lloyd George's speech, the assurance that they shall be finally freed from the Ottoman yoke, the Hellenic nationality, numbering several millions, was left out. The Royal Government thinks that plain justice demands such a declaration for it cannot be that general liberation will leave the Greek race, the most ancient one in those parts, alone in bondage to Young Turk nationalism.

The Royal Government is convinced that the Government of the United States, which has constantly repeated its firm decision to guarantee their freedom to the oppressed peoples, will take into earnest consideration the remarks which the Royal Government has the honor to submit to it and which it feels sure will be found to be just and necessary.

WASHINGTON, *January 28, 1918.*

[*Received January 29.*]

File No. 763.72119/1221b

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) <sup>1</sup>*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1918, 8 p. m.*

6383. It has been reported in the press that Count Czernin stated to the Austrian Delegations that the text of his recent speech had already been submitted to President Wilson before being delivered.

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<sup>1</sup>Repeated by circular telegram, on the same date, "for your information and not for communication," to the diplomatic representatives in Denmark, Greece (for paraphrase to the Special Agent at Corfu), the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.

You may informally advise the Government to which you are accredited that there is no foundation whatever for this statement. At the same time you may state that in view of the apparent sensation which the statement is causing in Germany, the Department is not making any comment for publication at the present time. Repeat to Paris, 3117, and Rome, 1050.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1203

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *January 29, 1918, 11 p. m.*

[*Received January 29, 10 p. m.*]

8433. My 8165, January 6, 1 p. m., embodying telegram from Anderson to Harrison.<sup>1</sup> London press of yesterday published a report purporting to be of Vienna origin suggesting that the President was fully informed of the contents of the recent speech delivered by Count Czernin concurrently with Count Hertling's utterance in the Reichstag. This caused something like consternation here. The tone of the London press in presenting this information indicates a belief that Austria is suggesting separate peace negotiations with the United States and that she is not unwilling to have it believed that she has secret means of communication with the United States Government.

Your denial of any foreknowledge of Czernin's speech is noted by London press today without the least appearance of incredulity but it seems to me evident that the Vienna suggestion is based on Anderson's visit and it may well be that Austria is preparing to make use of his communications with Austro-Hungarian statesmen with the desire to create dissension which is never absent from the diplomatic offensive of the Teutonic powers.

The point I chiefly wish to emphasize is that this is regarded here as another move in the German peace offensive and is calculated to create the primary impression that Austria is capable of acting independently of Germany and secondarily that the United States may be disposed to act independently of her cobelligerents which would create consternation among the Entente Powers. An evidence of this may be found in the fact that yesterday's London papers showed surprise and an undercurrent of uneasiness at the Vienna reports and today are engaged in explaining them away with an appearance of relief in which your denial plays a large part.

PAGE

<sup>1</sup>Not printed; see telegram No. 2261, Dec. 19, 1917, from the Chargé in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 478-482.*

File No. 862.00/252

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, January 30, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received January 31, 4 a. m.]

1409. Referring my cables 571<sup>1</sup> and 965<sup>2</sup> in which I reported information given me by Leube, a member of the German Reichstag and prominent in the Socialist Party, I desire to state that Leube again saw me yesterday and gave the following information which I listened to without discussion or comment on my part. While I am confident the German Government is cognizant of his visit to me and all that he said, yet Leube stated, as on his previous visits to me, that he is acting in an entirely unofficial manner. He is unaware that I am cabling you this information, although I clearly inferred his object in seeing me was to get this information to President Wilson.

He stated he voiced the feelings of the Majority of the Reichstag for peace. He felt absolutely sure that peace could be brought about on the basis of *status quo ante bellum* and emphasized that Belgium would have their entire independence so far as Germany was concerned. That Scheidemann in addressing the Reichstag had seriously warned the Government against prolongation of the war, providing such a basis could be arrived at, inasmuch as the Majority of the Reichstag, my informant said, felt that eleven of the fourteen clauses contained in the President's speech could easily be settled, the remaining clauses being debatable. He said that first seven clauses could easily be settled. Regarding clause number 8, Germany would evacuate all French Republic but it was useless to waste a single word on the question of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, inasmuch as all Germany were united in this. Clauses number 9, 10, and 14 would be easy to settle and number 11 also so far as evacuation was concerned. He said that Germany must also have a guarantee that that which belonged to her before the war would be restored, and particularly referred to the German colonies. The contention at present in the mind of Germany was the attitude of England with regard to this latter question.

MORRIS

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 302-303.



File No. 763.72119/1228½

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, January 30, 1918.

[Received January 31.]

2540. Department's 1406, January 28.<sup>1</sup> Czernin said:<sup>2</sup>

It is my duty to give a faithful picture of the peace negotiations, discuss the various phases of the results reached to date, and draw those conclusions which are true, logical and justified. It seems to me above all that those who seem to find the course of the negotiations too slow are not able to have even a slight idea of the difficulties which are naturally met in them everywhere. In what follows I shall describe these difficulties, but would like to point out in advance the cardinal difference between the peace negotiations at Brest Litovsk and all those which ever took place in history.

Never, so far as I know, have peace negotiations taken place in [public] view. It is quite impossible that negotiations which approach the present ones in extent and depth can take their course smoothly and without obstacles from the very beginning. Our task is to build a new world, and rebuild all which this most trying of wars has destroyed and trampled to the ground. The various phases of all peace negotiations which we know have developed more or less behind closed doors, and their results have been told to the world only after the negotiations were completed. All histories teach, and it is easily understood, that the troublesome road of such peace negotiations always leads up and down, that prospects are more favorable some days, less favorable others. But when these various phases, these details of each day are telegraphed to the world, it is quite easily understood they act like electric shocks in the present condition of nervousness which rules in the world, and that they excite public opinion. We were completely aware of the disadvantage of this procedure. Still we immediately gave way to the desire of the Russian Government for publicity, because we wished to show ourselves friendly, and because we have nothing to hide, and also because it might have made a false impression had we insisted on a method of provisional secrecy. But the consequent other [fact] of this complete publicity of negotiations is that the great public, that the country behind the front, and that, above all, the leaders [must] keep their nerves steady. The game must be finished in cold blood and it will come to a good end if the peoples of the Monarchy support its responsible representatives at the peace conference.

In advance let it be said that the basis on which Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly created Russian governments is: No compensations nor annexations. That is the program which I stated briefly to those who wanted [me to] speak about peace after my nomination as Minister, which I have repeated to the Russian people

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; instructing the Chargé to transmit Czernin's speech of Jan. 24, 1918.

<sup>2</sup> For readability the necessary articles and connectives have been inserted in the telegraphic text.

in power on their first offer of peace, and from which I will not deviate. Those who believe I can be crowded off the road which I purpose to go are bad psychologists. I have never let the public be in doubt as to the road which I go, and I have never allowed myself to be crowded from this road a hair's breadth either to right or left. Since then I have become the undisputed darling of the Pan-Germans and those in the Monarchy who imitate the Pan-Germans. At the same time I am calumniated as an inciter to war by those who want peace at any price, of which innumerable letters are proof. Neither has ever troubled me. On the contrary, these double insults are my only amusement in these hard times. I declare once more I demand not a square [foot] nor a penny from Russia, and if Russia, as it seems to do, puts itself on that point of view also, peace will be made. Those who want peace at any price might have doubts as to my nonannexationist purposes towards Russia if I did not tell them with the same inconsiderate openness that I shall never allow myself to make a peace which transcends the form I have just sketched. Should our Russian fellow peacemakers demand the cession of territory from us, or indemnity, I should continue the war despite the desire for peace which I have as well as you, or would resign if I could not make my view prevail.

Having said this in advance, and I emphasize it once more, that there is no reason for the pessimistic view that peace will fail, since the negotiating committees have agreed on the basis of no annexations nor contributions—and only new instructions [from the] various Russian governments, or their disappearance, could change this basis—I now proceed to [the two] greatest difficulties which contain reasons why the negotiations are not progressing as rapidly as we all should like.

The first difficulty is that we are not treating with one Russian peacemaker, but with various newly created Russian governments, which have not clearly defined among themselves their spheres of competency. The governments in question are, [firstly, that] part of Russia which is led by St. Petersburg; secondly, our own new neighboring state, great Ukraina; thirdly, Finland; and fourthly, the Caucasus. With the first two states we treat directly, with the two others now only more or less indirectly, because they have to date sent no negotiators to Brest Litovsk. These four Russian fellow peacemakers are met by us four Powers, and the case of the Caucasus, in which we naturally have no difficulties to remove, but which is in conflict with Turkey, shows the extent of the subjects of discussion.

What interests us especially and chiefly is the newly created great state which will be our neighbor in future, Ukraina. We have gotten very far in our negotiations with this delegation. We have agreed on the above-mentioned basis of no annexations nor compensations, and have agreed that and how commercial relations with the newly created republic are to be reestablished. But this very example of Ukraina shows one of the ruling difficulties. While the Ukrainian Republic holds the view that it has the right to treat with us quite autonomously and independently, the Russian delegation stands on the basis that the boundaries of its country and those of Ukraina have not been definitely fixed, and St. Petersburg con-

sequently has a right to participate in our negotiations with Ukraina, a view which the gentlemen of the Ukrainian delegation do not care to agree with. But this troubled situation of domestic conditions in Russia was the cause of enormous delay. We had overcome these difficulties also and I believed that negotiations which were to be taken up in a few days would find the road clear here.

We want nothing at all of Poland, the boundaries of which have not been definitely settled. Poland's people shall choose their own destiny, free and uninfluenced. I consider the form of popular decision of this question not especially important; the surer it reflects the general will of the people, the more I shall be pleased. For I desire only voluntary union on the part of Poland, and only in the desire of Poland in this matter do I see a guarantee of lasting harmony. I hold irrevocably to the point of view that the Polish question must not delay the conclusion of peace by a single day. Should Poland seek close relationship with us after the conclusion of peace, we shall not refuse; but the Polish question shall and will not endanger peace. I should have liked to see the Polish Government take part in the negotiations, for according to my opinion Poland is an independent state. The Petersburg Government, however, thinks the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak in the name of the country and failed to recognize it as a competent exponent of the country. Therefore we desisted from our intention in order not to create possible conflict. The question is certainly important, but more important for us is the removal of all obstacles which delay the conclusion of peace.

The second difficulty which we encounter and which found the greatest echo in the press is the difference of opinion between [our] German ally and the St. Petersburg Government in the matter of interpretation of the right of the Russian nations to determine their own destinies—that is, those territories occupied by German troops. Germany holds the point of view that it does not intend to make forcible territorial acquisitions from Russia, but, to express it in a few words, the difference of opinion is a double one. First, Germany holds justified the point of view that the numerous expressions of desire for independence by legislative bodies, communal bodies, etc., in the occupied provinces should be considered as a provisional basis for popular opinion which would be tested later by a plebiscite on a broad basis. The Russian Government is now opposed to this point of view, since it cannot recognize the right of existing organizations in Courland and Lithuania to speak in the name of these provinces [any more than the] Polish ones. The second difficulty is that Russia demands that the plebiscite should take place after all German troops and administrative organs have vacated the occupied provinces; while Germany contends that by such an evacuation, [carried] through to its extreme consequence, a vacuum would have been created, which undoubtedly would bring about the outbreak of complete anarchy and greatest misery. Here it must be explained that everything which today allows political life in occupied provinces is German property. The railways, posts, telegraphs, all industries and administrative parts of police and justice are in German hands. The sudden withdrawal of these parts would indeed create a condition which does not seem practically tenable. In both ques-



tions we must find compromises. The difference between these two points of view is, in my opinion, not big enough to justify the failure of negotiations. But such negotiations cannot be completed over night. They take time.

Once we have reached peace with Russia a general peace cannot long be prevented, [in my] opinion, despite all efforts of Entente statesmen. We have held it was not understood [in some] places why I declared in my first speech after the resumption of negotiations that it was now not a question of general peace but of a separate peace with Russia in Brest Litovsk. That was a necessary statement of clear fact which Trotsky has inevitably recognized and was necessary because we were treating on a different basis, that is, in more limited scope, when the question was one of separate peace with Russia rather than general peace. Although I have no illusions that the effort for general peace will mature over night, I am still convinced that it is maturing and that it is only a question of our holding through whether we are to have a general honorable peace or not.

I have been strengthened in this view by the peace offer which the President of the United States of America has made. To the whole world this is a peace offer, for in his fourteen points Mr. Wilson develops the basis on which he attempts to bring about general peace. It is evident that no such offer can be an elaboration acceptable in all details. Should this be the case, negotiations would be unnecessary, for then peace might be made by simple acceptance—by a simple yes and amen. That, of course, is not the case. But I do not hesitate to say I find in the last proposals of President Wilson a considerable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and among his proposals are some to which we can agree with great pleasure.

If I shall now be allowed to discuss these proposals in greater detail I must say two things in advance: As far as these proposals relate to our allies—and in them there is mention of the German holding of Belgium, of the Turkish Empire—I declare that, faithful to the duties of the alliance which I have accepted, I am determined to go to the very extreme in defense of our allies. The state of the property of our allies before the war we shall defend as our own. This is the point of view of the Allies in complete reciprocity. Secondly, I should say I must refuse politely but definitely any advice as to how we must govern our interior. We have a Parliament in Austria elected by common, equal, direct and secret suffrage. There is no more democratic parliament on earth, and this Parliament, in conjunction with other constitutionally authorized factors, alone has the right to decide the internal affairs of Austria. I speak only of Austria because I am speaking in the Austrian Delegation and not about the internal affairs of the Hungarian state. I should not consider that constitutional. We do not interfere in American affairs, and we wish as little foreign guardianship by any other state.

Having said this in advance, I allow myself to answer the remaining points as follows. I have nothing to say on the point which discusses abolishing secret diplomacy and complete publicity of negotiations. As for the question of publicity of negotiations,



nothing can be said against this method from my point of view, as far as it is based on complete reciprocity, although I have serious doubts whether it is always the most practical and the quickest way to reach results. Diplomatic treaties are nothing but business affairs. I can easily think of cases, for instance, when commercial treaties are being made between states, without its being desirable that incomplete results should be told to the whole world beforehand. In such negotiations both sides naturally begin by making as large as possible demands and by using one desire after another as compensation until that balance of interest is present which must be reached to make the conclusion of a treaty possible. Should such negotiations be conducted before the great public, it could not be avoided that the public should passionately take sides for every single one of the desires; whereupon the renouncing of such a desire, even if made only for tactical reasons, would be considered a defeat. Should the public take sides especially strongly for one desideratum, then the conclusion of the treaty might become impossible, or the treaty, should it be concluded, might be felt as a defeat perhaps on both sides. This would not further peaceful relations but [would increase the] points of friction between states. [But what is valid for commercial treaties] would be as valid for political ones which treat of political business. If abolishing secret diplomacy means there are to be no secret treaties, that treaties shall not be made without the knowledge of the public, I have nothing to say against the realization of this principle. How the realization of this principle and its safeguard is to be considered I know not. When the governments of two states agree, they will always be able to make secret treaties without anyone discovering it. But those are minor points. I do not stick to formulas and will never be responsible for the failure of a reasonable arrangement because of more less [*meaningless?*] formalities. We can therefore discuss point 1.

Point 2 relates to freedom of the seas. In this postulate, the President has spoken from the heart of all, and I subscribe to this desire of America's completely, especially because the President adds the clause, "outside territorial waters," that is, freedom of the open sea; but I cannot subscribe to the violation of the sovereign rights [of our] faithful Turkish ally. Its point of view on this question will be ours.

Point 3, definitely against future economic war, is so just and so reasonable and has been so often demanded by us that I have nothing to add to it.

Point 4, demanding general disarmament, explains in especially good and clear style the necessity of forcing free competition in armaments after the war to the point which the domestic safety of states demands. Wilson explains this clearly. I permitted myself to develop the same a few months ago in a Budapest speech. It is a part of my political creed, and every voice which speaks in the same sense I gratefully greet.

As far as the Russian reference is concerned we are proving with deeds that we are ready to create a friendly, neighborly relationship.

As far as Italy, Serbia, Roumania, Montenegro are concerned, I can only repeat the point of view which I have expressed already in the Hungarian Delegation. I refuse to figure as surety for enemy

war adventures. I refuse to make one-sided concessions to our enemies who remain stubbornly on the point of view of battle to final victory—concessions which would lastingly prejudice the Monarchy and give immeasurable advantage to our enemies and drag the war out to an infinite period. I trust Mr. Wilson will use the great influence he doubtless has on all his allies to the end that they may explain the conditions under which they are willing to negotiate; and he will have gained the immeasurable merit of having called the general peace conference to life. Just as openly, freely, as I am here replying to President Wilson, I will also speak to all those who desire to speak for themselves; but it is quite comprehensible that time and the continuation of the war cannot remain without influence on relations in this connection. I said this once before, and may refer to Italy as an example. Italy had the opportunity before the war to attain great territorial acquisitions without a shot. This it refused, entered the war, lost hundreds of thousands of dead, billions in war costs and destroyed values, brought upon its population misery and need, and all this only for advantages which it could have had once but which are now lost forever.

Regarding point 13, it is an open secret that we are supporters of the idea that there must be an "independent Polish state which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations." Regarding this I am also of the opinion that we could soon reach an agreement with Mr. Wilson.

Nor will the President find anywhere in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy any opposition to his proposal regarding the idea of a league of nations.

As may be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr. Wilson, we agree not only on the great principles in general, according to which the world is to be newly regulated after the end of this war, but our views also approach each other on several concrete peace questions. The remaining differences do not seem to me so great that discussion of this point should not bring clearness and *rapprochement*. This situation, which probably arises from the fact that Austria-Hungary and the United States of America are the two great Powers among the two groups of enemy states whose interests least conflict, suggests the thought that an exchange of ideas between these two Powers might be the starting point for conciliatory discussions between all states which have not entered into peace conversations. So much for Wilson's propositions.

WILSON

File No. 763.72119/1215

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *January 30, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received January 31, 10.41 a. m.*]

1974. Your 949, January 25, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Person mentioned in my 1880, January 13, 4 p. m. [*a. m.*],<sup>2</sup> in commenting on Hertling's

<sup>1</sup>*Ante*, p. 42.

<sup>2</sup>*Ante*, p. 26.

speech stated that Hertling was unable to make a more definite declaration as to Belgium. Although Reichstag Majority is convinced of necessity of restoring Belgium as an independent state, it does not feel that a declaration would be advisable at the present time as it might be taken as an indication of weakness and as it might merely pave the way to further demands from the side of the Entente. He says that such a declaration regarding Belgium, [notwithstanding] healing process which would ensue, could only be made by a great leader such as Germany does not possess at the present moment.

He again emphasizes what he pretends to consider the futility of public statements and says that if the United States really wishes to know if peace is possible it should designate some American who enjoys the confidence of both Governments to converse informally and secretly with a corresponding German so that each Government may receive first hand information as to the *bona fides* of the other. He claims that a willingness on Germany's part to appoint such an individual has been shown many times so that now a response from the opposite side is in order.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72/8713

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, January 31, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received February 1, 5.40 a. m.]

1393. Press declares that Orlando's visit to London entirely satisfactory, Orlando says same. The Paris conference, however, was called on the initiative of Lloyd George who telegraphed calling it as soon as he knew that Orlando was on the way to England. I hear on good authority Lloyd George satisfied Orlando, telling him that one does not go into details in public speeches but that England does not repudiate treaties.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/8155

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, January 31, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received February 2, 5.25 a.m.]

2544. Professor Lammasch of Vienna now in Zurich. Department doubtless familiar with his personality. He has been a devoted



adherent of the idea of a democratized Austria based on confederation of autonomous units, each unit comprising one racial group. In other words, an adherent of the ideas stated in my 1476, August 21,<sup>1</sup> noon, outlining Professor Foerster's interview with Emperor Charles. Recommend Department reread that telegram. Lammasch has charged Baron Jong, Dutch pacifist, to deliver following message to Professor George D. Herron, urging that it be brought to the attention of President Wilson. Lammasch confined to his bed in Zurich with heart trouble so unable to deliver message in person. Message follows:

In August last, Emperor Charles offered Premier[ship] to Lammasch but latter refused saying that time was not ripe to put his ideas into execution. Emperor has again urged on Lammasch that he accept task of forming a cabinet. Latter stated that he could only accept under the explicit condition that Austria should not negotiate for peace through Prussia but should make a separate peace. The Emperor unreservedly accepted these conditions. The only thing which prevents Lammasch's immediate acceptance [is] present condition of his health.

Lammasch has just received telegram from Meinel in Vienna (see my 2363, January 7, 9 p. m.<sup>2</sup>) stating that if President Wilson will make any public recognition of Czernin speech in addressing Senate or by any other means, commenting favorably on its tone, it can be counted on with absolute certainty that Austria will continue as follows: (1) She will make peremptory demands on Germany to change tone of Hertling's address. (2) If Germany refuses to do this, Austria is prepared to break with Germany and make a separate peace with the Allies, through American [mediation].

Jong reports that Lammasch instructed him to tell Herron:

You may assure Herron that what you have told him of Meinel's telegram is absolutely worthy of credence. While we do not trust Czernin absolutely we do trust the Monarch, who is prepared to grant all demands of Democratic Party and is prepared to break with Germany if latter refuses to make [peace] on basis President Wilson's message. You can go the full length of pledging me to Herron. Do entreat him to get this to President Wilson for if he does it will save democracy in Europe.

Jong also reports that Lammasch states to him that what Meinel could put in a telegram was only one-tenth of the real truth and that

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see despatch No. 1319, Aug. 27, 1917, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 201-205.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



real truth went infinitely beyond what would pass the censor. When questioned on details Jong indicated that there were two parties in Vienna: one represented by Lammasch with the views above indicated, and the other the reactionary court party including diplomatists and Government officers. The Emperor is prepared to throw over all his former associates and cast in his lot with a nation founded on consent of the governed.

In this connection it seems advisable to report that during the past three days Count Pálffy, member of Austrian Legation, has made repeated and determined efforts to get into conference with Herron and latter has consistently refused to, as he considered, as I do, inadvisable to get in touch with diplomats of enemy nation accredited here. It seems possible that Pálffy, member of aristocracy, has heard some hint of this matter and is endeavoring to ascertain what it amounts to.

When the strength of tradition and the influence of his education are considered, what the Emperor proposes to do seems almost unbelievable. That he, a young man, should cut loose from the German-Austrian circles who have always [depended] on the strength of Germany to maintain their [predominance] and reach out over them to rest his power [on the] consent of the people, would demand a [breadth of] view and a strength of character which would [make] me skeptical of the whole matter were it not that it [is coupled with] a man of such undoubted integrity as Lammasch.

In view of the prevailing uneasiness in Italy since President's message, I suggest that if it appears advisable that the President should make any public declaration in sense indicated, France and England be consulted and assurances given and steps taken in advance to convince Italian Government of our good faith towards her in this proceeding. From members of French Embassy here and well-informed Swiss it appears possible that if Italy should hear without warning of any negotiations between America and Austria she might be tempted to hurriedly conclude a separate agreement with the latter power.

Lammasch is arranging for personal interview in a discreet way with Herron as soon as former's health permits, in order confirm this matter from his own lips.

Does Department authorize me to inform French and British chiefs of mission of foregoing?

WILSON

Third Session of the Supreme War Council, January 30–February 2: Discussion of the Use of American Troops—Public Statement of the Allied Premiers Denouncing the Enemy Peace Program—Objection by the United States to Collective Pronouncements by the Supreme War Council—Unofficial Conversations on Peace between Professor Herron and a Bulgarian Emissary

File No. 763.72Su/11

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 1, 6.45 a. m.]

3117. For Secretary of State and Colonel House:

Frazier reports to me as follows:

Yesterday the Supreme War Council sat, the French, British and Italian Prime Ministers being present as well as the French and British commanders-in-chief and their 'chiefs of staff, the Italian Minister of War and the four military representatives including General Bliss. The plan of campaign for 1918 was the subject of the discussion. The French Prime Minister, being chairman, called upon General Foch, General Robertson, General Bliss, General Cadorna, Sir Douglas Haig, and General Pétain to express their views. They were unanimous in believing that an expectant attitude should be maintained, which however should not exclude the possibility of counteroffensives at well chosen points. General Foch, General Pétain, General Haig agreed that the American Army, if taken as an autonomous unit, could not be counted upon for effective aid during the present year, and that the only method of rendering them useful at the earliest possible moment would be by amalgamating American regiments or battalions in French or British divisions. General Pétain was particularly outspoken on this subject.

The Italian Prime Minister stated that in his opinion the Council should request General Bliss to state whether the American Government would or would not be willing to accept this system of amalgamation. The British Prime Minister objected that before putting this question it was essential to know the number of combatants which each of the four nations concerned could muster, the number of reserves and the amount of heavy and light artillery. He thought that each commander-in-chief or chief of staff should also make an estimate of the number of combatants and reserves which the Central Powers could [count on]. He said before making this calculation it was necessary that the four commanders-in-chief agree upon a definition of the word "combatant".

The meeting thereupon adjourned to be resumed at 3 o'clock today.

SHARP

File No. 763.728a/12

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *January 31, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[*Received February 1, 8.18 a. m.*]

3118. For Secretary of State and Colonel House:

Frazier reports to me as follows:

At a meeting held between General Robertson and General Pershing yesterday at Versailles General Pershing made the following objections to General Robertson's plan of sending to France by British shipping 150 battalions of infantry for service in British divisions on the western front:

- (1) The national sentiment of the United States opposed to service under foreign flag.
- (2) Probability that such action by the United States might excite serious political opposition to the administration in conducting the war.
- (3) The certainty that it would be used by German propagandists to incite public opinion against the war.
- (4) It would dissipate the effort of the American Army as well as its direction.
- (5) The danger differences in national characteristics and military training of soldiers, with consequent failure of entire cooperation, would undoubtedly lead to frequent [difficulties] and eventual misunderstanding between both countries.
- (6) Additional man power could be provided as quickly on the western front by some plan not entailing amalgamation.

General Pershing thereupon made the following counter-proposition which would use the available tonnage for bringing over the personnel of entire American divisions to Europe:

- (1) That the infantry and auxiliary troops of these divisions be trained with British divisions by battalions or by some plan to be mutually agreed upon.
- (2) Artillery to be trained by using French material as at present but under American direction.
- (3) That the staff officers and higher commanders be detailed with corresponding units of the British Army for training and experience.
- (4) That those battalions after sufficient training be reformed as regiments and that after complete training of the artillery all units comprising each division be united for service under their own officers.
- (5) That plan above mentioned be carried out without interfering with plans now in operation for transporting American forces to France.

- (6) That the questions of supply be arranged with our advice in concert with American and British commanders-in-chief.
- (7) That the questions of equipment and arms be decided in an analogous manner.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1219

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, January 30, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received February 1, 11.33 a. m.]

2536. Department's 1301, January 5.<sup>1</sup> I requested Professor George D. Herron to get in touch with Theodore K. Shipkoff. Herron complied and has now furnished me comprehensive report of his conversations with Shipkoff, submitted in my despatch 2282, January 28.<sup>2</sup>

Shipkoff declares America must not declare war on Bulgaria because of sentimental reasons which make Bulgaria younger sister of America through influence Robert College.

Shipkoff sketched economic conditions concerning increasing grasp of Germany and that Bulgaria looks to America for deliverance this menace. He makes most severe arraignment of Germany and states that German soldiery treat land occupied by Bulgaria as conquered territory. They have stripped Bulgarian Dobrudja as clean as if they were a swarm of locusts; therefore, Bulgaria fears German influence. Bulgaria has gained enormously in recent trade with Turkey. She now sees herself and not Germany as potential economic and ultimate political master of the region between Constantinople and Bagdad. Shipkoff therefore proposes, and lets it be understood that he is speaking the mind of his King and Government, that the Allies through America's persuasion shall make Bulgaria bulwark against German expansion towards Asia Minor.

He states that Hungary is potentially ready to join Bulgaria in making this wall against Germany. His country and Hungary are natural allies and could effect an alliance which would result both in democratization of Hungary and the walling-in of Germany.

For Bulgaria the war is now over. She has obtained all she went to war for with the exception of small Servian corner which she could occupy without dispute if Germans were out of the way. If she can come to a confidential understanding with the Allies through America's mediation she will not again fire a gun during the war

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 2, *ante*, p. 3.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



except in defense. She will not attack Salonica. She prefers Allies do not evacuate city as she does not want Germany to get a foothold there. France and England may withdraw their troops leaving only twenty or thirty thousand and Bulgaria will not attack it nor Greeks nor Servia. She cannot disband her army for then she would be invaded by Germany and attacked by Greeks and Servians. He stated, "Bulgaria cannot formally or technically make a separate peace but she will fulfill the substantial conditions of a separate peace if she can somehow obtain the assurance that America will not declare war against her."

Shipkoff declares that if Bulgaria can enter into this unwritten though actual peace now the Balkans will be hers in fifteen years without future war. Bulgaria regards herself as only competent and virile power in Balkans. She has a mission to organize and civilize. Her present territorial claims granted, she would soon by her vigor and sagacity absorb the Servians and Greeks in a Bulgarian confederacy which would take in all the Balkans.

Shipkoff then explained that this greater Bulgaria, blockading the path of Germany into Asia and possessing itself unlimited fields of exploitation, would be due to America's previous missionary activities and America's present and future financial favor. Bulgaria would open the doors to a new and boundless investment of American capital. Greater Bulgaria would be virtually "a grateful and willing American protectorate."

Shipkoff explained that although he comes in no official capacity technically speaking, he none the less comes as friend of his King and Government and is prepared to receive confidential communications or to carry on confidential negotiations, going back and forth to Sofia for the purpose. He adds that the more or less indefinite proposals of Bulgaria as outlined here are substantially authoritative.

Although it is not included in Herron's written statement, he informed me orally that Shipkoff had pointed out that if Bulgaria adopted this attitude of actual although unacknowledged separate peace, Turkey could not hold out because German aid could not reach her.

While Herron believes that great strategic advantage might accrue from negotiations, we would fatally compromise our reputation and purity of motives and that we could only enter such negotiations if we were under tremendous delusion as to Bulgaria's motives and banners [*sic*].

In spite of the nature of the proposals I do not feel that the United States is excluded from giving the matter serious consideration since proposals appear to be directed against our enemy and that of civilization, or from endeavoring to harmonize them with the interests of our allies.

Suggest possibility discussion with Great Britain feasibility of promising Bulgaria British aid in cooperating with Bulgaria to obtain Adrianople and adjacent territory, which Bulgarians have always claimed, as compensation for that part of Servia which she now occupies.

Have I Department's authorization to give a copy of Herron's report to British Minister in view of information contained in my telegram 2339 of January 2, 5 p. m.? <sup>1</sup>

WILSON

File No. 763.72119/1203

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>2</sup>  
[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1918, noon.

6403. Your secret 8433 <sup>3</sup> and Department's 6383.<sup>4</sup> Endeavor to ascertain confidentially whether British Government entertains any apprehension that this Government might have communications or even enter into conversations about peace with one or other of the Central Empires without the knowledge of the Allies. If so, you should informally express the distress felt by this Government that such a thing should be thought possible by editors and others.<sup>5</sup>

For your confidential information. Anderson upon reaching Berne telegraphed full report to the Department.<sup>6</sup> Copies were at that time communicated to the British and French Ambassadors here for the confidential information of their Governments.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup>*Ante*, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>The first paragraph, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, also to the Ambassadors in France (No. 3130) and Italy (No. 1056), with the introductory clause: "Referring to press reports purporting to be of Vienna origin suggesting that the President was fully informed of the contents of the recent speech delivered by Count Czernin and to the denial by this Government of any foreknowledge of what he was going to say."

<sup>3</sup>*Ante*, p. 52.

<sup>4</sup>*Ante*, p. 51.

<sup>5</sup>Answered by the Ambassador in telegram No. 8494, Feb. 4: "Mr. Balfour perfectly understands and feels no apprehension." (File No. 763.72119/1232.)

<sup>6</sup>See telegram No. 2261, Dec. 19, 1917, from the Chargé in Switzerland, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 478-482.

File No. 763.72119/1227

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 1, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received February 2, 10.45 p. m.]

2554. Monsignor Marchetti, Papal representative in Switzerland, called and urged strongly that President Wilson make some answer Czernin's speech. He pointed out that belligerents were infinitely nearer in accord than six weeks ago and that any statement from the President would tend to still further lessen the distance. In reply to my inquiry [Marchetti] stated that if the President took such action the Pope would undoubtedly use his influence on Hertling through Pacelli, Papal Nuncio in Munich, to persuade Chancellor that German Government must change attitude before peace could be accomplished.

WILSON

File No. 763.72/8729

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, February 2, 1918.

[Received February 3, 2.19 a. m.]

1995. German press comment.

Mannheim *Volksstimme*: Strike movement gains greatly throughout Germany. Mannheim and Ludwigshafen strikers from all around ammunition factories held orderly mass meetings, elected committee, passed resolution for early peace without annexations or indemnities on basis right of self-determination of peoples, admission of labor representatives all countries to peace negotiations, better distribution of food by seizure of all supplies, working classes giving up their special allowances, removal of state of siege and re-establishment of right of association, protection of female and juvenile workers, cessation of military [interference] with the labor unions, removal of military control over industrial plants, immediate release all political offenders, and thorough democratization of government in Germany, firstly by introduction universal suffrage for all men and women over 20 in Prussia. Number of strikers is certainly much greater than *bourgeoise* press dares to admit.

Chemnitz *Volksstimme*, 31st: We do not hesitate to say we deeply regret strike at this time but fault lies with those who have mocked at just demands and hopes of German working classes while they were bleeding for country. The only way out lies in wise concessions, not in stubborn resistance to strikers' demands; inflexibility might possibly enable Government to quell strike by force

temporarily but it is certain that violence will only provoke violence and that uncompromising attitude towards workers' demands is surest way to break completely Germany's powers of resistance. We Socialists know this and we say with all possible earnestness to Government, you are playing with fire and if conflagration breaks out responsibility falls on you and not on us who counselled reason in time and unmistakable terms. We have been doing this necessarily every day for three years. Will our voice be heard in the eleventh hour?

*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 31st: The movement remains perfectly quiet but it is extending to new cities and has not subsided in Berlin. Question is what Government is doing. We read of commanding generals exercising their almighty [powers], but of political Government we learn merely of refusal to receive labor delegates but of no positive action. What is needed is a cool head and avoidance of provocative talk or action. The attitude of the Majority Socialists should not be hastily condemned; they did not make the strike and we must await positive action by them before we can see for what purpose and with what success they have participated. Why cannot the Government find some way committing itself in convincing form to peace of understanding and internal reform? This would be best way to prevent all misunderstanding of strike movement and stop with strike itself its alarming and regrettable effect on our adversaries.

*Germania*, 1st: Government is fully justified in refusing to receive strikers' delegation for they have no authority to speak in name of German people and do not enjoy sympathy of wide circles. Neutral attitude of trade unions will immediately change to hostility if strikers permit themselves to lose their heads, which happily has not taken place heretofore except in isolated instances. From whatever standpoint the movement is considered it appears senseless blow in the air and this is reason why attitude of Socialist Party is so displeasing to *bourgeois* circles; however, reports of new political constellation as result are probably premature and sensational. We, for our part, do not believe Socialists will permit it to come to break.

*Tageblatt*, 1st: Refusal of Home Secretary to receive strikers' delegates for merely formal reasons is unintelligible, for everything must be avoided by both sides which would tend to accentuate crisis. Socialist and labor leaders however would make grave mistake not to accept Government's offer in *Norddeutsche* to bury the hatchet. The strike movement must be concluded as soon as possible, order and quiet must return and those who have influence on strikers must not hesitate a moment to do their part to bury the hatchet.

*Lokal-anzeiger*, 1st: Allied propaganda committee was formed at Washington January 1 and has at disposal \$150,000,000. Senator



Stone, Northcliffe and Reading are members. Object is revolutionary propaganda in countries Central Powers, especially Germany. Prisoners of war with revolutionary views are to be utilized, likewise German-speaking neutrals. These enemy agents are sent to Germany with forged papers, well supplied with money to carry on propaganda in ammunition factories, etc. High rewards are offered for sabotage, explosions, etc. Campaign is to be helped by pamphlets in Germany to be smuggled across frontier. It is significant that Entente countries now have many more consular officers in neutral countries than ever before, many being posted in unimportant points. Propaganda offices are to be organized at The Hague, Zurich and Copenhagen; funds are supplied by American Government.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72Su/13½

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 2, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received February 3, 11.27 a. m.]

3135. Frazier reports to me as follows:

At the final meeting of the Supreme War Council today the French, British and Italian Prime Ministers drafted the following statement of the labors of the conference for simultaneous publication in Paris, London and Rome on Monday the 4th instant, but not to be released before:

The Supreme War Council gave the most careful consideration to the recent utterances of the German Chancellor and of the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs but was unable to find in them any real approximation to the moderate conditions laid down by all the Allied Governments. This conviction was only deepened by the impression made by the contrast between the professed idealistic aims with which the Central Powers entered upon the present negotiations at Brest-Litovsk and the now openly disclosed plans of conquest and spoliation. Under the circumstances the Supreme War Council decided that the only immediate task before them lay in the prosecution with the utmost vigor and in the closest and most effective cooperation of the military effort of the Allies until such time as the pressure of that effort shall have brought about in the enemy Governments and peoples a change of temper which would justify the hope of the conclusion of peace on terms which would not involve the abandonment in the face of an aggressive and unrepentant militarism of all the principles of freedom, justice and the respect for the law of nations which the Allies are resolved to vindicate.

The decisions taken by the Supreme War Council in pursuance of this conclusion embraced not only the general military policy to be carried out by the Allies in all the principal theaters of war,

but more particularly the closer and more effective coordination, under the Council, of all the efforts of the powers engaged in the struggle against the Central Powers. The functions of the Council itself were enlarged, and the principles of unity of policy and action, initiated at Rapallo in November last,<sup>1</sup> received still further concrete and practical development. On all these questions a complete agreement was arrived at, after the fullest discussion with regard both to the policy to be pursued and to the measures for execution.

The Allies are united in heart and will, not by any hidden designs, but by their open resolve to defend civilization against an unscrupulous and brutal attempt at domination. This unanimity, confirmed by a unanimity not less complete both as regards the military policy to be pursued and as regards the measures needed for its execution, will enable them to meet the violence of the enemy's onset with firm and quiet confidence, with the utmost energy and with the knowledge that neither their strength nor their steadfastness can be shaken.

The splendid soldiers of our free democracies have won their place in history by their immeasurable valor. Their magnificent heroism, and the no less noble endurance with which our civilian populations are bearing their daily burden of trial and suffering, testify to the strength of those principles of freedom which will crown the military success of the Allies with the glory of a great moral triumph.

SHARP

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File No. 763.72119/8170

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 3, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received (February 4?) 3 a. m.]

2567. I am preparing important and long telegram supplementing my 2544, January 31, 4 p. m.<sup>2</sup> I venture to suggest that President withhold any contemplated answer to Czernin until its receipt.<sup>3</sup>

WILSON

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File No. 763.72119/8155

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 4, 1918, 2 p. m.

1449. Your 2544, January 31, 4 p. m. Withhold this information from French and British chiefs of mission.

POLK

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 306-307.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 60.

<sup>3</sup> The ensuing telegrams summarizing Professor Herron's account of his conversations with Lammasch are not printed; instead, the complete report rendered by pouch is inserted *post*, p. 82, in the order of date of receipt of the last of the series of telegrams, Feb. 7, 9.43 a. m.

File No. 763.72/8767

*The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*

No. 5438

LONDON, *January 19, 1918.*[*Received February 5.*]

SIR: I have the honor to bring to the attention of the Department the enclosed speech of the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, delivered on January 18 at the Central Hall, Westminster, before 350 delegates representing labor organizations, and assembled for conference with the Minister of National Service, as reported in the *Morning Post*.

The most interesting feature of this meeting was the questioning of the Prime Minister by various delegates who enquired closely with respect to the "freedom of the seas" and other questions of present importance.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT P. SKINNER

[Enclosure]

*Address of the British Prime Minister (Lloyd George) before the Trade Union Conference at London, January 18, 1918*

I am sure you will be pleased to hear that I do not propose to make a long speech, but I have come here to thank you on behalf of the Government, and, I venture to say, to thank you on behalf of the country for the spirit in which you have met the Government and its representatives—a spirit of complete frankness on both sides. That is the best way to do business—that we should speak quite openly and sincerely and frankly to each other whatever is in our minds. It is the only way to clear misunderstandings, and that is why I shall be very happy when I sit down to answer any question which you choose to put to me on any question of general policy. I had rather questions of detail in reference to the Bill should be left in the much more competent hands of my colleague Sir Auckland Geddes. I understand that the procedure with regard to the constitution of groups in these conferences was adopted by the Conference itself, and the procedure was a fair, a rational, and an equitable one, and we have adhered to it strictly without any deviation.

With regard to the proposals of the Government let me say this at the outset as to the method. There are no other alternatives for obtaining men except either raising the military age, as they have done in Austria, where it is 55, or sending wounded men back and back again into the battle line. Those are the alternatives. Now, I want to deal with the question of urgency. As to the urgency of the need, no man standing—like my colleagues and myself—on the watch-tower can deny it. Unless the need had been urgent we



should not have brought forward this demand now. There are men in this country who honestly believe we ought to have done it months ago. There are men in this country who honestly believe we ought to do it on a much more sweeping scale. There are a few who say we ought not to do it at all, and there are some who say both things simultaneously. (Laughter.) The Government view is this: It would be folly to withdraw men from industries one hour sooner than the need arose. On the other hand, it would be treason to the State, treason to our country, treason to democracy, treason to the cause of freedom if, when the need did arise, we had not made the demand. (Cheers.) What is the position? I assume that you all here in your hearts believe that the war aims declared by the great Labour Conference represent the minimum of justice which you can possibly accept as a settlement of this terrible dispute—the minimum. If we are not able to defeat the German forces, if we are not able to resist the military power of Prussia, is there any man here in possession of his wits who believes that one of your terms—the least of them—would be enforced? (Cheers.) I am not talking about the demands of imperialists. I am not talking about the demands of extreme war men, who want to grab everything and annex the earth and all the heavenly firmament. I am talking of the moderate demands of the most pacifist souls in this assembly. Go to Von Hindenburg with them. Try to cash that cheque at the Hindenburg Bank. It will be returned dishonoured. Whatever terms are set forward by any pacifist orator in these lands—you will not get them cashed by Ludendorff or the Kaiser or any of these great magnates—not one of them—unless you have got the power to enforce them. (Cheers.)

I felt very strongly that the time had come for restating our war aims, and for restating them in a way that would carry with us all the moderate, rational opinion of this land and of all other lands. And almost simultaneously the same idea came to President Wilson, and without any opportunity of previous consultation—because there was none—President Wilson and myself laid down what was substantially the same programme of demands for the termination of this war. How has that programme been received? Throughout the whole of the Allied countries it has been received with acclaim. There has hardly been the voice of criticism except from a few men who wish I had made more extreme demands. The Socialists of France, the Socialists of Italy, as well as the Socialists of this country have, in the main, accepted them as very fair general demands to put forward. What has been the reception in Germany? I beg you to consider this: especially those who think that we are responsible for perpetuating this horror. I would not have this war for a



second on my soul if I could stop it honourably. What has been the reception in Germany? The only comment has been "Behold, how England is weakening! Go on, and they will come down again." There has been no response from any man in any position in Germany that indicates a desire on the part of the ruling powers in that land to approach the problem in a spirit of equity. We demanded the restoration of Belgium. Is there one man here who would make peace without the complete restoration of Belgium and reparation for its wrongs? ("No!") Is there one man? ("No!") I would like to see him stand up. Is there one man who would do it? What is the answer from Germany? There has been but one answer, and it came from Von Tirpitz's soul—"Never!" There was a demand for a reconsideration of the wrong of Alsace-Lorraine. What is the answer from Germany? "Never!" When I suggested that Mesopotamia and Palestine should never be restored to the tyranny of the Turk, whatever else happened to it, what was the answer of Germany? "We will go on until they are restored." Is there a single condition laid down by you in your Trade Union aims to which you have had any response from anybody in Germany who has got any authority to speak? Not one.

I will tell you another fact which is very significant. There has been no civilian answer at all. ("Hear, hear!") I spoke here a fortnight ago. President Wilson's speech was delivered a few days after that. Both speeches have been thoroughly discussed in the German papers. But no civilian Minister has said a word. There have been conferences hurriedly called together. Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff were brought back from their armies in a great hurry to Berlin, but Herr Kühlmann has not been allowed to speak. Why? If it means anything it means this: that the Prussian military power is dominant. The answer which is to be given to civilisation is an answer which will be given from the cannon's mouth. Do not let us harbour any delusions. It would be a mistake to do it. Let us talk quite freely here among ourselves. You might as well stop fighting unless you are going to do it well. If you are not going to do it with all your might it is real murder of gallant fellows who have stood there for three years. ("Hear, hear!") Unless we are going to do it well let us stop it. There is no alternative. You have either got to put your whole strength into it, or just do what is done in the Russian Army, and tell those brave fellows that they can go home whenever they like, and that no one will stop them. There is no other alternative. Believe me, if there are men who say that they will not go into the trenches, then the men who are in the trenches have a right to say: "Neither will we remain here." ("Hear, hear!") Supposing that they did it, would

that bring the war to an end? Yes, it would. But what sort of an end? When the Russian soldiers ceased fighting and fraternised and simply talked great ideals and principles to the German Army, what did the Germans do? Did they retreat? No, they took Riga and the islands. The fraternisation did not prevent them from marching forward, and if Petrograd had been nearer they would have had that too. The Channel ports are not so far from the fighting line, and unless we are prepared to stand up to the whole might of the people who are dominating Germany now, and will dominate the world to-morrow, if we allow them, you will find that Britain and British democracy and French democracy and the democracy of Europe will be at the mercy of the cruellest military autocracy that the world has ever seen.

Now, I should like to ask you this. I have suggested it before. If we were not prepared to fight, what sort of terms do you think we would get from General Hindenburg? If you sent a delegation to him I know the answer. If you said to him: "We want you to clear out of Belgium," I know his answer. He would just mock you. He would say in his heart: "You cannot turn me out of Belgium with trade union resolutions." No, but I will tell you the answer which you can give him. "We can and will turn you out of Belgium with trade union guns and trade unionists behind them." (Cheers.) They have broken his line already, and if we endure with the spirit of our fathers and the spirit that has made the greatness of this land, that has made its power, its prestige, and its honour, that has made it great in the past, and that will make it greater in the future—if we do that we shall yet be able to carry to conviction, carry to triumph, carry to reality, carry as an essential part of the story of this world, the great aims that you in your own language, that the Government in their language, and that President Wilson in his noble language have been proclaiming in the last few days. But let us harbour no delusions. We must take the world as it is, and the story of democracy is this. No democracy has ever long survived the failure of its adherents to be ready to die for it—"Hear, hear!"—and my appeal to you is this. Last night this measure was carried in the House of Commons without a dissentient voice. ("Hear, hear!") What is democracy? Democracy, put into plain terms, is Government by the majority of the people. ("Hear, hear!") If one profession, one trade, one section, or one class in a community claims to be immune from obligations which are imposed upon the rest, that is a fundamental travesty of the principles of democracy. (Cheers.) That is setting up a new aristocracy. You and I in the past have been fighting against privilege. I hope that we shall be fighting on the same side again. We are fighting now

against the privilege claimed by a military caste. Democracy, if it means anything, must mean that the people of all classes, all sections, all trades, and all professions must merge their privileges and their rights in the common stock. ("And wealth!") Certainly. Now what I want to say in conclusion is this: If any man standing in my place can find an honourable, equitable, just way out of this conflict without fighting it through, for Heaven's sake let him tell me. My own conviction is this, the people must either go on or go under. (Cheers.)

At the conclusion of the Prime Minister's speech, questions were invited.

A delegate asked if the Prime Minister did not think it was advisable to enter into negotiations with the Germans when they were alleged to be whining and squealing for peace. ↗

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The Germans have always been ready for peace at their own price, but that is not a price we are prepared to pay them. We have not been prepared to pay it in the past, and we are not prepared to pay it now. That, I am confident, is the opinion of the people of this country. The moment the Germans show a disposition to negotiate peace on equitable terms—the terms have been stated and they are terms which the Labour Party itself in substance adopted—then there will be no reluctance to enter into peace negotiations.

A DELEGATE: Is not the best way to get at the opinion of the German people to allow representatives of this nation to meet representatives of the other Powers at Stockholm or elsewhere?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The representatives of the German nation would, of course, be chosen by the German Government. (A DELEGATE: Not necessarily.) Believe me, do not let us really deceive ourselves with a delusion. You can only make peace with a government. If the Government does not represent the people of Germany let them change their Government, and if this Government does not represent the people in this country they can change it. (A DELEGATE: Give us an opportunity.) We have given you the best opportunity that has been given for a long time, because this Government has introduced a franchise bill which added eight millions to the electorate. You can have your opportunity any time you like. It is not the Government which shrinks from it. (A DELEGATE: On the new register?) The new register is not ready. How can you have an election on a new register which is not ready? You must either have your election on an old register or a new register. The new register is not ready. Do you want your election on the old? (A DELEGATE: No.) Very well.



THE DELEGATE: If the German people decide upon a similar government to that which is now in existence in Russia, will this Government recognise their representatives?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: We will recognise the representatives of any government set up by the German people whatever it is.

A DELEGATE: Has the Government any objection to representatives of working class organisations taking part in an international meeting apart from governments altogether, and, if so, what are the objections?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I have already stated those objections in the House of Commons. It has been a matter for discussion. It has first of all been a matter for discussion between the various countries, and they came to the conclusion unanimously that, in their judgment, whatever negotiations are conducted must be conducted between the representatives of the governments in each country. That is the view which was taken by President Wilson, who certainly represents the greatest democracy in the world. It was the view taken by the French democracy. Those two great Republics took that view. Italy took that view, and we took that view. We do not believe that negotiations ought to be conducted between sections of the people. Here, again, it is a fundamental misconception of democracy that any section, however powerful, really represents the whole of the people. Whoever goes there to speak and to negotiate must represent the whole of the country and not merely a part of it.

A DELEGATE: Do I understand the Prime Minister to state that the acceptance of the Allies' terms of peace is a necessary condition of calling a peace conference, or am I to understand that it is the function of the peace conference to receive a statement of peace from each of the belligerents, and from those statements to plan a policy or scheme that all countries can listen to and give a decision upon?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It is a very difficult problem for any government to decide the moment at which it is desirable to enter into a peace conference. You may enter into it at one moment and find you have put your head into a noose. That is a position which the responsible heads of the governments in all these countries will have to consider very carefully. My own personal view is that it is not desirable to enter into a peace conference until you see that there is a fair chance of emerging out of it with a satisfactory settlement. I am firmly convinced from the attitude of the leaders of the German Government at the present moment that if you entered a peace conference it would not result in anything like an equitable understand-



ing. In that case it would aggravate matters instead of improving them.

A DELEGATE: In view of the admitted influence which the statement of the Blackpool conference and the subsequent statement of Labour war aims has had here upon the Government's war aims cannot we reasonably conjecture that if the Labour forces of this country were allowed to confer with the Labour and Socialist forces of Germany, together with those of other belligerent and neutral powers, it is reasonable to assume that similar pressure will be exerted by the Socialists and trade unionists of Germany to modify Government policy there? As Mr. Lloyd George said that we cannot expect that Ludendorff and Hindenburg will cash the cheque written by the Labour Party, cannot we reasonably expect that if they will not cash our cheque, Scheidemann and Liebknecht will?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Herr Liebknecht has been put in gaol. That is what happened to his attempt to cash peace cheques in Germany, and I rather guess that Herr Scheidemann will find himself in the same place if he attempts a similar operation. The first thing the Socialists of Germany have to do is to impose their terms on their Government. Mr. Williams seems to think he has imposed his terms on this Government. Let Herr Scheidemann do the same thing in Germany and then we might discuss terms.

A DELEGATE: I want to ask a different question of general interest. In President Wilson's speech there is a reference made to the freedom of the seas. I want to ask if the views expressed by President Wilson are the views of our Government, or if not, will the Prime Minister kindly let us know what are the views of the British Government on this expression of President Wilson's?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I want to know what freedom of the seas means. Does it mean freedom from submarines, and does it mean starvation for this country? After all, we are in a very different position from America or Germany or France or any other continental country. We are an island, and we must scrutinise with the very greatest care any proposal which might impair our ability to protect our lines of communication across the seas. Freedom of the seas is a very elastic term. There is a sense in which we would rejoice to accept it, but we must guard very carefully against any attempt to interfere with the capacity to protect our shores and our shipping that has alone enabled us even to exist up to the present moment.

A DELEGATE: Will the Prime Minister state, in view of the declared unanimity of the Allies with the war aims of this Government, that

steps will be taken to consolidate those respective war aims of America and the Allies in order to present a unified front to the Germans?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I think there is a good deal to be said for that suggestion. We did hope to be able to do it at the great conference in Paris which was held about two months ago. Representatives of the Russian Government were coming over, but accidents happened to them meanwhile. The Government was turned out of office, and there was a period of anarchy and confusion there, and civil war, and at the time the conference was held we had no one there to speak on behalf of Russia. It was quite impossible to attempt to co-ordinate the war aims of the Allies without having representatives of the Russian Government present, and that was the reason we did not enter upon the discussion. A good many of our difficulties arose from the demands which had been put forward by previous Russian Governments. Constantinople was a case in point. We could not have dropped Constantinople as a war aim without the assent of the Russian Government. I agree with our friend that if there were any doubt at all about the war aims of the Allies which have been stated by President Wilson and myself it would be desirable that we should meet, but so far we have had nothing but complete assent.

A DELEGATE: Will the Prime Minister briefly explain what he means by the reconsideration of the position of Alsace-Lorraine?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I stated the view of the Government, I think, quite clearly last time. My view is that the people of this country will stand by the people of France. It is a question for them to decide. You must remember this is really not a question of territory to them. It has been a question of vital principle. It has been like an open sore in their side for nearly fifty years. They have never been able to live in peace during the whole of that time, and their view undoubtedly is that you cannot have peace in France until you have settled this question once and forever, and if you cannot have peace for France you won't have peace in Europe, and you must settle this question unless you are going to have a series of wars in Europe. Therefore our view is that the people of France, who are primarily concerned, are the people who have to determine what they regard as fair, and in this respect the determination of the Government is to stand by the democracy of France in their struggles.

A DELEGATE: Is it the people of France or the people of Alsace-Lorraine who are complaining of how they are situated?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: The people of Alsace-Lorraine have never ceased to complain, but you must remember what has happened

there. A very considerable proportion of the population of Alsace-Lorraine have been forcibly expropriated by the Germans. Some of them have been driven out of the country, and if you take the real population of Alsace-Lorraine there is absolutely no doubt at all that the overwhelming mass of them are in favour of being restored to the French flag. Allow me to recall a personal incident. I remember once crossing over the Vosges into Alsace-Lorraine. It was late at night, and we stopped at a little inn on the French side. Just a mile or two beyond was the German frontier, and the old people who kept the inn told us that every Sunday working people and peasants came from the German side over to the French side merely in order to spend Sunday under the French flag.

A DELEGATE: Will the Prime Minister give an immediate undertaking that in the event of the terms of settlement being arrived at as indicated by him, compulsory military service in this country will be immediately withdrawn?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: It is my hope, and that is really what we are fighting for, that we will establish conditions that will make compulsory service unnecessary not merely in this country but in every country. Unless we succeed in establishing those conditions I personally shall not feel that we have achieved one of the most important of our war aims. We want to make this sort of thing impossible again ever. It is not a question of whether you are going to stop it in this country. You must stop it in other countries—otherwise you cannot stop it here. We must defend ourselves here, and the first thing for us to do is to put an end to militarism throughout the world.

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File No. 763.72119/1215

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands  
(Garrett)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1918, 8 p. m.

972. Your 1974, January 30, 5 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The person mentioned in your despatch [telegram] No. 1880, January 13, 4 p. m. [a. m.],<sup>2</sup> apparently is now speaking not as a representative of a group of German Liberals, but as an informal representative of the German Government. You should make it perfectly clear to him that the Government of the United States under no circumstances will enter into secret negotiations of any sort with representatives of the German Government, that the Government of the United States has

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<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 59.

<sup>2</sup>Ante, p. 26.

no secret purposes or desires, that the aims of the United States will be stated only in public by the President.

Department believes it is not only useless but also dangerous for you to have any further conversations with individual mentioned unless he frankly states that he does not represent German Government but simply reflects the views of a group of German Liberals. . . .

POLK

File No. 763.72Su/17b

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 5, 1918, 9 p. m.

3149. For Frazier:

(5) Your 3134, February 2, 8 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> indicates to Department that British, French and Italian Prime Ministers do not fully understand that the United States Government has no diplomatic or political representative on War Council and that General Bliss's function is purely military. Department's impression in this respect is confirmed by your 3135, February 2, 11 a. m.,<sup>2</sup> containing statement authorized for publication by Supreme War Council. This statement begins, "The Supreme War Council gave the most careful consideration to the recent utterance, etc." What must have been meant was that the British, French and Italian Prime Ministers gave the most careful consideration, etc. Further, the text of the official statement of the Conference states prominently that "Mr. A. H. Frazier, First Secretary of the United States Embassy at Paris, was present during the political discussions." No mention was made of the capacity in which you were present.

Department is most particular that in future it be clearly understood that you attend the meetings of the Council simply for the purpose of reporting its proceedings, but with no voice in the political discussions. You should make it very clear to the members of the Council that this Government objects to the publication by the Supreme War Council of any statement of a political character which carries with it the inference that the United States Government, on account of your presence and the presence of General Bliss, has been consulted and approves of such statement. You should point out to the members of the Council that statements issued by the Supreme War Council, upon which the United States Government has a military representative, naturally carry the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 70.



inference that they are issued with the approval of the United States Government. The United States Government objects to the issuance of such statements by the Council as may in any way be considered political unless either (1) the text of the statement is first referred to the President for his approval or (2) it is expressly stated in the statement that it is made upon the authority of France, England and Italy and that it has not been submitted to the Government of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

POLK

File No. 763.72119/8180

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 6, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received February 7, 3.11 a. m.]

2583. Department's 1449, February 4, 2 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Subsequent to my 2544, January 31, 4 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> I learned indirectly that both British and French missions suspected proposed meeting. In order to keep confidence of chiefs those missions I felt it necessary to inform them, in strict confidence, that unofficial meeting was to take place for sole object of listening to anything he<sup>4</sup> might have to say. They have not been informed detailed results thereof. May I at least inform them that matter being discussed with their Governments from Washington?

WILSON

The Herron-Lammasch Conversations, February 3-4

File No. 763.72119/1437

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

No. 2356

BERNE, February 8, 1918.

[Received March 7.]

SIR: In order that the Department may have a picture as complete as possible of the conversations between Professor Lammasch and Professor George D. Herron reported in my various telegrams between January 31 and February 6,<sup>5</sup> together with the circumstances surrounding these conversations, I have the honor to report herewith the events from the beginning in detail.

<sup>1</sup> See also telegram to the Ambassador, No. 3197, Feb. 18, *post*, p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 71.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 60.

<sup>4</sup> Doctor Lammasch.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed; see footnote 2, *ante*, p. 71.

As was doubtless the case in all neutral countries, after the delivery of Count Czernin's speech and his direct address to President Wilson, the atmosphere in Switzerland was electric with rumors and discussion of the probability either of further steps being taken by Austria through diplomatic channels or special agents, or of similar steps being taken by the United States. Persons who had or were supposed to have connection with this Legation were carefully watched and every movement discussed, and every important visitor who arrived from the Central Powers increased the tension.

On or about January 25 it was learned that a meeting of important Catholic members of the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary, together with certain dignitaries of the Church from those countries, was to be held in Zurich for the discussion of questions which peculiarly affected Catholic interests. The names mentioned in this connection were Dr. Lammasch, the Hungarian prelate from Budapest, Giesswein, and Erzberger, most prominent member of the Centrum Party of the Reichstag.

It is unnecessary to give the Department information concerning Dr. Lammasch, as his reputation as an expert on international law is well known. I believe, however, that it is due to Dr. Herron to explain that he has been forced into this matter, and that his prominence in this connection comes through no desire or effort of his own. Before the war Dr. Herron was an intimate friend of Professor Foerster of Munich, and of many other persons prominent in intellectual life in the Central Powers. He was known and trusted by them so that, while America was still neutral, it was most natural that when any of these men came to Switzerland, they called on Dr. Herron in Geneva to discuss international matters as seen through their eyes and to obtain from him the point of view with which America regarded the European cataclysm. The publication by Dr. Herron of his book entitled *Woodrow Wilson and the World's Peace*, and the distribution of this book in Switzerland and Germany, led people to believe that he was an intimate friend of the President and in close and continual touch with him. When America entered the war, therefore, members of the various committees, with which Geneva is crowded, representing the subject races, called on Dr. Herron to explain the aspirations of the different units and to beg him to use his influence with the President to recognize their separate causes. The Department will remember that in August last the Legation reported by telegraph a conversation of Professor Foerster, reporting an interview which he had just had with Emperor Charles in Vienna.<sup>1</sup> This conversation was held with Dr. Herron. Professor Foerster returned to Vienna sub-

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 201-205.

sequently, having been much impressed with Dr. Herron's personality and views, [and] spoke of him to Dr. Lammasch, which rendered it natural that when the latter desired to deliver a message directly to the President without treating with a neutral or Allied diplomat he should turn to Dr. Herron as a means of transmission.

The series of events opened on January 28 when Baron de Jong van Beek en Donk (erroneously spelled "Jongh" in former telegrams), formerly Director of the Ministry of Justice in Holland and at present General Secretary of the Association for a Durable Peace, called at the Legation. In my absence at the moment he was received by Mr. Dulles, Second Secretary, to whom he showed a telegram from Vienna despatched by Kommerzialrat Meinl, concerning whom the Department is already informed. The telegram reads in translation as follows:

Please bring it about that my friends [*sic*] in Geneva report immediately on the basis of my personal assurance that the offer is entirely sincere and in earnest, and that a speedy answer to Vienna on the part of Herron's chief would have an extraordinarily happy effect. Acknowledge the receipt of this telegram. Meinl.

The telegram needs some explanation; the "friend" referred to is Dr. Herron, the "offer" is Czernin's speech, and "Herron's chief" is naturally President Wilson. Mr. Dulles asked Baron Jong what he thought of Meinl and was informed that Meinl was a personal friend of the Emperor and generally understood to be a political opponent of Czernin's. Dr. Jong felt that this latter fact made his statement in regard to Czernin's message of especial weight. A copy of the telegram was retained in the Legation.

(It seems advisable to report here an event that occurred some days later in the Swiss Foreign Office in a conversation with Mr. Parravicini, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs. The latter suddenly asked me whether I knew Baron Jong van Beek en Donk, to which I replied that he had called at the Legation, but that I was out and had not met him. Mr. Parravicini then informed me that Baron Jong had declared that he had been commissioned by the Legation to obtain certain information from Austria-Hungary. Mr. Parravicini added that it was not an espionage case, but that the information which he declared he was trying to obtain for the Legation related to political matters. I replied that the Legation had given Baron Jong no such commission and I could not understand his making such a declaration.)

On the afternoon of the following day, Tuesday the 29th, Dr. Herron telephoned me from Geneva and informed me in a guarded way that Baron Jong had given him a message of great interest, and that he, Dr. Herron, would reach Berne on Thursday evening, the



31st, for a meeting concerning which he would give me the details on arrival.

On the succeeding day, the 30th, Colonel Godson, the military attaché, informed me that he had learned from Colonel Pageot, the military attaché of the French Embassy, that he had heard that a meeting was under discussion between Professor Herron and Professor Lammasch, and he urged upon Colonel Godson to insist on the utmost discretion in this matter as public opinion in Italy was in an extremely nervous state in view of the political tension. That the British service was also aware of this matter I also learned, since on reaching Geneva on Tuesday, the 29th, Baron Jong had shown the telegram above quoted and discussed the possible meeting with Dr. Herron in the presence of Commander Whitall and Mr. Edwards, special agents of the British Government.

On Thursday evening, the 31st, Dr. Herron reported to me the results of a series of conversations with Baron Jong, of which I informed the Department in my telegram No. 2544.<sup>1</sup> Baron Jong was presumably acting as the mouthpiece of Professor Lammasch, who at that time was confined to his bed in Zurich. The rough outlines of the plan which was subsequently developed in detail by Lammasch himself were then reported, and the principles for which the Emperor and Dr. Lammasch stood in Austria-Hungary. He also reported the distrust with which the Emperor and Professor Lammasch regarded Czernin, and spoke of the Emperor's offer to Lammasch of the premiership, but was apparently mistaken in declaring that the latter intended to accept this post.

I have already mentioned to the Department in my telegram above cited the incident of Count Pálffy's desire to be put in touch with Dr. Herron, as it is highly probable that his sudden and persistent efforts were not unrelated to the principal matter in hand. Professor Herron was acquainted with a Mr. Rudolf Kommer, an Austrian of supposedly liberal views, correspondent for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, and formerly correspondent of the *New York Evening Post*. Mr. Kommer informed Dr. Herron that Count Pálffy was anxious to make his acquaintance and urged Dr. Herron to meet him, as it would give Dr. Herron the opportunity of interpreting to a responsible and intelligent Austrian the ideals which actuated President Wilson. Dr. Herron provisionally refused this request, as he did not feel that it was appropriate or discreet that he should have any connection whatever with a member of the Austrian Legation regularly assigned to this country. In a subsequent conversation I informed Dr. Herron that I was in full accord with his position in this

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<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 60.



matter, and I sincerely hoped that he would maintain this attitude. On the 27th of January Mr. Kommer, however, sent a telegram from Berne to Geneva, informing Dr. Herron that he and Count Pálffy would call that evening, as the matter was of the utmost importance. Dr. Herron requested a Swiss friend to meet them and reiterate courteously his refusal to receive them. Count Pálffy and Mr. Kommer spent the night in Geneva and made repeated efforts on the following day to persuade Dr. Herron both by telephone and through third persons to receive them.

Mr. York-Steiner, who is known to any members of the staff of the former American Embassy in Vienna who may be in Washington, called on the 2d of February on business connected with the sale of Austrian ships to Phelps Brothers of New York through the agency of Ferruccio Schiavon of Lucerne. Mr. York-Steiner is one of the directors of the Austro-Amerikana Line. In conversation with Mr. Dulles, Mr. York-Steiner, who had on previous occasions stated that he was a personal friend of Lammasch and who had also brought to the Legation's attention that Dr. Lammasch was then in Switzerland, inquired whether I would see Professor Lammasch. Mr. Dulles replied that this was a matter which he could not discuss. Mr. York-Steiner then inquired who Dr. Herron was, thereby showing that he too had some knowledge that a meeting was contemplated between Professor Lammasch and Dr. Herron. Mr. Dulles replied that Professor Herron was a personal friend of mine, whose opinions were valued, that he was a man of discretion, but that he had no official position or any connection with the United States Government.

After describing Baron Jong's report of Professor Lammasch's views, Professor Herron informed me on the same Thursday night that a meeting had been arranged at Professor Lammasch's request, so that there could be no question in the mind of President Wilson that the message was not authentic or accurate, so that Professor Lammasch with his own lips could give a thorough statement of the Emperor's beliefs. The place of meeting was to be in the *château* of a friend of Dr. Lammasch, a German named Von Muehlon, in Château Hofgut in the town of Guemlingen [*Gümligen*], near Berne. I have subsequently made discreet inquiries in regard to Von Muehlon and find that he is recognized by all who know him as a man of most unusual personality and capabilities. All who come in contact with him are impressed with his clearness of mind and purity of faith and belief in the future of a regenerated Germany. He is apparently a man who started with no advantages, and entirely by his own ability became one of the directors of Krupp, and then, with the whole German world open before him, still in his youth, gave it all up for his conviction that Germany was profoundly wrong in this struggle and a menace to civilization.

Some days before these events a man resembling Dr. Herron was knocked down in front of Dr. Herron's house, his papers were rifled as he lay unconscious, and the assailants fled without stealing anything. The attack was obviously an attempt against Professor Herron, who has been for months past shadowed in his every move. It was therefore clear that in as momentous a matter as this, which the Pan-Germans would have such tremendous interest in interrupting, all precautions must be taken to insure Dr. Herron's safety both in coming from Geneva and in visiting Guemlingen. It was therefore arranged that an interned British sergeant should accompany him from his house in Geneva to the house of his father-in-law in Berne, where he passed Saturday night. The sergeant acted as guard through the entire trip, although dressed in civilian clothes. In order to avoid all risks in proceeding to Guemlingen, the military attaché and Lieutenant Dewald, both armed, accompanied Dr. Herron in my automobile, which had been closed to prevent the recognition of any of these persons. Professor Herron got out at the door, the other two did not descend, so that there was no risk of their being seen. The car then continued and returned some three hours later and brought Dr. Herron back to his father-in-law's house.

Professor Herron returned on Sunday afternoon from his interview, and I requested him to give me a statement of what passed in the presence of a stenographer, so that I might be able to report the matter as completely as possible. I have already sent to the Department in my despatch No. 2321, of February 4,<sup>1</sup> the verbatim copy of this report. In order to make this document complete, the report is again inserted.

When I got home, so as to try to be sure that I wouldn't forget anything, I made some notes from memory so as to get everything. So I will just follow these because I have got it here in consecutive order.

Well, to begin with, I made it perfectly clear to Lammasch that I had no kind of official mandate, either actual or implied; that he must have that perfectly clear; that I had come at his invitation because he was a friend of a special friend of mine, Professor Foerster; that we wanted to talk it over. Of course he replied then as a matter of courtesy that he had no official mandate, which he proceeded to disprove right away. He told me just how he had come solely for the purpose of this interview. The Emperor, urged on by the Empress, was getting more and more anxious for a change, and they wanted to find some way of getting a confidential message through to President Wilson that would not be known by Germany or, naturally, their other allies. So, not going into details, Professor Foerster is a very generous and loyal friend, and has spoken often about me in an exaggerated way, and so they concluded that the thing to do was to get the interview with me. Of course it is all

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

helped by this irrepressible rumor that I have told you about. So that this actually is directly what the Emperor wants to get through confidentially to President Wilson, and Secretary Lansing, of course, and by as narrow a channel as possible so as few as possible shall know of it.

This interview began with the fate of the world hanging on building some kind of a bridge between Vienna and Washington, and considering the way to build that bridge. I told him then that it was best for him to talk and make all of his propositions and let me get clearly before me just what he had to propose, or, as he assured me over and over again, that he was really speaking as the Emperor, and then I would say whatever I felt I could say afterwards. So I simply listened to his presentment of the case.

First—as to Czernin's message. He said quite frankly that Czernin was not to be trusted; that Czernin, although he wanted to be liberal in a sense, had no less the Prussian mentality, and was under the influence of Prussia; and that the Emperor personally forced Czernin to make that speech, and also exacted from him a promise that the speech should be transmitted formally to President Wilson from Austria. It was so started and Germany stopped it. Didn't permit it to go out. Germany never told them so, but they know. I said that I only knew what was said yesterday in the papers; that Secretary Lansing said it had not officially reached them. He said he was afraid not, and that Germany didn't probably transmit it. The only possible way to transmit it was through Holland or Denmark, or up that way, and Germany failed to transmit it that way. The Emperor told Czernin very flatly that he must make that speech or resign and give way to somebody that would make it. The speech was a pale and halting presentation of the way the Emperor wanted himself to have it said. It was a case of *force majeure*. So much for that point.

I brought in there the question about the possibility of his forming a Ministry himself in case some kind of an understanding, or some kind of a preliminary understanding, were effected with Washington. He said—no, he wouldn't do that under the circumstances; the difficulties would be too great, but he would probably become Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if the new order of things came. He said that he was personally well acquainted with Secretary Lansing.

Next, getting more definite. The whole heart of the Emperor is in effecting a great change in the constitution of the Monarchy, in getting extricated from Prussian hegemony, and in getting a reorientation, especially with America. He said that the Emperor is honest in this and determined in it, and that he is especially backed up by the Empress, whom he describes as extraordinarily clever and forcible.

The plan which Professor Lammasch has worked out with the Emperor then is this: That first President Wilson would make a public address of some kind in recognition of Czernin's address as indicating some sort of preparedness on the part of Austria toward peace. He can address whomever he pleases—the Senate, a labor union, or the high heavens, so long as he makes a public recognition. Then the next move would be that the Emperor himself would write a long letter to the Pope, at the same time publishing the letter to the



world, in which he would set forth as far as he can under existing circumstances (you will see later what those circumstances are) the desire for the integration and separate development of the people within the bounds of the Austrian Monarchy. He would have to say this in principle rather than geographic details.

Second. The desire for mutual disarmament and the society of nations, exactly as proposed by President Wilson, with the additional statement that if the peace congress would begin with these principles instead of the geographic details, then the questions of the old frontiers would lose their significance and would be easier for arrangement. That is, if the society of nations should be established, and the principle of disarmament agreed upon, every people everywhere, throughout the world, or at least within the society of nations, should have the right of choice of self-government, or at least autonomy. If the principle were made so that it included, well for instance, by implication, Ireland as well as the Irredenta, then it didn't become so important as to what particular governmental center the different groups of people belong. That if they would begin with these principles, then the questions of Alsace-Lorraine, of the Irredenta and all other questions would be easier of negotiation. You can see that there is plenty of room for illusion there, but I am only reporting the Emperor's proposition which he would include in the proposition to the Pope. That would be the second part of the plan.

Then follows Professor Lammasch's scheme for the new Austria which is to integrate, to put together, all the different peoples of Austria, each in separate states. He would group all the Yugo-Slavs that are in the bounds of the Austrian Empire into a new state. That includes Croatia, Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, into one single state. I know what your questions are. And he would group all the Poles into another state; the Austrians into another state; Transylvania into another; the Magyars or Hungarians strictly speaking into another state; the Italians left within the bounds of the Empire into a province, into an independent province, making Trieste an international port, something like the old free cities.

But this new Austria cannot be created by virtue of any power that the Emperor, or Professor Lammasch or their friends now possess. America must help us to do this. How? As a preface to his answer to "How", we, and I am always speaking of "we" as "Austria", have two great enemies. They are the Magyars, the Hungarians proper, who dominate the whole Empire and whose power is so great that we can do nothing. Our second great enemy, I think maybe equal enemy, is Prussia, who because of our internal situation establishes practically a hegemony over us. America must save us from these two enemies. But how? By making it the explicit requirement or condition of peace that Austria shall give integration and autonomy to all the existing national groups within the boundaries of the Austrian Empire.

I naturally said—But this is quite in contradiction to Czernin. Do you mean to say that you would permit us to dictate as to the internal construction of your Empire? His reply was extraordinary:—We will not only permit you, we beg you. The Emperor will embrace you. I could hardly believe my own ears. Then



follows next: If America will make those explicit conditions of peace to us, we will accept them. We will then confront Germany with the demand that she make peace, and that we accept those conditions. Germany dare not refuse. Of course, I naturally said, What if Germany refuses? First, Germany dare not refuse, and here came out a secret which he remembered very well but probably wanted me to infer it. If Germany refuses, Bavaria and Württemberg and all South Germany will refuse and join us, and, therefore, Germany dare not refuse. It will result in the instant breaking up of Germany. Still, I pressed the question—if she does? Then as a last resort Austria will separate and make her own peace.

He asked me then—of course, this was two hours long and I am giving you the naked outline—he asked me then for a frank reply to all this, and I said, of course, you understand I only express my personal opinion, but it is now half past twelve o'clock and we have been together more than two hours, and I would prefer to think over this over night, Professor Lammasch, before I should tell you what I personally think, and then it is getting late and you are tired and ought to rest, and immediately he said, then we will arrange tomorrow for the same hour, if you will, and to that I agreed. He said the house was at our disposal.

Having finished his actual statement of what Lammasch proposed, Professor Herron continued and gave me an outline of his impressions of the speaker and of the Emperor as reflected by Dr. Lammasch, and of how the proposal appealed to him, coming as he did fresh from its effects.

Now going on from there. I don't feel that I can stop here even now. I must say what I think while it is on my mind, because I wouldn't want to have the responsibility of reporting and presenting all this without, however worthless it might be, saying how it appears to me. I must do that, because you see I gather this from the whole trend of everything. First of all, Austria is not playing Germany's game. Of that I am sure. I am sure that she is trying to use America to get free of Germany. On the other hand she is playing Austria's game, and playing it for all she is worth. Secondly, she is playing the Pope's game. Behind all this nationality conversation that comes out, and he used the expression two or three times—a dream of the young Emperor encouraged in every way by the Pope to restore again in a modernized form the Holy Roman Empire. That I saw as of that the whole pattern was being woven, and I saw it all.

Now Professor Lammasch himself has the motive of: (1) to save Austria; (2) he has a very paternal feeling toward his pupil, toward the young Emperor personally. And that enters into it much more than an outlook upon the condition of the world as a whole so far as Professor Lammasch personally is concerned. That is a kind of a parenthesis.

Now going on again into the Emperor's dream. He sees that the old order passeth, and that whatever the future is it must be by some sort of seizure of the new order. He sometimes used to me the words of the Emperor. I was forced to feel this even though

I wanted to feel something else. I went searching for a door as for hidden treasure. My whole attitude was of one wanting to see a door through which a possibility of building a bridge could be seen. But the whole attitude of the Emperor and even of Professor Lammasch, if you submit it to any kind of searching analysis, is that of wanting to capture and use the new order, and not to serve the new order. There is as much difference between the two as between heaven and hell, or black and white. It is the old method by which Constantine adopted Christianity and destroyed it; by which the Roman Catholic Church adopted St. Francis. It is the old method that has prevailed throughout history. And then this idea of handing out in a paternal way as of a benevolent autocrat liberties of a kind to peoples, thereby binding them by better chains, chains with more gold even, to the throne seemed to me simply reactionism masquerading. I asked him many questions, but after all it was not the interest of these people, it was not actually a true vision of the new order. It was an attempt to really establish a benevolent autocracy in place of the old Habsburg autocracy. In other words across this golden bridge between Vienna and Washington it seemed to me that Austria wouldn't be walking into the future, but America would be walking into the past. That is the picture that came to me in the course of his presentation. And then finally I couldn't even with Professor Lammasch see anything but an almost greedy, evil, or in one sense parochial point of view. Good man that he is, I couldn't see that he understood, that there was anything that indicated he understood the program which President Wilson had presented to the world of wanting, of literally making the world a world of democratic peoples, of free, self-governing peoples. I couldn't see that either he or the Emperor, as he presented it, had grasped that with mentality, that after all it was only a somewhat glorified and yet no less masquerading and sordid self-preservation that they were seeking for.

We could take advantage of this situation and make separate peace with Austria. Of that I am sure. I am also sure that if we did it, in the end the last state of the world might be worse than the first, but we would betray, and without meaning to, the hopes of all these peoples of the world that are looking to us. Even in this conversation it came out that not in the whole history of the world has the world looked to a nation as it now looks to America. Looks to us, it trusts us. It looks to us to make good our platform of a world democracy and people in fellowship with each other. And so the world has never looked to a man as it now looks to President Wilson and has never trusted a man as it trusts President Wilson. And I came away feeling what I didn't want to feel. I wanted to find an open door, you see. I came away feeling that with all that I had in hand at that moment—we must let Austria wait, we must keep on. We really would destroy by this compromise, if we come to a measure of compromise, that faith that is rising in the hearts of all these peoples in the world, and I have been thinking ever since I left him that, terrible as it is, and I tell you ever since I have seen you last I have sweated blood every night over this, to say that it is real if it costs all these millions of our lives and actually breaks up and smashes the old world, and makes a new one, it is

worth it. I came away with the feeling that this is a case of Satan appearing as an angel. You know the old expression. This is what I am saying to you. I haven't said anything to him.

This statement finished the formal portion of the report. I thereupon questioned Dr. Herron, and shall report his answers as taken down by the stenographer, merely summarizing my questions.

I asked him first what he intended to tell Professor Lammasch when he returned. His answer follows:

I didn't eat; I went alone to be quiet and think out what I should say to him because, of course, I wanted to say it to you first, you see. This is what I have in mind to say to him, as how it looks to me, representing nobody but myself, of course.

"I will express to you, Professor Lammasch, the frank opinion of how this looks to me. First—If the Emperor really wants the confidence of America and of our President, and can cooperate with America upon the basis of the President's total program, not merely this last speech, for a world of free and democratic peoples, let him prove it first by his own initiative in his own Empire. He cannot put his moral responsibility for this initiative upon someone else, not upon President Wilson, not upon anyone. Let him act first and then ask help afterwards.

"Second—Instead of appealing to President Wilson [for] help, if he believes in this new world, let him throw himself upon his own people. He has a constitutional right under his autocratic government to make the proclamation to all his people, announcing to them that he wishes each group to consider itself free, to form itself according to its own affiliations; not that he is handing down something to these people, but that he is taking his hands off these people, and giving them the right to say what they want. He can say that he is at their service to form a federation, and he will remain their presidential Emperor, but let him throw himself upon these people, and instantly without any asking, I am sure, he would have the unanimous acclaim of the American people. This was the second thing I have to say to him.

"But even in an apparently benevolent way he cannot ask us to help him to impose a new and better autocratic order upon these people. He must act first."

And then in conclusion I shall try to point out to him to try to put before the Emperor that if he would do the complete thing, if he would really take a complete step, not try to bargain with somebody, but take this bold initiative, he has got an opportunity that hasn't come to a ruler in at least two thousand years. He can take the moral leadership of Europe. He can put himself here in Europe on the same platform that President Wilson stands on in America, and that not in all history of Christianity has such a ruler had such an opportunity, and he won't have it long. Here is a door open to him. I will try to impress it on Professor Lammasch, just as I have presented it to you, and Professor Lammasch is going straight from here tomorrow night to the Emperor, try to bring this whole thing up into some higher plane where it really becomes



a question of a new public morality in the world, of a new organization of people with each other, and show him that he has not a chance to save the Austrian Empire, not to serve his dynasty, but to really serve humanity, and to really take the lead to ending the war. Try to make him catch that. That is what I would say to him. It may be very foolish, but that is what I would try to impress upon him.

But I would also try to show Professor Lammasch the inherent immorality of asking us to make Austria be good. I am putting it like that; or Austria to invite us to make her be good because she has no power to herself. I am only telling you in this manner. But if she can't propose a course of freedom and righteousness because it is freedom and righteousness and take this of her own initiative, she would have no power to carry out her bargain if she made a bargain. But I said to him—you know, Professor Lammasch, I suppose, that your allies are not true to you; that Germany would welcome your disintegration tomorrow, even to establishing a Bolshevik in your Empire in order that she might come in and take possession of you. Oh,—he said,—I know all that. I said—You know even that Bulgaria would make a separate peace, if she could. He said—Is that true? I said—Yes, I know personally that it is true. He said—May I tell the Emperor that? That Bulgaria is trying to make a separate peace right now? I thought it was a good thing that they should know what is going on behind their backs. I only presented it as a personal fact, and thought it wise to sow the seeds of distrust, to encourage the seeds of distrust between Austria and her allies. I didn't give him any particulars. (No gentleman's name was mentioned?) No, nor was it said that I spoke as a participant in the conference or negotiations. Nothing of our report was mentioned. It was merely to sow the seeds. The more trouble you can make between those allies the better. But it didn't reveal anything else.

I asked him who was present, and he informed me that the conversation between Lammasch and himself had been entirely without witnesses, that Baron Jong van Beek en Donk was in Hofgut, as was Von Muehlon, but that both had retired and left them alone.

I pointed out to Dr. Herron that Baron Jong had reported that Lammasch was going to accept the Premiership, whereas Lammasch had stated differently. Dr. Herron's reply follows:

Yes. He has actually been offered it. He says the reason is not only his health, but having had absolutely no political connections at his age, having lived a wholly academic life, that it would be practically impossible that he could make the thing workable, but that he does feel that he could handle and carry through the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under this regime and in that capacity represent Austria at the table of peace.

I inquired whether Lammasch had covered the question of the representation of the minorities actually mixed in among the various racial groups, whether for instance his plan would not be in



Bohemia a mere ousting of the German hegemony with the substitution of the Czech hegemony; in other words, whether any system such as was formerly provided under our primary laws for the representation of minorities such as Scandinavian, Irish and others in our big cities, would be provided. Dr. Herron's reply follows:

It would have to be a system of suffrage that would represent both. Of course, the Magyars will fight it to death, and he says they can't do it except under compulsion, and that is how they come to invite a compulsion from America.

I then asked whether they desired the President to make a declaration specifying the necessity for a change in the internal government of Austria before or after the letter had been addressed to the Pope, as this matter was not clear in Dr. Herron's declaration. His reply follows:

To succeed his letter to the Pope. All they ask now is that President Wilson shall give them a lead in the sense of saying that it looks as though Austria was ready to enter the society of nations, and to make peace. They don't ask anything specific. He will simply say that Czernin made a speech and he will make something that is approximately as definite as Czernin's, and then Czernin will probably be pulled out of it, and after that the Emperor takes it in hand himself, and then the Emperor will go as far as he dares go in his answer to the Pope, and then will be the time for President Wilson. *There are four moves.*

At the end I asked Dr. Herron whether he believed that the Emperor and Professor Lammasch were consciously playing a game, or whether they were utterly sincere in their determination. His reply follows:

I don't think they are consciously playing a game. I don't think they are deliberately playing a game in the sense of trying to entrap America, for instance. On the other hand, they are seeking to bargain with America. They want to get the price guaranteed before they deliver anything toward the new order. They are actuated by motives of different kinds, of self-preservation, to restore the hegemony of Austria among the German states. I implied it all along that if this came about Bavaria and Württemberg might come along. I inferred this.

It won't exist if Austria takes the voluntary first step. Then it would put the whole thing upon a different basis, or at least it wouldn't exist in any degree as it does now.

It is asking a faith of us which has no warrant yet in the past history of America, or scarcely in the political history of the world at all, and I would like to go beyond your question and say it is asking of us to take a step which might turn out to be without our foreseeing it and without Austria foreseeing it, and both of us being perfectly sincere, a stupendous camouflage, so to speak, on the part of Germany. I mean it might result in creating an atmosphere of

peace in the world which would paralyze the resistance of the world, create an expectation in England, in France and America, and certainly in Italy, of peace, of thinking peace was on the way, and Germany [might] literally take advantage of that so that it would become a stupendous camouflage. It is a risk we take and which I have been thinking much of. I intended to speak of it and forget it. I think that it is a very great risk.

Finally Dr. Herron added a statement which he had forgotten to make in his formal report, that Professor Lammasch had proposed that Albania, which has no nationality, should be given to Serbia as a compensation, Montenegro to be free to do what it likes.

After Dr. Herron had finished reporting to me the interview with Professor Lammasch, he informed me that on leaving the latter's presence, the owner of the house, Herr von Muehlon, had taken him into his library and had talked to him in a manner which I have reported in my telegram No. 2578, of February 5.<sup>1</sup> The stenographer also took down in shorthand Dr. Herron's report of this conversation. The report is transmitted as received, as the vigor and life in the words would be lost if it was attempted to put the statement into more formal shape.

When I went in Herr von Muehlon met me himself, took me into his library and said,—I am only acting as host here and I will assume that I don't know what you and Professor Lammasch are going to talk about, although naturally I know why he comes. I would like to talk with you myself after he has gone. I said—Certainly, I will talk with you.

Now I must say a word about who he is. He was before the war a very important figure in the German Empire. His position seems a contradictory one. He was director of the Krupp Works, but four years before the war he resigned. He had become a believer in international disarmament. He attended the Hague Tribunal and worked there. He sought all sorts of channels for activity for making a change in Germany. He came to believe that the Prussian mentality was a menace of the world. He found he could do nothing with the Socialists because of their materialism which he found to be very sordid, and their depending on antique political methods. He could do nothing with the Kaiser. He resigned, but the Kaiser persuaded him to stay, and even the young Emperor joined in this persuasion. All this I know from Foerster.

And immediately the war broke out, he repudiated the whole action of Germany; put himself squarely against the Kaiser and all that had happened, and came and bought this *château* (in Switzerland) and has lived in absolute retirement ever since. That is the preliminary to the man.

Going on with this I must say that I haven't met a man in Europe since the war began who had made upon me such an impression that he has. I have never met a German, not even Foerster, who made such an impression upon me. He is a very extraordinary man. The

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

only man I have met in all Europe since this war began that soberly and seriously I could conceive of as having the capacity and character, both the brain and the heart, to do the great thing in the great crisis. I think he is the biggest man of the biggest size and understanding of any European I have met since the war began.

The things then that he wanted to present to me were these. He immediately said,—Of course, you don't need to make any replies to me about Lammasch, and what he is here for. I know him well, and I know the Emperor well (Karl). I know all the Austrians well, and I know well what he is here for, and why they are trying to reach America, and I know all that is going on; and he showed me a telegram from Foerster, and said—I have received this telegram a half an hour before you came, of a great Catholic professor who is working for this ideal; who is coming to Switzerland to see you. Foerster sent it to me. He said—I know all that is going on, and I want to say to you that it is a great *delusion*, that neither the Emperor, nor Professor Lammasch, nor Professor Foerster, nor all of these men, good men as they are, can put it through. That is the first thing he said.

“I want to say another thing which is a reason for America holding on. Not until yesterday have I believed a revolution is possible in Germany.” He said—I have men straight from Germany. I tell you this in confidence, but you are at liberty to let it be known to your President through the necessary channels, of course; a revolution is preparing, is under way in Germany, and will be a real one. Just hold on long enough—he said—this is a revolution that is springing out of the earth. The Socialist leaders themselves have lost control of the working men. They are trying to prevent this revolution, but they can't control it. He said—The revolution at last, I am glad to say, is at last under way in Germany. He said—It is coming right out of the soil as the French Revolution did. He said—I never would have said this before to-day, but to-day for the first time I am beginning to hope for Germany. He said—there will be other men talking to me in another room who will know nothing about your presence when you are here, and men of authority and men of high plans. I have few friends, but I have a few, but this is under way, and I don't think the Kaiser or the Junkers will be able to prevent it now. It is really serious. And the Socialist leaders can't prevent it. He said—The earth is trembling down beneath, and for that reason don't compromise. Hold on!

He said—I say to you in Germany, I have suffered for Germany; I am German of the Germans; I have renounced everything. The Kaiser would have given him anything. He had anything he wanted in Germany, but, he said, this is what I want to say: America must keep on for the sake of Germany, and for the sake of the world. Either Germany will ruin humanity, or Germany must be made to repent. He said—There is a spirit in Germany and it has been growing. The whole nation had become obsessed with it, and we were a nation gone mad; that is what is going on out in the world, and the world doesn't understand it, and I have for ten years seen that my country would be the ruin of humanity. The only thing that can save us is, first, a military defeat, no matter at what cost, and it must be at the hands of America, or better,



but even that won't do us any good except as a prelude to a repentance of our own; as breaking the way to it. He said—We must change the whole heart of Germany. The German people are like sheep. They have never had any mental development in spite of the fact that the world takes our side. If the master say—Go here, they go here; if he say—Go there, they go there. It would be better for us that we should be absolutely made subject and that the Allies should literally govern us for ten years, and then he went on to say—a peculiar thing for a German to say—you know, the commonest French workman is a more intelligent man than the ablest German professor. He has more mentality, more individuality than the ablest German professor. And he said—These people, possessed as they are by these leaders, having been drilled into them that this thing is so, have run amuck the world. He said—Go on and the revolution will take place.

Well, finally, every one of these people who come, Professor Lammasch, even to some degree Professor Foerster, who is my bosom friend, he said, are trying to prevent Germany from having to face the naked truth about her own responsibility in this matter. And he said—Germany is lost and she will yet drag the world down if she isn't made to face the naked fact of her own responsibility for what she has done, and be made to make it good. Germany must be made not only to surrender Belgium, but by an act of restitution of the wrongs she has done so far as humanly possible make that confession of wrong. She must be made to restore Alsace-Lorraine as the symbol of a wrong she has done years ago. She must be made to do that to France. Germany must be made to face this retribution; to face the naked truth. That was his statement.

Then came the supplementary article. You see the speech that Hertling has made—trying to put the responsibility off on the Allies. On the 15th day of July, 1914, Helfferich came to me and presented me the whole program for this war, and said to me—Now we have arranged that Austria will do this. She will present an impossible ultimatum to Serbia. This was on the 15th of July, before the war. He outlined the whole program to me of how it was arranged between Germany and Austria, and it was then that he resigned and immediately washed his hands of everything. Now he says that the German people are fed with this idea and they don't know it. I have written out a complete statement, he said, for my own sake, to be left to posterity, of exactly what happened in this interview between Helfferich and myself on the 15th of July. He said—I was willing to take all the consequences of having that published in Germany, and there is not a paper or person will dare be responsible for speaking or publishing it in Germany. He said it ought to come to be made known in Germany first. Then I said, when would you be willing to give that statement to me to be forwarded to the President? He reflected a moment and said—I will give that statement to you to be forwarded to the President with the understanding that he keeps it confidential until I have made still an effort which I am trying to make even now, to have this published before the German people. Give me still an opportunity. If I fail, then I will release the President from his confidence, and he may publish it to the world. He said here is the



thing absolutely, and I am prepared to back it up. I think that he decided to operate upon this ground, that something might happen in the end, after all, and he liked to have it where the truth was secret. That came out in our conversation. You understand perfectly that he is fully aware that he takes his life in hand in this.

The man himself I must say made a tremendous impression upon me. He is not more than forty years of age. You would be impressed just as much as I.

He said—You don't need to make great offensives, to make even great demonstrations; just hold fast; don't let Germany break through. Just let the German people see that Germany can't go on. You don't need to make such great sacrifices; you don't need to make offensives; but you do need to make walls of defense.

Dr. Herron and I discussed at some length the observations which he proposed to make on Professor Lammasch's statement. It is needless to reiterate the arguments used; I took the position that the practical difficulties of what Professor Herron was asking were nearly insuperable and more than could be demanded of human nature. At the end I begged him earnestly to make a complete statement to Professor Lammasch, not only telling the whole truth as to his lack of any connection with the American Government, but more important still, to convince Professor Lammasch of that truth, so that he would know that the decision still rested exclusively with the Government of the United States and the proposal was without prejudice whatever the views of Dr. Herron. This Dr. Herron assured me he would do, and this I am persuaded he did thoroughly, as shown by his report of the next meeting.

The same precautions as to Dr. Herron's visit were taken for the next meeting, and upon returning from Guemlingen he at once reported to me and made his statement for the second time in the presence of myself and a stenographer. The verbatim report follows, on which my telegram No. 2582, of February 6,<sup>1</sup> was based.

I went to him and said,—At first I want to make clear the exact situation, Professor Lammasch. I have transmitted as literally and accurately as possible the whole of our conference of yesterday to our Minister, to transmit to President Wilson as you requested. But of course you must understand I cannot even attempt to guess for you what his decision will be. About that I have absolutely nothing to say. You must understand that in this case I am only acting as a reporter of what is taking place. You must know that I have no idea whatever of what he will say. I don't want you to imply anything that is apart from anything I may say personally.

I then said,—Professor Lammasch, you have asked me to speak to you frankly as to my personal feeling about your offer. I must be frank. You are my superior in years, in wisdom, in eminence and authority, and I say what I say in all humility, but I must say to you what I think you can do since you have asked me.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

We discussed at length yesterday the probable situation of Europe in a little while if the war continues, and I want to unfold that a little more as it looks to me. Europe is trembling in this position: The danger of Bolsheviki revolution, or, or and, in the midst of that, a Prussian domination of Europe. Then in the end America would be face to face with one or the other European condition. That is a possibility. In any case the thing that appalls me here in Europe is the utter lack of leadership. No man has really risen to the occasion, and the nations of Europe are greatly in need of such a man. The nations are really driven by a kind of a blind fatalism, except Germany, who knows exactly what she wants, and it is possible that the abyss awaits you all and you may go into it. There is all the more reason for considering what can be done.

Then the next point is that they are all driven because they are bound up with an obsolete diplomacy, a diplomacy which is absolutely inadequate to act in the present situation. You are all of you hanging about the musty doors of Vienna in 1815, and you don't realize the conditions of to-day. And there is no use in trying to solve the problems by methods that are really archaic, and archaic because they are Machiavellian. The time has come when righteousness is the only thing that is practicable, and you ought to see that as a man of experience.

And going on with that, a still more appalling thing is that each of these nations, especially those related to you, are unable to get any point of view that is not essentially medieval or parochial. You don't any of you seem able to consider Europe as a whole, to say nothing of humanity, and you are all losing your lives in trying to save them, whereas if one of you could really rise up and consider yourself as a part of the whole and make some act of renunciation, you would be saving yourself.

Then I took up the peace and discussed the peace that he had proposed the day before and tried to show him that it was really founded in unrighteousness and immorality, that it was based upon barbarity and not based upon any sense of a nation really trying to do right, of a nation really trying to be just both to the people within its borders and to the people without its borders, and that we had reached a point that no matter how much the world had to suffer, whether we called it evolution or not, we would not get out of this spirit until we had a peace based upon justice between nations, that would involve the fellowship of nations; that we might have righteousness without peace, but never peace without righteousness. "Not even with your proposal; good man as you are, and great as you are, you do not seem to have risen to any really great conception of the opportunity of Austria. Do you permit me to say that?" He said,—Yes.

Then I came to my application. —Can't you persuade your Emperor, can't you present this to him, you, with your intimacy with him, and you are supposed to have more influence on him than anyone else? He replied,—I think I have. —Why can't you go back to him now and try to present to him just what I am presenting to you? Present to him first Europe and its situation as I have presented it to you, and then his opportunity to take a great historical initiative, not to try to save Austria, but to really try to save Europe. He has an opportunity which a ruler has not had in two thousand years to

really use initiative. He won't have it long. The door is open now, but it will be closed soon if he doesn't take it. Can't you persuade him to take it? Can't you persuade him not to take tentative steps, but to do the utmost, to take the really great initiative in this moment? It is a time when we have to have done with what is merely probable. I can recall to you as a university man that when Plato finished his "Doctrine of Probabilities", he concluded with the observation that we must always remember that the improbable was the greatest of probabilities. And this is the time when something that would seem fantastic and a great act of daring, it is only that which can save Europe from catastrophe, from a long war with America, or perhaps both. If you can put this vision of his opportunity before him for a great spiritual leadership here in Europe, appeal to the higher sort of ambition, show him what a toy the crown of Poland would be if it could be added to him as compared with this act of daring, how all these things are trifles. And show him this, that if he goes half way, he will probably fail. If he goes the whole way, he may succeed. And even if he fails, that failure will be a greater success and have a greater influence on humanity and on his own ultimate destinies than any success he could achieve by any kind of crown.

He raised the question now as to particulars of all these nationalities. —You wanted yesterday to reduce the geographical details to the background, as incidental. They are not incidental. Those are the symbols of the whole thing.

But what can we do with the Italians?—he asked. —Couldn't you create of the Irredenta an Italian province, giving to Trieste the University that it wants, and giving this Italian state or province autonomy without any string to it at all; home rule to govern itself, and asking it to remain within the Empire for a while and try it, but agreeing that after five or ten years of this experiment they should have a plebiscite to decide what they wish? Can't you do that?

It seemed a tremendous venture to him, but he admitted that it might be done. He said he would propose it. He admitted it as a possibility. Then again I emphasized,—Try it, but don't half try it. Go the whole length of the thing. Do it completely with the utmost spiritual daring and completeness, have him throw himself absolutely upon his people, but don't play with anything so big as this. Don't bargain with it. You can't drive a bargain with a big political division. You must absolutely seize it and identify yourself with it. Say to him, Professor Lammasch, and you ought to be able to do this, you who are not only a professor but an apostle almost of the Catholic Church, that the very faith would enable the Emperor to do this, the very faith on your part to urge him to do it would in itself almost warrant its fulfillment. And his people will respond, I am sure. I believe they would respond to this where they would not respond to half of it.

And then I said in conclusion that if he would take this step, that if he would act first and then appeal to America afterwards, the whole of America would rise up and acclaim him, not only Wilson but the entire nation would acclaim him and support him to the end. He would not need to bargain; he would not need to ask America. The whole America as with one great voice would join him.



He really was pretty much stirred up about it, was rather torn up by the roots. "Almost thou persuadest me." He waited a little and he said,—Yes, (he gave me his hand) I will do my best. I will try it now to go to him and present just what you have presented here. —He said I should admit the difficulty of his years and of his caution, and then I replied to that—But you see the thing that is most imprudent and incautious to-day in such a crisis as this is to be cautious. You have got to transcend all the limits of the known experience of Europe. You have got to make a new experience.

Next he raised the difficulties and began to enumerate them one after another. Then I pointed out to him—You never see the difficulties of staying where you are. You are in this *impasse*. There is not a man in Europe who really knows what to do. Could any difficulties be greater than the difficulties of the present moment and the situation you are in? Are not the difficulties of trying to keep your present course really vastly more perilous than any difficulties of the new initiative that I have proposed? —He admitted that they were after all. Then I said,—I appeal to you as an eminent Christian in the Catholic Church. Why is it, Professor Lammasch, that when it comes to the concrete you people really have no faith in the practicability of righteousness and justice? You speak of faith, but it is always in the abstract. When it gets down to the concrete it is only the devil you believe is practical. Why trust Machiavelli as being practical and not trust Christ and his Apostles as practical? —He had to acknowledge the pertinency of the question. It was to try to get him to turn around and see the other side. —Why consider the difficulties of the initiative and not consider the insurmountable difficulties of remaining just where you are?

Then he said,—But why could not the Pope take this initiative instead of Vienna?—I replied: It is not a question of your religious faith. It would have absolutely no value. In the first place you must remember that America in a large percentage is Protestant, not Catholic, that by proposing that the Pope take the initiative you are only adding a lot more complications and difficulties to those that already exist. There will be no objection among the Allies if the Emperor, as a Catholic Emperor, takes this initiative. That is a different matter. It must be a nation or the leader of a nation that takes this initiative.

He saw the point. He only put it forward, I saw, to feel what kind of response I would give him.

Then he raised this question, which I had dwelt so much upon, that Austria must ask first, but was there any objection to the President after all making just some kindly recognition of what Czernin had said, even though he himself did not trust Czernin and quite admitted that Czernin in the last analysis would be under the influence of Germany, and then the Emperor act according to the program that I had proposed? I said that I could see no possible objection to that, if the President decided to do it. Of course it was for him to decide. But in my personal opinion, if this was a prelude to the great action of the Emperor, by all means, if my advice were to count for anything, I should certainly not only advise but urge such action. I made clear that I was expressing my personal opinion, that I could not decide at all, that I could say what I thought



personally, but that might have no effect at all. It was for the President to decide. But with that understanding I said that I could see no objection to such action, that I saw every reason for his so doing as a predicate to the great action of the Emperor.

This was the final question and we sat both of us quite quietly for a little while, and apparently he parted with something almost approaching a sacramental feeling about the matter, as with a resolution. His face was quite lighted up, and he said that he would go back and try to bring about this action.

Professor Lammasch begs that if President Wilson decides to give this cue, it be done at the earliest possible moment, because it will have perhaps a very decided effect upon the terrible chemical offensive which the Germans are proposing. If he gives the cue and then Austria can respond and something is under way, if it did nothing else, it would limit the vitality of the offensive a little.

Again on leaving Dr. Lammasch, Herr von Muehlon requested Dr. Herron to give him a further half hour. Professor Herron's report of this conversation follows herewith.

Dr. Muehlon asked me to stay and talk with him again after the professor had gone, and of course in a sense this is going to quench the hope to some extent. He began by saying,—Each of these men that come to you from Austria and Germany, they all insist on seeing you alone, and I think it is my duty to tell you to keep in mind that these men, the very best of them, say different things in different situations. Even if they analyze this, they won't mean to do it. They do it nevertheless. Even Professor Foerster, who is almost my bosom friend, does it. Now Professor Lammasch will say to you that he is here for this one thing only, to speak with you. Don't tell me what he said, I am just supposing. Well, let us say it is the principal thing. But after all he also has had a meeting with Erzberger and with all the great Catholic prelates in Zurich, and there had serious things to consider as well. Let it be even though he did come to you as a result of his conference with Meinl and the Emperor, and Foerster, as he says, that he came for this sole purpose, that he is talking to you. For the moment it is psychologically true, but you must remember after all, Mr. Herron, that Professor Foerster is a German and Professor Lammasch is an Austrian. Don't forget it. Professor Foerster, my good friend, whom I love, will come to Geneva and he will listen to you, and he will say one thing and he will admit one thing. He will go to Vienna and talk with the Emperor, and he will say to the Emperor, "You must see that Germany gives up Alsace-Lorraine, because that is the difficulty on account of which Europe has gotten into this situation." But he will go to Berlin and meet Hertling or the Emperor, and he will never breathe a word about Alsace-Lorraine. In spite of himself Professor Foerster will say one thing to you, and because you are honest with him he will be honest with you. But he will go back to Vienna and say entirely different things to the Emperor, which fit in with what he thinks the Emperor would want, and the same in Berlin. Don't forget that Austria and Germany have got to be brought to repentance, and it is only

America that can bring them to repentance. And don't forget that these men are in this psychological atmosphere, they are a part of this thing that has to be brought to face the truth. And there is no repentance and there is no hope for Austria until they are brought up face to face with the truth.

And then I stood up at the window, and I was astonished to see what appeared to be a prelate going out of the house with Lammasch to his automobile. —Who is that?—I said. —Oh, you may well ask who is that,—he said,—and you will see well into all that is going on. That is the great Catholic prelate of Budapest, who is working more than any one else through the Emperor and Professor Lammasch and others for the restoration of the Catholic Empire. He has been here in the house in another room while this interview was going on. I wanted you to know it because you will see what is taking place. I was in Berlin when the war began, and on every side you could hear it said: "The first thing that we must do is to get the Pope. He would perhaps naturally be on the side of the French, but we must get him with political reasons. We must buy him with promises." You cannot believe the millions that were sent and the influence that was used on the Vatican to get in its influence before the Allies. Von Bülow, Erzberger, Cardinal . . . went to Rome. They made vast promises to the Pope. They got the Pope before the Allies ever thought of him. Please remember that, and please let that be known to Washington.

In the course of this discussion, and during the days which I have just described, I learned that telegrams had been exchanged between Baron Jong van Beek en Donk in Switzerland and Kommerzialrat Meinel in Vienna. These telegrams do not form strictly speaking a portion of the conversations between Professor Lammasch and Dr. Herron, but contribute to the general questions and doubtless also have had their weight on the mind of the Emperor. The following is a translation of a telegram which was despatched from Switzerland to Meinel:

Legal counsel desires me to say that his personal opinion is that you should inform the director-in-chief of the business in which we are interested that he and those who are advising him are conducting affairs in a way that will, legal counsel fears, lead to bankruptcy and a dissolving of the concern.

The present is an opportunity which will probably never occur again to reorganize and reconstruct business on co-operative lines.

This could, he believes, be done only if the director-in-chief made a public declaration to the shareholders that they would in future have equal control of the business with the debenture holders and the preference shareholders.

This declaration must be made not in vague and general terms but in full detail and specify clearly the way in which each branch of the business should be managed in future: the extent of the powers of the local managers and the manner of their selection as well as their powers in the central management should be most fully explained.

Confidence is the basis of all commercial operations and not written contracts. The shareholders have lost confidence in the director-in-chief and in his board of management; other firms have also lost confidence in your firm and until this confidence is re-established on all sides business relations will be with great difficulty continued. The first step is to establish firmly the co-operation with and confidence of the shareholders. This done, the confidence of firms who have done business with you will be easier to win than at present.

We strongly recommend that the director-in-chief should personally throw himself upon the honor and good faith of the shareholders, withholding nothing, but giving everything. In this way, he will win the confidence and respect of the whole business world and win for himself among his shareholders a position which every other director-in-chief would envy and endeavor very shortly to imitate,—a circumstance which would save your business and save other business in which you are interested.

Substituting Herron for “legal counsel,” the Emperor for “director-in-chief,” the Government of the Dual Monarchy for the “business,” and the people of the Dual Monarchy for the “shareholders,” it is readily comprehensible. This telegram passed the censor, because a reply has been received by Baron Jong from Meinel, which reads in German as follows:

Geschaeft wird unserseit zuerlaessig durchgefuehrt was den erfreulichen effekt haben wird dass andere general Versammlung analoges Geschaeft verlangt wofuer wir derselben vorher Option gesichert haben koenten.

I also quote herewith the best translation that I can make out of it:

Business being reliably carried on by us which will have the pleasant effect that other general meeting will demand an analogous business for which we might have answered [*assured*] it an option beforehand.

From this it is not clear whether Meinel entirely seized the idea presented. The fact that he uses the words “business being reliably carried on” is probably an indication that affairs in Vienna are tending towards the realization which these men desire.

In closing this report I have only to explain a little more fully than I did in my telegram No. 2583, of February 6,<sup>1</sup> why I felt it essential to take the French Ambassador and the British Minister into my confidence in this connection to some extent. I have stated above the fact that they had heard that these conversations were to take place, as I knew on Wednesday, the 30th, that the French had somehow learned of it, and later, after despatching my first telegram, that the British also had become aware of it. In view of this situation and the fact that if I made no declaration most alarming

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 82.



reports might have gone to Paris and London and these two men might have lost all confidence in the frankness of our relations, it seemed essential to inform them in strictest confidence at least that I was aware that an informal meeting was to take place and that Dr. Herron had consented to be present merely to report anything that Dr. Lammasch might want to say, but that he was not the bearer of any message from my Government.

I have [etc.]

HUGH R. WILSON

File No. 763.72/8807

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 8, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received February 10, 9.40 a. m.]

2603. *German political.* Unquestionably the strike situation in Germany has been settled temporarily. From meager reports available it appears that the great bulk of workmen have returned to their labors and that the strike arose as a warning to the Government and evidence of determination of Labor Party to force conciliatory peace. I have previously reported that a state of siege was declared in various cities and I now learn that special military courts with extraordinary powers, having jurisdiction only over civilians, of which the judges were two civilians and three officers, were established. Their findings were without appeal, with the exception of the death penalty.

In spite of severe measures reported certain cities, the authorities in other places, notably Mannheim, adopted paternal attitude towards strikers, stating that they had been deceived by their misguided leaders and urging them to return to work.

Dittmann, of the Independent Socialists, has been condemned to five years in a fortress, the papers indicating that the leniency of this sentence was due to extenuating circumstances. As a result of having published the incidents of this trial large number of German papers of all political complexions were suspended.

Berne *Intelligenzblatt* publishes today an article from *Frankfurter Zeitung* speaking of important decisions that Government must make and foreshadowing parliamentary crisis.

Leaders of all other parties gave consent to refusal of Socialist demands for immediate opening of Reichstag.

During Erzberger's stay in Switzerland he informed a person in whom I have confidence that the "League for Liberty and Justice" has four million members, including all labor unions, Socialists, Catholic and Progressive Parties in Germany. Its platform is practically identical with July 19 resolution. It is really organ for



Reichstag Majority and most effective weapon against Pan-Germans. Erzberger states peaceful mood of Majority is unquestionable and that three out of four hundred members of the Reichstag would again vote for the July resolution. Erzberger emphatically declared that he was still leader of the great majority of the Centrum Party. Even soldiers are ready to force the Government to accept a reasonable peace program. Erzberger points out that a conciliatory reply by Wilson will strengthen the workers against the Government while a bellicose answer would solidify them behind the Government.

*German economic.* Although it is clear that the strike had a political aim there is no doubt that one of the underlying causes of unrest is lack of proper nourishment. Munich *Neueste Nachrichten*, January 13, pointed out prevalence of a disease, "war dropsy", of which the only cure is proper nourishment and which results in general debility and death. Swiss who lived in Karlsruhe reports following rations per week per person: 9 pounds potatoes, 1600 grams bread, 50 grams butter, 250 grams meat. Milk for children and aged in other cities. Increased death rate among old due to reduction in fat allowance.

*Austria.* The strike is ended in Austria, even at Trieste, and politically nation appears to be marking time in the hope of reply from Entente statesmen. Heingartner<sup>1</sup> just arrived from Vienna states that reduction weekly flour ration in Vienna to one-eighth kilo per person has caused unrest which may soon assume serious dimensions in the near future. Disappointment is general that strikes did not gain more for workmen. On every side one hears discussion of intolerable conditions in the Cabinet. Crisis is passed and parties of Apponyi and Andrassy have merged. Apponyi lost five members of his party but several of the Károlyi party have gone to the Government *bloc*. Tisza is in opposition as well as Károlyi who continues to insist on immediate action on electoral reform bill. In such papers as have yet arrived from Austria, Wekerle's speech, in which he emphasizes necessity of cordial relations with Germany, meets with approval.

Beneš, Secretary Bohemian Committee of Paris, furnishes details of congress at Prague January 6. Two hundred delegates under President Kramář. Session lasted three-quarters hour and measures adopted unanimously which provided for entire independence (Bo-

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<sup>1</sup>Robert W. Heingartner, Vice Consul hitherto assigned to the Spanish Embassy, in charge of American interests in Austria-Hungary.

hemia?), stated that Austria-Hungary as state, had ceased to exist, denied to Reichsrath authority of any kind. After adjournment, delegates marched through streets singing national hymn without interference. No deputies were arrested although six of them had previously been under sentence of death.

Beneš knew of Foerster's conversation with Emperor Charles: Emperor subsequently discussed with Czernin advisability of giving autonomy to Bohemia. Czernin replied, "Very well, Your Majesty, you can try it, but it only means that Germany will send troops into Bohemia and exploit the country."

Beneš declared that allegiance to the Emperor was limited to (a) small circles, (b) Catholic hierarchy, (c) limited number of aristocrats. He declared that Emperor was of limited mental capacity. [and in] great ignorance concerning the affairs of his Kingdom.

WILSON

File No. 763.72/8826

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 10, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received February 11, 7.45 a. m.]

3178.

I learn from a source which in the past has been very reliable that as one of the results of the recent War Council at Versailles General Robertson went back to England with the intention of returning [resigning?] because of the extension of powers of the Supreme War Council. It is said that the part played by Lloyd George and General Wilson in this extension of powers has rendered acute the divergence of views between them and Marshal Haig and General Robertson. While M. Clémentel [*Clemenceau*] is now concentrating his attention on the Superior [*Supreme*] War Council the English do not feel that he has renounced the principle of the single commander-in-chief. This particular information seems to be corroborated from a declaration which Mr. Clémentel [*Clemenceau*] made to General Bliss and to me the day after General Bliss's arrival in Paris. In discussing the question the Premier said that he had rather have at the head of the Allied forces a commander exercising authority even though he be quite incompetent, than have [no] commander at all. However, General Pershing told me after the adjournment of the conference that he felt for the first time that real

progress had been made in bringing about a greater unity of military action.

The all round general confidence existing in all circles here in the strength of the military situation remains as stated in my previous weekly reports. While great uncertainty prevails even among those whose position to know is most favorable as to where the enemy's offensive will be launched, yet there evinces a calm confidence amounting almost to an actual desire and impatience to have the supreme test begin.

SHARP

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President Wilson's Speech in Reply to Hertling and Czernin, February 11; Comment in Associated and Enemy Countries—Assurances Transmitted to Lammasch, February 15—Letter of Emperor Charles to President Wilson, February 17

*Address of the President of the United States Delivered at a Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, February 11, 1918*

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS: On the 8th of January I had the honor of addressing you on the objects of the war as our people conceive them. The Prime Minister of Great Britain had spoken in similar terms on the 5th of January. To these addresses the German Chancellor replied on the 24th and Count Czernin, for Austria, on the same day.<sup>1</sup> It is gratifying to have our desire so promptly realized that all exchanges of view on this great matter should be made in the hearing of all the world.

Count Czernin's reply, which is directed chiefly to my own address of the 8th of January, is uttered in a very friendly tone. He finds in my statement a sufficiently encouraging approach to the views of his own Government to justify him in believing that it furnishes a basis for a more detailed discussion of purposes by the two Governments. He is represented to have intimated that the views he was expressing had been communicated to me beforehand and that I was aware of them at the time he was uttering them; but in this I am sure he was misunderstood. I had received no intimation of what he intended to say. There was, of course, no reason why he should communicate privately with me. I am quite content to be one of his public audience.

Count von Hertling's reply is, I must say, very vague and very confusing. It is full of equivocal phrases and leads it is not clear where. But it is certainly in a very different tone from that of Count Czernin, and apparently of an opposite purpose. It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes, the unfortunate impression made by what we had learned of the conferences at

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<sup>1</sup> For the texts of these speeches and those mentioned in the two preceding sentences, see *ante*, pp. 12, 4, 38, and 54, respectively.



Brest-Litovsk. His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which must constitute the body of any final settlement. He is jealous of international action and of international counsel. He accepts, he says, the principle of public diplomacy, but he appears to insist that it be confined, at any rate in this case, to generalities and that the several particular questions of territory and sovereignty, the several questions upon whose settlement must depend the acceptance of peace by the twenty-three states now engaged in the war, must be discussed and settled, not in general council, but severally by the nations most immediately concerned by interest or neighborhood. He agrees that the seas should be free, but looks askance at any limitation to that freedom by international action in the interest of the common order. He would without reserve be glad to see economic barriers removed between nation and nation, for that could in no way impede the ambitions of the military party with whom he seems constrained to keep on terms. Neither does he raise objection to a limitation of armaments. That matter will be settled of itself, he thinks, by the economic conditions which must follow the war. But the German colonies, he demands, must be returned without debate. He will discuss with no one but the representatives of Russia what disposition shall be made of the peoples and the lands of the Baltic provinces; with no one but the Government of France the "conditions" under which French territory shall be evacuated; and only with Austria what shall be done with Poland. In the determination of all questions affecting the Balkan states he defers, as I understand him, to Austria and Turkey; and with regard to the agreements to be entered into concerning the non-Turkish peoples of the present Ottoman Empire, to the Turkish authorities themselves. After a settlement all around, effected in this fashion, by individual barter and concession, he would have no objection, if I correctly interpret his statement, to a league of nations which would undertake to hold the new balance of power steady against external disturbance.

It must be evident to everyone who understands what this war has wrought in the opinion and temper of the world that no general peace, no peace worth the infinite sacrifices of these years of tragical suffering, can possibly be arrived at in any such fashion. The method the German Chancellor proposes is the method of the Congress of Vienna. We cannot and will not return to that. What is at stake now is the peace of the world. What we are striving for is a new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice,—no mere peace of shreds and patches.



Is it possible that Count von Hertling does not see that, does not grasp it, is in fact living in his thought in a world dead and gone? Has he utterly forgotten the Reichstag resolutions of the 19th of July,<sup>1</sup> or does he deliberately ignore them? They spoke of the conditions of a general peace, not of national aggrandizement or of arrangements between state and state. The peace of the world depends upon the just settlement of each of the several problems to which I adverted in my recent address to the Congress. I, of course, do not mean that the peace of the world depends upon the acceptance of any particular set of suggestions as to the way in which those problems are to be dealt with. I mean only that those problems each and all affect the whole world; that unless they are dealt with in a spirit of unselfish and unbiased justice, with a view to the wishes, the natural connections, the racial aspirations, the security, and the peace of mind of the peoples involved, no permanent peace will have been attained. They cannot be discussed separately or in corners. None of them constitutes a private or separate interest from which the opinion of the world may be shut out. Whatever affects the peace affects mankind, and nothing settled by military force, if settled wrong, is settled at all. It will presently have to be reopened.

Is Count von Hertling not aware that he is speaking in the court of mankind, that all the awakened nations of the world now sit in judgment on what every public man, of whatever nation, may say on the issues of a conflict which has spread to every region of the world? The Reichstag resolutions of July themselves frankly accepted the decisions of that court. There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages. Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists. National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We cannot have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it; because what we are seeking is a peace that we can all unite to guarantee and maintain and every item of it must be submitted to the common judgment whether it be right and fair, an act of justice, rather than a bargain between sovereigns.

The United States has no desire to interfere in European affairs or to act as arbiter in European territorial disputes. She would

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<sup>1</sup>*Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 139-140.*

disdain to take advantage of any internal weakness or disorder to impose her own will upon another people. She is quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring. They are only her own provisional sketch of principles and of the way in which they should be applied. But she entered this war because she was made a partner, whether she would or not, in the sufferings and indignities inflicted by the military masters of Germany, against the peace and security of mankind; and the conditions of peace will touch her as nearly as they will touch any other nation to which is entrusted a leading part in the maintenance of civilization. She cannot see her way to peace until the causes of this war are removed, its renewal rendered as nearly as may be impossible.

This war had its roots in the disregard of the rights of small nations and of nationalities which lacked the union and the force to make good their claim to determine their own allegiances and their own forms of political life. Covenants must now be entered into which will render such things impossible for the future; and those covenants must be backed by the united force of all the nations that love justice and are willing to maintain it at any cost. If territorial settlements and the political relations of great populations which have not the organized power to resist are to be determined by the contracts of the powerful governments which consider themselves most directly affected, as Count von Hertling proposes, why may not economic questions also? It has come about in the altered world in which we now find ourselves that justice and the rights of peoples affect the whole field of international dealing as much as access to raw materials and fair and equal conditions of trade. Count von Hertling wants the essential bases of commercial and industrial life to be safeguarded by common agreement and guarantee, but he cannot expect that to be conceded him if the other matters to be determined by the articles of peace are not handled in the same way as items in the final accounting. He cannot ask the benefit of common agreement in the one field without according it in the other. I take it for granted that he sees that separate and selfish compacts with regard to trade and the essential materials of manufacture would afford no foundation for peace. Neither, he may rest assured, will separate and selfish compacts with regard to provinces and peoples.

Count Czernin seems to see the fundamental elements of peace with clear eyes and does not seek to obscure them. He sees that an independent Poland, made up of all the indisputably Polish peoples who lie contiguous to one another, is a matter of European concern and must of course be conceded; that Belgium must be evacuated and restored, no matter what sacrifices and concessions that may

involve; and that national aspirations must be satisfied, even within his own Empire, in the common interest of Europe and mankind. If he is silent about questions which touch the interest and purpose of his allies more nearly than they touch those of Austria only, it must of course be because he feels constrained, I suppose, to defer to Germany and Turkey in the circumstances. Seeing and conceding, as he does, the essential principles involved and the necessity of candidly applying them, he naturally feels that Austria can respond to the purpose of peace as expressed by the United States with less embarrassment than could Germany. He would probably have gone much farther had it not been for the embarrassments of Austria's alliances and of her dependence upon Germany.

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and

Fourth, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany. If they have anywhere else been rejected, the objectors have not been sufficiently numerous or influential to make their voices audible. The tragical circumstance is that this one party in Germany is apparently willing and able to send millions of men to their death to prevent what all the world now sees to be just.

I would not be a true spokesman of the people of the United States if I did not say once more that we entered this war upon no small occasion, and that we can never turn back from a course chosen



upon principle. Our resources are in part mobilized now, and we shall not pause until they are mobilized in their entirety. Our armies are rapidly going to the fighting front, and will go more and more rapidly. Our whole strength will be put into this war of emancipation,—emancipation from the threat and attempted mastery of selfish groups of autocratic rulers,—whatever the difficulties and present partial delays. We are indomitable in our power of independent action and can in no circumstances consent to live in a world governed by intrigue and force. We believe that our own desire for a new international order under which reason and justice and the common interests of mankind shall prevail is the desire of enlightened men everywhere. Without that new order the world will be without peace and human life will lack tolerable conditions of existence and development. Having set our hand to the task of achieving it, we shall not turn back.

I hope that it is not necessary for me to add that no word of what I have said is intended as a threat. That is not the temper of our people. I have spoken thus only that the whole world may know the true spirit of America,—that men everywhere may know that our passion for justice and for self-government is no mere passion of words but a passion which, once set in action, must be satisfied. The power of the United States is a menace to no nation or people. It will never be used in aggression or for the aggrandizement of any selfish interest of our own. It springs out of freedom and is for the service of freedom.

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File No. 763.72119/1276

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, February 13, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received February 14, 5.30 a. m.]

1415. President's address published this morning. Rome papers received so far most favorably as important contribution to Allied cause. The *Messaggero*, independent interventist, says: President proclaims more strongly than ever sanctity of the rights of the people to justice and freedom; that message if disseminated in Germany would have greater effect upon people than a military defeat; that Italy now feels her aspirations will be fairly considered by the most solid mind among the idealists in political life. The *Giornale d'Italia*, afternoon semiofficial, while commending generally says the message not an adequate reply to Czernin's speech which it thinks the President has been deceived into considering different in intention from Hertling's, whereas only the tone was different, the two



being fundamentally in agreement. With this exception it praises warmly the President's address.

Premier Orlando spoke for Government yesterday on reopening of Chamber declaring plainly the question of peace or war no longer one of choice but of necessity, a question of life or death based on instincts of self-preservation. Having referred to lesson from German-Russian peace negotiations as tending to dishonor, he said Italy's war aims are the same now as when she entered upon struggle and added that now as then, Italy does not want more and will not accept less than the completion of her national unity and the security of her boundaries on land and sea. He then argued that Italy has no imperialistic claims and proclaimed that no doubt could exist between Italy's aspirations and the rights of other oppressed peoples. The military situation he declared good with every prospect of improving.

Italians apprehend great German-Austrian push on Italian front very soon. British, however, think chances of this are decreasing.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1279

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *February 14, 1918, 3 a. m.*

[Received 11.36 a. m.]

3197. All the French papers publish the President's message this morning and give prominent space to editorial comments thereon. They all pay fine tribute to the President's service to the cause of humanity. Perhaps the most opportune service, in so far as the south of France is concerned, is the effect it will have upon discouraging any revival of Socialistic agitation against the French Government. Within the past few days there has been a revival of that opposition formulated in resolutions adopted only last Sunday at a meeting of the Socialist Federal Council of the Seine. It is significant that some of the highest tributes to the message are paid by a [number] of the Socialist journals.

Marcel Sembat, the Socialist Deputy in [omission] fairly expresses the views of all the other Socialist journals when he says :

The last speech of President Wilson is of a marvelous vigor and precision. Not a useless sentence, each word acts. Reading Wilson we perceive that he was compelled to speak, he had essential things to say in reply to Hertling and to Czernin. And in his replies what substance, what power of thought! He smites with a strong fist on Hertling's chains and his blows are massive and regular.

After reading and re-reading the message it seems to me that the following few lines appearing in an editorial in the conservative

*Gaulois* best express the general conviction which must come to all those who have read both the messages of the President and the speeches of the Chancellors:

President Wilson accepted the fight on these grounds (peace discussions) as on all others and immediately asserted his superiority by means which were beyond the capacity of adversaries. To the subtlety of their tactics he opposes the irresistible power of arguments drawn from the sources of indisputable logic and truth. The purposely vague and aimless declarations of Hertling are exposed in such a manner that it would seem as though any reply to the President's message would necessitate for the first time from the German Government a clear and definite statement of its terms of peace and the methods of obtaining it if it is sincere in its proffer.

The *Petit Parisien*, the most widely read paper in France, says:

It is a proud and fine reply to the speeches of January 24. It is addressed to the masses even more than to the enemy Governments, and it throws full light upon the hypocritical game of Hertling, who has become the humblest and most constant servant of the German war machine.

*Le Temps* in its leading editorial last night devotes much of its discussion of the President's message in comparing it with Trotzky's declaration putting Russia out of combat.<sup>1</sup> It characterizes the action of the President as calculated to hasten the end of the war while that of Trotzky opening up the resources of Russia to Germany tends to indefinitely prolong it.

Mr. Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked me to hasten in the name of his Government to express its thanks for the President's message. He said the French Government indorsed it in every respect and was grateful for not only the effect of the message upon the French sentiment but also for the effect which it would have in Germany. He humorously remarked to me that the French Socialists were trying to turn the principles advocated by President Wilson against the French Army but, as French Government equally indorsed them, such principles would be doubly helpful to France.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/8862

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, February 14, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 11.50 p. m.]

1417. Bevione, member of League for Prosecuting War, read in the Chamber of Deputies yesterday secret treaty of April 26, 1915,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, p. 428.

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 497-500.

hitherto unpublished in Italy. He declared Italy's claims to round out nationality and defensive frontier indisputable but recognized change in the situation touching other claims [regarding] colonial expansion. Publication generally applauded.

Press generally approves President's message but *Idea Nazionale* criticises it.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1293

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, February 14, 1918.

[Received February 15, 5.45 a. m.]

2031. German press comment.

*Tageblatt*, 13th: Wilson makes distinction between speeches of Hertling and Czernin. Difference did not pass unnoticed by German press at time, some papers favoring Hertling's language, others Czernin's. Hertling's speech did not entirely satisfy anybody. Wilson compliments Czernin's but does not take up suggestion which made his speech particularly noteworthy, namely, exchange of opinion between two countries. Perhaps Wilson replied indirectly by saying that peace problems concerned all mankind, but all Wilson's fine words cannot make us forget decision of Versailles conference to continue war with utmost vigor until Allies' terms are accepted. Although United States was not represented at conference by delegate, Wilson must know there is no consequence [*consonance?*] between his message and Versailles declaration. President mentions Reichstag peace resolution which he thinks Hertling disregarded, but it must be remembered that resolution was not answered at time by any similar manifesto by Entente. It is true resolution lost much of its effect by Pan-German agitation against it, but that very agitation was encouraged by Entente's continuance of "might policy," Clemenceau's elevation to power in France, and repudiation Lansdowne's letter in England. Wilson's speech is such in words and thoughts with which we can declare agreement forthwith; but very perspicacity with which [he] determines the difference between Berlin and Vienna utterances, Hertling's speech and Reichstag peace resolution, must reveal the differences between his words and Versailles declaration. He considers German Military and Annexationist Party sole obstacle to peace, but forgets that Clemenceau, the English times [*sic*] politicians and even Italian super-annexationists are still very influential. This new message shows Wilson's inclination to continue peace discussion and four principles which he [lays]



down afford opportunity for serious reply as did his former fourteen points, but all this can have no practical value until whole policy of Entente decides in favor of general peace.

*Vorwärts*, 13th: Message brings us back to fundamental question, peace by force or peace by accommodation. American troops may appear in Europe but fact remains we cannot force America to peace nor can she force us. We are reminded of the words that Wilson said when still at peace with Germany, words that found readier echo in Germany than anything else he said: "If one side cannot overcome the other an understanding must be found." Question is whether new message can contribute to this understanding. In form it is undoubtedly highly peaceable and moderate, but leaves open the possibility that war must be pursued with all energy. Like so many speeches it is peace instrument and war means at same time. As war means it endeavours separate Germany and Austria and accentuate conflicts in Germany. It is fact that there are differences between German and Austrian policy and differences in Germany, that unity of military front is not equalled by unity of political front. There is unity in idea of defense alone. Hertling's speech was much criticized in Germany also, but it is not thinkable that Czernin's offer of Austro-American mediation will be made against wishes of German Government. On contrary it must be assumed Germany agreed. Undeniable there is close connection between German Government which Wilson treats so curtly and Austrian Government of which he speaks in such friendly manner. Germany cannot be completely alien to Austria's peace endeavors any more than Austria can be mere German satrap. Preliminary negotiations between Austria and America may initiate general peace. They might remove sharp conflict of views between Hertling and Wilson regarding method of negotiation. We cannot repeat too often that nothing stands in way of general conferences since whole German people is ready to reject with all means at its disposal claims of enemy imperialism to German possessions, and gratification of annexationist wishes is not will of German people, and cannot justify prolongation of war. German people stand united in defense against foreign annexationism, resisting in its overwhelming majority annexationism at home and waits impatiently for Government which will lead it to general peace. Wilson's four principles can be generally accepted in their general wording, but attempt to carry them out will immediately disclose antagonism of imperialism combating imperialism. Each side accepts general principles, but with ulterior [motives], and it is the hidden thoughts which must be given up before peace can be arranged. It remains to be seen whether Pan-Germans are obstacles to just peace as Wil-



son maintains or whether Pan-English, Pan-French or perhaps Pan-Poles, whom Wilson is favoring in remarkable manner, stand in way. The main point remains that both sides must recognize that an understanding is absolutely necessary to peace for this reason. Appropriate action must be taken by Germany to ascertain whether Wilson's statement that nothing stands in way of immediate peace discussion is mere diplomatic move or in reality the work for mankind. The German reply can only be that we too are immediately ready for peace discussions.

*Vossische*, 13th: Noteworthy that Wilson almost entirely approves Czernin's speech while he treats Hertling's speech with little approbation. It is plain from Wilson rejection of separate negotiations insisted on by Hertling that America wants presiding seat in international tribunal in order to realize America's real war aims which include prevention German-Russian-Japanese alliance which would defeat Anglo-Saxon world supremacy plans. Gerard endeavored to induce Bethmann Hollweg to annex in east, likewise aimed at permanent hostility between Russia and Germany who are natural allies. Wilson's insinuation that Czernin favors uniting all territory inhabited by Poles in new Poland is part of deep plan to perpetuate animosity in the east, and can only tend to encourage advocates of wrong Polish policy. Wilson's friendliness is far more dangerous than Lloyd George's fulminations and Germany must recognize reality of that in order to avert it.

*Lokal-Anzeiger*, 13th: Wilson's plain intention is to drive wedge between Austria and Germany. His principles of peace might be discussed if he had not declared the tribunal of mankind solely competent to apply them, for such tribunal would simply mean that Anglo-Saxons and their serfs would vote down Centrals at conference table.

*Magdeburgische Zeitung*, 13th: Analysis of speech shows nothing but heap of elastic phrases and hopeless attempt to postpone for time discussion of reasonable peace terms by sowing discord in central Europe; Czernin's bashful offer of negotiations is complete failure.

*Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, 13th: It is not devoid of interest to observe how wily America tries to catch Hertling by his inheritance from Bethmann Hollweg, the Reichstag resolution. We should recognize from this again how much damage that resolution has done us; it not only fills enemy with new courage, but gives them opportunity to trap any government that does not openly repudiate it.

*Tageszeitung*: Wilson attempts to incite Austria against Germany and German Reichstag Majority against supreme military command, this again illustrates what valuable weapon was furnished Wilson in Reichstag peace resolution.

*Tägliche Rundschau*: Wilson cannot conceal his main object of establishing Anglo-American supremacy under name of society of nations. The unfortunate Reichstag peace resolution which Wilson delights in repeating is really only thing he likes in Germany, gives him courage to make his maximum demands. We must stand by the facts of our victories and our invincible military situation.

*Frankfurter Zeitung*: Message seems [less] favorable to peace than last speech; its warlike tones are only intended to make clear the powers of invincible America and weight of her Wilson's voice. Wilson's four principles are so abstract that nobody can say anything against them. We agree with him that general peace could be arranged on such basis, but we do not agree that spokesmen of Military and Annexationist Parties in Germany are sole obstacle. Versailles declaration and Lloyd George's latest speech plainly show that Entente has not courage to decide for peace of accomodation and understanding.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/8184a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 15, 1918, 11 p. m.

1500. Secret for Wilson alone to decode.

Concerning the possible need of Austria to obtain financial aid after the war under certain conditions I think that it would be wise at this time to convey secretly, unofficially and orally to Lammasch or his agent that, in the event of Austria being deprived of German financial support through acting contrary to the wishes of the German Government in independently arranging a cessation of hostilities and negotiations for peace at the present time, person conveying information has strong impression amounting to conviction that Government of the United States will exert its influence to the end that financial assistance may be obtained in the United States as nearly as possible to the extent that Germany would have furnished it if there had been no breach in their relations.

As to the most expedient channel to convey this secret and unofficial information to Lammasch I rely wholly upon your discretion, though I think that it would be unwise to employ Herron, whose relationship with Lammasch should in no way be embarrassed by making him the agent of delivery of even the most unofficial message. Herron has acted so wisely and shown such discretion his future usefulness must in no way be endangered. Please act promptly and discreetly in this matter and report fully.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1315

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 15, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received February 16, 5.38 a. m.]

2642. In view Department's 1451, February 4, 5 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> consider it advisable telegraph in full Emperor Charles declaration on Ukraine peace:

To my people! Thanks to God's gracious assistance we have closed peace with Ukraina. Our victorious army and our sincere policy of peace which we have followed with indefatigable perseverance have brought us the first fruits of our war of defense carried on for our existence. Together with my sorely tried people I trust that after this first conclusion of peace, for us so gratifying, suffering humanity will soon be favored with general peace. Under the impression of this peace with Ukraina we look with full sympathy upon that striving young people in whose hearts as first among our enemies the feeling of neighborly good will exhibited itself and who after bravery proved in numerous battles also possessed sufficient determination to give expression by deed in the eyes of the world to its better conviction. Thus it detached itself first from the group of our enemies in order to join its efforts with our strength in the quickest possible attainment of the great objects which are now common. From the first moment in which I mounted the throne of my august ancestors I felt myself at one with my people in the firm determination to fight the struggle forced upon us until an honorable peace might be obtained and now I feel myself all the more one with them in this hour in which the first step toward the realization of this aim has been taken. With admiration for and affectionate recognition of the almost superhuman persistence and indescribable readiness for sacrifice of my heroic troops, as also of those who at home have daily shown a no less courageous spirit, I now look forward with full confidence to a near happier future.

May the Almighty continue to bless us with strength and endurance so that we may obtain not only for ourselves and our allies but for the whole of humanity the final peace. Signed, Charles.

WILSON

File No. 763.72119/1328

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 16, 1918.

[Received February 17, 10.10 a. m.]

2661. German press comment President's speech.

*Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, 13th: President's speech shows clear desire continue public discussion between Washington and

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; general instruction to cable important speeches.



Central Powers. Tone even milder than January speech which showed great progress over former speeches. Message justified recent articles in this paper written by Germans knowing American situation who painted other picture of Wilson than many of our shallow daily newspapers and comic papers; not as bribed agent Wall Street and champion of trust imperialism grasping rapaciously for world supremacy, but as pacifist of extreme puritanic fanaticism determined use every effort win victory his ideals of right and justice. In this doctrinairism lies perhaps Wilson's moral greatness and suggestive strength for Americans. German statesmen will do well to realize that if Germany comes to no *modus vivendi* with the Wilson mentality it will find in America its most tenacious and richest opponent with inexhaustible resources. Important to observe how greatly Wilson differs in tone and substance from declarations other Entente statesmen. Easily understood today why America not politically represented Versailles, because Wilson's present policy not Clemenceau's and Lloyd George's. Wilson mistaken in assuming existing difference between Military Party and German people but his mistake conceivable when considering recent unprincipled machinations of certain German party which hysterically cried for military *coup d'état*. Hoped that Reichstag in close cooperation with Government will immediately convince Wilson of error. Should not be difficult for Hertling, Czernin, by defining more closely former declarations, to come to agreement in principle with Wilson, but latter should also see justice of applying this beautiful principle to Allies. Altogether Wilson shows himself as only opponent with whom discussion possible. Therefore, duty of German statesmen to procure greatest possible benefits from this discussion. If agreement with America succeeds before its war machine assumes irresistible momentum the whole Entente will be unhinged.

*Münchener Post*, 13th: Wilson's reply to Hertling, Czernin, shows strong desire for general peace even more emphatic this regard than January message which this paper warmly supported. Must be admitted President entirely right in many points of his [polemic] against Hertling. Latter spoke but formulated no positive program. President places himself on basis Reichstag July resolution and thus general peace reconciliation becomes possible. Paper expects Chancellor to now build binding bridge to America. Professor Bonn recently properly declared that possibility for general peace depends on Germany's attitude toward American peace principles. Decision will not be difficult for German Government if it still holds to spirit July resolution and it must then subscribe to Wilson's developed general principles for general and just peace.



File No. 763.72119/1326

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, February 16, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received (February 17?), 3 p. m.]

1423. In conversation with Baron Sonnino this morning he expressed great satisfaction at coming of our military commission. Spoke of strong moral support our sending troops Italy\* would have.

Talked informally of Vatican position on peace moves and on clause 15 of the secret treaty just published here.<sup>1</sup> He says he hears the Vatican has taken some sort of steps to try and get Germany to take some action, at least, regarding Belgium which will affect President Wilson's views. The Vatican has just printed the secret treaty with interpellations and discriminations [*declarations?*] on clause 15 in the British House of Commons and Italian Chamber and with notes substantially charging falsehood in denials of existence of pact to exclude Vatican from action touching peace. Sonnino expressed view which he has always held that the admission of the Vatican to peace council would raise very embarrassing questions and that internationalization of Vatican would produce troublesome results and diminish spiritual power of Pope. He is evidently very desirous President's view should prevail with us and in my judgment his views on this point are sound. He declares that Italy did not expel the Central Empires' representatives at the Vatican; they left on their own accord after the Royal Italian Government had given its assent to their remaining. He mentioned that the approaching Socialist conference in London will ask that internationalist Socialism shall be represented at the peace council board and he expressed a hope that only the governments of belligerents would be represented. Any other arrangement will, he thinks, produce endless confusion.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1334

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 16, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received February 17, 10.25 p. m.]

2664. Haussmann of Liberal Populist Party and important leader in Reichstag (see my 2460, January 19, 10 [8] p. m.<sup>2</sup>) requested George D. Herron to grant him interview. At meeting he stated to Herron that Reichstag Majority able to pass resolution accepting

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 497-500.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

four principles President's message as base of peace discussion. He asked whether to strengthen his hand with Reichstag, President would not give him private assurance that message was sincere and that President would welcome such a resolution. Herron replied he was ready to wager his life on sincerity of every word President spoke and that he felt it would be an impertinence for such a message to be sent.

Hausmann finally dropped this question and inquired whether, if resolution were passed, it would imply that Alsace-Lorraine had to be brought into discussion. Herron replied it was impossible for Germany to both accept and reject the propositions. They must be accepted in their entirety or not at all. During the conversation Hausmann first declared German people would never consent to discuss Alsace-Lorraine but later admitted that if the question were raised and the working people began to feel that these provinces were stumbling block there might be revolution and people would not consent to continue sacrificing themselves for them.

Hausmann then said that if Parliament passed this resolution on eve of great offensive they might weaken themselves and would be running great risk. Herron pointed out the greater risk they ran in aligning America against them and allowing the war to go on until America was fully prepared. Herron pointed out that America was daily consecrating herself to this great task and that even if the worst should happen and Germany should dominate the continent they would then have to face an interminable war with America and eternal ostracism in our countries.

Unquestionably Hausmann has no conception of the meaning of the President's proposals, and he and his friends desire to play the same game with America as they played with Russia at Brest-Litovsk, to accept in principle and in every underhand way to dodge in practice. They probably hope to raise expectation of peace in America and thus weaken intensity of our preparation.

It is, however, encouraging to note from this interview that Hausmann who claims to be representing the Reichstag Majority is nervous about situation and is afraid that the laboring classes may no longer submit to their present leaders. They conceive that if they accept President's principles in appearance they can hold their people and have time to play dubious games of negotiation.

From his conversation Herron gained impression that German political leaders are nervous about the attitude of their allies. The tone of the German press and Hausmann's evident desire to converse with America show that they are by no means sure that Austria will hold on.

File No. 763.72119/1329

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 16, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received February 18, 4 a. m.]

2660. Baron von Trauttenberg of military branch Austrian Legation stated to reliable neutral that Austria was intensely desirous to break away from Germany and make a prompt and if necessary separate peace. He wondered whether President Wilson realized the difficulties which faced Austria in this connection and was ready to help Austria to attain this end.

WILSON

File No. 763.72119/1331

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, February 17, 1918.

[Received February 18, 6.42 a. m.]

2671. Vienna *Arbeiter Zeitung*, 13th: Wilson reply to Czernin and Hertling very opportune and to point. He speaks very calmly and in very friendly manner. Speech important step toward peace. Offer of negotiations by Czernin not refused. Wilson defined conditions peace and since he holds means towards making war his conditions will have to be carefully considered. He demands nothing for America and refuses to be tied any Entente territorial demands or act as arbiter. There is some truth in statement that German annexionists only obstacle to peace. His conditions can be accepted by Hertling and Czernin without doing violence to life interests of their peoples. We can not cross ocean and force America make peace which would change European balance power in our favor. It is now turn of statesmen Central Powers and theirs is responsibility to comply with Wilson's demand and enter negotiation.

Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, 13th: Wilson speaks kindly to Czernin and has been agreeably affected by Czernin's offer, showing he is accessible to esteem shown him personally. President's praise of Czernin for recognizing that ambitions Austrian nationalities must be satisfied for sake European peace due to error, for Czernin like all advisers of crown has several times categorically refused interference domestic affairs. If peace depended on theoretical principles Wilson's speech it could be signed tomorrow. But in reality

absolute justice impossible. Difficulties hindering agreement lessened by tone of speech but not removed. Waste of time to attempt sow discord between Germany and Austria whose alliance prevented war long time and will assure lasting peace. Wilson's demand for settlement all war questions by general congress and rejection separate treaties is obstacle to negotiations. Military superiority of Entente has failed and numerical diplomatic superiority is to take its place. Wilson mocks Vienna Congress which assured forty years peace. Czernin knows answer to Wilson and will not fail to give it.

WILSON

File No. 763.72Su/32½

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 18, 1918, 4 p. m.*

3197. For your information and not for communication to the Government to which you are accredited. The Department has to-day addressed the following note to the British, French and Italian Ambassadors at this capital:

Referring to the recent action of the Supreme War Council in regard to conditions of peace and to the action of the Inter-Allied Board with regard to the recognition of the Bolshevik authorities,<sup>2</sup> I beg to inform you that the President wishes very respectfully but very earnestly to urge that when he suggested the creation of the Inter-Allied Board and gave his active support to the creation of the Supreme War Council it was not at all in his mind that either of these bodies should take any action or express any opinion on political subjects. He would have doubted the wisdom of appointing representatives of this Government on either body had he thought that they would undertake the decision of any questions but the very practical questions of supply and of the concerted conduct of the war which it was understood they should handle. He would appreciate it very much if this matter were very thoroughly reconsidered by the political leaders of the Governments addressed and if he might be given an opportunity, should their view in this matter differ from his, to consider once more the conditions and instructions under which representatives of the United States should henceforth act.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> The same, on the same date, to the Ambassadors in Great Britain (No. 6606) and Italy (No. 1080).

<sup>2</sup> See telegram No. 3135, Feb. 2, from the Ambassador in France, *ante*, p. 70, and telegram No. 8656, Feb. 14, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. III, p. 34.



File No. 763.72/8918a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1918, 6 p. m.

6611. Department has received through the Greek Legation an intimation from Venizelos of the desirability of the Allies issuing some statement indicating their intention to stand behind Greece and see that her rights are protected, and at the same time conveying an expression of their appreciation of Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Allies. The Department desires to know whether the British Government has received a similar message and if so intends to make any such declaration.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/7725

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, February 20, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received 11.43 p. m.]

8748. For the Secretary and the President:

Admiral Hall informs me that he has just learned . . . that on the 18th instant the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna sent a cipher message to his Ambassador at Madrid of which the following is a translation.

On behalf of His Highness, Your Excellency is requested to communicate the following words without delay to the King of Spain and to hand it to him in writing:

The European situation has been materially cleared up by Mr. Wilson's public speech on the one hand and by Count Czernin's on the other and the points at issue have been reduced to a certain minimum; hence the time seems to have come when a direct discussion between one of my representatives and one representing Mr. Wilson might clear up the situation to such an extent that no further obstacle would stand in the way of a world's peace congress.

Your magnanimous desire so frequently expressed to pronounce proposals for peace at such a time prompts me to request you to forward the following message through a secret channel to President Wilson:

In his speech of February 12 [11] President Wilson expressed four main principles as the foundation of an understanding to be hoped for. My position in regard to these four principles I can sum up as follows:

In point 1 President Wilson demanded, according to the German text before me, "that each part of the final settlement must be basis for [based upon] the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent." With this guiding principle I am in agreement. Every man of principle and intellect must desire a solution which assures lasting peace and it is only a just peace, securing vital interests, that can afford such a solution.

Points 2 and 3 belong together and are to the effect that "peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now

<sup>1</sup>The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the Ambassador in France (No. 3199).

for ever discredited, of the balance of power, but that every territorial settlement involved in the war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among the rival states."

The question of territory, I believe, will resolve itself very simply if all governments expressly declare that they renounce conquests and annexations. Of course all states would have to be placed on the same footing. If the President will endeavor to bring his allies into line in this respect, Austria will do everything in her power to induce her own allies to take up this position. As regards what might be accomplished in respect of possible frontier modifications in the interest and in favor of the peoples concerned, similar friendly conversations may be carried on between state and state; for, and this seemed to be the opinion of the President too, a lasting peace could scarcely be promoted if, in a desire to avoid a forcible transference from the sovereignty of one power to another, we wished to prevent a corresponding territorial settlement in other parts of Europe where hitherto there has been no fixity of frontiers, as in the case of the part of [Macedonia?] inhabited by Bulgars. However, the principle must remain that no state shall gain or lose anything and the pre-war possessions of all states be regarded as inviolable.

Point 4, "all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded to them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world."

This statement too, so clearly and aptly put by the President, is acceptable as a basis. Again I lay the greatest stress on the fact that any fresh settlement of conditions in Europe should not increase the risk of future conflict, but rather diminish it. Wilson's sincerity in saying "that the American Government was quite ready to be shown that the settlements she has suggested are not the best or the most enduring", arouses in us a high hope that we may in this question, too, reach some agreement. In this exchange of opinion we shall be in a position to furnish conclusive proof that there are national demands the satisfying of which would be neither good nor enduring nor would they provide for the grievances which are continually put forward a solution which would meet the wishes of the states affected. We shall be able to establish this in the case of the national claims of Italy to the part of the Austrian Tyrol inhabited by Italians by means of the proof of indisputable manifestations and expressions of the popular will in this part of the Monarchy. I must therefore, for my part, most strongly urge that my representative discuss with the President every possible means of preventing fresh crises. In the principle already enunciated of an entire renunciation of annexations the demand for the complete surrender of Belgium is apparently also included. All questions of detail, such as Serbia's access to the sea, the granting of the necessary commerce and navigation outlets for Serbia, and many other questions, could be certainly cleared up by discussion and prepared for a peace conference.

The second main principle which the President had already established consists in the unconditional avoidance of a future war. With this I am in complete accord.

As regards the third point laid down by the President, the main purport of which is general disarmament and freedom of the seas for the prevention of future world wars, there is no difference of opinion between the President and myself. In view of all this I hold that there exists such a degree of harmony between the principles laid down by the President on the one hand and [my own] on the other that results might be expected from an actual conference and that such a conference might bring the world considerably nearer to the peace fervently desired by all states.

If you will be good enough to forward this reply to Mr. Wilson I believe you would render the cause of peace in general and the whole human race the greatest service in the power of any benefactor. Karl.

Your Excellency is requested to communicate the result of your *démarche*. Czernin.

File No. 763.72119/7726

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

LONDON, *February 20, 1918, 11 p. m.*[Received (*February 20?*) 6.48 p. m.]

8749. My immediately preceding telegram. It should be observed that the Emperor Karl's message is to be communicated in writing to the King of Spain, which makes it appear certain that it is sent with the knowledge and approval of the German Government.

The Emperor Karl proposes preliminary discussions without mentioning terms, in anticipation of a final world's peace conference. This is what the Germans have aimed at from the beginning, notably, the encouragement of attempt last September, also through Madrid,<sup>1</sup> to bring about preliminary discussions with the British authorities without the knowledge of Great Britain's allies.

PAGE

File No. 763.72/13447a

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Baker)*

WASHINGTON, *February 21, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I understand that you are planning, or have planned, to send only five men in the military mission to Italy, which is headed by General Eben Swift. I hope that you can find it possible to send a few more officers than that as I think numbers will have considerable to do with the impression that is made by the presence of the mission in Italy.

Of course I do not need to say to you how important I think the political effect of the mission will be, and how much very real good it will accomplish.

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72119/7727

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

LONDON, *February 21, 1918, 8 p. m.*

[Received 8.08 p. m.]

8764. My 8748, February 20. Fürstenberg sent the following message to Czernin yesterday:

As soon as the text, which has been mutilated in several places, has been definitely established I shall ask His Majesty to receive me

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 226-227.



in order that I may deliver the message to him tomorrow evening, February 21.

The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent the following supplementary message to the Ambassador at Madrid:

If Mr. Wilson assents to the King's proposal and sends a representative to discuss matters with me he should send some one who speaks either French or German as I do not know English well enough to discuss such weighty matters.

PAGE

File No. 763.72119/8185

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *February 21, 1918, 9 a. m.*

[*Received February 22, 2.03 a. m.*]

2694. Department's 1500, February 15, 11 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> was decoded personally by me.

Lammasch has no agent in Switzerland and I hesitated to confide this message to any neutral. It was therefore imperative to confide it only to a person of confidence who could deliver the message secretly, orally and unofficially to Lammasch in Vienna. I therefore summoned York-Steiner, an Austrian who often calls at the Legation in connection with the sale of the vessels of the Austro-American Line to Phelps Brothers. He is a close friend and warm admirer of Lammasch and a disciple of his in political matters. He is known personally to Grew in the Department and has always been found worthy of confidence both by the former Embassy at Vienna and this Legation; furthermore he is an ardent admirer of President Wilson, an opponent of German domination in Austria, and has come to Switzerland to devote himself to furtherance of mutual understanding between Austria and the United States.

I asked him whether he could proceed to Vienna on a confidential mission of benefit to his country. He replied that he could proceed as soon as the necessary three days of passport formalities had elapsed. I told him to obtain the necessary visé and then return to me. He returned on the 19th instant, having obtained permission to visit Vienna on the ground of his desire to bring his daughter back to Switzerland, a reason which really exists and a mission which he will accomplish.

I then delivered your message which he repeated to me in exact wording. He expressed himself as profoundly moved by this opportunity to be of service to his country and assured me that having

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 119.



delivered his message he would wipe it from his memory. He has arranged to inform me by a harmless telegram to his wife on Tuesday, who will know nothing of its import, when message has been delivered.<sup>1</sup>

Dulles<sup>2</sup> and I are ciphering this message and matter is known to no one else.

WILSON

File No. 763.72119/1408

*The Vice Consul at Zürich (McNally) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ZÜRICH, February 19, 1918.

[Received February 22, 3.47 a. m.]

The German offensive is being held back by the influence of the Kaiser who urges that the terrible slaughter which must follow should be withheld as he is certain that Lloyd George, the only person now preventing peace, soon will be deposed. The Pan-Germans are exceedingly incensed and have informed him that the offensive will not be withheld later than very early in March.

Meanwhile the recent speech from the President of the United States is received heartily and appreciated by the German Government and the people, and Hertling hopes to continue to interchange expressions, confident that the President's attitude will open a way to peace. The feeling in Germany towards the President is completely revolutionized and he is hailed as a conscientious, honest man doing his best to prevent further bloodshed. His utterances in the interest of peace are a great blow to the ambitions of the Pan-Germans who have been making every effort to lessen its effect. I am informed that both Hertling and Kühlmann are impressed with the sincerity of the President's intentions and that the Kaiser urges President's sincerity and hopes of peace as an additional argument against the early launching of the offensive.

The Germans heretofore gloomy and conservative are now confident if their offensive is launched that it will carry them through the French and British lines and that the havoc created with some new weapon which they now possess will astonish the world. They are ready and the morale of the men at the front is as it was in the beginning of the war, being impressed that the success of this offensive will force peace, enabling them to return to their homes.

[M McNALLY]

<sup>1</sup> In his telegram No. 2722, Feb. 25, noon, the Chargé reported: "The telegram agreed upon has been received, indicating that message has been delivered to Lammach." (File No. 763.72119/8172.)

<sup>2</sup> Allen W. Dulles, Second Secretary of the Legation.

File No. 763.72119/1372

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *February 22, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received February 23, 3.35 a. m.]

2058. Following views expressed by person in touch with German Moderates' attitude of German [*on Belgium?*].

I am informed that Meinecke who is one of Kühlmann's advisers may be taken as typical of important group in Germany opposed to a direct statement about Belgium. Meinecke has maintained ever since August 1914 that Belgium should be restored but up to very recently he has urged German Government against the making of a statement to that effect inasmuch as he feared it would be taken as a sign of weakness and would encourage Allies to make further demands after this point had been conceded. However as Austria is now exerting all possible influence against the Pan-Germans, as the impression created by President Wilson's message is more favorable than appears in the press, as Payer is holding office and as Prince Max of Baden's prestige is growing, it is reasonable to expect a more conciliatory attitude regarding a statement concerning Belgium.

An indication along this line may be seen in an editorial appearing in the *Germania*, Hertling's paper, in which it is said that if the Allies will make a statement regarding the integrity of the German Empire, the Germans will make a statement regarding the restoration of Belgium. In this connection the attitude of the President regarding Poland is said to be an obstacle as he is believed to mean that certain [parts] of Prussia should become a [part] of the Polish state.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/1371

*The Vice Consul at Zürich (McNally) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ZÜRICH, *undated.*

[Received February 24, 1918, 3.55 a. m.]

The wife of a German general is responsible for the statement that Count Hertling recently said to her: "My hands are out towards President Wilson in his peace efforts and my Government will, in furtherance of this desire, agree to vacate all enemy territory now occupied by ourselves including Belgium which will be handed back without any reservation whatever. In return we shall expect to hold and to have returned to Germany all territory held by her

before this war and that we will under no circumstances entertain possibility of relinquishing Alsace-Lorraine to France."

The lady gave it as her opinion that if Germany became hard pressed she might agree to converting Alsace-Lorraine into an independent state similar to Bavaria and Württemberg. It is reported by the same person that Conrad Haussmann, member of the German Reichstag, who recently has returned to Germany from Switzerland, there declared that he had had a conversation with Professor Herron of Geneva in which the latter had said to him as a representative of President Wilson that unless Germany was ready to return Alsace-Lorraine to France the United States would not enter peace negotiations of any kind with Germany. Is Professor Herron a representative in Switzerland of President Wilson?

[McNALLY]

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File No. 763.72Su/23

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 23, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 24, 4.11 a. m.]

11. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning and showed me a telegram just received from Mr. Jusserand which I saw at a glance embodied the President's note as communicated to the Embassy in Department's telegram No. 3197 of the 18th instant.<sup>1</sup> The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he could not understand the objection of the President to the resolution of the Supreme War Council of February 2, as the latter had expressed practically the same sentiments in his address to Congress of the 11th instant. I repeated to him the communication which I was instructed in the Department's No. 3149, February 5,<sup>2</sup> to make to the military representatives at Versailles; it was plain that he saw the force of the argument but he stated that it would be very dangerous if the Central Powers thought that the Allies were divided in matters of policy. I replied that this danger could be obviated in the future by submitting resolutions to the President for his approval in advance of their publication or by an explicit statement that they represented the views of only such of the Allies as had political or diplomatic representative present.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 125.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 81.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had no idea when the next meeting of the political representatives of the Supreme War Council would take place but thought, in deference to the wishes of Mr. Lloyd George, the meeting would be held in London.

The contents of this telegram are known to myself only.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72/8984

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *February 23, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[*Received February 24, 6.31 p. m.*]

1985. The Prussian equal-franchise fight has again become of paramount internal importance in Germany. The general implicit faith in the Government's sincere desire to pass the reform was confirmed by the *Norddeutsche's* article of the 15th. Of the Liberal press the *Vorwärts* alone was suspicious of the basis of the Government's adherence to the reactionary changes of the Herrenhaus. Friedberg's hint that plural franchise might be acceptable created momentary doubt of the Government's good faith, and the *Tageblatt* stated that the more radical elements of the Majority could hardly continue to support the Hertling Government in view of its desertion of equal suffrage in contravention of its promises. The storm of protest may well have resulted in Friedberg's statement two days later that the Government would not accept any form of plural franchise.

The strength of Conservative and National Liberal opposition had not been underestimated and therefore the result of the committee's vote in favor of the Conservatives' plural franchise amendment occasioned no particular astonishment. The Liberal newspapers view it simply as a serious temporary obstacle. They are pessimistic as regards the immediate fate of the reform, but exhibit the greatest confidence and determination as regards its eventual passage, while believing that the next move in the fight should be made by the Government which must, however, be held to a strict redemption of its promises. Hope still exists in the Liberal press that the present Landtag can be coerced into passing the reform and only if this is impossible will extreme measures be desirable.

The exploitation of the recent strikes by the Conservatives and their allies as proving that the masses are not politically ripe for equal suffrage has been answered by official statements in the Land-



tag Committee and semiofficially in the press that the strikes have in no wise altered the Government's attitude regarding franchise reform. Herein is indicated the Government's evident desire not to alienate the Majority Socialists and to assist in maintaining the Reichstag Majority, which the semiofficial organs state to be quite intact, the wish being apparent in the thought, though there are no further definite indications. The Reichstag Majority will probably continue cooperation although the National Liberals are apparently having difficulty in overcoming conscientious scruples against working with the Socialists who in turn are more than ever suspicious of the Government and determined to make their support dependent on strict fulfillment of the "November Program." Three reform bills are to be presented to the Reichstag during the present sitting in [consummation] of this program which are hailed as the results of the work of the Majority:

- (1) Addition of 44 Reichstag seats for the large urban districts.  
It is generally believed that these seats will fall largely to the parties of the Left.
- (2) Creation of boards of labor.
- (3) Revocation of the constitutional clause preventing certain classes of Government employees from forming unions.

[GRANT-SMITH]

File No. 763.72/8983

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, February 25, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 1.10 p. m.]

8795. Foreign Office informs me that British Minister at Athens has also drawn attention to desirability of the issue at the present juncture to Greek Government of some statement of the nature mentioned in your 6611, February 18, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> British Government are prepared to join United States Government in the issue of a statement indicating the intention of Allies to support protection of Greece's rights and conveying appreciative expression regarding entry of Greece into the war. French delegate stayed with [stated to?] British Minister at Athens will be instructed to concert with his colleagues in giving an official assurance to Greek Government as soon as French delegate [*Government*] is informed as to readiness of other Allied Governments to participate in such [statement], and as to exact terms [in] which United States Government propose to issue.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 126.

Chancellor Hertling's Speech, February 25—British Attitude toward German and Austrian Advances Regarding Peace—Support by the United States of Proposals for an Inter-Allied General Reserve—Italian Request for American Troops

File No. 763.72119/1385

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, February 25, 1918.

[Received February 26, 4.46 p. m.]

2066. Following substance Hertling's speech delivered today in Reichstag:

The House has just claim to being informed here and in committee regarding foreign political situation and policy of Government thereon, although doubts have been expressed as to value of conversations in public between ministers and statesmen of belligerent powers. A Liberal member of English Lower House admitted recently that it would bring us far nearer to peace if instead of discussions in Parliament negotiations might take place in limited circles between responsible plenipotentiaries of belligerent powers. I can only express my agreement with this suggestion and conversations would undoubtedly force our adversaries to interpret our words as they are meant and to bring forward their own views freely. The advantages of discussion in a limited circle would be that agreement could be reached concerning all details which are bound to come up in the settlement of great conflicts as well as concerning all the various issues.

I am mindful particularly of Belgium. Our position towards Belgium has repeatedly been discussed in this House and it has repeatedly been declared from this position that we have no idea of keeping Belgium, but that we must be protected against the danger of the state with which we desire to live in peace and friendship after the war being made the breeding place of enemy intrigue. The ways and means leading [thereto] could undoubtedly best be discussed in such a limited community. If a suggestion of this sort should come from the other side we should not assume an attitude rejecting it from the beginning. Naturally discussion of this nature could only have an informal character for the present but at this time it does not seem as if this suggestion would become a tangible one and thus I am forced to continue for the present the method of dialogue.

Turning to the message of President of the United States of 11th instant I concede that a small degree of *rapprochement* can perhaps be found in this message. Assuming this I shall immediately apply myself to four clauses with which the President's remarks close and which he thinks might form basis of general peace. The first of these principles says that every part of a final agreement must rest materially on justice in such a manner that it is most probable it can bring permanent peace. Who wants to contradict this? The second principle—that nations and provinces shall not be bartered as mere objects from one ruler to another—is a principle to which one might agree. Wilson's third principle—

that every solution of territorial questions brought up by this war must be settled in interest of and in favor of populations residing in such territories, and not as part of mere compromise of claims of rival states—can also be included without further ado in expression of assent. In fourth principle he demands that all clearly defined national aspirations shall be accorded greatest possible gratification without bringing in new elements or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism which would probably be likely in time to break peace of Europe and consequently of the world. In principle I agree to this also. I thus declare that I agree with President Wilson that these principles set up by him may be basis of agreement for world peace.

One reservation only must be made. These four principles must not only be proposed by President of United States but must actually be proposed by all states and nations. Such a wish of sincerity for preservation of peace must be based on unselfish mutual recognition. That would be an object earnestly to be desired but unfortunately we are still remote from that object, and objective tribunal of arbitration established by all nations which might judge impartially does not yet exist. Yet I would naturally rejoice if such an objective tribunal of arbitration recognized by all states and nations existed.

Of course I would be happy to be able to contribute to the establishment of such ideal conditions but I still fail to find any trace of similar feelings among representatives of the Entente. England's war aims such as have appeared in the latest speeches of Lloyd George are still of purely imperialistic nature. They still demand that peace in Europe must be formed according to England's will and when England speaks of right of self-determination of nations she has not thought of applying this principle to Ireland or Egypt, etc.

As is well known, our war aims are defense of the Fatherland, the maintenance of its territorial integrity, the preservation of freedom of our economic development in all directions. These were our objects from the very beginning and our conduct of warfare even when it was forced to have aggressive character was really of defensive nature in ultimate analysis.

I particularly emphasize this at this time in order to remove any apprehensions regarding our military operations in the east.

After peace negotiations at Brest were broken off on 10th instant, as you know, by Trotzky, we had free hands towards Russia. Our advance into Ukraine was destined to insure us the fruits of peace with Ukrainia which was imperilled by machinations by Bolsheviks, and that advance was further supported by calls for help addressed to us from the Ukraine to aid them in ordering and securing the new country against the hostile acts of Bolsheviks. Although military operations have been initiated in other districts also they are quite remote from any intentions of conquest. I emphasize that we have no thought of establishing ourselves in Livonia or Esthonia. All that we wish is to live in peace and friendship with the independent states which are forming there. But the military operations which we started with peaceable intentions have produced a success far beyond the object originally aimed at. You already know from



Kühlmann's notification of Trotzky's wireless, which was confirmed in writing and stated that Russian delegates wished to resume interrupted peace negotiations. Our reply was that we were ready to do so. We sent our peace terms to Russia in form of ultimatum. The Russian delegates have already left. Our peace terms have been accepted in principle by Russian Government. Our delegates left yesterday evening for Brest-Litovsk. This is the new and happy communication which I am able to make to you.

Peace negotiations with Roumania commenced on 23d. Negotiations are difficult because we do not stand alone but are obliged to assert just interests of our loyal allies, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, but I resign myself to the hope that with good will on our side these difficulties may lead to satisfactory result.

Regarding Poland I would say a few words because Entente and Wilson also appear lately to have particular interest in Poland. In addition to already existing difficulties particularly of economic nature the collapse of old Russia has brought new difficulty, the question of delimitation of the new Polish state and neighboring Russian territory. I may perhaps express hope that after thorough discussion of the various interests and equitable consideration of Polish conditions a compromise can be found if good will is manifested on all sides, and the very expression of serious intention [in this direction has been] effective to some extent in Poland, as we can see with satisfaction.

In contrast to our war aims which as I have repeatedly brought out with emphasis were purely defensive, the war aims of the Entente are still aggressive and directed towards conquest. The Entente is fighting for return of Alsace-Lorraine to France. I need add nothing to what has already been said. There is no Alsace-Lorraine question. If there were an Alsace-Lorraine question it would be a purely German question. The Entente is fighting for acquisition of territory of Austria-Hungary in favor of Italy. In Italy the fine name of "sacred egoism" has been found for this, but this fine name cannot conceal annexationist intentions. The Entente is fighting for cession of Turkish territory, for detachment of Syria and Arabia from Turkish Empire, and English statesmen have repeatedly stated themselves that England's colonial aims are directed towards expansion, although called consolidation of England's already enormous possessions in Africa.

In the face of this thoroughly aggressive policy aiming at conquest Entente statesmen have nevertheless continually spoken of imperialistic, militaristic, and autocratic Germany which was trouble maker in Europe and must be confined as closely as possible, if not destroyed. Lately a novel line has been taken in the system of agitation, mendacity and calumny already conducted against Germany. A picture is painted of our intended imminent violation of neutrality of neutral countries. In reply to intrigues of this sort recently started again in Switzerland we take occasion to declare with all possible emphasis that we never have thought and never shall think for a moment of violating Switzerland's neutrality. We are closely tied to Switzerland not only by principles of international law but also by century-long friendly relations. We owe our thanks to Switzerland and the other neutral countries, Holland, the



Scandinavian countries, Spain which is exposed to peculiar difficulties owing to her geographical situation, and also to non-European neutral countries not yet driven into the war. We pay tribute of esteem and gratitude for manifold energy with which they have adhered to neutrality thus far despite all challenges and enticements.

The world yearns for peace but it does not seem as if this deep longing met with any response in the Entente which is still able to drive its people to the furies of war and to enforce war to the end. I have heard other voices from England, it is true. Runciman's speech was recently followed by Lord Milner's speech which was perhaps still more conciliatory. Now we can only hope that these voices multiply, but it is high time that they did, for the world is confronted at every moment with momentous decisions. Either [our] enemies decide to listen to the voice of mankind and reason and to make peace—and they know under what conditions we would be ready for understanding—or they believe that they must persist in the criminal madness of war of conquest. Therefore our splendid troops shall continue to fight under their masterly leaders. Our enemies know well enough that and to what extent we are equipped for this, and our sturdy people will continue to hold out, but the blood of the fallen, the wounds of the maimed, and the sufferings of the nations will fall upon the heads of those who resisted the voice of mankind until the very last.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/7729

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *February 26, 1918, 8 p. m.*

[Received (*February 26?*) 6.46 p. m.]

8815. My 8780, February 22.<sup>1</sup> On Saturday last Fürstenberg sent the following message to Czernin:

The day before yesterday, February 21, I was received privately by the King. When I informed the King briefly of the object of my visit and told him of the contents of the message I was about to hand over His Highness appeared somewhat concerned. Thereupon I read the message over again, [giving] him translation into French and explaining certain passages which were misleading to him by reason of his defective knowledge of German. As I proceeded I gathered the impression that the apprehensions first aroused in His Majesty's mind were gradually removed. When I had finished he declared his great willingness to undertake to forward the august message. At the same time he asked me to inform the Emperor that his experience led him to apprehend that there would be leakage and filtering into the press on account of the laxity prevailing at the White House. He laid stress upon the fact that the secret could scarcely be kept if the President accepted His

<sup>1</sup> "A message from Fürstenberg to Czernin just intercepted indicates that the interview took place as arranged and soon the King undertook to telegraph the Emperor's message to Washington." For text of the Emperor's message, see *ante*, pp. 126-127.

Majesty's offer. At the same time I should like to remark that in my opinion leakage is not improbable here.

The King also asked me whether the Emperor Charles' step was taken with the consent of the Kaiser and the German Government which was of prime importance. I put forward the view that His Majesty could scarcely have expressed himself so plainly on the question of territory, notably as regards Belgium, unless there had been some understanding with the German authorities.

In view of possible future conversations I request Your Excellency to furnish me with instructions (apparent omission)\* bring to a successful conclusion. A French translation has been made of the message for the Spanish Ambassador in Washington and the King is transmitting it in his own private cipher.

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File No. 763.72119/1391

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *February 26, 1918, 5 p. m.**[Received February 27, 3.50 a. m.]*

1576. For Polk personally:

Referring to the [Legation's] No. 1409, January 30, 1 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Leube again saw me today. He prefaced his talk by giving me to understand that before he left Berlin on Saturday he had been in conversation with very high German officials and it was their desire that Leube give me the following information. Of course, as I cabled you before, they felt that this would be transmitted to you, although I have not told Leube this, nor have I entered into discussion on any of these matters with him.

Leube emphasizes the fact that he was told before he left Berlin that his Government, in principle, accepted the four points which were brought out in President Wilson's last speech and stated that this would be made public today in a speech made by Chancellor Hertling. Leube particularly wished to bring out the fact that his friends in Berlin felt that if representatives of the various Governments could meet to discuss matters, much more could be accomplished towards bringing about peace than by the present system of public speeches and he even went so far as to say that they felt that peace might be brought about this way. In connection with this, he pointed out that they looked towards President Wilson as being by far the most important factor, wielding the most influence, and felt that if there was an understanding reached between Germany and President Wilson, this would undoubtedly be accepted

\* Inserted by the Embassy. [Footnote in the original.]

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 53.

by the other Allies who are now dependent on America in this war. However, there was some doubt in Leube's mind as to what England's position would be regarding the right of self-determination of nations and he questioned in this respect what would be their position regarding Ireland, Egypt, and India.

He further stated in this connection that the contemplated great offensive on the west front was being held in abeyance to see what result would be obtained from this speech of Hertling's, affirming that the German Government accepted in principle the four points of Wilson's speech. Leube stated the Emperor and his Government felt it their duty to avoid the great sacrifice of life which would be entailed on both sides by such an offensive if there was any possibility of coming to an understanding.

MORRIS

File No. 763.72119/1612

*Memorandum of the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)*

[Extract<sup>1</sup>]

*February 27, 1918.*

The French Ambassador called this afternoon and said that he had had two cables from his Government directing him to lay certain matters before the President. The matters deal with certain secret proposals for peace which the Central Powers are making and of which the French Government has definite and positive information to substantiate. I told him that I would take the matter up with the White House and let him know at the earliest opportunity.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

File No. 763.72119/10497

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *February 27, 1918, noon.*

[Received 7 p. m.]

8826. For the Secretary and President only:

My 8815 of yesterday. I have had a long private and wholly unofficial conversation with Balfour. He left the impression clearly on my mind that he regards the Austrian approach made separately to the United States as another class [*case*] of the German policy of

<sup>1</sup> Remarks by the Ambassador concerning intervention in Siberia not printed.

trying to create trouble between the Allies. It is admitted in Fürstenberg's telegram of February 23<sup>1</sup> that the German Government is essentially a partner in this approach and Hertling's speech also makes this partnership plain. Balfour pointed out that there are several ways in which conversation between the United States and Austria at this stage of the war and without a more specific basis of discussion might be hoped by Germany to create dissension. One way is this. The British and French treaty with Italy, which is regrettable, but by which Great Britain and France are in honor bound, cannot be overcome to square with the President's just conditions of peace. If this fact leaked out in a conversation and [should] be made known by Germany, Italy might abandon the war. Balfour thinks that this unfortunate treaty will not give trouble in the end, but any premature discussion or even mention of it might [give] trouble.

Another possible unfortunate effect might be a dampening of war spirit in the United States if it became known that peace conversation was going on, and the Germans would make it known if it suited their purpose.

Mr. Balfour pointed out other possible troubles that might be caused. He remarked that nothing could bring disagreement between the United States and Great Britain but that many complications might arise with other governments. Then he said: "I suppose of course that the President would prefer House as his spokesman. If House came to Europe now to discuss peace the whole world would blaze with expectations, with discouraging effect in all Entente countries."

He spoke of [Smuts's] private and unsuccessful errand to Switzerland which became known, to Great Britain's embarrassment, against the greatest precautions.

He knows that Austria is most eager for peace, but in this move through Madrid the hand of Berlin is visible. The real wishes of Austria are much more clearly set forth in the Herron conversations in Switzerland than in the Emperor's message to the King of Spain.

I sought this conversation with Balfour on my own initiative in the hope of extracting from him some intimation of his views for your information. I disapprove of [*suppose?*] what he said was consciously designed for communication to you, but his conviction and feeling were clear. It is certain that he hopes that the President will decline to discuss a general peace with Austria alone.

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<sup>1</sup> See telegram No. 8815, Feb. 26, from the Ambassador in Great Britain, *ante*, p. 138.



File No. 763.72119/1396

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *February 28, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received 6.25 p. m.]

8841. For the Secretary and the President:

In Mr. Balfour's speech in the House of Commons last night on the recent speeches of Hertling and Czernin he said:<sup>1</sup>

I am convinced—and I beg the House to weigh my words—that to begin negotiations, unless you see your way to carrying them through successfully, would be to commit the greatest crime against the future peace of the world. Therefore it is that I have to differ from my hon. friend who spoke last. Therefore it is that while I long for the day when negotiations may really take place—negotiations which must be a preparation in bringing ideas closer together—much as I long for that day, I believe I should be doing an injury to the cause of peace, which is the cause I have at heart, the great cause I have at heart, if I were either to practice myself or to encourage others to practice, or to hope myself or to encourage others to hope, that there was any use in beginning those verbal personal communications, until something like a general agreement was apparent in the distance, and until statesmen of all countries concerned saw their way to the broad outlines of that great settlement which it is my most earnest hope will bring permanent peace to this sorely troubled world.

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File No. 763.72/9126a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 28, 1918, 7 p. m.*

6719. Please cable at once complete resolutions and vote of the recent Inter-Allied Labor Conference at London, the reception of the resolutions by British labor, the present political alignment of British labor on international questions, and the exact political views and labor affiliations of the delegates who are to visit the United States. Consultation with Brailsford and Webb is suggested.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup>The quotation hereunder, garbled in the telegram, has been edited to conform to the text printed in *Parliamentary Debates—Commons—1918*, vol. 103, p. 1474.

File No. 763.72/9478

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *February 28, 1918, midnight.*

[Received March 1, 10.06 a. m.]

3264. My 3231, February 21, 11 a. m.<sup>1</sup> I am in receipt of note from Foreign Office stating that French Government is disposed for its part to give satisfaction to the desire expressed by the Greek Government and that French Government in consequence considers that the Allies might state to the Cabinet at Athens taking the occasion of the mobilization that it can count on their complete support in the efforts which it is making for the liberation of the territory and for the protection of the liberties of Greece.

On the other hand, the note continues, the British Government has communicated to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a telegram from the British Minister at Athens relative to the proposals made by General Bordeaux according to which it would be opportune for the French and British Governments to make a declaration to the Greek Government concerning their intention never to allow King Constantine to return to Greece. Mr. Balfour informed Lord Granville that such a declaration did not seem to him necessary, but that he authorized him to inform Mr. Venizelos that in case he considered it desirable, the British Government would support him in any energetic local action which he desired to prevent a movement in favor of King Constantine.

The French Government would be disposed to make a similar declaration to the one proposed by Mr. Balfour as above.

Mr. Pichon desires to know the opinion of our Government in this respect.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/9013

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *March 1, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received March 1, 3.51 p. m.]

8860. Your 6719, February 28, 7 p. m. Full memorandum on war aims of Inter-Allied [Labor] and Socialist Conference covers about

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see telegram to the Ambassador in Great Britain, No. 6611, Feb. 18 (*mutatis mutandis*, to France), *ante*, p. 126.

5,000 words, or more than three columns small print, London *Times* of February 25, which goes to you by the pouch today. Shall I telegraph it in full?<sup>1</sup> Other questions will be answered in a few days.

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File No. 763.72119/1404

*The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HAVRE,<sup>2</sup> March 1, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received 5.05 p. m.]

With reference to Hertling's speech the Belgian Government declares that its thought has not changed since the response it made to the Pope. It will discuss peace only in concert with its allies. Hymans makes statement to this effect to-day.

WHITLOCK

File No. 763.72/9066

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, March 2, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received March 3, 2.10 a. m.]

2006. The aim of Hertling's speech as stated by *Germania* was twofold: the discussion of peace with Wilson and explanation of Germany's plans in the east. Judging from the effect produced both in the press and in the Reichstag, the real aim of the speech was evidently to give hope to the forces of moderation in the Entente countries and particularly in America, and simultaneously to re-emphasize the "defensive war" fiction in order to keep the German inner front intact upon the eve of spring hostilities in the west, and to justify the war's continuance as necessary to maintain Germany's political and territorial integrity, thus casting on the enemy the odium for further bloodshed.

While the Chancellor was successful in impressing on all but the most Radical sections of opinion his views concerning the divergence between the President's last message and war aims of the Entente, Scheidemann, *Vorwärts* and the *Tageblatt* were all quick to point out the divergence between the Chancellor's own words and the trend of events in the [east]. The speakers and press of the other less Radical sections of the Majority *bloc*, being superficially satisfied

<sup>1</sup> Answered by telegram No. 6741, Mar. 2: "Do not telegraph full memorandum on war aims of Inter-Allied Socialist Conference." The text received by pouch is printed *post*, p. 155.

<sup>2</sup> For papers concerning the American Minister's withdrawal from Belgium, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 1, pp. 628 *et seq.*

with the pleasing general tone of the speech and in part probably secretly gratified that the Chancellor has again left open the possibility of an annexationist interpretation of the Government's protestations of its will to peace, do not draw the logical conclusions from this divergence; there is further complete unanimity within this division of opinion, that the German advance is a measure necessary for securing order in the eastern border territories and as a protection against Bolshevik propaganda. The Socialists do not regard the statement of the German intentions concerning Belgium as definite enough, while Trimborn the Centrist leader interpreted it as a declaration of absolute readiness to reestablish completely Belgium. The Pan-Germans, while evidently displeased by the tone and contents of the speech, are eagerly concentrating their attention on the favorable possibilities for an immediate consummation of their plans in the east, which the Government's policy wittingly or unwittingly opens to them; they accordingly refrain from openly hostile criticism of the Chancellor's answer to the President and his statements regarding Belgium, which they merely attempt to minimize and interpret as favorably as possible to themselves in the belief that when their plans in the east have been realized they can succeed in forcing a similar settlement in the west.

Payer's speech received quite as much press comment as the Chancellor's as being of the greatest inner political significance. The fact that he spoke not from the Government bench but from the speaker's rostrum, that he advocated a program of internal reform, originating not with the Government but with a majority of the popular representatives, that he based himself squarely on the support of this majority attacking the opponents of the program both to right and left, and making no attempt to straddle or to throw off sops to the reactionaries, led the Majority parties as well as the Conservatives to proclaim it, the former joyfully, the latter wrathfully, as a further and convincing proof that parliamentary Government in Germany has become to a measurable extent a reality. The anger of the Conservatives was particularly aroused by Payer's assertion of the doctrine that since Prussia exerts such extensive influence in imperial matters, Prussian questions (in this case franchise reform) must of necessity be a matter of vital interest to the Reichstag; for they see in the recognition of this doctrine the destruction of one of the principal traditions upon which Junker control of Prussia and hence of the Empire is based. From the lips of a non-Prussian it was particularly distasteful and took on added significance.

Scheidemann's speech appears of most interest in the debate which followed the utterances of the Chancellor and Payer. It was printed in full in the *Vorwärts*, but completely emasculated in the summaries



given in the *Norddeutsche* and other papers. It verified the *Vorwärts* assertion that the Social Democracy would appear in the Reichstag not as the accused but as the accuser in regard to the strikes, of which Scheidemann draws detailed account with special reference to the attitude of the Majority Socialists. On this point he took issue with Payer's exposition of the Government's standpoint, marking the only important exception of the otherwise unqualified support which the Vice-Chancellor received from the Majority parties. Scheidemann particularly reasserted the independence of his party, where its aims diverged from those of the other parties or of the Government. Trimborn, the Centrist leader, also affirmed the independence of the various parties of the Majority group aside from the program agreed upon. Thus it appears that the Majority now stands completely in agreement as regards the internal Government program, less completely as concerns peace and foreign policy, and only potentially in regard to other questions. The attitude of the National Liberals is still uncertain. *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* is authority for stating that they intended to make their relations to the Majority *blocc* dependent on the Socialist attitude in the Reichstag in settlement of strikes but the same paper points out that after Payer's speech it will be impossible for them to join the "more than ever isolated Conservatives".

The debates on the Prussian franchise reform have been interrupted. The possibility of passing the Government measure is mentioned with slightly increased optimism by the Radical press. Public opinion and perhaps pressure from official quarters upon it have had their effect and most of the National Liberal papers as well as the Reichstag faction are favoring with increased emphasis support of the Government bill and openly condemning the action of the four members of the party who voted for the Conservatives' amendment in committee; this may effect a change of the attitude to the recalcitrant portion of the Landtag faction. Payer's comments on the franchise reform show typically the determined belief in Radical circles that public opinion will inevitably insist on the reform in the near future.

The publication by the official Austrian Telegraph Bureau of the protest of the Polish club in the Cholm question containing attacks on the German military authorities (the publication of which was forbidden in Germany) has received some attention in the press and the *Kölnische* indicates plainly that it gave rise to diplomatic protest by the German Ambassador in Vienna. In this connection Scheidemann's assertion in the Reichstag that "in Austria the people feel entirely hostile to us" is interesting.

[GRANT-SMITH]

File No. 763.72119/1434

*The Chargé in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, March 4, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received March 6, 6.27 a. m.]

2769. Since my telegram 2536, January 30,<sup>1</sup> Theodore K. Shipkoff has laid continued siege to George D. Herron and myself. Herron informed me yesterday that Shipkoff had come to tell him that he was leaving for Sofia shortly to see King Ferdinand. He states that Bulgaria is daily growing more terrified of Germany and more fearful of military and economic domination; he reiterates the true friendship for America in Bulgaria. He declares that "America can best judge Bulgaria if she wants [to]" and that "Bulgaria wants to play America's game if she knows what it is." Bulgaria, according to Shipkoff, is excluded from making a separate peace alone for fear of punishment by Germany, but if there is even a chance of Austria taking such action, provided it is action which is satisfactory to America, Bulgaria earnestly desires to join Austria in that action.

Shipkoff to all appearances has been much moved by his various talks with Herron and declares that he is convinced that there are greater things for a nation than the expansion of her frontiers and that he will earnestly labor to make Bulgaria fulfill the rôle in the Balkans that the United States is attempting to fulfill for Europe. He has the conviction that they themselves should endeavor to make concessions with Servia in a manner satisfactory to both.

All of the foregoing Shipkoff will urge upon Ferdinand and he states that though his Sovereign is far from perfect he believes that, feeling these things passionately himself, he will be able to instill the same belief in Ferdinand. He explained to Herron that many people in Switzerland knew that a meeting had taken place between Lammasch and Herron but that of what transpired at the meeting he is of course ignorant. He informed Herron, however, that there was only one reason which would induce a man of Lammasch's standing and influence with the Emperor to talk to an enemy subject and that was the hope of arranging a basis of peace. He most earnestly begged Herron to give him, for his Sovereign's information, some indication of what is going on between America and Austria so that his Sovereign could proceed to his estates in Hungary, unostentatiously meet Emperor Charles, and if necessary come to Switzerland incognito to meet an American to learn the President's views himself. He also begged that Herron, in a purely personal capacity, would address a letter to Ferdinand which Shipkoff would carry to

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 65.

Sophia, in which Herron would point out to Ferdinand his views as explained to Shipkoff: that the continent of Europe was menaced with a situation of universal Bolsheviki, Prussian domination, or both; that such a situation if it transpired would leave England and America face to face with Germany in an endless war to the death; that it might be generations before the struggle ended in which the whole of European civilization would disappear in the whirlpool. To avoid such a situation there was only one means, to loyally and frankly accept the President's declarations and to make peace on that basis, by such action leaving Germany a moral outcast even (by its?) allies, which could not fail to open the eyes of the German people.

I have requested Herron to say to Shipkoff that this is a very serious matter and that therefore he needs time, perhaps a week, to think over, in order to delay Shipkoff's departure so that some answer may be had from the Department in advance even if it is an answer which indicates that the American Government desires to do nothing in this case.

May I ask permission to express my views on this question. Lammasch's message was furnished to Herron in the strictest confidence. I do not therefore believe we are at liberty to reveal it but I do feel that an unusual opportunity is being here offered, that Shipkoff should not go back discouraged in his point of view. I therefore believe that it would be appropriate for Herron to assure him of the deep and enthusiastic sympathy which America would feel towards an entente [*attempt*] by Bulgaria to solve its difficulties on the basis of the President's proposal and to do it immediately. I wish to recommend that Herron inform him that information of anything that might be going on could doubtless be obtained from his Austrian ally if his King should frankly and loyally approach the Emperor with a statement of how Bulgaria feels, how desirous they are to cooperate in any efforts toward peace, and invite his confidence.

I should also recommend that I be authorized to give Shipkoff, through another channel than Herron, the same message for Bulgaria as that contained in your 1500, February 15,<sup>1</sup> for Austria to relieve apprehension on economic grounds since Shipkoff has often emphasized the menace [to] Bulgaria of being obliged to borrow from Germany.

It is not necessary to believe that Shipkoff or his King would be actuated entirely by such ideas as he is now professing. It is very probably an adroit effort on the latter's part to gain for himself American sympathy, but I do believe that whatever his character

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 119.

heretofore [*he is*] a patriotic Bulgarian and firmly convinced that Bulgaria must go to some means to free itself from German influence. I request that the Department will state its views also, concerning which or advisability of which I am skeptical, of a letter from Herron to Ferdinand with any suggestions as to what might be included therein. Permit me to again emphasize the urgent need for haste if anything is to be done in this matter since to delay Shipkoff unduly would be proof that the Government, and not a private American citizen, is acting.

WILSON

File No. 763.72119/7730

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *March 6, 1918, noon.*

[*Received 2.57 p. m.*]

8910. My 8815, February 26, 8 p. m.<sup>1</sup> I have just learned that on March 1 the King of Spain sent a wireless message to the Emperor of Austria through Fürstenberg acquainting His Majesty that the Spanish Ambassador at Washington had reported that he had communicated the King's message to the President on February 25. The Ambassador had stated that the President read it with care and remarked that it was transcendental but that its receipt placed him in a somewhat embarrassing position as he had expressed himself as opposed to secret negotiations. He welcomed the King's intervention. He would have to examine the communication with care before replying. The Ambassador had added that while it was difficult to penetrate the President's reserve he was left with the impression that the receipt of the communication was an enormous surprise to the President.

The above is a summary of a translation which probably suffered by being several times removed from the language in which the interview took place.

King Alfonso's message also contained his Ambassador's version of the latter's remarks to the President at the interview but most of this is unintelligible owing to many of the cipher groups having been "jammed."

In another telegram of the same date to Czernin Fürstenberg reported that he had been able to satisfy himself through other sources (presumably either through knowledge of the Spanish cipher or through persons in the King's *entourage*) that His Majesty's version of his Ambassador's report was accurate in all essential particulars.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 138.



File No. 763.72119/1436

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, March 5, 1918.

[Received March 7, 1.35 a. m.]

2781. Vienna press, March 1, reports excerpts from speech of Doctor Lammasch before Austrian Upper House, attacking address of Dr. Pattai who is said to represent in Austria principles of German Vaterlands Partei:

Never has Austria been as close to honourable peace as at present. Only danger threatening country is anarchy from east, but we cannot meet this danger in Russia or the Ukraine, but only by fighting it in our own country—by fulfilling people's just desires, by giving nationalities right to self-government, and by giving peoples bread, peace, and an opportunity for quiet work.

It is the merit of Count Czernin that America is pretty obviously holding out a hand to us, perhaps not for peace, but at least for negotiations. Nothing prevents our grasping the outstretched hand. We could enter into negotiations with primary object of finding out war aims of opponents and of stating those of Central Powers. This result cannot be reached by public discussion, especially in case of Entente made up as it is of twelve different states with divergent interests. It will therefore be best, as German Chancellor hinted, to conduct negotiations not among all belligerents, but in a small committee where we can speak openly and clearly. It is obvious that we must keep faith with allies during negotiations. It would be ungrateful to leave allies in hour of danger, but hour of danger is past for them.

One should not draw parallel between Trieste and Strassburg. We have duty to defend Strassburg and assure possessions of German Empire, but are not obliged to defend present constitutional status of Alsace-Lorraine. If peace is possible on supposition that Alsace-Lorraine becomes autonomous federal state we have no reason to carry war further in order that provinces should remain imperial territory with Prussian administration. There are signs that opponents would be content with this concession. It is our duty also to give to single nations of Austria greater measure of self-government. In this way we would consolidate our situation. Nations have not shed their blood for "peace of victory", but for lasting and sure peace based on reconciliation of nations. It is great merit of our Emperor that he has accepted principle of such peace as outlined by Pope. The last message of President Wilson did not touch territorial questions and America has not participated in political discussion at Versailles, because Wilson was not supporting imperialistic policy, especially of Italy. Regrettable that although conversation between Austria and America has its origin in Austria it was not carried on by Austria, but by German Empire. Last speech of Count Hertling great progress in direction of peace as is also Wilson's last message.

Question now arises whether Austrian people can best secure its most sacred [possessions] by continuation of war or by making

honourable peace. If America's offer is now refused the war will last years. On one side is America which alone can make peace, on other Austria-Hungary led by our Emperor in whom all nations have confidence.

Vienna press reports that speech of Lammasch caused great disturbance in House and interruptions from all sides. When he said that Austria was not in duty bound to fight for present constitution status Alsace-Lorraine exclamations that speaker interfered in domestic affairs of Germany. At several places in Lammasch speech such excitement prevailed as has rarely shown itself in Upper House.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/9114

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 7, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received March 8, 12.33 a. m.]

8946. Your 6719, February 28, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> My 8860, March 1, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup> I can now report views of Webb, Brailsford and Henderson which I summarize briefly as follows:

First, there has been no opportunity of testing the reception by British Labor of the recent memorandum on war aims of the international conference<sup>3</sup> published in the *Times* of February 25, but all agree that since the general principles enumerated in that memorandum are practically identical with those approved by British Labor at Blackpool last August, and by enormous majorities at two conferences held since, there can be no doubt that British Labor strongly supports the general principles embodied in the international memorandum, particularly those of the League of Nations, of disarmament, and of no economic or tariff boycotts after the war. The specific territorial claims put forward in the international memorandum stand in quite a different category from the general principles and except in so far as they logically follow from or illustrate those principles, British Labor has no direct interest in such claims; they were inserted in the memorandum at the instance of the various foreign delegations represented in London, and British Labor men realize that in many points of detail these claims will be subject to modification.

Second, of the five delegates to the United States authorized by the International Conference, only three have as yet been chosen:

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 142.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 143.

<sup>3</sup> *Post*, p. 155.

Jouhaux, Secretary French Confédération du Travail, Lieutenant Demaine, a Belgian Socialist, and Huysmans, Secretary of the International. J. H. Thomas, Secretary, Railway Men's Union, is strongly urged to go both by Webb and Henderson and will probably represent British Labor. An Italian representative acceptable both to [omission] Reform Socialists has not yet been chosen.

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File No. 763.72Su/25a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain*  
(Page)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1918, 7 p. m.*

6841. You are instructed to deliver the following message from the United States Government to the Government to which you are accredited, advising General Bliss of the contents thereof:

The United States Government has been advised by General Bliss, its military representative on the Supreme War Council, of the resolution taken by the Executive War Board of the Supreme War Council on March 4 or 5 with reference to the creation of the inter-Allied general reserve provided for by the Supreme War Council at its session of February 2. While admitting the possibility that the military situation on the British front may make it impracticable to assign British divisions to the inter-Allied general reserve, nevertheless the United States Government hopes that the principle involved in establishing such a general reserve will not be abandoned, and that the Allies who are able to contribute to such reserve will promptly do so.<sup>1</sup>

POLK

File No. 763.72/9181

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *March 15, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received 7.42 p. m.]

9069. My 8946, March 7, 11 p. m. In addition to the three delegates mentioned, namely, Jouhaux, Demaine and Huysmans, the following have now been appointed: for Great Britain, G. Stewart Bunning, Secretary, Postmen's Federation and a member of Labor Party Committee; for Italy, Canopa, reformist and supporter of Bissolati. Besides Jouhaux, who is a Trade Union representative,

<sup>1</sup> See also telegram to the Ambassador, No. 6935, Mar. 19, *post*, p. 168.

the French are also sending as political representative, Cachin, the deputy who went to Russia last summer with Moutet. Henderson states that he hopes the six delegates will sail next week. J. H. Thomas is unable to leave and although Henderson says he is loath to have Huysmans leave London, Huysmans himself informed me last night that he would go to the United States without fail.

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File No. 763.72/9182

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, March 14, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received March 16, 7.10 a. m.]

1472. The Minister of Treasury, Nitti, called on me and made with great earnestness a statement to the following effect: That in Italy great reliance is placed on the United States; that Italy is the only country of the Entente in imminent danger; that, Russia having fallen, only two fronts remain, the French and Italian; that France has drawn to herself all the great forces of the Entente and has now about 9,000,000 soldiers defending her front, of which less than half are French; and that, moreover, France has also all the economic advantages which are tremendous; that Italy, on the other hand, is alone on her terrible front, save for less than 200,000 French and British soldiers, and has against her nearly the entire army of Austria besides contingents which the Turks, Bulgarians and Germans have furnished and will continue to furnish; that Austria-Hungary, moreover, has in her favor all the advantages of the frontier; that Germany will first strike Italy as the weakest section of the Allied front in hopes of obtaining the great resources of northern Italy, and if she succeeds will then drive Allied armies from Balkans and Palestine, thus saving Turkish Empire, subjecting to herself northern Italy, the Balkans, Turkey with Palestine and Mesopotamia, and finally Russia, or a great part thereof; that Italy is in urgent need of aid with many of her railways stopped and many of her munition factories closing exclusively for want of fuel; that the Allies do not show enough friendly cooperation in this field; that France has now a coal consumption ten times greater than that of Italy, and Italy would be content with one-sixth of coal used by France, but to live and make war she must have at least 650,000 tons of coal per month and quickly, 20,000 freight cars and 200 railway locomotives; that England and France can give everything needed, but will not do so unless the Government of the United States exercises opportune pressure; that there are 3,000,000 Italian subjects in America and one might say all the



Italians have relations [there]; that in this moment of real danger, nothing would strengthen morale of the people more than to send at once detachments of American troops to Italy where even two or three regiments would be useful; that military leaders naturally prefer a single army and point of attack, but American generals should recognize need of action in Italy; that in Italy great confidence is felt in American cooperation with war and in the effective pressure which the United States can exercise on England and France in favor of Italy, but in order to be effective her action should be immediate.

I send the foregoing by cable at Nitti's express request that it be brought to the attention of the President immediately, and I myself feel that the situation is of such gravity as to demand immediate and serious consideration. Nitti's memorandum certainly presents a case of great urgency.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1546a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 16, 1918, 5 p. m.*

6912. What action did Socialist Conference take respecting British participation in Stockholm conference in case Germany is represented, also in case Germany not represented? Department desires copy of secret proposal reported submitted by Thomas to British Labor Party and Socialist Conference. Cable substance of this proposal.

LANSING

Memorandum of the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference on War Aims, February 23 (Received March 18)—Proposals for a Discussion between Socialist and Labor Parties of the Allied and Central Powers and for an Allied Socialist Mission to the United States; Attitude of the American Government—Allied Reverses in France: American Assurances of Reenforcements—Communications Exchanged between President Wilson and Emperor Charles—The American Labor Mission to Europe

File No. 763.72119/1489

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

No. 8442

LONDON, *March 1, 1918.*

[Received March 18.]

SIR: With reference to my telegram No. 8860 of March 1, 1918, 6 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> in regard to the war aims of the Inter-Allied [Labor] and Socialist Conference, I have the honor to transmit herewith en-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 143.

closed, for the information of the Department, the memoranda in full adopted by the conference, together with newspaper comments<sup>1</sup> on the same subject.

I have [etc.]

For the Ambassador:

F. M. GUNTHER

[Enclosure]

*Memorandum on War Aims, Adopted by the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference at London, February 23, 1918*

THE WAR

I. The Inter-Allied Conference declares that whatever may have been the causes of the outbreak of war, it is clear that the peoples of Europe, who are necessarily the chief sufferers from its horrors, had themselves no hand in it. Their common interest is now so to conduct the terrible struggle in which they find themselves engaged as to bring it, as soon as may be possible, to an issue in a secure and lasting peace for the world.

The Conference sees no reason to depart from the following declaration unanimously agreed to at the Conference of the Socialist and Labour Parties of the Allied nations on February 14, 1915:

This Conference cannot ignore the profound general causes of the European conflict, itself a monstrous product of the antagonisms which tear asunder capitalist society and of the policy of colonial dependencies and aggressive imperialism, against which International Socialism has never ceased to fight, and in which every government has its share of responsibility.

The invasion of Belgium and France by the German armies threatens the very existence of independent nationalities, and strikes a blow at all faith in treaties. In these circumstances a victory for German imperialism would be the defeat and the destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe. The Socialists of Great Britain, Belgium, France, and Russia do not pursue the political and economic crushing of Germany; they are not at war with the peoples of Germany and Austria, but only with the Governments of those countries by which they are oppressed. They demand that Belgium shall be liberated and compensated. They desire that the question of Poland shall be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Polish people, either in the sense of autonomy in the midst of another state, or in that of complete independence. They wish that throughout all Europe, from Alsace-Lorraine to the Balkans, those populations that have been annexed by force shall receive the right freely to dispose of themselves.

While inflexibly resolved to fight until victory is achieved to accomplish this task of liberation, the Socialists are none the less resolved to resist any attempt to transform this defensive war into a

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

war of conquest, which would only prepare fresh conflicts, create new grievances, and subject various peoples more than ever to the double plague of armaments and war.

Satisfied that they are remaining true to the principles of the International, the members of the Conference express the hope that the working classes of all the different countries will before long find themselves united again in their struggle against militarism and capitalist imperialism. The victory of the Allied Powers must be a victory for popular liberty, for unity, independence, and autonomy of the nations in the peaceful federation of the United States of Europe and the world.

### MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY

II. Whatever may have been the objects for which the war was begun, the fundamental purpose of the Inter-Allied Conference in supporting the continuance of the struggle is that the world may henceforth be made safe for democracy.

Of all the conditions of peace none is so important to the peoples of the world as that there should be henceforth on earth no more war.

Whoever triumphs, the peoples will have lost unless an international system is established which will prevent war. What would it mean to declare the right of peoples to self-determination if this right were left at the mercy of new violations, and was not protected by a super-national authority? That authority can be no other than the League of Nations, in which not only all the present belligerents, but every other independent state, should be pressed to join.

The constitution of such a league of nations implies the immediate establishment of an international high court, not only for the settlement of all disputes between states that are of justiciable nature, but also for prompt and effective mediation between states in other issues that vitally interest the power or honour of such states. It is also under the control of the League of Nations that the consultation of peoples for purposes of self-determination must be organized. This popular right can be vindicated only by popular vote. The League of Nations shall establish the procedure of international jurisdiction, fix the methods which will maintain the freedom and security of the election, restore the political rights of individuals which violence and conquest may have injured, repress any attempt to use pressure or corruption, and prevent any subsequent reprisals. It will be also necessary to form an international legislature, in which the representatives of every civilized state would have their allotted share, and energetically to push forward, step by step, the development of international legislation agreed to by, and definitely binding upon, the several states.

By a solemn agreement all the states and peoples consulted shall pledge themselves to submit every issue between two or more of them for settlement as aforesaid. Refusal to accept arbitration or to submit to the settlement will imply deliberate aggression, and all the nations will necessarily have to make common cause, by using any and every means at their disposal, either economical or military, against any state or states refusing to submit to the arbitration award, or attempting to break the world's covenant of peace.

But the sincere acceptance of the rules and decisions of the supernational authority implies the complete democratization in all countries; the removal of all the arbitrary powers who, until now, have assumed the right of choosing between peace and war; the maintenance or creation of legislatures elected by and on behalf of the sovereign right of the people; the suppression of secret diplomacy, to be replaced by the conduct of foreign policy under the control of popular legislatures, and the publication of all treaties, which must never be in contravention of the stipulation of the League of Nations, with the absolute responsibility of the Government, and more particularly of the foreign minister of each country to its legislature.

Only such a policy will enforce the frank abandonment of every form of imperialism. When based on universal democracy, in a world in which effective international guarantees against aggression have been secured, the League of Nations will achieve the complete suppression of force as the means of settling international differences.

The League of Nations, in order to prepare for the concerted abolition of compulsory military service in all countries, must first take steps for the prohibition of fresh armaments on land and sea, and for the common limitation of the existing armaments by which all the peoples are burdened; as well as the control of war manufactures and the enforcement of such agreements as may be agreed to thereupon. The states must undertake such manufactures themselves, so as entirely to abolish profit-making armament firms, whose pecuniary interest lies always in the war scares and progressive competition in the preparation for war.

The nations, being armed solely for self-defence and for such action as the League of Nations may ask them to take in defence of international right, will be left free, under international control, either to create a voluntarily recruited force or to organize the nation for defence without professional armies for long terms of military service.

To give effect to the above principles, the Inter-Allied Conference declares that the rules upon which the League of Nations will be founded must be included in the treaty of peace, and will henceforward become the basis of the settlement of differences. In that



spirit the Conference expresses its agreement with the propositions put forward by President Wilson in his last message :

(1) That each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent ;

(2) That peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now for ever discredited, of the balance of power ; but that

(3) Every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states.

(4) That all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe, and consequently of the world.

#### TERRITORIAL QUESTIONS

III. The Inter-Allied Conference considers that the proclamation of principles of international law accepted by all nations, and the substitution of a regular procedure for the forceful acts by which states calling themselves sovereign have hitherto adjusted their differences—in short, the establishment of a league of nations—gives an entirely new aspect to territorial problems.

The old diplomacy and the yearnings after domination by states, or even by peoples, which during the whole of the 19th century have taken advantage of and corrupted the aspirations of nationalities, have brought Europe to a condition of anarchy and disorder which have led inevitably to the present catastrophe.

The Conference declares it to be the duty of the Labour and Socialist movement to suppress without hesitation the imperialist designs in the various states which have led one government after another to seek, by the triumph of military force, to acquire either new territories or economic advantage.

The establishment of a system of international law, and the guarantees afforded by a league of nations, ought to remove the last excuse for those strategic protections which nations have hitherto felt bound to require.

It is the supreme principle of the right of each people to determine its own destiny that must now decide what steps should be taken by way of restitution or reparation, and whatever territorial readjustments may be found to be necessary at the close of the present war.

The Conference accordingly emphasizes the importance to the Labour and Socialist movement of a clear and exact definition of what is meant by the right of each people to determine its own destiny. Neither destiny of race nor identity of language can be regarded as affording more than presumption in favour of federation or unification. During the 19th century theories of this kind have so often served as a cloak for aggression that the International cannot but seek to prevent any recurrence of such an evil. Any adjustments of boundaries that become necessary must be based exclusively upon the desire of the people concerned.

It is true that it is impossible for the necessary consultation of the desires of the people concerned to be made in any fixed and invariable way for all the cases in which it is required, and that the problems of nationality and territory are not the same for the inhabitants of all countries. Nevertheless, what is necessary in all cases is that the procedure to be adopted should be decided, not by one of the parties to the dispute, but by the supernational authority.

Upon the basis of the general principles herein formulated the Conference proposes the following solutions of particular problems:

(a) *Belgium*

The Conference emphatically insists that a foremost condition of peace must be the reparation by the German Government, under the direction of an international commission, of the wrong admittedly done to Belgium; payment by that Government for all the damage that has resulted from this wrong; and the restoration of Belgium as an independent sovereign State, leaving to the decision of the Belgian people the determination of their own future policy in all respects.

(b) *Alsace and Lorraine*

The Conference declares that the problem of Alsace and Lorraine is not one of territorial adjustment, but one of right, and thus an international problem the solution of which is indispensable if peace is to be either just or lasting.

The treaty of Frankfort at one and the same time mutilated France and violated the right of the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine to dispose of their own destinies, a right which they have repeatedly claimed.

The new treaty of peace, in recognizing that Germany, by her declaration of war of 1914, has herself broken the treaty of Frankfort, will make null and void the gains of a brutal conquest and of the violence committed against the people.

France, having secured this recognition, can properly agree to a fresh consultation of the population of Alsace and Lorraine as to its own desires.

The treaty of peace will bear the signatures of every nation in the world. It will be guaranteed by the League of Nations. To this League of Nations France is prepared to remit, with the freedom and sincerity of a popular vote, of which the details can be subsequently settled, the organization of such a consultation as shall settle for ever, as a matter of right, the future destiny of Alsace and Lorraine, and as shall finally remove from the common life of all Europe a quarrel which has imposed so heavy a burden upon it.

(c) *The Balkans*

The Conference lays down the principle that all the violations and perversions of the rights of the people which have taken place, or are still taking place, in the Balkans must be made the subject of redress or reparation.

Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Albania, and all the territories occupied by military force should be evacuated by the hostile forces. Wherever any population of the same race and tongue demands to be united this must be done. Each such people must be accorded full liberty to settle its own destiny, without regard to the imperialist pretensions of Austria, Hungary, Turkey, or other state.

Accepting this principle, the Conference proposes that the whole problem of the administrative reorganization of the Balkan peoples should be dealt with by a special conference of their representatives or in case of disagreement by an authoritative international commission on the basis of (a) the concession within each independent sovereignty of local autonomy and security for the development of its particular civilization of every racial minority; (b) the universal guarantee of freedom of religion and political equality for all races; (c) a customs and postal union embracing the whole of the Balkan states, with free access for each to its natural seaport; (d) the entry of all the Balkan states into a federation for the concerted arrangement by mutual agreement among themselves of all matters of common interest.

(d) *Italy*

The Conference declares its warmest sympathy with the people of Italian blood and speech who have been left outside the boundaries that have, as a result of the diplomatic agreements of the past, and for strategic reasons, been assigned to the Kingdom of Italy, and supports their claim to be united with those of their own race and tongue. It realizes that arrangements may be necessary for securing the legitimate interests of the people of Italy in the adjacent seas, but it condemns the aims of conquest of Italian

imperialism, and believes that all legitimate needs can be safeguarded, without precluding a like recognition of the needs of others or annexation of other people's territories.

Regarding the Italian population dispersed on the eastern shores of the Adriatic, the relations between Italy and the Yugo-Slav populations must be based on principles of equity and conciliation, so as to prevent any cause of future quarrel.

If there are found to be groups of Slavonian race within the newly defined Kingdom of Italy, or groups of Italian race in Slavonian territory, mutual guarantees must be given for the assurance of all of them, on one side or the other, full liberty of local self-government and of the natural development of their several activities.

*(e) Poland and the Baltic Provinces*

In accordance with the right of every people to determine its own destinies, Poland must be reconstituted in unity and independence with free access to the sea.

The Conference declares further that any annexation by Germany, whether open or disguised, of Livonia, Courland, or Lithuania would be a flagrant and wholly inadmissible violation of international law.

*(f) The Jews and Palestine*

The Conference demands for the Jews in all countries the same elementary rights of freedom of religion, education, residence, and trade and equal citizenship that ought to be extended to all the inhabitants of every nation. It further expresses the opinion that Palestine should be set free from the harsh and oppressive government of the Turk, in order that this country may form a free state, under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return and may work out their own salvation free from interference by those of alien race or religion.

*(g) The Problem of the Turkish Empire*

The Conference condemns the handing back to the systematically cruel domination of the Turkish Government any subject people. Thus, whatever may be proposed with regard to Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, they cannot be restored to the tyranny of the Sultan and his pashas. The Conference condemns the imperialist aims of governments and capitalists who would make of these and other territories now dominated by the Turkish hordes merely instruments either of exploitation or militarism. If the peoples of these territories do not feel themselves able to settle their own destinies, the Conference insists that, conformably with the policy



of "no annexations", they should be placed for administration in the hands of a commission acting under the super-national authority or League of Nations. It is further suggested that the peace of the world requires that the Dardanelles should be permanently and effectively neutralized and opened like all the main lines of marine communication, under the control of the League of Nations, freely to all nations, without hindrance or customs duties.

(h) *Austria-Hungary*

The Conference does not propose as a war aim dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or its deprivation of economic access to the sea. On the other hand, the Conference cannot admit that the claims to independence made by the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs must be regarded merely as questions for internal decision. National independence ought to be accorded, according to rules to be laid down by the League of Nations, to such peoples as demand it, and these communities ought to have the opportunity of determining their own groupings and federations according to their affinities and interests. If they think fit they are free to substitute a free federation of Danubian states for the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

(i) *The Colonies and Dependencies*

The International has always condemned the colonial policy of capitalist governments. Without ceasing to condemn it, the Inter-Allied Conference nevertheless recognizes the existence of a state of things which it is obliged to take into account.

The Conference considers that the treaty of peace ought to secure to the natives in all colonies and dependencies effective protection against the excesses of capitalist colonialism. The Conference demands the concession of administrative autonomy for all groups of people that attain a certain degree of civilization, and for all the others a progressive participation in local government.

The Conference is of opinion that the return of the colonies to those who possessed them before the war, or the exchanges or compensations which might be effected, ought not to be an obstacle to the making of peace.

Those colonies that have been taken by conquest from any belligerent must be made the subject of special consideration at the peace conference, as to which the communities in their neighbourhood will be entitled to take part. But the clause in the treaty of peace on this point must secure economic equality in such territories for the peoples of all nations, and thereby guarantee that none are shut out from legitimate access to raw materials, prevented from dis-

posing of their own products, or deprived of their proper share of economic development.

As regards more especially the colonies of all the belligerents in tropical Africa, from sea to sea, including the whole of the region north of the Zambesi and south of the Sahara, the Conference condemns any imperialist idea which would make these countries the booty of one or several nations, exploit them for the profit of the capitalist, or use them for the promotion of the militarist aims of the governments.

With respect to these colonies, the Conference declares in favour of a system of control, established by international agreement under the League of Nations and maintained by its guarantee, which, whilst respecting national sovereignty, would be alike inspired by broad conceptions of economic freedom and concerned to safeguard the rights of the natives under the best conditions possible for them, and in particular:

(1) It would take account in each locality of the wishes of the people, expressed in the form which is possible to them.

(2) The interests of the native tribes as regards the ownership of the soil would be maintained.

(3) The whole of the revenues would be devoted to the well-being and development of the colonies themselves.

#### ECONOMIC RELATIONS

IV. The Inter-Allied Conference declares against all the projects now being prepared by imperialists and capitalists, not in any one country only, but in most countries, for an economic war, after peace has been secured, either against one or other foreign nation or against all foreign nations, as such an economic war, if begun by any country, would inevitably lead to reprisals, to which each nation in turn might in self-defence be driven. The main lines of marine communication should be open without hindrance to vessels of all nations under the protection of the League of Nations. The Conference realizes that all attempts at economic aggression, whether by protective tariffs or capitalist trusts or monopolies, inevitably result in the spoliation of the working classes of the several countries for the profit of the capitalists; and the working class see in the alliance between the military imperialists and the fiscal protectionists in any country whatsoever not only a serious danger to the prosperity of the masses of the people, but also a grave menace to peace. On the other hand, the right of each nation to the defence of its own economic interests, and, in face of the world shortage hereinafter mentioned, to the conservation for its own people of a sufficiency of its own supplies of foodstuffs and raw materials, cannot

be denied. The Conference accordingly urges upon the Labour and Socialist Parties of all countries the importance of insisting, in the attitude of the government towards commercial enterprise, along with the necessary control of supplies for its own people, on the principle of the open door, and without hostile discrimination against foreign countries. But it urges equally the importance, not merely of conservation, but also of the utmost possible development, by appropriate government action, of the resources of every country for the benefit not only of its own people, but also of the world, and the need for an international agreement for the enforcement in all countries of the legislation on factory conditions, a maximum eight-hour day, the prevention of "sweating" and unhealthy trades necessary to protect the workers against exploitation and oppression, and the prohibition of night work by women and children.

#### THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE

V. To make the world safe for democracy involves much more than the prevention of war, either military or economic. It will be a device of the capitalist interests to pretend that the treaty of peace need concern itself only with the cessation of the struggles of the armed forces and with any necessary territorial readjustments. The Inter-Allied Conference insists that, in view of the probable world-wide shortage, after the war, of exportable foodstuffs and raw materials, and of merchant shipping, it is imperative, in order to prevent the most serious hardships, and even possible famine, in one country or another, that systematic arrangements should be made on an international basis for the allocation and conveyance of the available exportable surpluses of these commodities to the different countries, in proportion, not to their purchasing powers, but to their several pressing needs; and that, within each country, the government must for some time maintain its control of the most indispensable commodities, in order to secure their appropriation, not in a competitive market mainly to the richer classes in proportion to their means, but, systematically, to meet the most urgent needs of the whole community on the principle of "no cake for anyone until all have bread."

Moreover, it cannot but be anticipated that, in all countries, the dislocation of industry attendant on peace, the instant discharge of millions of munition makers and workers in war trades, and the demobilization of millions of soldiers—in face of the scarcity of industrial capital, the shortage of raw materials, and the insecurity of commercial enterprise—will, unless prompt and energetic action be taken by the several governments, plunge a large part of the wage-earning population into all the miseries of unemployment more



or less prolonged. In view of the fact that widespread unemployment in any country, like a famine, is an injury not to that country alone, but impoverishes also the rest of the world, the Conference holds that it is the duty of every government to take immediate action, not merely to relieve the unemployed, when unemployment has set in, but actually, so far as may be practicable, to prevent the occurrence of unemployment. It therefore urges upon the Labour Parties of every country the necessity of their pressing upon their governments the preparation of plans for the execution of all the innumerable public works (such as the making and repairing of roads, railways, and waterways, the erection of schools and public buildings, the provision of working-class dwellings, and the reclamation and afforestation of land) that will be required in the near future, not for the sake of finding measures of relief for the unemployed, but with a view to these works being undertaken at such a rate in each locality as will suffice, together with the various capitalist enterprises that may be in progress, to maintain at a fairly uniform level year by year, and throughout each year, the aggregate demand for labour, and thus prevent there being any unemployed. It is now known that in this way it is quite possible for any government to prevent, if it chooses, the occurrence of any widespread or prolonged involuntary unemployment, which, if it is now in any country allowed to occur, is as much the result of government neglect as is any epidemic disease.

#### RESTORATION OF THE DEVASTATED AREAS AND REPARATION OF WRONG-DOING

VI. The Inter-Allied Conference holds that one of the most imperative duties of all countries immediately peace is declared will be the restoration, so far as may be possible, of the homes, farms, factories, public buildings, and means of communication wherever destroyed by war operations; that the restoration should not be limited to compensation for public buildings, capitalist undertakings, and material property proved to be destroyed or damaged, but should be extended to setting up the wage-earners and peasants themselves in homes and employment; and that to ensure the full and impartial application of these principles the assessment and distribution of the compensation, so far as the cost is contributed by any international fund, should be made under the direction of an international commission.

The Conference will not be satisfied unless there is a full and free judicial investigation into the accusations made on all sides that particular governments have ordered, and particular officers have exercised, acts of cruelty, oppression, violence, and theft against



individual victims, for which no justification can be found in the ordinary usages of war. It draws attention, in particular, to the loss of life and property of merchant seamen and other noncombatants (including women and children) resulting from this inhuman and ruthless conduct. It should be part of the conditions of peace that there should be forthwith set up a court of claims and accusations, which should investigate all such allegations as may be brought before it, summon the accused person or government to answer the complaint, to pronounce judgment, and award compensation or damages, payable by the individual or government condemned, to the persons who had suffered wrong, or to their dependents. The several governments must be responsible, financially and otherwise, for the presentation of the cases of their respective nationals to such a court of claims and accusations, and for the payment of the compensation awarded.

#### INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

VII. The Inter-Allied Conference is of opinion that an international conference of Labour and Socialist organizations, held under proper conditions, would at this stage render useful service to world democracy by assisting to remove misunderstandings, as well as the obstacles which stand in the way of world peace.

Awaiting the resumption of the normal activities of the International Socialist Bureau, we consider that an international conference, held during the period of hostilities, should be organized by a committee whose impartiality cannot be questioned. It should be held in a neutral country, under such conditions as would inspire confidence; and the conference should be fully representative of all the Labour and Socialist movement in all the belligerent countries accepting the conditions under which the conference is convoked.

As an essential condition to an international conference, the Commission is of opinion that the organizers of the conference should satisfy themselves that all the organizations to be represented put in precise form, by a public declaration, their peace terms in conformity with the principles "No annexations or punitive indemnities, and the right of all peoples to self-determination", and that they are working with all their power to obtain from their governments the necessary guarantees to apply these principles honestly and unreservedly to all questions to be dealt with at any official peace conference.

In view of the vital differences between the Allied countries and the Central Powers, the Commission is of opinion that it is highly advisable that the conference should be used to provide an opportunity for the delegates from the respective countries now in a

state of war to make a full and frank statement of their present position and future intentions, and to endeavour by mutual agreement to arrange a programme of action for a speedy and democratic peace.

The Conference is of opinion that the working classes, having made such sacrifices during the war, are entitled to take part in securing a democratic world peace, and that M. Albert Thomas (France), M. Emile Vandervelde (Belgium), and Mr. Arthur Henderson (Great Britain) be appointed as a commission to secure from all the governments a promise that at least one representative of Labour and Socialism will be included in the official representation at any government conference, and to organize a Labour and Socialist representation to sit concurrently with the official conference; further, that no country be entitled to more than four representatives at such conference.

The Conference regrets the absence of representatives of American Labour and Socialism from the Inter-Allied Conference, and urges the importance of securing their approval of the decisions reached. With this object in view, the Conference agrees that a deputation, consisting of one representative from France, Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain, together with Camille Huysmans (secretary of the International Socialist Bureau), proceed to the United States at once, in order to confer with representatives of the American democracy on the whole situation of the war.

The Conference resolves to transmit to the Socialists of the Central Empires and of the nations allied with them the memorandum in which the Conference has defined the conditions of peace, conformably with the principles of Socialist and international justice. The Conference is convinced that these conditions will commend themselves on reflection to the mind of every Socialist, and the Conference asks for the answer of the Socialists of the Central Empires, in the hope that these will join without delay in a joint effort of the International, which has now become more than ever the best and the most certain instrument of democracy and peace.

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File No. 763.72Su/33

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *March 18, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[*Received 11.30 p. m.*]

23. At the close of the conference on the 16th instant the British and Italian Prime Ministers, accompanied by Mr. Balfour and

Signor Bissolati,<sup>1</sup> adjourned to the Foreign Office where they were met by the Italian Ambassador in London. At this conference article 15 of the secret treaty between Great Britain and Italy was discussed, I was informed.

FRAZIER

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File No. 763.72/9406a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 19, 1918, 2 p. m.*

6935. You are instructed to present textually the following to the Government to which you are accredited:

The resolutions formally adopted by the Supreme War Council at its fourth session held in London on March 14, 1918,<sup>3</sup> with reference to the question of the inter-Allied general reserve, have been transmitted to the United States Government by General Bliss, the military representative of the United States Government on the Supreme War Council. These resolutions meet with the entire approval of the United States Government.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72119/1477

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *March 19, 1918, 2 p. m.*

[Received 2.11 p. m.]

9116. Your 6912, March 16, 5 p. m.<sup>4</sup> Inter-Allied Socialist Conference in resolution, forwarded to Department in my despatch No. 8522, March 11,<sup>5</sup> provided that international conference shall be held in some neutral country organized by committee of neutral Socialists and attended by full representation of Socialists from belligerent countries. Henderson and Huysmans state that no such international conference could be held if German Socialists were absent, or even if Minority German Socialists were not represented. Henderson says the Prime Minister told him in December that British Socialists would be allowed to proceed to such a conference only in case German Government allowed that the conference to [should] be attended by both Minority and Majority German

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<sup>1</sup> Italian diplomatic representative on the Supreme War Council.

<sup>2</sup> The same, on the same date, to the Ambassador in France (No. 3333) with the addition: "Advise Frazier of contents."

<sup>3</sup> The resolutions referred to were in fact adopted on Mar. 14 and 15, 1918, the dates of the second and third meetings of the session.

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 154.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.

Socialists. No secret proposal was submitted to recent conference by either Albert Thomas of France or J. H. Thomas of England. Henderson and Huysmans both state that they would certainly have seen such a secret document had it existed.

PAGE

File No. 763.72119So

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 19, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received March 20, 1.18 p. m.]

28. For the President and the Secretary:

Conference of the 16th instant. Mr. Lloyd George made the statement that the Allied Governments might soon expect a demand from the Socialists and the Labor Party for an international conference where the Allied representatives could meet those of the enemy. As the last Socialist conference at London had reached an agreement regarding the war aims of the Allies it was probable that the Socialists would make a definite request to proceed perhaps to Berne for the purpose of discussing peace terms with enemy Socialists. He thought it highly important that the Allied Governments should all make the same reply to such a demand.

M. Clemenceau said he would reply by a frank explanation; the question had often arisen in France, but all Governments of all shades of opinion had consistently opposed [desires of] Allied Socialists to meet and discuss peace terms with the Germans. Inasmuch as there existed in Great Britain, France and Italy, Governments which were the sole proper organs to discuss terms of peace and war, it would imply a tendency to substitute some Socialist representatives for the Governments if the request of the Socialists were granted. There were also moral obligations; peace conversations would mean discussion with the enemy and this might prove a serious danger to the Allied nations in view of the enormous effort made and the long duration of the war. M. Clemenceau said he dreaded these discussions, for, although they would be entered into in good faith by French and British Socialists, the German Socialists would not enter them with equally good faith. He went so far as to say that under the present conditions no reasonable basis for a discussion of peace terms existed; only yesterday in Berlin at the by-election the Socialist vote was given for the imperialistic candidate. He deemed it the duty of the Governments to try to



make their Socialists understand the position without actually discouraging them; in fact he thought that, at the present time, any proposal for international Socialist conference would be premature.

Signor Orlando said that it was a very difficult and delicate question; he was opposed to any conference; he agreed with M. Clemenceau that the Allied Socialists might enter the conference in good faith while the Germans would enter it in bad faith. No one could say, however, that a resolution taken at the present time could be final for all time.

Signor Bissolati pointed out that the London Socialist conference had thrown out every proposal against the cause of the Allies. He considered, as far as Italy was concerned, that it would be dangerous to allow a meeting to take place with enemy Socialists; the refusal of the Government to allow such a meeting would be well received by all except the pacifists; since the Brest-Litovsk treaty of peace,<sup>1</sup> there was a general feeling in Italy that it would not be right to meet the enemy.

Mr. Balfour thought that it would be easy to refuse the Socialists without annoying them by replying in the sense that it was not an occasion when a discussion was desirable with German Socialists, who were the tools of their Government, and Russian Socialists, who lived in the clouds. Mr. Lloyd George said he would refuse on the ground that it was an affair of the Government and not of parties. He himself in addressing the British Labor Party had asked what answer he should give if English Liberals desired to meet German Liberals and if English Conservatives wished to meet German Conservatives. He had pointed out that the Socialists themselves had protested at the idea of British financiers meeting German financiers and yet if one party were allowed to confer with the enemy other parties should have the same right. Such a reply, however, would be inconsistent with Mr. Clemenceau's suggestion that the proposal was premature. Mr. Clemenceau said, having expressed the whole of his idea on the subject, he wished to leave himself a loophole of escape because he felt that, if at any time he found a party or a group in France capable of engaging serious ideas of peace with a corresponding party in the enemy country, he would not have the courage to oppose it.

Mr. Lloyd George stated that certain Socialist delegates consisting of Messrs. Jouhaux and Cachin for France, Canopa for Italy, and Camille Huysmans for Belgium, desired proceed to the United States to confer with Mr. Gompers and the Socialist Party of that country. They had approached the Shipping Comptroller for permission to sail for New York.

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<sup>1</sup> For text of treaty, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 442 *et seq.*

Mr. Balfour suggested that the United States should first be asked whether they desired that permits should be issued to these men.

M. Clemenceau said there was a great difference between associating themselves with permits to an international Socialist conference and those to proceed to America. He himself was quite ready to consider the French delegates' permits. He has been informed by one of M. Tardieu's assistants that Socialist delegates could do no harm in America, and would not be listened to by [any] individual. Recommended that the Allies send real working men to America, men who were not only practical workers, but also sound about the war. M. Clemenceau said that he had at once acted on this suggestion and had sent one working man from Lyons, who is a Socialist, and another man from Nancy, who, although not a Socialist, was a miner and has been working in the zone of fire for some time; he thought that [if] the British and Italian Governments were to do the same thing, excellent results might follow.

Signor Orlando accepted this suggestion which he thoroughly approved of.

The Conference decided that Mr. Balfour telegraph to the United States to ascertain if the American Government desired permits to be given to the Socialist deputation.

FRAZIER

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File No. 763.72119So

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 22, 1918, 4 p. m.*

3352. Frazier's No. 28, March 19, 12 noon. You may communicate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in substance the following as a statement of the attitude of this Government in regard to unofficial international conferences such as the proposed conference of representatives of the Socialist and Labor Parties of the countries at war:

The discussion of international questions of a political character by representatives of a political party or group with similar representatives from other countries can accomplish no good purpose and may seriously embarrass the government which are solely responsible to their people for the conduct of international affairs. The success of a democratic government depends upon submission to the will of the majority, which finds expression in the popular election of public agents authorized to exercise the sovereign

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<sup>1</sup> Repeated in telegrams dated Mar. 23, to the Ambassadors in Great Britain (No. 6993) and Italy (No. 1129) with instructions, respectively, to communicate the substance to the Foreign Secretary and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

power. Until those agents are replaced by the people their policies, so far as other nations are concerned, are the policies of the nation, and no course of action by individuals, except through the channels of internal politics, should be permitted when it tends to weaken or affect a government's international policies.

Unofficial international conferences upon political subjects, since they do not and cannot express the popular will of the nations from which the delegates come, are liable to cause confusion and create false impressions which may work irreparable harm in carrying out the national policies of the responsible authorities, and this is especially true if the conferees represent minority political parties and include representatives of enemy nations.

It would, therefore, in the opinion of this Government, be unwise and dangerous to the vital interests of a nation to permit, and much less to encourage, such unauthorized conferences during the progress of war when the national safety demands unity of purpose and undivided loyalty to the Government chosen by the people.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1501

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, March 22, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received March 24, 4.40 p. m.]

2919. Person referred to in my 2769, March 4,<sup>1</sup> contemplates returning home in a few days. Is there any message the Department desires to have intimated to him unofficially?

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/13355

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 24, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received 10.03 p. m.]

9196. For the President:

The Secretary of War and I have just called on Lord Derby who declared that the British setback in France is most serious and perilous. He would not call it a disaster but surely a most grave event. The Fifth British Army has suffered a bad defeat, all men and officers on leave in Britain have been ordered to France immediately. There is grave depression in London which, however, stiffens British resolution. Lord Derby and General Wilson, Chief of Staff, credit the story of a German gun which carries more than sixty miles. They lost no time in making known to Secretary Baker their desperate need of men and their hope of help from us. He is to have a

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 147.

further conference with them tomorrow after which I think he will telegraph you. Tomorrow the Secretary will see the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, and the King.

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 File No. 763.72119/8730

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, March 23, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received March 25, 7.25 a. m.]

2921. From reliable source it is reported that German Government is furious at Professor Lammasch in Vienna, and German Embassy made definite complaint to Austrian Government that Lammasch was engaged in pernicious agitation against Germany. It is stated that the representations amounted to a precipitate ultimatum. It was demanded that Emperor Charles disapprove Lammasch or face prospect of German occupation of Vienna. Austrian Government was obliged to make evasion and tentative disavowal of Lammasch's negotiations in Switzerland. Emperor personally stands by Lammasch and latter has announced he will fight to death to complete Austrian federation with autonomous states, complete separation from German policy, and a reorientation in accord with the Western Powers.

STOVALL

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 File No. 763.72Su/84

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council (Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 26, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received 1.41 p. m.]

36. Referring to my telegram No. 23, March 18, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> Signor Gallavresi of the Italian Legation in Berne informed me today that article 15 of the secret treaty between Great Britain and Italy had been imperfectly and inaccurately revealed by the Russian Maximalists.<sup>2</sup> The actual sense of the article was that Great Britain had agreed, in case the Pope proposed peace negotiations with any intention of reviving the question of temporal power, not to accept his intervention without consulting Italy. Gallavresi could not tell me to what extent this article had been modified at the meeting on the 16th instant in London.

FRAZIER

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 167.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 1, vol. I, pp. 497-500.



File No. 763.72/13346

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 26, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 2.36 p. m.]

9219. For the President and the Secretary:

Secretary Baker returned to France this morning, having spent Sunday and Monday here. He had interviews with the King and the principal members of the Government including the Prime Minister, Balfour, Derby, all heartily welcoming him and much gratified at his visit. They urged necessity of utmost and immediate American help in the present military crisis.

I understand Mr. Baker is including in a telegraphic report to you the Prime Minister's urgent hope which he expressed to both of us that the United States strain every effort to rush further military reinforcements to France at this most critical hour. The Prime Minister particularly wishes this not only for the help it will give but also for its steadying effect on the public mind in France and Great Britain.

The tense anxiety here was slightly relaxed last night but this morning the yet unpublished news is even worse than was indicated in my telegram of Sunday. The possibility is admitted in Government circles of a disastrous end of the war. Lord Derby remarked to me that if all possible American troops do not get in at once they may have no chance to get in at all. The British resolution has not weakened and every available man is being rushed from England to France.

The President's telegram to Haig was much appreciated here.

PAGE

File No. 763.72119So/5

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 26, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received 9.32 p. m.]

3453. Your 3352, March 22, 4 p. m. Upon communicating this morning to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the statement of the attitude of our Government in regard to unofficial international conferences, Mr. Pichon asked me to transmit to you his sincere thanks for such a clear and able exposition of that attitude. He told me that it exactly comported with the views upon the subject entertained by not only the British and French Governments, but by the Italian as well. He was very complimentary in his reference

to the manner in which these principles were fully set forth, saying that they well typified those upon which all democratic governments should be founded and administered.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/9490

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 26, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received March 27, 2.55 a. m.]

3455. In a conversation with Mr. Pichon at the Foreign Office this morning he informed me that while the French Government looked upon the military situation, growing out of the great struggle on the British front, as still grave, yet the outlook seemed to be more hopeful as the struggle continued. What gave him special encouragement was the fact that the Germans had been defeated in their main object, to drive a wedge in between the British and French forces at the point of their juncture, which point the enemy regarded as the weakest on the entire front. The prompt requisition, however, of large reserve force of the French Army not only defeated this plan, but actually succeeded in driving the Germans back.

Notwithstanding this hopeful feature the unpleasant fact remains that the Germans had actually succeeded in advancing from Ham—recently retaken by them—down as far as Noyon, which town they entered last night—a distance of approximately 12 miles on a direct line towards Paris. It would seem from the operations of German forces that they are planning to quickly reach Compiègne as their southern objective, which town is located about 50 miles from Paris, and on the north to take the important railroad center of Amiens. The fall of the latter, now within easy range their big guns, would bring very serious results. Except in few places the gains in territory made during the last few days by the Germans fairly represent the territory which they abandoned just a year ago, and which I visited in its entirety a week later, reporting to the Department the scene of wide-spread desolation left in the wake of that retreat.

In this connection Mr. Pichon said that the fact that all the trees within gunshot at that place have been cut down by the Germans, made now the holding of that territory by the Allied forces doubly difficult. Perhaps one of the most significant developments, remarked upon by him, which has grown out of the result of this offensive has been the placing of English troops in considerable numbers at the south end of their line under direct control of a French commander. The Minister told me, with a great deal of

satisfaction, that at that hour there is reason to believe the much desired principle of unity of command was being discussed with every prospect of this becoming an accomplished fact before the close of the day. This I know from personal knowledge has been one of the strongest contentions of Clemenceau since he became the head of the Government.

The more hopeful look upon the situation as promising a repetition of the experiences at Verdun where, after many outposts had been successfully carried, a final stand was eventually maintained against the enemy. Only the fact that the Germans have come in such overwhelming superiority of numbers makes the situation seem to me so full of danger. One of regrettable features thus far of the Allied retreat is the falling into the hands of the Germans of many institutions of relief established by Americans in that stricken district.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119So/1

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, March 26, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received March 27, 3.10 a. m.]

1488. Paraphrase your 1129, March 23, 4 [2] p. m.,<sup>1</sup> shown to Baron Sonnino who declared himself fully in accord with views expressed. Says that it would have good effect if it could be brought to the attention of public, which could be done when Parliament meets middle of April, without publishing it as a direct communication.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/13345

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to President Wilson*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 27, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received March 27, 11.58 a. m.]

I have returned to Paris and leave tonight for visit to Italian headquarters. Will sail for home April 1.

The situation here is very grave but seems better this morning than at any time since the offensive began. The French have taken over substantial part of the British line and reserves of both armies are now concentrated near chief point of attack which seems to be Amiens which is rail head for supplies of British front; its capture would be serious. A part of the German plan is to drive in between

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 171.

the French and British forces and for a while they were out of touch with [one] another. Communication was reestablished last night and the line of defense is now unbroken.

General Pershing is in full accord with General Pétain and General Haig and is placing all our men and resources here at their disposal. Our engineer troops are being brought up from the line of communications to aid Haig in the construction of new defensive positions and Pétain is placing four of our divisions in the line thus freeing divisions for use as battle reserves. This is the best use to be made of them, all agree. They will be in action but not as a corps as they have not had corps experience except in association with French divisions and under French corps commanders.

Both British and French people calm but serious. British have control of air but enemy is still able to use air service effectively.

BAKER

File No. 763.72119So/4a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 27, 1918, 7 p. m.*

3391. For Frazier from Colonel House:

In reply to message Arthur Henderson sent to the President through Buckler and you,<sup>1</sup> will you please express to him the President's sincere appreciation for the confidence he generously reposes in him and say that the President would like to convey to him the intimation that it would make a bad impression in this country if any group of men were to visit it who would be understood to represent a party, whether that party be national or international, the people of this country being just now intolerant of parties and impatient of special missions, and this quite irrespective of the welcome they might in other circumstances wish to extend to the individuals comprising the group.

LANSING

President Wilson's Files

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to President Wilson*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *March 28, 1918.*

[*Received 10.44 a. m.*]

A joint resolution of the advisers of the Supreme War Council<sup>2</sup> will reach you to-day with my recommendation appended. It seems

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see telegram from the Ambassador in Great Britain, No. 9069, Mar. 15, *ante*, p. 152. The Socialist delegates referred to finally did not come to the United States.

<sup>2</sup> *Infra.*



important for us not to insist upon carrying out an ideal program at a moment when all agree that the greatest need here is infantry and the use of shipping for other personnel decreases the number of infantry possible to be transported. Nevertheless I agree with General Pershing that we should keep constantly before the British and French that all our plans are ultimately in that direction. This for the two reasons: (1) we do not want either nation to rely upon us for replacements, and (2) we want the Germans to know that we are augmenting the present Allied forces and not merely making good [their] losses. Moreover, (American?) sentiment must be satisfied. After full consideration I believe you should approve the joint resolution in the manner suggested in my note attached to the copy sent you by General Bliss. General Pershing will then be free to make necessary stipulations with French and British commanders for the use and ultimate return of these units and General Pershing's judgment of the military situation will determine when they can safely be reincorporated in American forces.

BAKER

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War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Cables Section Files

*The Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss) to  
the Adjutant General (McCain)*

[Telegram]

VERSAILLES, *March 28, 1918.*

67. Paragraph 1. The Secretary of War this morning directed this telegram be sent direct to the President with copy for Secretary of State and Secretary of War and Chief of Staff. Following Joint Note 18 of the permanent military representatives with the Supreme War Council is transmitted for the action of the President. Following the text of the joint note are the recommendations of the Secretary of War dictated by him this morning.

Paragraph 2. The following joint note 18 was adopted by the permanent military representatives March 27, 1918: <sup>1</sup>

1. In paragraph 4 of joint note No. 12 dated 12th [21st] January, 1918,<sup>2</sup> the Military Representatives agreed as follows:

After the most careful and searching enquiry they were agreed on the point that the security of France could also be assured. But in view of the strength of the attack which the enemy is able to develop on this front, an attack which, in the opinion of the Military Representatives could reach a strength of 96 divisions (excluding rein-

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<sup>1</sup>The text of joint note 18 follows a photostat of the original received later (File No. 763.728u/138).

<sup>2</sup>See telegram from the Ambassador in France, No. 3087, Jan. 24, *ante*, p. 36.

forcements by *roulement*), they feel compelled to add that France will be safe during 1918 only under certain conditions, namely:

(a) That the strength of the British and French troops in France are continuously kept up to their present total strength, and that they receive the expected reinforcement of not less than two American divisions per month.

2. The battle which is developing at the present moment in France and which can extend to the other theatres of operations may very quickly place the Allied armies in a serious situation from the point of view of effectives, and the Military Representatives are from this moment of opinion that the above-detailed condition (a) can no longer be maintained and they consider as a general proposition that the new situation requires new decisions.

The Military Representatives are of opinion that it is highly desirable that the American Government should assist the Allied armies as soon as possible by permitting, in principle, the temporary service of American units in Allied army corps and divisions; such reinforcements must, however, be obtained from other units than those American divisions which are now operating with the French, and the units so temporarily employed must eventually be returned to the American Army.

3. The Military Representatives are of opinion that, from the present time, in execution of the foregoing, and until otherwise directed by the Supreme War Council, only American infantry and machine gun units, organised as that Government may decide, be brought to France, and that all agreements or conventions hitherto made in conflict with this decision be modified accordingly.

Paragraph 3. The following is the action recommended by the Secretary of War:

To the President: The foregoing resolutions were considered by General Tasker H. Bliss, General Pershing, and me. Paragraph 3 proposes a change in the order of shipment of American troops to France and necessarily postpones the organization and training of complete American divisions as parts of an independent American army. This ought to be conceded only in view of the present critical situation and continued only so long as that situation necessarily demands it. The question of replacements will continue to embarrass the British and French Governments, and efforts to satisfy that need by retaining American units assigned to them must be anticipated, but we must keep in mind the formation of an American army, while, at the same time, we must not seem to sacrifice joint efficiency at a critical moment to that object. Therefore, I recommend that you express your approval of the joint note in the following sense:

The purpose of the American Government is to render the fullest cooperation and aid, and therefore the recommendation of the Military Representatives with regard to the preferential transportation of American infantry and machine gun units in the present emergency is approved. Such units when transported will be under the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces and will be assigned for training and use by him in

his discretion. He will use these and all other military forces of the United States under his command in such manner as to render the greatest military assistance, keeping in mind always the determination of this Government to have its various military forces collected, as speedily as their training and the military situation will permit, into an independent American army, acting in concert with the armies of Great Britain and France, and all arrangements made by him for their temporary training and service will be made with that end in view. Baker.

BLISS

President Wilson's Files

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to President Wilson*

PARAPHRASE OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER TO LORD READING,  
DATED MARCH 28TH, 1918

Please see the President immediately and beg him to approve the action proposed in this telegram.

A great success has been won by the German forces and although, largely as a result of exhaustion, their advance has been stayed for the moment, there can be no doubt that they will make another terrific onslaught as soon as they possibly can with the object of capturing Amiens, the great railway centre, and effecting a separation between the French and British Armies. It is impossible to say that they will not succeed in their object although we are hurrying reinforcements with all possible speed to the crucial point.

It has unfortunately not proved possible to achieve through the machinery set up at Versailles the perfect co-operation between the British and French Armies which is essential, in spite of all the efforts that have been made to that end. This has been due to the inherent difficulty of welding into a single whole the armies of two or three different nationalities, and in no way to a lack of desire on the part of one Government or the other. In these circumstances a meeting took place yesterday between the British and French Governments and they decided, with a view to this grave defect being remedied, that General Foch should be entrusted with the co-ordinating authority over all the dispositions of the Allies on the western front. The arrangement is actually worded as follows:

General Foch has been entrusted by the British and French Governments with the task of co-ordinating the action of the Allied armies on the western front. He will consult for this purpose with the commanders-in-chief who are requested to furnish him with all necessary information.

We feel sure that the President will realise that the extreme urgency of the situation made it impossible to delay action for the purposes of consultation, and we are confident that he will approve



the decision which does no more than carry out the policy of unity of control which it had been intended to secure by the Versailles agreement and to which he gave his strong approval. The action of General Foch is of necessity confined for the moment to the co-ordination of the movements of the British and French Armies, but it is earnestly hoped that the President will agree to the same authority being exercised by him in regard to the movements of the American Army which it is desired shall come into the fight.

Further, it is of paramount importance that American troops should be sent to France with the utmost speed possible and I wish you to urge this on the President. Should the present object of the enemy, viz.: the separation of the British and French Armies, prove successful, the second operation will certainly be an attempt completely to destroy one of these armies while the other is being held. If this second operation also succeeds, he will turn upon the remaining one with the whole of his strength. If, on the other hand, the Allies now succeed in holding the enemy, my military advisers are of opinion that he will go off and help the Austrians to smash Italy, returning afterwards with Austro-Hungarian forces in an attempt to seize the Channel ports before our armies can again be made up to their fighting strength. The late spring or early summer of this year is, in any case, certain to see further fighting of the most desperate nature. France has no further reserves at her disposal. We are scraping men from every possible side. Our military age is being raised to 50 and possibly to 55, and we are considering whether conscription shall not be applied to Ireland. As we have already raised over five millions of men, it is inevitable, however, that the further numbers we can get by this scraping process will be small. It is, therefore, of vital importance that American troops of all arms should be poured into France as rapidly as possible, whatever may be the outcome of the present battle. I beg you to press this fact upon President Wilson with all the force you can. For the present it is not material which is required, but man power to make good the losses in killed, wounded and missing.

Finally, there is the question as to how to make available in the quickest possible time the American forces now in France and those which may arrive later on. I am advised that it is not possible to use many of the American divisions in active operations in their present state of training. As regiments they are, however, excellent. Arrangements for the use of a great part of his force have already been made with General Pershing, and we should like to know if the President would agree to the brigading, during the crisis, of all other units that may become available with French or British divisions, as regiments are fit for incorporation into experienced divisions long before they can be formed into divisions by



themselves. We most earnestly trust that he will agree. Before this battle is over every man may count who is capable of fighting, and American troops may be of inestimable service if they can be employed in whatever way they may be of most use. I can see no other way of utilising this splendid material which should be made available for fighting in France this summer when the whole war may be decided one way or the other.

[No signature indicated]

File No. 763.72/9315

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

ROME, March 28, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received 1.08 p. m.]

1491. . . . Signor Nitti makes a most earnest plea for American troops, even one thousand men, to be sent with the American flag to the Italian frontiers before any blow can fall at that point. He is of the opinion that this would be of enormous advantage, not only to Italy, but to the common cause, and this opinion I most earnestly endorse.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/8735

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 28, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received (March 28,) 7.15 p. m.]

9268. My 8910, March 6.<sup>1</sup> In the absence from England of Admiral Hall I have only just received a copy of King Alfonso's message of March 5 to the Emperor Charles, transmitting the President's reply as handed to Riaño, and also of the Emperor's rejoinder to the President dated March 23, which I do not telegraph as I assume it has now been received in Washington.<sup>2</sup>

In the message of the 5th instant, after communicating the text of the President's reply to the Emperor, the King of Spain added:

The President received the Ambassador with the usual cordiality. He told him that in order to maintain secrecy he had himself typed on the typewriter the message which he handed him. My Amba-

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 149.

<sup>2</sup>No copy of the President's reply to the Emperor has been found in the files of the Department of State or among Mr. Wilson's personal papers. The copies of the Emperor's messages which were communicated to the President by the Spanish Ambassador are likewise missing. Accordingly, the intercepted versions received by the Ambassador in Great Britain, which were later transmitted to the Department, are inserted following this telegram.

sador gave expression to his delight that the President had found in your message something that might form a basis for future understanding, and which might in some way open the possibility of negotiation, a statement to which the President assented. At the same time he remarked that in spite of his (wireless groups jammed) he was of opinion that after direct conversations had taken place he would (further undecipherable group) inform his allies. The Ambassador's impression is if not optimistic nevertheless fairly favorable for he thinks that if you are willing to answer the peace questions in detail the goal of all our proposals will be brought nearer. It is my private impression that the delegate proposed by you should have as chief task to clear up those points which Wilson regards critical. This would not (imply?) complicated and formal negotiations and in this manner you could avoid pledging yourself by the direct reply desired of you. In all these matters my services are ever at your disposal.

With royal greetings,

ALFONSO.

PAGE

File No. 763.72119/8735

*President Wilson to Emperor Charles*<sup>1</sup>

I am gratified that my recent declaration of the principles to be observed in formulating the conditions of peace are so largely agreed to by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and that His Majesty desires a closer comparison of the points of view of the two Governments. I should be heartily pleased if His Majesty were disposed to be more explicit concerning the four principles which I outlined in my message to the United States Congress on February 11th last. In that message I endeavored to specify with greater clearness than heretofore the principles which I had attempted to enunciate concretely in a message to Congress of January 8th. In that previous message I set forth in detail the manner in which the said principles ought to be put into practice. I presume that the Emperor of Austria is in possession of my message of January 8th and that he is acquainted with the terms of the programme which in my view should form the basis of a general peace. These terms were set forth in words so explicit and clear that a delegate sent to represent me in person could not have made them more precise. It would assist me materially in determining whether a more intimate and personal comparison of points of view were worth the trouble if I had before my eyes an equally explicit programme.

The Emperor also says that he believes he has positive proof that certain proposals which I made relative to the complicated Balkan situation would be less acceptable to the peoples concerned and more

<sup>1</sup> Intercepted text as sent by wireless from Madrid to Vienna, Mar. 5, 1918; the President's message itself is not dated.

likely to evoke new antagonisms than the adjustment proposed by Austria herself and that certain re-arrangements desired by Italy would not be acceptable to the peoples directly concerned, but he has not given me point by point what I ardently desire, the benefit of his positive programme.

I can assure His Majesty of my willingness to take into consideration any solution he may have in mind. More especially should I like to know how His Majesty proposes to end the dispute in the Balkans and to satisfy the national aspirations of the Slav peoples who are so closely related to masses of his own subjects; what solution he would suggest for the Adriatic coast; what definite concessions to Italy he would regard as just; what in his opinion is the best method of removing the rivalries and antagonisms of the Balkan states which have only been increased by the war; and who is to protect the non-Turkish peoples subject to Turkish rule.

As I understand it the Emperor holds the same views about Belgium and Poland as myself.

With such explanation and information I should be in a better position than at present to form an opinion with regard to the advisability of taking action. I assure His Majesty, if such assurances are necessary, that I seek no strategic advantage nor any advantage of a personal nature, but a just settlement which will confer on the world a just and lasting peace.

[No signature indicated]

File No. 763.72119/8735

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*Emperor Charles to President Wilson*<sup>1</sup>

The reply made by the President to my communication respecting the fundamental principles of a just and lasting peace, strengthens me in the conviction that between those principles on the one hand and my own views on the other, such a degree of harmony exists as is necessary to start a successful discussion of the conditions of that peace which is so heartily longed for by all states. The President's reply contains nothing that deprives me of the hope that we may agree in the application of these principles. I am still of the opinion that the best method of procedure would be by means of direct oral discussion between one of my representatives and one appointed by Mr. Wilson. This would avoid a delay of many weeks. I believe that by so doing the President would be convinced that on the various special points mentioned by him we too are seeking, . . . to use his own words, ["such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that is permanent"].

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<sup>1</sup> Intercepted text as sent by wireless from Vienna to Madrid, Mar. 23, 1918.



In this connection I can give the assurance that the satisfaction of the righteous national aspirations of those Slav peoples residing in such close proximity to my own territory must be my earnest desire in the permanent interest of my country, because those populations are so intimately related to large masses of my subjects, as the President rightly points out. If the President on his part is prepared for similar propositions, we shall gladly stretch out our hand to him and do all in our power to improve the conditions of their existence, their progress and trade, without allowing them to be bartered about from one sovereignty to another. At the same time, we cannot permit populations to be transferred against their wishes from one state to another in the interest of one particular race, as this cannot be done without infringing the rights of other states. Such a discussion would furnish proofs that we are not pursuing any policy with reference to the Adriatic coast which conflicts with any of Mr. Wilson's principles, nor have we any desire to alter the balance in this region in our favour. But if we do not wish to introduce new elements of discord calculated to disturb the peace of Europe, in accordance with Mr. Wilson's intentions, we must avoid securing to any state such a preponderance which might lead to [omission]; this would arise, e. g., if Italy were to seek territorial aggrandisement in that quarter. The rivalry in the Balkans is due to the fact that up to the present there has been no final territorial settlement, but such can, however, be attained if an earnest endeavour is made to solve these questions in favour of the populations, as Mr. Wilson manifestly desires. I have already suggested in this connection that the relation of (?Bulgars) [*Italians?*] living in [*Austria-Hungary*] with the mother country, the granting of the necessary commercial facilities to Serbia, etc., are questions for which a solution is to be sought and can be found by mutual agreement. Nor have I any doubt that, with regard to the protection of non-Turkish populations included in the Turkish Empire, a solution can be discovered which accords with the President's pronouncements and takes into full consideration the just claims of Turkey.

The President inquires further what definite concessions to Italy I should regard as just. In my opinion, I should regard as just those concessions which are in harmony with the principles enunciated by him. Now the territorial aspirations of the Italian State, as openly proclaimed in this war, do not agree in the slightest with the principles laid down by the President. Italy demanded that the whole of the territory as far as [the Brenner?] and almost to Laibach, should be ceded on strategical grounds. Those are the demands of a war of aggression. They are in contradiction with the President's principles. The population of the districts in question are in over-



whelming majority German or Slav and both peoples have regarded it as a grave injustice to be subjected by force to a foreign state with which they have no community of interests, sentiment or ideas. If, then, I understand the President's question as it only can be understood in the light of his pronouncements—how far the definite wishes of Italy can be fulfilled, “not as part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims of rival states” (in this case Austria and Italy), but “in the interest and [for the benefit] of the [populations] concerned”—it is not possible to regard any concession as just. Italy is striving for the possession of territory inhabited by a larger number of Slavs and Germans than Italians. As the Italian minority has with difficulty maintained itself for more than 400 years in Austrian [Tyrol], how can it aspire to the Carso region, the population of which is entirely Croatian and totally distinct from the Italians? Hence Italy desires to dominate a foreign people for whom the separation from Austria would mean commercial ruin. It would compel them to start a new existence. This would not be any solution in accordance with the President's large principles, according to which all territorial questions raised by this war must be adjusted “in the interest and [for the benefit] of the populations [concerned].”

The President will be convinced after what I have said that I, like himself, am honestly anxious to discover for the war settlement such a basis [as] will meet just claims and which consequently will contain the elements of permanence [omission]. He will be convinced that I believe I have discovered such a basis in similar principles to those laid down by him. What remains to be established is whether, as I firmly believe and hope, we can agree as to the application of these principles in definite cases. The direct discussion proposed by me would have as its object to ascertain this and to supply each of us with the necessary information on this head. I hold that it is incumbent upon us to leave no avenue unexplored which offers any hope of restoring the vanished peace to our countries. In short, all belligerent states alike should pledge themselves to refrain from annexing foreign states, and I can only repeat that, if the President will endeavour to influence his allies in this direction, Austria too will do her utmost to induce her allies to similar action. There is only one obstacle to peace that cannot be solved in open discussion, and that is the French and Italian lust of conquest. If the President can induce both these states to renounce their plans of annexation, he will render the cause of universal peace the greatest service.

[No signature indicated]

War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Cables Section Files

*The Adjutant General (McCain) to the Military Representative on the Supreme War Council (Bliss)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1918.

39. For Secretary Baker :

Reference cablegram 67 signed Bliss, the action of the President is as follows :

The President concurs in the joint note of the permanent military representatives of the Supreme War Council in the sense formulated in your No. 67, March 28, and wishes you to regard yourself authorized to decide questions of immediate cooperation or replacement. March.<sup>1</sup>

McCAIN

File No. 763.72119/1501

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1918, 7 p. m.

1695. Your 2769, March 4, 2 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> and 2919, March 22, 6 p. m.<sup>3</sup> The Department has no message to give to Bulgaria other than that already clearly expressed by the President in his various public utterances. Herron would be justified in informing Shipkoff it is his opinion that this Government would welcome any steps that may be taken by Bulgaria in good faith towards meeting the President's views. It is obvious that if Bulgaria desires to take joint action with Austria in efforts towards peace, such cooperation should be initiated directly with Austria, not through the medium of the United States.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/13488

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 30, 1918, 8 a. m.

[Received March 30, 7.55 a. m.]

9285. For the Secretary of State and the President :

The Prime Minister said to me, privately, that he thinks it probable that the present battle will lead to the appointment of executor [*executive*] generalissimo.

PAGE

<sup>1</sup> Maj. Gen. Peyton C. March, Acting Chief of Staff.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 147.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 172.

File No. 763.72/9614

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 353

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have just received a telegram from the Prime Minister asking me to convey to the President the sincere thanks of the War Cabinet for his instant and complete response to the appeal of the British and French Governments.<sup>1</sup> It has come as the greatest relief to all those who have the immediate responsibility for dealing with this crisis to know that, thanks to the President's prompt co-operation, the Allied armies are to receive an indispensable reinforcement of men during the next few vital months.

May I ask you to be good enough to convey to the President the above message from Mr. Lloyd George.<sup>2</sup>

I am [etc.]

READING

File No. 763.72119So/3

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)<sup>3</sup>*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1918, 3 p. m.

7106. Referring to your confidential telegram 9245, March 27, 11 p. m.,<sup>4</sup> and as supplemental to my telegram 6993, March 23, 2 p. m.,<sup>5</sup> I would state for your information and for such use as you think advisable the following:

By section 5 of the Federal Penal Code an American citizen who, without permission or authority of this Government, carries on intercourse with a foreign government with the intent to influence its conduct for the purpose of defeating measures of his own Government, shall be subject to a heavy fine and imprisonment. In view of the principle involved in this law it would be contrary to the reciprocity which should govern international intercourse and inconsistent with the traditional policy of the United States for the President or a responsible official to receive the subjects or citizens of a foreign state for the purpose of discussing an international question involving the policy of their Government unless their Government directly or through its diplomatic representative indicates that it has granted them permission or authority to carry on intercourse with the Government of the United States.

<sup>1</sup> See telegram transmitted by the Adjutant General, Mar. 29, *ante*, p. 187. Response was also made orally by the President to the British Ambassador.

<sup>2</sup> Shown to the President, Apr. 2.

<sup>3</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the Ambassadors in France (No. 3426) and Italy (No. 1142).

<sup>4</sup> Not printed.

<sup>5</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 171.

You will use the foregoing declaration with discretion and in a way to avoid embarrassment to this Government.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/9427a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 2, 1918, 4 p. m.

7107. Delegation of seven men and two women representing American Federation of Labor will arrive soon in Great Britain. As Mr. Gompers assures me of their intense loyalty to this country and their unswerving devotion to the cause of democracy, it would be well to show them such courtesy and consideration as you properly may in your official capacity.

You will understand that my telegram No. 7106 does not apply to this delegation which is proceeding abroad to discuss labor conditions and to seek the most effective way in which the laboring classes can cooperate with and advance the policies of their respective Governments in prosecuting the war. There is no purpose on the part of the American delegates to consider or discuss the policies or in any way to interfere with the avowed purpose of this Government or of any Government of the Allies.

LANSING

Speech of the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Czernin), April 2—Request of the Greek Government for Guarantees

File No. 763.72119/1541

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, April 3, 1918.

[Received 3.22 p. m.]

2234. The Imperial and Royal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Czernin, on the 2d of April delivered the following address to a delegation of the Common Council of Vienna which, headed by the Burgomaster, called on him on his return from Bucharest:

[Translation <sup>1</sup>]

Excellency, highly honored gentlemen: I am very glad and ready to answer the questions put by His Excellency the Burgomaster and thus to give you, as well as the broader public, an exact insight into the political conditions as I now see them. I had hoped to speak further in the proper forum but the circumstance that one of the two committees cannot be convened at this time prevented, and I

<sup>1</sup>Translation made in the Department from text telegraphed in German; verbal corrections have been made of errors due to faulty reception.



take this opportunity to unfold to the gentlemen here present in a few words a picture of the international situation.

Peace with Roumania brings the war in the east to an end. Three treaties of peace have been concluded with Petersburg, with Ukraine and with Roumania. A chapter of the war is closed.

Before turning to the several treaties and going more minutely into their particulars I would revert to the declarations of the President of the United States in which he replied to my speech delivered on the 24th of January to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Austrian Delegation. In many parts of the world the speeches of Mr. Wilson are looked upon as an attempt to drive a wedge between Vienna and Berlin. I do not believe it because I have too high an opinion of the statesmanlike acumen of the President of the United States to believe him capable of such a thought. Mr. Wilson does not want to sunder Vienna from Berlin. He does not want that and he knows that it cannot be done. Mr. Wilson perhaps says to himself that Vienna is a promising soil in which to sow the seed of peace generally. He says to himself, perhaps, that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is blessed with the good fortune of having a ruler who sincerely and honestly wants peace but that this monarch will never be guilty of a breach of faith, never will he conclude a dishonorable peace, and that 55 million souls stand behind the Emperor-King. Mr. Wilson perhaps says to himself that this compact mass represents a force that is not to be undervalued, that this honest strong will for peace with which the Monarchy is imbued, which binds the peoples of the two states together is apt to be the mainstay of that great idea which has enlisted Mr. Wilson's services.

Before going into Mr. Wilson's last declarations, I must dispel a misunderstanding. In reply to a question on that point I declared in my last speech to the committee of the Austrian Delegation that Mr. Wilson must already have had my declarations in his possession. Mr. Wilson later corrected this and made it plain that this was a mistake. In order to avoid the semblance of possible misapprehension or distortion, I had drawn up the text beforehand and I thought that that text should have already arrived in Washington at the time I made my speech. This in no wise alters the case. The object I had in view, that the President of the United States should have knowledge of the exact text of my declarations, has been achieved, and the slight delay of a few days is altogether secondary.

As for the President's answer I can only say that I attach great value to the fact that the German Imperial Chancellor in his remarkable speech of February 25 took the answer out of my mouth and declared that the four principles developed by Mr. Wilson in his speech of February 11 afford a basis upon which general peace may be discussed. I fully concur. The President's four points are a suitable foundation upon which to start a discussion of a general peace. Whether the President has succeeded in his effort to rally his allies on that basis is an open question.

God is my witness that we have tried in every possible way to avoid the new offensive. The Entente would not have it so. Mr. Clemenceau some time before the offensive was launched in the west inquired of me whether I was ready for negotiations and on what

basis. I immediately answered, in accord with Berlin, that I was ready and could see no obstacle to peace with France but her hankering for Alsace-Lorraine. From Paris came the answer that no negotiation could take place on that basis. There was no choice left. The tremendous strife in the west is already on. Austro-Hungarian and German troops are fighting shoulder to shoulder as we have fought together in Russia, Serbia, Roumania and Italy. We are fighting united in the defence of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Our armies will show to the Entente that the French and Italian longings for our territory are idle dreams for which frightful penalty will have to be paid. An explanation, however, for this course bordering on insanity that has been taken by the Entente Powers can be, in a great degree, found in certain occurrences in the interior of our country to which I shall yet advert. Come what may we shall not forsake Germany's interests as she will not leave us in the lurch. Loyalty along the Danube equals German loyalty. We are fighting not for imperialistic or annexationist aims of our own or of Germany's but we will go together to the very end for our defence, for our political life, for our future.

The peace negotiations with Russia battered the first breach in our enemies' war lust. It was the outbreak of the peace idea. To overlook the close, intimate contact in which the several peace treaties stand to one another is to give evidence of childish amateurishness. The constellation of the powers opposing us in the east was like a net in which when a mesh is cut the others fall apart of themselves. We first gave international recognition to the separation of Ukraine from the Russian Empire that had been consummated in the interior of Russia; we turned the favorable situation thus created to advantage by concluding with the Ukraine the peace she was striving for. This led to the peace with Petersburg, whereby Roumania was so isolated that she too had to conclude peace. Thus did one peace draw in another in its wake and bring on the desired result, the end of the war in the east. On technical and material grounds we had to begin with the Ukraine; the blockades had to be broken up and the future will show that the peace with Ukraine is a thrust in the heart of the rest of our enemies. With Roumania a peace has been concluded which can become the starting point for friendly relations. The insignificant frontier rectifications that we have secured are not annexations; the territory they take in is almost unpopulated and will exclusively answer the purpose of military safety. . . .

I repeat that I see the surest guarantee in future international agreements which will prevent war. If drawn up in a binding manner I would have seen far stronger guarantees in such treaties against assaults by neighbors than in boundary rectifications, but with the exception of the President of the United States I have not yet found an earnest desire among any of our opponents to act on this idea. Notwithstanding the fact that the idea was at first but little understood, I believe it will be put through.

I take a pencil in my hand and figure out the burdens with which the nations of the world will emerge from this war, and I ask myself in vain how they will meet the military expenditures if there is any further free competition in preparedness. I do not believe that any nation will be able after this war to meet the requirements so greatly

increased by the war. I rather think that financial necessity (*vis major*) will compel the nations to enter an international compromise regarding reduction of armaments. My calculation is neither idealistic nor fantastic. It is a real political calculation in the truest sense of the word. I should consider it a great misfortune if it were not eventually possible to reach general agreements as to the decrease of military preparations. . . .

Those who are constantly urging me to make annexations are dissatisfied with the peace already concluded. I can only say to them that I consider their tendencies wrong. In the first place, the forcible annexation of foreign peoples will render general peace difficult, and, secondly, such increases of territory are not absolutely a strengthening of the Empire. On the contrary, in the constellation of the Monarchy they would rather signify a weakening. What we need are not territorial annexations but economic assurances for the future. On these we must work.

We will make every effort to create a condition of permanent quiet in the Balkans. We must also not forget that only through the collapse of Russia did the factor cease to exist which had hitherto made it impossible for us to bring about a final internal peaceful condition in the Balkans. And now, as for Serbia, we know that in Serbia the desire for peace is very great, yet the country is prevented by the Entente powers from concluding peace. Bulgaria must receive certain territories inhabited by Bulgarians, but we do not wish to annihilate Serbia or to lay her in ruins. We wish to afford her an opportunity to develop and to bring about a closer economic connection between Serbia and ourselves. We do not wish to influence the future relation of Serbia and Montenegro with the Monarchy by factors which will oppose a status of friendly and neighborly relationship. The best political selfishness is that which seeks to place beaten neighbors on such a footing as will make lasting friends of them. I have had to exercise this sort of selfishness for Austria-Hungary in order that our enemies, after being conquered in a military way, may also be conquered morally. Only then can we disarm. Then the victory will be a complete one. Here diplomacy must take over the work.

Since I have been in office I have had only one aim, namely, to bring an honorable peace to the Empire and to create conditions which shall insure Austria-Hungary free development in future and furthermore to do everything within the range of human possibility in order that this horrible war may be the last for an immeasurable length of time. I have never said or tried anything else, but I do not try to beg this peace, to bring it about by entreaty and complaint; I rather wish to force it through our moral right and our physical strength. I consider any other tactics as tending to prolong the war, and unfortunately I must say that in recent weeks and months much has been spoken and said in Austria that prolongs it.

The prolongers of the war are divided into different groups, according to their motives and their tactics. There are, firstly, those who uninterruptedly ask for peace. They are contemptible and foolish and they prolong the war. In France this sort are called



*defaitistes* (advocates of defeat). However, they are treated less softly there than among us. The strife for peace at any price is contemptible because it is unmanly, and it is foolish because it continually affords fresh food to the already dying aggressive spirit of the enemy, and therefore artificially accomplishes the contrary of what is intended. The desire for peace of the great masses is both natural and comprehensible and it is no peculiarity of Austria-Hungary, but a world-wide manifestation. But the leaders of the people must remember that certain utterances in the land of our enemies accomplish the opposite of what they aim at. I should like to cite to these men the example of our Monarch, who certainly wishes peace but will never conclude any other than an honorable peace, and I should like to remind you of Goethe's beautiful words "Womanly despondency, timorous lamentation, will avert no misery and not make me free. Preserve yourself in spite of all violence, never give in, stand up robustly, and this will bring to you the help of the gods."

By virtue of my firm confidence in our strength and the justice of our cause, I have thus far concluded three moderate but honorable treaties of peace. Even those who still remain our enemies are beginning to understand that we want nothing else than the assured future of the Monarchy and of our allies, but that we wish to and can and will secure this future by force. I shall pursue this path in spite of all odds and take up the fight with any one who stands in my way.

The second group of war prolongers are as it were the defeaters of peace. Both prolong the war. It is a perversion of the truth to assert that Germany has made conquests in the east. The Lenine anarchy drove the border peoples into Germany's arms and induced them to seek refuge, by depending on the German Empire, from the awful conditions which prevail in Russia. Is Germany to be obliged to refuse the voluntary annexation of neighboring foreign states? The German Government no more wishes to commit acts of violence than we, and I am firmly convinced that neither the annexationists who are filling the world with their cries of conquest and instilling into it a fear of plans of world conquest and oppression, nor the weaklings who are constantly asking for peace and indicate to the enemy that we are at the end of our strength, will be able to permanently prevent a moderate but honorable peace. They delay it but they cannot prevent it. A good chapter of the great world drama is breaking upon us and we shall pull through; perhaps the time is no longer far off when we can look back upon the last few years as on a wicked dream.

The "defeatists" as well as the annexationists accomplish the same result in spite of their opposite tactics, but I am willing to admit that both groups are acting in good faith. Both probably believe that their tactics will bring about the desired peace. Unfortunately there is a third group of war prolongers in whom I cannot admit this good intention. This group consists of individual political leaders of Austria. And here I come back to that on which I touched before in connection with the Paris inquiry. This hope of our enemies for eventual victory is no longer based solely on military expectations and the blockade. This has been broken by our armies.



The hopes of our enemies are rather based in great part on our internal political conditions and—what cruel scorn!—on certain political leaders, not last in the Czech camp, as we know perfectly from numerous consistent reports from abroad. A short time ago we were, as already mentioned, near to entering upon negotiations with the Western Powers. Then the wind suddenly shifted about, and as we well know the Entente decided it would be better to wait a while, because the parliamentary and political conditions in our country justified the hope that the Monarchy would soon become defenseless.

What fearful irony! Our brothers and sons are fighting like lions on the battlefield. Millions of men and women in the interior are heroically bearing their hard lot. They are sending ardent prayers to the Almighty for an early termination of the war, and certain leaders of the people, popular representatives, are ranting against the German alliance which has proven itself so effective, making resolutions which have no connection with the idea of the state, find no words of reproach for Czech troops who fight criminally against their own native land and their brothers in arms, would like to bite parts out of the Hungarian state, deliver with impunity speeches which cannot be construed otherwise than as an invitation to our enemies to continue the fight, all in order that their political aspirations may be furthered, and continually rekindle the smouldering war flame in London, Rome, and Paris. The wretched Masaryk is not unique in his kind. There are also Masaryks within the boundaries of the Monarchy.

I would much rather have spoken of these sad cases in the Delegations, but as stated the present convocation of the committees has proven impossible. And I cannot wait. I must in a few days return to Rumania to complete the peace negotiations, and in view of the slowness of these negotiations hitherto, I do not know how long my enforced absence will last. The public, however, which longs for any honorable conclusion of the war, wished to know what above all has lengthened this war.

I am not making any general accusation. I know that there are Czech leaders whose Austrian patriotism is pure and clear, but I am making my charge against those leaders who wish to end the war and attain their purposes by a victory of the Entente. We shall also overcome these difficulties. Certainly! But those who act thus assume a fearful responsibility. They are the cause of the falling of further thousands of our sons, of the prolongation of the misery, and of the continuation of the war. Do they not shudder at this responsibility? What will German and Hungarian mothers some day say when, after the war, the war-prolonging activity of these men is clearly laid before the world? What is more, I do not need to refer to Germans and Hungarians. I have said before that the peoples themselves whom these gentlemen represent do not think as they do. I am thoroughly acquainted with Bohemia. I know how to distinguish between the Bohemian (Czech) people and certain of their leaders. The Bohemian people, the Bohemian mothers, do not think as do these men. The mother who is anxious about her son, the wife about her husband, is international. She is also the same in all the peoples of the Monarchy. The misery of war binds

all peoples together, all want the war to come to an end. But they are misled, they are led astray, they do not see that it is certain of their representatives who are systematically prolonging the war and their sufferings.

I regret that circumstances so seldom enable me to speak to the chosen representatives of the people. It is bad for a foreign minister when his official duties compel him nowadays to remain for months abroad, but I belong where the peace treaties are being concluded; perhaps if I could live more here at home I might, with the help of the loyal parties (and thank God we have such!), more successfully combat these tendencies. But I appeal to all who wish an early and honorable termination of the war to join together and in common wage a fight against high treason. No one claims that the Austrian Constitution is not capable of improvement, and the Austrian Government is willing to proceed to revise it in common with the other competent authorities. But those who hope for a victory of the Entente in order thereby to realize their political aims are committing high treason and this high treason is going on in the very arteries of the Government and constitutes the last war-prolonging hope of our enemies. If we can eliminate this poison, the general honorable peace is nearer than the great public imagines. I appeal to all; I appeal above all to the Germans and the Hungarians who have accomplished superhuman things in this war. But I also appeal to millions of citizens of all other peoples of the Monarchy who are loyal to the bone and do not think like certain of their leaders. Every Austrian, every Hungarian, must step into the breach. No one has a right to remain aside. The last, the decisive struggle is at hand. All hands on deck. Then we shall win.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72/9394

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, April 3, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received April 4, 5.09 a. m.]

1497. Baker's visit to Italy though so hurried has been highly appreciated and will certainly have good effect. When he was first expected at the front the Minister of War accompanied me to meet him and would have done so when he actually came, but he was ill. The King being in Rome, as well as all the Ministers, it was necessary for the Secretary to come here. To leave Italy without doing so would have caused great offense. He was met at the station by the Minister of War and Minister of Treasury, besides certain functionaries. The King, the Premier and Minister Nitti all dwelt upon the great moral effect it would have in Italy to send American flag here with small contingent of men. I, myself, believe it to be of the utmost importance to do so, not as a question of increasing the fighting forces here, but because of the moral effect. Italy is looking to America as never before in her history. The Prime Minister

said that the plain countrymen of Italy, especially in the south, know little of other countries, but all know of America, and would feel the presence of the flag to be the token that she is fighting for Italy as she is fighting for England and France.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/9428

*The Greek Minister (Roussos) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

No. 1085

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1918.

[Received April 5.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to enclose herewith the text of a telegram which Mr. Venizelos, president of the Council of Ministers of Greece, will forward directly to the President of the United States on the 6th instant.

As delays in the transmission of telegrams are quite frequent, I deem it advisable to hand to you in good time the text of the said telegram, so that in case it should not reach the President in the forenoon of Saturday next, you may be pleased to hand him the enclosed text in the place thereof.

Your Excellency will kindly excuse this abundance of caution which comes solely from my desire that the greetings of the Royal Government will reach the Chief Magistrate of the great American Democracy on the very anniversary of its glorious entrance into the world conflict, a day which will stand as a historical date.

Having the good fortune of living in the midst of your great people and of witnessing the enormous sacrifices they are undergoing in order to secure justice and freedom to the world, I cannot refrain from availing myself of the opportunity to express to you the deep admiration I feel for this immense effort for a sublime ideal. The glory of the people of the United States and of those who guide them in that triumphant cause will be everlasting.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

G. ROUSSOS

[Enclosure—Telegram—Translation]

*The Greek Prime Minister (Venizelos) to President Wilson*

MR. PRESIDENT: Stirred by deep emotion, the Hellenic nation salutes the anniversary of the entrance of the United States of America into the great struggle for the defense of the liberties threatened by the Central Empires and their allies. The magnificent impulse which pours upon the fields of battle of France the flower of the youth of the United States of America, and the bravery with which the first American contingents are taking a part in the libera-



tion of French territory, leave no room for doubt as to the triumph of our cause.

Greece is proud to share in the sacrifices so generously offered by the democratic peoples of the world, in order to insure to all nations the right of free development for the great good of humanity. She therefore confidently cherishes a hope that when the struggle comes to an end, thanks to the support of her powerful allies, she will not only recover the integrity of her territory, but will also see guarantees of existence, commensurate with their legitimate aspirations, accorded to her congeners who cannot be brought within her boundaries.

VENIZELOS

File No. 763.72/13354

*The Secretary of War (Baker) to President Wilson*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 5, 1918, noon.

[Received 2.16 p. m.]

39. Returned from Italy Thursday. Spent one day at the front and one in Rome as Mr. Page feared misunderstanding if I failed to visit [that] capital after having been in Paris and London.

Military situation continues stationary with very heavy artillery duel more or less continuously. Believed here that the Germans have still 30 divisions of fresh troops and plan another attack in force near Arras. Plans for defense along the whole line are made and Allies have much larger and better placed reserve than on March 21. If estimate of 30 divisions is correct Germans have used up more than half of their first quality attack troops. Our First Division begins to move out of the trenches today to become a part of the battle reserve and will probably be in action in a week or ten days. This division about equals two British divisions in numbers and is now waiting, fully trained. The men are full of enthusiasm and pride; they are also completing one of the replacement divisions so that we will have four in the trenches and one in battle. Our four, because of larger numbers, release six French for reserve. Our contribution is thus important and helpful. Counter-attack in preparation which may modify whole recent situation.

The original appointment of General Foch was hesitating and powers given him largely advisory. At meeting yesterday<sup>1</sup> whole matter was reviewed and practically supreme command given him over British, French and American armies on west front.

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<sup>1</sup> Should read "day before yesterday," i.e., Apr. 3, date of the Beauvais conference.



So far as I can see, there is nothing else for me to do here now and unless you advise otherwise I will leave on Tuesday, April 9, for home. No available ship sails earlier. Reply will reach me care Ambassador Sharp.

BAKER

File No. 763.7211980/6

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 4, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received April 5, 2.34 p. m.]

3525. Further in reference to my 3453, March 26, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Office tells me that Mr. Clemenceau has attached much importance to our Government's position in reference to this subject and looked upon it as strengthening the position which he had always consistently taken towards the Socialist movement in France. It was stated that as the Premier had been accused of taking advantage of his present power to adopt strict measures towards the Socialists on account of his long time opposition to them, the position of our Government, coming from a democracy recognized by the world as foremost in its influence, was regarded by him as a vindication of his position.

In connection with this piece of information I would say that under the stress of the present crisis on the front, even the most aggressive of the Socialist groups have evidently found it the part of wisdom, if not of patriotism, not to offer the slightest opposition to the Government.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/13355a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1918, 4 p. m.

7144. [Shipping] Board's State 16, for Stevens, from Hurley:

Acting upon the call of the Inter-Allied Supreme War Council for the fullest possible immediate American military participation the President has decided after consultation with representatives of England and France and heads of Government departments to increase our military effort as follows:

(1) A minimum of 91,000 troops will be shipped overseas monthly commencing April 1. Every available American transport, the transports loaned by the British, and American and

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 174.

British liners will be used for this movement. We understand England to have guaranteed, besides, sufficient additional tonnage to carry at least 29,000 additional troops per month. This makes a total of 120,000 troops per month as a minimum.

(2) A cargo movement will be carried out consisting of the necessary engineering *matériel* for ports and lines of communication, such part of the aviation and ordnance programs as will be ready for shipment including replacement of materials 438,000 tons for France and 50,000 tons for England and quartermaster, medical and miscellaneous supplies for monthly increments of 91,000 men, plus maintenance of our troops now in France and establishment of reserves. Great Britain to furnish the material and supplies for the additional troops according to her agreement as fully stated in Pershing's cablegram No. 596 of February 12 and 705 of March 10.<sup>1</sup>

After careful study of all tonnage requirements of the United States it is clear that this movement can be carried out, but only with the greatest difficulty. The execution of the undertaking is subject to the provisions that we retain all neutral tonnage now employed in the service of the United States, that the submarine sinkings do not develop to an unusual extent above the present losses, that the Emergency Fleet Corporation's promised delivery of ships be carried out, and that the import reduction now planned be not impeded. All tonnage owned or controlled by the United States will be required by the Shipping Board to meet the military program and other imperative needs and commitments. Ships loaned to France and Italy will not now be disturbed but we must utilize all Dutch ships requisitioned in our harbors to meet our present program. We cannot divert any additional tonnage without impairing the military program to which we are thus definitely committed.

The War Department is repeating this cable to Bliss and Pershing. British and French Ambassadors also notified.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/9402

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 5, 1918, 6 p. m.

1157. Your 1491, March 28, 12 a. m.<sup>2</sup> War Department have issued orders for the transfer of 30 United States Army ambulance sections consisting of 30 officers and 1350 men to Italy for duty with the Italian forces.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Neither printed.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 182.

President Wilson's Speech of April 6; Comment in Associated and Enemy Countries—Assurances to Greece, April 19

*Address of President Wilson Delivered at Baltimore, April 6, 1918*

FELLOW CITIZENS: This is the anniversary of our acceptance of Germany's challenge to fight for our right to live and be free, and for the sacred rights of free men everywhere. The Nation is awake. There is no need to call to it. We know what the war must cost, our utmost sacrifice, the lives of our fittest men and, if need be, all that we possess. The loan we are met to discuss is one of the least parts of what we are called upon to give and to do, though in itself imperative. The people of the whole country are alive to the necessity of it, and are ready to lend to the utmost, even where it involves a sharp skimping and daily sacrifice to lend out of meagre earnings. They will look with reprobation and contempt upon those who can and will not, upon those who demand a higher rate of interest, upon those who think of it as a mere commercial transaction. I have not come, therefore, to urge the loan. I have come only to give you, if I can, a more vivid conception of what it is for.

The reasons for this great war, the reason why it had to come, the need to fight it through, and the issues that hang upon its outcome, are more clearly disclosed now than ever before. It is easy to see just what this particular loan means because the cause we are fighting for stands more sharply revealed than at any previous crisis of the momentous struggle. The man who knows least can now see plainly how the cause of justice stands and what the imperishable thing is he is asked to invest in. Men in America may be more sure than they ever were before that the cause is their own, and that, if it should be lost, their own great Nation's place and mission in the world would be lost with it.

I call you to witness, my fellow countrymen, that at no stage of this terrible business have I judged the purposes of Germany intemperately. I should be ashamed in the presence of affairs so grave, so fraught with the destinies of mankind throughout all the world, to speak with truculence, to use the weak language of hatred or vindictive purpose. We must judge as we would be judged. I have sought to learn the objects Germany has in this war from the mouths of her own spokesmen, and to deal as frankly with them as I wished them to deal with me. I have laid bare our own ideals, our own purposes, without reserve or doubtful phrase, and have asked them to say as plainly what it is that they seek.

We have ourselves proposed no injustice, no aggression. We are ready, whenever the final reckoning is made, to be just to the German people, deal fairly with the German power, as with all others.



There can be no difference between peoples in the final judgment, if it is indeed to be a righteous judgment. To propose anything but justice, even-handed and dispassionate justice, to Germany at any time, whatever the outcome of the war, would be to renounce and dishonour our own cause. For we ask nothing that we are not willing to accord.

It has been with this thought that I have sought to learn from those who spoke for Germany whether it was justice or dominion and the execution of their own will upon the other nations of the world that the German leaders were seeking. They have answered, answered in unmistakable terms. They have avowed that it was not justice but dominion and the unhindered execution of their own will.

The avowal has not come from Germany's statesmen. It has come from her military leaders, who are her real rulers. Her statesmen have said that they wished peace, and were ready to discuss its terms whenever their opponents were willing to sit down at the conference table with them. Her present Chancellor has said,—in indefinite and uncertain terms, indeed, and in phrases that often seem to deny their own meaning, but with as much plainness as he thought prudent,—that he believed that peace should be based upon the principles which we have declared would be our own in the final settlement. At Brest-Litovsk her civilian delegates spoke in similar terms; professed their desire to conclude a fair peace and accord to the peoples with whose fortunes they were dealing the right to choose their own allegiances. But action accompanied and followed the profession. Their military masters, the men who act for Germany and exhibit her purpose in execution, proclaimed a very different conclusion. We can not mistake what they have done,—in Russia, in Finland, in the Ukraine, in Rumania. The real test of their justice and fair play has come. From this we may judge the rest. They are enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride. A great people, helpless by their own act, lies for the time at their mercy. Their fair professions are forgotten. They nowhere set up justice, but everywhere impose their power and exploit everything for their own use and aggrandizement; and the peoples of conquered provinces are invited to be free under their dominion!

Are we not justified in believing that they would do the same things at their western front if they were not there face to face with armies whom even their countless divisions can not overcome? If, when they have felt their check to be final, they should propose favourable and equitable terms with regard to Belgium and France and Italy, could they blame us if we concluded that they did so only to assure themselves of a free hand in Russia and the East?



Their purpose is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Baltic peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can then erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy,—an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe,—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East. In such a programme our ideals, the ideals of justice and humanity and liberty, the principle of the free self-determination of nations upon which all the modern world insists, can play no part. They are rejected for the ideals of power, for the principle that the strong must rule the weak, that trade must follow the flag, whether those to whom it is taken welcome it or not, that the peoples of the world are to be made subject to the patronage and overlordship of those who have the power to enforce it.

That programme once carried out, America and all who care or dare to stand with her must arm and prepare themselves to contest the mastery of the world, a mastery in which the rights of common men, the rights of women and of all who are weak, must for the time being be trodden under foot and disregarded, and the old, age-long struggle for freedom and right begin again at its beginning. Everything that America has lived for and loved and grown great to vindicate and bring to a glorious realization will have fallen in utter ruin and the gates of mercy once more pitilessly shut upon mankind!

The thing is preposterous and impossible; and yet is not that what the whole course and action of the German armies has meant wherever they have moved? I do not wish, even in this moment of utter disillusionment, to judge harshly or unrighteously. I judge only what the German arms have accomplished with un pitying thoroughness throughout every fair region they have touched.

What, then, are we to do? For myself, I am ready, ready still, ready even now, to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely purposed,—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer.

I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow countrymen, everything

that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat the force of those who flout and misprize what we honour and hold dear. Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and Peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether Right as America conceives it or Dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

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File No. 763.72119/1555

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, April 6, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received April 7, 4.20 a. m.]

2134. The exchange of denials between M. Clemenceau and Count Czernin relative to certain peace feelers probably finds its origin in the time-honored German maneuver to provoke an opponent into taking the ostensible initiative. It would seem [probable] that the true story will be found to bear a striking resemblance to certain tentatives of a similar nature of which this Legation was the object during the month of January last and which only the inadequacy of the clerical force prevented me from reporting at the time.

Herr Westfried, an Austrian Jew, an explosives contractor to the Austro-Hungarian War Ministry, whose wife is said to be the daughter of a New York German-American banker, has been resident in Copenhagen more or less continuously during the past two years. He caused it to be intimated to me that he desired to speak with some one in this Legation relative to the invitation of a discussion between Austria-Hungary and the United States of the terms of a possible peace. Pursuant to my instructions, Lieut. John A. Gade, acting naval attaché, met Westfried, who states that if the United States would send a responsible person to Copenhagen the Austro-Hungarian Government would send some one of equal rank to confer with him. He alleged that as a result of his endeavors Sir Francis Hopwood had come here in February of last year on behalf of the British Government, but that owing to the jealous hostility of the Austro-Hungarian Legation nothing had come of it.

In reply he was informed that before I would consent to refer the matter to Washington compliance with two conditions would be

indispensable: (1) the production of documentary evidence of his authority to act, and (2) satisfactory assurances that Austria-Hungary was prepared to make a separate peace. The matter was dropped there where, as expected, it has since rested. Suspicious as ever of everything emanating from the Central Empires, I [felt] incredulous of Westfried's authority to negotiate. He could produce no documentary evidence of his *bona fides* but was rich in assurances and did his utmost to persuade us to lay the matter before the Government at Washington. Had he succeeded in this with satisfactory issue he could have gone to Vienna with something tangible to bargain with.

He would have found the Ballplatz eagerly receptive of a proposal for a conference the initiative for which would have ostensibly been taken by the Government of the United States. Westfried has unquestionably had a backstairs correspondence on the subject with certain persons of influence at Vienna who in my opinion encouraged his activities if they did not instigate them. Decorated if successful, easily disavowed if not, Westfried is undoubtedly but one of a large band of agents of the Central Powers whose members lie in wait for credulous enemies who will further their endeavors to coax some one of the Allies to the council table.

The British Minister, Sir R. Paget, confirmed my impressions and denies that Sir F. Hopwood had come to Copenhagen on the mission alleged although he listened incidentally to what Herr Westfried had to say.

I am reliably informed that Westfried is now in Holland supposedly operating in conjunction with the Austrian military attaché with whom he is alleged to be on close terms. I am therefore repeating this telegram to Garrett for his information.

GRANT-SMITH

File No. 763.72/9469

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, April 8, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received 2.11 p. m.]

3547. The President's Baltimore speech is given great prominence in all of today's papers, for lack of time since its receipt for publication except in some of the afternoon papers. Comments on the speech are chiefly confined to the headlines and introductory references to it. It is unanimously commended for its clarity of exposition of the situation brought on by the Germans and particularly for its vigor.

No message could have been more opportune than the words coming from the President in the midst of a crisis on the front calling



for every word of sustaining encouragement. The news from the front, however, of a much more encouraging nature during the past few days, will be given an impetus of good cheer by his words which will permeate not only the civil population, but the soldiery as well.

Sometimes without exactly knowing why, there comes a feeling of confidence in the assurance and certainty that all is going well. While the situation is still serious and full of doubt, yet it is this kind of a feeling which seems to pervade the minds of almost everyone here as to the conviction that the German Army, in so far as accomplishing real results is concerned, has been thoroughly checked. This feeling, so far as I am able to learn, has taken possession of men versed in knowledge of military affairs as well as the man in the street. The President's reference to the military situation so clearly senses the outlook existing on the front at this moment that it fortifies the public mind and leads to belief.

Mr. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, told me today that he greatly admired the speech for its firmness of tone as well as its beauty of expression. He said that it had impressed the French Government most favorably in every respect and would exert a very good influence. He charged me to convey to the President his personal thanks for the message contained in his speech.

In the following brief quotations from the Paris press, commenting on the speech, one observes the particular emphasis given to that portion of the speech which refers to the necessity of using military force. . . .

SHARP

File No. 763.72/13344

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, April 10, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received 7.31 p. m.]

9443. For the Secretary and the President:

The most grateful appreciation continues to be expressed in all quarters of our hastening troops to help British Army, and of the President's Baltimore speech. Such encouragement comes opportunely because the continued gain of ground by the Germans, their large capture of guns and other material, as well as British loss of men, cause increasing uneasiness here. Generals on the War Staff here deny directly the accuracy of military statement in Prime Minister's speech last night, and say the situation is far more critical than he pictured it. The news today is still less assuring.

PAGE



File No. 763.72/9489

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, April 10, 1918.

[Received April 11, 5.30 a. m.]

2288. German press comment President's speech.

*Vorwärts*, 8th: Tone of Wilson's Baltimore speech admits of no possible doubt where we stand. Either we shall succeed in bringing war in west to conclusion in reasonable time with military means or future will look dark for us, that is to say, it will not be bright even if, as we all hope, the struggles of this spring and summer bring a favorable decision; but it would be far less bright if the decision should not be forthcoming. There can, therefore, be no difference of opinion among German people as to what must be desired and aimed at now; semi-official comment on speech differs very materially from what we have unfortunately been forced to read in the press so often. It says that speech shows what a lost war would mean for Germany. These are uncommonly serious words. In January 1917 almost all German papers, except Socialist press, said England would surrender in few months owing to unrestricted submarine war, that America's war threat was nothing but bluff and not to be taken seriously, and that war would be over before America could even attempt to help Entente; had this prophecy been fulfilled the sanguinary battles now raging on western front would have been superfluous; we should have had peace long ago and Wilson would not have been able to deliver this speech. But we can be grateful to President for speech in certain sense for it recalls what many appear to have forgotten, that this war is not cherry-picking expedition. German people is still faced with tremendous effort which it must put forth if it is to withstand to end fanatical will for war of its adversaries. Of all nations affected by this war, the German has least reason to despair. But none of them, not even the German, has any reason to contemplate coming events lightly and overconfidently. America stands behind Allies with enormous material resources and tremendously stimulating moral power. Without [them] Allies would perhaps already have suffered economic and moral collapse as result of Russian defection. Hopes centered in great ally across ocean keep them together and incite to renewed resistance. How long this resistance will be kept up will depend on events now happening. There is no other solution of world confusion to be seen but hoped-for full German victory in west. Also Wilson's speech further dissipates all doubt

that bridges towards peace of accommodation were burnt by Brest treaty. Wilson, the undisputed political leader of Entente, will not recognize peace of Brest and gives Germany choice of retreating from her threats of force or of accepting battle of force with him. We German Socialists are far from considering every act of Germany's policy right. Our political position is clearly outlined by what we said and wrote before outbreak war, before declaration of unrestricted submarine war and before conclusion of peace of Brest. In those three decisive moments Empire did not take course that we recommended; we always warned against consequences but nevertheless did our part in order to prevent them from becoming fatal. Situation so sharply illuminated by Wilson's speech, this infinitely serious and decisive situation, was brought about by policy which was not that of Socialists, but situation is here and shows no other outlet than an early complete victory of Germany in west also. German people has put forth its full power for that victory and responsibility for success rests with military and political command. Peace if thus enforced, will bring abundance of complex problems which will severely tax those who govern in future but price is not too dear.

*Schwäbische Tagwacht*, 8th: True aspect of Wilson's latest speech can only be seen when it is considered as reply to Czernin's renewed peace invitation. Wilson says reply to his peace call was given not by German statesmen but by German generals, whose deeds clearly express aims and intentions of German policy, the complete domination of Russia, Balkans and east. Speech is abrupt declination of Czernin's peace invitation and announcement that United States is determined to fight side by side with Allies until final victory. Regardless of whether Wilson's reference to German policy in east is sincere or not, fact remains that that policy gives President possibility of talking of German's policy of world domination carried out by military leaders. We called attention to this possibility when first signs of military policy of force in east became visible and we never [tired] of warning against such policy. Now that Wilson rejects invitation to peace negotiation, solely owing to Germany's policy of force in east, we can only regret again that Germany's political authorities did not possess power to prevent that policy.

*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 8th: It is difficult to account for President's long silence. Perhaps explanation is that he tried to secure revision of Entente war aims but was disappointed. His omission to discuss Czernin's recent amicable speech at all may also be due to this. President still declares readiness to discuss just honorable peace but is this more than mere words? Perhaps he won't make peace with

an unconquered Germany, perhaps he can't negotiate owing to aggressive war policy of his allies. This can be matter of indifference to us since new speech has sole object of furnishing foundation for continuation of war. Policy of responsible statesmen of Centrals gives Wilson no ground for his proclamation of force, so he repeats his accustomed tactics of arbitrarily constructing an opponent by now differentiating between German statesmen and military leaders who dictate policy of force. Perhaps waste of time to reject such interference in our internal affairs; it is matter of course that German people resents it. President's argument of eastern peace treaties fails because we sincerely sought peace of accommodation with Russia but were prevented by Trotsky's open proclamation of policy based on force. Assertion that Centrals enforced peace in east to secure absolute domination in whole eastern Europe and Asia is pure calumny. If Wilson has in mind former frontier nations of western Russia he must know that last word concerning their future has by no means been spoken and that Germany acknowledged their right of self-determination and enforced it against Russia. We shall not dwell on [Wilson's] fine words about wanting justice from and equality of all nations; for his own deeds, the violent subjection of Filipinos and brutal oppression of all peace friends in America, contradict him daily. Material thing for us to say today Wilson can hear from the organ of Socialist Party on which his political tactics seem for most part to speculate. This American speech shows us again that Germans' duty at this moment lies alone on battlefields in west, Germany's mission and hope of peace.

*Germania*, 9th: Wilson's speech plainly proves that ravages of anti-peace disease have now extended in like degree to America. There is no use in wasting time with his tirades any more, but it would be desirable if we should now finally cease to expect anything else from across the ocean than from Paris or London or argue that Wilson would have acted differently if our policy had taken different course on certain occasions. We no longer believe in any of the American's phrases. He would have talked just the same had we submitted to [impudence] of Bolsheviks; thus peace in east in accordance with Socialist demands, would not have helped us but hurt us in west. We went just as far with Petrograd gentlemen as right and equity, combined with our just interests, warranted in circumstances. [Garbled passage.] Fact that Wilson will not condescend to recognize Brest peace does not prove it is bad peace but only that opposition to it suits Wilson's policy. But all this dispute is of theoretical importance merely; main thing is that situation finds us Germans reunited. Even *Vorwärts* comes to con-



clusion there is no way to peace but over military victory and we should all act in full consciousness of this fact.

*Vossische*, 8th: Wilson's failure to mention Czernin's speech is noteworthy, the tone of speech with appeals to force unusually harsh, Brest peace being taken as justification. This confirms our earlier surmise that Wilson would take eastern peace as starting point for diplomatic campaign to incite Allies, particularly France, against Germany anew and to have Brest treaties revised.

*Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 8th: Wilson's speech must be taken merely as part of political and psychological war campaign of enemies. It has no value as historic document and Wilson knew this, otherwise he would not have taken such liberties with truth. Nothing more could be expected of Wall Street's agent, the great exponent of America's war profits trust. Germans need not be frightened at his appeal to force. He charges Germany with aiming at world empire of force and greed but that is what he himself wants. This speech can be laid aside with the rest of them. The Americans will continue to throw good money after bad and American public can later settle with Wilson when it cannot get its money back. Speech is of small importance for Germany's experience has adequately shown that her position cannot be overthrown with words.

*Tageszeitung*, 8th: We always maintained from [beginning] all [deference] to Washington was in vain; only thing to satisfy Washington was Germany's defeat or her subjection to judgment of nations of earth. Wilson's speeches always had the same theme. The veiled prime motive of his policy was always elimination German Empire as Continental power, as naval power, and as competitor in world market with any available means, cheaply if possible, but if necessary, at any cost.

GARRETT

File No. 763.721198o/9

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, April 11, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received April 12, 11.51 a. m.]

1513. My telegram 1488, March 26, 3 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs has mentioned to me again the good effect it would have to be able to refer in Parliament to our view touching subject.

NELSON PAGE

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 176.



File No. 763.72119/1582

*Report of the Consul at Paris (Lay)*

[Extract]

PARIS, *March 23, 1918.*[*Received April 13.*]

## PACIFISM AND POPULAR UNREST IN FRANCE

France is passing through a period of political ferment which portends the most serious crisis of the war. There can be no doubt that the populace is becoming strongly impregnated with the virus of pacifism and that it is growing impossible for this country to pursue a strictly military programme without an effective resort to other means for the early termination of the war.

This movement, however, should not be construed as one of "peace at any price," for its price is specifically the "peace of the peoples" from which it draws both its force and its inspiration. French pacifists have nothing less in view than the realization of the "Wilson peace" and their entire campaign is one of coercing their Government into its acceptance. The existing state of unrest may be attributed to the fact that the present Government has neither subscribed publicly to the Wilson programme, nor offered any substitute therefor; that it appears bound to a purely military programme by treaties which it will not reveal, and therefore is not free to utilize the effective arm of diplomacy in shaping the destiny of the nation.

The same movement and the same tendencies are equally menacing in England, but the aspects of the situation in the two countries are contrasted by the predominance of Socialistic factors in France. In England there are three elements of initiative; in France only two, for there exists no middle ground of purely liberal democracy, comparable to the Lansdowne school, capable of standing as a buffer between the present regime and Socialism. Lord Lansdowne espouses the cause of the Wilson peace which he conceives to be obtainable through other means than purely military effort; he believes that such a peace would be possible through negotiations should the Allies abandon their present programme of "war at any price." This conception clearly concedes a higher degree of obstinacy on the part of the Governments of the Allies than on those of the Central Empires, but if the Lansdowne movement is designed to modify the energetic war policy of the Lloyd George Government, it none the less checks and restrains the radicalism of the Socialistic faction.

In France the line of cleavage is particularly pronounced, and when one departs from the established war policy of the present Government in the direction of the Wilson peace, the first group of

associates encountered is that of the Socialistic Party itself. No strong democrat has publicly embraced the policy of "peace by negotiations," and therefore there is no intermediate group on whom the power of state might fall if wrested from the hands of the present governing element. In England Lord Lansdowne, as representing democracy rather than socialism, would get credit for any benefit which might accrue through a departure from the present policy; in France this credit would fall to the Socialistic Party. The reason for the existence of these two extremes without a middle is that all of the prominent public men, as regards the war policy, either belong to what might be called the Clemenceau school, the Caillaux school, the Socialistic Party, or the Royalists. During the war the leading men of the "Clemenceau school" (Viviani, Briand, Ribot, Painlevé, etc.) have all been tried, and have each had a part in binding France to inter-Allied obligations, and this fact now renders it impossible for any one of them to seek to repudiate or modify these obligations which constitute the chief objective of the pacifist attack. The Caillaux followers are all either in prison, or badly compromised politically, while the Royalists are vigorously military and uncompromising. This leaves only the Socialistic leaders to profit by all developments towards what must eventually be the established policy of France.

On December 25, 1917, the Conference of the General Confederation of Labor, held at Clermont-Ferrand, issued a declaration of which the following are the principal provisions:

The Conference demands, first of all, precisions as to the war aims pursued by our Government, condemns secret diplomacy, wants no annexations and seeks the establishment of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves; reconstitution in their territorial integrity of the invaded countries; reparation of damages caused; no war contributions; liberty of the seas; obligatory arbitration for the regulation of differences. The Conference demands insistently that the laboring classes of all the countries at war require of their respective governments the publication with the same precisions of their peace conditions. This general action already demanded by the Russian Revolution at its début, and to which the Conference subscribes, appears at the present hour to be the only means of such a nature as to avoid a separate peace.

For these reasons the Conference affirms the right for the working class of all countries and for that of France in particular to participate in an international conference and to bring it about in case of need.

It will be recalled that following this declaration the Socialistic Party and the General Confederation of Labor sent delegates to the Interallied Conference at London and that delegates from these two

organizations are now en route to the United States for the purpose of securing the participation of American Socialists and syndicalists in the proposed international conference which is shortly to bring together representatives of the Entente Powers and of the Central Empires.

During the present period, preparatory to decisive action, the labor element of France is being intensively organized and committed to its programme through resolutions passed by the working men employed in each establishment. This is particularly true as regards munition plants, aviation works and other industries essential to the prosecution of the war. The laborer has become suddenly conscious of the fact the war is continuing because of the work of his own hands and thus, since he must bear a heavy responsibility for permitting its continuance against his doctrinal principles, he has himself seized the occasion to proclaim his own war aims and strive for their realization. The following resolution, selected at random, is translated from a Socialistic paper as typical of the hundreds now being passed in the various establishments:

Considering that the moment has arrived for an intense propaganda in favor of syndicalism in view of the present situation, the General Assembly decides, jointly with the delegations of other firms and the support of syndicalist organizations, to direct an action for the realization of the resolutions voted by the congress at Clermont-Ferrand;

Invites the counsels of administrations of all the syndicalist and labor organizations to exert a pressure in every way and under all circumstances on their Members of Parliament . . . (3 lines censored) . . .

2d. To oblige the Government to take a clear position as regards the propositions of peace of President Wilson and to reveal publicly its war aims and its peace conditions.

3d. To obtain from the Government in particular and the Allies in general the participation of delegates of the working class in the negotiations of peace.

On the other hand, basing itself on the messages of President Wilson and on the resolutions of the reunion of the representatives of the shop delegates of the Department of the Seine the Assembly . . . (3 lines censored) . . . to arrive at a peace of the peoples without annexation or indemnity and with the liberty of the peoples to dispose of themselves under the safeguard and the control of the Society of Nations;

Binds all the laborers to group themselves under the syndicalist banner, the only organization capable of action;

Insists that the General Confederation of Labor and all Federations adopt these resolutions in order that . . . (15 lines censored) . . . the old track of a secret diplomacy incapable of solving great international problems;

Vows the [eternal] hatred of conscious peoples for all governments which henceforth do not use all their efforts to conclude at the earliest moment a durable peace—a peace of the peoples.



Many similar resolutions express profound sympathy for their brothers who are now imprisoned for expressing their views on the war, etc.

The rapidity with which the entire Socialistic fabric is being woven into a single piece by this process is due largely to the fact that issues touching the war are combined with demands for increased wages and action on the two taken concurrently. When the hour arrives for the revealing of whatever may be now accumulating in a latent state there is little doubt that absolute solidarity will be an accomplished fact among all factions of organized labor, and that the action of the proletariat will be as compact and as concurrent as an effectual *levée en masse*. France will be permitted to prosecute the war only so long as syndicalism permits, and the present temper of its disciples, with their growing pacifism and spirit of self-assertiveness, indicates that there must shortly be a change in the public policy or that an attempt may be made to effect a change of institutions.

Respectfully submitted:

TRACY LAY

File No. 763.72/9564

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 14, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received April 15, 7.33 a. m.]

3615. The public interest during the past week may be said to have been almost equally divided between the [progress] of the great battle in the north and the publication of the letter of Emperor Charles to his brother-in-law Prince Sixte de Bourbon, in which he was asked to deliver his message of a possible conciliation to President Poincaré. Concerning the latter subject, I wish before reporting thereon to first verify some very interesting information which I expect to be able to communicate to the Department tomorrow. It may be sufficient at the moment to say in reference thereto, that the whole affair may have not only the most important bearing upon the political conditions here, but as already has been seen by the exchange of letters and telegrams between Emperor Charles and Emperor William, the most important influence upon the Central Powers. With the exception of a doubt raised in one or two of the Paris papers, the press is unanimously behind M. Clemenceau for the part he played in giving publicity to this famous letter. The Premier will give an explanation of the affair in the Chamber on next Wednesday. I believe interesting developments are bound to follow.



Between feelings of most marked depression and a rekindled hope, the British and French *communiqués* of the battle have been read with the greatest interest during the past week. Perhaps the most discouraging feature of such *communiqués*, and one which seems to most impress itself on the public mind, is the fact that each has recorded some advance by the enemy. Everybody has come to recognize that the north end of the battle front, defended by the English troops, is in grave danger. The most hopeful prospect of the English Army being enabled soon to definitely resist any further advances seems to be in the constant reinforcement of large consignments of troops from England, for only the marked superiority in numbers of the German troops seems to have accounted for their success thus far. General Haig's stirring appeal to his armies, which appeared in yesterday's papers, while by its tone confirming the gravity of the situation, yet has inspired a most encouraging hope. I would say that among the better informed, there has come a settled conviction that, until an arrival of large accessions of American troops, the best that may be expected by the Allies is to hold substantially their present positions against the enemy. Such an accomplishment coming at the end of next few weeks would, in the judgment of many, prove very disastrous to the morale of the German people at home. Such a result might go much further to clarify a situation, at present so completely obscured and so impenetrable in its outlook, than the armies of either side could accomplish.

One who would seek the truth is all the more baffled by the great divergence of statements issued in the *communiqués* of the Allies and those of the Germans. This applies not only to estimates of the losses sustained in the present great battle but also as to those occasioned by the submarine, and particularly of aeroplanes brought down over the lines. In the latter item I have seen the estimated totals of loss in a given week almost exactly reversed in these official *communiqués*. Confidentially, a former high French military commander is my authority for the statement that many of the Allied *communiqués* have fallen short of a truthful narrative of actual conditions growing out of this offensive.

The daily visitation of the shells from long range cannon and frequent night attacks of the air raiders have failed to produce that panic among the people here which the enemy had expected. While some of the losses from both means of destruction have been deplorable in their magnitude, yet I am sure the people of Paris are prepared to endure much more of danger with equal equanimity. Their eyes are turned constantly to the north as the source from

which their own protection must come. Supreme confidence is felt in General Foch to keep all his lines intact. Out of this commander's courage and resourcefulness many have come to believe that such a countermove may soon be made against the enemy as to greatly weaken his hold on the positions which his advance, made during the first few days of the offensive, had won for him.

Except these great military events now following each other in such rapid succession, and the portent of certain important political occurrences, above briefly referred to for a future telegram, there is nothing else of importance to report for the week's happenings. It may be noted that the increasingly [rigorous] enforcement of the use of bread cards and limitation of certain foods have brought to the Parisians a source of deprivation not before experienced.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/9973

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, April 16, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received April 17, 11.55 a. m.]

3628. Referring to the brief mention in my No. 3627<sup>1</sup> of yesterday concerning the publication of a letter of Emperor Charles to Prince Sixte de Bourbon and the possible political effect thereof in France, I have learned of certain facts which would seem to establish it as perhaps the most important incident in its possible consequence that has marked the administration of Mr. Clemenceau.

Next in degree to the surprise which was occasioned by the publication of the Emperor's letter by order of the Premier, the fact that such a letter had been written so long ago and kept secret by the French Government came to the public as an astounding revelation. While it is true that in the late days of Mr. Ribot's Premiership he had made brief reference in the course of a statement in Parliament to certain peace overtures coming from Austria, yet his vague remarks gave no indications of what had really taken place. I learn that the Socialists have seized upon the incident to renew their criticism of what they term secret diplomacy, while others not politically allied with them deplore the publication of the letter. . . .

SHARP

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.7211980/9

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1918, 5 p. m.

1190. Your 1513.<sup>1</sup> There is no objection to use in Parliament of this Government's declaration of policy regarding unofficial international conferences, as set forth in Department's cable to Embassy, Paris, quoted in Department's 1129, March 23.<sup>2</sup>

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1601

*The Greek Minister (Roussos) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

## AIDE-MÉMOIRE

By order of my Government I have the honor to inform you that the chief of Bulgarian propaganda at Berne . . . called at the Greek Royal Legation at Berne to propose an understanding between Greece and Bulgaria, the result of which would be withdrawal from the Macedonian front.

He offered the explanation that Bulgaria, surrounded by enemies and fearing subjection to Germany, is seeking friendly support in the Balkans.

The Royal Government in bringing the foregoing to Your Excellency's knowledge wishes to declare that Greece will not listen to proposals of a separate understanding with any of our enemies.<sup>3</sup>

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1918.

File No. 763.72/9617

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 415

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1918.

[Received April 19.]

SIR: I have the honour to inform you, under instructions from His Majesty's Government, that the French Government have agreed to General Foch's receiving the designation of commander-in-chief of the Allied armies in France.

I have [etc.]

READING

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 209.<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 171.<sup>3</sup> Acknowledged Apr. 26, with the observation that "The Secretary of State notes, with pleasure, the concluding statement . . ."

File No. 763.72/9680

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Greece (Droppers)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1918, 5 p. m.

429. On April 4 Venizelos addressed to the President a message of congratulation on the anniversary of the entrance of the United States into the war.<sup>1</sup> The President replied on April 5 as follows:

May I not acknowledge with the deepest appreciation your generous message and convey through you to the oldest of the western nations the fraternal greetings of the young Republic of the West, at the same time expressing our confidence that the valor and devotion of the armies of Greece will play an important and distinguished part in the final triumph. May I not also convey to you personally my own cordial assurances of friendship and tell you of the warm admiration your unselfish devotion to the cause of liberty has excited among our people.

Through the French Ambassador the Greek Minister in Washington asks whether this Government could say anything further as to the future of Greece. Without a formal communication to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, you may await a suitable occasion to give publicity to the following:

The people of the United States view with great admiration the unselfishness and courage with which the Greek people, animated by that love of liberty and devotion to right which they have inherited from a long line of heroic ancestors, are fighting to preserve the freedom for which their patriotic forefathers valiantly fought.

Claiming similar ideals and moved by the same principles of right and justice, the Government and people of the United States are determined that the fullest possible measure of assistance shall be rendered to Greece and that her integrity shall be preserved and her rights secured in any final negotiations for peace that shall take place.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1617

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, April 24, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received April 27, 3.50 a. m.]

3153. Atmosphere in Switzerland is charged with rumors of probable peace offensive by Germany. Several Germans of prominence are now in Switzerland and Professor Quidde, famous pacifist of University of Munich, called on George D. Herron, and the summary of his conversation which follows is a probable indication of

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 196.



the trend of this offensive. Other Germans have endeavored to get in touch with him and other Americans, but a discouraging attitude has been consistently adopted towards them. Quidde let it be understood that he had recently talked with Berlin Foreign Office and in a sense represented their views, although more particularly he represents views of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. He maintains that within a month, no matter what results are obtained in France, peace party in Germany will assert itself, and German Government will be ready to begin negotiations. He wished the President to be prepared for such a moment and urged him to take quick advantage of it.

Herron inquired concerning kind of peace desired: Question of Alsace-Lorraine must not be discussed, Germany must not be asked to renounce anything in advance concerning Brest-Litovsk arrangements, although they do not exclude discussion of these arrangements in the conference. Quidde states that offensive in France is final movement for peace.

It is unnecessary to report by telegraph Herron's vigorous and indignant denunciation of such an effort. Copy of his report will be sent by mail.<sup>1</sup>

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/9719

*The Minister in Greece (Droppers) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ATHENS, April 26, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received April 27, 9.15 a. m.]

488. Your 429, April 19, 5 p. m. Have given publicity to statement in your telegram. It has had happy and widespread effect. Venizelos said to me a month ago he would like some assurance from Entente Powers about integrity of Greece, if not publicly then privately, so that he could if challenged in the House of Representatives reassure the members.

DROPPERS

File No. 763.72119/1622

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, April 27, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received April 29, 1 a. m.]

3181. My 3153, April 24, 8 p. m. De Jong, a Dutch pacifist, reports an interview on April 10 in Switzerland with Doctor Solf, the German Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, as follows:

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

Probably first phase of offensive will end about the middle of May. At that time there would be possibility of peace conversations. There are strong influences in Germany which favor at that time a clear declaration that Germany will restore absolute and unconditional independence to Belgium and that Germany will submit Brest and Bucharest treaties to revision. Solf willing to use his influence to this extent. Such sane and moderate policy has approval overwhelming majority of people and Majority Reichstag. If opportunity for peace conversations is rejected by Entente, German war party will be strengthened.

Solf authorized De Jong to communicate this to friends in Entente countries, but stipulated his name be not used, since Pan-Germans would then try to eject him from office.

STOVALL

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Fifth Session of the Supreme War Council, May 1-2: Discussion of the Use of American Troops—Consideration of the Advisability of Declaring a State of War with Turkey and Bulgaria—President Wilson's Speech of May 18

File No. 763.72Su/83

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council (Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ABBEVILLE, May 1, 1918, midnight.

[Received May 2, 8.38 p. m.]

47. At meeting of Supreme War Council today at Abbeville there were present the French, British and Italian Prime Ministers; the French, British, Italian, and American military representatives, General Foch, General Wilson, Marshal Haig, Lord Milner, Admiral Wemyss, Admiral de Bon, Sir [Maurice] Hankey, General Lochridge, General Lawrence, General Weygand, Sir William Wiseman and myself.

M. Clemenceau opened the debate on the subject of the arrival of American troops by a rather acrimonious statement in which he said that an agreement had been reached on the 24th ultimo in London between Lord Milner and General Pershing, quite without consulting either the French Government or the Supreme Commander—and this he regretted—whereby six American divisions consisting of infantry, machine gunners, engineers and signal corps were to be diverted to the British Army for the month of June [May?]; if the Supreme Commander was to be something more than a name he should have been consulted; according to a decision of the Supreme War Council at Versailles the United States were to furnish a monthly contingent of 120,000 men to be divided equally

between the French and British Armies; while not objecting to the agreement for the month of May, he asked that a like number of American divisions be sent to the French Army during the month of June. Lord Milner replied with some warmth that he was not aware that any such decision had been reached at Versailles and that his one idea was to hasten the arrival of American soldiers when they would be fighting the Germans on French soil irrespective of whether they might find themselves amalgamated with French or British troops. General Pershing said that in making the arrangement with Lord Milner he was guided by the sole purpose of meeting an existing situation as rapidly as possible. Neither he nor Lord Milner had any idea of allotting American troops to either the British or French armies. The troops were being brought over to meet an emergency but he had never lost sight of the original plan of creating an American Army to act as an autonomous unit. M. Clemenceau objected that they were not there to discuss personal matters, he merely wanted to know from General Pershing how many American troops would be allotted to the French Army during the month of June. General Pershing replied that he declined to make any arrangement for the month of June. He needed to be convinced that the same emergency which made the May agreement necessary still existed in June. Mr. Lloyd George remarked that the interests of the Allies must be identical and that unless the subject of American reinforcements were approached from that point of view the unity of command had no meaning. Up to the present the British Army had borne the brunt of the fighting. All the drafts from their depots had been sent to France; they were prepared to send over every man they had. Ten of their divisions had been knocked out; if these divisions were not filled up, other divisions, perhaps French divisions, would have to take their places. The Germans were fighting to exhaust the British reserves; it was a question to decide whether the American Army [should be drafted to] French or British divisions.

General Foch said it was undeniable that the British Army had suffered severely; it was therefore right that it should receive the support of the Americans for the month of May, but as the French were now fighting loyally side by side with their British comrades it was evident that they would also suffer; consequently he asked that the agreement of London be completed by an analogous arrangement for the month of June, whereby the French Army would benefit correspondingly.

General Pershing retorted that he did not understand that the American Army was available for allocation either to the French



or British Army for an indefinite period. In a short time he felt obliged to insist on the principle that American soldiers were not to be parcelled out to the French, British or Italian Army. The Allied commanders apparently did not look forward to the time when the separate units of the American Army would be grouped together under a single command. He added that while it had been made to appear that there were more American troops serving with the British Army than with the French, the contrary was the case; the entire month of May was before them and there would be time to consider whether the present emergency existed at the beginning of June. In the latter event, he was ready to continue the agreement of the month of May to the month of June, but he was unwilling to make such an agreement in advance.

Lloyd George said that speaking in the name of the British Government he entirely accepted the principles laid down by General Pershing, but he pointed out that the Allies were fighting the decisive battle of the war and that if they lost it there would be no need for either a French, British or American Army. Therefore, the first consideration was the defeat of the German Army in this battle. General Foch said that no one was more in favor of an American Army than himself, because an army under its own officers [fought] much better than an army fighting under foreign commanders, nevertheless an emergency existed and he therefore asked that a meeting take place after the regular session between Lord Milner, General Pershing and himself to settle an arrangement for the allotment of American troops for the months of May and June. General Pershing concurred in General Foch's suggestion. The Council thereupon agreed that Lord Milner and General Pershing and Foch should meet in separate session and submit their decision to the Supreme War Council on the following day. The good temper and reasonable attitude of Mr. Lloyd George were successful in harmonizing the conflicting interests in a discussion which at first threatened to be controversial.

The other subjects discussed today were the withdrawal of French and British troops from Salonica, the dissolution of the Supreme War Board controlling the general reserve, and Italian reinforcements for France. These three subjects will be reported in separate telegrams.<sup>1</sup> At 7.30 the meeting adjourned until 11 o'clock tomorrow morning.

FRAZIER

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<sup>1</sup> Frazier's telegrams Nos. 50, 49, and 51, respectively, of which only the last two are printed, *post*, p. 223.



File No. 763.72Su/102

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *May 2, 1918, midnight.*[Received *May 3, 4.40 a. m.*]

48. After protracted discussion an agreement was reached on the subject of the employment of American troops and was adopted by the Supreme War Council this afternoon. The full text of this agreement will be [telegraphed] by General Pershing.

Its essential features are that during the month of May preference should be given to the transportation of infantry and machine gun units of six divisions and that the same program shall be continued for June provided that the British Government furnish shipping for a minimum of 130,000 men in May and 150,000 in June, such infantry and machine gun units to be withdrawn and united with their artillerymen and auxiliary troops into divisions and corps at the discretion of General Pershing.

After consulting with General Foch it was agreed that there would be another meeting to review the situation again early in June for the purpose of determining future action and that in case the British Government finds itself able to transport more than 150,000 men in June, anything above that figure should consist of infantry and machine gun units. The discussion which preceded the adoption of this agreement will be telegraphed tomorrow.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72/9799a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)<sup>1</sup>*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 3, 1918, 4 p. m.*

7556. There is a well-defined movement in Congress to declare that a state of war exists between the United States and Turkey and Bulgaria. Will you please confidentially sound the Government to which you are accredited and obtain its opinion as to the advisability of such a declaration against both or either of the countries named. You will perceive that the action of the United States is based essentially on expediency. I desire therefore to know the judgment of the Government to which you are accredited, as to whether or not such a declaration would be of material aid to the supreme purpose of defeating the Central Powers. A reply as soon as possible is desired.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup>The same, on the same date, to the Ambassadors in France (No. 3830) and Italy (No. 1248).

File No. 763.72Su/63

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 3, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received 5.09 p. m.]

49. The Supreme War Council adopted a resolution on the 2d instant dissolving the Executive War Board as its functions had been superseded by the agreement of Beauvais<sup>1</sup> appointing a supreme commander.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72Su/86

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 3, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received May 4, 10.25 a. m.]

51. The question of further Italian reenforcement for France was discussed on the 1st and 2d instant. M. Clemenceau asked General di Robilant whether it was possible to send more Italian troops to France. General di Robilant answered arrangements have been made to send two divisions but that no more could be spared for the present; he said that in reply to a suggestion that an Italian offensive should be made on the Austrian front to act as a diversion to the German offensive, General Diaz had replied that the weather at the present time made an offensive impossible. Nevertheless the offensive was being prepared and would be carried out when conditions were more favorable.

Signor Orlando remarked owing to the large number of Slavs in the Austrian Army desertions were frequent; these deserters were not cowards but on the contrary brave men who deserted in order to apprise the Italians of any projected move on the part of the Austrian Army; he said that in this way the Italian Army was well informed of intention of its adversaries. The deserters were unanimous in asserting that an Austrian offensive was in preparation. He stated that he was in principle favorable to the idea of the supreme command being extended to Italy; he added that in his opinion the agreement of Beauvais was susceptible of two interpretations.

A long discussion then followed upon this subject. Mr. Lloyd George drew attention to the fact that according to the agreement of Beauvais each commander in chief reserved the right, in case he

<sup>1</sup> Apr. 3, 1918. See telegram of the Secretary of War, Apr. 5, *ante*, p. 197.

considered that a decision of the supreme commander created a danger for his army, of referring the decision to his Government; this, he added, was a very important reservation. Signor Orlando finally consented to abide by the agreement of Beauvais as far as Italian troops fighting in France were concerned, and largely at the suggestion of General Foch agreed to accept the agreement of Doullens<sup>1</sup> for coordination [of the] action of the Italian commander with that of the generalissimo in France. Signor Orlando remarked however that, whenever the same conditions existed in Italy of French, British, and American armies fighting side by side with Italians, he would be in favor of accepting General Foch as generalissimo. In the midst of this discussion General Pershing emphatically stated that he had always been convinced on the necessity of a supreme commander; he believed that the same principle might be extended to Italy with advantage.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72Su/52

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 4, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received May 5, 1.40 a. m.]

52. The discussion of employment of American troops began on the 1st instant and was continued on the following day; in the meantime drafts of agreements had been exchanged between the members of the committee appointed by the Supreme War Council.

The Council assembled at 11.30 on the morning of the 2d.<sup>2</sup> The discussion was opened by M. Clemenceau, who pointed out that the greatest battle in the war was being fought on a [front] of 150 kilometers; if the Germans were able to break through at Villers-Bretonneux in three days they might easily reach Paris, and the Allied armies would in that case be forced to fall back to the Loire; if on the other hand they broke [through] at Ypres the British would lose control of the Channel ports and the situation would be an exceedingly serious one. He particularly desired to have these considerations borne in mind. General Foch then rose, and read a paper embodying his views on the subject. He said in substance that it was plainly the purpose of the German commander to exhaust the reserves and fighting forces of the Allies while still preserving intact a certain proportion of their own. It was quite impossible for him as commander in chief of the Allied armies in France not

<sup>1</sup> Mar. 23, 1918.

<sup>2</sup> The time of the session herein described is given in the printed French text of the minutes as 2.30 p. m., and in the English text as 2.45 p. m.

to be consulted about the numbers of troops coming from the United States to France or the disposition to be made of them upon their arrival. M. Clemenceau then turned to Mr. Lloyd George and said "Scientific something."

Mr. Lloyd George after some deliberation remarked that this was the most dangerous moment of the greatest battle. England had called out six million troops—including the colonies, seven million; France had mobilized every available man; unless America came to the rescue of the Allies in the present state of danger, the Germans might be successful in their plans. If the Allies were defeated [without America] assisting them it would be an honorable defeat, but America up to the present time had sent over only a handful of men. How would the great American nation feel if at the time her assistance was most needed there were not sufficient men to aid the Allies?

General Pershing next spoke. He agreed perfectly as to the seriousness of the situation and would not take issue with General Foch on that point. Americans were just as desirous to take their part of the battle as it was possible for them to be. There might be a difference of ideas but they were united in a common purpose. The United States entered the war as an independent power; America must always be looking forward to the time when she could be fighting in the war as an independent army. The morale of the American troops was dependent upon their fighting under their own flag; the time was not far distant when American people would demand that their Army fight as a separate and autonomous unit. The General terminated by saying that he stood ready to sign the proposition which he had just submitted. The proposition was finally adopted with the addition of the final paragraph.

The remainder of the session was devoted to the approval of joint notes which have already been transmitted to the War Department by General Bliss, after adoption by the military representatives at Versailles. The conference thereupon adjourned to meet again at the beginning of June.

FRAZIER

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File No. 763.72/9839

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, May 4, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received May 5, 2.57 p. m.]

1248 [1579]. Your 1248, May 3, 4 p. m. Took up matter immediately and confidentially with Baron Sonnino who thinks that such a declaration will serve most useful purpose and have an important effect. It will shake up Turkey and Bulgaria, and will prove a



material aid against Austria and also Germany. He expressed himself as very confident of the material aid which the declaration would render to the Allied cause.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72Su/50

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 6, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

54 [55<sup>?</sup>]. Last night in discussing with Wiseman the question of the best utilization of American troops to meet the present crisis, we both felt that you must be puzzled to note the four successive agreements made between the American Government and General Pershing and the French and British Governments with the approval of the two latter and yet to find that neither France nor Great Britain is satisfied with the agreement of Abbeville<sup>1</sup> which superseded the three preceding agreements. Wiseman tells me that as far as England is concerned the explanation is that the British Government did not wish to come to a deadlock with General Pershing and to appeal over his head to higher authority, consequently they accepted an arrangement which they did not think adequately met the situation. I feel reasonably certain that the same explanation would apply to France. The situation as Wiseman and I see it is briefly this:

On the one hand you have General Foch, the commanders in chief of the French and British armies and their chiefs of staff, the military representatives at Versailles, including General Bliss, in full agreement with his colleagues, who all believe that to prevent the appalling danger of the Germans exhausting the Allied reserves and having them at their mercy in July or August, every available ton of shipping should be utilized for the transportation of American infantry and machine gunners; on the other hand there is General Pershing who wishes to build up an autonomous army by utilizing the excess of tonnage over what is necessary to transport six divisions of infantry and machine gunners per month, for the transportation of artillery, etc., necessary to complete his divisions. The difference in result between these two conflicting plans is not insignificant; assuming that tonnage can be found for transporting 200,000 men in the months of May and June and that only infantry were sent, the Allies could count on 400,000 men to fill up their shattered divisions and thus not be forced to reduce the number of

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<sup>1</sup> May 2, 1918.

such divisions. According to General Pershing's plan, barely half of this number of infantry would be available at the end of the same period. Therefore, if the agreement of Abbeville is adhered to, and if General Foch and those who agree with him are right, the best measures for meeting the greater grave emergency will not have been used. If General Pershing is right, and if all tonnage be used to transport exclusively infantry and machine gunners during May and June, it only means that the creation of his Army will be delayed by two months.

General Studd told Wiseman yesterday at Versailles that there was no reason to believe that the morale of the German soldier had deteriorated or that the German staff had not accomplished all it expected in the offensive.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72/9873

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 6, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received May 7, 3.10 a. m.]

3818. Department's 3830, May 3, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> In bringing this matter to the attention of the Foreign Office today, Mr. Pichon said that it was his personal opinion that such a declaration as to both Turkey and Bulgaria would be of much help to the Allies. He, however, wishes to bring the question before the Council of the Ministers tomorrow for their consideration before undertaking to answer for the French Government. As soon as I hear further from him I will telegraph his answer.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/9893

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 7, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received May 8, 1.18 a. m.]

3825. The following is the reply of General Bliss to your 3831:<sup>2</sup> Immediately after receipt by me of the State Department telegram 3831, I submitted the subject of it in conference to my colleagues and after careful consideration we agreed to the following joint recommendation:

I. In reply to the question submitted by the American military representative at the instance of his Government as to whether it

<sup>1</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 222.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; requesting General Bliss to obtain the opinion of the military representatives with the Supreme War Council on the subject of telegram No. 3830, *ante*, p. 222 (footnote).

would be advisable for the United States to declare that a state of war exists at the present time between the United States and both the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria or either of them, the majority representatives after considering the subject from a military standpoint agree to the following joint recommendation:

(a) An immediate declaration that a state of war exists between the United States and the Ottoman Empire is desirable through their representatives.

(b) In view of the moral effect upon Bulgaria of the above action, it is advisable to oppose a declaration that a state of war exists between the United States and Bulgaria until it shall have been found impossible by diplomatic negotiation to detach the latter country from her alliance with the Central Powers, but a limit should be placed upon the time allowed her for consideration of this subject, to be immediately followed by a declaration of a state of war should she within that time limit fail to take satisfactory action.

(c) It is distinctly understood, however, that no situation resulting from a declaration of the existence of a state of war between the United States, on the one hand, and Ottoman Empire or Bulgaria or both of them, on the other, shall be allowed to divert any American troops from the western front, which is in need of, and will be in need of, every man that the United States can send to it until the situation on that front is radically changed.

II. Although it is imperative that the United States permit no diversion of the assistance desired by the Allies on the western front, the military representatives are of opinion that the following military advantages would result from the action recommended above:

1. The moral effect and influence on the peoples of these countries that would follow such a declaration, in the case of the Ottoman Empire and subsequently, if necessary, in the case of Bulgaria, showing the Allies to be really in unison in every theater of the war.

2. The fact that this declaration would enable the United States to participate in the eastern theater and cooperate there with her allies, should opportunity offer, which she cannot do under present conditions and which the necessity for legislative action might prevent her from doing, in their opinion, should the declaration be left until the emergency presents itself.

3. Those elements of the peoples of the Middle East who, owing to the uncertainty of the situation, are now hesitating to put forth strong efforts against the Turks will be encouraged to throw in their lot decidedly with the Entente Powers when they find that the vast potential power of the United States is now to be opposed to the Government of the Ottoman Empire.

Signed by Generals Sackville-West, Belin, Di Robilant, and Bliss.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1649

*The Vice Consul at Zürich (McNally) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ZÜRICH, May 4, 1918.

[Received May 9, 7.10 a. m.]

My son-in-law has had a long conversation with Count Hertling, German Chancellor, on the subject of peace, in which the latter expressed the belief that if he could communicate direct with the President of the United States, in whom he places the greatest confidence, an amicable understanding could be reached. My son-in-law has the memorandum of German peace terms signed by the German Chancellor himself. He declares that his Government can negotiate a peace over the objections of the Pan-Germans notwithstanding the offensive. He informed my son-in-law that he could go much further into German peace conditions in a confidential communication with the President of the United States than in a speech. He would guarantee the strictest secrecy on the part of his Government and would request the same guarantee in return. He emphatically declared himself to favor peace and as being opposed to the war and the manner in which it is being prosecuted.

My son-in-law, whose statements to me can be considered reliable, says that the old Chancellor was terribly in earnest and frequently during the conversation feelingly expressed the hope that the President of the United States would open negotiations for the exchange of peace ideas.

[McNALLY]

File No. 763.72/9904

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 8, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received May 9, 9.30 a. m.]

3835. My No. 3818, May 6. Mr. Pichon further informs me that after bringing before the Council of Ministers the value of the declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria on the part of the Government of the United States, he had been authorized to say that such action would give great satisfaction to the French Government. Desiring to get if possible an elaboration of the Government's view, I took the matter up in person with Mr. Clemenceau this afternoon. He said that there was really little to add to the decision arrived at by the Council of Ministers but that there existed no doubt in their mind of the desirability of such action, and he emphasized the wish that such declaration might be made applicable to both countries as soon as possible.

SHARP



File No. 763.72/9967

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, May 12, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received May 13, 3 a. m.]

3871.

There has been nothing of any particular significance in domestic politics, but the visit of the American Labor Commission, extending over the past week, has created a most lively interest, the press giving much space to accounts of its doings. There is no question but that the impression created by the coming of these men, and particularly by the words uttered by their leaders, has been very favorable. Attending a number of receptions accorded to the members of the commission, I am able to give full praise to the wisdom and patriotism of the messages which they brought. Many members of the French Government, among them M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, have expressed to me their greatest satisfaction over the helpful influence which these delegates have exerted among the labor elements in France. Perhaps something of the kind was needed just at this time. I regret that their stay was not long enough to permit them to visit some of the other big labor centers like Lyon and Bordeaux. However, the entire foreign [*French*] press has carried very favorable accounts of their speeches on America, their meetings while in Paris. . . .

SHARP

File No. 763.72/10091a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1918, 4 p. m.

7755. It has become increasingly clear to the Department that this Government should redouble its efforts to assist the Italian Government in its endeavors to prosecute the war against the Central Powers with all possible intensity. Strong efforts on the part of the German Government by propaganda and otherwise to undermine the enthusiasm of the Italian people for the war, coupled with the inability up to the present time of this Government to render as much physical assistance to Italy as to France and Great Britain may create a situation in Italy comparable to that heretofore created in Russia. The Department fears that applications made by the

<sup>1</sup>The same, on the same date, to the Ambassador in France (No. 4039).

Italian Government for supplies such as coal and other war materials and ships have not been treated by this Government and by the other Governments associated with us in the war as sympathetically as have similar applications made on behalf of Great Britain and France. In order to change this condition of affairs, the Department wishes you to call into conference the principal representatives of the more important United States organizations in the country to which you are accredited and urge them to redouble their efforts to accord to Italian requests for assistance the greatest possible consideration and to use their influence with their French and British colleagues with the view to correcting this situation. Steps are now being taken in this country, with the President's approval, to bring this matter to the attention of the various departments and boards situated here and to create in this country a sympathetic interest towards Italy which will result in encouraging the Italian people to prosecute, even more vigorously than in the past, the war against the Central Powers. This matter is considered vitally important and you should use every effort to impress upon your colleagues the necessity for vigorous action in this respect.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10001

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, May 16, 1918.

[Received May 17, 6.35 a. m.]

2638. German press summary regarding meeting of Emperors.<sup>1</sup> *Kölnische Zeitung*, 15th: Conversations at headquarters which progressed so satisfactorily form, with settlement of fundamental principles for extension and deepening of alliance, the beginning of work of political, military and economic negotiations which will shortly commence in Berlin. Naturally political and military agreements can be concluded much sooner than economic agreements. Director Koernce, of Commercial Department of Foreign Office, will presumably conduct economic negotiations, which will take several months. Many reports from Vienna and Budapest papers give a false impression of conversations. Thus statement that new alliance will be incorporated in the constitutions of Allied Empires. Intention is to conclude political, military and economic treaties which form cohesive whole and will be signed at same time. Report that discussions at headquarters resulted in agreement on so-called Austrian solution of Polish question is wrong. From nature of matter the

<sup>1</sup> At Spa, May 12, 1918.

military and political guiding lines for future shape of alliance have already been worked out to some extent; the practical experiences of war have supplied rich material for effective military cooperation in future and political experiences of war have been useful also. Name of League of Arms [*sic*] has been chosen for forthcoming military agreement.

*Vorwärts*, 15th, comments sarcastically on brevity of Emperor Charles's stay at headquarters and fact that Wolff only quotes comment of [German?] Austrian papers on meeting and ignores Slavic papers.

*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 14th: New central Europe will not be able to make its way without hindrances and struggles, but underlying necessities of [case] are strong enough to overcome obstacles and when this war shall have been terminated by a peace which leaves Central Powers in possession of their rights, even the reluctant will be forced to recognize that course of world history cannot be arrested by stubborn protest.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72/10049

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, May 17, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received May 18, 5 a. m.]

10116. I communicated contents of your 7556, May 3, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> to the Foreign Office who have replied under today's date as follows:

In reply to the inquiry which Your Excellency was so good as to communicate to me on the 8th instant I have the honor to state that in the considered opinion of His Majesty's Government it would be desirable that war should be declared by the United States on the Governments of Turkey and Bulgaria.

The main reasons for this opinion are as follows:

So long as America treats the enemies of the Entente Powers as friendly neutrals the impression in southeastern Europe is inevitable that America has not entered whole-heartedly into the war and that she regards two of the powers who are fighting on the side of our enemy with feelings which are certainly not hostile and might easily become friendly. This naturally discourages our allies in these regions, and neither the Greeks and Servians, whose citizens in territories occupied by Bulgaria are being murdered and deported, nor the Armenians, who are threatened with extermination, find it easy to understand why the gigantic efforts now being put forth by the United States in the cause of freedom appear to leave their interests out of account.

But even more important than the discouragement produced amongst our friends is the encouragement given to our enemies by

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 222.

American neutrality. Bulgaria and Turkey joined in the war without provocation from the Western Powers. Both countries have suffered much economically and both look forward with apprehension to the increasing grip which Germany is gaining over their national resources. A full measure of victory would give them territory but not independence. A German defeat would give them nothing but would still leave them economically dependent. From these misfortunes they hope to be saved by American assistance and if they once clearly realized that they were counted among America's enemies their confidence in the future would be profoundly shaken.

In addition to these arguments, based upon the encouragement to our friends and the discouragement to our enemies which would follow upon an American declaration of war against Bulgaria and Turkey, there is one other consideration which I venture to submit to Your Excellency. The part which America is to play in the labors of the peace conference must in any case be of decisive importance but it seems to His Majesty's Government that there is no portion of the field of international controversy where it would be more valuable than in the Near and Middle East. If America abstains from declaring war against the common enemy in these regions the inference will certainly be drawn by friends and foes alike that she means the various phases of the eastern question which must come up at the peace conference to be settled without her active intervention. His Majesty's Government would regard this as a great misfortune. From the point of view, therefore, of peace, as well as from the point of view of war, they are [desirous] of seeing the United States adopt the same policy towards Turkey and Bulgaria as has been already adopted by the other great belligerents who are fighting to free the world from German domination.

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*Address of President Wilson, Opening the Campaign in New York  
for the Second Red Cross Fund, May 18, 1918*

MR. CHAIRMAN AND FELLOW COUNTRYMEN: I should be very sorry to think that Mr. Davison in any degree curtailed his exceedingly interesting speech for fear that he was postponing mine, because I am sure you listened with the same intent and intimate interest with which I listened to the extraordinarily vivid account he gave of the things which he had realized because he had come in contact with them on the other side of the water. We compassed them with our imagination. He compassed them in his personal experience.

I am not come here to-night to review for you the work of the Red Cross. I am not competent to do so, because I have not had the time or the opportunity to follow it in detail. I have come here simply to say a few words to you as to what it all seems to me to mean.



It means a great deal. There are two duties with which we are face to face. The first duty is to win the war. The second duty, that goes hand in hand with it, is to win it greatly and worthily, showing the real quality of our power not only, but the real quality of our purpose and of ourselves. Of course, the first duty, the duty that we must keep in the foreground of our thought until it is accomplished, is to win the war. I have heard gentlemen recently say that we must get five million men ready. Why limit it to five million? I have asked the Congress of the United States to name no limit, because the Congress intends, I am sure, as we all intend, that every ship that can carry men or supplies shall go laden upon every voyage with every man and every supply she can carry.

And we are not to be diverted from the grim purpose of winning the war by any insincere approaches upon the subject of peace. I can say with a clear conscience that I have tested those intimations and have found them insincere. I now recognize them for what they are, an opportunity to have a free hand, particularly in the east, to carry out purposes of conquest and exploitation. Every proposal with regard to accommodation in the west involves a reservation with regard to the east. Now, so far as I am concerned, I intend to stand by Russia as well as France. The helpless and the friendless are the very ones that need friends and succor, and if any man in Germany thinks we are going to sacrifice anybody for our own sake, I tell them now they are mistaken. For the glory of this war, my fellow-citizens, so far as we are concerned, is that it is, perhaps for the first time in history, an unselfish war. I could not be proud to fight for a selfish purpose, but I can be proud to fight for mankind. If they wish peace, let them come forward through accredited representatives and lay their terms on the table. We have laid ours, and they know what they are.

But behind all this grim purpose, my friends, lies the opportunity to demonstrate not only force, which will be demonstrated to the utmost, but the opportunity to demonstrate character, and it is that opportunity that we have most conspicuously in the work of the Red Cross. Not that our men in arms do not represent our character, for they do, and it is a character which those who see and realize appreciate and admire, but their duty is the duty of force. The duty of the Red Cross is the duty of mercy and succor and friendship.

Have you formed a picture in your imagination of what this war is doing for us and for the world? In my own mind I am convinced that not a hundred years of peace could have knitted this nation together as this single year of war has knitted it together; and better even than that, if possible, it is knitting the world to-

gether. Look at the picture! In the center of the scene, four nations engaged against the world, and at every point of vantage, showing that they are seeking selfish aggrandizement; and against them, twenty-three governments, representing the greater part of the population of the world, drawn together into a new sense of community of interest, a new sense of community of purpose, a new sense of unity of life. The Secretary of War told me an interesting incident the other day. He said when he was in Italy a member of the Italian Government was explaining to him the many reasons why Italy felt near to the United States. He said, "If you want to try an interesting experiment, go up to any one of these troop trains and ask in English how many of them have been in America, and see what happens." He tried the experiment. He went up to a troop train and he asked, "How many of you boys have been in America?" and he said it seemed to him as if half of them sprang up: "Me from San Francisco," "Me from New York,"—all over. There was part of the heart of America in the Italian Army,—people that had been knitted to us by association, who knew us, who had lived amongst us, who had worked shoulder to shoulder with us, and now, friends of America, were fighting for their native Italy.

Friendship is the only cement that will ever hold the world together. And this intimate contact of the great Red Cross with the peoples who are suffering the terrors and deprivations of this war is going to be one of the greatest instrumentalities of friendship that the world ever knew; and the center of the heart of it all, if we sustain it properly, will be this land that we so dearly love.

My friends, a great day of duty has come, and duty finds a man's soul as no kind of work can ever find it. May I say this: The duty that faces us all now is to serve one another. No man can afford to make a fortune out of this war. There are men amongst us who have forgotten that, if they ever saw it. Some of you are old enough—I am old enough—to remember men who made fortunes out of the Civil War, and you know how they were regarded by their fellow citizens. That was a war to save one country. This is a war to save the world. And your relation to the Red Cross is one of the relations which will relieve you of the stigma. You cannot give anything to the Government of the United States. It will not accept it. There is a law of Congress against accepting even services without pay. The only thing that the Government will accept is a loan and duties performed, but it is a great deal better to give than to lend or to pay, and your great channel for giving is the American Red Cross. Down in your hearts you can not take very much satisfaction in the last analysis in lending money to the Government of the United States, because the interest which

you draw will burn your pockets. It is a commercial transaction; and some men have even dared to cavil at the rate of interest, not knowing the incidental commentary that that constitutes upon their attitude.

But when you give, something of your heart, something of your soul, something of yourself goes with the gift, particularly when it is given in such form that it never can come back by way of direct benefit to yourself. You know there is the old cynical definition of gratitude, as "the lively expectation of favors to come." Well, there is no expectation of favors to come in this kind of giving. These things are bestowed in order that the world may be a fitter place to live in, that men may be succored, that homes may be restored, that suffering may be relieved, that the face of the earth may have the blight of destruction removed from it, and that wherever force goes, there shall go mercy and helpfulness.

And when you give, give absolutely all that you can spare, and do not consider yourself liberal in the giving. If you give with self-adulation, you are not giving at all, you are giving to your own vanity, but if you give until it hurts, then your heart-blood goes into it.

Think what we have here! We call it the American Red Cross, but it is merely a branch of a great international organization which is not only recognized by the statutes of each of the civilized governments of the world, but is recognized by international agreement and treaty, as the recognized and accepted instrumentality of mercy and succor. And one of the deepest stains that rest upon the reputation of the German Army is that they have not respected the Red Cross. That goes to the root of the matter. They have not respected the instrumentality they themselves participated in setting up as the thing which no man was to touch because it was the expression of common humanity. By being members of the American Red Cross, we are members of a great fraternity and comradeship which extends all over the world. This cross which these ladies bore to-day is an emblem of Christianity itself.

It fills my imagination, ladies and gentlemen, to think of the women all over this country who are busy to-night, and are busy every night and every day, doing the work of the Red Cross, busy with a great eagerness to find out the most serviceable thing to do, busy with a forgetfulness of all the old frivolities of their social relationships, ready to curtail the duties of the household in order that they may contribute to this common work that all their hearts are engaged in and in doing which their hearts become acquainted with each other. When you think of this, you realize how the peoples of the United States are being drawn together into a great

intimate family whose heart is being used for the service of the soldiers not only, but for the service of civilians where they suffer and are lost in a maze of distresses and distractions.

You have, then, this noble picture of Justice and Mercy as the two servants of Liberty. For only where men are free do they think the thoughts of comradeship, only where they are free do they think the thoughts of sympathy, only where they are free are they mutually helpful, only where they are free do they realize their dependence upon one another and their comradeship in a common interest and common necessity. If you ladies and gentlemen could read some of the touching despatches which come through official channels, for even through those channels there come voices of humanity that are infinitely pathetic; if you could catch some of those voices that speak the utter longing of oppressed and helpless peoples all over the world to hear something like the Battle Hymn of the Republic, to hear the feet of the great hosts of Liberty coming to set them free, to set their minds free, set their lives free, set their children free; you would know what comes into the heart of those who are trying to contribute all the brains and power they have to this great enterprise of liberty. I summon you to the comradeship. I summon you in this next week to say how much and how sincerely and how unanimously you sustain the heart of the world.

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File No. 763.72119/1815

*Report of the Special Agent at Cairo (Yale)*

[Extract]

Report No. 22

CAIRO, April 8, 1918.

[Received May 20.]

The very fact that on October 29, 1916, the Cherif of Mecca was recognized by the Assembly of Ulemas at Mecca as the King of the Arab Nation is a striking indication of the ambition of the man. At that time and up until the entrance of the United States into the war there was much talk of an Arab confederacy or empire embracing northern Mesopotamia, the hinterland of Syria, and Arabia. It was generally supposed that France would have the Syrian coast, that Great Britain would take southern Mesopotamia, that Palestine would be internationalized and that the rest of the Arab countries, which were under Turkish domination, would become independent. . . .

It seems quite evident early in 1915 the Cherif of Mecca began to contemplate a revolt against the Ottoman Government, and that



the time between July 1915 and June 1916 was spent in coming to an agreement with the British Government and in making the necessary preparations. It would appear that the Cherif had made known to the British in a general way his ambitions, and it is to be supposed that he has received encouragement of some sort from them.

Everything tends to show that the Cherif and his sons wish to extend their power over part of Syria and of part of Mesopotamia. As such ambitions presumably run counter to the projects of the French in Syria, and as the entire Christian element of Syria is opposed to the domination of Syria by the King of the Hedjaz and also as there is a certain element among the Moslem Syrians, whose strength cannot be estimated at the present time, that does not wish to have Syria submitted to the control of the Hedjaz, a solution of the ambitions of the King of the Hedjaz is of interest.

WILLIAM YALE

File No. 763.72119/1680b

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1918, 3 p. m.

784. The Department requires as soon as possible all the information obtainable as to what happened at the Stockholm conference in the spring of 1917, particularly as regards the relation there developed between German Socialists such as Scheidemann and other German agents and Bolsheviki such as Fürstenberg, Parvus and others now influential in Soviet councils.

Please prepare and transmit to the Department by mail as soon as possible a complete report. It is suggested that you consult your Allied colleagues and have military and naval attachés do likewise. Matter is urgent and of extreme importance.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10189a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1918, 5 p. m.

1336. For your confidential information, Department on May 16 sent the following telegram to the American Embassies at London and Paris and has forwarded a copy of the telegram and letter in

<sup>1</sup> Similar telegram, on the same date, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, No. 7822 (File No. 763.72/1680a).

support thereof, to Treasury Department, Food Administration, Fuel Administration, Shipping Board, War Trade Board, War Industries Board:

[Here follows text of telegram printed *ante*, page 230.]

The Department does not believe it would be proper to communicate the substance of the above to the Italian Government, but leaves it to your discretion to advise the Italian officials informally of the sympathetic interest shown by this Government as evidenced by the above instructions.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72119/1681

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *May 23, 1918, 3 p. m.*

[*Received May 24, 3.55 a. m.*]

2149. Your 784, May 21 [20], 3 p. m. As Department is aware, the Stockholm conference never actually took place but a Dutch-Scandinavian committee was formed and delegations from the Central Powers later arrived at different times and handed in reports to this committee. The official Russian delegation composed of Rozanoff, Grünberg, Smirnoff, arrived about the beginning of July and had several meetings with the Majority and Minority German Socialists. Does the Department require information concerning the activities of this delegation or only concerning the unofficial activities of Fürstenberg, Parvus, Radek, etc., who were here earlier? <sup>1</sup>

MORRIS

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File No. 763.72/10119

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *May 23, 1918.*

[*Received May 24, 2.42 p. m.*]

2852. German evening papers, 21st, print inconspicuously abridged summary President's speech under titles "Wilson's New War Speech," "Wilson's Latest Diatribe," "Wilson's Grim Determination," etc. No paper prints complete text. Comment limited.

*Vorwärts*: It is very easy to refute many points speech as demagogical exaggeration. Thus the hateful charge of failure respect Red Cross should be addressed primarily to those who misused Red

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<sup>1</sup> Answered by telegram No. 799, May 25, stating report on both desired. The report, 22 pages in length, dated June 15, 1918, received July 13, is not printed.

Cross as cover for military transports, etc., but on whole speech reflects psychological impression peaces of Brest and Bucharest were bound to produce across ocean. Surely Wilson has no right to compare efforts Central Powers for expansion with unselfishness Entente. Renaudel's recent article in *Humanité* vividly exposes unselfishness French war aims but since French, English, Italian plans exist only on paper, whereas Brest and Bucharest peaces form weighty facts, Wilson's deceptive logic will find ready reception in already biased heads his countrymen. The peace in east has therefore extraordinarily consolidated Wilson's position.

*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22d: Wilson made two noteworthy statements. First, his placing Russia on same plane as France which would indicate his reports from France are so little favorable that he could count France with Russia among the helpless. Second, his statement every proposal for an understanding in west involves reservation regarding east. Wilson thus can conceive no peace with Centrals without revision eastern treaties or more properly their abrogation in favor Entente's egotistic objects, but these eastern treaties have legal validity and only the might of Entente can annul them. Entente Powers were given opportunity to participate in Brest negotiations but by their failure to appear deprived themselves, or better, their people, of possibility of influencing arrangement of eastern affairs. Wilson's belated endeavor to change facts is attempt that could only succeed through defeat of Centrals and he hardly believes in that himself.

*Tägliche Rundschau*: Entente peace speeches become frequent again. Certainly no mere chance that Cecil, Smuts and now Wilson speak indirectly of peace. Wilson, like Cecil, wishes to know our terms. Hertling recently voiced opinion of German Government.

*Die Post*: As always, Wilson is mainly concerned in self-sanctification. False pride and patent untruth remain stamp of Wilson's character. The monument to America's unselfish war and humanity is firmly enough established on sale ammunition to Entente under guise neutrality. Wilson's assurance of succour to helpless and friendless France as well as Russia is doubtful flattery illy concealing American egoism. The calumny that Germany misuses Red Cross is audacious coming from mouth of notorious violators of that institution, but not surprising. It is exceedingly doubtful whether Wilson will ever attain this first object of victory.

*Magdeburgische Zeitung*: Wilson wants war to end and will not listen to any peace conditions. His mention of France in same breath with Russia will not improve spirit in France. His speech proves beyond doubt war prolongers in Entente are as strong as ever. His hypocritical attacks on German Army for not respecting Red Cross are so disgusting that we need not bother with them.

*Düsseldorfer Nachrichten*: This speech is by man who had to declare war because plutocracy, whose tool he is, was afraid of losing capital invested in war. Stolypin's son-in-law recently confirmed this on ground of official documents. Wilson's hypocrisy cannot be excelled even by British statesmen. His charges of violation Red Cross by Germany are best illustrated by American custom of sending aviators across Atlantic on hospital ships.

*Kreuz Zeitung*: It is becoming difficult to take Wilson otherwise than as pathological case.

*Hannoverscher Kurier*: Justice, mercy, and freedom in mouth of Wilson sound like praise of virtue in mouth of prostitute.

*Tageszeitung*: It seems compatible with Wilson's second object of winning war greatly and worthily to threaten France with blockade and starvation to keep her [in] line and let pacifists see France must go on even if she doesn't want to. We never shared view Wilson is recluse professor or the indignation at his hypocrisy. We always considered him astute politician and hypocrisy part of his nature and consistent with part allotted himself and United States. In fact attitude of United States since war began would have been impossible without playing such part. Thus we understand why he emphasizes America is fighting unselfish war because any American reading this will feel proud, which would not be case if Wilson told truth and said this is war of Anglo-Saxon capitalists for world supremacy. Wilson's slur on name of German Army is one of the obligatory lies characteristic of the great President which he is ambitious to have himself called.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/1740

*Report of the Special Agent at Cairo (Yale)*

[Extract]

Report No. 17

CAIRO, March 4, 1918.

[Received May 28.]

THE GROWING DISCONTENT AMONG THE ARABS; REASONS FOR THIS DISCONTENT

In 1915 Emir Faisal, the son of the King of the Hedjaz who is now leading the Arab forces at Akabah, was in Damascus. He was in constant communication with the Moslem Arab leaders in Damascus, who were bitterly opposed to the Turks and wished to free themselves from the Ottoman yoke. Arab leaders and sheikhs from the important tribes and groups in Syria from the East Jordan, Hauran and other regions secretly visited Emir Faisal and the Damascus leaders, and pledged themselves to aid and support an Arab revolt, if such should be started by the Cherif of Mecca.



At this time the Arabs affirm that they received a telegram (a copy and translation of which it is hoped will later be obtained) from Cherif Houssain stating that he had received the requisite supply of rifles, cannon, ammunition, provisions and gold and that the Arabs had been promised their independence if they joined in with the Allies. On the strength of this telegram the Arab leaders in Syria were pledged to the cause of the Cherif; and Emir Faisal with several of the Damascus leaders fled to the Hedjaz. On June 5, 1916, the revolt of the Arabs against the Turks began under the leadership of the Cherif of Mecca and his four sons.

Many of the Arabian sheikhs were won over to the cause of the Cherif, Syrian officers and soldiers offered their services to the King of the Hedjaz, and through prisoners of the British taken from the Turks they were organized and trained to cooperate with the forces of the Cherif and his four sons. A propaganda in favor of the Arabs was spread among the Arab tribes in the East Jordan regions, in the Hauran, in the Irak and among the Arabs of Syria.

Up to this time no public announcement was made of the policy of the Allies towards the Arabs; but the Arabs were fighting for the deliverance of their people from the Turks and with the hope [of] independence, partial or entire, in their hearts.

During the summer of 1917 the secret treaties between England, Russia and France were found and published at Petrograd.<sup>1</sup> And it became known that by these agreements France was to be given Syria, Palestine was to be made international, and Great Britain was to have Mesopotamia and the Irak and to hold the Syrian ports of Haifa and Acre.

British and French statesmen made no definite statements about the future of Syria, Mesopotamia and the Arabs; but public declarations were made to the effect that neither Great Britain nor France was waging a war of conquest and annexation, and that they endorsed the principle of the right of small nationalities to an existence of their own.

The Turks began to change their policy; Djemal Pasha visited Berlin and returned to Syria, Abbas Hilmi, ex-Khedive of Egypt, was brought to Syria, and a pro-Arab, Pan-Islamic propaganda was inaugurated. (See Report No. 11 of January 21.<sup>2</sup>)

On November 11, 1917, Mr. Balfour made his now famous declaration to the Zionists, and shortly afterwards the southern part of Palestine and the city of Jerusalem fell into the hands of the British. This supplied the Turks with more material for their propaganda, by which they are trying to stir up the Arabs in Mesopotamia, in the Irak, in Syria, the Hauran and East Jordan regions, and even

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 493-507.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

in Arabia. (See Report No. 11: Letters of Djemal Pasha to Emir Faisal and Cherif Houssain.<sup>1</sup>) The Turks point out that the first step taken by the Allies after conquering southern Palestine was to give it, an Arab country, to the Jews; and they, the Turks, insist that England and France are fighting Turkey only to seize Mesopotamia and Syria for themselves and not for the Arabs.

On December 23, 1917, Sir Mark Sykes, a special delegate of the British Government (whose activities have been mentioned in several previous reports), made the following statements in a speech delivered before the Central Syrian Committee at Paris:

1. Great Britain and France are at one in their politics in regard to all that concerns the non-Turkish elements of the Ottoman Empire.

2. There exists no divergence or dispute between the two countries.

3. Jerusalem, Bagdad, Bassorah have been delivered from the Turks, and if the Turks are unable to retake them by force of arms they shall never have them by treaty.

4. The Arabs have brought to a successful conclusion the independence of the Hedjaz, and the least that can be said is that they are able to maintain their position. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Point 4, the independence of the Hedjaz, is also of real importance; the accomplished fact of the independence of the Hedjaz renders it almost impossible that an effective and real autonomy should be refused to Syria. . . .<sup>2</sup>

1. The Turks are still the masters of Syria.

2. The Syrians are not united. Make no mistake, Europe will not continue the war for the sole purpose of giving Syria her independence. And by this I wish to say that if when the war ends the Turks are still in Damascus and Beyrouth and you Syrians being still divided among yourselves into many parties following your ancient races and religions, I would despair of obtaining for you more than reforms on paper. . . .<sup>2</sup>

Get together, unite, and you will become a powerful political force and if you desire a program, I would not know how to dictate it to you, it is the circumstances which will write it.

1. First of all it is necessary to do away absolutely with the negative Turkish regime: that which by unanimous opinion is intolerable in Armenia, is equally intolerable in Syria.

2. You must desire that France give you her indispensable assistance, which a people for long time oppressed has need of before it can walk alone; you must demand guarantees of the civilized powers of the world that you be not again submitted to Turkish domination, which has reduced you to poverty and discord.

A translation from the French of the entire speech<sup>1</sup> of Sir Mark Sykes is attached to this report.

M. Jean Gout, Minister Plenipotentiary, representing the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, made a speech after Sir Mark Sykes, from which the following is quoted:

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Punctuation as in the original.

Putting aside all idea of colonial domination, the two Allies are resolved, each in its sphere of action, to guide the population which speaks Arabic, and those who speak all other languages, who inhabit the region which extends from the Anatolian mountains to the Indian Ocean (the sea of the Indies) towards a regime of autonomy and civilized development, in a mutual respect of the religious beliefs and nationalities. A guide towards a better future, an arbitrator between religious and ethnical groups, a friendly advisor of civilization; such is the role that France and Great Britain are ready to assume, one in the north, the other in the south.

The entire text of the speech of M. Jean Gout<sup>1</sup> is attached to this report.

Not only are the Syrian Arabs in Egypt greatly upset by this news and declare that it means the division of the Arab provinces between France and Great Britain, but they claim that the Arabs of Syria, east of the Jordan, in the Hauran and throughout Syria, worked upon by the Turks, who it is reported have promised the Arab provinces autonomy and are returning Arab exiles to Syria, are losing faith in the Allies and are unwilling to cooperate with them.

They claim that, unless a clearer, less ambiguous statement be made by the Allies in regard to the future of Syria and Mesopotamia, the Arab tribes of the Irak and the Arabs of Syria as well as many of the tribes in Arabia will be lost to the cause of the Allies and of the King of the Hedjaz.

WILLIAM YALE

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Sixth Session of the Supreme War Council, June 1-3: The Question of Unity of Naval Command in the Mediterranean—Appeal of the Allied Premiers for More American Troops—Fresh Reverses in France—Assurances to France and Promise of American Troops to Italy—"Peace Offensive" in the German Press—Speeches of Kühlmann and Hertling, June 24 and 25—Change of Government in Bulgaria: Unofficial Advances Regarding Peace

File No. 763.72Su/49

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council (Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 2, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received June 2, 12.50 p. m.]

67. To save time, the names of those present at opening session of conference<sup>2</sup> and minutes of session will be telegraphed later.

M. Clemenceau who opened conference asked that discussion of first subject of agenda be postponed as French and British had already reached an agreement regarding manpower. This was

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> June 1, 1918.

agreed to. Conference then took up second subject. Admiral di Revel opposed motion of Allied Naval Council to detach four Italian dreadnaughts from squadron at Taranto to pool them with French fleet at Corfu. Admirals de Bon and Wemyss supported motion. Clemenceau suggested that, as technical arguments had been heard, Governments represented should consider matter in private session. All present then left Council Chamber except three Prime Ministers, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Italian Foreign Minister, Sir [Eric] Geddes<sup>1</sup> and myself, as Mr. Lloyd George asked me to remain. Lloyd George proposed [unity] of command in the Mediterranean stating that [unity] of command in France had only been reached after a conference in the field and he hoped that the Allies would not await a naval disaster before adopting the same principle. The Italian representatives after some discussion agreed with reservations analogous to those in the Beauvais agreement.<sup>2</sup> Mr. Lloyd George's proposal of Admiral Jellicoe as supreme commander in the Mediterranean was adopted by the French and Italian Prime Ministers. Sir Eric Geddes then submitted a draft resolution in regard to Allied commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean which was accepted in principle by the three Prime Ministers, but its final consideration was postponed until tomorrow. Notes of this session as well as a copy of above resolution will be given to the naval attaché of the Embassy. The conference meets tomorrow at three and will probably continue Monday through Monday night. Subject 4, sub-head (1), I am informed that it will be suggested that the Supreme War Council take command of an Allied expedition in Siberia.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72Su/48

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 2, 1918, noon.

[Received 8 p. m.]

69. Supreme War Council, having heard the views of Admiral di Revel, Admiral de Bon and Admiral Wemyss and having studied the report of the Allied Naval Council, are agreed that the new naval situation created in the Mediterranean by the German and Russian Black Sea fleet can be met by a proper distribution and coordination of the existing Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Aegean. They are further agreed that this object can best be secured by applying to the Allied fleets in the Mediterranean the principle of unity of command already adopted on land.

<sup>1</sup> British First Lord of the Admiralty.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram of Secretary of War, Apr. 5, ante, p. 197.



They have, therefore, decided to appoint Admiral Lord Jellicoe to coordinate the movements of the Allied naval forces in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, and Aegean as well as to arrange for the preparation and conduct of naval operations in every way. Admiral Jellicoe will make his general dispositions subject to the approval of the Allied Naval Council, but each commander-in-chief will have the right of appeal to his Government if in his opinion the safety of his fleet is compromised by these general dispositions. Details as to Admiral Jellicoe's duties and powers are to be laid down forthwith by the Allied Naval Council on the basis that it is the intention of Supreme War Council that Admiral Jellicoe shall be in effective strategic command in the Mediterranean, Adriatic and Aegean.

FRAZIER

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File No. 763.72/13361

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 2, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received June 3, 6.10 a. m.]

70. Referring my No. 69. Resolution was withdrawn by Mr. Lloyd George as Italian representatives insisted upon retaining the naval command in the Adriatic. After two hours of debate the French and British representatives decided that further discussion was useless as the Italians could not be induced to make a definite proposal to enable naval unity of command to become a reality. I ascertained privately after the session that Mr. Lloyd George intends to bring the matter up again. Throughout the discussion there was the most perfect unity of opinion between the French and British representatives. After exhausting every means to reach an agreement both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George lost patience with the intransigent attitude of the Italians and some rather acrimonious comments were exchanged.

FRAZIER

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File No. 763.72/10237

*The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, June 3, 1918.

[Received June 4, 4.40 a. m.]

2218. Swedish press reports from Vienna, June 1. On May 30 and 31, German Social Democratic Labor Party in Austria held con-

ference in Vienna. Resolution passed demanding immediate convocation of the Reichs council [*Reichsrat*]. Another resolution passed declaring Brest and Bucharest peace treaties run counter to principles of a peace of agreement without annexations and indemnities.<sup>1</sup> [Hence] it is requested that before ratification peace treaties be submitted to Reichs council for examination and approval. Conference urged Governments of Central Powers to offer peace to Governments of enemy countries on following basis:

- (1) Establishment of a society of peoples comprising all countries which shall apply the principles of universal disarmament and settlement of all disputes between the peoples through arbitration.
- (2) Renouncement all annexations and indemnities in west, east, south, and southeast.
- (3) Full right of self-decision for all border peoples separated from Russia.

[From] Berlin, June 1. At meeting Social Democratic Party committee on Friday, Scheidemann emphasized war aims of Entente Socialists coincided to great extent with annexation aims their Governments. The responsibility for peace in the east which the Socialists would not approve fell on Socialists of the Entente countries and above all on the Bolsheviks. The committee adopted resolution pronouncing in favor of peace of agreement and condemning attitude of Prussian Government in the suffrage question.

MORRIS

File No. 763.72Su/109

*The French, British, and Italian Prime Ministers to President Wilson*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

VERSAILLES, June 2, 1918.

[Presented to the President by the French Ambassador, June 6.]

We desire to express our warmest thanks to President Wilson for the remarkable promptness with which American aid, in excess of what at one time seemed practicable, has been rendered to the Allies during the past month to meet a great emergency. The crisis, however, still continues. General Foch has presented to us a statement of the utmost gravity, which points out that the numerical superiority of the enemy in France, where 162 Allied divisions are now op-

<sup>1</sup> For texts of treaties, see, *post*, pp. 771-777, and *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 442 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> The text here printed is taken from the minutes of the Supreme War Council. No other copy has been found in the files of the Department of State or among the papers of President Wilson.

posed to 200 German divisions, is very heavy, and that, as there is no possibility of the British and French increasing the number of their divisions (on the contrary, they are put to extreme straits to keep them up), there is a great danger of the war being lost unless the numerical inferiority of the Allies can be remedied as rapidly as possible by the advent of American troops. He therefore urges with the utmost insistence that the maximum possible number of infantry and machine-gunners, in which respects the shortage of men on the side of the Allies is most marked, should continue to be shipped from America in the months of June and July to avert the immediate danger of an Allied defeat in the present campaign, owing to the Allied reserves being exhausted before those of the enemy. In addition to this, and looking to the future, he represents that it is impossible to foresee ultimate victory in the war unless America is able to provide such an army as will enable the Allies ultimately to establish numerical superiority. He places the total American force required for this at no less than 100 divisions, and urges the continuous raising of fresh American levies, which, in his opinion, should not be less than 300,000 a month, with a view to establishing a total American force of 100 divisions at as early a date as this can possibly be done.

We are satisfied that General Foch, who is conducting the present campaign with consummate ability, and on whose military judgment we continue to place the most absolute reliance, is not over-estimating the needs of the case, and we feel confident that the Government of the United States will do everything that can be done, both to meet the needs of the immediate situation and to proceed with the continuous raising of fresh levies, calculated to provide, as soon as possible, the numerical superiority which the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies regards as essential to ultimate victory.

A separate telegram<sup>1</sup> contains the arrangement which General Foch, General Pershing, and Lord Milner have agreed to recommend to the United States Government with regard to the despatch of American troops for the months of June and July.

G. CLEMENCEAU  
D. LLOYD GEORGE  
V. E. ORLANDO

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<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*

War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Cables Section Files

*The Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces  
(Pershing) to The Adjutant General (McCain)*

[Telegram]

VERSAILLES, June 2, 1918.

[Received June 4.]

1236. For Chief of Staff and Secretary of War:

The following agreement has been concluded between General Foch, Lord Milner, and myself with reference to the transportation of American troops in the months of June and July:<sup>1</sup>

The following recommendations are made on the assumption that at least 250,000 men can be transported in each of the months of June and July by the employment of combined British and American tonnage.

We recommend:

(a) For the month of June—

- (1) *Absolute priority* shall be given to the transportation of 170,000 combatant troops (viz.: 6 divisions without artillery, ammunition trains or supply trains, amounting to 126,000 men and 44,000 replacement for combat troops);
- (2) 25,400 men for the service of the railways, of which 13,400 have been asked for by the French Minister of Transportation;
- (3) The balance to be troops of categories to be determined by the commander-in-chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

(b) For the month of July—

- (1) *Absolute priority* for the shipment of 140,000 combatant troops of the nature defined above (4 divisions minus artillery, etc., amounting to 84,000 men, plus 56,000 replacements);
- (2) The balance of the 250,000 to consist of troops to be designated by the commander-in-chief, American Expeditionary Forces.

(c) It is agreed that if the available tonnage in either month allows of the transportation of a larger number of men than 250,000, the excess tonnage will be employed in the transportation of combat troops as defined above.

(d) We recognise that the combatant troops to be despatched in July may have to include troops which have had insufficient training, but we consider the present emergency is such as to justify a temporary and exceptional departure by the United States from sound

<sup>1</sup>The text of the agreement here printed is in the form recorded in the minutes of the Supreme War Council.



principles of training, especially as a similar course is being followed by France and Great Britain. Foch, Milner, Pershing.

PERSHING

File No. 763.72/10266

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

LONDON, June 5, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received June 6, 10.06 a. m.]

10448.

I sent a member of the Embassy staff a few days ago to Mr. Arthur Henderson to inquire whether any progress was being made towards arrangements for the international conference proposed at the Labor and Socialist meeting held in London last February and whether any reply had been received from the Socialists of the Central Powers to war aims memorandum adopted at that meeting. I think it well to give his answer in full.

He said that no reply had as yet been received except from the Bulgarian Socialists of which he had the text from a Bulgarian newspaper which he had just received. With regard to the German and Austrian Socialists, he said the position was obscure. They were reported not to have received any one of the copies officially transmitted through neutral countries and apparently do not trust to the accuracy of the copy printed in full in the *Times* of February 25. Their attitude of doubt as to the accuracy of the *Times* copy was due to the fact that the British Government censorship, like the German, does not show, by gaps or blanks, any indication of its handiwork, and Mr. Huysmans declared that this scepticism as to the correctness of matter printed in British newspapers existed not only in Germany but in neutral countries as well.

According to present arrangements Mr. Branting from Stockholm and Mr. Troelstra from Rotterdam will, it is hoped, be also present at the annual British Labor Conference to be held on the 27th instant. This will afford an opportunity for the committee of three to discuss the possibility of holding the international conference and for the second committee to consider questions connected with the granting of facilities for this conference by the various Entente Governments. After the meeting in London on the 27th instant, it is proposed to visit Paris and discuss these questions further with the French Socialists. Henderson does not anticipate that any obstacles will prevent the meeting of these committees and feels confident that the resolute opposition to any international conference expressed by the American Labor delegates who visited Lon-

don last month will not have any effect in preventing the conference from taking place, provided a satisfactory attitude is displayed by the Socialists of the Central Powers. Henderson expressed his hearty approval of the definition of victory given by General Smuts in his Glasgow speech on May 17 and of the attitude towards "peace by negotiation" of the Irish Nationalists as expressed in Mr. Devlin's recent speech.

The fact that the American Federation of [Labor] agrees with the British and Allied Socialists in the view that a labor conference should be held concurrently with the peace conference, in whatever place that peace conference may hold sessions, is regarded by Henderson as a valuable indication of agreement between American labor and that of the [Allies. He repeated] what he has several times told me as to his earnest hope that President Wilson will have the preponderant voice in the peace conference and virtually determine the policy of the Allies in the world settlement and he regards the presence of American Labor as essential in order to support the President's views. But even if American Labor does not see fit to cooperate in the preliminary conversations or conferences which the Allied Socialists desire, he does not feel that the absence of American representatives need prevent such conversations or conferences from taking place.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 763.72119/2417

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the  
Secretary of State*

No. 628

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received a telegram from Mr. Balfour from which it appears that there was some reason to believe that the Germans intended to take advantage of the recent visit of Sir George Cave to The Hague in order to endeavour to initiate conversations on the subject of peace.

This visit, as you are perhaps aware, was made in connection with the discussion of the question of the exchange of prisoners of war between the two countries.

It even appears to have been alleged that Sir George Cave was specially selected to proceed to The Hague in order that such conversations might be facilitated.

While there was, of course, no foundation whatever for such an allegation, it appeared to His Majesty's Government to be quite possible that Sir George Cave might be approached with regard to peace and he was therefore instructed that, should this occur, he might listen to any proposal which might be volunteered to him, but should only say in reply that he had no instructions in the matter

and could do no more than report fully to His Majesty's Government on what was said to him.

Mr. Balfour has requested me to inform you confidentially of the above.

Believe me [etc.]

READING

File No. 763.72/10293

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, June 8, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 4.28 p. m.]

2377. Discussion of Soissons-Rheims offensive continues to be comparatively unenthusiastic. The tendency of military comment is plainly evident from quotations in the Legation's 2376, 8th.<sup>1</sup> Similar ones appear in practically every paper of whatever color. Comments on political significance of offensive have nearly all been in connection with demand of *Kreuz Zeitung* for a "peace offensive" consisting in publication of German war aims. Socialist and Liberal papers were quick to emphasize that this was exactly what they had always demanded, but added that the aim of the *Kreuz Zeitung* was to bind the Government to annexationist aims at a moment when the military situation was favorable; nevertheless they supported the demand as before. The remainder of the annexationist press looked [askance] at the suggestion of the *Kreuz Zeitung*, probably recognizing that the Pan-German demands would not bear discussion in the public forum, even in Germany, and that nothing would sooner undermine the "defensive war" theory, which is still the [foundation] of Germany's military strength. Evidently acting upon the reception its demand received, the *Kreuz Zeitung* recanted to a large extent, stating that the article in question was only the personal view of one of its staff, did not represent the policy of the paper, and that the suggested "peace offensive" in no way resembled the Reichstag's "renunciation resolution."

That the columns of the leading Prussian Conservative newspaper should contain a suggestion of the advisability of the use of the political weapon before the soldiers have concluded their work is an admission that in theory at least the Liberal press has been warranted in its demands that an attempt be made to impress upon the enemy the possibility of negotiating on the basis of Germany's terms; it also seems to indicate that even in the Pan-German camp there are those who begin to doubt the ultimate and final efficacy of weapons in bringing a decision.

AMERICAN LEGATION

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72/10308

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 9, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received June 10, 3.35 p. m.]

4147. Weekly report. Military.

Like the first offensive projected on the northern front late in March, so the second offensive launched nearly two weeks ago against the French lines extending from Soissons to Rheims has been gradually checked. In each case similar gains in territory were made in large part during the first three or four days of the attack, the element of surprise as to time and place, always with the attacking party, being chiefly responsible for such successes. With defensive reserves increasing with each day, however, the advance has been stopped. Perhaps a cross-section of the greatest bulge of the territory thus gained would in both drives show something like twenty to twenty-five miles, though the average in width from end to end of the points of the offensive would be much less than this.

Manifestly the vital question which confronts the Allied forces today is how many sustainable advances will the enemy be enabled to make before important counterattacks can be successfully made against him. Another advance of a similar distance from the southernmost point of his second attack would cut in two distance which now separates him from Paris. It would amount to even more than this in the north, where Calais is the objective. Indeed it has become quite the settled opinion of many here that the enemy plans to keep on making attacks, making sufficient gains each time to finally enable him to plant his big guns within shelling distance of the city.

With this conviction uppermost in the minds of the people of Paris, many have plans quietly laid providing for women and children to leave the city in a timely and orderly manner so as to avoid any panicky conditions that might otherwise follow in an emergency. It is a delicate situation with which to deal; for obvious reasons publicity cannot be given to the carrying out of such plans. In so far as this Embassy is concerned, tentative plans have been made for removing the archives and records, etc., by [*camion*] should that later be considered necessary. I know that all Allied embassies and legations are doing likewise. Informed at the Foreign Office that provisions would be made by the French Government to transport the entire personnel of all the diplomatic and consular corps if the necessity occurred. In conference with Major Perkins of the Red Cross and Mr. Carter of the Y.M.C.A., I have learned that those organizations are also prepared to take care of



their entire working forces, which alone constitute a considerable number estimated to be about fifteen hundred for the Red Cross and perhaps half that number for the Y.M.C.A. I have been pleased to know that during the past two weeks many Americans, chiefly women and children, have been going out of Paris to other points further south and west, and I hope that this work may go on until one can see more clearly what lies ahead.

This exodus has been without doubt very much hastened by the almost nightly raids of hostile aeroplanes and the daily visitation of the shells from the long-range guns. Of course some of these shells have been striking right in the heart of the business portion of the city and yesterday one struck in the building adjoining the Ministry of War. While no official account is issued as to the loss of life or property, yet without doubt nearly every shell exacts costly toll. Through it all, however, there has never been a moment of panic or fear and everything is being done in a systematic and orderly way without, in fact, the public knowing anything about plans for leaving. Mr. de Margerie of the Foreign Office within the past few days told me that as a matter of fact even before the first offensive the French had been quietly moving to different portion of France. As a precaution of safety, portion of their records and more recently in many cases munition plants and equipment were quietly being moved out of Paris to other places further to the south. This work has been under the direction of Mr. Loucheur, the Minister of Armaments. The tremendous explosion of the munitions storage depot at La Courneuve just about in the outskirts of the city two weeks ago determined the orders as to the necessity of removing other important plants and munitions storage warehouses away from danger. I have heard it is estimated that 60 per cent of the munition output in France comes from factories located in Paris. While at the Foreign Office a few days ago I saw workmen in the act of taking down the valuable tapestries hanging in the large salon for removal to other places.

Despite all these preparations, the determination to never yield a foot of territory to the enemy that can be held and to hold Paris at all hazards, has never been weakened. The determination to make every possible resistance, voiced by Marshal Joffre, as well as his comments on the advisability of certain civilian classes leaving Paris, which I have quoted in another telegram of today,<sup>1</sup> fairly represents the general sentiment existing here. I trust that the Department will not be misled by these preparations for certain classes of people who are engaged in no useful [work] to leave the city, into believing

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

that there is anything like a conviction that the city will be taken by the enemy. I think I can quite conservatively say that the confidence in the Allied forces to prevent such a catastrophe is unshaken. I mean merely to acquaint the Department with the situation which actually exists here and the methodical and sure manner in which that situation is being faced in taking timely precautions in preparing for the unexpected.

Naturally the events of the past ten days have caused a grave concern to everybody but already the possibility of danger from the second offensive has been discounted and the possibilities of another to follow further north are now being considered. In fact, it was Colonel Fabri, a gallant officer who lost a leg in the early days of the war and since has become one of the confidential aides on the staff of Marshal Joffre, who told me the other day it was from the third offensive that the greatest danger might come. He expressed this opinion because the French might not have sufficient reserves left to sufficiently protect such new point of attack. This morning in a talk with Mr. Clemenceau, who had late last night returned from the front, he told me that this futile attack had actually been launched last night in the neighborhood of Montdidier and was now being carried on with great force. He remarked to me, however, with much confidence, that the Allied troops were fully prepared to meet such attacks. It is at that particular sector, I believe, we have stationed the largest number of the American troops. Already, comparatively small as is our own contingent in numbers, the Allies have come to place great reliance upon us. The courage and very audacity of our boys, in a manner of fighting peculiarly their own, continue to call forth the most enthusiastic praise from the French officers. . . .

Personally I have great confidence in the conviction that the American troops are very soon to play a part of the most heroic proportions in stemming the tide of the enemy's progress. I believe I would not indeed be surprised to see a counter move made against him at a propitious moment which would do much to demoralize the whole offensive operations. At the present moment our troops seem to [excel] in the loyalty which promises to permeate the Allied forces and to give them that confidence in the invincibility of their power that will stamp defeat written in its biggest letters all along the lines of the enemy trenches. But the awaited events of strategy will indicate the measure of success of the new attack. To-morrow I will refer in a supplemental report to the political significance of the recent Socialistic attack on the Clemenceau Government.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/10275

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1918, 3 p. m.

1424. Your 1472, March 14,<sup>1</sup> and mail despatch No. 857 of March 19.<sup>2</sup> Subject of sending American troops to Italy has been considered by our representatives of Supreme War Council. General Pershing has also been instructed to express the sympathetic attitude of this Government on this question and to point out the obligation of the United States to meet the increased demand of Great Britain and France for American troops up to July 1 and to express the hope that favorable determination of the question may soon be made to send troops to Italy subsequent to June.

You may inform Italian Government that matter of furnishing supplies of coal, freight cars and locomotives is one which should be referred to the Supreme War Council for consideration.

LANSING

President Wilson's Files

*President Poincaré to President Wilson*

[Telegram—Translation]

PARIS, June 12, 1918.<sup>3</sup>

MR. PRESIDENT: I will not let the anniversary of General Pershing's arrival in France with the first contingents of the American Army pass by without expressing to you my admiration for the magnificent effort successfully put forth since then by the great sister republic and my warm congratulations on the splendid troops who are beginning to give daily examples of their bravery on the battlefield. The Allies, who have at present to hold in check forces largely increased by Russia's capitulation, are living through the most trying hours of the war; but the speedy formation of new American units and the unceasing growth of ocean transportation are bringing us surely nearer to the day when the balance will at last be restored. When it is turned in our favor, the Allied armies in brotherly union will wreak a decisive revenge on the enemy and by their common victory will lay the foundations of a peace conforming to the principles solemnly set forth by you and assuring, with the necessary guarantees, the rule of law and the freedom of nations.

RAYMOND POINCARÉ

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 153.<sup>2</sup> Not printed.<sup>3</sup> Time of receipt not indicated.

File No. 763.72/10483a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1918, 5 p. m.

1432. For your information only. Department's 1424 and your 1723,<sup>1</sup> June 11. Department is advised in strict confidence by War Department that one regiment of infantry will be sent from the United States on transportation furnished by Italy for service in Italy. General Pershing has been instructed to take up question of transportation with Italian Government and to cable the War Department arrangements made and date regiment should be ready for shipment. You will be kept advised with reference to this matter.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10355

*President Wilson to President Poincaré*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1918.

MR. PRESIDENT: Your telegram of yesterday<sup>2</sup> was certainly conceived in the highest and most generous spirit of friendship and I am sure that I am expressing the feeling of the people of the United States as well as my own when I say that it is with increasing pride and gratification that they have seen their forces under General Pershing more and more actively cooperating with the forces of liberation on French soil. It is their fixed and unalterable purpose to send men and materials in steady and increasing volume until any temporary inequality of force is entirely overcome and the forces of freedom made overwhelming, for they are convinced that it is only by victory that peace can be achieved and the world's affairs settled upon a basis of enduring justice and right. It is a constant satisfaction to them to know that in this great enterprise they are in close and intimate cooperation with the people of France.

WOODROW WILSON

File No. 763.72/10396

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, June 14, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received June 16, 6.30 p. m.]

3654. *German political.* The peace offensive advocated in *Kreuz Zeitung* has developed into a rather general expression of desire

<sup>1</sup>The latter not printed.<sup>2</sup>June 12; President Wilson's telegram was written the 13th, but was not sent until the following day.



that the Government define its program of war aims. The author of the original article has stated that such a program should provide for liberty of the seas and adjustment of economic and colonial questions, more definite understanding, the reduction of the British Navy, internationalization Gibraltar, Malta, etc., under which conditions Germany could give up Belgium. Accounts of German submarines off the American coast have been confined to neutral and Allied press reports and the idea has been expressed that transport of troops will be reduced. References to American Army less disparaging so far as numbers are concerned. Emphasis now laid on lack of training. Allied grain reserve is spoken of as destroyed.

Electoral reform has been defeated in fourth reading and, the Conservative-Liberal-Center compromise being accepted, hope is removed that equal suffrage bill will pass without new election. Hertling is said to have stated that he would stand or fall with this bill and if the question is not satisfactorily solved by winter the House would be dissolved. The election of Fehrenbach of Baden by an overwhelming majority to the presidency of the Reichstag increases the importance of south Germany in the Reichstag. He is of the Democratic wing of his party and close to Erzberger. Radical Dove, National Liberal Paasche, and Socialist Scheidemann were elected vice-presidents. Socialists hold chairmanship main committee in person of Ebert, and Fischbeck, a Radical, probably is [chairman] inter-party committee. All important offices thus held by Moderates. . . .

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/10328

*The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Sofia (Murphy)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1918, 5 p. m.

Department informed that a Bulgarian officer under training was recently on German submarine U-104 while engaged in hostile operations. Also that Bulgarian officer cruised to the United States on the German U-53. Request of Bulgarian Government an urgent explanation of its action in placing its officers on enemy ships of war engaged in active aggression against the United States with which Bulgaria is not at war. Report by cable.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10416

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

LONDON, June 19, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

10713.

The New York correspondent of the *Daily News* announces that the American labor delegates who have recently returned from this country recommend that an international organization be started "to combat the political movement of labor associated with Mr. Henderson," and that the American Federation should maintain one or more representatives in Europe of whom Mr. Gompers should be the first. In a talk which a member of this Embassy had with Mr. Sidney Webb he expressed the opinion that in the interests of Allied unity it would not be desirable that any more American labor delegates preaching the doctrine of the "knockout blow" and of complete nonintercourse with German Socialists should come to this country or to France at the present time. His opinion is that the recent visit of the American delegates to France and their intercourse with French Socialists did not tend towards harmony but had on the contrary a somewhat disturbing effect on French Socialists and labor circles.

Webb stated that as has been announced in the English press there was little doubt that Mr. Branting from Stockholm and Mr. Troelstra from Rotterdam would attend the British Labor conference to be held here on the 27th instant. He believes that Mr. Branting would proceed with Mr. Henderson to Paris to confer with French Socialists respecting the proposed international Socialist conference, but owing to the strong feeling in France against Troelstra it was not certain that this gentleman would be able to go there, in which case it was probable that some of the French Socialist leaders would come here to confer with him. The Northcliffe press strongly intimates that Mr. Troelstra will not receive his passport to come to England, but Webb says that has had no news of such action and that in any case Mr. Troelstra would attend the Labor Party conference as a secondary fraternal delegate and would have no opportunity of speaking there on the question of the proposed international conference.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 763.72119/1749

*The Vice Consul at Zürich (McNally) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ZÜRICH, June 17, 1918.

[Received June 20, 3.30 a. m.]

While the German Government deny that they are making a peace offensive they cannot deny the truth that they are anxious to make peace and also Hertling is most desirous of making his terms known to the President of the United States. They are anxious for the *status quo ante* and would vacate every foot enemy ground now occupied but only after a peace treaty had been signed. They still maintain, however, that the question of Alsace and Lorraine is not debatable. This information is reliable.

➤ [McNALLY]

File No. 763.72/10463a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1918, 4 p. m.

1476. Reports have been received indicating that certain Americans in Rome have not hesitated to criticize most unfavorably the actions taken by this Government regarding the conduct of the war with especial reference to Italy. It is also understood that, owing to certain conditions dating back to the entrance of Italy into the war, a lack of harmony exists between the French and the Italians.

With a view to the establishment of complete harmony and cooperation among the Governments associated in the war against Germany, so essential at the present time, you are instructed to impress upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs the fact that this Government entered the war for the general good and is willing to place its resources, men and ships where they will do the most good for the general cause and that the principles upon which we are fighting have been so clearly defined that not only Italy but the other Governments must recognize the fact that the Government of the United States will not permit of anything in the final settlement except what is in complete harmony with those principles and that therefore Italy can have no cause for anxiety so long as the war against the Central Powers is brought to a successful conclusion.

You may also inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we have been disturbed by a certain lack of harmony and cooperation at sea and say that in order to be encouraged in our efforts so far as Italy herself is concerned, we should be assured of a perfect willingness on her part to enter into the plan of the Allied nations and cooperate in every way possible and to the fullest extent.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10498

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, June 25, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 3.52 p. m.]

1766. Your 1476, June 21, 4 p. m. There is no criticism by Italians of America here now. Have heard of none since we declared war Austria, except from Socialist organ. Report probably form of enemy propaganda or relates to time before we declared war Austria.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1761

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, June 25, 1918.

[Received June 26, 2.46 a. m.]

3260. Kühlmann speaking yesterday before Reichstag gave Burián credit for bringing about meeting of two Emperors, an historic event of great significance for future relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary. He characterized resignation of Radoslavov as regrettable but said change of Cabinet would have no effect on Bulgarian policy. Difficulties had arisen between Turkey and Bulgaria regarding condominium in Dobrudja and regulation of Maritza border but he was confident of satisfactory adjustment. The Roumanian questions would be reserved for later separate treatment.

Events in Russia demanded closest attention of German diplomacy and exercise of utmost prudence. In Finland, thanks to German assistance, struggle has ended in favor of those desiring the country's independence; across the Baltic, however, difficult situation involving Lettish people has arisen as foreseen by negotiators at Brest-Litovsk, but complete dissolution of Russian Empire had made the course taken unavoidable. The sending of troops into Esthonia and Livonia to help subdue terrorism of Red Guard had been done with approval of united German public opinions. An attempt to settle outstanding questions in this region is about to be made in Berlin with representatives of Soviet Government under presidency of German Foreign Secretary. Inherent difficulties of Polish question together with its inseparable connection with economic problems had so far stood in way of final settlement.

In Caucasus, Turkey, under pressure of military necessity, had undoubtedly advanced further than was strictly permitted but after conference between Turkish and German General Staffs progress has been stopped. Independence of Georgia had been recognized by Germany and every effort would be made to promote friendly rela-



tions with this country. A conference for regulation of Caucasian questions will soon take place in Constantinople. No decision has yet been reached concerning Åland Islands but it is greatly to be hoped that they will not be used for military purposes. He praised attitude of Denmark, Switzerland and Holland, declared there was no prospect of Spain [veering] from her neutrality and said that German Government was doing its utmost to counteract influence of United States among American republics and to prevent any more of these from abandoning their neutrality.

As regards the Belgian question he evaded any direct declaration stating that Germany must decline to commit herself in advance to any policy which would bind her without in any way binding the enemy; he said however that he could answer for his Government in saying that it would not refuse to listen to any proposal for an honorable peace. No prediction could be made as to duration of war since in spite of successes of German arms enemy showed no inclination to come to terms. He saw no hope of ending the struggle so long as overtures from either side were denounced as peace traps. It was his opinion that vast scale of conflict made it impossible to reach decision by military means without diplomatic aid. Germany's advantageous position in all respects permitted his saying this without fear of being misunderstood. He hoped enemy would soon abandon their illusions of victory and come forward with peace befitting the actual situation and satisfying the necessities of Germany's existence.

GARRETT

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File No. 763.72/10512

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, June 24, 1918, 9 a. m.

[Received June 26, 11.20 a. m.]

3744. Since the fall of Radoslavoff Bulgarians in Switzerland have been actively attempting to get in touch with their immediate enemies, the Serbs and Roumanians. Such Bulgarians are professors and business men, members of official Bulgarian propaganda service. A certain . . . rich merchant and friend of Malinoff, foretold present crisis to a Russian in whom I have confidence, inquired how the Malinoff faction should act to win the confidence of the Entente and prove readiness to modify present policy. I repeat his statement in full as it is typical of general tone adopted:

I turn to you in the name of group of Bulgarians who hope you will aid them. We believe the moment has come to change from words to definite deeds. We have firm relations with an or-

ganization which exists not only in the interior of Bulgaria but also on the front. Situation in country such that sign from us sufficient to lead Bulgarian Army on the Salonica front to show white flags and to refuse to fight against the Allies. In order to have a moral possibility for this, we must put ourselves on the ground of a realistic policy and must, above all, come to a lasting agreement with Servia. Knowing your relations to us and to the Servians, we believe that you are the only person who could today arrange a meeting with the Serbs to begin negotiations relative to the conditions under which an agreement between these two sister countries would be possible. We leave you complete liberty in this matter to act as you think fit. We beg you only that the Serbs with whom we may meet shall be representatives of all tendencies in Servian public life. On our side we would be ready for great concessions and we are convinced that our work begun here would aid to great and spontaneous results.

Radoslavoff fell for the only reason which can destroy a ministry in Bulgaria, because the Czar desired it. The official announcement stated that he lacked a majority, but the Chamber was not in session. Therefore it is probable that Czar is beginning to doubt Germany's final victory and desires to play safe by selecting a man who would not be looked on with suspicion by Allies in case he should desire to negotiate.

One of three hypotheses must apparently explain present activity of Bulgarians here:

- (1) That they are acting on their own initiative as persons who, nearer the center of events, recognize the trend of affairs and the necessity of reconciliation with the Allies better than their Government;
- (2) Under direct instructions from Sofia to endeavor to come to an understanding with enemies;
- (3) [Instructed] from Government but so that Germany will hear rumors of it, become alarmed at the unrest of the Bulgarian people and grant Bulgaria the concessions she desires in Dobrudja and elsewhere.

It is significant that in spite of inter-Balkan hatred, two representative Servians and Roumanians, with whom I have talked independently, agreed that the present opportunity in Bulgaria should not be neglected, that a territorial agreement in the Balkans is not impossible, that even if third hypothesis is correct and Bulgaria is insincere it could only further embroil Bulgarian-German relations if friendly attitude shown to Bulgarian suffering.

It is highly probable that these persons will try to get into touch directly or indirectly with the Legation. It would therefore be desirable that I be instructed as to my attitude on—

- (1) What questions I might raise concerning territorial arrangements with Servia, Greece and Roumania;

- (2) Probability of financial assistance;
- (3) Any discussion that might arise as to the attitude of our co-belligerents towards Bulgarian aspirations for those lands occupied by Bulgarians under Turkish dominion;
- (4) The possible request that I serve in an unofficial way as intermediary between Bulgaria and other Balkan states.

If anticipated attempts are made to Legation and if Bulgarians endeavor to show readiness to negotiate, I suggest desirability at that time of sounding Bulgarian Government as to its inclination to receive a duly accredited American diplomatic representative who could reach Bulgaria either through or over the Salonica lines. This proposal would serve as a test for the sincerity of their efforts. If they accept a new representative with resulting displeasure from Germany it would appear proof of sincerity. If not, the whole matter could be dropped. There are also obvious advantages which need not be detailed in sending a representative with fresh instructions from the Department to converse directly with Bulgaria's public men.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/10507

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, June 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received June 26, 2.31 p. m.]

1764. Your 1476. Took up matter with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He said that he supposed the suggestion of the telegram came from Council at Versailles which I imagine is the fact. He then said he desires to have Italy act in harmony with the other Allies. He does not believe an Allied naval council [desirable?] but has nothing against the idea of a single commander of all the Allied naval forces, provided that a regard be had to a certain rapidity and liberty of action to be left to commander of the Italian Navy touching operations in the Adriatic. This he considers necessary because of the following conditions: first, the geographical relation of the two sides of the Adriatic, the western side being low, flat, sandy, without harbors, while the eastern side, which is mountainous and full of harbors and inlets, is adapted for war and this is particularly the case touching modern submarine warfare. Rapidity of action he declared necessary in the Adriatic where warfare is a matter of surprise and marked [by] surprises, as shown by the recent Italian actions at Pola and off Palmeda. From this he drew conclusion that a certain autonomy of the Italian Command is necessary, said this would also have an important political bear-



ing on the spirit of the people. I jotted down his points as he advanced them.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1769

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, June 26, 1918.

[Received June 27, 9.21 a. m.]

3271. Following text of Hertling's speech delivered yesterday in Reichstag during debate on foreign policies :

Gentlemen: It was not originally my intention to take part in these proceedings under the present circumstances. The reasons which influenced me in thus holding back are obvious: they are the experience which I have had, with my predecessors, in the successes of our speeches. If we spoke of our pacific sentiment, or our readiness for peace, it was interpreted by some as a symptom of our weakness and of our impending collapse, and by others as a slyly set trap. If on the contrary we spoke of our unshaken determination to defend ourselves in the war of conquest forced upon us, we heard Ludendorff's saber rattle and it was said: This is the voice of Prussian militarism to which the leading statesmen must willy-nilly yield.

On February 24 [25] of this year I went a step farther.<sup>1</sup> I then expressly took a stand with respect to President Wilson's message. I discussed his well-known four points and theoretically declared my consent to these four points. I said that the four points might possibly constitute the basis for a general world peace. No utterance followed this on the part of President Wilson.

All this is without purpose. ("Very correct!") The communications which I have received from the hostile nations, particularly America, showed me plainly what was meant by a peace federation, by a federation of the peoples, by an international federation of freedom and justice. ("Very correct!") Our opponents allowed it plainly to be seen that they would be the nucleus of this proposed international federation, and that there would be no difficulties whatever in connection with the isolation of Germany, which is inconveniently striving to equal them, and no difficulties in extinguishing Germany's breath of life by means of economic [pressure].

On the contrary I considered it entirely appropriate that the Honorable Secretary of State of the Foreign Office should make statements regarding the details of our political situation in the east, in Finland, [on] the Black Sea, as he was competent for the purpose owing to his acquaintance with the subject, on the basis of the experience he had had during his self-sacrificing and successful participation of several months' duration in the negotiations. I am of the opinion that the Honorable Secretary of State discharged this mission very efficiently.

However, I have regretted to note that some of his utterances have been received in extensive circles in a more or less unfriendly

<sup>1</sup> See Hertling's speech, *ante*, pp. 135-138.



manner. ("Very correct!" "Very true!") The Secretary of State spoke of the [guilt] question. We may calmly leave all [guilt] questions to history. Testimonials are already at hand to show that Germany was not to blame for the war and that she did not light the torch of the world-wide conflagration. ("Very true!")

Nevertheless I deem it my duty to clear away a misunderstanding which appears to me to lie at the bottom of the interpretation given to the second part of the statements of the Secretary of State. The tendency of the statements of the Secretary of State was solely to impute the responsibility for the continuance and incalculable prolongation of the horrible war to the hostile powers, just as I did myself on February 24 [25] of this year.

Gentlemen, there can consequently, of course, be no question of a weakening of my will or of a shaking of our confidence in victory. (Lively applause on left.) Now as before, the Kaiser and the Empire, the princes and the people, stand together closely and full of confidence. They trust to our incomparable troops. They trust in our people, who stand together as a unit and unshaken, and in the magnificent attitude of the people, which we have been forced to admire for years, and we may hope that the Almighty, who has hitherto helped us, and who has led us from victory to victory, will reward this loyalty of the German people. In regard to the details, the Secretary of State himself will take the floor in order to clear up the misunderstandings.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72/10518

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

BERNE, June 26, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received June 27, 11 p. m.]

3782. Supplementing my 3744, June 24. I learned that a Bulgarian in propaganda service is preparing a plan of territorial arrangements to submit to me.

My British colleague informs me that before the Cabinet changes in Bulgaria a prominent Bulgarian in the opposition called on him and stated that group he represented desired to come to terms with Entente, that Bulgarian aspirations included:

- (1) The entire Dobrudja;
- (2) Macedonia including Seres, Drama, Cavalla and Monastir;
- (3) Extension of frontier to Enos-Midia line.

He asked what message he could carry to Sophia.

British Minister replied, under instructions, that Bulgarian aspirations would be considered in a friendly spirit; he also took the opportunity to point out continued agitation in America for declaration of war against Bulgaria and the condition Bulgaria would be in after the war financially; he also indicated that the opposition must

prove its strength before any confidence could be placed in it. The Bulgarian returned to Sophia and shortly after his arrival the old Government was overturned.

I venture again to emphasize the value of my having as detailed knowledge as possible of Department's views so that opportunity may be seized if presented. There are also some indications of a desire on the part of Turks to start conversations. I raise question of expediency of declining to listen to Turks if approached so that Bulgarian hopes of uniting their population now under Turkish dominion may not be dampened.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/10525

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, June 26, 1918, noon.

[Received June 28, 8 a. m.]

3774. Call attention to my despatch 3519 of June 17.<sup>1</sup> Herron has now been informed by Muehlon that De Fiori is one of Ludendorff's most intelligent agents. He can travel freely and cross frontier without visé of German Government. Muehlon says De Fiori is first of series of agents which Ludendorff will send, among them very prominent men, to prepare the way for a conciliatory peace in case offensive in France not successful. Ludendorff recognizes tendency in Germany towards peace and that tendency will be beyond control if offensive fails. He is therefore taking precautions. Muehlon urges that no word be said which can give them any expectation of coming to an arrangement other than through peace of absolute redress. He adds if America holds firm a crash is coming in Germany before many months.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/10518

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1918, 2 p. m.

2201. Your 3744, June 24, 9 a. m., and 3782, June 26, 5 p. m. Department desires that you carefully watch the activities of the Bulgarians, reporting to the Department from time to time, but abstain wholly from conversations with them or with Turks.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see telegram No. 3884, July 5, *post*, p. 276.

File No. 763.72/10564

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

BERNE, June 28, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received June 30, 12.14 p. m.]

3802. *German political.* Kühlmann spoke before the Reichstag on June 24 with a dull, discouraged air, arousing little interest until his statement, "by military decisions alone, without diplomatic discussions, an absolute end of the war can hardly be expected," awakened the anger of the Conservatives. The emotion was so great that the Chancellor was obliged to offer a conciliatory statement at beginning of the next session. Kühlmann then spoke again to explain his confidence in a military victory as the basis of the future peace [thus alienating his support by the Left]. The phrase which Kühlmann used will, however, persist, as will the anger of the Conservative press against him. His resignation is already reported as imminent.

STOVALL

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President Wilson's Speech of July 4—Seventh Session of the Supreme War Council, July 2-4—The Herron-De Fiori Conversations

*Address of President Wilson Delivered at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918*

GENTLEMEN OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS AND MY FELLOW CITIZENS: I am happy to draw apart with you to this quiet place of old counsel in order to speak a little of the meaning of this day of our nation's independence. The place seems very still and remote. It is as serene and untouched by the hurry of the world as it was in those great days long ago when General Washington was here and held leisurely conference with the men who were to be associated with him in the creation of a nation. From these gentle slopes they looked out upon the world and saw it whole, saw it with the light of the future upon it, saw it with modern eyes that turned away from a past which men of liberated spirits could no longer endure. It is for that reason that we cannot feel, even here, in the immediate presence of this sacred tomb, that this is a place of death. It was a place of achievement. A great promise that was meant for all mankind was here given plan and reality. The associations by which we are here surrounded are the inspiring associations of that noble death which is only a glorious consummation. From this green hillside we also ought to be able to see with comprehending

eyes the world that lies about us and should conceive anew the purposes that must set men free.

It is significant,—significant of their own character and purpose and of the influences they were setting afoot,—that Washington and his associates, like the barons at Runnymede, spoke and acted, not for a class, but for a people. It has been left for us to see to it that it shall be understood that they spoke and acted, not for a single people only, but for all mankind. They were thinking, not of themselves and of the material interests which centred in the little groups of landholders and merchants and men of affairs with whom they were accustomed to act, in Virginia and the colonies to the north and south of her, but of a people which wished to be done with classes and special interests and the authority of men whom they had not themselves chosen to rule over them. They entertained no private purpose, desired no peculiar privilege. They were consciously planning that men of every class should be free and America a place to which men out of every nation might resort who wished to share with them the rights and privileges of free men. And we take our cue from them,—do we not? We intend what they intended. We here in America believe our participation in this present war to be only the fruitage of what they planted. Our case differs from theirs only in this, that it is our inestimable privilege to concert with men out of every nation what shall make not only the liberties of America secure but the liberties of every other people as well. We are happy in the thought that we are permitted to do what they would have done had they been in our place. There must now be settled once for all what was settled for America in the great age upon whose inspiration we draw to-day. This is surely a fitting place from which calmly to look out upon our task, that we may fortify our spirits for its accomplishment. And this is the appropriate place from which to avow, alike to the friends who look on and to the friends with whom we have the happiness to be associated in action, the faith and purpose with which we act.

This, then, is our conception of the great struggle in which we are engaged. The plot is written plain upon every scene and every act of the supreme tragedy. On the one hand stand the peoples of the world,—not only the peoples actually engaged, but many others also who suffer under mastery but cannot act; peoples of many races and in every part of the world,—the people of stricken Russia still, among the rest, though they are for the moment unorganized and helpless. Opposed to them, masters of many armies, stand an isolated, friendless group of governments who speak no common purpose but only selfish ambitions of their own by which none can profit but themselves, and whose peoples are fuel in their hands;



governments which fear their people and yet are for the time their sovereign lords, making every choice for them and disposing of their lives and fortunes as they will, as well as of the lives and fortunes of every people who fall under their power,—governments clothed with the strange trappings and the primitive authority of an age that is altogether alien and hostile to our own. The Past and the Present are in deadly grapple and the peoples of the world are being done to death between them.

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No halfway decision would be tolerable. No halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace:

1. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

2. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, or sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

3. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honour and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

4. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

These great objects can be put into a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.

These great ends can not be achieved by debating and seeking to reconcile and accommodate what statesmen may wish, with their projects for balances of power and of national opportunity. They can be realized only by the determination of what the thinking peoples of the world desire, with their longing hope for justice and for social freedom and opportunity.

I can fancy that the air of this place carries the accents of such principles with a peculiar kindness. Here were started forces which the great nation against which they were primarily directed at first regarded as a revolt against its rightful authority but which it has long since seen to have been a step in the liberation of its own people as well as of the people of the United States; and I stand here now to speak,—speak proudly and with confident hope,—of the spread of this revolt, this liberation, to the great stage of the world itself! The blinded rulers of Prussia have roused forces they knew little of,—forces which, once roused, can never be crushed to earth again; for they have at their heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless and of the very stuff of triumph!

File No. 763.72Su/59

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, July 3, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received July 4, 6.25 p. m.]

103. M. Clemenceau requested M. Tardieu to address the Council. M. Tardieu said the measures to be examined were the consequences of the decision taken at the last meeting of Supreme War Council and the telegram sent by M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George and Signor Orlando to the President asking that 300,000 men be called for military service each month in the United States. He reminded the Council that this telegram had been sent [*presented*] on June 6<sup>1</sup> and that President Wilson had replied that he saw no objection to these figures and that they might even be exceeded if necessary.<sup>2</sup> The British and American Governments had found the necessary tonnage for the transportation of the men but it now became necessary to consider what was needed to transport guns, machine guns, aeroplanes, etc., and especially horses, as the French Government were unable to supply the American Army with horses after the month of July. The French had asked Lord Reading to request his Government to continue the arrangements made for transporting American troops in June and in July until the end of the year, and M. Jusserand had stated that according to Lord Reading's reply there was little doubt that the necessary amount of tonnage would be available.

He then referred to a telegram which had been sent June 23 by M. Clemenceau to the French Ambassador in Washington indorsing the proposal of Generals Foch and Pershing that the American Army

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 247.

<sup>2</sup> No copy of the President's reply has been found in the files of the Department of State or among the papers of President Wilson.

should be progressively increased to 100 divisions by the end of July 1919. He also read out a telegram which General Bliss had received on the same day from Secretary Baker commenting on this progressive increase. He said that while these figures were incomplete, as a result of his calculations it was seen that for the present month of July, 2,500,000 tons dead weight, for August, 3,000,000, and for September, 3,300,000 will be necessary. It was therefore obvious that a corresponding American tonnage effort would be needed to transport the additional supplies. He thought that these figures would increase until a monthly total of 8,000,000 tons was reached.

Mr. Lloyd George asked who had made up these figures as up to the present time all arrangements of tonnage had been made between the American Government and the British Shipping Board. M. Tardieu replied that these figures had been compiled in (collaboration?) with representatives of the American General Staff, of the French Government, and Sir Joseph Maclay. Mr. Lloyd George said that Sir Joseph Maclay had only casually been consulted for the first time about these figures on the preceding day. As all tonnage was either American or British, he could not see the purpose of these figures. M. Tardieu said that these estimates had also been considered by the military representatives of Supreme War Council. Both General Sackville-West and General Bliss stated that they had never been consulted about these figures and had never seen them. Mr. Lloyd George said that he felt the question should be considered by General Bliss and by Sir Joseph Maclay; he said that it was quite useless to examine the question without exact figures and without the presence of competent authorities. He said that the first thing was to find out how much America could transport and then if there were a deficiency, to see what British tonnage would be available to meet the deficiency. General Bliss said that two days ago he had heard that a plan was under consideration for providing tonnage to supply an army of 4,160,000 American soldiers and he had been asked to make a study of the tonnage required to supply such an [army]. He had made a study of it although he was not an authority.

M. Tardieu then said that he agreed entirely with everything that Mr. Lloyd George had said and he had merely endeavored to reach an estimate of the tonnage required to supply the American Army without in any way touching the question of providing tonnage itself. Mr. Lloyd George proposed that General Bliss should ascertain what America could do in the way of providing ships, and that if there were a deficiency the British Government could be appealed to. M. Clemenceau said it seemed to him that they were all in agreement regarding Mr. Lloyd George's proposition. It was therefore decided by the Council that as soon as the American Government replies regarding amount of tonnage which it could make available,



the British Shipping Board should be approached with a view to supplying eventual deficiency.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72Su/91

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council (Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, July 4, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received July 5, 7.55 a. m.]

111. The Supreme War Council terminated its session this afternoon. Following announcement will be released for publication in Saturday morning's papers in London, Paris and Rome:

The Supreme War Council has held its seventh session. It offered its earnest congratulations to the Italian Army and people on their memorable defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Army. In their judgment, this victory gained at a critical period of the war has been an invaluable contribution towards the eventual success of the Allied cause.

A feature of the session was the presence during this meeting of Sir Robert Borden, Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. W. F. Massey, Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. W. F. Lloyd, Prime Minister of Newfoundland, and other Ministers of the overseas Dominions of the British Empire, who were introduced by Mr. Lloyd George. On behalf of the Supreme War Council, M. Clemenceau and Signor Orlando tendered to these representatives the thanks of the Allied nations for the very great services rendered on the battlefield during the war by their troops.

The Supreme War Council considered the present situation of the war in all its aspects in conjunction with General Foch and other military advisers and came to important decisions in regard thereto.

Among those present during the session were M. Clemenceau, Mr. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando, M. Pichon, Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Baron Sonnino, General Foch, Sir Henry Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, General Pershing and the permanent military representatives at Versailles.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72119/1772

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

COPENHAGEN, July 6, 1918.

2476.

[Received July 7, 11.50 a. m.]

Following summary of Scheidemann's Reichstag speech July 4 [3]:



Discussion caused by Kühlmann's speech has shown how insurmountable are differences of opinion concerning war aims and despite all deceptive camouflage has thrown dazzling light upon distribution of power in our country. Kühlmann's speech caused tremendous excitement because it seemed to express programatically a long-known and hotly-contested Government opinion supported by Socialists since war began and shared by all politically cool heads. Opinion based on appraisal of physical and moral forces both sides shows war of conquest prosecuted by Germany would lead to destruction of German race and perhaps entire Europe. Given a correct utilization of our powers, Germany cannot be crushed, but achievement of German world hegemony appears impossible. No policies could have been less suited to achieving German world hegemony than those carried out by German Government during the past thirty years. We have stumbled into this greatest of wars without any aim. Germany [has been] forced to prosecute war of national defense which [she is] ready to terminate as soon as possessions no longer challenged or attacked by enemies. German Socialists have now fought nearly four years to bring forth this view in official policies. I do not believe one single person at any time officially connected with our foreign policy will contradict Kühlmann's statement which could only be considered inopportune. He uttered what we all think. His speech would have been a political accomplishment if second address had not followed next day.

To excuse Kühlmann I can repeat he has not contradicted first speech but greatly decreased its importance and destroyed good it might have done. Easy to imagine to what barrage fire of telephonic or verbal reproaches and invectives Kühlmann exposed after uttering his candid remarks. There has been much said about peace offensive. I advise trial of truth offensive. Kühlmann's retreat before Great Headquarters opens up most unsatisfactory prospects. Where is the man in civilian clothes who will fearlessly tell gentlemen at Great Headquarters that the opinion that they can force peace upon world is merely self-delusion? They may perhaps take Paris, possibly drive the English from France, and even force all enemies to accept peace, but can never attain through purely military measures lasting international peace desired by German Nation. Those at Great Headquarters are mere political amateurs and should keep their hands off politics. Ignominious that press instructed how it must interpret Ministers' speeches. Constitutional state under which we live is that of military absolutism [softened] by fear of parliamentary scandal.

Industrial laborers, middle classes and rural population agitated by extreme dissatisfaction and unanimously demand termination of war. Termination in honor, but termination. We demand Government recognize unrestrictedly Belgium's right to independence and do everything to attain early peace without sacrificing Germany's interest. Will heartily support such Government but cannot grant budget to Government unable to raise state of siege after four years. This not carelessly uttered declaration but serious warning, being matter of life or death to millions.

File No. 763.72/10618

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, July 7, 1918.

[Received 7.30 p. m.]

3365. German press comment on President's speech.

*Tageblatt*, 6th: Wilson's four conditions are again couched in language distinguishing war aims statements of statesmen of today. They are vague and obscure making it difficult to guess what speaker means. First condition might be construed as wish for limitation of armaments, which we share. The second reverts to right of self-determination, excludes annexations and oppression, and might therefore be subscribed to by all who do not wish annexations or oppressions. There is no objection whatever to third condition either, which speaks of restoration of right. The fourth condition demands peace organization and arbitration court, which demand is advocated by German majority parties also. Thus, there is nothing in Wilson's conditions to prevent world from concluding peace, yet Wilson talks of life or death struggle. He should know Germany is very much alive and has strong vitality.

*Vorwärts*, 6th: Speeches of Wilson and Churchill cannot serve peace. They both make condition of decisive military victory to which presumption German people has but one reply. All assurances that justice will be done Germany after she is conquered cannot be accepted by those who know history and the nature of justice shown by victors towards helpless vanquished. The assurance that war is against government, not people, has been given countless times, but never prevented conquered people from having to atone for government in the end. If Wilson proclaims life and death struggle, nobody can expect German people to accept death voluntarily. German people have no choice but resolute defensive in struggle until adversaries also become convinced that not final victory but only accommodation affords possibility of flourishing future of [world].

*Frankfurter Zeitung*, 6th: Wilson's conditions are so general that not much can be done with them for real termination of war, which must proceed from existing situation. Naturally there is hidden meaning behind Wilson's sentences which operates against Germany, but if these fine principles are sincerely meant, they imply removal of unduly advantageous position of Entente countries as well as Central Powers, thus America's privileged position in Cuba, Porto Rico, Philippines, France's position in Morocco, and England's in India, Egypt, Mesopotamia and Turkey. If, however, Wilson means that these privileged positions must remain and become permanent, his ideal demands are shown to have sole object of having the per-

manent fettering of Germany outwardly adapted to the principles of justice and freedom which Entente leaders continually preach.

*Morgenpost*, 6th: Wilson still owes reply to Hertling's speech accepting four points of Wilson's earlier program. If Wilson were really concerned in bringing about just, lasting peace, he should have entertained Hertling's reply and found out whether peace was possible on his terms at that time.

*Germania*, 5th: Headlines, "Wilson's minimum war aim is our reduction to actual impotence."

*Kölnische Zeitung*, 5th: This speech is new edition of familiar phrases showing Wilson's complete ignorance of Europe and the real world. One might be tempted to think, if one assumes he is more able than he really is, that his speech was veiled reprimand for his English ally.

*Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 5th: The Czar of reactionary America presumes again to preach Anglo-Saxon world lie of freedom and democracy. Hypocrisy and brutality, thy name is Wilson. Europe must continue to wade through sea of blood to augment vast fortunes of trust kings and satisfy Yankee lust for political and economic world domination.

GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/1776

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, July 5, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received July 8, 4.20 a. m.]

3884. My despatch 3544, June 22 [3519, June 17].<sup>1</sup> De Fiori called again on Herron at Geneva and informed him that after his conversation with Herron he had returned to Munich instead of to Berlin, as he had previously intended, and presented to Professor Foerster, the Bavarian Minister of War and the Bavarian Minister President, the memorandum of his conversations with Herron (practically identical to that submitted by despatch). De Fiori states that both these Bavarian officials later conferred with him stating they were much impressed with memorandum, believing that it represented genuine American opinion. They stated: "If war continues we will be defeated in the end. We must bring influence on Prussia towards conciliatory peace."

De Fiori learned that copies of memorandum were furnished Ludendorff and Hertling, who in turn distributed additional copies

<sup>1</sup>Not printed; it transmits a 47-page account by Professor Herron of conversations with Doctor de Fiori, described as "a Bavarian correspondent formerly connected with the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*."



to about all members of Reichstag. He states that he was summoned Berlin by telegraph but did not go.

According to De Fiori the memorandum was also laid before the King, Crown Prince of Bavaria, and Bavarian Cabinet, which debated whether discussion of peace was possible and subsequently indicated to De Fiori a tentative peace program which later submitted to Herron who had it taken down verbally. Program follows:

The restoration of Belgium; contracts concerning the liberty of German navigation on Scheldt and Rhine; elevation of Alsace-Lorraine to a free confederate state with complete home rule; equal free trade with France and Germany; contracts for the customary free exchange of coal, potash, and iron between Germany and France (personally I put here complete freedom of the press, of language and school, and in all national and political things). I attract your attention to the fact that the representation—that is, the parliamentary representation of the new German confederate state—would not stand on any other basis than it does now, because they have now already the direct right of vote for the Landtag in Alsace-Lorraine.

Self-administration for all the Austrian peoples, including the Germans, according to the principles agreed upon with Professor Lammasch; self-administration for the Italian provinces, with Trieste as capital and free port; repeal of all existing different[ial] contracts in favor of Trieste, which are greatly to Italy's damage; reorganization of the traffic of Trieste with Lombardy and Venice, like before 1859, wherewith Trieste would remain, and would have to remain, a completely Italian city. Under the term self-administration of Trieste, I understand also the political and police administration, so that the state and not the monarchy would have the right to hinder in any way the political intercourse with Italy. The political relations of the territory of administration of Trieste with Italy would therefore be taken same as those of the canton of Ticino with Italy. Self-administration for all non-Magyar peoples of Hungary.

Complete restoration of Servia, with free access to the Adriatic, perhaps Durazzo becoming a Servian port, and the Servian part of Albania given to Servia.

Restoration of Poland in full freedom and independence. I do not mean that Galicia should go to Poland, nor that Prussia should give Posen. (I avoid these questions on purpose, because they would create confusion. I personally and confidentially would say that it would be a great injustice to leave Posen with Prussia, if Posnanian Poland would not get complete self-administration like Alsace-Lorraine.) Poland should receive freedom of the flag on the Weichsel [*Vistula*] and [Memel], and a free access to the east sea, through Lithuania. Reopening of the peace of Bucharest and the peace of Brest-Litovsk.

All the Balkan questions should be referred to the peace conference for their final settlement. America should mediate between England and Germany in all questions of the colonies; also in all



German-English questions of the Balkans, till a satisfactory arrangement was arrived at. (Return to the policy of contracts, which already before the war was on its best way.)

Disarmament; the society of nations.

De Fiori then stated to Herron: "Can you say to me that you believe President Wilson would be favorable to at least debating peace on these terms? We ask you, Doctor Herron, to give your opinion. If you think the President would be willing to discuss peace on this tentative program, Bavaria would try to round up other German states to bring pressure to bear on Prussia to end that Imperial Government should make formal peace offers in this sense. This program is not the last word. These terms may be called middle terms. We feel it is America which must umpire between England and Germany."

Herron stated: "I cannot express an opinion; I must reflect. When I have arrived at answer I will send for you in Zurich."

Herron stated to me that he shrank from assuming responsibility of giving his own views, even though requested, in view of magnitude of question. He stated to De Fiori, however: "If I could believe for one moment that as a result of such peace a new Germany would emerge, if I believed we could trust Germany loose in the world without cutting her fangs, if I felt we could trust her word, I would give my life to open the door to peace. There are many reasons to make me wish to be convinced but I cannot achieve such conviction."

Herron believes that it is possible to reconcile Muehlon's statements [transmitted] in my cipher telegram 3774, June 26,<sup>1</sup> concerning De Fiori, with latter's statements of activity in Munich, since De Fiori's immediate chief was Bavarian Minister of War. Herron feels also that De Fiori was speaking honestly and that Muehlon was somewhat mistaken in his characterization. It should be borne in mind however that few people can speak as authoritatively on such subject as Muehlon.

My feeling in the matter is that Ludendorff is searching the way sympathetic to America to put through his compromise program in case of failure on western front. It is also highly probable that Ludendorff thus makes use of Liberal elements so that on receipt of anticipated refusal from America it will be clearly demonstrated to Liberals that serious endeavor for peace was made and failed. These terms are more precise but not far different from Kühlmann's statements in his first speech which raised a tempest in military party.

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<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 267.

Can it be assumed that the Bavarian Government could put through a program on which the Prussian Government itself failed?

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/10647

*The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SOFIA, June 27, 1918.

[Received July 9, 6.20 a. m.]

149. First audience with Minister President completely satisfactory. He begs me to assure that while he is in power Bulgaria will maintain most friendly possible relations. Having followed attentively President Wilson's program he is convinced Bulgaria will find a protector at the peace conference in the great Republic in spite of the fact that it fights with the present enemies of Bulgaria. Minister President anticipates intimate financial and commercial relations with North America after the war.

Concerning presence of Bulgarian officer on board German submarine<sup>1</sup> Minister President declares that no Bulgarian officer received such order. In any case Minister President will go deeper into question and will inform me in more detail. At telegraphic request by Minister President to commander in chief latter replied that he never ordered any Bulgarian officer in that sense.

Concerning report in American papers announcing that Bulgarian soldiers are fighting on west front Minister President declares that no Bulgarian soldier has been on this front and that Lieutenant Tosheff reported captured during combat was in reality made prisoner by Servians on the Macedonian front twenty months ago and subsequently delivered to French. I have subsequently learned that Tosheff was captured by Servians October 20, 1916, at Florina.

MURPHY

File No. 763.72119/1785

*The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*

No. 6392

LONDON, June 26, 1918.

[Received July 10.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith six copies of a discussion which took place in the House of Commons on June 20, 1918, in the course of which . . . the [Secretary] for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Balfour, spoke on the subject of peace by negotiation.

The text transmitted is official.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT P. SKINNER

<sup>1</sup> See telegram of June 17 to the Consul General, *ante*, p. 258.

[Enclosure—Extract]

*Remarks of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bal-four) Delivered in the House of Commons, June 20, 1918*<sup>1</sup>

We have never rejected any proposals which we thought had the slightest probability of producing the sort of peace which most of us—and, I hope, all of us—desire. There is no evidence whatever that the German Government have ever been serious in making such offers of peace. I have more than once referred to Belgium, though I always do so with some hesitation lest hon. Gentlemen should run away with the idea that, in my judgment, the restoration of Belgium would by itself give all that we ought properly to ask for as a result of the War. The case for Belgium is merely an example. It is a good example of German methods, because Belgium, as the hon. Member<sup>2</sup> has pointed out, was the occasion of the War. I am not sure whether the hon. Member would admit that, but at any rate it was intimately connected with the opening phases of the War. The treatment of Belgium is, and remains, the greatest blot upon German honour and German humanity. German honour and German humanity, I think, have been violated in many parts of the world, but Belgium stands out as the great and unanswerable proof of what it is that the German Government will do if they think that any military advantage is to be got by it. Have the German Government ever openly and plainly said in any document, or in any speech, that Belgium is to be given up, that Belgium is to be restored, that Belgium is to be placed in a position of absolute economic as well as political independence? I know of no such statement. It has been suggested that Belgian territory should be restored, and there have been other suggestions of one kind or another, but you will never find any frank avowal that Belgium, having been taken by one of the most iniquitous acts of which history has record, is to be put back, so far as the perpetrator of the crime is concerned, as far as possible in the position in which she was before the crime was committed.

Does not the hon. Gentleman think that perhaps when he is discussing the reasonableness of terms he might have reminded the House of that fact? What he does is to point to ambiguous speeches and doubtful resolutions, and he turns his eyes resolutely away from the clear-cut and unmistakable statements on the other side, made by German writers of repute and German politicians of position. He turns his eyes resolutely away from what Germans write and what Germans say, and he turns his eyes still more resolutely away

<sup>1</sup> *Parliamentary Debates—Commons—1918*, vol. 107, pp. 569–571.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. Philip Snowden.



from what Germans do both in the east and the west, and then he presents a picture of German statesmen on that side offering reasonable terms of peace to the English statesmen on this side, and the English statesmen obstinately shutting their ears and insisting on going on with the War and determinedly forcing this country and its allies to go on with the expenditure of blood and of treasure, and he expects us to listen to him patiently and not to say that, whatever his intention may be, his acts in this House have the effect of doing everything that can be done by a speech in this House to discourage the Allies and their friends and to encourage the Central Powers and their friends. I must honestly say that I think that is a lamentable performance. If I understood one part of his speech aright—I may have failed to get the clear meaning—he seemed to think that we differ from President Wilson upon these points. So far as I know, there is no difference between the Allies and President Wilson upon war aims. I believe that we cherish the same ideals, we are fighting for the same purpose on the same fields of battle, we are making similar sacrifices, and we are working towards the same end.

I cannot conceive why the hon. Gentleman, animated as I am bound to suppose he is by a public-spirited policy, suggests that there should be in this matter of war aims the smallest difference between us and our American allies. There is no such difference, neither is the hon. Gentleman right when he supposes that these secret treaties are an obstacle to peace. The notion is fantastic. I am not going to discuss the secret treaties. I have often explained to the House that these treaties were made not by me, not by the party to which I belong, not by the present Government; they were made in obedience to motives which I believe would have moved any government in power at the time to make the same or similar arrangements. It is very easy for the hon. Gentleman to say that if the treaty with Italy to which he referred—I am not going to discuss it—were discussed, it would be disapproved of in this meeting or that meeting throughout the country. If you want to judge the treaty rightly, remember the circumstances under which it was made, and ask the people whether, if they had been responsible for the conduct of affairs, they would have hesitated to come to arrangements of that kind. Even if the treaty is open to criticism, even granting—and I am not going to make any admissions about it—that it was open to this criticism, it is a mistake to suppose that it stands in the way of peace.

The Allies are prepared to listen collectively to all reasonable arrangements. Certainly His Majesty's Government are not going to shut their ears to anything that can be called a reasonable suggestion. If such a suggestion was made, and it met with the ap-



proval of the Allies collectively, does the hon. Gentleman really suppose that the fact that three years ago, or whenever it may have been, they took a different view that that would stand in the way of accepting this reasonable suggestion? Of course it would not! Any proposal to the Allies will be considered by the Allies on its merits. These treaties were entered into by this country with other members of the Alliance, and to these treaties we stand. The national honour is bound up with them, and I really cannot conceive a more unfortunate moment in which the hon. Gentleman should criticise our Italian allies than at the very moment when those very allies are fighting with heroic courage in the battles which they are now carrying out against their Austrian enemy.

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File No. 763.72119/1776

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1918, 5 p. m.

2265. Your 3884, July 5, 9 p. m. It seems obvious that the German peace plan is to sacrifice in the west in order to obtain a vast incalculable gain in the east. Herron's attention might be called to the fact that the Eastern Question is not dealt with in the Bavarian tentative peace program and told that a discussion of a settlement which did not put all the Russian, Turkish, and Eastern cards on the table was not even remotely possible.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72119/1824a

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1918, 10 p. m.

2273. Wilson from Harrison:

Please advise Edelman<sup>1</sup> that we have received information from agent in Egypt that it is rumored in connection with German and Turkish propaganda in favor of the Arabs that an Arab committee composed of prominent Syrians and others is on its way to Switzerland where propaganda will be carried on in favor of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire remaining after the war under Turkish control as autonomous provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Should commission reach Switzerland please cover activities and discreetly endeavor to win them over to the program of America and the Allies.

LANSING

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<sup>1</sup> Samuel Edelman, Vice Consul at Geneva.

File No. 763.72/10661

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, July 9, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received July 11, 10.20 a. m.]

3914. Through reliable intermediary I have received memorandum from unofficial but well-to-do Bulgarian who belongs to Bulgarian revolutionary organization of Geneva to the effect that Bulgarian Army has ceased to be blind instrument of Ferdinand and Germany and ardently desires agreement with its Balkan neighbors and regain sympathies of Entente. Informant states that Army is ready to cooperate in a *coup d'état* directed against Government and Czar if peace interests of nation will be satisfied by Entente and Balkan states. Informant claims to make this declaration in the name of secret military revolutionary organization which favorably disposed throughout Bulgarian Army and includes as leader a Bulgarian general.

Informant outlines following factors which have contributed to making Bulgarian Army ready for radical action against present Government:

- (1) Lack of necessities of life, food, clothing and raw materials;
- (2) General war fatigue and prospect of having to support further heavy losses and formidable debts without real profits;
- (3) Impossibility of living for ever at odds with Balkan neighbors;
- (4) General indignation against Germany and Turkey, discontent with the policy of Ferdinand and revelations of German and Turkish [subsidies] to individual Bulgarians to influence Bulgarian policy;
- (5) Acts of German agents in Bulgaria who behind the front have enriched themselves by theft and violence;
- (6) Consciousness that Bulgaria is only Slav state fighting with the enemies of Slavs and guarding Constantinople and the Dardanelles while [Austrians?] and Turks are free to pillage Servia.

Memorandum exposes the plans of the Bulgarian Revolutionary Party to bring about a *coup d'état* if America and Entente signify support. *Coup d'état* is to take place on first day of session of Parliament called for October 15, arrangements having previously been made for the opening of Bulgarian front for Entente but preferably not for Greek or Servian troops. Bulgaria is to proclaim itself a republic, become neutral in war but will permit volunteers to attach themselves to an expedition of Entente against Constantinople. America and Entente should approve and guarantee a

peace between Bulgaria and other Balkan states, a peace which should assure unity of Bulgarian race and secure for herself from Turkey at least the line of the treaty negotiated London or preferably that of Midia-Rodosto. America and Entente should grant Bulgaria an opening and facilitate import of first necessities. If America and Allies accept this proposition in principle it is shown [*sic*] that a public meeting of all Balkan refugees, including Bulgarians in Switzerland, be held in Geneva to proclaim the fundamental principles of the union of the Balkans.

I shall endeavor to ascertain discreetly the standing of Bulgarians in Switzerland whose views are represented by this memorandum and report further. In view of the fact that memorandum, while addressed to America, primarily was intended for our allies also, unless otherwise instructed I shall submit a copy to my French and British colleagues.

STOVALL

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Chancellor Hertling's Speeches of July 11 and 12: Statements of Policy Regarding Belgium—Unofficial German Advances toward Belgium Regarding Peace; Unfavorable Judgment of These by the American Government

File No. 763.72119/1798

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, July 12, 1918.

[Received July 13, 2.56 a. m.]

3433. Following German text of Hertling's speech<sup>1</sup> given by *Kölnische Zeitung*:

[Translation—Extract]

Regarding the events of the last few days the gentlemen have already been informed by the statements of the Vice Chancellor von Payer. However, I thought that the gentlemen might possibly wish to have me appear here myself and announce my stand on these events. The change in the Foreign Office does not mean a change in the political course. The Imperial Chancellor is alone responsible for the policy of the [German] Empire. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs has charge of the foreign policy, and he has to act with the consent and under the responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor. This has been a principle of the German Empire from the beginning. This principle still holds today. As I stated in my speech of November 29, 1917, in the full session of the Reichstag, I adhere absolutely to my political stand both regarding our domestic and our foreign policy, and no change will be made in it as long as I remain in this position. Regarding our domestic policy I have fully redeemed my

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<sup>1</sup> Before the Main Committee of the Reichstag, July 11.



former promises as far as it lay within my power, and I shall insist that my promises also continue to be carried out in future and that any obstacles be energetically overcome. The gentlemen may rely upon this.

As regards our foreign policy, I clearly indicated my stand on November 29, when I told the gentlemen [I] adhere to the position taken in the Kaiser's answer to the peace note of the Pope of August 1, last year.<sup>1</sup> The peaceful sentiment which animated this answer also animated me. But I added that the peaceful sentiment (willingness for peace) should not afford the enemies *carte blanche* for an indefinite prolongation of the war. But what have we now experienced? While there can be no doubt of our willingness for years to extend our hand for an honorable peace, we have up to the very last few days been bearing the provocative speeches of foreign statesmen. President Wilson wants war to annihilation, and what Mr. Balfour said must really send the blood of anger into the face of every German. However, we have a feeling for the honor of our native country, and we cannot allow ourselves to be continually insulted publicly in this manner. Behind these insults stands the desire of our enemies to annihilate us. As long as this desire to annihilate us exists we must hold out with our faithful people. I am convinced, I know that an earnest willingness exists throughout the widest circles of our people to hold out as long as the desire of the enemy to annihilate us continues. And we shall hold out trusting to our troops, to our army commanders, and to our glorious people, who have so wonderfully borne this hard period with its great privations and continued sacrifices.

No change will be made in the direction of our policy, but I must say right here that if, in spite of these hostile utterances on the part of foreign statesmen, serious movements occur in any quarter looking toward paving the way for peace or if even the first steps toward such a movement should become apparent, we would certainly not assume a declinatory attitude from the start but we would immediately meet such seriously meant (I say emphatically, seriously meant) overtures. Of course it is not enough that this or that agent should come and say that he is authorized to bring about peace parleys here and there, but it is necessary that authorized representatives of the hostile powers who are expressly empowered by their governments should give us to understand that discussions are possible. Naturally these discussions would take place at first within a restricted circle. However, the statesmen who have thus far spoken have not mentioned such possibilities. If such possibilities arise and if a serious inclination for peace shows itself on the other side, we will at once consider it, that is, we will not reject it. At first we will talk in a small circle. I can also say to you that this stand is not only my own but that it is expressly shared by the highest army commanders, for not even the highest army commanders are carrying on the war for war's sake, but have told me that as soon as a serious willingness for peace becomes perceptible on the other side, we must take the matter up.

GARRETT

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 328-331, 217-219, and 162-164, respectively.



File No. 763.72119/1795

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, July 11, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received July 13, 10.12 a. m.]

3932. I have received written statement from Herron on matter reported orally, mentioned in my 3884, July 5.<sup>1</sup> Statement is being forwarded by me. Herron writes as follows:

May I suggest that you intimate to Washington that if there is anything to say, if the President or the State Department cares to express any wish as to what I, individually and unofficially, may say or may not say, this would need to be done as quickly as possible. I think that Washington might well let me know, for my own personal guidance, whether it is thought wise to keep this Bavarian door open, even though a negative answer or no direct answer at all be given, to Bavaria.

While I am not clear what answer, if any, the Department may care to make, I consider it advisable to transmit this request.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/1796

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, undated.

[Received July 14, 1918, 1.55 p. m.]

3436. . . . Wolf's Bureau states Hertling spoke as follows concerning Belgium in second speech:<sup>2</sup>

With regard to future of Belgium, the occupation and present possession of Belgium means merely, as I said yesterday, that we have pledge for future negotiations. The word pledge implies something held in the hand but not intended to be kept when negotiations lead to favorable result. We have no intention of keeping Belgium in one form or another. We wish, as I said June 24 [February 25],<sup>3</sup> that Belgium rise anew as independent state; after war shall not be vassal of any power and shall live in good friendly relations with us. This is standpoint regarding Belgian question which I assumed from very beginning and still take today. Gentlemen, this side of my policy is in full agreement with general principles I set forth to you yesterday. We are conducting war as war of defence and for this reason and because we have been far removed from any imperialistic tendencies or any tendencies aiming at world dominion from very beginning, our peace aims must also be in agreement therewith. What we want is integrity of our territory, free air for development of our people, especially in economic field, and,

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 276.<sup>2</sup>Before the Main Committee of the Reichstag, July 12.<sup>3</sup>See telegram No. 2066, Feb. 25, from the Minister in the Netherlands, ante, p. 135.

of course, guarantees as well for difficult conditions of the future. This is quite consistent with standpoint I take regarding Belgium; it will depend on future negotiations, however, how this standpoint can be applied in detail. I cannot make any binding statement thereon now. I must rest content with again laying down with emphasis this general guiding principle . . .

GARRETT

File No. 763.72/10702

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

BERNE, July 12, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received July 14, 2.10 p. m.]

3937. *German political.* President Wilson's Fourth of July speech received relatively meager comment in the German press, which pretends to distinguish between his ideas and the annexionist claims of the Allies. While finding little to criticise in the President's words, the pretense is made that they are vague and not supported by his actions. Only one Socialist paper accepts his message with anything like approval.

The assassination of the German Ambassador in Russia<sup>1</sup> came as a shock to Germany. The immediate effort of the press was to place the blame on Entente agents in Russia and to exculpate the Bolsheviks.

The resignation of Kühlmann, predicted ever since his Reichstag speech, is probably due to the antagonism of the Conservatives and the military. It represents Hertling's concession to the High Command, and is hailed with joy by the Conservative press. The action of the Socialists has been deferred, and may lead to the disruption of the parliamentary majority.

It seems probable that secret emissaries of Ludendorff have proposed to Entente powers in Switzerland tentative peace terms not unlike Kühlmann's formula, "The integrity of the German Empire." Then the question arises, why should Ludendorff force Von Kühlmann to resign for stating in the Reichstag principles with which Ludendorff is already secretly identifying himself. The answer seems to be that Ludendorff desires an untarnished, Conservative official to be the sponsor for a conciliatory peace in order that it may be the Conservatives and not the Socialists who receive the nation's gratitude. If this be true one may expect from Von Hintze, named as Kühlmann's successor, a policy, and particularly enunciations in the Reichstag, acceptable to the Conservatives, until the hour shall arrive to expose peace terms.

STOVALL

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. I, pp. 572-573.

File No. 763.72119/1800

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, July 15, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received July 16, 8.22 p. m.]

3958. My 3884.<sup>1</sup> In conversation with a member of French Embassy, latter states that De Fiori, "a dangerous agent of Ludendorff," was in Switzerland endeavoring to get into touch with Entente and especially America. It is possible that this was said to sound out the Legation. Merely to avoid any misunderstanding, I shall be glad to have the Department's permission to acquaint British, French and Italian colleagues with substance of De Fiori's communications without revealing channel through which received.<sup>2</sup>

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/1801

*The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HAVRE, July 15, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received July 17, 11.11 a. m.]

133. Not long ago, under the seal of great confidence, I learned from an English friend, who is an officer in the British secret service, that Count de Tarring, a Bavarian and a brother of the Queen of the Belgians, had had a conversation with Peltzer, Belgian Minister at Berne, in the Dutch Legation in Berne, on the 27th March, in which Tarring had broached the question of peace with Belgium. I took the opportunity to inform Hymans that I knew of this fact and to reproach him mildly with not having told me. He said that he had informed the British and French Governments as guaranteeing powers and by a rather striking coincidence was just on the point of telling me when I introduced the subject. I told Hymans that I thought that the American Embassy should be kept informed by its [associates] in the war of all that was going on and he quite readily agreed. He gave me the following details:

On or about the 15th March the Dutch Minister at Berne informed Peltzer that De Tarring wished to see him. Peltzer asked for instructions of his Government and was authorized to meet Tarring hinting [*merely?*] to listen to what he had to say, but was instructed to make no definite reply. Peltzer met Tarring at the Dutch Legation at Berne on the 27th March. After inquiring about the health of the royal family Tarring said that in Germany there was much favorable sentiment to Belgium, that while he was not authorized to make any proposals he felt assured that a peace could be arranged

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 276.<sup>2</sup> Answered by telegram No. 2313, July 19, 5 p. m., "Department has no objection to your informing British, French and Italian colleagues as you suggest."



provided Belgium would give guarantees for her neutrality, for disarmament and for resumption of economic relations with Germany. He also said that the German Government regretted that Belgium had not made a more formal response to Hertling's speech of the 24th [25th] February than that implied in the brief interview which Hymans had given to the press. Peltzer reported these facts to his Government.

On the 30th June Peltzer again met Tarring at Dutch Legation and made to him as instructed by the Belgian Government the following declaration:

Belgium did not wish the war. Unjustly attacked, she has endured it for the defense of her honor and her independence. On different occasions the Belgian Government has formulated in good faith and clearly the conditions of a just peace, so far as Belgium is concerned. She defined these conditions with an especial precision in her response of the 24th [August] last to the Pontifical message of the 1st August 1917.<sup>1</sup> The lack of precision in the intentions with regard to Belgium expressed by the Chancellor in his discourse of the 25th February last has not permitted the Belgians to make any other declarations than that to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs confined himself in recalling the demands formulated in our note to the Pope. It is for the German Government to explain itself. The Belgian Government could reply (*pourrait répondre*) if on the German side authorized declarations were made that would permit it, the Belgian Government, to talk without compromising the national future for which the Belgian people have sacrificed themselves.

In the course of this conversation Tarring asked what effect a "satisfactory" declaration on the part of the German Government in regard to Belgium would have on "the other problems created by the war and on the continuance of the war itself" and asked Peltzer to meet him again on the 15th July, that is, today. Hymans has just told me that he has instructed Peltzer to ask the Dutch Minister at Berne to inform Tarring that the Belgian Government considers the moment inopportune to continue the conversation and to ask him to postpone his visit. There the matter rests.

Hymans says that Belgian Government feels it to be its duty not to reject, without examination in [concert] with its allies, any serious offer of peace, and it is to be presumed that in the event of the failure of the offensive which began to-day Tarring may renew his efforts, especially in view of Hertling's speech of the 12th July. Hymans feels that the attitude to be assumed in such an exigency should be carefully determined beforehand and if such proposals are renewed he will wish to have your views as well as those of the President.

WHITLOCK

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 175 and 162-164, respectively.



File No. 763.72/10718

*The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SOFIA, July 9, 1918.

[Received July 17, 11.15 p. m.]

152. Referring [Department's] telegram 17th,<sup>1</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs communicate following:

The Bulgarian Government highly appreciates friendly relations which so fortunately exist between Bulgaria and Republic of the United States of America and the idea of affecting these relations is far from its contemplation. There are indeed Bulgarian officers finishing their instruction in Germany but they have never been authorized to take part in war operation or, in general, in any hostile actions taken by our allies against America. More than that, as a result of the *démarche* made by the honorable Legation in its note No. 565, specific orders have been given to the Bulgarian sailors who are being trained abroad, strongly impressing upon them never board vessels that are to carry out acts or operations of war.

MURPHY

File No. 763.72119/1795

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1918, 4 p. m.

2307. Your 3932. You can tell Professor Herron for his personal guidance that in the opinion of the Department it is just as well not to close any door. At the same time Department does not think it wise to express any opinion or thought which could be conveyed to the parties approaching Herron. It does not seem possible any serious movement for peace could come from Bavaria at this time.

POLK

File No. 763.72/10742

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, July 18, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received July 20, 3.16 a. m.]

3997. My 3914, July 9.<sup>2</sup> I learn that memorandum mentioned was later submitted by my Bulgarian informant to British official, Geneva, who is taking up with his Government the question of giving financial support to Bulgarian Revolutionary Party. Efforts are also being made to facilitate the journey to Switzerland of Bulgarian

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 258.<sup>2</sup> Ante, p. 283.

Radical leader . . . to ascertain his plans and possibility of such a revolutionary movement.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/1808

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, July 18, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received July 20, 4.29 a. m.]

3998. Department's 2265, July 10.<sup>1</sup> Same agent has called on Herron who pointed out that Bavarian proposals did not touch Russian and Turkish questions. Agent promised to consult with his superiors and present revised program. He inquired further if high personage in Germany could present personal question to President and obtain reply unknown to other nations. Mr. Herron stated he believed question might be transmitted but could express no opinion as to whether it would be answered.

From Italian press bureau I learn that Herron's conversations with this man are known about. The agent is described as extremely clever Austro-German agent formerly in Rome.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/10771

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, July 19, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received July 21, 10.15 p. m.]

4005. *German political.* Resignation of Von Kühlmann, despite the regret of the Liberal press of both Germany and Austria at losing a statesman who has voiced their ideas, and despite the displeasure of the Reichstag Majority at the suddenness of the change, has not prevented the Chancellor from saving the situation and obtaining the required credits before the cessation of the Reichstag session.

Apparently the Chancellor, in a speech before the Main Committee, made concessions satisfactory to the Socialist Majority Party which, however, demanded that publicity be given to his statement concerning the restitution of Belgium. Accordingly a *résumé* was given out by Wolff evoking criticism from the Conservative press. The whole of the Chancellor's statement was then published by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* showing that Belgium is held as a pledge, not only for German territorial integrity and restoration of colonies, but also for guarantees that Belgium will not be base

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 282.

against Germany in military or economic sense. The press amplifies this by adding it must be pledge against economic boycott and for reparation German loss through illegal blockade, and adds that promise of independence to Flanders must be kept.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/10783

*The Diplomatic Agent at Cairo (Gary) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CAIRO, July 22, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received July 23, 10.56 a. m.]

107. A Jewish battalion of 350 men reported recruited in the United States for service with the British armed forces in Palestine recently arrived Egypt. On the 20th instant they paraded principal streets Cairo carrying the American, British, and Zionist flags, all of equal size. In view of the acute political situation here in connection with Zionist and Arab movements and also the fact that the United States has not declared war on Turkey, feel that this open display of the American flag should be called to Department's attention.

GARY

File No. 763.72/10865

*The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

No. 259

SOFIA, June 29, 1918.

[Received July 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 26th instant, I had a most satisfactory audience with Bulgaria's new Prime Minister, Mr. Alexander Malinoff, and beg to confirm my telegram of the 27th instant, as follows:

[Here follows paraphrase of telegram No. 149 of June 27, *ante*, page 279.]

The Prime Minister, who was most cordial in his greeting, is a warm friend and admirer of the United States, one expression he used deserving to be remembered. It was to this effect—"I beg to assure you that during my administration, Bulgaria's conduct will be such as will never offend the United States." As I telegraphed on the 21st instant, all the members of the new Cabinet are of the Democratic Party and all are friends of the United States. Mr. Malinoff's attitude has long been known to me—as well as the attitude of Mr. Andrew Liapcheff, the new Minister of Finance. They are dependable men—of great ability and sterling character, enjoying to the full the confidence of the entire country.

The old Cabinet fell because of the anti-German sentiment that has been constantly increasing and spreading until it has become general throughout Bulgaria. The feeling that the Germans were permitted to drain the country of her food supplies, leaving the people to suffer and to starve, could no longer be ignored—hence the change—which is universally welcomed. To be just to the former Prime Minister, it must be said that he invariably treated me, as the American representative in Bulgaria, with the most distinguished courtesy. He firmly resisted the German pressure which has been steadily applied to force a break in the relations between Bulgaria and the United States. How much of his attitude, however, was attributable to the wishes of His Majesty, King Ferdinand (who has always been friendly to the United States), I am not prepared to say, but I want to give Dr. Radoslavoff all the credit that belongs to him.

It would be a thousand pities if any misunderstanding should arise now between Bulgaria and the United States—after the coming into power of this new Democratic Cabinet, every member of which is friendly to us. Mr. Malinoff's assurance that while he is in power, Bulgaria "will maintain the closest possible relations with the United States," expresses the desire of every single member. Mr. Malinoff has closely followed the program of the President and unhesitatingly expressed his approval of it.

Here I will quote the words of a distinguished member of the Democratic Party—one of the leaders of the Sofia bar—"Germany"—said he—"would be very happy, she would give millions to force a break with America—particularly now that she knows Mr. Malinoff and his colleagues admire and respect the stand America has taken in this world war and her defense of the small nations." Similar expressions may be heard now every day—so that my long-cherished hopes are strengthened that in the Balkans may yet be found the way that will lead the world out of the labyrinth in which it has been well-nigh lost.

I have [etc.]

D. I. MURPHY

File No. 763.72/10835

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, July 26, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received July 27, 6.34 a. m.]

1878. My 1579.<sup>1</sup> In conversation with Baron Sonnino today he took up again question of Bulgaria, reiterating his conviction that,

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 225.



if we declared or put ourselves in train to declare war, Bulgaria would be greatly affected. He thinks that this is an auspicious time when we are gaining on French front. He says that Bulgaria is always playing game, holding out suggestions of making peace, but he will have nothing to do with it as every step he takes touching upon Balkan matters is liable to excite suspicion of other allies that such an action has ulterior motives. He believes Bulgaria most susceptible now to the fear of losing out.

I promised to report his view which is worth considering. The new Italian Minister to Chile, who says that he knows Bulgaria, holds this view. He thinks Bulgaria susceptible to advances. This I question.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1825

*The Vice Consul at Zürich (McNally) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

ZÜRICH, undated.

[Received July 29, 1918, 6.14 a. m.]

My son-in-law has been transferred to the Admiralty in Berlin and there the German Chancellor Hertling requested him to ask me to transmit the President of the United States through the Department of State an acceptance of his peace conditions saying that in no other way could he get the true statement before him. I replied that I was not permitted to without the consent of the Department of State and there the matter has rested for several days. Believing now, however, that my Government would profit by a knowledge of its nature, I am transmitting unknown to them the complete text:

German Chancellor fully agrees to the four conditions in President Wilson's speech at Mount Vernon on the Fourth of July, 1918, and he too considers them as a good basis for peace negotiations. He agrees to these four conditions in the belief that the first generally is not intended to apply to any one stated government but is directed against all autocracies generally.

MCNALLY

File No. 763.72119/1830

*The Serbian Minister (Michailovitch) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1918.

[Received July 31.]

YOUR EXCELLENCY: In consequence of the news that Bulgaria intends to enter into certain peace negotiations with the Entente Powers or with the United States, I have the honor to enclose here-

<sup>1</sup> Via the Legation in Switzerland, No. 4100, July 27, noon.

with a memorandum<sup>1</sup> on the Serbian Government's views concerning this step of the Bulgarian Government.

The purpose of this memorandum is to help by our experiences to avoid faults which could have disastrous effects. The alliance of Bulgaria with the Central Powers and her participation in this war on their side had terrible consequences, not only for Serbia, but also for all the Slav element which is enduring the German-Hungarian yoke. In the Croatian Diet, as well as in the Budapest and Vienna Parliaments, the Jugo-Slav members are openly protesting against the unheard of ill-treatment of our element in the systematic destruction of which Bulgaria is playing the foremost rôle.

If the salvage of our element is one of the war aims of the Entente Powers and of the United States, then our enemies are also necessarily the enemies of our protectors. I, therefore, take the liberty to express the hope that there will be no negotiations made with our enemies which would concern our future,—without our participation in them;—not that we claim it as a right of ours, but because we feel that our participation would contribute greatly to the just and proper solution of the problems in question.

I beg to renew [etc.]

L. MICHAILOVITCH

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File No. 763.72/10783

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Agent at Cairo  
(Gary)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your 107, July 22, 5 p. m. Make appropriate representation to British authorities and Jewish battalion to prevent further display by Jewish battalion of American flag in Egypt and Palestine.

POLK

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File No. 763.72/10953a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1918, 4 p. m.

1597. Department's 1476<sup>2</sup> and your 1764.<sup>3</sup> British and French Governments are proposing to Allied Naval Council a unity of command in the Mediterranean, just as there is now a unity of military command on the western front. The Government of the United States is in entire agreement with this view and instructions have been sent to Admiral Sims to give his support to the proposal to agree upon a single naval commander for the forces in the Mediter-

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 260.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 264.

ranean. Please inform Italian Government of the views held by the Government of the United States.

POLK

File No. 763.72119/1856

*The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HAVRE, August 10, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received August 11, 10.50 a. m.]

136. My despatch [*telegram*] No. 133, dated July 15, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Count Tarring, having been informed of the Belgian Government's request that his visit be postponed, said to the Dutch Minister at Berne on the 20th July that he hoped that the Belgians would reply to his question reported in my despatch aforesaid and significantly added that he had just come from Hertling. The Belgian Government has instructed Peltzer, its Minister at Berne, to say to his Dutch colleague, for repetition to Tarring, that the two speeches of Hertling on the 11th and 12th July, in which the Chancellor referred to Belgium as a pawn in German hands, had given rise to such universal reprobation, not only in the Belgian mind, but in Allied and [neutral?] nations, that, so long as such a view was held by Germany, no further communication was possible. The British Government has informed the Belgian Government that it feels that any clear proposals that may be submitted by Germany should not be rejected without consultation with the Allied Powers.

WHITLOCK

File No. 763.72/10985

*The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, August 10, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received August 11, 2.03 p. m.]

3911. My 3908, 10th.<sup>2</sup> German *communiqués* of 8th evening and 9th morning unique in open admission of enemy successes thus showing possible responsiveness to campaign for truth about military situation waged by Rathenau, Rohr[bach] and even Reventlow. Great astonishment unquestionably existed in German mind over unexcelled [*unexpected*] reverses. Home propaganda is endeavoring to turn dismay into dogged determination. Difficult to forecast what iconoclastic effect this violent and sudden shock of truth will have upon German [public] so long immune from thoughts of imminent danger. In apparent attempt to divert public interest, press is giving undue publicity to matters of secondary importance, as for ex-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 288.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

ample, Prussian-Bavarian differences resulting from alleged discrimination in meat distribution in favor of Berlin; the bitterness of this discussion is believed to be indicative, however, of the general irritability.

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GARRETT

File No. 763.72119/1834

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1918, 1 p. m.

2437. Your confidential mail despatch 3788.<sup>1</sup> Advise Herron that he may say substantially to De Fiori that he (Herron) has so distinctly gained the impression that the Government at Washington objects to indirect approaches of this kind and is definitely determined to entertain only official suggestions coming from accredited representatives of a government, that he has come to the conclusion that it would prejudice matters rather than promote them to seek to ascertain the attitude of our government in the way that De Fiori has hoped that he (Herron) might be willing to attempt to ascertain it.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72119/1859

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

LONDON, August 13, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 8.25 p. m.]

1045. The Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress recently applied for passports to Switzerland for Henderson and Bowerman in order that they might meet Troelstra in Berne to ascertain from him the present attitude of German Socialists. The War Cabinet last week refused this application, whereupon the executive of the Labor Party and the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress passed strong resolutions of protest. In yesterday's press a statement by Henderson at Cardiff pointed out that the request for passports emanated from the members of the Parliamentary Committee who were the strongest supporters of the Government's war policy and that the reply of organized labor to this refusal must be expressed at the Jubilee Conference to be held at Derby next month. Liberal papers such as the *Daily News* and the *Manchester Guardian*, which criticised in June the refusal to permit Troelstra to attend the Labor conference in

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed; see the Minister's telegram No. 3884 of July 5, *ante*, p. 276.



London, now support Henderson in criticising the Government's recent refusal of passports to him and Bowerman.

Except in the Seamen's Union, led by Havelock Wilson, there seems to be a growing sentiment among British Labor men in favor of their representatives' getting into direct touch with representatives of German Labor either through a conference or through some neutral representative such as Troelstra, and the restiveness at the Government's refusal to countenance this policy seems to be growing in strength. The Bakers' Union Conference passed yesterday, with only four dissentients, a resolution condemning the refusal of passports as a calculated insult to organized labor. The recent resolution passed by the French Socialists by 1544 votes against 1172 in favor of refusing war credits, if the facilities for a neutral conference continue to be denied, is of course a great encouragement to the British Labor policy of insisting on such a conference. The persistency with which this is being urged seems to be causing much anxiety both to the British and French Governments.

At Blackpool on August 2 a conference was held by Havelock Wilson, James Sexton and other representatives of dissentient labor with a view to forming a new Labor Party on a purely trade union basis but no important union except the seamen's supports this movement and there is no sign whatever that Henderson and his colleagues are failing to represent the views of the vast majority of British Labor.

PAGE

File No. 763.72/11050

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

LONDON, August 20, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 11.48 p. m.]

1232. The announcement last Wednesday that Mr. Samuel Gompers was coming to this country and would attend the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference to be held here on September 17 to 19 has been widely welcomed in the press, and by Mr. Bowerman, Secretary to the Parliamentary Committee of the Trades Union Congress, in a long statement published in the *Daily News* of August 15. Mr. Bowerman stated orally to a member of my staff that his committee and the Labor Party would be particularly glad to confer with Mr. Gompers because, as he said, the nine American delegates who visited this country three months ago were bound down by their instructions, and were for this reason unable fully to discuss questions of labor policy.

Mr. Gompers' visit is hailed with special joy by the Northcliffe and Conservative press as an antidote to pacifism in the British Labor Party. There is, therefore, some possible danger lest the exploiting of his visit by elements particularly hostile to that party should annoy their rank and file, and thus accelerate their political movement to the Left which has been a marked feature in the development of British Labor policy during the past year. Havelock Wilson of the Seamen's Union, strongly supported by the *Daily Mail*, is appealing in a large advertisement to members of the trades union congress which meets at Derby on Monday, September 2, to form a purely trade union antipacifist organization, and Will Thorne at the first conference of the new pro-war National Socialist Party denounced the Labor Party and its present leaders. It seems clear, however, that Henderson and Bowerman have at their back the majority of Labor votes, and Mr. Gompers will require all his diplomatic skill to avoid antagonizing the majority represented by those leaders, while at the same time co-operating with the minority led by Appleton and Thorne who are bitterly hostile to Henderson and Bowerman.

On the question of the advisability of an international conference to be held in a neutral country at which representatives of enemy powers would be present, there is not, according to a recent private statement of Sidney Webb, the remotest chance of the settled policy of the British Labor Party in favor of such a conference being altered by Mr. Gompers and his associates. Webb stated, at the same time, that Mr. Gompers will be welcomed and listened to with the greatest respect by all British Socialists and Labor men.

On the 16th instant Representative Sherley of Kentucky had a long interview with Bowerman in which he explained the present policy of the United States; he failed to see Webb and Henderson who are out of town. I learn that Mr. Barnes, the Labor member of the War Cabinet, is forming a representative committee of labor representatives to entertain Mr. Gompers.

PAGE

File No. 763.72/10584

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett)*

No. 632

WASHINGTON, August 22, 1918.

SIR: The Department acknowledges the receipt of your despatch No. 6, [Luxembourg], of June 14, 1918,<sup>1</sup> stating that the *Luxembourg Libre*, a monthly publication under the auspices of the League of Luxembourg Patriots Abroad, reports that according to the *Gazette*

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

*Luxembourgeoise*, the United States "has declared that subjects of the Grand Duchy will neither be interned as enemies nor enrolled as allies in the American Army in view of the fact that Luxembourg is and remains a neutral state." You state that you have not been able to verify these reports and that you would be glad to receive such information on the matter as may be of interest in connection with the affairs of Luxembourg and their relation to the United States.

In reply, you are informed that the attitude of the United States toward Luxembourg is characterized by the fact that we have accredited a minister to that country and that we regard Luxembourg as an independent and neutral state whose territory is occupied by the armed forces of a nation with which the United States is at war.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72/11096

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

ROME, August 24, 1918, noon.

[Received August 26, 3.40 a. m.]

1947. *Political situation.* No change apparent except that the *Corriere della Sera*, leading Milan paper, is conducting violent campaign against foreign policy of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sonnino, charging that terms of pact of London by which Italy entered war should be revised as in present form [likely] to alienate American and other Allied sympathy for being too grasping and disregarding Jugo-Slav aspirations. *Giornale d'Italia*, leading Rome paper, and others support Sonnino. Italians in general believe in Sonnino whom they realize is honest and personally disinterested from petty ambitions. He appears to care nothing for politics, and his strength lies in above fact, and knowledge that he is staying on in office from sense of duty to his country. . . .

Chamber probably reassembles last week in September. American pro-war Socialists met representative of official Socialist Party in private debate but from *résumé* given press were unable to alter latter's anti-war attitude. American delegation has left for Milan and Switzerland. Visit of Congressional naval committee very successful; upon occasion my presenting them to Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, most cordial speeches were exchanged. Minister of Marine gave a banquet for the committee who were guests Italian Government during their brief stay in Rome before visiting front.



File No. 763.72/13369

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, August 30, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received August 31, 1.40 a. m.]

129. For the Secretary of State and Colonel House:

At the request of General Pershing, I called upon him yesterday at his headquarters to discuss an idea which he has been turning over in his mind for several days.

He believes that the successful advance of the Allies on the western front will continue and while he does not consider that the Germans are yet beaten, he is satisfied that the morale of their troops is bad. Under these circumstances, he thinks that united action should be taken to bring about the end of the [war] if possible before next year. He believes that if the President were now to urge the Allies to attack simultaneously on the Italian front, at Saloniki, and in Mesopotamia if possible, if he were to address words of encouragement to that section of the Russian public which is pro-Ally; if an intimation from the same source were conveyed to Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey that the time has come for them to yield, and if pressure were brought to bear upon the neutrals, especially Spain, to join the Allies, the defeat of Germany, which he now considers certain, would be hastened. General Pershing informs me that according to his Intelligence Service, the Germans are already moving supplies to the right bank of the Rhine and that an attack by the American Army is now imminent.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72/11341

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, September 7, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received September 8, 12.20 p. m.]

4313. My 4310, 7th.<sup>1</sup> Recent utterances of public men in Germany including even the Crown Prince's contribution are of a considerably softened tone and now seem destined more to repair German morale than to influence Entente thought. The recent extraordinary campaign of home propaganda is now crushed by Governor General of [Brand]enburg's appeal to people not to heed wild rumors. There could be no better evidence which indicates existence of unusual depression in Germany, well informed sources asserting

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



that the Pan-Germans are now the most depressed of all groups, and Moderate circles are endeavoring to convey impression that the former have lost all influence. Legation's 3641, July 23,<sup>1</sup> reported that Kühlmann's supporters would argue that his famous speech was only a wise and timely warning. Now *Vorwärts* compares it to Crown Prince's interview and finds that the ideas expressed with regard to the means of terminating the war are practically identic but points out that Kühlmann had sagacity to choose moment of great military success for his statement. Moderate informant reports that Moderates' disapproval of Crown Prince's speech based on inconsistency revealed by it. Hertling shows appreciation of blackness of hour by repeating in address to Prussian Upper House committee that Government's intention is to stand or fall on the question of fulfillment of royal proclamation on equal suffrage. He points out that matter not only concerns ministerial responsibility but also protection of crown and dynasty. He added the significant warning that while no previous accounts [*special efforts?*] would be exerted to have a compromise, yet any delay might result in upheavals. He encouragingly told them that by a compromise now, far-reaching changes in Government institutions could still be avoided. This committee formed to consider these questions represents in large majority the nobility. In this connection reference is made to Doctor Scheler's statement transmitted in Legation's despatch 1750, August 12,<sup>1</sup> relative to Conservative opposition to crown because of conflict of interests between royal and imperial policies.

More than usual significance is attached to Crown Prince Rupprecht's visit to Munich. The recent indications of bad feeling between Bavaria and Prussia over food questions are followed by reports that Bavaria is dissatisfied with manner in which her economic interests are being considered in the economic plans of the Empire. Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg have had special representatives at Salzburg where the future economic plans of Germany and Austria have been discussed. It is reported that Bavaria has flatly refused to agree to plan of the purchase of raw material under Berlin control. The recent announcement that Bavaria and Saxony propose to establish legations in Sofia is sharply condemned by Berlin press, Bavarian press retorting that such a measure is necessary for the protection of Bavaria's own interests, especially in important matter of the Danube shipping, which have been neglected by the imperial authorities. The current rumors of disagreement in the Bavarian Army may be noted in this connection.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72/11349

*The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HAVRE, *September 9, 1918, 7 p. m.*

[Received September 10, 3.20 a. m.]

140. Count de Tarring has sent a long letter to Peltzer, Belgian Minister at Berne, in which he says that having conferred with Hertling and Von Hintze he is in a position to state that Germany has no intention to impose any charge or to make any propositions that would offend the honor of the Belgian Nation or Army. The German Government has declared repeatedly that it is ready to re-establish the complete independence of Belgium. After the end of the war Germany will reestablish Belgium in its former situation; she will make no claim on Belgian territory, either in Europe or in Africa. Belgium will recover her complete political and economic independence. Germany is willing that Belgium return to her former situation as a neutral power and besides she leaves to the Belgian Government the liberty to decide whether the international relations of Belgium shall be established on the old basis or whether Belgium shall have complete liberty of movement. The wish of Germany is that a means be found that will permit the reestablishment of those friendly relations that existed between Belgium and Germany before the war and if possible to make them in time more solid and intimate. In the economic domain Germany has no intention to impose on Belgium any prejudicial condition. In this domain complete commercial liberty must be assured. As an economic war would not be in the interest of either Belgium or of Germany the German Government proposes that the commercial treaty in force before the war between Belgium and Germany be maintained for several years after the war.

As the word "pawn" recently employed by the Chancellor has received a false interpretation abroad, it is explained as follows: The German Government does not demand any security from Belgium; it will be satisfied with a declaration that Belgium will undertake to intervene with the Allied Governments for the restitution of the German colonies.

As to the Flemish question, the German Government might desire that Belgium after the war seek a solution of the Flemish question that would give satisfaction to certain interested circles and that an amnesty be accorded to Flemish activists.

Hymans, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, before replying to this letter would be pleased to have the views of the American Government as well as those of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, and makes the following observations:

Torring, while claiming no mandate will be forwarded [*sic*] Imperial Government, says he is in a position to make known its intentions and believes that he has fully set them forth. His declarations of principle deserve attention. They seem to indicate a tendency to approach an equitable solution of the Belgian question and are therefore a step in advance but they are followed by propositions which in fact impede the application of these principles and impose limitations on the exercise of Belgian liberty. The suggestion that an amnesty be accorded Belgians who have compromised themselves in the Flemish activist movement constitutes an evident intrusion in Belgium's internal affairs.

The proposal to restore the treaty of commerce of 1904 with its favored nation clause for several years after the war would hinder Belgium in her commercial relations with the Allies. While Germany seems disposed to recognize in principle Belgium's right to political and commercial independence the suggestions tend to restrain the application of these principles and are not in accord with the demands expressed by the Belgian Government in its note to the Pope<sup>1</sup> which constitute an indispensable basis of a just peace so far as Belgium is concerned. The declarations regarding the independence of Belgium and the integrity of her territory are conditional. They are subordinated to an obligation on the part of Belgium to intervene with the Allies for the restitution of Germany's colonies. Nothing is said about reparations and indemnities.

WHITLOCK

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File No. 763.72/11349

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Belgium (Whitlock)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 11, 1918, 4 p. m.

310. Your 140, September 9, 7 p. m. This Government does not consider that Count de Torring's letter merits favorable consideration

LANSING

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File No. 763.72/11416

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, September 13, 1918.

[Received September 14, 11.05 a. m.]

4403. Following summary of Payer's speech, Stuttgart, September 12:

Depression in Germany is not due so much to the recent reverses in the west as to the prospects of a fifth winter of war, but this affects all combatants alike. The loss of millions of men, the innumerable other burdens of war all have to be borne in common. Germany's debt has reached a fabulous height. All combatants must recognize, if they are not blind, that the [more the] larger European nations continue to tear each other to pieces the more will

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<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 175.*



wise and more calculating nations enrich themselves at Europe's expense. The question as to how long it will be before a military decision is reached depends upon which combatant can carry on the longest financially, economically and politically.

The Entente are relying upon America, which nation is certainly [proving] a serious and increasing burden for Germany. Germany's enemies forget that hundreds of thousands of Americans on west front will not counterbalance millions of Russians, Serbians and Roumanians [who] have been put out of action, and territory gained by Entente in past weeks is only part of territory conquered by Germany. The submarine war had not been so rapid nor so effective as was previously calculated. But there is no object in disputing now who was to blame. Germany's enemies at all events were not able to make good their losses in tonnage. Robbery of neutral tonnage by Entente cannot be repeated, and with transport of troops from United States, need of ships for maintenance of troops will grow. Destruction of ships desperate for England after the war, as vessels constructed during war to replace losses will belong to America. Germany's enemies have begun to suffer unexpected lack in material; foodstuffs are scarce everywhere, but ahead things appear to have turned in Germany's favor. In the east the world has again been opened for Germans, her only care is to carry on war on hostile soil with conviction that Germans are the attacked.

Germany is strong enough even in midst of war to settle its political divergencies. Prussian electoral reform no longer Prussian but German question, and further delay in its solution is unseemly. If Committee of Upper House does not pass equal suffrage the Government will order dissolution.

Turning to question of peace he said, it would not be made by governments alone but in cooperation with whole of peoples and must be a lasting peace, therefore not a peace of conquest. Such a peace necessarily requires return to *status quo ante*. This everywhere possible except in east. The old Russia could have remained alive if it had succeeded in making lives of its oppressed peoples bearable by federal reorganization; it broke down because it could not hold together internally. Germany's victories and those of her allies have now given subjects of the huge Empire chance to free themselves. Germany cannot help to set up old order again or deliver up Kingdom of Poland to Russia nor help compel Finland go back under Russian yoke. She cannot place treaties with Ukraine, Russia and Roumania before Entente for its approval or alteration. Elsewhere territorial possessions of before the war can be restored.

First condition for Germany and her allies must be that all territory she had August 1, 1914, must be restored; [she] must therefore in first place receive back colonies. Idea of exchange for reasons of suitability need not be excluded. As soon as peace is concluded Germany can evacuate the occupied districts. When matters have gone so far she can evacuate Belgium also. When Germany and her allies are again in possession of what belonged to them, when they are certain that in Belgium no other state can be placed in better position than they, then Belgium may be given back without a charge on it and without reservation. Necessary understanding between Belgium and Germany will be easy because their economic



interests run parallel in many ways. Germans have no reason to doubt that much discussed Flemish question will be settled justly. It is hypocrisy to call Belgium innocent victim of German policy. Belgian Government (Belgian people are not concerned) took lively part in England's policy of isolating Germany.

There remains question of indemnities. If Germans had been allowed to go on with their work peaceably there would have been no war, therefore question is not whether they should pay but whether they shall receive compensation for damage caused to them. They are convinced that, as the innocents attacked, they have right to material compensation, but to carry on war till they get this would cause damage that could not be replaced by money, therefore even with favorable military situation they prefer renounce this claim.

Nations call for prevention of damage after war, for a league of nations, for international courts of arbitration, above all for agreements for simultaneous disarmament. Enemy Governments made this their cry. Germany desires to cooperate; she had idea of league of nations long before England and France, desired agreements for disarmament regulating things equally and applying to naval forces as well as land. Following same idea, she demands freedom of seas and sea routes, open door in oversea territories; protection of private property on seas. In negotiations about rights of small nations she willingly supports laws which will free countries oppressed by England. Impossible preliminary conditions for peace negotiations must not be made. Germany laughs at view that she must repent and ask for mercy before she is admitted to negotiations. Mutually with others she will protect world peace from danger in future. In Germany itself all that can be done to advance peace is to facilitate tedious and difficult negotiations with Austria-Hungary and neighboring countries in east, and oppose attempts of enemy to suppress thought of peace in Germany. This can be more easily accomplished as people are becoming united regarding peace aims, namely, peace of understanding without annexation and indemnity. Meanwhile the will to destroy on part of Germany's enemies must be opposed to the end.

KIRK

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Austro-Hungarian Peace Note, September 16; American Reply, September 17—Hertling's Speech, September 24

File No. 763.72119/1914

*The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation from French]

WASHINGTON, *September 16, 1918.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to communicate to you the following note addressed by the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the Royal Government of Sweden and received by me on this day by telegraph:

Although it was declined by the enemy Powers, the peace proposal made on December 12, 1916,<sup>1</sup> by the four allied Powers, which never

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1916, Supplement, pp. 90 and 94.

desisted from the conciliatory intent that had prompted it, nevertheless was the beginning of a new phase in the history of this war. From that day the question of peace, after two and a half years of fierce struggle, suddenly became the main topic of discussion in Europe, nay, in the world, and has been steadily gaining prominence ever since. From that day nearly every belligerent state has repeatedly voiced its opinion on the subject of peace. The discussion, however, was not carried on along the same lines. Viewpoints varied according to the military and political conditions, and so, thus far at least, no tangible or practical result has been achieved. Notwithstanding those fluctuations a lessening of the distance between the viewpoints of the two parties could be noted, though no attempt will be made to deny the great divergences of opinion which divide the two enemy camps and which it has heretofore been impossible to reconcile. One may be nevertheless permitted to notice that some of the extreme war aims have been departed from, and that the fundamental basis of a universal peace is to some extent agreed upon. There is no doubt that on either side the desire of the peoples to reach an understanding and bring about peace is becoming more and more manifest. The same impression is created when the manner in which the peace proposal of the four allied Powers was received in the past is compared with the subsequent utterances of their adversaries, whether they came from responsible statesmen or from personages holding no office but likewise wielding political influence. By way of illustration confined to a few instances, the Allies in their reply to President Wilson's note advanced claims which meant nothing less than the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, the mutilation of and radical changes in the political structure of Germany, and also the annihilation of European Turkey. With time, those terms that could not be enforced without a crushing victory were modified or partly abandoned by some of the official declarations of the Entente.

Thus Mr. Balfour, in the course of last year, plainly declared to the English Parliament that Austria-Hungary was to solve her domestic problems by herself and that Germany could not be given another constitution through foreign influence; Mr. Lloyd George afterward announced, in the beginning of this year, that the Allies were not fighting for the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary or to despoil the Ottoman Empire of its Turkish provinces, or, again, to bring internal reforms to Germany. We may also add that in December 1917 Mr. Balfour categorically repudiated the assumption that British policy had pledged itself to create an independent state including the German territory lying on the left bank of the Rhine. As for the utterances of the Central Powers, they leave no doubt that those states are merely fighting to defend the integrity and safety of their territories. Much greater than in respect to concrete war aims is the evidence that the principles upon which peace could be concluded and a new order of things established in Europe and throughout the world have in a way drawn nearer to one another. On this point President Wilson in his addresses of February 12 [11], and July 4, 1918, formulated principles that have raised no objection from his allies and whose wide application will [scarcely] meet with objections from the four allied Powers provided [that application] be general and consistent with the vital interests of the states con-

cerned. To agree upon general principles, however, would not suffice; an agreement should also be reached as to their interpretation and application to the several concrete questions of war and peace.

To an unprejudiced observer there can be no doubt that in all the belligerent states, without exception, the desire for a compromise peace has been enormously strengthened; that the conviction is increasing that the further continuance of the bloody struggle must transform Europe into ruins and into a state of exhaustion that will check its development for decades to come—and this without any guarantee of thereby bringing about the decision by arms which four years of efforts, hardships and immense sacrifices have failed to bring about. Now, by what means, in what manner can the way be paved that will finally lead to such a compromise? Can anyone in earnest expect that goal to be attained by adhering to the method heretofore followed in the discussion of the peace problem? We dare not answer that question in the affirmative. The discussion as conducted until now from one rostrum to another by the statesmen of the several countries was substantially but a series of monologues. It lacked sequence above all. Speeches delivered, arguments expounded by the orators of the opposite parties received no direct immediate reply. Again, the publicity of those utterances, the places where they were delivered, excluded every possible serviceable result. In such public utterances the eloquence used is of the high-pitched kind which is intended to thrill the masses. Whether intentionally or not, the gap between conflicting ideas is thus widened. Misunderstandings that cannot easily be eradicated spring up, and a simple, straightforward exchange of ideas is hampered as soon as mentioned, and even before an official answer can be made by the adversary every declaration of the statesmen in power is taken up for passionate and immoderate discussion by irresponsible persons. But the statesmen themselves are obsessed by a fear that they may unfavorably influence public opinion in their country and thereby compromise the chances of the war, and also of prematurely disclosing their true intentions. That is why they use [strong phrases] and persist in upholding unflinching points of view.

If therefore it were intended to seek the basis for a compromise apt to make an end of the war, whose prolongation would mean nothing but suicide, and to save Europe from that catastrophe, resort should be had in any event to some other method which would permit of continuous and direct converse between the representatives of the governments and between them only. Such an exchange of views would take in the conflicting views of the several belligerent states to the same extent as the general principles on which to build up peace and the relations between states, and might first lead to an understanding as to those principles. The fundamental principles once agreed upon, an effort should be made in the course of the informal negotiations to apply them concretely to the several peace questions and thereby bring about their solution. We indulge the hope that none of the belligerents will object to this proposed exchange of views. There would be no interruption of military operations. The conversation would go no farther than deemed useful by the participants; the parties concerned could be put to no disadvan-



tage thereby. The exchange of views, far from doing any harm, could be but beneficial to the cause of peace; what might fail at the first attempt could be tried over again; something will at least have been done toward elucidating the problems. How many are the deep rooted misunderstandings that might be dispelled! How many the new ideas that would break their way out! Human sentiments so long pent up could burst forth from all hearts, creating a warmer atmosphere, while safeguarding every essential point, and dispel many a discussion which at this time seems important. We are convinced that it is the duty of all belligerents to mankind to take up together the question whether there is no way, after so many years of a struggle which notwithstanding all the sacrifices it has cost is still undecided and the whole course of which seems to demand a compromise, of bringing this awful war to an end.

The Imperial and Royal Government therefore comes again to the governments of all the belligerent states with a proposal shortly to send to a neutral country, upon a previous agreement as to the date and place, delegates who would broach a confidential non-binding conversation over the fundamental principles of a peace that could be concluded. The delegates would be commissioned to communicate to one another the views of their respective governments on the aforesaid principles and very freely and frankly interchange information on every point for which provision should be made.

The Imperial and Royal Government has the honor to apply for your kindly good offices and to request that the Royal Government of Sweden kindly communicate the present communication, which is addressed to all the belligerent states simultaneously, to the Governments of the United States of America and of Great Britain. Burián.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

File No. 763.72119/1914

*The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Ekengren)*

WASHINGTON, *September 17, 1918.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note, dated September 16, communicating to me a note from the Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary, containing a proposal to the governments of all the belligerent states to send delegates to a confidential and unbinding discussion on the basic principles for the conclusion of peace. Furthermore it is proposed that the delegates would be charged to make known to one another the conception of their governments regarding those principles and to receive analogous communications, as well as to request and give frank and candid explanations on all those points which need to be precisely defined.

In reply I beg to say that the substance of your communication has been submitted to the President, who now directs me to inform



you that the Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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File No. 763.72119/1910

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *September 17, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received September 17, 4.18 p. m.*]

1950. Mr. Balfour tells me today, in reply to an inquiry I made of him as to the British Government's answer to the Austrian peace proposal, that your answer published in today's evening papers so completely meets with his views that he will probably not follow with idea he had tentatively formed of concerting with our co-belligerents in forming a joint answer. This came out quite informally as conversation and I transmit it at once for your information. If anything further develops I shall inform you.

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File No. 763.72119/1926

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *September 19, 1918, 11 a. m.*

[*Received 11.52 a. m.*]

2022. Your circular 17th.<sup>1</sup> Press universally approves President's answer to Austrian note. Even the *Daily News* does not find fault. Especial delight is shown over rumor that reply was dispatched within half an hour of the receipt of the official text or, as several papers expressed it, by return of post. Mr. Balfour in a somewhat lengthy speech on Monday stated emphatically that in his opinion no advantage could be gained by accepting the Austrian offer or even giving serious consideration to it. The terseness of the President's answer has been favorably compared editorially with the long discourse which Mr. Balfour thought it advisable to pronounce.

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed; transmitting text of the note of that date to the Swedish Minister.

File No. 763.72119/1938

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *September 21, 1918, 10 a. m.*

[Received 12.08 p. m.]

2813. The military comment in the German press evidently acting under inspiration is now proclaiming that the Entente's military activity is dictated by the absolute necessity arising from political and economic causes of gaining a military decision this year so that anything less than this can be interpreted as a defeat.

In the past week political discussion suddenly assumed an almost unprecedented volume and intensity; most of it can be summed up in the one word peace. The Austrian note, Payer's speech, the ministerial crisis, rumors of the Finnish throne question and Prussian electoral reform are all discussed with peace as a starting and finishing point. There is complete unanimity that Austria's step was ill-timed and ill-advised; from the first there has been entire scepticism as to its results; the Conservative press is bitterly derisive and the Socialist press lukewarm. Even the thought that sharp rejection by the Allies may assist in reconstituting the inner front seems to offer little consolation. The press is likewise unanimous that the initiative for the note was solely in Vienna and many circumstances tend to indicate that this is in fact correct and that its despatch was rather without than with Germany's warm approval. It is otherwise difficult to explain that such united disapproval was permitted in the German press and that Payer's speech seemingly intentionally cut the ground from beneath the Austrian note before its despatch. Something similar to the Austrian note was to be expected in the course of the German peace offensive but it is difficult to believe that Germany would not have waited for a more propitious moment, while internal affairs may well have compelled Austria to immediate action, even in the face of German disapproval.

Payer's speech was greeted as representing the Government's peace program, which is undoubtedly the case. It found adherents among the Centrists and sections of the Progressives and National Liberals. The Pan-Germans were furious at its "renunciations" while the Socialists and Liberals of the *Tageblatt* brand see ever more clearly that Germany's eastern policy makes peace out of the question. As a result the Reichstag Majority presents an appearance far from united, while never have the general cries from all quarters for unity of the inner front been louder.

The hostility towards Hertling among the Socialists and Liberals has certainly not abated in spite of the over-plaintive denials of *Germania* that no crisis exists. The realization among Socialists and Liberals that the Chancellor's conservative character also blocks the way to peace, seems to have reached a point where even the reaction from the Allied rejection of the Austrian note cannot possibly save him.

Copy to London.

AMERICAN LEGATION

File No. 763.72119/1940

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Kirk) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, September 21, 1918.

[Received 4.24 p. m.]

4524. Dutch press.

*Maasbode* publishes wireless from Berlin saying that the German Government's reply handed to Ambassador at Vienna is as follows:

Undersigned Imperial Ambassador has honor to reply to very much appreciated note of the Imperial and Royal Ministry of the 14th, instant. The invitation of the Government to all belligerent states to a not binding confidential conference in a neutral country on basic principles for peace agrees in spirit to readiness for peace and conciliation which responsible statesmen of the Quadruple Alliance and the competent representatives of the Allied peoples have always announced. Reception which such steps formerly made met with at hand of opponents discouraging; Imperial Government however welcomes this new attempt to bring just and durable peace so ardently desired closer, and honestly and earnestly hopes that the attempt made by the Dual Government in deep feeling of reconciliation and noble humanity will this time have the desired result on behalf of the Imperial Government. The undersigned has the honor to state that Germany is prepared to participate in proposed conference.

[No signature indicated.]

KIRK

File No. 763.72114A/185d

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1918, 1 p. m.

2774. For Garrett:<sup>1</sup>

It seems almost unnecessary to caution you against entertaining any overtures for or reference to peace which may be introduced

<sup>1</sup>John W. Garrett, American Minister in the Netherlands, Chairman of the American Commission sent to Berne to negotiate with a German commission an agreement relating to prisoners of war; see Supplement 2.

by the German or Austrian delegates during the prisoner-of-war conferences.<sup>1</sup>

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1951a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 24, 1918, 3 p. m.*

1569. This Government is gratified to observe the success with which the British Army is operating in Palestine. This success if continued, which it earnestly hopes will be possible, may be the occasion of an attempt by Turkey to secure an independent peace. The Department observes that the London *Morning Post* already is urging that diplomatic effort be made to detach Turkey from the Central Powers. Department desires you to keep it informed on this subject and to report immediately if in your opinion there is any possibility that the British Government is preparing to consider favorably such a proposition.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/11516

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *September 24, 1918.*

[Received September 25, 6.30 a. m.]

4569. Hertling, speaking before Main Committee of Reichstag, 24th, said:

Our last great offensive has not brought us the hoped-for success. This must be admitted at once. Military command has felt it necessary to withdraw our far-flung battle front to so-called Siegfried Line. Situation is serious but we have no cause for discouragement. We have already passed through sterner trials.

Chancellor then said that even if Russian situation cannot be regarded as composed and future appears uncertain, two enemies are out of way and many troops released for action in west. Old spirit of German soldiers is unbroken and paeans of victory of enemy will soon die down. Chancellor maintained that violation of written law by invasion of Belgium was based on right of de-

<sup>1</sup>In a telegram dated Oct. 5, Mr. Garrett reported: "Mensing, one of the German delegates and son-in-law of Vice Consul McNally in charge at Zurich, has tried through his father-in-law to find out whether I would see him privately. I have given him to understand that I would not. Somewhat similar approaches have been made to Mr. Davis [military attaché?] with a like result." This action was approved by telegram No. 3106 from the Acting Secretary of State, Oct. 11. (File No. 763.72114A/222.)



fense and self-preservation and referred to Belgian archives which showed intentions of Western Powers in case of war and the fact that Belgian Government, in spite of German offer of restitution of damage caused by military measures, joined the combination of enemies. Just like Belgium, Germany in all later struggles was only on defensive everywhere. German Government showed that it had not thought of conquests.

After explaining in detail enemy war propaganda under cover of fighting for oppressed nations, Chancellor referred to present situation and attitude of German Government and people. He said:

Germany, conscious of her great past and her still greater mission in future, will stand erect and not grovel to earth. The wall of armies on western front will not be broken and submarine war slowly but surely accomplishes its task of diminishing cargo space and thereby threatening effectively the transport of troops and material from United States and limiting it more and more. The hour will arrive, because it must arrive, when our enemies too will listen to reason and will be ready to make an end to war before half of the world has become desert and flower of manhood lies blighted.

Speaking of internal political situation, Chancellor repeated unalterable determination of Prussian Government to insist on electoral reforms in a democratic and progressive spirit necessary by applying extreme constitutional measures.

He declared humanity trembles at thought that this terrible civilization-devouring war might not be the last but might cause future wars, and question is being more insistently asked whether it might not be possible to create organization among peoples longing for peace, substituting right for might and peaceful solutions for bloody conflicts. Chancellor referred to his declarations of January 24<sup>1</sup> approving of league of nations on condition that honest will to peace and recognition of equal rights for all states be guaranteed, while enemies are thinking of league of nations as armed against Germany. To realize league of nations, there must be general simultaneous gradual disarmament, the establishment of obligatory courts of arbitration, freedom of seas, and protection of small nations. Referring again to speech on January 24, he spoke of disarmament as within range of possibility if it were possible to form international combination requiring that questions in dispute among nations be always submitted to court of arbitration. If this duty could be imposed on members of league of nations, considerable step towards maintenance of general peace would doubtless be taken. More detailed considerations necessary, especially guarantees for acceptance of decisions of arbitral courts require careful and thorough examination.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 38-42.

After remarking that problem of freedom of seas is main obstacle to free communication between nations and peoples, he went on to say that as regards protection of small nations, Germany could immediately and unconditionally subscribe to this as she had entirely clear conscience.

It is to be hoped that league of nations is not merely dream of future. May the thought penetrate deeply that all countries should, according to their abilities, their statesmen, and their invitations [*inclinations?*], prepare themselves for an honest and energetic desire for peace and justice.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/1952

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

LONDON, September 25, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 6.12 p. m.]

2205. Your 1569, September 24, 3 p. m. No knowledge I have or can obtain at present leads me to believe that the British Government is preparing to consider favorably such a proposition but I shall keep the matter in mind and report anything that appears to indicate a tendency in this direction.

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President Wilson's Speech of September 27—The Bulgarian Armistice, September 29—Declaration of the United States against a Separate Peace with Bulgaria, October 2—Replacement of Chancellor Hertling by Prince Max of Baden

File No. 811.51/691b

*The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the Allied and Associated Countries*

[Circular telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 26, 1918.

Herewith Department sends you a Presidential address to be delivered in New York Friday night, September 27. By the President's direction you will hand a copy to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and at the same time make a request for an expression of the opinion of his Government of the various statements contained in the address, calling particular attention to last paragraph. When you have obtained such opinion cable it to the Department at once. Also please furnish copy of the address only to the representative of the Committee on Public Information, with the statement that it is released for publication in the morning papers of Saturday, September 28. If there is no representative of the Committee on Public

Information, you will yourself give copies to the press for publication in Saturday's papers. Following is the text of the address:<sup>1</sup>

LANSING

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*Address of President Wilson, Opening the Campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan, Delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York City, September 27, 1918*

MY FELLOW CITIZENS: I am not here to promote the loan. That will be done,—ably and enthusiastically done,—by the hundreds of thousands of loyal and tireless men and women who have undertaken to present it to you and to our fellow citizens throughout the country; and I have not the least doubt of their complete success; for I know their spirit and the spirit of the country. My confidence is confirmed, too, by the thoughtful and experienced cooperation of the bankers here and everywhere, who are lending their invaluable aid and guidance. I have come, rather, to seek an opportunity to present to you some thoughts which I trust will serve to give you, in perhaps fuller measure than before, a vivid sense of the great issues involved, in order that you may appreciate and accept with added enthusiasm the grave significance of the duty of supporting the Government by your men and your means to the utmost point of sacrifice and self-denial. No man or woman who has really taken in what this war means can hesitate to give to the very limit of what they have; and it is my mission here to-night to try to make it clear once more what the war really means. You will need no other stimulation or reminder of your duty.

At every turn of the war we gain a fresh consciousness of what we mean to accomplish by it. When our hope and expectation are most excited we think more definitely than before of the issues that hang upon it and of the purposes which must be realized by means of it. For it has positive and well-defined purposes which we did not determine and which we cannot alter. No statesman or assembly created them; no statesman or assembly can alter them. They have arisen out of the very nature and circumstances of the war. The most that statesmen or assemblies can do is to carry them out or be false to them. They were perhaps not clear at the outset; but they are clear now. The war has lasted more than four years and the whole world has been drawn into it. The common will of mankind has been substituted for the particular purposes of individual states. Individual statesmen may have started the conflict, but neither they

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<sup>1</sup> *Infra.*



nor their opponents can stop it as they please. It has become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races, of every degree of power and variety of fortune, are involved in its sweeping processes of change and settlement. We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome. Its challenge drove to the heart of everything we cared for and lived for. The voice of the war had become clear and gripped our hearts. Our brothers from many lands, as well as our own murdered dead under the sea, were calling to us, and we responded, fiercely and of course.

The air was clear about us. We saw things in their full, convincing proportions as they were; and we have seen them with steady eyes and unchanging comprehension ever since. We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them. Those issues are these:

Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They *are* the issues of it; and they must be settled,—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest.

This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with.

We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they



are without honour and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot "come to terms" with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

It is of capital importance that we should also be explicitly agreed that no peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. There should exist no doubt about that. I am, therefore, going to take the liberty of speaking with the utmost frankness about the practical implications that are involved in it.

If it be in deed and in truth the common object of the governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be, to achieve by the coming settlements a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it; and ready and willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honoured and fulfilled.

That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and not only impartial justice but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a league of nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality, by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table but by what follows.

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Roumania. . . . But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more

like a practical programme. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace:

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favourites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

The confidence with which I venture to speak for our people in these matters does not spring from our traditions merely and the well known principles of international action which we have always professed and followed. In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.

I have made this analysis of the international situation which the war has created, not, of course, because I doubted whether the leaders of the great nations and peoples with whom we are associated were

of the same mind and entertained a like purpose, but because the air every now and again gets darkened by mists and groundless doubtings and mischievous perversions of counsel and it is necessary once and again to sweep all the irresponsible talk about peace intrigues and weakening morale and doubtful purpose on the part of those in authority utterly, and if need be unceremoniously, aside and say things in the plainest words that can be found, even when it is only to say over again what has been said before, quite as plainly if in less unvarnished terms.

As I have said, neither I nor any other man in governmental authority created or gave form to the issues of this war. I have simply responded to them with such vision as I could command. But I have responded gladly and with a resolution that has grown warmer and more confident as the issues have grown clearer and clearer. It is now plain that they are issues which no man can pervert unless it be wilfully. I am bound to fight for them, and happy to fight for them as time and circumstance have revealed them to me as to all the world. Our enthusiasm for them grows more and more irresistible as they stand out in more and more vivid and unmistakable outline.

And the forces that fight for them draw into closer and closer array, organize their millions into more and more unconquerable might, as they become more and more distinct to the thought and purpose of the peoples engaged. It is the peculiarity of this great war that while statesmen have seemed to cast about for definitions of their purpose and have sometimes seemed to shift their ground and their point of view, the thought of the mass of men, whom statesmen are supposed to instruct and lead, has grown more and more unclouded, more and more certain of what it is that they are fighting for. National purposes have fallen more and more into the background and the common purpose of enlightened mankind has taken their place. The counsels of plain men have become on all hands more simple and straightforward and more unified than the counsels of sophisticated men of affairs, who still retain the impression that they are playing a game of power and playing for high stakes. That is why I have said that this is a peoples' war, not a statesmen's. Statesmen must follow the clarified common thought or be broken.

I take that to be the significance of the fact that assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, almost every time they came together, and are still demanding, that the leaders of their governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they were seeking in this war, and what they think the items of the final settlement should be.



They are not yet satisfied with what they have been told. They still seem to fear that they are getting what they ask for only in statesmen's terms,—only in the terms of territorial arrangements and divisions of power,—and not in terms of broad-visioned justice and mercy and peace and the satisfaction of those deep-seated longings of oppressed and distracted men and women and enslaved peoples that seem to them the only things worth fighting a war for that engulfs the world. Perhaps statesmen have not always recognized this changed aspect of the whole world of policy and action. Perhaps they have not always spoken in direct reply to the questions asked because they did not know how searching those questions were and what sort of answers they demanded.

But I, for one, am glad to attempt the answer again and again, in the hope that I may make it clearer and clearer that my one thought is to satisfy those who struggle in the ranks and are, perhaps above all others, entitled to a reply whose meaning no one can have any excuse for misunderstanding, if he understands the language in which it is spoken or can get someone to translate it correctly into his own. And I believe that the leaders of the governments with which we are associated will speak, as they have occasion, as plainly as I have tried to speak. I hope that they will feel free to say whether they think that I am in any degree mistaken in my interpretation of the issues involved or in my purpose with regard to the means by which a satisfactory settlement of those issues may be obtained. Unity of purpose and of counsel are as imperatively necessary in this war as was unity of command in the battlefield; and with perfect unity of purpose and counsel will come assurance of complete victory. It can be had in no other way. "Peace drives" can be effectively neutralized and silenced only by showing that every victory of the nations associated against Germany brings the nations nearer the sort of peace which will bring security and reassurance to all peoples and make the recurrence of another such struggle of pitiless force and bloodshed forever impossible, and that nothing else can. Germany is constantly intimating the "terms" she will accept; and always finds that the world does not want terms. It wishes the final triumph of justice and fair dealing.

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File No. 763.72119/1954

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *September 26, 1918, 12 p. m.*

[*Received September 27, 2.30 a. m.*]

4585. Just received from Bulgarian Minister here [note transmitted] in my 4586, September 27, 1 a. m. I am not handing a



copy of the note to the British Legation here but am communicating it to the Department for such action as it may consider appropriate. However, in order to gain time, should the Department desire to take immediate action with the British Government in the matter, I am forwarding the text in my cipher telegram No. 6202 to the American Ambassador at London to be kept entirely secret pending instructions from the Department.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/1953

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *September 27, 1918, 1 a. m.*

[*Received 7.10 a. m.*]

4586. My 4585, September 26, 12 p. m.

Royal Bulgarian Legation,  
The Hague, September 26, 1918.

Very confidential and urgent.

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires: By order of my Government I have the honor to inform you that the commander in chief of the Bulgarian armies in the field has been authorized yesterday by the Royal Government to propose to the commanders of the British armies in Macedonia the immediate cessation of operations on the entire Macedonian front in order to permit the signing of an armistice with a view to beginning negotiations for peace.

At the same time the Royal Government has appointed its delegates for the peace negotiations, namely, His Excellency Mr. Andrew Liapcheff, Minister of Finance, and General Ivan Lukoff, army commander.

I have the honor by order of my Government to beg you kindly to transmit the foregoing to the British Government, which your country represents in Bulgaria, by the intermediary of your Embassy at London as well as by that of the British Legation to the Netherlands. Considering the very friendly relations so happily existing between our two [countries], the Royal Bulgarian Government hopes that His Excellency President Wilson will use his influence with his allies in support of the sincere efforts of the Bulgarian Government to stop the bloodshed.

In thanking you in advance for your very obliging communication in the matter, I seize the occasion [etc.]

Mischeff  
Minister of Bulgaria.

BLISS

<sup>1</sup> Substance transmitted by telegram No. 1695, Sept. 30, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, for communication to the British Government.

File No. 763.72119/1955

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *September 27, 1918, 2 a. m.*

[Received 9.20 a. m.]

4587. My 4585. Bulgarian Minister has just written me the text of a telegram from Malinoff, Bulgarian Premier, to Bulgarian Minister at Washington, which he requests that I forward in cipher. Does Department desire me to accept it for transmission or express regrets at not being able to comply with Minister's request? The telegram instructs Bulgarian Minister at Washington to communicate textual message to the President and the Secretary of State, which is to the effect that Bulgaria's participation in the war was had only after exhausting all peaceful means of reaching agreement with neighbors for realization of national unity, as well as [emphasizing] Bulgaria's answer to Austrian peace proposal of September 14; that Bulgarian cause is in conformity with principles which led the United States to intervene in war and Bulgarian Government therefore appeals to President Wilson to mediate to terminate bloodshed in southern theatre of war by an armistice to be followed by preliminary peace negotiations, the various questions regarding the Balkan peninsula to be left to general peace conference for final settlement.

I request instructions as soon as possible.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/1957

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *September 26, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received September 27, 10.54 a. m.]

4918. Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires presented to me personally this evening a telegram from Murphy, at Sophia, for Honorable Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, of which following is translation from French:

The Bulgarian Government has decided to ask for the cessation of hostilities with the Entente. At its request I leave tonight for the Macedonian front, where delegates of the Bulgarian Government will ask for the arrangement of an armistice. The task of arranging the [settlement of questions?] in the Balkan peninsula is left to the international congress which shall conclude the general peace. The Bulgarian Government begs energetic steps from the United States to the end of putting a stop to bloodshed. Murphy.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/1955

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 27, 1918, 3 p. m.*

2132. Your 4586 and 4587, September 27. The President appreciates the confidence reposed in him and is willing to urge an armistice upon the Entente if the Bulgarian Government will authorize him to say that the conditions of the armistice are left to him for decision and that the Bulgarian Government will accept the conditions which he imposes.

Otherwise the President would not be hopeful of the result of mediation on his part at this juncture in so vital a matter.

If the above conditions are accepted you may transmit to Department the text of the telegram from Malinoff, Bulgarian Premier, to the Bulgarian Minister at Washington.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/11547

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, *September 26, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[Received September 27, 10.30 p. m.]

2050. In interview with Sonnino yesterday he took up need of Italy for American troops and further Allied support. On my mentioning to him that I had found one great obstacle in general among the people I had talked with to be the fact that Italy had not placed her armies under the command of Foch and that I believed it would be to Italy's advantage if Diaz should do what Pershing had done and offer this, as in such a case Foch would feel responsible for Italy as his right flank and would then have to do whatever was necessary to protect it, Sonnino said: "But we have agreed to this. I consent to this and Premier has told Foch that if he gave us the order to march (that is, as I understand, make an offensive) and would take the responsibility of it, we would march, and invite him to come and see for himself." I then said: "But Pershing made the offer of his command, of course, in accordance with the views of our Government, and if Diaz would make this offer it should meet the situation." He replied: "But we are ready to accept this and Premier has stated as much to Foch." He then repeated the arguments showing Italy's need of reenforcements.

I hear that Marconi in a recent interview with the King, at the front, discussed the question of the united command under Foch. The King said that he and Diaz were ready to accept the united command with the understanding that Italy would not be ordered to

make an offensive against Austria until they had been given a sufficient number of Americans, as had been given by [to?] France at need. The King is said to have instructed Marconi to make this statement when he was in Paris and in London where he is at this moment. The demand for American military assistance is undoubtedly growing and finding expression in public press with permission of censorship. Also (I?) believe it of great importance. I hear that Sonnino pushed for an offensive but the military authorities felt it too hazardous.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1957

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1918, 11 a. m.

3013. For Murphy, Sofia:

Department desires you to return immediately to Sofia and to take no part whatsoever in present situation without instructions.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1971

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, September 27, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 28, 8.20 p. m.]

4946. In a formal note Bulgarian Legation hands me telegram in English from Malinoff to Bulgarian Minister, Washington. Telegram follows:<sup>1</sup>

Kindly transmit to the President of the United States, Mr. Wilson, and to the Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, in Washington, the following:

The Bulgarian Nation and Government were constrained to enter into the general conflict after they had exhausted all peaceful means possible for coming to an understanding with their neighbors and for realizing their race reunion. This fact Bulgaria reiterated in her note of September 20 last<sup>2</sup> in answer to the peace proposition of Count Burián given out on September 14. If the ideas of the President of the United States are to be crowned with success, and if their realization is [to be] sought for no more in the old conception and methods of action, but in the path pointed out by the honored President of the American Republic, for the establishment of a new order of things guaranteeing freedom and justice among the nations, Bulgaria, which feels that the idea and the cause for which she is struggling find place side by side with the principles in behalf of which America interfered in this war, is glad and ready to follow that path, in order to secure the fulfillment of justice desired by her. Having this in view, therefore, the Bulgarian Govern-

<sup>1</sup>The text of this telegram was transmitted to the Bulgarian Minister, Sept. 29. It was formally communicated by him to the Secretary of State in a note of Sept. 30 (File No. 763.72119/2033).

<sup>2</sup>See telegram No. 169, Sept. 21, from the Consul at Sofia, *post*, p. 326.



ment turns to the friendly President of the Republic of the United States, with the request that its President use his good offices for putting an end to the bloodshed on the Macedonian front by the conclusion of an armistice, after which are to follow preliminary negotiations for peace, the final settlement of the Balkan questions being left to be decided in the general peace conference. Signed, Malinoff.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/1972

*The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SOFIA, September 21, 1918.

[Received September 28, 9.12 p. m.]

169. Bulgarian Government, in replying favorably to the Austrian note,<sup>1</sup> declares as follows:

Faithful to the democratic ideal of justice and liberty to which the traditions of our reawakening, the spirit of our political constitution, and all the sources of our political life attach us, we do not aspire either to the conquest of provinces inhabited by foreign populations, or to the establishment of a hegemony over our neighbors. Our war aims are resumed solely and exclusively in the consolidation of some security and in the realization of the unity of our people in the ethnographic limits to which history has assigned them and which the accords based on the decisions of the great powers have more than once sanctioned in the past.

This formula does not date from today. Each time that the Balkan question has been brought to the fore, whether before the great diplomatic discussions of Europe or before the deliberations of the interested peoples themselves, Bulgaria has placed itself invariably on the ground of nationalities. Today as yesterday, we demand nothing beyond what the real extent of our race guarantees us.

In following the claims of our people thus formulated, we are conscious not only of collaborating in the creation in eastern Europe of a just and solid order, but also of bringing our loyal contribution to the bases of that society of nations which the wishes of the peoples call for more and more urgently.

With these views, we believe we ought to emphasize the opinion uttered by the President of the United States on the necessity of regulating Balkan disputes in accord with the right of nationalities. The Entente Powers have many times adhered to the ideas of Mr. Wilson. Bulgaria has every reason to conclude that the Governments of these powers could not raise against these claims any opposition of principle.

Sharing then the convictions of Your Excellency that an understanding is possible between the states at war, we formulate the hope that the step taken by the Austro-Hungarian Government will contribute to hasten the end of the immense misery which desolates humanity and to aid the organization of an international life resting on the noble principles, the accession of which the most author-

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Austro-Hungarian note referred to, see *ante*, p. 306.

ized voices among the great nations have demanded and which Bulgaria would be particularly happy to see triumph.

I am justified in saying that Bulgaria is in accord with the principles announced by the President in his speech of July 4<sup>1</sup> and welcomes the declaration that America works the rule of entrance founded on the consent of those who are governed and sustained by the organized opinion of humanity. Bulgaria accepts with good will that the President should be the arbiter of the Balkans.

MURPHY

File No. 763.72/11569

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, September 28, 1918.

[Received 10 p. m.]

4595. German press summary:

*Vossische*, 21st, quotes extract from pamphlet by Erzberger entitled *The League of Nations the Way to Peace*, which is soon to be published. Chapter quoted gives complete plan of league of nations under headings organization, laws: firstly, sovereignty of states comprising league; secondly, perpetually neutral states; thirdly, obligatory arbitration; fourthly, disarmament; fifthly, economic equality and open door; sixthly, freedom of world commerce; seventhly, colonies, executive powers. Erzberger submits plan for criticism stating it is draft with all faults of such and is intended to lead to counter proposals.

*Vorwärts*, 22d: Value of Erzberger's book on league of nations is augmented by fact that author is not Socialist [but influential] member of great *bourgeois* party. Before this there were very few people in Germany outside Socialist Party who advocated league of nations. Despite differences of opinion on some details we are inclined to attach great value to Erzberger's work. It forms pendant to writings of Gray, Henderson and Milhaud, and like them furnishes stones for structure of better future for mankind. Erzberger's chapter on Belgium is particularly interesting. He declares quite openly that wrong in case in Belgium is on Germany's side, that there can be no talk of any Belgian blame, and that Belgium could not act differently than she did. There is not particle of valid proof of intention on French side to cross frontier, on contrary it has been established by German side that French plan of mobilization didn't provide march into Belgium. We can only add in confirmation of Erzberger's views that at outbreak of war Bel-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 268.

gian military authorities had orders to prevent by force of arms any violation of frontiers whether from German or French side. Case of Belgium is therefore absolutely clear and Germany should give up attempts to obscure it.

*Tageblatt*, 23d, prints interview given by Burián to Theodore Wolff<sup>1</sup> in which he comments on extraordinary haste with which Wilson replied to Austrian note. Burián says in conclusion:

[For the] moment my note has had one effect at least and that is that situation on opposing side has been clearly illuminated. It has permitted us to recognize many things that we perhaps suspected but could not see clearly. Although the success of opening the way to peace now has been denied by *démarche*, this will not prevent me from continuing on path taken. Naturally we shan't take next step immediately but after certain interval as soon as suitable occasion presents itself and always in full agreement with our allies. But I believe we mustn't remain inactive and permit time to pass unused.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/1976

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *September 28, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received September 29, 12.45 a. m.*]

Department's September 26, 3 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Through unaccountable delay the President's speech did not reach Paris in its entirety until 9 p. m., the 27th; however, I caused at that time a complete copy to be sent over to Mr. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, a considerable portion of the address having been left by me in person with him late in the afternoon. This morning I discussed with the Minister various statements contained the address, calling particular attention to the last paragraph, agreeable to the Department's desire. Mr. Pichon gave his unreserved approval to the entire address, saying that unquestionably it would meet the approval of the French Government. He said that he particularly liked the expression of the President's views as to the impracticability of forming a league of nations now; it must be done after peace has been declared. He expressed approval of the thought conveyed in the speech that it had become in a sense a peoples' war rather than a war to be decided and settled by merely heads of governments.

On account of the delay attending the receipt of the complete address no comment appears upon it in the French morning papers. From my own knowledge of popular sentiment in France as voiced

<sup>1</sup> Editor-in-chief of the *Berliner Tageblatt*.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 315.

in the past by numerous public declarations of members of the Government as well as press comments I am confident that the views expressed in the President's speech are in full accord with those of France.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1982

*The Consul General at Saloniki (Horton) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SALONIKI, *September 28, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received September 29, 2.59 p. m.*]

Mr. Archibald Walker, attached to Legation of the United States at Sophia, arrived in town today with an autograph letter from the United States Consul General D. I. Murphy addressed to General d'Espérey, commander in chief the Allied armies on this front, begging him to transmit to Washington, D. C., an inclosed cable embodying an official request of the Bulgarian Royal Government praying mediation of the United States between Bulgaria and the Entente Powers for granting armistice with the object of discussing separate peace. Territorial questions to be settled at the general peace conference. General d'Espérey informed Walker that the cable has been sent today noon to Premier Clemenceau to be handed to our Ambassador at Paris. Cable could not be sent via Austria.

Bulgarian commissioners General Lukoff, commander of the Second Bulgarian Army, Liapcheff, Minister of Finance and the chairman of the commission, and Radeff, Minister Plenipotentiary to Berne and Bucharest, have arrived at the British Army headquarters and will be here tonight, 7 o'clock p. m., to discuss armistice. Walker says Liapcheff has full power to conclude armistice, peace and an alliance with Entente.

It is probable that the King will be asked to abdicate and Crown Prince Boris succeed. Walker says Bulgarian harvest the worst in history, no rain for months, no cotton and no clothing in the country, no shoes, food at unobtainable prices, much sickness including typhus. Growing anger against the German Army, who have led country into war and stripped it, has reached the climax.

Victorious advance the Allied armies continuing with diminishing resistance. General d'Espérey with whom I have spent a great part of the day assures me that he will keep me informed as to full details and I shall not fail to make a report to the Department promptly by cable. Walker leaves tomorrow for Sophia, 9 a. m.

HORTON



File No. 763.72119/1985

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*WASHINGTON, *September 30, 1918.*

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM MR. BALFOUR TO HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR  
AT PARIS, DATED SEPTEMBER 27

Please communicate immediately the following message from the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet to Monsieur Clemenceau:

We have received the following message, which has no doubt reached you:

I received the following message to-day by *parlementaire*, who was passed through my lines about midday. I have forwarded the officer, a Bulgarian, and the message on to the commander-in-chief of the Allied armies. Translation begins:

To His Excellency General Milne, commander-in-chief of the British Forces, Army of the Orient. I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Royal Bulgarian Government has authorized me, with the consent of His Majesty the Czar of Bulgaria, to have recourse to your kind mediation and beg that you would have conveyed to His Excellency the commander-in-chief of the Army of the Orient my request for 48 hours' cessation of hostilities during which time delegates authorized by the Bulgarian Government, Their Excellencies A. Liapcheff, Minister of Finance, and the commander of the Second Army, General J. Lukoff, will present themselves to General Headquarters of the Army of the Orient in order to arrange conditions of the armistice and eventually of peace. Trusting to Your Excellency's friendly kindness, I beg you to accept assurance of my high consideration. G. O. C. in Chief of Bulgarian Army (signed) Doroff, dated September 25, 1918.

I think that the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Army should be told that it is impossible to agree to an armistice till we know that the enemy are prepared to accept terms which would form a basis of peace, but that every facility should be given to the Bulgarian delegates to cross the lines and discuss terms, including necessary military guarantees, as a preliminary to a possible armistice.

In the meantime the Allied offensive should be pressed with all possible vigour.

I am sending a copy of this message to Milne, from whom the message was received.

[No signature indicated]

File No. 763.72/11591

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, *September 29, 1918, noon.*

5231.

[Received September 30, 2.52 p. m.]

As of interest in the industrial and economic world, having also no little political influence, as it affects the Socialist opposition, the coming to Paris of Mr. Gompers has excited great interest. On Fri-

day I saw him enthusiastically acclaimed by 5,000 working men and women in the great dining hall of the Citroën shell works. Mr. Pichon expressed to me most lively satisfaction over the effect which the visit of Mr. Gompers was having among the laboring people. His receptions both by President Poincaré and Mr. Clemenceau were very cordial. Mr. Citroën during my visit at his factory told me that 6,000 of his employees out of 11,000 had subscribed to the last French loan averaging 200 francs per capita. He said that complete harmony prevailed among his employees.

Although the Paris papers evidently have not been permitted to publish the news, yet I learn that there have been renewed strikes within the past few days on the part of women workers in various employments, chiefly dress makers. No importance however is attached to this manifestation.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1988

*The Consul General at Saloniki (Horton) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SALONIKI, *September 30, 1918.*

[Received October 1, 5.13 a. m.]

It is officially announced that at midnight a military convention was signed between commander-in-chief Allied armies here and representatives Bulgarian Government. Convention brings hostilities with Bulgaria to end. Bulgarian representatives accepted all terms imposed by commander-in-chief including evacuation of all occupied Greek and Serbian territories and complete disarmament Bulgarian Army. Does Department wish me to telegraph more complete details?

HORTON

File No. 763.72119/1991

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, *September 29, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received October 1, noon.]

2063. Immediately upon arrival of President's address, morning of 28th, I sought appointment with Minister for Foreign Affairs who could not see me until late in afternoon. Also immediately sent copies to [Committee on Public Information] for translation and it appears in morning papers with brief but favorable comment relating principally to League of Nations.

Baron Sonnino read address, making comment thereon. To statement of issues he assented. To the reference to lessons of Brest

Litovsk and Bucharest he suggested: "I wonder he did not add Belgium, perhaps the strongest of all." The reference to the declaration of position against peace by compromise evidently pleased him. The declaration regarding League of Nations he approved but expressed the view that it is difficult in its complete realization and application. He agreed entirely with the suggestion that this matter of a league of nations must be settled at the peace table, saying that if formed now it would be only an alliance of the Entente powers and if not formed until afterwards it would be most difficult as Germany would refuse to be bound. He thinks a matter to be considered is the number of small powers who might combine with one side or another thus constituting a majority.

Touching the five numbered paragraphs containing details of the President's practical program he said that he thought the matters set forth therein less simple than they appeared. To the first he assented fully. The second he thought difficult to realize in actual practice. The principle, however, he evidently approved. The third he thought hardly practicable in the nature of things. The fourth he expressed his assent to in general terms. The fifth he thinks difficult to realize in practice and questioned the soundness of publishing to the world all conventions saying that in the past there have been instances where secrecy contributed greatly to the promotion of peace and justice. He cited the agreement of Plombières. Had that been published the creation of United Italy would have been prevented. He also cited the case of France and Russia in whose agreement secrecy was necessary. Also said the Triple Alliance contributed to the peace of Europe for a generation, its secrecy and indeed mystery having been one of its important factors because others did not know how far the convention went. Moreover, secrecy is often a great protection to weak states.

Regarding the references to the definitions of their purpose by statesmen and the disappearance of national purposes before the common purpose of mankind he observed, "Statesmen must follow but must also guide the people and prevent their going forward too far."

Regarding the last paragraph of the address, he began by saying that there is a difference in the height of nations, that is, as I understand, [garbled passage] in their ability to understand principles. He said that he hardly thought these so well understood by the people generally as the President thought; that they take concrete views. A fight starts over some matter or another but as men get into it the causes are lost sight of and the aim is to knock on the head the man who tries to knock you. The people now, he thinks, are inspired by the wish to knock Germany on the head rather than by principles, however sound.

He then branched off and discussed the whole matter philosophically, repeating the comments made above. He said: "Practically it means the end of these attempts to secure peace by compromise; it means fighting it out to the end." He then [added]: "In principle I approve of it but it appears rather theoretic. We are a long way still from that at which this aims but we must strive towards it."

We cannot, however, brush aside and obliterate all that is between us notwithstanding the ideal, we must recognize the reality of things, we must study these complex questions carefully, we cannot accept the present situs as near the end, simply assuming that what now exists geographically, etc., represents right. Even in questions of nationalization [*nationality?*] we must consider the work of these last years in getting rid of (?) other questions by forcing them out of regions where they were placed [*sic*]. As for example in Alsace and Lorraine triangle and Albania. To accept in such cases the present situs as a basis would be to put a prize on prepotency. Important to consider in any event defensive frontiers. There is, he argued, a predatory [*prescriptive*] right of nations not going back indeed to ancient times but taking account of long-standing right sufficient to be considered predatory [*prescriptive*]. In Latin the term justice is based on use. The question of geographic situation he declared important to consider in conjunction with this predatory [*prescriptive*] right and the question of defensive frontiers. On this point he reverted to his illustration of fastening one's door to be able to keep out one's enemies who have prepared secretly to attack when more police authority may be so far off that one may be destroyed before its arrival. Therefore there must be defensive geographic frontiers.

We should push forward and eliminate all questions possible which now cause wars and we may [decrease] the number of these, working steadily [toward] that end, but can hardly abolish special agreements or understandings which tend to protect weaker states and avoid collisions.

Diplomacy is necessary. There is good [and bad] diplomacy, but diplomacy has accomplished much good and prevented much trouble in the past and will do the same in the future. Politics is admirable and its function is to find the least bad way. "The aims of Italy," he said, "are not irrational but are simply liberty, the independence and reasonable security of our people. We must be able to go to sleep at night with reasonable security. This security does not mean offense against one's neighbor." He added that Italy's aims in the east are, in a nutshell, that if others take a privileged position there Italy feels she has a right to claim an equal share with them, that



is all. "The Italians aim but for a position of equality and free competition with all the world, trusting to gain such place as we may deserve and in such free competition to work towards the aims of civilization and progress according to our abilities, intellectual, moral and physical, that is, our industry and capability."

In closing he repeated, "We should strive towards what the President aims at but the matters involved are of great complexity."

I asked if he would prepare and give me a memorandum of his views but he excused himself saying that to do so would require great study of the whole address and he is not well at this time.

I have given Baron Sonnino's first impressions, as he called them, at such length because from these can be formed a judgment on what he really thinks and he is likely to hold the same views later on.

➤ NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2004a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1918, noon.

1738. You will inform the Government to which you are accredited textually as follows:

In connection with the recently arranged armistice entered into between the commander of the Allied military forces operating in Macedonia and the commissioners of the Bulgarian Government, the Government of the United States, in expressing its gratification at the practical withdrawal of Bulgaria from her alliance with the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and the consequent cessation of hostilities, feels that it should very frankly state that it cannot but regard every question which concerns the Balkan states as an essential part of the general peace settlement inasmuch as there is no region of Europe more likely to be a seed-bed for war than the Balkans. The Government of the United States is firmly convinced that peace with Bulgaria cannot be treated apart from a general Balkan settlement without embarrassing the consideration of such subjects as the reopening of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest and making very difficult many matters of final consideration. The Government of the United States desires to register the opinion that it would be very hazardous to treat separately any part of the whole subject which will be included in the final treaty of peace.

Repeat, *mutatis mutandis*, Rome, 1736; American Consul, Nice, for Dodge, and Athens, 652.<sup>1</sup>

LANSING

<sup>1</sup>The communication was also included in a note to the French Ambassador, Oct. 1 (File No. 763.72119/3348g).

File No. 763.72/11621

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, undated.

[Received October 3, 1918, 12.24 p. m.]

4632. German press summary, October 2.

*Tageblatt*, 1st: It cannot be denied that Foch uses his numerical and material superiority with skill and energy; there is something demoniacal in rapidity of his attacks, his indifference to cost, indefatigability with which he forces one sector of front after the other into foreground of public interest. These qualities can only be shown in attack. German Command is committed to defensive for present; what will happen when enemy is forced by exhaustion to desist from his furious attacks is written in the stars. It now devolves upon German Command to concentrate its forces as much as possible, to shorten various fronts, and to evacuate all positions not strongly enough fortified. Necessary retreating movements call for full confidence in Command on the part of the troops and all reports agree that this confidence is unshaken. Those at home should also recognize that this surrender of ground is result of cool tactical deliberation and is not a confession of defeat; it is highly desirable that home front look upon these adjustments of front, which are likely to be repeated several times, from this point of view.

*Kölnische Volkszeitung*, 1st: The Emperor has addressed following decree to Hertling:

Your Excellency has reported to me that you no longer feel able to remain at head of Government. I cannot be insensible to your reasons and am obliged with heavy heart to dispense with your further cooperation. You may be certain of the thanks of the Fatherland for sacrifice made by you in assuming office of Imperial Chancellor in most serious times and for services which you have rendered. I wish to have German people cooperate more effectively than heretofore in determination of destiny of Fatherland. It is therefore my will that men supported by confidence of the people shall participate to large extent in rights and duties of government. I request you to conclude your work by continuing in office and preparing the measures wished by me until I have found your successor. I await your proposals in this direction. General Headquarters, September 30, 1918. Signed, Wilhelm II, countersigned, Hertling.

This decree is act not merely of constitutional monarch but monarch of country with pronounced parliamentary government. We register this fact without expressing regret or approval. There is not slightest doubt that this means change to parliamentary government. Uncertainty of further developments makes it impossible for

us to judge whether reform will inure to advantage or disadvantages of Empire. Our approval will depend on whether constitutional foundation of Empire can be maintained without material impairment.

*Norddeutsche Allgemeine*, 1st: Crisis is over; thanks to Emperor's noble decision to permit people to share more effectively in determination of fate of country, our internal front can be made as solid as possible.

*Vorwärts*, 1st: Socialist Party will show that it can serve country if given opportunity. Times demand, first, resolute men who will break with outlived prejudice. We need Social Democratic ministers who remain true to their principles while in office. Decisive day in history of our people and our party has dawned. We are attached to this party with heart and soul because we believe in great task which it must accomplish for our nation and all mankind. Whatever is injurious to it is therefore bad for whole, of which it forms most virile and hopeful part. No one will enjoy our responsibility. What is at stake is welfare of people, nation and new world which must arise, return to peace and entry of German people into league of nations, equality of all nations and decisive transition to democracy.

*Tageblatt*, 1st: Emperor has cleared road for new Germany. Only coming generations will be able fully to appreciate what he has done. Millions at front and at home will welcome this step in advance as relief from heavy care in perhaps darkest days of German history. Change into new time is proclaimed, reform was never more necessary, this is merely beginning.

*Börsen-Zeitung*, 1st: Emperor's decree is turning point in the life of our nation, the old autocracy has come to an end and parliamentarianism enters Germany; also, the German subject becomes a citizen with voice in the Government.

*Kölnische Zeitung*, 1st: Parties can only be united on basis of compromise. Next few days will show whether parties are alive to gravity of the moment. We well know what is at stake, we must go through this crisis and reach united internal front in face of enemy's will to destroy. There must be no parties, only Germans.

*Kreuz Zeitung*, 1st: We make no efforts to [conceal] great apprehension with which we contemplate developments; we have only wish that energetic men may enter Government. Fatherland is in danger and this consideration should guide new Government.

BLISS

File No. 763.72/11630

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, October 4, 1918.

[Received 9.10 p. m.]

4650. Dutch press, 4th. *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Wolff* telegram:

Prince Max [of Baden] has been appointed Chancellor. At ordinary sitting Reichstag on 5th he will disclose Government program. Groeber and Scheidemann appointed secretaries without portfolios. Wallraf, Interior Secretary, has tendered resignation and will be replaced by Centrist. Fischbeck will be Prussian Minister for Commerce.

BLISS

File No. 763.72/11632

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 3, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received October 5, 3.43 a. m.]

2083. In unofficial conversations with Sonnino and Orlando, I have mentioned having found prevalent among certain important people the view that Italy ought to make an offensive even if only a partial one. They both expressed conviction based on their military reports that such offensive too hazardous to undertake (without?) support from outside, that is, of American troops, and I understand Orlando will defend, in Chamber today, Italy's position. Sonnino, I know, has urged an offensive but yielded before opposition. Orlando I saw yesterday, he having just returned from headquarters at front. Immediately afterwards he had a conference of newspaper men and the *Messaggero* this morning declares for an Italian offensive.

NELSON PAGE

German Note Requesting an Armistice and Peace Negotiations on the Basis of the President's Addresses, Presented October 6—Speech of the German Chancellor, October 5—Austro-Hungarian Note, Presented October 7—Informal Turkish Proposals to the Allies, October 6—9—American Reply to the German Request, October 8—Joint Note of the Allied Premiers to President Wilson, October 9

File No. 763.72119/2113

*The Swiss Chargé (Oederlin) to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1918.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to transmit herewith, upon instructions from my Government, the original text of a communica-



tion from the German Government, received by this Legation late this afternoon, from the Swiss Foreign Office.

An English translation of this communication is also enclosed. The German original text, however, is alone to be considered as authoritative.

Please accept [etc.]

F. OEDERLIN

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The German Imperial Chancellor (Max of Baden) to President Wilson*

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of this request, and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis for the peace negotiations, the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918.<sup>1</sup> In order to avoid further bloodshed the German Government requests to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water, and in the air.

MAX, PRINCE OF BADEN

File No. 763.72/11656

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

BERNE, October 4, 1918.

5041.

[Received October 7, 12.43 a. m.]

*Austrian press political.* Only by reading between the lines of worried German comment can one gain picture of effect of Bulgaria's action upon Austria. The *Frankfurter Zeitung* admits that besides the Austrians who maintain alliance there are many who hope that as result Bulgaria's defection they will secure speedy peace. *Mannheimer Generalanzeiger* believes recent Vienna Crown Council was for purpose of agreeing upon peace campaign and that while Austria-Hungary does not desire conclude separate peace, attempt will be made to secure special peace terms which Monarchy hopes she can force Germany to accept. The vehemence of all Vienna papers in denying that separate peace is being considered is evidence of extent to which rumor of such action has spread.

Austria may now be expected to endeavor to obtain confidentially a general outline of the Allies' terms in order that she may present

<sup>1</sup> For messages, see *ante*, pp. 12 and 316, respectively.

same to Germany and force latter to accept by threatening separate peace in case Germany refuses.

A Crown Council was held Vienna, September 27. Results of discussion so far kept secret, but it is rumored that question of immediate constitutional reform was taken up and also that of coalition cabinet. Burián makes statement that external political situation made necessary certain changes in the Empire in direction of federalism to create the necessary conditions for peace, just as in Germany it is the task to reach a parliamentary form of government.

Austrian Parliament reassembled October 2. In opening speech Hussarek emphasized necessity carrying through autonomy for nationalities, which was answered by tumult of objections from Czechs. Parliament will debate upon peace problems and Burián's note,<sup>1</sup> financial measures, reform of food administration and the constitutional changes with which Government hopes to quiet nationalities by eleventh-hour concessions. See press telegram for summary of first debates.<sup>2</sup> Government's apparent attempt to form coalition cabinet in this crisis has failed like other attempts to rally all parties to federalism scheme.

The Czech press is unanimous in opposition to either of these schemes. The *Venkov* writes that time irrevocably past when Czechs could consider entering [Vienna] Government. Failure of official conferences Austrian party leaders to reconcile German and Slav differences has given rise to suggestions that informal conference be held in which Germans and Slavs will meet to examine means of saving principle of the Austrian state in new Austria. This situation seems to make it more than ever imperative to turn a deaf ear to any proposition which may come from Austrian Government. I believe that we can confidently trust the Czechs and Jugoslavs to hold out against Austrian Government. Austrian Poles are doubtful as they still hope for Austro-Polish solution which both Burián and Hussarek in recent declarations have dangled before them as more than ever probable. Recent pardon to members Polish Legion of Austria who had revolted and were being tried in Hungary will tend to further conciliate Austrian Poles.

After first expression of bitter disappointment and apprehension at Bulgaria's action Austrian press endeavors explain that all necessary measures have now been taken to meet new situation, maintain the Balkan front, keep open communication with Constantinople. The *Neue Freie Presse* states that the elimination of Bulgaria is less grave from military viewpoint than from a moral viewpoint, that whereas previously no one could consider that in the east Germans fought against Slavs as Slav Bulgars were fighting with Central Powers, now the situation is changed and one can reproach Cen-

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, pp. 306-309.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

tral Powers [with] trying to carry through German racial policy in the Balkans. It is significant that no bitterness toward Bulgaria is expressed. The hope to maintain that country is not definitely lost and the act may prove to be that of one political party and Malinoff. Emphasis is placed on alleged telegram of Ferdinand to Austrian Emperor expressing fidelity to [his] allies.

Unconfirmed report states that Czernin likely to come to Switzerland incognito to endeavour to get in touch with America to ascertain our peace terms for Austria. Learn confidentially that Valyi, Hungarian editor of *Revue Politique Internationale* of Lausanne, considers that Austria is in a very bad way and will soon go to pieces. The peasants in the Tyrol are now eager to be incorporated in Germany as the only way of escaping from the present intolerable disorganization. Valyi expects that the break-up will come in the next month or two, and when it happens he thinks that the Germans will occupy Vienna and will agree to the independence of Bohemia as they consider that the strong German element there will enable them to exercise necessary influence over the new state. He states that Tisza is now in favor of creating a Jugoslav state provided that Hungary retains the Banat and that Fiume is made free port, but is irreconcilable as regards Slovak independence.

Telegram from Vienna gives following summary of opening session Austrian Reichstag [*Reichsrat*]. Polish deputies in name of Polish people demand independent Polish state composed of all districts inhabited in majority by Poles, including Silesia. Polish representative should also be allowed place in congress which will settle Polish question. Ofner, deputy from Vienna, demands careful parliamentary discussion peace conditions, especially Wilson's fourteen points. Czech deputy Stanek emphasizes solidarity between Jugoslavs, Czechs, and Poles, and declares way to peace acceptance Wilson's fourteen points. Jugoslav, Korošec, states Minister President too late with his program of national autonomy. No possibility to separate Croatians and Serbians from Slovenes. Debates frequently interrupted by noisy scenes.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/2041

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, October 7, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 5.25 p. m.]

2564. Your 1569, September 24,<sup>1</sup> and Embassy's 2205, September 25,<sup>2</sup> and 2380, October 1.<sup>3</sup> Foreign Office informs me that during

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 313.

<sup>2</sup> Ante, p. 315.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

the past few days, the Turkish Government has made several tentative approaches on the subject of peace which are, however, too vague to conceive seriously. Some of these offers have been from more or less irresponsible persons suggesting the stirring up of internal troubles and so forth. One offer came through Switzerland appearing to emanate from the Sultan individually, as apart from the Turkish Government, and another which has just been received through Athens for Turkish emissaries there claiming to be representatives of Rahmi Pasha, Governor of Syria [*Smyrna*].

The Foreign Office consider that there is nothing to be gained from the above-mentioned proposals and have promised to keep me informed should anything worth considering arise.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 763.72119/2536

*The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

No. 4978

WASHINGTON, *October 7, 1918.*

EXCELLENCY: By order of my Government I have the honor confidentially to transmit herewith to you the following communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President of the United States of America:

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and arrive at a just and honorable peace, hereby addresses itself to his Lordship (*Monseigneur*) the President of the United States of America and offers to conclude with him and his allies an armistice on every front, on land, at sea, and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 12 [11], 1918, should serve as a foundation, and in which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account.<sup>1</sup>

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

File No. 763.72/11662

*The Chargé in Greece (Chabot) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ATHENS, *October 6, 1918, 2 a. m.*

[*Received October 8, 3.26 a. m.*]

576. Following interview with British Minister:

British Admiral arranged cruiser to arrive Athens with Giraud, French (*chargé d'affaires?*) and Carabiber, confidential agent and

<sup>1</sup> For messages, see *ante*, pp. 12, 108, and 316.



delegate of Rahmi, of Smyrna, who presented to British Minister letter from Rahmi in which he stated certainty of possibilities to overthrow present Turkish Government, providing he received favorable terms from the Entente. Rahmi returned to Smyrna from Constantinople October 4. While in Constantinople he made every arrangement to overthrow present Government at meeting of Chamber to take place October 10. Talaat is ready to efface himself. Rahmi requested the following terms with an immediate reply from the British, French and American Governments:

- (1) Constantinople to remain the capital of Turkey. The Straits to be under Turkish control with the right to fortify them, but with complete freedom of passage to ships of all nations;
- (2) Completely free governments for Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Armenia but with the retention of nominal Turkish sovereignty;
- (3) No concession of any kind to Bulgaria, but retention of 1914 frontiers;
- (4) Entente to substitute their guarantee for that of Germany for all paper money in circulation and grant credit for further issuance, of course in exchange for some financial control and other economical advantages;
- (5) Entente to promise an immediate military and naval power if it should be necessary to [eject] Germany from Constantinople;
- (6) The question of the Khalifate not to be raised, thus leaving it in the state that it was in before the war;
- (7) Entente to show clearly that no other Turkish statesman could get such good terms.

The British Minister replied in personal conversation in regard to: (1) That the Entente would be sure to object; Carabiber replied that if the Straits, however, were not fortified attacks would be possible—by Greece, for instance—and on the other hand Turkey would be completely under control of the Entente anyhow. (2) That there would be possible objections to any sovereignty of Turkey. In reply Carabiber explained that this sovereignty could be in any form whatsoever, as it was only to avoid any appearances of having sold his country.

Carabiber in personal conversation explained further in regard to: (4) The Turkish debt to Germany to be settled in the general peace after the war and Entente is asked to guarantee paper money inasmuch as the Turkish people would be ruined if it lost its value—there is a great quantity in circulation. It is understood by him that there is a British surcharge on the paper money in circulation

in territory occupied by British forces, and he merely asks the same guarantee for the entire nation. It is also necessary that the new Government to be formed, have money. (5) Guarantee by Turkey to [eject] Germany not sure. British Minister thereto added that Entente would undoubtedly send troops and ships to the Straits.

Time is most valuable as decision and action must take place before the German troops can get back from Caucasus. Cruiser remaining in nearby waters with delegate who awaits three Governments' replies. Not in touch with shore, however, and closely guarded. Please instruct as soon as possible.

CHABOT

File No. 763.72119/2113

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé (Oederlin)*

No. 282

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge, on behalf of the President, your note of October 6, enclosing a communication from the German Government to the President; and I am instructed by the President to request you to make the following communication to the Imperial German Chancellor:

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January last and in subsequent addresses and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of these powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answers to these questions vital from every point of view.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2043

*The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HAVRE, October 7, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 8, 9.40 a. m.]

143. Hyman, Minister for Foreign Affairs, asks me today to convey to you the desire of the Belgian Government in event of an armistice being considered to be heard as to the guarantees that it would deem indispensable to the safety of Belgium.

WHITLOCK

File No. 763.72119/2060

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council (Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 7, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received October 8, 1 p. m.]

141. At the termination of the conference this afternoon Mr. Lloyd George informed me that they had agreed upon the military measures to be taken in Bulgaria. A portion of the troops were to be sent to the Danube but the larger number, including Greeks and Serbians, were to attack to the north of Constantinople. He said that they had not come to any agreement regarding terms of an armistice with Turkey. He had proposed himself that the Allies should notify the Turks of the territory which would be left to them, detaching from it such non-Turkish parts as Arabia, Armenia, etc., but no conclusion had been reached; they had agreed to refer the question of the conditions of an armistice with Germany to the military representatives at Versailles; naval representatives would also be present as the naval aspect of the armistice was most important. Germany might for instance agree to abstain from submarine warfare if the blockade were removed; such points could be decided by the naval authorities.

He was exceedingly anxious to find out whether President Wilson had replied to the German peace proposal and earnestly hoped that the President would send Colonel House over at the earliest moment. He remarked that he had discussed the peace proposal of the Central Powers quite fully with Albert Thomas yesterday. The latter was entirely sound on the question of Alsace-Lorraine and Netherlands [*Belgium?*] but felt that no impossible conditions should be imposed upon Germany. Mr. Balfour did not cross over but Mr. Bonar Law and Lord Robert Cecil represented Great Britain in addition to the Prime Minister. M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon represented France while Italy was represented by Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino.

The foreign representatives are remaining in Paris over tomorrow in the hope that something may be heard from President Wilson.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72119/8962

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 8, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received 2.28 p. m.]

142. Also for Colonel House:

I am informed on good authority that word was passed down by the French Government to the press in Paris to adopt an uncompromising attitude toward the peace proposals of the Central Empires. Public opinion in the provinces and the provincial press assure full agreement on this issue with Paris newspapers. While public opinion will undoubtedly be influenced by the press, the man in the street looks upon the German proposal as a suspicious maneuver, a device to enable the German Army to extricate itself from a difficult position and to placate public opinion at home. French people are highly gratified by the German proposal as indicating assurance of complete victory within a short time; because of this assurance it is expected the Allies will present conditions which Germany will not accept now, but which she will be compelled to accept in a few months. If the military judgment which now dominates public opinion should prove to be mistaken the reaction will be powerful and will in all probability be directed in part against the United States, as public attention in the last two weeks has been withdrawn from the American military effort owing to the slow progress in the American sector. French public opinion undoubtedly expects the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and reparation for destruction in the occupied territory; any other result would be looked upon as a defeat.

The attitude of Socialist Party as expressed in the Socialist press is comparatively mild. It is to the effect that the proposal should be accepted with proper military and political guarantees. M. Albert Thomas, who occupies a middle position in the Socialist Party, believes that the Germans would consent to an armistice of conciliation; he feels that the Allies should have an armistice [obtaining], first, the evacuation of Belgium, France and Alsace-Lorraine and such other military guarantees as may be necessary and, second, the acceptance of President Wilson's fourteen conditions as principles, not as chapter headings. He considers that the reply should have a firm content but a generous and pacific tone. There is an under-



current of hurt pride that the proposal should have been addressed to President Wilson rather than to France.

I think it fair to assume that all of President Wilson's fourteen conditions will be acceptable to the French people save for the clause referring to Alsace-Lorraine which is considered ambiguous.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72119/2066

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 8, 6.35 p. m.]

2103. My 2101.<sup>1</sup> My greetings to the President.

Samuel Gompers and his entire labor mission most earnest in their expression of hope that no favorable response be made to the Central Empires' request for an armistice. They say the entire labor element in America, of whom 2,000,000 are enrolled in the military service, will be against it.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/8963

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council (Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 9, 11.20 a. m.]

144. Referring to my telegram No. 141. Representatives met again at Foreign Office at 3 but adjourned at 4.30 without reaching a decision as they are awaiting the response of President Wilson to the peace proposals. Mr. Lloyd George informed me that he as well as the other foreign representatives would remain another night in Paris in the hope of receiving word from Mr. Wilson.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72119/2076

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, October 8, 1918.

[Received October 9, 12.32 p. m.]

4715. *North German Gazette*, 6th, text Prince Max's speech:<sup>2</sup>

In pursuance of the Imperial rescript of September 30 the German Empire has undergone a fundamental change of its political

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Before the Reichstag, Oct. 5; for readability the necessary articles and connectives have been inserted in the telegraphic text.

direction. I have been called by the Emperor to be head of the new Government as successor of Count Hertling, who tendered such great services to the country. It is in accordance with the nature of the manner of government now introduced with us that I set forth to the Reichstag in public without delay the principles according to which I intend to conduct my responsible office. These principles were laid down in agreement with the Federated Governments and with the leaders of the Majority parties of this high House before I resolved to assume the office of Chancellor. They therefore contain not only my own political creed, but also that of by far the greater majority of the representatives of the German people, that is to say, of the German Nation which has filled the Reichstag according to its wish on the basis of universal, equal and secret suffrage.

Only the fact that I am certain that the conviction and the will of the majority of the people are behind me has given me the strength to assume the direction of the affairs of the Empire in the severe and solemn times through which we are passing together. The shoulders of one alone would be too weak to carry the tremendous responsibility which falls upon the Government at this time. Only when the people take an active and most extensive part in the determination of their destiny and when the responsibility extends also to the majority of their freely elected political leaders can the leading statesman assume with confidence his share of the responsibility in the service of the people and the country.

The decision to do this was made easier for me by the fact that influential representatives of the working classes have also arrived at the highest offices of the Empire in the new Government; in this I see the safest guarantee that the new Government is supported by the firm confidence of the broad masses of the people, without whose earnest support its whole action would be doomed to failure from the beginning.

What I express today I therefore say not only in [my] name, and in the name of my official collaborators, but also in the name of the German people.

The program of the Majority parties on which I rest contains, first, an acknowledgment of the reply of the former Imperial Government to the Pope's note dated August 1, 1917, and unconditional approval of the Reichstag resolution of July 19 of the same year. It further proclaims the readiness to join a general league of nations on the basis of equality of all—of the weak as well as the strong.

It sees [*seeks?*] a solution of the much-disputed Belgian question in the complete restoration of Belgium, in particular her independence and territory. An agreement regarding the question of indemnification is also to be sought.

The program does not wish to permit the peace treaties thus far concluded to become any obstacle to the conclusion of a general peace. It seeks particularly the early establishment of parliamentary government on a broad basis in the Baltic countries, Lithuania and Poland. We wish to facilitate without delay the establishment of conditions necessary to that end by introducing a civil administration. Those countries are to draw up their own constitutions and regulate independently their relations to neighboring nations.

In internal policy I have taken a clear and firm position by the method in which [my] Government was formed. In response to

my proposal, leaders of the Majority parties have been appointed my immediate advisors.

Gentlemen, I was of the conviction that the unity of the Imperial Government should not only be guaranteed by merely schematic party connections of various members of the Government, but I considered unity of our views almost still more important. I have adopted this point of view likewise in the choice of my collaborators who do not belong to Parliament. I attached the greatest importance to having the members of the new Imperial Government accept the standpoint of a righteous peace independent of the war situation and to their having openly acknowledged this point of view at the time when we were at the acme of our military success.

Gentlemen, I am convinced that the [Majority] in which the Imperial Government has now been formed, with the cooperation of the Reichstag, doesn't constitute anything temporary, and that [in] peace time no government [can] be formed which doesn't rest on the Reichstag and doesn't take its leading men from the Reichstag. The war has carried us across the old and much-torn party life which made it so difficult for a united and determined political will to be asserted. Formation of a majority means formation of a political will, and it is an undisputed result of the war that for the first time in Germany great parties have joined together on a firm, uniform program and thus have become able to help determine the fate of the people themselves. This idea will never fade, this development will never be set back. I trust that, as long as Germany's fate is surrounded with dangers, the circles of people outside the Majority, and their representatives who don't belong to the Imperial Government, will relegate to the background all that disunites and give to the Fatherland what is due to it today.

This development necessitates an amendment of our constitutional provisions in the sense of the Imperial rescript of September 30 which will make it possible for those members of the Reichstag who enter the Imperial Government to retain their seats in the Reichstag. A measure along these lines has been sent to the Bundesrat and will immediately be submitted to you for your decisions.

Gentlemen, let us remain mindful of the words which the Emperor spoke on August 4, 1914, which I took the liberty of translating at Karlsruhe, December last, into the words: "There are parties, to be sure, but they are all German." In the sign of these words of the Emperor, the political evolution in the leading German federated state, Prussia, must be carried out; and the messages of the King of Prussia promising democratic suffrage must be fulfilled quickly and entirely. The Prussian suffrage question is, in view of Prussia's dominant position, a German question, and I do not doubt that those federated states also which are still backward in the development of their constitutional conditions will resolutely follow [Prussia's] example. In this I adhere most firmly to the federative foundations of the Empire as a federated country the various members of which regulate their internal constitutional life in full independence, a right to which Alsace-Lorraine also has a full title. The independent and manifold nature of life in the various federated states, the close and loyal bonds which unite every German to his home, and his own Sovereign, are the sources whence the indescribable strength, the



patriotism and the spirit of sacrifice of the German people during the whole war have risen.

Throughout the whole period of the war complaints have been made regarding the manner in which the state of siege has been applied. They have had a disuniting and embittering effect and hindered [cheerful] cooperation in the severe task of war. As the example of all belligerent countries teaches, the extraordinary powers which the state of siege confers cannot be dispensed [dispensed?] with for the present, but close relations between military and civil authorities must be established which will make it possible for the views of the civil administration authorities to prevail in all matters not of purely military nature and particularly in the province of censorship so that the ultimate decision will be placed under the responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor. To this end an order of the Emperor will be issued to the military commanders in chief, and the Imperial ordinance of December 4, 1915, will immediately be enlarged accordingly.

September 30, 1918, the day of the rescript, is the beginning of a new epoch in Germany's internal history. The internal policy herewith outlined is of decisive importance for the question of war and peace. The impulsive force which the Government will have in its efforts for peace depends on whether it has behind it a united, firm, and unshakable popular will. Only when the enemy feels that the German people stand united behind their responsible statesmen can words become deeds.

In the peace negotiations the German Government will aim to have provisions regarding the protection of laborers and labor insurance included in treaties which bind the contracting governments to establish in their countries within a reasonable time a minimum of similar or equivalent institutions to insure life and health and for the care of workingmen in case of disease, accidents and invalidity. In preparing this I reckon on the expert advice of labor associations and of employers.

As long as German brothers are prisoners I shall endeavor with all my strength to have their welfare looked after. I shall also take care in a just manner of enemies now our prisoners.

Gentlemen, I am convinced that this program of which I have merely set forth the fundamental points will stand comparison with all foreign principles of government.

To go still further into particulars doesn't seem to me to be well-timed today. (Commotion.) Deliberations which we have held before the new Government was formed have, as a matter of course, gone more deeply into matters than I am able to repeat today in this place in my short summary of the most important points. On the other hand, however, I believe that the honorable House does at this time not at all care to learn my opinion concerning secondary things. The deciding point is, if I understand the situation correctly, my information regarding the general spirit of the new Government. For everyone who understands this spirit correctly can readily deduce from it the attitude of the Imperial Government regarding the pending individual questions. Naturally I am gladly prepared to report more fully to the Reichstag on later occasions. Of immediate importance are now the practical inferences



which the new Imperial Government has drawn in the short space of time of its present existence from the situation by which it found itself confronted and from the application of its political principles to this situation.

More than four years of most bloody struggle against a world of numerically superior enemies lie behind us: years full of the severest battles and the most painful sacrifices. Every one of us has his scars, only too many of us [have] even yet open wounds, be it in the hidden recesses of his soul or on his body which is delivered up in the spirit of sacrifice on the battlefield for German freedom. Notwithstanding, we, strong of heart and full of confident belief in our strength, are resolved to make still greater sacrifices if it be absolutely necessary for the happiness of our descendants. (Lively acclamation.) With deep, glowing gratitude we think of our brave troops who under brilliant leaders have achieved almost superhuman deeds during the entire war, and whose deeds so far done surely guarantee that the destiny of all of us will in the future [also] lie in good and dependable hands. One single terrible, murderous battle has been raging in the west for several months. Thanks to the incomparable heroism of our army, which will continue to live to all time in the history of the German people as an imperishable memorial of glory, the front has remained unbroken; this proud consciousness permits us to view the future with confidence.

Just because we are imbued with this sentiment and conviction it is also our duty to obtain the certainty that this bloody struggle which demands so much sacrifice shall not be continued one single day over and above the point of time when an ending of the war which doesn't touch our honor appears possible to us. Therefore I haven't even waited till today before taking action for furtherance of the peace idea. In full accord with all the competent authorities in the Empire, and upon the assent of the Allies acting in union with us, I directed, in the night preceding the 5th of October, through the mediation of Switzerland, a note to the President of the United States in which I request him to take into his hands the bringing about of peace and for this purpose to communicate with all the belligerent states. The note will arrive in Washington today or tomorrow. It is directed to the President of the United States because he has formulated, in his message to Congress on January 8, 1918, and in his later utterances, especially in his New York speech of September 27, a program for general peace which we can accept as the foundation for negotiations.

I have taken this step on the road leading not only to the salvation of Germany and its allies, but of entire mankind which has suffered for years through this war, because I believe that the thoughts pointing to future happiness of the peoples which Mr. Wilson proclaims are fully in accord with the general opinions which imbue also the new German Government and with it the greater majority of our people. As far as I myself am concerned, my former speeches delivered before another audience prove that no sort of change has taken place in the opinions which I hold of future peace since the guidance of the Empire's affairs has been entrusted to me. What I desire is an honest lasting peace for the whole human race, and I believe confidently that such a peace would be at the same time the firmest protection for the future welfare of

our own Fatherland. I accordingly see no kind of difference between national and international duties in reference to peace. The deciding point for me is exclusively that these duties are recognized and honored as binding by all participants with the same sincerity as is the case with me and the other members of our new Government.

Thus I look forward with the inner calmness which my good conscience as a man and as a servant of our people [lends] me, and which at the same time is founded upon [my] firm confidence in this great faithful people capable of any sacrifice and in its glorious militant power, to the result of the first action which I have taken as the leading statesman of the Empire. Whatever this result may be, I know it will find Germany firmly resolved and united—as well for an honest peace which refuses to consider every selfish violation of rights of others, as also for the final life or death battle to which our people would be forced without its own fault if the answer of the powers waging war with us to our offer should be dictated by the will to destroy us.

No faint-heartedness [troubles] me at the thought that this second result might happen, for I know the greatness of the gigantic forces which are present in our people even now, and I know that an irrefutable conviction that they are fighting for nothing but our existence as a nation would double these forces. (Acclamation.) But I hope for the sake of all mankind that the President of the United States will understand our offer as we mean it. This would open the door to an early honorable peace of right and reconciliation for us as well as for our opponents.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/8964

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 9, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received October 10, 4.35 a. m.]

145. The three Prime Ministers will meet at Versailles this afternoon; they have summoned Marshal Foch to report on the military situation. The latter yesterday formulated his conception of the terms of an armistice. Broadly speaking, they include evacuation by the Germans of all territory up to the left bank of the Rhine, with bridgeheads on the Rhine to be held by the Allies.

In a conversation with Lloyd George and Bonar Law this morning I noted a tone of disappointment that the President had not left the terms of armistice to the military men. Lloyd George said that along a large part of the front the Germans were in full retreat with the Allies close on their heels; this put the Germans in an embarrassing position but if they were allowed time to evacuate France and Belgium they could place their armies in position for a defensive campaign. It would have been otherwise if the evacuation

of Alsace-Lorraine had been included as a condition of the armistice and he thought the Italians would regret that the Trentino was not included also.

Mr. Lloyd George intimated that M. Clemenceau was not entirely in accord with President Wilson's fourteen points and said that the British Government would like to have a definition of the meaning of the expression "freedom of the seas". He doubted whether British Army could be induced to resume hostilities if Alsace-Lorraine were not restored to France; he did not even feel sure that the French Army would fight again under these circumstances.

FRAZIER

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File No. 763.72119/8961

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 10, 4.13 a. m.]

146. Prime Ministers are now drafting a note to President Wilson regarding his reply to German peace proposals. The tenor of this reply will be (that the?) evacuation of occupied territories is not sufficient guarantee. Marshal Foch stated before the Prime Ministers that the terms of armistice shift from day to day according to the military situation; in view of the great victory by the British and French troops north of Saint-Quentin yesterday the terms of an armistice tomorrow will be different from those of today. I hope to obtain a copy of this joint note at 6 o'clock tonight and will telegraph it as soon as possible.

FRAZIER

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File No. 763.72/11687

*The Chargé in Greece (Chabot) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ATHENS, October 9, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received October 10, 4.50 a. m.]

578. In regard to Legation's 576, October 7 [6], 2 a. m.<sup>1</sup> British Minister just called at Legation to say that he has had a reply from Lloyd George, who is at Paris, that British Government cannot consider any negotiations with those not actually the Turkish Government. British Minister communicating this reply to [Carabiber] for Rahmi evidently, and delegates are leaving immediately.

Note to British Minister added: If proposed new government were to become the actual Turkish Government, then negotiations would

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 341.



be acceptable. If any armistice is desired, General Allenby should be approached. Terms suggested are quite out of the question.

CHABOT

File No. 763.72119/8965

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 9, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received October 10, 10.55 a. m.]

147. Referring to my telegram No. 146. The following is the English text of joint note, original having been drafted in French:

The Allied Governments have taken cognizance of the reply addressed by President Wilson to the Chancellor of the German Empire, with the greatest interest.

They recognize the elevated sentiments which have inspired this reply. Limiting themselves to most urgent question, that of the armistice, they agree with the President of the United States that the preliminary condition of all discussion of this question is the evacuation of all invaded territory. But they think for the conclusion of an armistice itself this condition, while necessary, would not be sufficient. It would not prevent the enemy from profiting by a suspension of hostilities to install himself, after the expiration of an armistice not followed by peace, in a better military position than at the moment of the expiration of hostilities. He would be left the facility of retiring from a critical situation to save his war material, reconstitute his units, shorten his front and retire without loss of men to new positions which he would have the time to choose and fortify.

The conditions of an armistice cannot be fixed until after consultation with military experts and in accordance with the military situation at the moment of engaging in negotiations. These considerations have been forcibly exposed by the military experts of the Allied Powers and especially by Marshal Foch. They are of equal interest to the armies of the Governments associated in the battle against the Central Empires.

To these considerations the Allied Governments draw the entire attention of President Wilson.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72/13374

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 9, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received October 10, 10.06 a. m.]

148. The three Prime Ministers will address following joint telegram to President Wilson tonight:

The Allied Governments venture to point out to the President that the time has come when decisions of supreme importance in regard



to the war may have to be taken at very short notice; they therefore think that it would be of very great assistance if an American representative possessing the full confidence of the United States Government could be sent to Europe to confer when occasion arose with the other Associated Governments so as to keep them accurately and fully informed of the point of view of the United States Government.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72119/2100

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 8, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received October 11, 2.23 a. m.]

2111. French Ambassador has expressed to me the hope that immediate answer to Central Empires be made to prevent spread of idea that armistice will be granted, of which great danger here. I unite in this view. There have been demonstrations of workmen and others in Milan, Bologna, Padua, Florence, Leghorn proclaiming peace. Ministers inform me demonstrations all now ended and Government has things in hand.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2123

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 10, 1918, noon.

[Received October 11, 2.10 p. m.]

5387. The press of this morning, as well as of yesterday afternoon, join in hearty commendation of the President's reply to Germany's note. In a few instances, but not in the more important papers, while giving approval in all other respects, yet the view is expressed that the evacuation of Alsace-Lorraine should have been specifically mentioned in connection with the references to the evacuation of the invaded territories.

Among those who have personally spoken to me in its praise is Mr. Viviani, former President of the Council, who said to me last night that it was a document of the highest statesmanship and would be sustained by the entire people of France. The one dominant note in the press comments concerning it, is the satisfaction over the manner in which the President had completely deprived the Central Powers of political capital at home which a point blank refusal to their peace overtures would have given to them. The headlines in practically all the others, especially feature the demand for the evacuation of the invaded territory before even considering the enemy's request.

Coming as it does amidst the unparalleled triumphs of our armies, all the way from the [Belgian] front down to the American sector in Lorraine, the total collapse of the enemy's power seems to many to be near as a result of this month's victories at the front. One cannot be insensible to the whetted appetite for demanding ever-increasing penalties from a hated foe. The daily publication of the story of his new depredations in French towns only serves to increase it.

On a visit to Soissons two days ago by invitation of the French Government I took luncheon with General Mangin, in command of the Tenth Army of that sector. He expressed to me great confidence in the ability of the Allied forces to destroy the German armies before they could evacuate French and [Belgian] territory, though on account of the lateness of the season they might not bring about such result before next spring. He thought that the enemy might secretly be glad to be allowed to get out of France with his men, arms and ammunition saved; at the same time he did not minimize the tremendous energies and desperation with which that enemy is endeavoring to cover his retreat.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/2116

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*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 9, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 11, 2.27 p. m.]

2115. The President's reply considered here as complete response to Central Empires and as perfect diplomacy. Government's official comment is that the reply is just what the Entente expected of the proposal; that now Central Powers must prove that their proposal was made in good faith; that while waiting Italy will offer new proof of moral resistance.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2122

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*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 11, 1918.

[Received 8.20 p. m.]

5398. The Commission of Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies after a general study of the political situation and the diplomatic negotiations now taking place unanimously voted yesterday the following order of the day:

The Committee on Foreign Affairs has examined the reply made by Mr. Robert Lansing in the name of President Wilson to the

proposition of the German Government. It has given its approval to this reply and counts upon the Government to accept in the name of France no armistice which would fail to assure the satisfaction and the guarantees to which the victorious armies of the Entente have a right.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/2132

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *October 12, 1918.*

[Received 10.45 p. m.]

4765. Have received telegram from Luxemburg signed Emile Reuter, Minister of State, of which following is translation:

Luxemburg Chamber in order of the day, voted unanimously in its session of October 8, has invited the Government of the Grand Duchy to urge the President of the United States to support our claims and our rights as an independent state at the time of the peace negotiations. I beg Your Excellency kindly to telegraph this resolution to President Wilson and to intercede so that wish expressed by representatives of country [with] which the Luxemburg Government eagerly associates itself may be granted.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/2138

*The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *October 12, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received October 13, 6 a. m.]

471. To President Wilson:

Sir: We hope you include Russia, while replying to Germany's request for armistice, among Powers whose territories [are] to be cleared of invaders, since we have repudiated treaty of Brest Litovsk and continued at war with Central Powers. We consider ourselves allies of you and other Allied Powers. Signed, President Government Northern Russia, member Ufa Directory of Five, Nicholas Tchaikowski.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72119/2139

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, *October 12, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received October 13, 6.31 p. m.]

2128. In a conversation with Minister of War he informs me that even if Italy's territory overrun during this war be evacuated

in the event of an armistice, Italy, should armistice fail, would not be able to defend former frontier against sudden attack as that frontier is nearly twice length of Piave frontier and all of Italy's original defenses on former frontier have been destroyed. To render Italy at all secure against attack, he declares that it is necessary to assign to Italy as pledges certain strategic points to hold during any negotiations.

NELSON PAGE

Second German Note, October 12; American Reply, October 14, Calling for the Destruction of Arbitrary Power in Germany—Turkish Note Requesting an Armistice and Peace Negotiations, Presented October 14—Dispatch of Colonel House as American Representative in the Armistice Negotiations at Paris—Proclamation of the Federalization of Austria, October 16

File No. 763.72119/2313

*The Swiss Chargé (Oederlin) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith, upon instructions from my Government, the original text, received this morning, of a communication from the German Government to the President of the United States, in reply to his communication to the Imperial German Chancellor, transmitted to me by Your Excellency on October 8, 1918.

I beg herewith also to enclose the English translation of this communication, as transmitted by the German Legation in Berne to the Swiss Foreign Office.<sup>1</sup>

Accept [etc.]

F. OEDERLIN

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The German Secretary of State of the Foreign Office (Solf) to the Swiss Foreign Office for President Wilson*

In reply to the question of the President of the United States of America the German Government hereby declares:

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January 8 and in his subsequent

<sup>1</sup> A translation of the German Government's communication, differing from the one enclosed, was sent by the Chargé in the Netherlands, "as received by telegram from Berlin," in his telegram No. 4775, Oct. 12, received Oct. 13, 8 a. m. A translation identical with the enclosed was sent by the Minister in Switzerland, in his telegram No. 5195, Oct. 12, midnight, received Oct. 13, 2.10 p. m., as given him by the President of Switzerland at 6 p. m. The Minister also sent another copy of the same translation in his telegram No. 5196, Oct. 13, 1 a. m., received 12.53 p. m., as forwarded for the Vice Consul at Zürich, who added: "In order to avoid further bloodshed German Government placed wireless station at Nauen at the disposal of Swiss Government for the transmission of this note but latter feared it might cause misunderstanding in America." (File Nos. 763.72119/2133, 2150, 2144.)



addresses as the foundations of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms.

The German Government believes that the Governments of the powers associated with the United States also accept the position taken by President Wilson in his addresses.

The German Government in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government for the purpose of bringing about an armistice declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation.

The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.

The present German Government which has undertaken the responsibility for this step towards peace has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all of his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

BERLIN, *October 12, 1918.*

SOLF

File No. 763.72119/2313

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé (Oederlin)*

No. 285

WASHINGTON, *October 14, 1918.*

SIR: In reply to the communication of the German Government, dated the 12th instant, which you handed me to-day, I have the honor to request you to transmit the following answer:

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th [6th] and 12th of October, 1918.

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they still persist in. At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of all they contain not only but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

It is necessary, also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the Fourth of July last.<sup>1</sup> It is as follows: "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency." The power which has hitherto controlled the German Nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German Nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

The President will make a separate reply to the Royal and Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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File No. 763.72119/2532

*The Spanish Ambassador (Riaño) to President Wilson*

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1918.

MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to transmit herewith, acting upon instructions from my Government, the text of a communication received by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain from the

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 268.

Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey in Madrid on September [*October?*] 12, and which reached me late yesterday, Sunday evening.

Please accept [etc.]

JUAN RIAÑO

[Enclosure <sup>1</sup>]

*The Turkish Chargé in Spain to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs*

The undersigned, Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey, has the honour, acting upon instructions from his Government, to request the Royal Government to inform the Secretary of State of the United States of America by telegraph, that the Imperial Government requests the President of the United States of America to take upon himself the task of the reestablishment of peace; to notify all belligerent states of this demand and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations. It (the Imperial Government) accepts as a basis for the negotiations the programme laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, especially the speech of September 27.<sup>2</sup>

In order to put an end to the shedding of blood, the Imperial Ottoman Government requests that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

[No signature indicated]

File No. 763.72119/2167

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, October 12, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received October 14, 3.50 p. m.]

5178. From a Pole in close touch with the Polish authorities in Warsaw, I have received following information:

From different parts of former Russian Poland appeals have been received for military force for police duty after the signing of the armistice. In view of the increasing danger of social revolution and of the fear that the Germans leaving the country would sack it and foster anarchy, it has been repeatedly suggested from Warsaw that the most desired would be American forces combined with the Polish legions on the French front. The first request of that kind came in July after the first Allied victories. Since then with always-increasing insistence those requests were sent out five times, coming from all parts of Russian Poland.

<sup>1</sup>Text received in English.

<sup>2</sup>Texts of the two messages, *ante*, pp. 12 and 316.



In view of the fact that similar reports have reached me from other sources (see my 5139, October 10, 2 p. m.<sup>1</sup>), I believe that the danger of anarchy in eastern states bordering Germany will become very real with withdrawal of German troops from this territory.

STOVALL

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File No. 763.72119/2225a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1918, 5 p. m.

1967. You may inform the Government to which you are accredited that the President has decided to send Mr. E. M. House to Europe as his special representative. Mr. House will start almost immediately.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72/11751

*The Diplomatic Agent at Cairo (Gary) to the Secretary of State*

No. 125

CAIRO, September 7, 1918.

[Received October 15.]

SIR: With further reference to the Department's telegraphic instruction of July 31, 4 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> and to my despatch No. 116 of August 29, 1918,<sup>1</sup> concerning the incident of the display of the American flag by a Jewish battalion, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a note dated September 2, 1918,<sup>1</sup> which I have received from the British High Commissioner wherein His Excellency informs me that the commander-in-chief states that this misuse of the American flag was entirely without authority and even without the knowledge of the commanding officer of the battalion concerned.

The High Commissioner conveys the regret of the commander-in-chief that this incident should have occurred and states that General Allenby wishes to assure me that steps have been taken to prevent any occurrence of a similar nature in the future in Egypt or Palestine.

Immediately upon receipt of the High Commissioner's note, I wrote thanking him and asking him to be so good as to assure General Allenby of my sincere appreciation of his courteous message and of the consideration he has shown in taking steps to prevent a recurrence of the incident.

I have [etc.]

HAMPSON GARY

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>The same to the Ambassador in Italy, No. 1764; unnumbered telegram of notification on the same date to the Ambassador in France. (File No. 003.1140/—.)

<sup>3</sup>*Ante*, p. 295.



File No. 763.72/11764

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 14, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 16, 3.35 a. m.]

2142. Orlando and Sonnino have both returned to Rome, Orlando having visited the King and Diaz on the way back, as is believed, to urge Diaz to make an offensive as condition precedent to any outside aid. D[iaz] reported as saying he wants to make an offensive but is 20 divisions and 200 guns under number Austria has on front and that even should Austria be forced back it would lengthen Italy's front to point where it could not be held. The feeling that an offensive should be made is apparently growing but Nitti seems backing Diaz strongly.

I hear from reliable source that when Orlando arrived at Paris ten days ago and found a French official Havas telegram in the papers there declaring that his reference in his speech before Italian Chamber intimating that the Italian Army's failure to attack was in accord with Foch's wishes was inexact, he threatened to return to Rome that evening. The matter was, however, patched up in an interview with Clemenceau.

The feeling here against France is more in evidence than formerly and I hear much talk of France's selfish attitude everywhere and especially towards Italy. The pushing forward of the Italian and French columns in Albania indicates this rivalry.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2180

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 14, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received October 16, 4.37 a. m.]

2145. Have talked with Sonnino who says that he would not be sorry if the President should [reject] Germany's propositions in entirety. He thinks Germany's whole proposal insidious; says that Italy's position, should armistice be now declared, would be unfortunate as so much of her territory occupied, and even evacuation of this territory would leave Italy in a difficult position owing to increased length of her frontier and destruction of her former defense. He dwelt upon difference between Italy's geographical position and France's and says that even should there be an armistice the special situation of Italy geographically should be considered by military and naval experts from a military and naval point of view before

compromising by an armistice. This view he bases on peculiarities of Italy's frontier, especially of Adriatic coast. He strongly favors Italy's making an offensive. I think he is very apprehensive of the effect on the people of an armistice. Many troops are stationed about the city this evening to prevent demonstrations. Sonnino considers it to be of great importance to detach Turkey; also thinks Bulgaria might be brought into line with the Allies if properly handled—for example, if offered Adrianople.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2191

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 16, 1918, 2 a. m.

[Received 6.06 p. m.]

5442. Marshal Joffre has given the following statement to Mr. Warrington Dawson, a member of the staff of this Embassy whom I had asked to secure such statement. It expresses his views upon the question of the demand for an armistice.

I believe that every one who has had enough of war for all have suffered heavily; in consequence it will be a boon for humanity to stop the war, but there must be guarantees so that it may be not only the end of this war, but the end of wars for decades and decades to come. We can attain this result only by being very strict in our demands.

The armistice will be long, several months or perhaps more. I doubt if peace can come for a year yet, and the armistice should not end entirely until peace is signed. The armistice might be renewed at intervals running one into the other, the first might be for one month after which our military precautions and effort might be reduced if Germany's good faith were then established; that month will enable us to know. Germany is, I think, reduced to extremity, but her desire for an armistice might possibly be only a ruse of war. In this case, her bad faith would become evident during a respite of one or two months allowing her to reconstitute her strength. There may be people in Germany who have such hopes from the armistice. But there are certainly others who know better. Germany is not a unit, there are divergences of opinion within her borders as elsewhere. But we ourselves could do much more than she during this time, therefore the situation would not be to her advantage.

Certain Governments of the Entente have not yet decided upon all the measures which might be taken with a view to the armistice and to peace.

Although Germany as a whole desires peace, and we desire peace, yet we have the upper hand, thanks especially to America, and we must have a logical and rational peace. Above all, we must suppress the German governmental system. It has already been done away with in other directions, even in Austria, and in Germany

itself many small states would be happy to have more freedom. I entirely agree with President Wilson that this present system must disappear, or it would be a permanent menace to peace.

The Marshal also gave an outline of the measures which he thought should be imposed for the armistice as well as other very interesting statements on general conditions which I will forward in the next pouch.

Perhaps as fairly typical of the sentiment of the press other than the Socialist I may quote the concluding lines of leading editorial appearing in the Sunday's *Temps*:

The regime of the Hohenzollerns has changed labels at most and it survives in its entirety. President Wilson must realize this as we do; the rulers of Germany are at the end of their tether; at all costs they must obtain a respite to restore their calmness, their army, their people. To discuss with them is to give them back their prestige, to treat with them is to save them. Let them be told as soon as possible to address themselves to Marshal Foch.

However, Mr. Herbette, political writer of the *Temps*, has just telephoned me that his paper will today express its great satisfaction over the President's reply to Germany just received. It is to appear in both English and French.

As I dictate this telegram, various French patriotic leagues and committees are placarding posters calling for complete victory and protesting against any attempt to come to other terms than those imposed upon the enemy by force of arms. One of these posters runs: "With incendiaries, with murderers, with thieves, there can be no question of discussions; judgement must be passed on them." Another poster is headed "A Trap", and is an appeal to refuse an armistice.

I wish that I might disabuse my mind of the belief that some of the comments appearing in the Paris press during the past few days owe their inspiration in no small part to the personal jealousies by a few men in high places over the authority exercised by one so far removed from the European arena of politics. I would not confine these jealousies to France alone. Even Marshal Joffre in his communication to me has not failed to severely censure those possessed of this fault. The unique position of an arbiter of the world's destinies which must inevitably grow out of a settlement of this war, is a shining rôle not unenvied. How much real conviction there is in the fear expressed in some of the French journals that Germany may after all succeed, through discussions and parleying, in escaping the full visitation of justice upon her, I do not know, but I have wondered if withal there is not some pique over the turn of events which has transferred a discussion of the whole subject over



to the shores of America. Perhaps I have said enough to apprise the Department of the actuating motives and real significance of what may be expected to crop out from time to time in other discussions which must follow.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/2211

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *October 15, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received October 16, 11.10 p. m.*]

2823. The sole topic of interest during the past week has been the German peace offer and the interchange of correspondence between the President and the German Government. The President's reply to the first German communication met with general approval and is regarded as a shrewd and masterly stroke. The wish was expressed in some quarters that it might have shut the door on all further discussion [save] an offer of unconditional surrender but the best opinion considered it a tactful concise answer in no way compromising our further demands. The prompt rejoinder from Berlin was hailed with unbounded delight. There was a tendency on all sides to consider the war as practically over and to give way to the comforting belief that a complete and overwhelming victory has been won already. Within a few hours, however, a very noticeable reaction set in. Attention was called to the fact that the German understanding of an evacuation could not be satisfactory to the Allies, the entire press combined to point [out] that nothing short of a complete surrender of all German war material together with the German battle fleet and submarines could be considered a guarantee that the Allies would not be tricked into resigning the advantage of their superior military position. Moreover, the mere assurance that Prince Max spoke as the mouthpiece of the German people and not simply as the tool of the military party was not considered in any way conclusive, but the most remarkable change of public opinion is in the attitude of the country toward Germany's acceptance of the President's fourteen points.

Hailed at first as a brilliant statement of our war aims, acceptable also as the aims of the Allies, now that their achievement seems possible, grave doubts are expressed as to whether they adequately connote the demands which must be imposed upon Germany to obtain a satisfactory and lasting peace. It is felt even more strongly that some of the points are detrimental to the interests of certain of the Allies, especially Great Britain, and especially is this true of the second point, [calling for] the freedom of the seas. Great



Britain's future welfare is seen to be inseparably linked up with her foreign trade and premier position as a carrier for the world and to be in a large measure dependent upon her control of the waters immediately surrounding the British Isles; it is felt that her safety depends on a maintenance of that control or at least an assurance that such control will not pass into the hands of any other power or group of powers.

Article 3, which calls for the [removal of] all economic barriers, caused embarrassment to the high tariff party who fear it will prevent erection of a tariff wall around the British Empire and so hamper the Government in its attempt to control the supply of raw materials within the Empire, but even the free traders are [among] those condemning any arrangement which would compel Great Britain to extend to Germany and Austria the same terms of an economic treaty which might be extended to America and France.

Article 5, dealing with colonial claims, is not comprehended at all. The majority of the British people sincerely wish that the best solution possible may be found for the difficult problem of the German colonies and are by no means insistent that this territory should remain under British rule. They will not tolerate, however, the suggestion that the colonies might be returned to Germany [apparent omission] the interests and expressed desire of manufacturers, natives should seem to point to that end. It has also been pointed out that this article might apply to all the French and British [colonial territory] held long before the war and whose allegiance has never been called into question.

Article 12 is also believed to present difficulties which may conflict with previous engagements [contracted] with the other Allies.

This lack of understanding of the fourteen points which Germany is said to have accepted, and a fear that the President may go farther along the road towards a final solution without consulting with and considering the particular wishes of his cobelligerents, is as I have said, causing grave uneasiness. Even should the danger of a premature armistice be avoided it is feared that we may be tricked by this hypocritical waving of a white flag into concluding a peace which will be but the shadow and not the substance of the complete victory which is within sight, and a peace which will provide Germany with undeserved opportunities for future mischief-making. However, as it will undoubtedly prove that there is no real ground for these fears, I think this panicky feeling will pass, as it undoubtedly arises partly from the reaction brought about by a sense of [escape] from the immediate German peril. I do not think the demand for unconditional surrender and nothing short of a dictated peace is as universal in this country as it appears to be in the United States, but the majority undoubtedly distrust any diplo-

matic negotiations at the present time and are absolutely opposed to the granting of any concessions whatever. If Germany hopes to promote discord among her enemies by approaching United States and ignoring the rest, she has not succeeded in smallest degree; her methods [are] too apparent, her subterfuges too clumsy.

Above was written before the publication of the President's latest note which has just appeared in this afternoon's press. This retort to Germany is hailed with enthusiasm and I have heard nothing but unqualified approval of its terms. There can be no mistaking its meaning and I feel sure it will clear away the baseless fears that have been expressed.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 863.00/89, 90

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, October 18, 1918.

[Received in sections, 5.40 p. m. and 6.45 p. m.]

5274. Following Vienna telegram published in all Swiss press:

An extra edition of the official *Wiener Zeitung* publishes the following Kaiser's manifesto:<sup>1</sup>

To my loyal Austrian peoples! Since my accession to the throne, my one wish has been to bring the longed-for peace to all my people, as well as to show the people of Austria how they can develop their strength unhindered by obstacles and friction and work successfully for their spiritual and economical welfare. So far the dreadful struggles of the World War have hindered the work of peace. Heroism and loyalty, willingness to bear sacrifices, misery and privations, have gloriously defended the Fatherland in these hard times. The hard sacrifices of the war were necessary to secure for us the honorable peace on whose threshold, with God's help, we stand to-day.

We must now without fail undertake the rebuilding of the Fatherland on its natural and therefore sure basis. The wishes of the Austrian peoples must here be carefully harmonized and fulfilled. I have decided to undertake this work with the free collaboration of my peoples in the spirit of those principles which the Allied monarchs in their peace offer have adopted. Following the desires of her peoples Austria must become a federated state in which every race will form its own state commonwealth in the districts inhabited by it. The union of the Polish districts of Austria with the independent Polish state is no way affected by this. The town of Trieste with its district will have a special situation in accordance with the wishes of its inhabitants. This change which does not touch the integrity of the lands of the sacred Hungarian crown is to guarantee the independence of every national state. It will also effectively protect all common interests and will further them wherever the federation is a vital necessity to the various states.

We must especially unite all forces in order to fulfil equitably and justly all the tasks arising out of the effects of the war. Until this change shall have been executed constitutionally the existing institutions for the protection of general interests will remain unchanged. My Government has the task of preparing, without delay, all work necessary for the change in Austria. My call is addressed to the peoples on whose self-determination the new Kingdom must be founded; I ask them to collaborate in the great work through the national councils which, composed of the Reichsrat members of all na-

<sup>1</sup> Dated Oct. 16, 1918.

tions, will represent the interests of the peoples toward one another as well as toward my Government.

So may our Fatherland, solidified by the harmony of the nations of which it is composed, come out of the storms of war as a federation of free peoples. The blessings of the Almighty be upon our work, may He help the great peace work which we are reaching so that it shall mean the happiness of all my peoples. Signed, Karl. Hussarek.

STOVALL

**American Reply to the Austro-Hungarian Peace Note, October 19, Repudiating Autonomy of Subject Peoples as a Basis of Peace—German Note of October 20 Conveying Assurances of Popular Control of the Government**

File No. 763.72119/2540

*The Secretary of State to the Swedish Minister (Ekengren)*

No. 466

WASHINGTON, *October 19, 1918.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 7th instant in which you transmit a communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary to the President.<sup>1</sup> I am now instructed by the President to request you to be good enough, through your Government, to convey to the Imperial and Royal Government the following reply:

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following:

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent Government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom.

The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 341.



File No. 763.72119/2251

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *October 18, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received October 19, 7 p. m.]

5277. Andrassy has spent last few days in Switzerland and has endeavored through medium of Poles to obtain an audience with French Ambassador and British Minister. French Ambassador refused to receive him and British Minister did likewise on instructions from his Government. Andrassy saw only an unofficial agent of French Embassy to whom, as far as I know, he revealed nothing of urgent interest. He stated that he came on mission for Emperor Charles and that through loyalty to Emperor he was ready to present Austro-Hungarian views and not strictly his Government's.

Today Jan Perlowski, Pole with whose name Department familiar, showed me a letter from Skrzynski, a Pole, Counsellor of Austrian Legation here, authorizing him to discuss the following matter with this Legation, a matter which had been discussed previously between Perlowski, Skrzynski, De Vaux, Chargé d'Affaires, and Count [Revertera]. The Emperor has been prevented from making a separate peace heretofore from feeling of loyalty to Germany, his word of honor being pledged. He now feels, however, that Germany, although accepting President's conditions, is endeavoring to evade the consequences thereof as far as Alsace-Lorraine and Posen are concerned, and thus Charles feels that he is released from further military obligation as he cannot consent to abide strictly by acceptance of these principles. Emperor desires to request representatives here to discuss not acceptance of terms but application of terms to portions of Monarchy in order to ascertain how President interprets terms for different places in doubt. Emperor desires to send some one who has been consistently opposed to Prussian policy [who] would be acceptable and of Polish race, so has chosen Adam Tarnowski who was sent to America as Ambassador in 1917 and was subsequently ordered from Warsaw by German authorities after having been nominated President of Council.

Skrzynski stated he realized that Legation could not receive [Tarnowski] without authority from Washington [and credentials] proving him representative of Emperor and suggested that Tarnowski be received in unofficial capacity purely for information purposes, that information be wired to Washington; if satisfactory, Department could authorize conversations to proceed and Tarnowski could produce formal credentials as Emperor's representative for peace discussion which would be provided him before he left Vienna.



Burián's position is so shaky he must resign shortly, when Andrassy will be appointed to succeed him, but Andrassy will not be sympathetic to idea of a Pole negotiating for Emperor and therefore would probably not authorize Tarnowski for this mission. If, however, Tarnowski previously authorized in view of his rank as Ambassador, Andrassy upon entering office could not interrupt or interfere with mission already in Paris. For this reason it was urged that I give my consent at once, without consulting Washington, to Tarnowski's coming, with assurances that he would be received on his arrival in unofficial capacity as above mentioned.

I have informed Perłowski that for the present I cannot give such assurances. If Department desires me to do so, please address reply direct to American Legation, Berne, to save time. I cannot escape the conviction that Andrassy's and Tarnowski's trips here are directly related and that former's failure is reason for endeavor of latter to open conversations. Austria is going rapidly to pieces and this may be last desperate effort to save prestige of Monarchy and prevent disintegration. I have strong impression that Austrians and Hungarians must be brought to realize that prompt unconditional and immediate capitulation is their only possible step. This will not be repeated to Paris unless I am so instructed.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72114/4097

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *October 19, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received October 20, 3.30 a. m.*]

4832. Belgian prelate who left Malines yesterday has just delivered a letter addressed by Cardinal Mercier to President Wilson, translation of which follows in my 4833. Sagua, bearer of letter, states that after transmission of German peace note but before President's reply was received Von der Lancken, [head of] German Political Department, communicated to Cardinal substance of declaration enclosed in above-mentioned letter but that it was not until Thursday, October 17, that Von der Lancken called on the Cardinal and presented written copy of the declaration together with passport for the purpose to proceed to Holland with letters from Cardinal. The declaration as originally presented contained no mention of date on which liberation of Belgian prisoners and deported should commence, and date October 21 was added in writing by Von der Lancken after a conversation with Cardinal Mercier. Prelate adds that similar letters from Cardinal are being sent to Pope and King of Belgium and that above-mentioned declaration

from Von der Lancken, with exception of first sentence and closing phrase, will be made public in Belgian churches tomorrow.

Prelate, who was allowed by Germans to cross into Holland without usual frontier formalities, plans to return to Malines Tuesday, October 22.

Original letter and enclosure are being sent in pouch.

BLISS

File No. 763.72114/4096

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *October 19, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received October 20, 9 a. m.*]

4833. [For the President:]

Archiepiscopal Palace, Malines, October 17.

Mr. President: At 3 o'clock today, Baron Von der Lancken, chief of the German Political Department, came to tell me, in the name of the Governor General of Brussels and of the Berlin Government, that the Belgians under arrest in Belgium and Germany for political reasons, as well as the Belgians who have been deported into Germany, will be set at liberty as soon as Belgium shall have been evacuated. The release of prisoners interned in the prisons of the occupied portions of Belgium, with the exception of the military *étapes*, will begin Monday, the 21st of the month.

I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of a written declaration which the delegate of the German Government left with me. The United States have so generously assisted our people in their distress, and by the heroism of their army, and the high authority and the prestige of the Head of their Government have exercised so decisive an effect on the course of events, that I consider it my duty to address myself without delay to Your Excellency and inform you of the well-intentioned and spontaneous action which has been taken towards me. In it I see the proof of a sincere desire to arrive at a peace, and I discern with emotion the dawn of an era of calm and tranquillity for our beloved Belgian people which has suffered so greatly and so nobly.

Now that the occasion offers, I venture to express to the President of the United States the hope that the future peace congress will be held at Brussels. My compatriots, who were the first victims of the violence of the invasion, would consider the honor which would be thus done their capital as a first step toward reparation and would be unanimously grateful for it.

Accept, Mr. President, my respectful admiration and my undying gratitude. Signed, Cardinal Mercier, Archbishop of Malines.

Translation of the German declaration transmitted with above as enclosure, reads as follows:

For us you are the incarnate spirit of occupied Belgium, of which you are the revered and respected [father]. For this reason it is

to you that the Governor General and my Government have instructed me to make the announcement that when we shall evacuate your country we shall restore to you spontaneously and of our own free will those Belgians who have been deported or held as political prisoners. They will in part be at liberty to return to their homes beginning with Monday, October 21. As this announcement must rejoice your heart, it gives me pleasure to make it, especially in view of the fact that I have not been able to live for four years among the Belgians without esteeming them and without forming a true estimate of their [virtues].

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/2263

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, October 19, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 20, 10.55 a. m.]

4834. Activity of the military party is indicated by the much advertised presence in Berlin of Ludendorff and Scheer and accompanying wave of patriotic resolutions, telegrams to Hindenburg. It appears to be conviction of Conservative and National Liberal press that German reply will mean retardation of peace action and will probably be followed by great patriotic rally. Even organs of Majority reluctantly assume the tone of German reply will make it difficult for President to reject it. This view appears to be gaining ground despite recognition by a few Majority papers of justice of President's demand that secret arbitrary power controlling Germany must be destroyed. Nothing could better justify that demand than present developments, which point to an unweakened if less prominent position of the military party. Reticence of Majority Socialist press on this point is only in line with the consistent policy of the party leaders to prevent developments of too radical a nature. It is openly admitted by Majority Socialist papers that the peace offer was instigated by the old Government.

Proceedings of congress of Bavarian Socialists in which speakers of opposition openly demanded Emperor's abdication and punishment of all those responsible for Germany's present state and freely spoke of revolution strongly indicates ferment. The increasing and apparently freer activity of Independent Socialists is also significant in this connection. Majority Socialist leaders have lost no time in issuing public appeal to laborers not to listen to revolutionary plans. It is believed clear that Majority Socialist leaders will have a difficult time if nothing results from the peace action.

Aside from Conservative papers only few sheets affect to believe that acceptance by Germany of Wilson's peace program will necessarily imply loss of Alsace-Lorraine and Polish provinces. Tre-



mendously stimulated activity of Poles is giving rise to great alarm; statistics are generally published showing that there is preponderating Polish population only in Posen. Polish Reichstag member Korfanty is reported to have marked on a map in lobby of Reichstag districts which Germany would have to surrender to Poland.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/2268

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

BERNE, *October 18, 1918, 11 a. m.*

[*Received October 20, 3 p. m.*]

5266. *German political.* The German press considered the President's answer to the first German note satisfactory and pointed out that for the first time a German peace offer was not immediately rejected. Press has satisfied itself with stating that the Alsace-Lorraine question must be settled so as to cause no new wounds and it has attempted to show that the German parts of the old Kingdom of Poland were now largely settled by Germans who outnumbered the Poles. The Conservative press alone considered the President's first note as unacceptable and stated that the demand for the evacuation of the occupied territories amounted to a demand to surrender.

The publication of the Chancellor's letter to Hohenlohe threatened a new crisis which was avoided by the Chancellor's statement to the inter-party committee that he would resign if his person proved an obstacle to peace, and that he had written letter to rid himself of the undesired support of Hohenlohe. The Socialists, who were his chief critics, have stated that there is no objection to his remaining in office at present. I am reliably informed that the [National] Liberals would be glad to sacrifice the Chancellor if they could find some one to take his place. There has been increased discussion of the responsibility for America's entrance into the war and the radical papers demand information from the Government regarding a peace offer to the President in the late autumn of 1916, which failed because of the opposition of the military and the increased severity of the submarine warfare. The Conservatives have held meetings to protest [against] the Government's peace policy but at the present their opposition does not seem important.

The constitutional changes proposed by the new Government have passed the Federal Council and will be submitted to the Reichstag. They are:

- (1) A provision allowing members of the Reichstag to accept salaried Government offices:



- (2) A provision that war can be declared only with the consent of Federal Council and Reichstag, unless the frontiers or the coasts have been attacked;
- (3) A provision that treaties of peace and treaties affecting the Empire must have the consent of the Federal Council and the Reichstag.

An "imperial proclamation" has ordered that the military authorities can make no regulations under the "state of siege" without the consent of the Chancellor. The forced resignation of Von Dallwitz, Conservative governor of Alsace-Lorraine, and the appointment of Schwander, the Mayor of Strassburg, appears indicative of the new Government's more liberal policy towards Alsace-Lorraine. The appointment of Delbrück to succeed Von Berg as chief of the Emperor's private Cabinet places another office in the hands of the new Government. The prominent Progressive Haussmann has been appointed a Minister without portfolio and will be a member of the War Council.

The increasing unrest of the people is indicated by the decisions of the Governments of Saxony and Anhalt to liberalize their electoral laws. The reported defection of the radical and Bolshevik [Spartacists], an entire group under Mehring, from the Independent Socialist Party is also of interest as showing the unrest in the proletariat.

The Emperor has ordered the courts to carry out amnesty which will embrace all political offenders whose offenses were not felonious or infractions of military discipline.

So far as it is available the German press has been disappointed over the President's second note and calls upon the Entente not to drive the German people to desperation. The influence of the Entente on the President is stated to be the reason for its more severe tone, in the brief extracts of the German press so far available.

I learn from reliable German Republican sources that they are in possession of information that the present democratization of Germany and the demand for an armistice are the work of Ludendorff, who desires to save his army from a catastrophe. These circles point out that the Reichstag was not consulted before the answer to the President's note, and that even main committee was not called, but that the only consultation of the people were the discussions with the party leaders. It is the belief of these circles that as soon as Ludendorff has safely brought his army and material to Germany, he will suppress the present quasi-democratic Government, whose peace step he has suffered only to deceive the President and to gain time. They demand the calling of a German national assembly to draft a new Constitution and they state that there can be no real change in the German Government until the Allies are on German soil and can force the retirement of the present Reichstag, which

contains all those who caused the war. They also [believe] that the result of the President's answer to the second German note will be an increasing [severity] of military government in Germany.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/2265

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 20, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received October 21, 9.50 a. m.]

2191. The press, certainly reflecting general opinion of public, has been expressing much mystification at postponement of President's reply to Austria and beginning to discuss with increasing possibilities [*positiveness?*] Italy's right to have her claims as contained in London pact and her rights referred to in point 9 of President's fourteen points considered and established. Papers have published declaration made by Mr. Balfour that London pact touching Italy's claims will be absolutely respected, also that Pichon had stated that claims of Italy would be given as much attention and importance as the question relating to Alsace-Lorraine. Further, they are beginning to discuss imperative importance of arriving at definite agreement on essential points before declaring armistice and [starting] discussion of peace terms.

*Corriere della Sera* of 19th in leading editorial firmly declares that Entente before entering into peace negotiations must formulate its peace program and give exact interpretation to fourteen points of President and to avoid opening peace discussion with any enemy without having first decided between themselves arrangement of Europe, thus preventing tremendous weapon being placed in hands of enemy in discord among Allies concerning such arrangement. It cites recent article London *Times* [with] which it declares itself in agreement and points out the intolerable effect of Allies having their representatives argue and bargain with insidious and disloyal enemy diplomats concerning peace conditions as formerly done at Congress[es] of Vienna and Berlin where seeds of present catastrophe were sown. Precise conditions of peace should be determined beforehand by Allies and presented to enemy for acceptance without change and not for discussion.

Attention is called to peril of vagueness of fourteen points, now the only foundation on which to discuss peace, and the possibility of different interpretations not only by enemy but by Allies. It asks, "Does Germany give full acceptance in her interpretations of eighth and thirteenth points? Does Austria recognize necessity of her dissolution in tenth point, and finally, is ninth point clear enough to

Italians to tranquilize them?" It asserts that in the mixed zones clearly recognized lines of nationality [are] not to be found, so recourse must be had to unbiased interpretation of statistics, considering also that historic and geographical reasons mark regions belonging to one state. It declares Italy entered war on strength of London treaty which settles her rights and asks, "Do the United States recognize the treaty or not?" Declares Italy cannot be content with semi-official assurances and does not wish to tremble at [peace] congress nor wish [it] to end in terrible disillusion to her. It admits that nothing compromised so far and Italy convinced that President will give Austria-Hungary an answer satisfactory to Italy but that there is no time to lose.

It then refers to telegram from New York to effect that although President has replied twice to Germany without consulting Allies it will not be misunderstood in Europe as he had at his disposal *résumé* of decisions of Entente Premiers at Paris conference and adds that "this is all very well, but what part is Italy taking in all this? America has been of inestimable moral and material help to Italy and without America the war would be lost but the President, whose figure rises to the greatest heights of history, does not request us in exchange to [become] the absolute arbiter of our destinies." It then proceeds: "It is our business to place before him a clear formulation of what we ask after so much suffering without exceeding the bounds of justice which we intend to respect."

Finally it closes declaring that Italy should be represented at Washington not by diplomats but by high political personalities even perhaps by those responsible for this Government, and declaring that Italy is dumb because she is not firmly resolved to bring about the liberation of the peoples oppressed by Austria and Turkey and because she had no clear ideas of what must be done for Russia, Poland and the Balkan populations. The difficulties, which it admits are imposing, are not eliminated by putting off their solution and in the discussion with the enemy they will become more perilous.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/11569

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 21, 1918, 5 p. m.

2269. Your 4595<sup>1</sup> regarding pamphlet entitled *The League of Nations the Way to Peace*, by Erzberger. Department desires to be furnished with copies of this pamphlet as soon as it appears.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 327.



File No. 763.72/11831

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

ROME, October 19, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received October 21, 7.35 p. m.]

2181. *Political.* Evil effects of Germany's peace proposal on morale of people not as widespread as predicted it would be, they having been made to realize insidiousness of such moves and the folly of even considering them, at the present time, when enemy on the high road to complete defeat. [Active] propaganda is going on in favor of Italy's attaining her aspirations in Trentino and across Adriatic. Patriotic wave apparently sweeping country and majority appear [getting] together as to necessity to push war through to success.

In view of continued Allied successes on all fronts and the comparative inactivity on the Italian front, there is appearing a more pronounced feeling that Italy should immediately undertake an offensive in the hope of bringing about the collapse of Austria-Hungary but military authorities plead lack of sufficient troops and materials; Nitti sustains Diaz in this view while Sonnino is in favor of action. With no effort in this direction to retake large invaded territory, it is secretly feared by many Italians that Italy's aspirations will receive scant consideration at peace conference. Meantime offensive in Albania is being pushed vigorously and successfully and press is connecting it with Italian aspirations and need of defensive frontier. Nothing more heard of situation referred to by the Premier in his speech before Chamber indicating that Italy's armies are now like those of other Allies under command of Foch.

There is renewed talk of change in the Government; reopening of the Chamber has been postponed further by order of Premier.

Approval by Italians of President Wilson's preliminary reply to Germany has lost nothing by critical study to which it is being subjected by press guiding public opinion. That President dominates and will dominate situation in the interest of fair play is public opinion in Italy. Official statement of the Government on President's second reply rather guarded, as is press and public comment, confining itself to declaration that it is clear and categorical as military and political situation demands. Some criticism that no mention made of withdrawal of Germans from Russia and naturally those who place an early peace before everything else consider that both replies too strong. The success of Allied armies is strengthening greatly morale of the people.



In official circles it is generally believed Germany endeavored first to consolidate German people behind Government, second, to weaken the war spirit in Allied countries, especially Italy, and third, to withdraw safely to Antwerp, Metz, and Rhine line of defense. It is also conviction that guarantees which will place it beyond Germany's power to reopen hostilities should be exacted, such as turning over of Metz and Strassburg and bridge-heads on Rhine. Also it is held here that to make Italy safe she should be given as guarantees important strategic points in Trentino beyond Isonzo and on east coast Adriatic. Turkey it is thought can be easily brought to terms and is only awaiting opportunity. After that Austria-Hungary would shortly surrender, also that Bulgaria if properly handled could be made quasi-ally.

At meeting at Rome, Italian Committee on Armenian [*Albanian*] Independence asked Italian and Allied Governments to recognize freedom of Albanian Nation and assure its national independence, no territory to be given Bulgaria at its expense.

Mr. Gompers and labor mission were given warm welcome at Turin, Milan and Genoa before returning to France, but as at Rome there was strong undercurrent against them among the Socialists who hold that being pro-war he was anti-Socialist since true Socialism is against all war. Reports from Milan, Genoa, Turin, show that visit of these missions and Gompers' unequivocal stand for fighting war through accomplished great good.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2274

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 21, 1918.

[Received October 22, 2 a. m.]

2196. Press publishes to-day President's reply to Austria with brief official comment that—

It is perfectly clear in thought and spirit and is equivalent to refusal to recognize to-day in the Austro-Hungarian Government the legitimate representatives of the peoples through which they can carry forward negotiations for an armistice and peace. The promises made in the manifesto of Charles of simple autonomy of the various nationalities comprised in one or the other of the two Monarchies are not sufficient to change the situation. This declaration of President Wilson confirming the legitimacy of the aspirations of the peoples who are fighting for their independence cannot

but confer on them a new force and hasten in this way the complex movement which drives towards the dissolution of that state.

The press generally announces the demise of Austria-Hungary.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2251

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1918, noon.

5173. Your 5277, October 18, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Department cannot authorize discussions with anyone representing Emperor Charles, either in official or unofficial capacity. Refer to this Government's reply of October 18 [19]<sup>2</sup> to Austrian peace proposal.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/11834

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 22, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 11.25 p. m.]

2202. Much rivalry and increasing mutual criticism between Italians and French. This is strongly emphasized by rivalry in Albania and Servia where each is straining every nerve to forestall the other. I hear on good authority that the Italian commander in Albania, fearing that French will turn westward, has ordered his cavalry to arrive at Scutari at all hazards before the French. Italians also planning to land forces at San Giovanni di Medua with same design.

The Italians believe that the French are really hostile to Italy and rivalry at times approaches antagonism and may bear ill fruit in the future.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2377a

*The Swiss Chargé (Oederlin) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1918.

SIR: By direction of my Government, I have the honor to transmit herewith to Your Excellency the original German text of a communication dated October 20, 1918, from the German Government, which has today been received from the Swiss Foreign Office. I beg to also enclose an English translation of the communication in

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 369.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 368.

question as transmitted to the Swiss Foreign Office by the German Government with the request that it be forwarded to Your Excellency's Government.

Please accept [etc.]

F. OEDERLIN

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The German Secretary of State of the Foreign Office (Solf) to the Swiss Foreign Office for President Wilson*

In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of the occupied territories the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. The German Government suggests to the President to bring about an opportunity for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and with opening a way to a peace of justice.

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat, destructions will always be necessary and are insofar permitted by international law. The German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished.

The German Government further denies that the German Navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government proposes with regard to all these charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions. In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, the German Government has caused orders to be despatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return.

As the fundamental conditions for peace, the President characterizes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people in the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Government. The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people

in decision on peace and war. These conditions have just now undergone a fundamental change. The new Government has been formed in complete accord with the wishes of the representation of the people, based on the equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government. In future no government can take or continue in office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Chancellor of the Empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the Constitution of the Empire so that the consent of the representation of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

The question of the President, with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing, is therefore answered in a clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which, free from arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

SOLF

BERLIN, *October 20, 1918.*

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American Note to Germany, October 23—Submission of the Correspondence with Germany to the Associated Governments—Speech of the German Chancellor, October 22—German Note of October 27—Austro-Hungarian Note, Transmitted October 29, Offering to Negotiate Separately

File No. 763.72119/2377a

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Chargé (Oederlin)*

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1918.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 22d transmitting a communication under date of the 20th from the German Government and to advise you that the President has instructed me to reply thereto as follows:

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the 27th of September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from Ministers who speak for the Majority



of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

The President would deem himself lacking in candour did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the 20th of October, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of

the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2377a

*The Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere)*<sup>1</sup>

No. 460

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1918.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to enclose herewith certain communications which have passed between the Government of the United States and the Government of Germany, relative to an armistice and the terms of a treaty of peace between the belligerents in the present war, with the request that you transmit the same to your Government.

The President instructs me to make request that your Government take this correspondence under careful consideration and communicate, at its convenience, its views and conclusions concerning it.

The President desires especially an expression of the decision of Your Excellency's Government as to its willingness and readiness to acquiesce and take part in the course of action with regard to an armistice which is suggested in my note of October 23, 1918, to the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland, in which is set forth the decision of the President with regard to the submission of the question of an armistice to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated in the prosecution of the war against Germany, and with regard to the manner in which the terms of an armistice are to be determined provided an armistice at this time is deemed possible from the military point of view.

I wish to point out to your Government that the President has endeavored to safeguard with the utmost care the interests of the peoples at war with Germany in every statement made in the enclosed correspondence, and that it is his sincere hope that your Government will think that he has succeeded and will be willing to cooperate in the steps which he has suggested.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

<sup>1</sup> The same, on the same date, to the diplomatic representatives of Belgium (No. 118), Brazil (No. 249), China (No. 88), Cuba (No. 283), France (No. 2273), Great Britain (No. 295), Greece (No. 68), Guatemala (No. 128), Haiti (No. 37), Honduras (No. 70), Japan (No. 16), Montenegro (No. 2), Nicaragua (No. 74), Panama (No. 101), Portugal (No. 201), Russia (No. 65), Serbia (No. 80), and Siam (No. 24). For note of Oct. 25 to the Rumanian Chargé, see *post*, p. 782.

File No. 763.72119/2493

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

[Received October 23, 1918.]

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM MR. BALFOUR TO MR. BARCLAY OCTOBER 22, 1918

The British Government have been approached by the Turkish Government and have authorised the British Naval Commander-in-Chief at Mudros to discuss armistice with accredited Turkish representatives.

We have told our Admiral to obtain, if possible, all the conditions suggested at Versailles, but in our judgment the immediate complete opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and secure access to the Black Sea are of such paramount importance and so obviously carry everything else with them that if he can obtain these he may accept armistice at once.

Please inform the Government to which you are accredited.

[No signature indicated]

File No. 763.72119/2309

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 22, 1918, midnight.

[Received October 23, 8.54 p. m.]

German reply published late edition evening papers with official governmental comment to the following effect:

The first observation on German reply is that German Government appears to speak this time only in its own name, as it makes no more mention of Austria-Hungary, but only of the German people. The first impression of its contents is the manifest disproportion between the scant phrases which in the beginning are devoted to the more important and urgent questions, that is, the conditions of the armistice, and the diffuse way in which the note deals with political questions and the accusations of having committed acts against humanity and the law of nations. Regarding this it is not necessary to go fully into its fundamental hypocrisy. The burning of entire cities, for example Cambrai, in the very act of their evacuation is classified as legal acts of destruction necessary to cover the military retreat. The [note attempts] to give due value to the attempted defense of the atrocities committed against so many unfortunates by their submarines and to the assurances of having today given orders to all their commanders to suspend all sinking of steamships carrying passengers with the reservation, however, of those exceptions which may occur through failure of those orders reaching their destination. It suffices to recall the methods and the official instructions of Luxemburg for sinkings without leaving any trace.



Coming on the other hand to the [armistice conditions], is [there] any radical difference between the first reply already given and this which now follows it, whence the impression that the object is to gain time? In the first reply it was desired to refer the conditions of the armistice to a mixed commission; and now, confronted by the formal declaration of the President that such conditions must be requested by the military authorities of the inter-Allied Supreme Command, it says that "the conditions of armistice should be left to the judgement of military counsellors" and the President is requested to create the opportunity to regulate the details.

This turn of phrase not only appears in itself tortuous but, considered attentively, evades the President's ringing and precise demand to refer their request for an armistice to the military commander[s], and substitutes therefor a judgement of military counsellors who should be [designated] by the President himself. Is not this a short cut in disguise to a mixed commission?

Yet more serious [is] the other point of the reply. President Wilson had declared that he was not, so far as he was concerned, disposed to accept any provisional arrangement which would not assure and guarantee the maintenance of the present existing supremacy of the Allied armies, and that was evidently just. Germany replies that the arguments [*arrangements?*] for an armistice should be based on the present relations of the Allied forces on the several fronts. From this is deduced that on the subject of military guarantees all that Germany declares herself disposed to consent to is that they should consist in the conservation of the present relation of forces that are confronting each other. Apart even from the concrete difficulty of such an arrangement and especially of the guarantees of its loyal fulfilment, there is revealed the manifest snare of including all the efficiency of the military forces in the simple proportion of the numerical forces of the combatants, while even those [ignorant] of the military art know that many other coefficients have a significant importance: that is, the extension of the fronts, their defensibility, the means of communication, the morale of the people and so forth.

It is clear, then, that to concede today an armistice on the basis of the simple conservation of the combatant force the Allies would give to the Central Empires in substance, [collectively] and individually considered, the time and the means to reorganize their forces, refurnish them with arms which are now deficient, systematize their internal conditions, [refortify] their spirit, reestablish their unity; in fine, place them once more on their feet, extracting them from their present situation which is so grave as to constrain them to ask for peace.

All this goes to show the new document emanating from the Imperial Chancery not only evades the fundamental problem of the guarantees of the armistice but reveals the persistence of the enemy in his methods of subtle astuteness. It is necessary, then, in the interest of a just and durable peace itself to be wary and to stand on guard.

NELSON PAGE



File No. 763.72/11849

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 23, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received October 24, 9.10 a. m.]

2212. My 2210.<sup>1</sup> Offensive which starts today is undertaken in consequence of pressure brought to bear on commanding general from outside and for common good and I believe contrary to his military opinion. I hope therefore that, should it not succeed, troops will be sent here immediately as otherwise consequences may be serious.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2335

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, October 24, 1918.

[Received October 25.]

4882. *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 23d. Text of Prince Max's speech:<sup>2</sup>

Gentlemen: Since I spoke to you last time further steps have been taken by both sides in prosecution of the peace action initiated by [my] Government when I entered office.<sup>3</sup> First came President Wilson's counter question. Our frank reply in the affirmative led to another question by the President; our reply to that was published yesterday. Gentlemen, the whole German people is waiting to hear what prospects the Government thinks it can see for the success of [its] peace work. You will readily understand that I can express myself on this point only with the greatest reserve. I know that the parties also wish to have debate limited in accordance with the gravity of the hour. The German people have been addressed by President Wilson. This fact gives increased weight to the statements of the representatives of all parties.

Regarding the international situation I should like to say only one thing today. The first reply of the President to the peace step of the German Government has brought the conflict of opinions in all countries concerning the question of a peace of right or a peace of force to a climax. This is the conflict of ideas which is being publicly fought out in every country, as it should be fought out with us also in the same situation. On the one side, those raise their voices louder than ever who imagine the time is near when they can satisfy their accumulated emotion of hate and revenge on the soil of our German home; on the other side, sincere advocates of a league of nations are absolutely clear on the point that the fundamental idea of the new faith is today undergoing its decisive test. This fundamental idea is as follows: Before any single power or group of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Before the Reichstag, Oct. 22.<sup>3</sup> For the text of Prince Max's note and the notes mentioned in the two sentences here following, see *ante*, pp. 338, 343, 357, 358, and 380.

powers undertakes to use compulsion of force to assert the right which it represents against another nation the attempt must be made with all thoroughness and honesty to preserve the peace by means of voluntary agreement, or, applied to the present international situation, to attain the peace. This conflict of opinions is still undecided.

We can name the spiritual forces which confront each other, but cannot estimate their relative strength. The last note of President Wilson has not made it clear to the German people what the issue of the public dispute of opinions will be. Perhaps the new reply of the President will bring final certainty. Until then, gentlemen, [all our] thoughts and all our acts must rest upon two possibilities. [The first is] that the enemy governments want war and we have no choice but to defend ourselves with all the strength of a people driven to the extreme. In the event of this necessity I have no doubt that the German Government will be permitted to issue an appeal for the national defense in the name of the German people, just as it was privileged to speak in the name of the German people when it took action for peace. Whoever sincerely takes the position of a peace of right assumes at the same time the obligation not to yield to a peace of force without a fight. A government void of appreciation of this would be exposed to the contempt of the fighting and working people and would be swept away by the wrath of public opinion.

But, gentlemen, we must also contemplate the second possibility today in its full significance. The German people must [not] be led blindfold to the conference table. The Nation has the right to ask today what it means for our life and future if peace is arranged on the basis of Wilson's conditions. Our reply to the President's questions has, to judge from the echo of public opinion, awakened the consciousness of the German people to what is at stake; now the people want clarity.

Yes, gentlemen, it is a decision of tremendous importance. Not what we ourselves consider right but what is recognized as right in free conversation with our adversaries is to apply in future to our position as a power. [This is a] difficult victory over oneself for a proud people accustomed to victory. For the question of right does not halt at our frontiers which we would never voluntarily open to force: the principles which we have accepted as applicable to us affect also problems within the territory of the Empire.

Gentlemen, it has been held up to me from many sides that acceptance of Wilson's conditions would mean subjection to a tribunal hostile to Germany which would decide the question of right solely from the viewpoint of selfish interests. If that were the case why should the extreme-might politicians of the Entente be the very ones to shun the tribunal like guilty persons? The pith of Wilson's whole program is the League of Nations; it cannot ever be established unless all nations rise to a height of national self-control. Realization of the community of right demands surrender of a part of that absolute independence which was hitherto the sign of sovereignty with us, as well as others. It will be of decisive importance for our whole future, in what spirit we follow this necessary development. If we are tenacious inwardly of the basis of national egotism which was the ruling force in the life of the nations until a short time ago, then, gentlemen, there can be no reconstruction and renovation for us, then there would remain a feeling of bitterness which

would cripple us for generations. But when we have recognized that the meaning of this terrible war is above all else victory of the idea of right, and when we subject ourselves to this idea, not with reluctance, not with internal reservations, but with all frankness, then we shall find in it a healing for the wounds of the present and a task for the forces of the future. The German people must cooperate in this task with all the real seriousness and conscientiousness which we inherit.

Gentlemen, we need only go back two generations to find all the necessary moral incentives for the new development. If these aims of mankind are once ours the cooperation of the nations becomes the great task of liberation for us. I should like to quote my words of February 19: "The mere fight for existence standing alone leaves great sources of human power unexplored. We must take up the happiness and right of other nations in our national will."

If I depict the idea of the League of Nations to our people today, at this critical hour, as a source of consolation and new strength, I will not attempt to deceive you for one moment as to the tremendous resistances which must still be overcome before the idea can become a reality. No human being can say whether this will take place quickly or slowly. Whether the next few days or weeks may summon us to further battle, or whether the road to peace [may] be opened, there can be no doubt that we can only cope with the duties of war or peace by carrying out the program of the Government and resolutely turning aside from the old system.

I now arrive, gentlemen, at questions of internal policy regarding which I owe an accounting to the German popular representative body. On October 5 I set forth to you the general principles according to which I intended to conduct my office as Chancellor and discussed the program of the Majority parties,<sup>1</sup> whose confidence permitted me to enter this office. Guided by those principles I have taken steps with my collaborators which are intended to establish liberal conditions in the interior of Germany and regarding which I must now report to you.

Through the praiseworthy accommodation of the parties to the proposals of the Government, reform of the franchise in Prussia has progressed so far that the introduction of general, equal, direct and secret suffrage is assured there. Two drafts of laws have been submitted to the Reichstag which are to free our new form of government from the constitutional obstacles which are still in its way. The first measure intends to create the possibility for members of this High House to enter the Government without losing their Reichstag seats. This is indispensable if the connection between Parliament and the highest authorities of the Empire is to remain as firm as is called for by their joint labors and mutual confidence. The measure further proposes a change of the law relative to representation of the Imperial Chancellor. Heretofore only the chiefs of the highest departments of the Empire could become Vice Chancellor; in future, members of the Reichstag are to participate in the direction of Imperial policy and must be able to stand for the Chancellor although not having a department under them.

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<sup>1</sup> For text of speech, see *ante*, pp. 346-351.



This opens the new way to arrive at the responsible conduct of affairs of the Empire. It is the parliamentary way. We are convinced that it will prove a feeder of valuable popular forces heretofore unused, not merely for the Government, but indirectly for Parliament also. The rise of born leaders from other free vocations is not obstructed by it.

In connection with this are preliminary measures for legal enlargements of the political responsibility of the Imperial Chancellor which should be insured by the establishment of a state tribunal. It might be doubted whether a state tribunal is needed to enforce the responsibility of the Chancellor, since no Chancellor or Secretary of State can remain in office if he has lost the confidence of the Majority of this House. I nevertheless consider it useful to have the new political institutions of the German Government reforms sanctioned and safeguarded by such a new instrumentality of public law, and I hope soon to be able to submit to the Reichstag the result of the preliminary study.

The new system of Imperial Government has had a new form of government in the Reichsland as a natural consequence. An Alsatian has assumed the [governor-generalship] of Alsace-Lorraine and an Alsatian has become Secretary of State. Further, leading men from the Second Chamber of the Diet will enter the Government of the country. I assume that the new governor general will set up a program for his Government with the party leaders and publicly explain it.

Gentlemen, the second measure which looks to the amendment of article 11 of the Imperial Constitution contains the compulsory establishment of the fundamental idea of the new nature of the Government; it intends that the Reichstag as the chosen representative of the people shall have the full right of determination in deciding the most important vital questions of the whole Nation, the questions of war and peace. This constitutes a guarantee for the peaceable further evolution of the Empire and its relations with other powers. The guarantees could be strengthened [if] treaties of alliance were also made subject to the new provisions. The Imperial Government will gladly lend its hand for such extension of the people's rights when the League of Nations assumes practicable shape. As long as no world law prevails on the point Germany would be at a disadvantage by binding herself alone, but when the League of Nations has abolished all secret separate alliances and privy agreements, article 11 can be extended in this direction also.

Gentlemen, the state of war has resulted in irksome restrictions of civic liberty in all countries. Peace will bring its complete restoration. The extraordinary powers of wartimes are [as] yet indispensable, but now they can only be exercised in agreement with the Imperial Chancellor, who is responsible for their application. Unreasonable hardships are to be avoided in this way. Orders of His Majesty the Emperor, which I announced October 5, have been issued meanwhile and include not alone measures in the province of censorship, right of association and meeting, and restriction of personal liberty, but extend also to the full activity of the executive, even in the field of economic and social policy. If local military commanders cannot agree with the administrative authorities on



these points, the decision of the superior military commander must be sought, and he can make no decision and issue no order to which I, or my representative, have not assented. Secretary Groeber is my representative. Since the superior military commander has also received authority to establish general principles with my approval, provision has been made so that the act relative to the state of siege will be applied in the spirit in which I assumed direction of the affairs of the Empire and in which I am determined to carry them out.

Gentlemen, the pardoning of persons sentenced for political crimes or offences, especially in connection with strikes, street demonstrations, or similar occurrences, was part of my program of October 5. An extensive amnesty of this sort has been suggested to the Emperor and all federated governments [and] is being put into effect. A large number of those thus sentenced have already regained their liberty. The Government has arranged pardon for many of them only after overcoming serious patriotic apprehension. The conviction of the healing qualities of a policy of confidence was decisive.

Gentlemen, all constitutional [authorities] have agreed to all the steps on the new course which I [have] recited to you; they accordingly took the ground of the form of government represented by me and my collaborators. If you also, gentlemen, agree to these measures, and I have no doubt on this point, then government of the people will be firmly anchored in the laws of the Empire.

I know, gentlemen, that a review of the internal political harvest of the memorable three weeks of October produces feelings of different natures among you. To some it will appear as a description of an ill-considered course on the downward path leading to the overthrow of the existing regime, to others it will appear like an uncertain, hesitant feeling of the way towards a new form of government. Both feelings may find their expression; that is the right and duty of the opposition which we need for the independence of Parliament. Those free from any responsibility may freely criticize. To both I would state for the Government of the Reichstag Majority that my colleagues and I are in complete agreement as regards both the object and the means of reaching it. The [object is] the political majority of the German people. It stands before our eyes as an immovable guiding star. The various members of the Government proceeded from different positions originally, but they follow the common object with equal loyalty and for this reason their roads have continually approached each other.

The German people has been in the saddle for a long time; now it must ride. Our people had for a long time a number of rights which many politically mature neighbors envied it; German communal administration was a model in many respects, the Reichstag suffrage was for a long time the most liberal franchise of the world, and the Reichstag thus freely elected always had a strong political influence through its ability to refuse the budget. But the German people made no use of its power in decisive points.

It is not enough to make a master violin player to make [him a] present of a fine violin. The player must be willing to try his capacity. The German people never tried to play its instrument with full force because it gladly trusted the efficient constituted powers; its main strength was deployed in great isolated achievements outside of [politics]. It was not the arbitrariness of the constituted powers but the lack of political will among the people that preserved Germany so long as a magistral state. Since July 1917 the resolve for political responsibility has been maturing; now at the end of September it has forced its way through and through. Thus everything has become new, gentlemen; in this lies the guarantee for the maintenance and enlargement of the new system. It came [about] through a decisive turn in the development of the character of the German people which had become inevitable after all the deeds and sacrifices of this war. This affords a more substantial guarantee than any legal paragraph. I see in [it] the roots of the power of the new Government. The result is for me a fixed line of march for all our measures. Not for the sake of foreign countries, nor in order to master the distress of the moment, must we resort to forms of government not backed by our inmost convictions and not expressive of our peculiar character and history, otherwise we should act insincerely and would deprive the new system, which is now passing through its first test, of the stamp of irrevocability with which we cannot dispense. Gentlemen, the great appeal addressed by Fichte to the Germans in time of need is heard by all of us: "Now preserve yourselves as a nation for those duties in the world which you alone can perform. Every nation has a duty of its own." There are still great treasures in the depths of our people which can only be brought to light by the new freedom. Those hours in the life of the German Nation which seem to crush it down have always been the hours of the birth of new spiritual forces.

But in order to develop the quality of our peculiar nature we must be able to insist on our domiciliary right. The enemy stands at our gates; our first and last thoughts belong to [those] brave men who are defending us against superior forces and [whom] we must protect against unjust accusations. Gentlemen, it must not be believed that our army can be insulted without affecting the honor of our people. Isolated evil acts and measures have occurred in every army, but the fundamental will of the people's army rejects them. When the words were spoken that the spirit of the Red Cross was just as appropriate for a true army as the spirit of attack, overwhelming approval came from the circles of the army and confirmation came from Christian soldiers in enemy countries who fought against the Germans.

Gentlemen, our soldiers have a terribly difficult task today; they are fighting with care for their country, they are fighting with the idea of peace and still hold fast. We thank them, we trust in them, we call to them: The country will not leave you in the lurch; whatever you need and whatever it can furnish in men, material and courage shall be sent you.

BLISS

File No. 863.00/94

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, October 25, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received October 27, 11.02 a. m.]

5395. Austro-Hungarian political:

The effect of the Emperor's proclamation of federalization and of the President's reply to Austria-Hungary<sup>1</sup> has been to complete the demoralization of the country. The Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Poles, Ruthenians and Germans are engaged in organizing as quickly as possible local administrative parliaments. The Vienna Government appeals in vain to the people to maintain the present governmental organs until new can be created to replace them. No one pays any heed, with the result that the railway service and consequently the provisioning of the country is disrupted. There is outlined below the political action taken by the various nationalities of Austria:

*Austro-Germans:* At a meeting of all German delegates of Austrian Reichsrath resolution adopted calling for:

- (1) Establishment independent German-Austrian state with determination of relations which join it to other states;
- (2) German-Austrian state must include territory occupied by Germans, including German Bohemia;
- (3) New state must endeavor to assure access to Adriatic;
- (4) German Reichsrath deputies will form peace assembly for state with power to treat with other nationalities and represent German Austrians at peace convention;
- (5) An executive committee of 20 members should be appointed with power to raise loans.

The attitude of majority of German deputies is expressed by statement of Adler, Socialist leader: "German Austrians willing to form coalition of free nations with neighboring states if satisfactory conditions could be established, otherwise German-Austrian state would be forced to accept annexation to Germany."

It is most significant that German Social Democrats have joined forces with other German deputies although they had formerly been in opposition, and thereby the united action of all Germans of Austria is assured. The problem as to how far it is the desire of America and Entente to prevent realization of union of Austro-Germans with Germany is definitely presented and merits careful consideration.

*Czecho-Slovaks:* Shortly after receipt of President's answer to Austria-Hungary, Czech leader Stránský stated that all negotiations with the Czecho-Slovak Government must be carried on with

<sup>1</sup>See telegram No. 5274, Oct. 18, from the Minister in Switzerland, *ante*, p. 367, and note, Oct. 19, to the Swedish Minister, *ante*, p. 368.



the National Council of Paris as the 150 Czech delegates in Austrian Parliament no longer felt themselves authorized treat on behalf of the nation. This action was taken to avoid possible confusion which would result if there were two Czecho-Slovak Governments, one at Paris and the other at Prague. Czech leaders and Czech parliamentary delegates held recent conference at Prague under presidency of Kramárz. Resolutions have been adopted containing following principles: One aim of Czecho-Slovak nation formation of independent state closely allied with Polish and other Slav states. Foundation of Czecho-Slovak state shall be democratic and insure justice to all peoples of the state without distinction of race. There can be no negotiations with Vienna regarding the future of this state which is an international problem to be solved together with other world problems.

*Yugo-Slavs*: October 17 to 20 [there] was held at Agram reunion of a central committee elected by the national council of the Slovenes, Croatians and Serbs of Austria. This committee elected Doctor Korošec as president and announced that as duly authorized representatives of these three peoples they took over the direction of national policy. The following Yugo-Slav claims were formulated:

- (1) Reunion of all Slovene, Croat and Servian peoples;
- (2) Special representation of Yugo-Slav people at future peace conference;
- (3) Rejection of solution of Yugo-Slav problem proposed in Kaiser's manifesto of October 16.

Please see my press telegram 5391, October 25,<sup>1</sup> for recent events in Croatia which indicate beginning of Yugo-Slav revolution.

*Poles*: Since introduction into Austrian Parliament of resolution of October 2 declaring all Austro-Polish parties unified in demanding restoration of Polish state composed of all Polish territories, the Poles of Austria have taken little part in political life of Austria. In session of Austrian Delegation of October 15 the Polish delegates adopted a resolution confirming that of October 2, reiterating that henceforth they considered themselves "as members of the free and independent Polish state, including all the Polish territories, basing this action upon the declarations of the President of the United States and their acceptance by the Central Powers."

*Ruthenians*: The Austrian Ukrainians appear to be the only racial [unit] satisfied with Emperor's manifesto, as it contains first clear recognition of their nationalistic ambitions. As there are a great many Polish land-owners in eastern Galicia, and some cities, as Lemberg for example, are almost entirely Polish, though rural popu-

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 856.



lation overwhelmingly Ukrainian, the problem of Ruthenian state very difficult of solution and will inevitably meet strong Polish opposition.

Austro-Hungarian Government bitterly disappointed at President's answer as they had hoped that they would be leniently treated in order to attempt to separate them from Germany. Notwithstanding declarations in favor Yugo-Slavs and Czechs, Austro-Hungarian Government had not previously been convinced that America had abandoned its conciliatory policy of a year ago. It is reported that President's note will be shortly answered pointing out that while Austrian Government unable to treat with Czech National Council at Paris, Government will adopt conciliatory policy towards nationalities and endeavor to carry out the President's principles. An urgent request for terms of armistice for Austria-Hungary will presumably be made.

Austrian military power is at point from which decline will be rapid. Press reports from Vienna state that plans are being drawn up for the demobilization and that evacuation of Servia and Montenegro is being rapidly carried out.

*Hungary:* The project of liquidating agreement of 1867 with Austria introduced by Károlyi is being considered. Parliamentary discussions have caused heated debates over German alliance, the possibilities of separate peace and the origin of the war. Recent events in Croatia contribute to make Wekerle's position untenable and he has again offered resignation to King, which has been accepted.

Austro-Hungarian economic report:

German parts of Austria are threatened with famine. Czechs have placed every possible impediment upon export of food from Bohemia. Hungarians have entirely stopped food exports to Austria allegedly because latter refuses Hungary petroleum and coal. Austrians are appealing to Germany and to Czechs for food, as well as promising Poles of Russian Poland withdrawal of Austro-Hungarian military administration in return for food. There is little prospect that any of these measures will alleviate threatening situation of German Austria.

STOVALL

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File No. 763.72/11918

*The Vice Consul at Zürich (McNally) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ZÜRICH, October 23, 1918.

[Received October 28, 2.40 a. m.]

Am able to confirm my former telegraphic information concerning the action of the German Admiralty in ordering submarine com-

manders to discontinue operations. The German Government has requested the Admiralty to recall all submarines, pending their peace efforts. The Admiralty strenuously opposed at first sending out such orders, compromising on the instructions to their commanders to discontinue the attacks on passenger ships, but later agreed to the recall if the same was not publicly announced as it would tend to kill the morale of the Navy if known.

Ludendorff says he will hold the line from Antwerp to Liège and the Meuse River territory and that he will now thicken the resistance in other sections. Solf is for peace at any price but the Chancellor believes that it is not necessary that the Kaiser abdicate and claims to have heard from sources in the Government that the President of the United States does not insist upon abdication. The Pan-Germans are building up a national defense party in Germany who will be sworn to die in defense of the Empire. The people are opposed to a continuation of the war and speak openly of the necessity for the abdication of the Kaiser which is opposed by the military leaders who see their prestige die with the abdication. Ludendorff has promised to make a successful resistance until the sentiment for the total extinction of Germany changes in France.

[McNALLY]

File No. 763.72119/2367

*The Swiss Chargé (Oederlin) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 28, 1918.

SIR: I am instructed by my Government and have the honor to submit to Your Excellency the original German text of a communication from the German Government, dated October 27, 1918, which has today been received from the Swiss Foreign Office.

I beg leave also to enclose an English translation of the above-mentioned communication, the German text of which, however, is alone to be considered as authoritative.

Accept [etc.]

F. OEDERLIN

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The German Secretary of State of the Foreign Office (Solf) to the Swiss Foreign Office for President Wilson*

The German Government has taken cognizance of the reply of the President of the United States. The President knows the far-reaching changes which have taken place and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure. The peace negotiations are being conducted by a government of the people in whose hands rests, both actually and constitutionally, the authority to make decisions. The military powers are also subject to this authority. The German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice,

which is the first step toward a peace of justice, as described by the President in his pronouncements.

SOLF

BERLIN, *October 27, 1918.*

File No. 863.00/95

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *October 27, 1918, 9 a. m.*

[*Received October 28, 9.18 p. m.*]

5448. The Vienna Government continues to lose in influence in proportion as the various nationalities gain assurance and improve their organization. This central Government only continues to exist in virtue of the well-organized bureaucracy on which it is based and the prestige of the past and its own momentum. In regard to Andrassy's appointment as Minister for Foreign Affairs, officially announced on the 24th, if Andrassy sees that it is useless to try to save the Dual Monarchy he will probably endeavor to secure the position of Foreign Minister in Hungary. Hussarek's resignation as Austrian Minister is expected and it is rumored that Lammasch may succeed him. In accepting such a position his task would be to direct a government which would maintain order during the liquidation of old Austria and to turn over the administration to the new states. Referring to the President's answer to Austria, Lammasch is reported to have said:

I do not believe the answer of Wilson is so unfavorable as is so generally considered. The President demands that the Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-Slavs, as regards their nationalistic aspirations, should have recourse to negotiations with the various nationalities and the Vienna Government, which they have as yet refused to do. The President excludes the negotiations regarding their positions as a nation from the peace conference, which can be considered as most significant. In any case it is a postponement which benefits us and it can be surely expected that the next answer of Wilson's will be conciliatory.

The Austrian Upper House ended its debates on the 25th and it seems probable that its sessions will not be renewed. If so this probably means the end of the Austrian Parliament, as the Lower House has not been in session for some days. During last debates in Upper House, Czernin is reported to have stated:

The condition for most quickly reaching peace is to recognize the Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav states, according to the principles of Wilson. The national councils of the various peoples should, as

quickly as possible, create governments in order to get in touch with each other and create the conditions which will facilitate the way to peace.

This is most significant as a sign of the times, coming as it does from a bitter opponent of the Czechs.

It is reported that the special committee appointed by German-Austrian National Council has drafted a note to President Wilson regarding armistice and peace as well as a note to Germany and the neutral states notifying them of the formation of the German-Austrian state. A group of representative German Austrians is contemplating coming to Switzerland to [inform] themselves on neutral and enemy opinion regarding the Austrian situation.

The leaders of Czech National Council have now arrived Switzerland. During their absence Tusar is acting as leader of the National Council of Prague. He has informed the mayor of Vienna in reply to latter's request for food that he was willing to discuss the matter, not with the Vienna Government, however, but with the mayor directly. It asserts, however, that the Czech National Council has decided not to deliver any food to Vienna, that the Czech railway employees impede any such export and that the Prague branch of the Austrian food transportation office has closed.

It is telegraphed from Lemberg that the Poles of eastern Galicia have adopted a proclamation stating:

(1) In view of acceptance of President Wilson's conditions we consider ourselves as of the unified, free, and independent Poland;

(2) The Diet representative [of] all Poland should be convoked as soon as possible and should include delegates of all Polish territories;

(3) A Polish Government should be formed representing all parts of Poland;

(4) The Polish Committee of Paris is recognized as the representative of the Polish Nation in Allied countries.

*Hungary:* The Emperor has approved the proposition to establish an independent Hungary as far as concerns (foreign affairs?), army and economic agreements and consented to this to the Hungarian Parliament. A new Cabinet will take place of the Wekerle Cabinet and will try to carry [out] this [proposition] and their [*then*] attempt to make peace with the Entente. A man of the political complexion of Károlyi will probably be chosen Premier. Wekerle's statement in Parliament that in the interest of the protection of the frontiers it was necessary to immediately bring back to Hungary Hungarian troops is of special importance.



File No. 763.72119/2395

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

No. 6686

PARIS, October 14, 1918.

[Received October 29.]

SIR: Confirming my telegram No. 5414 of October 13,<sup>1</sup> I have the honor to enclose copies in translation of (1) text of the resolution adopted by the Congress of the French Socialist Party giving its approbation to the reply of the Secretary of State in the name of the President to the German proposal of acceptance of the President's fourteen bases of peace; (2) text of an appeal concurrently issued by the General Labor Confederation to the working men of France; and (3) text of a further resolution of the Socialist Party outlining its working programme for the immediate future.

I have [etc.]

W. G. SHARP

[Enclosure 1—Translation]

*Resolution Passed by the Congress of the French Socialist Party, October 11, 1918*

The Congress of the French Socialist Party, confirming its address to President Wilson, gives its approbation to the reply which has just been made in the name of the President, by Secretary of State Lansing, to the note of the German Chancellor.

The Socialist Party is pleased to take note of this first thorough application of positive and public diplomacy.

It takes note that the door is thus opened to negotiations between the belligerents with a view to a peace of justice.

It approves the diplomatic and military guarantees demanded by President Wilson in view of the armistice.

[Enclosure 2—Translation]

*Appeal of the Confédération Générale du Travail to the Workingmen of France*

The Confederate Committee, in the presence of the proposition addressed to President Wilson by the Central Empires and Turkey, for an immediate general armistice and the opening of peace negotiations:

Recalls the fact that the Confédération Générale du Travail has always declared itself in favor of the end of secret diplomacy and for a positive and public diplomacy:

That in so doing, the Confédération Générale du Travail expressed the sentiments of the popular masses, as President Wilson recognized in his speech of September 27 last, saying that:

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Assemblies and associations of many kinds made up of plain workaday people have demanded, almost every time they came together, and are still demanding, that the leaders of their governments declare to them plainly what it is, exactly what it is, that they were seeking in this war, and what they think the items of the final settlement should be.

The Confédération Générale du Travail is also conscious of having expressed the sentiments of the popular masses by approving the fourteen points of the Wilson proposition, by demanding the participation of workingmen in peace, and by declaring that this peace of the peoples which is to make an end to war should be based upon the general principles: "No annexation; the right of peoples to dispose of themselves."

For these reasons, and logical in its attitude, the Confederate Committee declares that a positive refusal to the proposition of the Central Empires and Turkey could not form the reply which is hoped for and demanded by the workingmen of this country, as well at the front as at the rear.

In exhorting the Government of this country not to remain silent before the appeals addressed to it, the Confederate Committee sees in President Wilson's propositions guarantees for the conclusion of the armistice and the opening of peace negotiations.

But it expects these guarantees to bring to the workingmen of this country the certainty that the damages caused there will be repaired, that the peoples now subjected to the law of might will be liberated, and that the possibilities of a new war may be definitively set aside.

These guarantees being admitted, the Confederate Committee could not understand that the Governments of the Entente should oppose a categorical refusal to the Central Empires and Turkey.

Before such a refusal, the Confédération Générale du Travail would feel compelled to appeal to the judgment of the workingmen of this country and to clear its own responsibility if the war were to be carried on beyond the limits determined by the fourteen points of President Wilson's proposition.

The Confederate Committee asks, at this grave hour, the working class to exercise its action in favor of public diplomacy and for the peace of peoples, superior to promptings of hatred and in a clear sentiment of international law.

THE CONFEDERATE COMMITTEE

[Enclosure 3—Translation]

*Resolution Adopted by the Congress of the French Socialist Party*

The Socialist Party proclaims, more loudly than ever, its determination to remain faithful to the principles which guided the creation

of its unity and developed its action and its forces up to the eve of the war.

These principles which, in the course of the terrible crisis weathered by Socialism during these four years, have suffered regrettable injury, in spite of the persevering efforts which the Party solemnly approved at its last National Council, must now, and definitively, be reestablished in their full force.

The Party considers that the world crisis foreseen and announced by it has only confirmed in its eyes the necessity for the disappearance of capitalistic society and for replacing it by a system in which, class antagonism being done away with, antagonism among nations could not continue either. Once again, the Party declares itself solidary for the national defense which the soldiers of the Republic are assuring by the continuity of their sacrifice, after having, in four years of war, to triumph not only over the enemy's might, but over the errors of the command, whilst they had to accept, by a prolonging of misery, the consequences of a blindly bellicose policy exploited by imperialistic ambitions.

While asserting its fidelity to national defense, the Party renews the expression of its attachment to the Internationale.

More than ever, the workingmen of the universe need an effective link. The Internationale alone can prepare the lasting peace of peoples, by abolishing the hold of finance and of high industry upon public affairs, and by killing the hatred deliberately encouraged by rulers among human groups. The Internationale alone can establish Socialism in the world.

#### SOCIALIST AUTONOMY

The Congress asserts that Socialism, in France as elsewhere, must pursue its task in complete sovereignty and autonomy, without accepting a collaboration with *bourgeois* fractions seeking to weaken its prestige and its action by associating it in power and assigning to it grave complicities. It rejects all new attempts at collaboration, considering that those of the past suffice for passing judgment upon such tactics, and that they have resulted only in arming reaction at home and imperialism abroad.

The Party will energetically defend public liberties, compromised by the political abdication known as the "sacred union". It calls upon the working class to safeguard the republican *régime*. It rises up against assaults upon individual rights, as upon the rights of the proletariat. It protests against the condemnations and the arbitrary acts which have stricken organized workingmen (notably the delegates of the workshops of war factories). It denounces the scandalous decision of the high court of justice, rendered in contradiction with laws and in subjection to power. It stigmatizes the alliance of

the Clemenceau Cabinet with the champions of the King and the remnants of Bonapartism.

### THE INTERNATIONALE AND PEACE

The Party proclaims the duty of the working class to put an end, at last, to this bloody conflict. More than ever, the working class may, by exercising its action in all belligerent nations at the same time, impose peace upon the peoples. Opposed by governments, the international Socialist conference ought to take place very soon. This conference alone can tear away the arms from all militarisms, seeking with sincerity the justest peace conditions, rising up against raging imperialisms, taking all possible precautions so that this war may not be survived by hatreds which would kindle fresh conflicts.

The French Socialist Party declares itself ready to respond immediately to the summons of Citizens Huysmans, Branting, and Troelstra, entrusted with preparing the meeting of the Internationale.

It is because they dread the expansion of the prestige of the proletariat that the governments of the two belligerent combinations fetter the liberty of the working classes and are opposed to the meeting of the conference. Socialist and Union organizations must everywhere join their efforts to force the will of the public powers and obtain the means necessary for this meeting.

The French Socialist Party accepts as its own the resolution voted on this subject at the Trades Unions Congress by more than four million English workingmen.

The Congress, in the presence of the Government's refusal to give passport facilities to the delegates regularly elected by the organized working class,

Condemns this policy on the part of the Government,

And declares that if it is to continue, the organized labor movement would necessarily take up the challenge thrown down to it;

The Congress warns the Government that the patience of organized labor men is rapidly being exhausted before the constant affronts thus made to them.

Prompted by the sentiment so forcibly expressed by English workingmen, the Party must rise up against any government which should again oppose the meeting of the Internationale, just as it must rise up against any government combining with reaction, accepting imperialistic programs, laying aside acceptable peace propositions, or attacking the working class and its organizations.

Against these expressions of a policy of reaction at home and abroad, the Party empowers its permanent committee on administration and its delegates to act by employing, according to circumstances, all the means in its power, including the refusal of



credits. It joins fully in the decisions reached by the Confédération Générale du Travail at its last congress for uniting, in case of need, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary action.

#### THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The Party castigates, with all its might, the action undertaken in Russia and in Siberia by official France and her allies, and which infringes upon the rights of the Russian people. It considers that criminal in principle, this intervention is profoundly dangerous in other ways, because it arouses the anger of the popular masses of Russia against France, and so favors the action of Prussian militarism.

The Socialist Party protests against the treatment inflicted by the rulers of France and of her allies upon the Russian Revolution, recalling only too well the treatment which the coalition of sovereigns attempted to inflict upon the French Revolution.

#### THE RIGHT OF PEOPLES AND THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS

The Socialist Party recalls that it has always demanded for all peoples the right to dispose freely of themselves from the national point of view, as well as that of determining, also freely, their own institutions. It declares that, when the treaties of peace are elaborated, it will exercise all its power in favor of all legitimate and immediately realizable national demands. But its duty is to add that it does not expect from the war, directed on both sides by capitalistic states a prey to territorial greed and to thirst for annexation, a truly just settlement of all these questions. It strenuously opposes any programme which, under pretext of attaining such an end, might urge on to a prolongation of the conflict. The general development of the political power of the working classes is what will prepare or partially realize this settlement; the triumph of international Socialism is what will establish it definitively by settling, upon indestructible bases, the liberty of all peoples as of all individuals.

In the same order of ideas, the Party recalls the fact that it has always not only supported but incited, by its action against the war, the initiatives of those who have tried, in society as it exists, to assure to the nations a minimum guarantee for peace. Therefore its support is assured to all efforts made sincerely with a view to founding as soundly as possible the institutions for arbitration of the society of nations. But it could not, without yielding to the most detestable deviations, make a war-aim of such a demand; and it would fail in its deepest thought if it did not warn workingmen that so long as monarchic dominations and capitalistic struggles exist, the peace of the world may be endangered.

## THE ACTION FOR TO-MORROW

The signing of peace must be the preface for the great work of economic, political, and social transformation for which Socialists are fighting. The war, by annihilating or overthrowing so many homes, by accumulating expenses, by indefinitely swelling debts, by preparing crushing burdens of taxes, by creating for the capitalistic state, as for the proletariat, the practical impossibility of living, has accumulated the elements for the most formidable revolution the world has ever known. It is by remaining faithful to its principles of all times that Socialism—which had foreseen this moment—shall become equal to its duties.

The Congress of the Socialist Party, at this solemn hour of history, declares that French Socialism will not fail in its task. Having a care to safeguard indispensable unity, it condemns the deviation of those who seek, in a compromise with *bourgeois* society, to elaborate bastard solutions. In the renewal of the world which they foresee, French proletarians shall have no other associates than the proletarians of the Internationale.

File No. 763.72119/2382

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *October 28, 1918.*

[Received October 29, 9.55 a. m.]

5461. Berne *Bund*, 28th: Hungarian press bureau reports from Budapest creation, 25th, Hungarian National Council by Károlyi Party, Social Democrats and Radicals. Program demands removal present Government, independence Hungary, Hungarian troops to be recalled from front, and "immediate ending of hopeless war." [In] peace negotiations interests of Hungary alone must be considered and German alliance dissolved. Lower House to be dissolved and new House elected based on equal and woman suffrage. Non-Hungarian nationalities of Hungary must have right of self-determination in sense of Wilson principles. Hungarian delegates peace conference must favor disarmament, League of Nations and arbitration. National Assembly alone can decide questions peace and war. Same paper: Berlin reports creation Soldiers' and Workmen's Council in Budapest. Whole press appears uncensored and favours Károlyi. Bourgeois and students have organized and 200 officers demanded peace at Károlyi Club. Károlyi now subject to National Council.

Berne *Bund*, 28th: German Reichstag Majority proposes article of Constitution that Chancellor must have confidence Reichstag.

Chancellor also responsible for all official acts of Emperor. Proposes also that Chancellor shall countersign all military appointments. Minister of War also to be responsible to Reichstag. Majority party has introduced proposal to subject military authorities to civil authority. Secretary of State Groeber announced that if these proposals were accepted by Reichstag Government would speak for them in Bundesrat. All proposals were accepted by all votes against Conservative opposition.

Berne *Bund*, 28th, Vienna: Lammasch intends formation coalition cabinet of officials without party colour. This Government to be transitional and task to bring about peace as soon as possible. Vienna Correspondence Bureau reports Redlich as Finance Minister new Cabinet, which will contain all former Ministers except Justice who will be higher official. Same paper, Vienna Correspondence Bureau reports acceptance by city congress German-Austrian proposal for German National Council soon to administer new German-Austrian state and to prevent hunger catastrophe by organizing food supply. Meeting affirmed faithfulness to alliance with Germany. Same paper, Austrian War Press Bureau reports riots Fiume due to misled replacement company. All troops fighting [with] accustomed bravery.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/2392

*The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

No. 5328

WASHINGTON, *October 29, 1918.*

[*Received October 29, 4.20 p. m.*]

EXCELLENCY: By order of my Government, I have the honor to beg you to submit to the President the following communication from the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary:

In reply to the note of President Wilson to the Austro-Hungarian Government dated October 18 [19]<sup>1</sup> of this year, with regard to the decision of the President to take up with Austria-Hungary separately the question of armistice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honor to declare that it adheres both to the previous declarations of the President and his opinion of the rights of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, notably those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, contained in his last note. Austria-Hungary having thereby accepted all the conditions which the President had put upon entering into negotiations on the subject of armistice and peace, nothing, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, longer stands in the way of beginning those negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government therefore declares itself ready to enter, without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations, into

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 368.



negotiations for a peace between Austria-Hungary and the Entente states and for an immediate armistice on all the Austro-Hungarian fronts and begs President Wilson to take the necessary measures to that effect.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

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Participation of Colonel House in the Armistice Negotiations at Paris—  
Interpretation of the Fourteen Points—British Reservation Concerning  
“Freedom of the Seas”—American Note to Turkey, October 31—Austro-  
Hungarian Note, Received October 31

File No. 763.72119/8979

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *October 29, 1918, 3 p. m.*<sup>1</sup>

5. Following for the President from Colonel House:

At my request Cobb and Lippmann<sup>2</sup> have compiled the following respecting your fourteen points. I shall be grateful to you if you will cable me whether it meets with your general approval. Here follows memorandum:

1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

The purpose is clearly to prohibit treaties, sections of treaties or understandings that are secret, such as the [Triple Alliance], etc.

The phrase “openly arrived at” need not cause difficulty. In fact, the President explained to the Senate last winter that the phrase was not meant to exclude confidential diplomatic negotiations involving delicate matters. The intention is that nothing which occurs in the course of such confidential negotiations shall be binding unless it appears in the final covenant made public to the world.

The matter may perhaps be put this way: it is proposed that in future every treaty be part of the public law of the world, and that every nation assume a certain obligation in regard to its enforcement. Obviously, nations cannot assume obligations in matters of which they are ignorant; and therefore any secret treaty tends to undermine the solidity of the whole structure of international covenants which it is proposed to erect.

2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

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<sup>1</sup>Time of receipt not indicated; the London date line, at a time when Colonel House was in Paris, is possibly explained by the forwarding of the telegram from there.

<sup>2</sup>Frank I. Cobb, editor of the *New York World*, and Walter Lippmann, Secretary of The Inquiry, later attached to the Commission to Negotiate Peace.



This proposition must be read in connection with number 14 which proposes a league of nations. It refers to navigation under the three following conditions: (1) general peace; (2) a general war, entered into by the League of Nations for the purpose of enforcing international covenants; (3) limited war, involving no breach of international covenants.

Under " (1) General peace " no serious dispute exists. There is implied freedom to come and go [on the high seas].

No serious dispute exists as to the intention under " (2) A general war entered into by the League of Nations to enforce international covenants. " Obviously such a war is conducted against an outlaw nation and complete non-intercourse with that nation is intended.

" (3) A limited war, involving no breach of international covenants " is the crux of the whole difficulty. The question is, what are to be the rights of neutral shipping and private property on the high seas during a war between a limited number of nations when that war involves no issue upon which the League of Nations cares to take sides. In other words, a war in which the League of Nations remains neutral. Clearly, it is the intention of the proposal that in such a war the rights of neutrals shall be maintained against the belligerents, the rights of both to be clearly and precisely defined in the law of nations.

3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

The proposal applies only to those nations which accept the responsibilities of membership in the League of Nations. It means the destruction of all special commercial agreements, each putting the trade of every other nation in the League on the same basis, the most-favored-nation clause applying automatically to all members of the League of Nations. Thus a nation could legally maintain a tariff or a special railroad rate or a port restriction against the whole world, or against all the signatory powers. It could maintain any kind of restriction which it chose against a nation not in the League. But it could not discriminate as between its partners in the League.

This clause naturally contemplates fair and equitable understanding as to the distribution of raw materials.

4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest points consistent with domestic safety.

" Domestic safety " clearly implies not only internal policing, but the protection of territory against invasion. The accumulation of armaments above this level would be a violation of the intention of the proposal.

What guarantees should be given and taken, or what are to be the standards of judgment have never been determined. It will be necessary to adopt the general principle and then institute some kind [of international commission of investigation] to prepare detailed projects for its execution.

5. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

Some fear is expressed in France [and England] that this involves reopening of all colonial questions. Obviously it is not so intended. It applies clearly [to those] colonial claims which have been created by the war. That means the German colonies and any other colonies which may come under international consideration as a result of the war.

The stipulation is that in the case of the German colonies the title is to be determined after the conclusion of the war by "impartial adjustment" based on certain principles. These are of two kinds: (1) "equitable" claims; (2) the interests of the populations concerned.

What are the "equitable" claims put forth by Great Britain and Japan, the two chief heirs of the German colonial empire, that the colonies cannot be returned to Germany? Because she will use them as submarine bases, because she will arm the blacks, because she uses the colonies as bases of intrigue, because she oppresses the natives. What are the "equitable" claims put forth by Germany? That she needs access to tropical raw material, that she needs a field for the expansion of her population, that under the principles of the peace proposed, conquest gives her enemies no title to her colonies.

What are the "interests of the populations"? That they should not be militarized, that exploitation should be conducted on the principle of the "open door", and under the strictest regulation as to labor conditions, profits and taxes, that a sanitary regime be maintained, that permanent improvements in the way of roads, etc., be made, that native organization and custom be respected, that the protecting authority be stable and experienced enough to thwart intrigue and corruption, that the [protecting] power have adequate resources in money and competent administrators to act successfully.

It would seem as if the principle involved in this proposition is that a colonial power acts not as owner of its colonies, but as trustee for the natives and for the interests of the society of nations, that the terms on which the colonial administration is conducted are a matter of international concern and may legitimately be the subject of international inquiry, and that the peace conference may, therefore, write a code of colonial conduct binding upon [all] colonial powers.

6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind

that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

The first question is whether Russian territory is synonymous with territory belonging to the former Russian Empire. This is clearly not so, because proposition 13 stipulates an independent Poland, a proposal which excludes the territorial reestablishment of the Empire. What is recognized as valid for the Poles will certainly have to be recognized for the Finns, the Lithuanians, the Letts, and perhaps also for the Ukrainians. Since the formulating of this condition these subject nationalities have emerged, and there can be no doubt that they will have to be granted an opportunity of free development.

The problem of these nationalities is complicated by two facts: (1) that they have conflicting claims; (2) that the evacuation called for in the proposal may be followed by Bolshevist revolutions in all of them.

The chief conflicts are: (*a*) between the Letts and Germans in Courland; (*b*) between the Poles and the Lithuanians on the northeast; (*c*) between the Poles and the White Ruthenians on the east; (*d*) between the Poles and the Ukrainians on the southeast (and in eastern Galicia).

In this whole borderland the relations of the German Poles [*sic*] to the other nationalities is roughly speaking that of landlord to peasant. Therefore the evacuating of the territory, if it resulted in class war, would very probably also take the form of a conflict of nationalities. It is clearly to the interests of a good settlement that the real nation in each territory should be consulted rather than the ruling and possessing class.

This can mean nothing less than the [recognition] by the peace conference of a series of [*de facto*] governments representing Finns, Esths, Lithuanians, Ukrainians. This primary [act] of recognition should be conditional upon the calling of national assemblies for the creation of *de facto* governments, as soon as the peace conference has drawn frontiers for these new states. The frontiers should be drawn so far as possible on ethnic lines, but in [every] case the right of unhampered economic [transit] should be reserved. No dynastic ties with German [or] Austrian or Romanoff princes should be permitted, and every inducement should be [given] to encourage federal [relations] between these new states. Under proposition 3 the economic sections of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk are obliterated, but this proposition should not be construed as forbidding a customs union, a monetary union, a railroad union, etc., of these states. Provision should also be made by which Great Russia can federate with these states on the same terms.

As for Great Russia and Siberia, the peace conference might well send a message asking for the creation of a government sufficiently [representative] to speak for these territories. It should be understood that economic rehabilitation is offered provided a government carrying sufficient credentials can appear at the peace conference.



The Allies should offer this provisional government any form of assistance it may need. The possibility of extending this will exist when the Dardanelles are opened.

The essence of the Russian problem then in the immediate future would seem to be: (1) the recognition of provisional governments; (2) assistance extended to and through these governments.

The Caucasus should probably be treated as part of the problem of the Turkish Empire. No information exists justifying an opinion on the proper policy in regard to Mohammedan Russia—that is, briefly, Central Asia. It may well be that some power will have to be given a limited mandate to act as protector.

In any case the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest must be cancelled as palpably fraudulent. Provision must be made for the withdrawal of all German troops in Russia and the peace conference [will] have a clean slate on which to write a policy for all the Russian peoples.

7. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

The only problem raised here is in the word "restored". Whether restoration is to be in kind or how the amount of the indemnity is to be determined is a matter of detail, not of principle. The principle that should be established is that in the case of Belgium there exists no distinction between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" destruction. The initial act of invasion was illegitimate and therefore all the consequences of that act are of the same character. Among the consequences may be put the war debt of Belgium. The recognition of this principle would constitute "the healing act" of which the President speaks.

8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

In regard to the restoration of French territory it might well be argued that the invasion of northern France, being the result of the illegal act as regards Belgium, was in itself illegal. But the case is not perfect. As the world stood in 1914, war between France and Germany was not in itself a violation of international law, and great insistence should be put upon keeping the Belgian case distinct and symbolic. Thus Belgium might well, as indicated above, claim reimbursement not only for destruction but for the cost of carrying on the war. France could not claim payment, it would seem, for more than the damage done to her northeastern departments.



The status of Alsace-Lorraine was settled by the official statement issued a few days ago. It is to be restored completely to French sovereignty.

Attention is called to the strong current of French opinion which claims "the boundaries of 1914 [1814]" rather than of 1871. The territory claimed is the valley of the Saar with its coalfields. No claim on grounds of nationality can be established, but the argument leans on the possibility of taking this territory in lieu of indemnity; it would seem to be a clear violation of the President's proposal.

Attention is called also to the fact that no reference is made to status of Luxemburg. The best solution would seem to be a free choice by the [people of] Luxemburg themselves.

9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

This proposal is less than the Italian claim; less, of course, than the territory allotted by the treaty of London; less than the arrangement made between the Italian Government and the Jugo-Slav state.

In the region of Trent the Italians claim a strategic rather than ethnic frontier. It should be noted in this connection that [Italy] and Germany will become neighbors if German Austria joins the German Empire. And if Italy obtains the best geographical frontier she will assume sovereignty over a large number of Germans. This is a violation of principle. But it may be argued that by drawing a sharp line along the crest of the Alps, Italy's security will be enormously enhanced and the necessity of heavy armaments reduced. It might, therefore, be provided that Italy should have her claim in the Trentino, but that the northern part, inhabited by Germans, should be completely autonomous and that the population should not be liable to military service in the Italian Army. Italy could thus occupy the uninhabited Alpine peaks for military purposes, but would not govern the cultural life of the alien population to the south of her frontier.

The other problems of the frontier are questions between Italy and Jugo-Slavia, Italy and the Balkans, Italy and Greece.

The agreement reached with Jugo-Slavs may well be allowed to stand, although it should be insisted for [the protection of] the hinterland that both Trieste and Fiume be free ports. This is [essential] to Bohemia, German Austria, Hungary, as well as to prosperity of the cities themselves.

Italy appears in Balkan politics through her claim to a protectorate over Albania and the possession of Valona. There is no serious objection raised to this, [although the] terms of the protectorate need to be vigorously controlled. If Italy is protector of Albania, [the local] life of Albania should be guaranteed by the League of Nations.

A conflict with Greece appears through the Greek claim to northern Epirus, or what is now southern Albania. This would bring Greece closer to Valona than Italy desires. A second conflict with Greece occurs over the Aegean Islands of the Dodekanese, but it is understood that a solution favorable to Greece is being worked out.

Italy's claims in Turkey belong to the problem of the Turkish Empire.

10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

This proposition no longer holds. Instead we have [to-day] the following elements:

(1) *Czecho-Slovakia*. Its territories include at least a million Germans for whom some provision must be made.

The independence of Slovakia means the dismemberment of the northwestern countries of Hungary.

(2) *Galicia*. Western Galicia is clearly Polish. Eastern Galicia is in large measure Ukrainian (or Ruthenian) and does not of right belong to Poland.

There also are several hundred thousand Ukrainians along the north and northeastern borders of Hungary and in parts of Bukowina (which belonged to Austria).

(3) *German Austria*. This territory should of right be permitted to join Germany, but there is strong objection in [France] because of the increase of [population] involved.

(4) *Jugo-Slavia*. It faces the following problems: (a) Frontier questions with Italy in Istria and the Dalmatian coast; with Roumania in the Banat. (b) An international problem arises out of the refusal of the Croats to accept the domination of the Serbs of the Servian Kingdom. (c) A problem of the Mohammedan Serbs of Bosnia who are said to be loyal to the Hapsburgs. They constitute a little less than one-third of the population.

(5) *Transylvania*. Will undoubtedly join Roumania, but provision must be made for the protection of the Magyars, Szeklers and Germans who constitute a large minority.

(6) *Hungary*. Now independent and very democratic in form, but governed by Magyars whose aim is to prevent the detachment of territory of nationalities on the fringe.

The United States is clearly committed to the program of national unity and independence. It must stipulate, however, for the protection of national minorities, for freedom of access to the Adriatic and the Black Sea, and it supports a program aiming at a confederation of southeastern Europe.

11. Roumania, [Serbia,] and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

This proposal is also altered by events. Servia will appear as Jugo-Slavia with access to the Adriatic. Roumania will have acquired the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and probably Transylvania. These two states will have eleven or twelve million inhabitants and will be far greater and stronger than Bulgaria.

Bulgaria should clearly have her frontier in the southern Dobrudja as it stood before the second Balkan War. She should also have

Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line and perhaps even to the Midia-Rodosto line.

Macedonia should be allotted after an impartial investigation. The line which might be taken as a basis of investigation is the southern line of the "contested zone" agreed upon by Serbia and Bulgaria before the first Balkan War.

Albania could be under a protectorate, no doubt of Italy, and its frontiers in the north might be essentially those of the London conference.

12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

The same difficulty arises here as in the case of Austria-Hungary concerning the word "autonomous".

It is clear that the Straits and Constantinople, while they may remain nominally Turkish, should be under international control. This control may be collective or be in the hands of one power as mandatory of the League.

Anatolia should be reserved for the Turks. The coast lands, where Greeks predominate, should be under special international control, perhaps with Greece as mandatory.

Armenia must be [given] a port on the Mediterranean, and a protecting power established. France may claim it, but the Armenians would prefer Great Britain.

Syria has already been allotted to France by agreement with Great Britain.

Great Britain is clearly the best mandatory for Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia.

A general code of guarantees binding upon all mandatories in Asia Minor should be written into the treaty of peace.

This should contain provisions for minorities and the "open door". The trunk railroad lines should be internationalized.

13. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenants.

The chief problem is whether Poland is to obtain territory west of the Vistula, which would cut off the Germans of East Prussia from the Empire, or whether Danzig can be made a free port and the Vistula internationalized.

On the east, Poland should receive no territory in which Lithuanians or Ukrainians predominate.

If Posen and Silesia go to Poland, rigid protection must be afforded the minorities of Germans and Jews living there, as well as in other parts of the Polish state.



The principle on which frontiers will be [delimited] is contained in the President's word "indisputably". This may imply the taking of an impartial census before frontiers are marked.

14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small [states] alike.

The principle of a league of nations as the primary essential of a permanent peace has been so clearly presented by President Wilson in his speech of September 27, 1918, that no further elucidation is required. It is the foundation of the whole diplomatic structure of a permanent peace.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/8981

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *October 29, 1918, midnight.*

[Received October 29, 8.17 p. m.]

7. Cobb has reported to me the following:

General opinion of all American correspondents in Paris is that the one definite policy of the Allies at this time is to take the control of the peace negotiations out of the [hands] of President Wilson. The same opinion is expressed by correspondents who have just returned to Paris from London. That also is the tone of a large section of the French papers.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72/11952

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *October 29, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received 9.35 p. m.]

3191. There was a noticeable feeling of relief when the President officially transmitted his correspondence with the German Government to Great Britain and France and intimated that the next rejoinder must come from the concerted action of all the nations opposing the Central Powers. While the country as a whole felt that the President's demands would be in accord with those of Great Britain, there was a good deal of anxiety lest the series of notes between Germany and the United States should involve the Allies in unforeseen complications and possibly if too prolonged weaken



the morale of the army and the people at home. During the last two weeks events have followed each other with such rapidity that the press and people are quite unable to appreciate their significance. The widely advertised reforms in the German Government, the resignation of Ludendorff, and the statement that Germany merely waits to be informed of the armistice terminations are treated very sceptically. There is a tendency everywhere to distrust all optimistic statements and people as a rule refrain from expressing such opinions although many no doubt feel more confident than they are willing to admit. There is a strong but numerically small party who call for unconditional surrender. The Pacifist "Peace At Once" Party is hardly heard and its organs have contented themselves for the most part with expressing satisfaction with the existing situation.

I notice a disposition among some in higher official quarters to shrink from the idea of the suppression of the Hohenzollern dynasty and even of the abdication of the present Emperor. Those who show such feelings seem inclined to think it would be better in the long run to deal with a thoroughly chastened and fettered Hohenzollern Government than to begin anew with an unknown quantity. The majority of the people are waiting to see what course events will take and refrain from expressing their opinions too forcibly. The country is more desirous of an early peace than it wishes to show and, while unwilling to give up any of the advantages which have been won so far and united in demanding a complete and unquestioned victory including the acknowledgment of the Allies' war aims, the nation would probably be willing to accept [*forego?*] the triumph of an absolute dictated peace and the satisfaction obtainable from a complete humiliation of the German people if the war could be shortened thereby. It is not probable, however, that the Government will recant any of its war aims which, while somewhat indefinite as officially pronounced, are fairly clear in the popular mind. Nor will the nation shrink from a prolonged prosecution of the war should such a course prove to be necessary, but should an early peace prove to be unobtainable the general disappointment will be far more keen than will be immediately apparent, and the natural reaction might weaken the morale of the country to a noticeable extent.

Mr. Balfour's speech at the luncheon of the British colonial representatives, in which he stated that Great Britain could never consent to the return of the German colonies, has been generally approved although without great enthusiasm. In some quarters this pronouncement is looked upon as premature; it was, however, inevitable that he should make some statement on this matter at such a gather-

ing and equally inevitable, considering the well-known views of the British Minister, that it should take the form it did. There is a rumor that if Holland should enter the war or give valuable aid to the Allies the German colonies might be handed over to her, but I attach no importance to this further than that it indicates a disposition to find a solution of the question along the line of no annexations. The press today comments enthusiastically upon the visit of Prince Higashi Fushimi, to whose mission considerable importance is attached. It is looked upon as a further guarantee of close cooperation between Great Britain and Japan both during the present war and afterwards and as a formal approval of the Anglo-Japanese alliance which the press unites in praising.

A statement on economic policy after the war promised in Parliament by the Prime Minister is being awaited with great interest. The French Government has sent to Great Britain Monsieur de Boysson, a controller general of armies, to obtain British machinery for French territory being evacuated by the Germans. He has asked that war restrictions as to priorities be relaxed as much as possible because of the serious problem of providing employment for French workmen in these districts. This is a problem which may soon be deserving of very serious attention. The threatened strike of South Wales coal miners to begin November 18 would be nothing short of a calamity in view of the present acute shortage of coal. The way the Government handles this matter may be watched carefully for the next two weeks.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 862.001W64/32

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *October 29, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received 11.32 p. m.*]

3042. My 2938, October 14.<sup>1</sup> From an absolutely reliable source, directly connected with the chiefs of the present German Government, the Legation is informed that the Kaiser's abdication is imminent. The step will be taken as proof of the sincerity of the new course in Germany on the ground that the Kaiser's public personality is incompatible with the spirit of the new order. The Crown Prince will also abdicate but the monarchical form of government [will be] maintained.

AMERICAN LEGATION

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72119/2393

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *October 29, 1918, 2 p. m.*[Received *October 30, 12.50 a. m.*]

4904. Through an entirely reliable propagandist [*spokesman?*], the Turkish Minister here has conveyed the information that he has been instructed by his Government to see the American representative and to say that Turkish Government is very desirous of renewing friendly and diplomatic relations with the United States. Please instruct. In view of your 2230<sup>1</sup> I have repeated above to Colonel House at Paris.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/2401

*The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *October 29, 1918, 12 a. m.*[Received (*October 30?*), *2.03 a. m.*]

3043. Osborne<sup>2</sup> was last night visited by young German Liberal whom he knew in Berlin and who is known to Bullitt and from whom the Department has had various reports through the Legation at The Hague.<sup>3</sup> He came evidently with the knowledge and consent of the present German Government in an effort to establish its bond as democratic and representative Government.

Osborne reports that the change in the man physically and in his ideas since he knew him in Berlin were far more significant and interesting than what he said, which in effect was only what the Government press has been claiming for the new regime. On this occasion he appeared not as the sincere exponent of a quasi-liberalism, but as one who had come to see the needs and demands of the people as the result of period of adversity and suffering. He was quite ready to admit that the present triumph of liberalism in Germany would never have been achieved without the military failures as a stimulus. The adherence to the new program on the part of many is pure opportunism, for instance, in the case of the National Liberals. The sincerity of the leaders of the new Government is proved by their including in their program far-reaching constitutional and administrative reforms which two months ago they would not advise, but for which they know there is a popu-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Lithgow Osborne, Second Secretary of the Legation.<sup>3</sup> Kurt Hahn; see telegrams to the Legation in the Netherlands. No. 907, Jan. 11, and No. 2335, Nov. 4; from the Legation, No. 1880, Jan. 13, and No. 1974, Jan. 30; pp. 23, 459, 26, and 59, respectively.

lar demand. Up to the present time these changes have been sincere. If more extreme reforms are adopted at this juncture, such as the declaration of a republic merely to impress the Entente, they would be insincere, as they would not represent the demands of the people now. The constitutional reforms which [it] is expected [will] now become law and which take the command of the army away from the Emperor, subordinate the military to the civil authorities, fix the responsibility of the Chancellor to the Reichstag and make his counter-signature necessary for the validity of the Emperor's, etc., furnish the requisite legal guarantees for democratic development and deprive the militarists of all constitutional support. Such guarantees are, however, "scraps of paper" unless backed up by a popular will to make full use of them. That such a will exists is also indicated by the fact of the extensive amplification of what was originally the present Government's program as the result of the people's demands.

He maintained that the present Government's willingness and ability to fight successfully the militarists is shown by the action of Prince Max in writing out his own resignation and sending word that he would insist upon its acceptance unless Ludendorff disappeared within 24 hours, and also by his instructions to all submarines to return to their bases. Prince Max was responsible many months ago for securing the dismissal of brutal prison camp commanders and since taking office the two most offensive of the commanding generals have been dismissed and also the Secretary of War, who was the protégé of Great Headquarters. The militarists can be reinstated only as a result of a *coup d'état* or popular desire, both of which are unthinkable after they have been discredited through experiences.

The Chancellor's peace platform, he stated, was based on President Wilson's sincerity and expressed sympathy for the German people. Prince Max's strength and consequently his power of accomplishing his rational and cleansing work, varies according to the strength of the German people's belief in the sincerity of the President. After his first answer was received, prestige of the President was tremendous, but his third was regarded as "lending his moral vocabulary to the claims of the French jingoes" and indicating that Germany was to make herself powerless to resist the will to destroy her of those Governments who signed the still unwarranted [*unrepudiated?*] secret treaties.<sup>1</sup> Degrading terms of armistice would anticipate the work of the peace conference, as this would mean a dictated peace, and hence make impossible a "league of freely con-

<sup>1</sup> For the replies and treaties mentioned, see notes to the Swiss Chargé. Oct. 8 and Oct. 23, *ante*, pp. 343 and 381; and *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 493 *et seq.*



senting free nations," and will undermine and discredit the President's peace program at the outset. He contended that Prince Max will stand discredited and can only resign or refuse the terms in spite of the overwhelming odds against Germany. But for the present the German people will be embittered permanently, since the belief that their freedom is won, and needs only to be extended and secured, exists not only in the present Government but also among such pre-war Radicals as Maximilian Harden, Theodore Wolff and the Independent Socialists who began their recent manifesto with "German militarism has received a blow from which it can never recover."

(Informer returned Berlin this morning.)

GRANT-SMITH

File No. 763.72119/2399

*The Vice Consul at Zürich (McNally) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ZÜRICH, October 26, 1918.

[Received October 30, 6.26 a. m.]

President Wilson's last note has made a favorable impression on the members of the Prisoner Exchange Commission now sitting at Berne, as well as on the German Minister there, and the terms of the note are now fully understood by them. They admit the necessity for the early abdication of the Kaiser and a complete change in the Constitution. Prince Hohenlohe, the leader of the German Commission, has sent a code telegram to the authorized statesmen urging that this action be taken immediately. The German Minister has telegraphed to the same effect.

Ludendorff influence on the Chancellor changed the tenor of the last German note. Thirty generals had been called by the Government to give to the War Cabinet full details of the military situation but because Ludendorff declared that it was a reflection on him and that if carried out he would resign, the order was countermanded. He is urging a national defence and when asked his reasons therefor, replied that they had sufficient materials to defend their frontier for four months during which time public sentiment [it] is expected would change.

The Kaiser has moved his headquarters to Homburg with his staff, all of whom hide true military conditions and the real sentiment of the people towards him. While the leaders of the Government realize that the Kaiser must abdicate, none among them have the courage to inform him. My [informant] says those at Legation are informed that if it is finally decided to depose the Kaiser or force his abdication their reply to the President's note will be de-

layed to permit an amendment to their Constitution, for as it now reads the Crown Prince would automatically succeed to the throne. It is certain that their materials are practically exhausted.

McNALLY

File No. 763.72119/2420

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *October 29, 1918, 3 p. m.*

[*Received October 30, 1.07 p. m.*]

5480. Prince Alfred of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Secretary of Austrian Legation, formerly attached Austro-Hungarian Embassy, Washington, telephoned to Dulles requesting interview. In view Department's instruction regarding proposed visit of Tarnowski, I hesitated to have member of Legation receive Hohenlohe. Hohenlohe thereupon met Doctor H. H. Field of Zurich who reports interview as follows:

Firstly, Hohenlohe stated that the Austrian Government desires to emphasize officially that her note is intended to mean that she sues for a separate peace independent of Germany's decisions. This fact was implied in the note but was somewhat veiled in order not to provoke needless irritation with her former ally and also to [prevent] internal disturbances on the part of the newly constituted Austro-German national state.

Secondly, that the Austrian Government begs for immediate action in her own interest as well as in the interest of the cause for which the President stands. This for three reasons:

(a) Bolshevism is raising its head to an alarming degree and the movement may lead to chaos and anarchy against which no continental country is today immune.

(b) Starvation in its direst form is threatening Austria.

(c) The military offensive now in progress is causing needless loss of life without its being possible for it to secure greater concessions since the capitulation of Austria-Hungary is already intended to be complete.

Thirdly, the Austrian Government declares that its note is absolutely sincere; that it has no occasion for endeavoring to leave loop holes for any subsequent equivocation. He states that the present Government regarded its sole duty to be one of liberators. Its relations with the separate nationalities are therefore very complex and diversified, extending from absolute [representation] as spokesman for the German national element, to a condition in which the Government could scarcely be called a spokesman at all, as was the case for the Czecho-Slovak state. Any question of modality "as to

whether or not the present Government can speak for the subject nationalities" can be immediately arranged in accordance with any suggestions that may be made by President Wilson. The situation of the Government rendered it difficult to find a wording for its last note to the President which would correctly express the resolution taken by the Austrian Government, namely, to meet the President's wishes in every possible way.

Hohenlohe stated that the foregoing was spoken under direction from his Government.

Prince Hohenlohe then continued with personal impressions concerning the extremities under which the Austrians were at present living and endeavoring to make his appeal as distressed as could be. He gave a very vocal picture of the danger which is staring in the face two million people of Vienna and declared that the people had reached [worse] extremities than any pictured. When asked whether he wanted this or that political solution, would be sure to reply that he wanted peace and food and cared for nothing else. The particular kind of peace which might be offered seemed unimportant compared with the clamor for immediate peace. He referred especially to the danger that would arise when the troops returned [from] the front, as they were the only elements capable of creating a [revolution]. Their resentment would be increased by any delay in securing peace.

He bitterly criticized the consequences of Austria having placed herself in dependence upon the German Empire. He knew that the unrestricted submarine warfare was accepted by his countrymen with extreme reluctance but when they were told on expert testimony that it would lead to complete victory within three months, it was as impossible to protest against it as it would be for a patient to object to the positive prescriptions of his [physician]. He referred to the letter of Prince Max<sup>1</sup> as revealing a change of view since the beginning of the year and pointed out that this was the lot of all Germans. Indeed the Chancellor had less far to go than the bulk of his countrymen with whom, however, peace must be eventually signed. He stated that he himself had gone through an evolution.

In conclusion Prince Hohenlohe expressed the hope that everything would be done to save time in reaching a cessation of hostilities and a provisioning of the country and that until official relations could be established communications might be continued through the same channels upon points which required immediate action.

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 338.

Doctor Field informs me that his impression of Prince Hohenlohe was that of complete openness. He invited questions and said that it was no time for standing [on ceremony].

STOVALL

President Wilson's Files

*The President to the Special Representative (House)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1918.<sup>1</sup>

Analysis of fourteen points<sup>2</sup> satisfactory interpretation of principles involved but details of application mentioned should be regarded as merely illustrative suggestions and reserved for peace conference. Admission of inchoate nationalities to peace conference most undesirable.

WOODROW WILSON

File No. 763.72119/8982

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 30, 1918, 4 a. m.

[Received 2.30 p. m.]

8. For the President:

Lloyd George, Balfour, and Reading lunched with me today<sup>3</sup> and George stated that it was his opinion that if the Allies submitted to Germany's terms of armistice without more [discussion?], Germany would assume that the Allies had accepted President Wilson's fourteen points and other speeches without qualification. So far as Great Britain was concerned, George stated, point 2 of speech of January 8, 1918, respecting freedom of the seas, could not be accepted with [out] qualification. He admitted that if point 2 was made a part of point 14 concerning League of Nations, and assuming League of Nations was such a one as Great Britain could subscribe to, it might be possible for Great Britain to accept point 2. He said that he did not wish to discuss freedom of the seas with Germany and [if] freedom of the seas was a condition of peace Great Britain could not agree to it. Before our discussion ended it seemed as though we were near an agreement concerning this matter along the lines of interpretation of point 2 heretofore cabled you in cable No. 5<sup>2</sup> to the Department.

<sup>1</sup> Hour of dispatch not recorded.<sup>2</sup> Reference is to the Special Representative's telegram No. 5 of Oct. 29, *ante*, p. 405.<sup>3</sup> Oct. 29; the telegram was evidently written on that date, though not sent until after midnight.



We then went to conference at Quai d'Orsay attended by Clemenceau, Pichon, George, Balfour, Sonnino and myself. Conference opened with discussion of fourteen points enumerated in President's address of January 8 last. Clemenceau and others balked at number [*point*] 1 until I read them interpretation thereof as cabled to you in telegram No. 5. They then all accepted number [*point*] 1. After number [*point*] 2 had been read, George made a short speech worded so as to excite Clemenceau. He reversed his position taken a short time before with me privately and said respecting point 2: "We cannot accept this under any circumstances; it takes away from us the power of blockade. My view is this, I want to see character of League of Nations first before I accept this proposition. I do not wish to discuss it with Germany. I will not make it a condition of peace with Germany." I stated that if these views were persisted in the logical consequences would be for the President to say to Germany: "The Allies do not agree to the conditions of peace proposed by me and accordingly the present negotiations are at an end." I pointed out that this would leave the President free to consider the question afresh and to determine whether the United States should continue to fight for the principles laid down by the Allies. My statement had a very exciting effect upon those present. Balfour then made a forceful speech to the effect that it was clear that the Germans were trying to drive a wedge between the President and the Allies and that their attempts in this direction must be foiled.

It was then suggested that France, England, and Italy confer together and submit tomorrow drafts of the proposed answers to the President's communication asking whether they agree to his terms of peace, stating where they can agree with the President and where they disagree. I then offered to withdraw from the conference so that they would feel at liberty to discuss the matter between themselves. They all stated that they had no secret from America and that they wished me to remain. Accordingly it was agreed after further discussion and after the reading of the terms agreed upon by the inter-Allied naval conference now in session in Paris for the naval armistice that we should meet Wednesday afternoon to consider draft answers by the Allies to the President's communication transmitting correspondence between the President and Germany.

French Prime Minister and Italian Prime Minister are not at all in sympathy with the idea of League of Nations. Italian Prime Minister will probably submit many objections to fourteen points. French Prime Minister, George, and I agreed to meet Wednesday morning without Italian Prime Minister for the purpose of further discussion.

It is my view that privately George and Balfour believe that the proposed terms of the naval armistice and those of the military

armistice are too severe. They wish to get just as much as they can but they wish to be able to continue negotiations in the event that Germany refuses to accept the terms proposed.

An exceedingly strict censorship by the French War Office makes it impossible for American correspondents to send any communications to the United States respecting the progress of the present conference. I am examining into this matter and it may be advisable to take drastic steps in order that the United States can arrange for herself what news of political character shall be communicated to her people.

EDWARD HOUSE

President Wilson's Files

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*The President to the Special Representative (House)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1918.<sup>1</sup>

I feel it my solemn duty to authorize you to say that I cannot consent to take part in the negotiation of a peace which does not include freedom of the seas because we are pledged to fight not only to do away with Prussian militarism but with militarism everywhere. Neither could I participate in a settlement which did not include league of nations because peace would be without any guarantee except universal armament which would be intolerable. I hope I shall not be obliged to make this decision public.

WOODROW WILSON

File No. 763.72119/8983

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*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 30, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 7.05 p. m.]

9. For the President:

It is my intention to tell Prime Ministers today that if their conditions of peace are essentially different from the points you have laid down and for which the American people have been fighting, that you will probably feel obliged to go before Congress and state the new conditions and ask their advice as to whether the United States shall continue to fight for the aims of Great Britain, France and Italy.

The last thing they want is publicity and they do not wish it to appear that there is any cause for difference between the Allies. Unless we deal with these people with a firm hand everything we have been fighting for will be lost.

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<sup>1</sup> Hour of dispatch not recorded.

I told the British privately you anticipate that their policy would lead to the establishment of the greatest naval program by the United States that the world had ever seen. I did not believe that the United States would consent for any [power] to interpret for them the rules under which American commerce could traverse the sea. I would suggest that you quietly diminish the transport of troops giving as an excuse the prevalence of influenza or any other reason but the real one. I would also suggest a little later that you begin to gently shut down upon money, food and raw material. I feel confident that we should play a strong hand and if it meets with your approval I will do it in the gentle and friendly [way] almost certain [to prevail?].

HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/8984

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*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *October 30, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received 11.54 p. m.]

10. For the President:

In my private conversation with Lloyd George yesterday he said that Great Britain desired the United States to become trustee for German East African colonies. That Great Britain was unwilling that they should be turned back to Germany for the reason that the Germans had used such inhuman methods in their treatment of the natives. He said by right [South West] Africa and the Asiatic islands belonging to Germany must go to the South African Federation and to Australia respectively; that unless this was done Great Britain would be confronted by a revolution in those dominions.

He added that Great Britain would have to assume a protectorate over Mesopotamia and perhaps Palestine. Arabia he thought should become autonomous. France might be given a sphere of influence in Syria.

My [opinion, based on] his suggestion regarding German East Africa, is that the British would like us to accept something so they might more freely take what they desire.

George also thought the Allies should get together before the peace conference and thresh out their differences. He believed the peace conference itself need not last longer than one week. The preliminary conference he thought could be finished in three or four weeks.

I strongly advise against this procedure and for reasons which will be obvious to you.

HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/8985

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 30, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received October 31, 5.50 a. m.]

## 12. For the President:

Lloyd George, Clemenceau and I met for 45 minutes this morning alone at the office of the Minister of War. Just before we entered Clemenceau's office George handed me a proposed answer to the President which the British authorities had drafted. I quote the draft in full.

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and their property (by the forces of Germany?), by land, by sea, and from the air.

I told George that I was afraid his attitude at yesterday's meeting had opened the flood gates; Clemenceau, Sonnino would have elaborate memoranda to submit containing their objections to the President's fourteen points, and that I doubted whether Clemenceau would accept (another version?) [*the answer*] drafted by British which was in marked contrast to the position taken by George yesterday.

It [at once] developed at the conference that Clemenceau was having prepared an elaborate brief setting forth France's objections to the President's fourteen points. I promptly pointed out to Clemenceau that undoubtedly Sonnino was preparing a similar memorandum and that if the Allied Governments felt constrained to submit an elaborate answer to the President containing many objections to his program it would doubtless be necessary for the President to go to Congress and to place before that body exactly what



Italy, France, and Great Britain were fighting for and to place the responsibility upon Congress for the further continuation of the war by the United States in behalf of the aims of the Allies. As soon as I had said this George and Clemenceau looked at each other significantly.

Clemenceau at once abandoned his idea of submitting an elaborate memorandum concerning the President's fourteen points and apparently accepted the proposed answer drafted by the British. I suggested that the word "illegal" be placed before the words "damage done to the civilian population of the Allies," in the last sentence of draft of proposed answer. George accepted this suggestion but Clemenceau stated [that he] preferred that the draft should be left as it was. I believe that the suggestion would be accepted by all if the President sees fit to insist upon it. I am not entirely clear yet that this is necessary.

I ascertained that George and Clemenceau believed that the terms of the armistice, both naval and military, were too severe and that they should be modified. George stated that he thought it might be unwise to insist on the occupation of the east bank of the Rhine; Clemenceau stated that he could not maintain himself in the Chamber of Deputies unless this was made a part of the armistice to be submitted to the German forces and that the French Army would also insist on this as their due after the long occupation of French soil by the Germans, but he gave us his word of honor that France would withdraw after the peace conditions had been fulfilled. I am inclined to sympathize with position taken by Clemenceau.

I pointed out the danger of bringing about a state of Bolshevism in Germany if terms of armistice were made too stiff, and the consequent danger to England, France, and Italy. Clemenceau refused to recognize that there was any danger of Bolshevism in France. George admitted it was possible to create such a state of affairs in England and both agreed that anything might happen in Italy.

I asked Clemenceau where he thought it would be wise to hold the peace conference. He answered, "Versailles," but however, did not argue with us when George stated that he and I had agreed on Geneva. I stated that I thought this matter should be discussed later. Upon leaving the conference, George and I again agreed that the conference had better be held in neutral territory than in a belligerent country and I still have in mind to urge Lausanne.

It was agreed that this afternoon we would discuss, first, results [*terms?*] of an armistice with Austria; second, the terms of the armistice with Turkey (with this I explained we have nothing to do); third, the terms of the armistice with Germany. It was agreed that there should be a meeting at my headquarters tomorrow morn-

ing of Clemenceau, George, Orlando, Marshal Foch, and myself, with Geddes at hand to advise concerning naval questions. Uninterruptedly, I am in constant consultation with our military and naval authorities.

In the event that answer drafted by British and quoted above is adopted by Allies as their answer to your communication I would strongly advise your accepting it without alteration.

HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/8986

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 30, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received October 31, 4.36 a. m.]

13. For the President:

At the meeting this afternoon practically entire time was consumed with a discussion between George and Clemenceau as to who should accept the surrender of the Turks—the British or the French admiral. Discussion was [most] bitter at times and of course I did not participate in it. It was virtually agreed by French, British, and Italians that the proposed answer to the President's communication as drafted by the British and as cabled you this morning, should be adopted as the answer of the Allies, so far as Germany was concerned. It was agreed that the terms of the military and naval armistice to be offered Austria should be reviewed by the Allied generals and admirals, and when completed should be transmitted direct through General Diaz to the Austrian commander-in-chief. This has the advantage of avoiding political discussion respecting Italian and other claims before capitulation of Austria [received]. [Armistice terms to be discussed?] by the conference set for tomorrow at 11.30 at my headquarters, of George, Clemenceau, Orlando, Foch and myself. Full meeting of Supreme War Council called for 3 p. m. tomorrow afternoon at Versailles.

EDWARD HOUSE

President Wilson's Files

*The President to the Special Representative (House)*

[Telegram—Extract]

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1918.<sup>1</sup>

I fully and sympathetically recognize the exceptional position and necessities of Great Britain with regard to the use of the seas for defence both at home and throughout the Empire and also realize

<sup>1</sup> Hour of dispatch not recorded.

that freedom of the seas needs careful definition and is full of questions upon which there is need of the freest discussion and the most liberal interchange of views, but I am not clear that the reply of the Allies quoted in your 12 definitely accepts the principle of freedom of the seas and means to reserve only the free discussion of definitions and limitations. . . . Terms one, two, three, and fourteen are the essentially American terms in the programme and I cannot change what our troops are fighting for or consent to end with only European arrangements of peace. Freedom of the seas will not have to be discussed with Germany if we agree among ourselves beforehand but will be if we do not. Blockade is one of the many things which will require immediate redefinition in view of the many new circumstances of warfare developed by this war. There is no danger of its being abolished.

WOODROW WILSON

File No. 763.72119/2532

*The Secretary of State to the Spanish Ambassador (Riaño)*

No. 984

WASHINGTON, *October 31, 1918.*

EXCELLENCY: I did not fail to lay before the President the note which you addressed to him on the 14th instant,<sup>1</sup> and handed to me on that date.

Acting under the instructions of your Government, you enclosed with that note the text of a communication received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain from the Chargé d'Affaires of Turkey at Madrid on October 12, in which the good offices of the Government of Spain were sought to bring to the attention of the President the request of the Imperial Ottoman Government that he take upon himself the task of the reestablishment of peace, and that he notify all belligerent states of the request, and invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations, the Imperial Ottoman Government accepting as a basis for the negotiations the program laid down by the President in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, especially his speech of September 27. It is further requested by the Imperial Ottoman Government that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

By direction of the President I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States will bring the communication of the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires to the knowledge of the Governments at war with Turkey.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 359.

File No. 763.72119/2480

*The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State*

No. 5348

WASHINGTON, October 30, 1918.

[Received October 31.]

EXCELLENCY: At the request of the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government I have been ordered to transmit to Your Excellency the following communication:

Mr. Secretary of State: Having taken charge of my office, I have immediately dispatched an official answer to your note of October 18 [19],<sup>1</sup> by which you will find that we in all respects accept the principles which the President of the United States has expressed in his various declarations.

In full accord with Mr. Wilson's efforts to prevent future wars, and to create a family of nations, we have already made preparations, in order that the peoples of Austria-Hungary may, entirely without hindrance, decide upon and complete their future organization according to their own wishes.

Since the accession of Emperor and King Karl, it has been His Majesty's undaunted endeavor to bring, in every way, an end to the war.

More than ever before, this is today the wish of the Monarch and of all the peoples, who are dominated by the conviction that the future destiny of the peoples of Austria-Hungary can only be formed in a peaceful world free from the disturbances, the trials, the privations and the bitterness of war.

I, therefore, address to you directly, Mr. Secretary of State, an appeal that you use your good offices with the President of the United States to the end that, in the interest of humanity, as well as in the interest of all the peoples living in Austria-Hungary, the entering upon negotiations of peace and an immediate armistice on all the fronts of Austria-Hungary may be brought about. (Signed) Andrassy.

Accept [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

File No. 763.72119/2392

*Memorandum of the Secretary of State*

October 31, 1918.

The Minister of Sweden, at my request, called upon me at 6.15 p. m. at my residence.

I informed him that, after conferring with the President relative to the communication of the Austro-Hungarian Government addressed to the President in relation to peace negotiations and an armistice, I wished to inform him that the communication would be submitted to the Governments with which this Government is associated in the war, for their consideration, and that he was at liberty to so advise his Government.

<sup>1</sup> Texts of the two notes, *ante*, pp. 368 and 404-405.



The Minister thanked me for the information and said that he would immediately cable his Government to that effect.

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2291

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1918, 4 p. m.

332. Your 471, October 12, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> President desires you to assure President of the Government of Northern Russia that interests of Russia have at no time been out of our thoughts and that in any arrangement that may be entered into at any time with the German Government, we shall be careful to safeguard the interests of Russia.

LANSING

Discussion of the Armistice Terms—The Armistice with Turkey, Signed October 30—Disintegration of Austria-Hungary—The Armistice with Austria-Hungary, Signed November 3

File No. 763.72119/9043

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 31, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received October 31, 9.35 p. m.]

23. For the President:

The three Prime Ministers, Marshal Foch, and myself met this morning and practically agreed upon terms for the armistice with Austria, in order that we might facilitate matters when we met at Versailles this afternoon. At conference this afternoon at Versailles terms of naval and military armistice to be proposed to Austria were formally agreed upon. Views of military and naval authorities were somewhat modified. Full text of proposed armistice is being cabled.

Following resolution was adopted by Supreme War Council:

The Supreme War Council decided—

(a) To approve attached terms of an armistice with Austria-Hungary;

(b) That General Diaz on behalf of the Associated Governments shall on the arrival of accredited representatives of Austrian Supreme Command communicate to them approved terms of an armistice;

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 356.

(c) That the Italian Government on behalf of the Supreme War Council shall be responsible for communicating this decision to General Diaz;

(d) To invite Colonel House on behalf of the Supreme War Council to communicate this decision to President Wilson.

Versailles, October 31, 1918.

Fortunately I was able [to prevent] discussion of political questions. I regard this feature as most favorable. It is not [?] very probable that the submission of terms of armistice to Austria under the circumstances and without any express qualifications may be construed as acceptance on the part of the Allies of the President's proposals. I thought it best not to bring on a discussion of this matter at this time.

Clemenceau, George, Orlando, Foch and myself are to meet again tomorrow at my headquarters and the Supreme War Council is to meet again tomorrow at 10 o'clock at Versailles. At these meetings terms of the military and naval armistice to be offered Germany are to be discussed. It is my understanding that when the terms of armistice to be offered Germany have been agreed upon, they will be cabled to the President. The Allies will at the same time formally agree to the President's fourteen points with the reservations cabled you in our No. 12.<sup>1</sup> If the President accepts this they then propose to send word to Germany that Foch is prepared to receive their military authorities and to transmit to them the terms of armistice agreed upon by the Allies and the United States. The plan is not to publish the terms of the armistice until Germany has accepted them. They insist that publication should not be made because if published, public opinion would not permit modification.

HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/2424

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 30, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received October 31, 10.40 p. m.]

2255. The Austrian note to the President requesting an armistice and peace terms reached the Italian Government Monday but only appeared in the late editions of press last night with an official Stefani comment prepared in office of Premier before he left for Paris. Comment is to following effect:

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 425.

*Communiqué* emphasizes great similarity between alleged reform and concessions granted by Hapsburgs to the oppressed nationalities, both being prompted by self-interest. Demands whether "rights of the people" admitted by Andrassy signifies same as liberation of nationalities in Hungary. Adds that Austria's note has more submissive tone but doubts whether Andrassy, [statesman] of Hungary, until recently so submissive to Germany, is sincere in his desire for armistice without awaiting "outcome of other negotiations." *Communiqué* points out the fact that these poses of Central Empires are intimately connected with their serious military condition, and reminds public of Emperor Charles' statement in [omission] but now to fleet and army. *Communiqué* emphasizes the fact that Hapsburgs are making every effort to bolster up diplomatic, military, and administrative branches of the Empire and reminds the public that Austria-Hungary has always consisted of an administration and an army rather than a state either federal or national. It is therefore necessary, as with last German proposals, that conditions of armistice be settled in such a way that the conditions in themselves contain the guarantees of peace.

The foregoing appears the general opinion as reflected in the papers today; meantime the papers are full of unexpectedly successful Italian offensive.

A private Reuter telegram from London a day or two ago stated that there was reason to believe an Italian offensive would not encounter great resistance. This however proved otherwise and the stout resistance met at first caused much apprehension here in military circles lest flood in the Piave destroying pontoon bridges might prevent reinforcements being sent across. This anxiety now relieved in view of apparently diminishing resistance of Austrians and successful advance.

In this connection member of Government informs me that last night's French *communiqué*, stating that Italian offensive can be seen took place only when Austria, worn out, had asked armistice, has aroused intense indignation here, and that a few such innuendoes will upset all that has been accomplished.

I learn a wireless message from Poland was picked up yesterday addressed to the Italian General Headquarters saying Austro-Hungarian forces would retire without destroying roads, railroads or bridges if allowed to retire unmolested. As message was unofficial, military operations continuing with greatest vigor.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/2494

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 1, 1918, 2 a. m.

[Received 5 a. m.]

24. Following is the final proposal of the Austrian armistice:<sup>1</sup>

## I. MILITARY CLAUSES

1. The immediate cessation of hostilities by land, sea and air.
2. Total demobilization of the Austro-Hungarian Army and immediate withdrawal of all Austro-Hungarian forces operating on the front from the North Sea to Switzerland.

Within Austro-Hungarian territory, limited as in clause 3 below, there shall only be maintained as an organized military force a [maximum of 20 divisions], reduced to pre-war [peace] effectives.

Half the divisional, corps and army artillery and equipment shall be collected at points to be indicated by the Allies and United States of America for delivery to them, beginning with all such material as exists in the territories to be evacuated by the Austro-Hungarian forces.

3. Evacuation of all territories invaded by Austria-Hungary since the beginning of war. Withdrawal within such periods as shall be determined by the commander in chief of the Allied forces on each front of the Austro-Hungarian armies behind a line fixed as follows: From Piz Umbrail to the north of the Stelvio it will follow the crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisach, passing thence by Mounts Reschen and Brenner and the Heights of Ötz and Ziller. The line thence turns south crossing Mount Toblach and meeting the present frontier [of the] Carnic Alps. It follows this frontier up to Mount Tarvis and after Mount Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Col of Predil, Mount Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglou) and the watershed of the Cols di Podberdo, Podlanischam and Idria. From this point the line turns southeast towards the Schneeberg, excluding the whole basin of the Save and its tributaries; from the Schneeberg it goes down towards the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglie and Volosca in the evacuated territories.

It will also follow the administrative limits of the present province of Dalmatia, including to the north Lisarica and Trivania and, to the south, territory limited by a line from the [shore] of Cape Planca to the summits of the watershed eastwards so as to include in the evacuated area all the valleys and water courses flowing towards Sebenico, such as the Cikola, Kerka, Butišnica and their tributaries. It will also include all the islands in the north and west of Dalmatia from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Macn, Pago and Puntadura in the north up to Melida in the south, embracing Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Torcola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta,

<sup>1</sup>Telegraphic text brought into accord with that appended to the minutes of the Supreme War Council, Oct. 31, 1918 (File No. 763.72 Su/109).



as well as the neighboring rocks and islets and [Pelagosa], only excepting the islands of Great and Small Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza.

All territory thus evacuated [will be occupied by the troops] of the Allies and of the United States of America.

All military and railway equipment of all kinds, including coal, belonging to or within those territories, to be left *in situ* and surrendered to the Allies according to special orders given by the commanders in chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the different fronts. No new destruction, pillage or requisition to be done by enemy troops in the territories to be evacuated by them and occupied by the forces of the Associated Powers.

4. The Allies shall have the right of free movement over all road and rail and waterways in Austro-Hungarian territory and of the use of the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means of transportation.

The armies of the Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order.

They shall have the right of requisition on payment for the troops of the Associated Powers wherever they may be.

5. Complete evacuation of all German troops within 15 days, not only from the Italian and Balkan fronts, but from all Austro-Hungarian territory.

Internment of all German troops which have not left Austria-Hungary within that date.

6. The administration of the evacuated territories of Austria-Hungary will be entrusted to the local authorities under the control of the Allied and Associated armies of occupation.

7. The immediate repatriation without reciprocity of all Allied prisoners of war and interned subjects and of civil populations evacuated from their homes on conditions to be laid down by the commanders in chief of the forces of the Associated Powers on the various fronts.

8. Sick and wounded who can not be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by Austro-Hungarian personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

## II. NAVAL CONDITIONS

1. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea, and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all Austro-Hungarian ships.

Notification to be made to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

2. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of 15 Austro-Hungarian submarines, completed between the years 1910 and 1918, and of all German submarines which are in or may hereafter enter Austro-Hungarian territorial waters. All other Austro-Hungarian submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed, and to remain under the supervision of the Allies and United States of America.

3. Surrender to the Allies and United States of America with their complete armament and equipment of 3 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 9 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, 1 mine layer, 6 Danube monitors, to be designated by the Allies and United States of America. All other surface warships, including river craft, are to be concentrated in Austro-Hungarian naval bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and United States of America.

4. Freedom of navigation to all warships and merchant ships of the Allied and Associated Powers to be given in the Adriatic and up the River Danube and its tributaries in the territorial waters and territory of Austria-Hungary.

The Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions and the positions of these are to be indicated.

In order to insure the freedom of navigation on the Danube, the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy or to dismantle all fortifications or defense works.

5. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged and all Austro-Hungarian merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture, save exceptions which may be made by a commission nominated by the Allies and United States of America.

6. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in Austro-Hungarian bases to be designated by the Allies and United States of America.

7. Evacuation of all the Italian coasts and of all ports occupied by Austria-Hungary outside their national territory, and the abandonment of all floating craft, naval materials, equipment and materials for inland navigation of all kinds.

8. Occupation by the Allies and the United States of America of the land and sea fortifications and the islands which form the defenses and of the dockyards and arsenal at Pola.

9. All merchant vessels held by Austria-Hungary belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers to be returned.

10. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

11. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in Austro-Hungarian hands to be returned without reciprocity.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/2443

*The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State*

[Extract]

WASHINGTON, *October 31, 1918.*

[*Received November 1.*]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of October 23, enclosing certain communications which have passed between the Government of the United States

and the Government of Germany, relative to an armistice and the terms of a treaty of peace between the belligerents in the present war.

Following the instructions of the President, you make request that this correspondence be taken under careful consideration by the Government and that the Government's views and conclusions be communicated to you; and this especially with regard to the possible terms of an armistice between the belligerents and the manner in which such terms might be determined.

Under conditions prevailing I am not in a position to refer your note for proper answer, as there is no Government of Russia recognized by the United States. On the other hand, the questions involved are of an importance so momentous and of a character so vital for the whole future of Russia, that I feel it would be detrimental to the interests of my country if they would remain unanswered and the aspirations and interests of the Russian Nation would not be expressed.

I am therefore led to believe, that I would not consummate my duty, as a representative of Russia, if I did not present certain suggestions in connection with the questions under consideration.

I am guided in such course by the open-hearted and humanitarian attitude which the Government of the United States has assumed toward Russia and which so fully and lucidly has been revealed in different announcements relative to the terms of peace.

The events in Russia, following the fall of the Provisional Government on November 7, 1917, with the disintegration of the army and the abolition of any articulate mechanism of orderly administration, have been used by Germany as an unlimited opportunity for effectuating its premeditated plans of domination of the East. These plans have found explicit expression in the treaty of Brest Litovsk and a number of subsequent arrangements. Besides, a deep practical hold of Russia's political and economic life has been gained through a widespread network of ingenious agreements between German firms and Russian establishments. This systematic policy of peaceful penetration was eventually supplemented by direct seizure. The latest revelations have further exposed the internal relations between the German Government and the acting Russian authorities and have clearly shown by what process these authorities were entangled within the tenets of Germany's intrigue so as to become ultimately mere instruments in the hands of the masters of Germany.

It is evident, that an eventual suspension of hostilities on the western front and a subsequent period of peace negotiations might give Germany the most promising opportunities to further consoli-

date her actual control of Russia and to perfect the instrumentality of her domination, if the very possibility of such activities were not thwarted by the very act of armistice, the conditions of which would put an end to the very prospects of German achievements in Russia.

An armistice, couched in terms which would cancel, once for all and antecedent to the final peace proceedings, the results which Germany obtained in the east since the fall of the Provisional Government put an end to organized military resistance, would not only do justice to the interests of the people of Russia, but would entirely correspond to the real spirit, in which the war aims of the United States have been conceived.

More so if, as the note of October 23 to the Chargé d'Affaires of Switzerland makes mention, the acceptance by Germany of the terms of the armistice will afford the best evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace, there could be no better test of good faith on the part of Germany than a repudiation at the very outset of all achievements due to a policy in such flagrant contradiction to the precepts to which the German Government claims to have agreed.

With this in mind, I am enclosing a statement of eventual terms, which appear to respond to the above purpose. The general conception of these terms is to remove out of the very heart of Russian life the obnoxious influence of German activities, thus giving the people an opportunity for unrestrained and free determination of their own destinies.

I avail myself [etc.]

B. BAKHMETEFF

[Enclosure]

*Terms of Armistice with Germany Suggested by the Russian Ambassador*

1. Unconditional abrogation of the treaty of Brest Litovsk and all other agreements concluded by the German Government after November 7, 1917, either with the authorities acting in the name of Russia or with whatever national or political groups, claiming to represent authority on any territory of the former Russian Empire.

2. Evacuation of German troops from the territory of the former Russian Empire. Evacuation or isolation of prisoners of war, including their disarmament. Withdrawal of all German officials, experts and agents of whatever character. Return of all Russian prisoners of war.

3. Suspension by Germany of financial and military assistance to the present authorities in Russia and the discontinuation of supply-



ing materials, which might be used for military operations against the Allies or for the upholding of massacre and terror.

4. Immediate restitution by Germany of all naval and commercial vessels, auxiliary craft and *matériel* as well as the restitution of arms, rolling stock, war and railway materials, taken after November 7, 1917.

5. Restitution of all Russian gold reserves, bullion, securities and bank notes, commandeered by Germany or transferred to her by the acting authorities after November 7, 1917.

6. Abrogation of all franchises, financial and economic agreements, entered into by the German institutions, public or private, with Russian establishments of whatever character after November 7, 1917. Cancellation of purchases of Russian stock and securities, effectuated after same date by German institutions, directly or through substitutes.

B. B.

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File No. 763.72119/9045

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 1, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received November 1, 1.53 p. m.]

30. For the President:

We made satisfactory progress this morning regarding terms for German armistice. Both Clemenceau and George now moderate as Foch will permit. They realize that the terms [are] somewhat harsher than is necessary to fulfill your conditions regarding the making of it impossible for Germany to renew hostilities. We are modifying the naval program in the interest of commerce.

EDWARD HOUSE

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File No. 763.72/12020

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, October 31, 1918.

[Received November 1, 2.23 p. m.]

5506. *Berliner Tageblatt*, October 31, report from Vienna: Procession thousands of soldiers and officers in Vienna to House of Parliament. Ministry of War surrounded by many thousands soldiers and workmen. Soldiers' delegation placed itself disposal National Council and demanded [formation] Soldiers' Council. Decision taken to create provisional soldiers' and officers' committee to meet members National Council. Small crowds forced officers tear

off Imperial cockades. All generals forced to do so. In Vienna itself there were no serious disorders.

*Vossische Zeitung* reports from Budapest, 31st: Many thousands gathered in front of National Council in Budapest. Four regiments led by officers swore allegiance National Council and marched through streets in great enthusiasm. Two officers members of National Council arrested, but guards joined crowd and aided in storming military prison freeing all political and military prisoners. Republic was acclaimed. Imperial cockades changed by soldiers for national colors. Budapest eastern railway station occupied by crowd where two battalions leaving for front joined mob. Civilians also arrested by mob which having pillaged arms factory had enormous amounts arms and munitions. Budapest infantry regiment No. 32 mutinied and placed itself at disposal of Republic. Report that commandant Budapest put in prison by Hungarian soldiers.

STOVALL

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File No. 763.72/12021

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, October 31, 1918.

[Received November 1, 3.23 p. m.]

5520. *Freie Presse*, 22d: Vienna extremely short food supplies. Thought of what may result not pleasant. Care of public order and personal safety anxiety of all. In sending supplies to Vienna, Hungary would render herself a service. It would be nothing less than madness to allow Vienna to fall into a state of anarchy and unrest at present time.

*Freie Presse*, 23d: The national states have been born, the separation accomplished, but no union takes the place of the old. There is a huge void staring us in the face. In this crisis we must feel our way carefully if we are to extricate country from hopeless confusion. The question for the moment is whether Austria is still strong enough to establish new relations between the various national states in such a way as to form collective state. At peace conference life or death sentence of Austria will be pronounced.

*Arbeiter Zeitung*, 25th: Events in Croatia and Hungary show serious position Germany and Austria. United and decided Jugo-Slav people long shamefully oppressed and dismembered demand their unity and independence. Autocrats of Budapest feel their power is shaking and helplessly look to democracy for succor. Hungary is calling upon Social Democrats, yesterday scorned and persecuted, and autocrats are begging favors of the Slovaks and Rumanians trampled on since 1848, robbed of all rights since 1867. An old feudal Hungary is breaking down and in its misery is looking for

salvation at any price. It would like to win mercy of Entente by separation from Germany and Austria and offer separate peace.

Swiss press reports from Vienna: Executive committee of German-Austrian National Assembly decided to submit at full meeting of National Assembly note drawn up for President Wilson. This note informs Wilson of formation German-Austrian state which claims freedom for all German districts of Austria, representation at peace conference and opportunity to enter into direct negotiations with the representatives of all belligerent powers. Executive Committee accepts unreservedly Wilson's principles including recognition of Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav nations. Note closes with appeal to President to use his authority in favor of general armistice and right of self-determination of Austrian Germans. (Actual text of this note not yet published.)

Speech of Lammasch before party leaders exposing his program summarized as follows in Swiss press: German Government was in possession of all facts day before Austrian Government sent special peace proposal to President Wilson. For almost year German Government has known Austria-Hungary could not continue struggle longer than certain period. Such declaration often made to German Ambassador and German representatives at Berlin. Military front must not allow itself to be dissolved by hope of armistice and peace but order must be kept to avert danger of disorderly retreating army overflowing country. The Government takes all necessary measures to insure orderly return of troops. Any soldier who left front on his own responsibility would find return retarded instead of hastened owing to congested state of traffic and provisioning which would necessarily ensue. Change in state form also requires calm. Though situation calls for rapid solution questions cannot be decided by momentary passions. Government convinced of principle of peoples' right to self-determination but desires emphasize that definite decisions should not be made until soldiers return from front to exercise citizens' rights. Boundary lines between various nationalities must be decided by agreement between nations and eventually by arbitration. In interim Government will continue to carry on affairs as far as possible considering itself a servant of the people. During peace negotiations new states will naturally begin their relations with neutral powers. Foreign Minister is ready to put himself at their disposition in this regard and support their activities. As regards burdens and obligations which have been borne in common, new states must be considered as legal heirs of former commonwealth. The Government feels it is its duty on ethical and practical grounds to proclaim wide political amnesty and pardon:

File No. 763.72119/2445

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, October 30, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received November 1, 5.06 p. m.]

2261. The following is a *précis* of a telegram sent by General Diaz [the] Italian national chief of staff:

On October 29, Captain Ruggiero Camillo of the Austrian General Staff presented himself before our lines with pass and letter signed respectively by Generals Krobotin and Weber. Letter states that the Austro-Hungarian Government, having accepted with its reply of 28th instant all of the conditions imposed by the President, has instructed commission, presided over by General Weber, to enter into negotiations for immediate armistice on land and sea with the plenipotentiaries of the Italian Supreme Command. General Weber proposes city of Ala as the place of negotiations.

Through the captain referred to above I replied to General Weber as follows:

The Italian Supreme Command cannot carry on any negotiations with General Weber because the documents transmitted by him do not show that the authority was given personally to him by the Supreme Command of the Austrian Army. Italian Supreme Command cannot undertake to discuss with any commission either armistice or suspension of hostilities tending to interrupt the current military operations. It will, however, gladly receive duly authorized delegates in order to inform them of the conditions which it will accept with the consent of the Government and in complete accord with its allies.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/9044

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, undated.

[Received November 1, 1918, 7.55 p. m.]

32. Following is full text of conditions of armistice as arrived at between British Admiral and Turkish delegates which took effect from 12 noon, October 31, 1918:<sup>1</sup>

1. Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and access to the Black Sea. Allied occupation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.

2. Positions of all mine fields, torpedo tubes and other [obstructions] in Turkish waters to be indicated and assistance given to sweep or remove them as may be required.

3. All available information as to mines in Black Sea to be communicated.

<sup>1</sup>The armistice was signed on board the British warship *Agamemnon*, at Port Mudros, Lemnos, Oct. 30, 1918.



4. All Allied prisoners of war and Armenian interned [persons] and prisoners to be collected at Constantinople and handed over unconditionally to Allies.

5. Immediate demobilization of the Turkish Army except for such troops as are required for surveillance of the frontiers and for maintenance of internal order. (Number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by Allies after consultation with Turkish Government.)

6. Surrender of all war vessels in Turkish waters or in waters occupied by Turkey, these ships to be interned at such Turkish port or ports as may be directed, except such small vessels as required for police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.

7. The Allies to have the right of occupation of any strategic points, in the event of situation arising which threatens the security of Allies.

8. Free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation and denial of their use by [to] enemy. Similar conditions to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping in Turkish waters for purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army.

9. Use of all ship repair facilities at all Turkish ports and arsenals.

10. Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

11. Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from northwest Persia to behind the pre-war frontiers has already been ordered and will be carried out. Part of Trans-Caucasus has already been ordered to be evacuated by Turkish troops, the remainder to be evacuated if required by Allies after they have studied the situation there.

12. Wireless telegraph and cable stations to be controlled by Allies, Turkish Government messages excepted.

13. Prohibition to destroy any naval, military or commercial material.

14. Facilities to be given for purchase of coal, oil, fuel and naval material from Turkish sources after requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material to be exported.

15. Allied control officers to be placed on all railways including such portions of Trans-Caucasus railways now under Turkish control which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to needs of population. This clause to include Allied occupation of Batoum. Turks will raise no objection to occupation of Baku by Allies.

16. Surrender of all garrisons in Hedjaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria and Mesopotamia to nearest Allied commander and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia except those necessary to maintain order as will be determined under clause 5.

17. The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to nearest Italian garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies and communications with these officers if they do not obey the order to surrender.

18. The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to nearest Allied garrisons.

19. All Germans and Austrians, naval, military and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions; those in remote districts as soon after as may be possible.

20. Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for disposal of the equipment, arms and ammunition, including transport of that portion of the Turkish Army which is demobilized under clause 5.

21. An Allied representative to be attached to Turkish Ministry in order to safeguard Allied interests. This representative to be furnished with all [aid] necessary for this purpose.

22. Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of Allied Powers. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age to be considered.

23. Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with Central Powers.

24. In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve the right to occupy any part of them.

25. Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, Thursday, October 31, 1918.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/2443

*Memorandum of the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)*

*November 2, 1918.*

I showed this<sup>1</sup> yesterday to the Secretary, who feels that the Russian Ambassador should communicate any comments he has to make to Paris through his colleague in Paris. I gave Mr. Bakhmeteff this reply today. Mr. Bakhmeteff, however, is urging us to become Russia's champion at Versailles and thinks we could do so best by transmitting his views as expressed herein. He thinks that Russia should be treated now as an entity until after the peace conference, when a decision must be reached by the self-determination process, but that it would be a mistake to consider at this time the apparent claims of the several states claiming independence. He emphasizes the fact that these claims *have been originated by Germany*.

W. PHILLIPS

File No. 763.72/12032

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

BERNE, *October 31, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[*Received November 2, 10.26 a. m.*]

5513. *German political*: As understood in Switzerland, general proposal for armistice was initiated by Ludendorff in hope to obtain respite in fighting on western front to recuperate German forces. Movement was taken seriously by German people and began to get out [of hand], whereupon Ludendorff hurried to Berlin to

<sup>1</sup>The Russian Ambassador's note of Oct. 31, *ante*, p. 435.

demand that negotiations be broken. Although Chancellor was ill, a council in presence of Kaiser resulted in defeat of Ludendorff's plan and he resigned. Thus Germany has abandoned idea of last concerted struggle against Allied armies. His resignation appears acceptable to press.

Growing ascendancy of the civil authorities over military is evidenced by constitutional changes passed by Reichstag and Federal Council as follows:

(1) Power to declare war even if Germany attacked now in hands of Federal Council and Reichstag. Peace treaties must be sanctioned by same bodies.

(2) Appointment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of officers of Army and Navy requires countersigning by Chancellor, and in federal states Minister of War is responsible to Reichstag for similar action in local contingents. Thus influence of military authorities inside the Army is limited.

(3) A provision making Chancellor responsible for political acts of Emperor and requiring that he in turn have confidence of Reichstag.

Austrian proposal for separate peace has produced some bitter comment in German press, and *Vorwärts* states that further resistance on the part of Germany is now hopeless.

Reichstag debates concerning Alsace-Lorraine and Poland have been heated and Solf has stated that President Wilson's program did not provide for cession to Poland of [solidly] German territory of which Danzig is example. Government is using the French anti-Catholicism as appeal to Catholicism of Alsace-Lorraine.

Abdication of Emperor has been demanded in Reichstag by Independent Socialists. Agitation against him is increasing.

A manifesto by radical group of Independent Socialists calling for Bolshevik institutions caused meeting 6,000 radical Socialists who cheered Bolshevik Minister. As yet movement is not widespread.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/9047

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 2, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received November 2, 12.40 p. m.]

35. For the President:

At meeting yesterday afternoon at Versailles terms of military armistice to be offered Germany were discussed, but no final conclusion reached. At meeting this morning at French War Office

general discussion was had respecting steps to be taken by Allies and the United States in the event that (1) terms of armistice are accepted by Austria; (2) terms of armistice are refused by Austria. These matters were referred to the military and naval authorities and I am in constant conference with Generals Pershing and Bliss and Admiral Benson regarding the position of the United States respecting them. After consulting with military authorities, it was decided to give Austria until Sunday, midnight, November 3, to accept terms of armistice. It was agreed that we should wait until we receive Austria's answer before finally determining the terms of armistice to be offered Germany. Meeting at Versailles this afternoon to discuss terms of naval armistice to be offered Germany.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 863.00/101

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, November 2, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received November 3, 10.17 a. m.]

5543. There are the following governmental organs constituted or in the process of constitution in Austria[-Hungary] which should not be lost sight of:

1. The Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government.
2. In Austria:
  - (a) The Imperial Austrian Government;
  - (b) The newly constituted Government of German-Austria;
  - (c) The Czecho-Slovak National Council;
  - (d) The Yugo-Slav National Council.
3. In Hungary:
  - (a) The Royal Hungarian Government;
  - (b) The Budapest National Council.

(This summary does not include Galician Poles, who now politically form a part of Greater Poland, and the Ruthenians, who exert little influence on general situation.)

*Austria.* Andrassy represents Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government. His power is waning and even from German Austrians, who have appointed their own Minister for Foreign Affairs, he receives little support. Andrassy's retirement and return to Hungary is probable.

(a) The Imperial Austrian Government is represented by Lammasch and his new Cabinet described in my press telegram 5520 of the 31st.<sup>1</sup> As Lammasch has been repudiated by Czechs and Yugo-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Slavs, who refused to enter Cabinet, and as German Austrians are not interested in his Government but in formation of their own state, it seems improbable that this cabinet will be able to do useful work. If it gives up the task, the Emperor will be entirely isolated and in a practically hopeless situation.

(b) The German-Austrian National Council: This body, composed of German delegates to Austrian Parliament, has worked out draft of constitution for German-Austrian state, power to be exercised by this assembly provisionally until permanent representative body can be elected. An executive commission including three presidents and twenty members of assembly constitute power as council of state. Various cabinet officers created. The council will designate one of these officers as preceptor of Government. Present laws to remain in force unless specially abrogated. It is reported that Socialist leader, Victor Adler, has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Steps are being taken to assure the government of Vienna. A peace note is being drawn up for President Wilson recognizing President's principles and independence of Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav states and steps are being taken to obtain recognition from neutral and co-belligerent powers. At present responsible Socialist leaders, Adler and Seitz, have predominant influence this Government. How long these law-abiding Socialists will retain power against pressure of current working for anarchy is a question.

(c) The Czecho-Slovak National Council: During past few days, and subsequent to Andrassy note recognizing independent Bohemian state, Czechs have rapidly proceeded to take over administration, destroying outward insignia of union with Austrian state and seizing mail and telegraph services. Up to the present moment the revolution in Prague has been bloodless. Kramář and other Czech leaders are still in Geneva, but intend returning Prague shortly.

(d) Yugo-Slav National Council: This body represents Slovenes, Croats and Servian population of Yugo-Slav territory, meeting at Agram. The Croatian Government still maintains Landtag, its governmental body during period of Croatian union with Hungary, but this body has entirely gone over to the Yugo-Slav state and recently adopted resolutions stating that its object was union of all Yugo-Slav peoples from Isonzo to Vardar. The Croatian troops will serve as nucleus in support of Yugo-Slav National Council. New state, however, is encountering two serious difficulties: (1) agitation of Italian populations, especially in Trieste and [Fiume], for union with Italy; (2) the acts of brigandage by the deserters roaming throughout Yugo-Slav countries, whose numbers are reported to approach 100,000.

*Hungary.* (a) The Royal Hungarian Government: Károlyi candidacy to premiership was apparently unacceptable to Emperor, Andrassy and Lammasch. Hadik, a Liberal, but little known in political life, chosen. At same time, Emperor sent to Budapest as his personal representative Archduke Joseph, who has lived largely in Hungary, and is supposed to enjoy great popularity there, to endeavor to support Government of Hadik which is backed by Hungarian Parliament.

(b) The Budapest National Council: This is an unconstitutional and revolutionary body opposed to the Monarchy and to the present Government. Károlyi is its present leader and has been proclaimed Premier "by the grace of the people." This body has drawn up indictments of Hungarian Government and of its policy during war, submitted my press telegram.

Beside this Budapest National Council, there has been formed Soldiers' and Workmen's [Council], which strikingly resembles first Bolsheviki councils. It is a serious question whether Károlyi, who has now frankly espoused cause not only of radical Magyars but also of oppressed Hungarian nationalities, will be able to keep control over the Socialist movement in Hungary. There is a probability of republic taking place of present Monarchy.

To summarize, I greatly fear that we may witness a rapid movement towards extreme socialism, which will sweep away not only present forms of government and the dynasty, but which will become a clearly defined Bolsheviki movement. There are [now] few extreme Socialist leaders in the country and these few are principally in Hungary, but the soldiers will form the nucleus for the Bolsheviki elements.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/9049

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 3, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 3, 1.32 p. m.]

38 [39?]. Austrian armistice signed. You may publish this at once. Terms as cabled you may be published in American papers Monday afternoon, November 4, but I have promised that care will be taken by our censor so that terms are not cabled to Europe before publication here on Tuesday morning.<sup>1</sup>

HOUSE

<sup>1</sup>According to the Special Representative's telegram No. 43, Nov. 4 (File No. 763.72119/9053), the time of European publication was changed to 4 p. m. on Tuesday, Nov. 5.

Discussion of President Wilson's Principles of Peace—Note of the Soviet Government, Received November 3, Regarding Participation in the Peace Negotiations—Reports of Constitutional Changes in Germany—Memorandum of the Allied Governments on the Bases of Peace, November 4—Agreement on the Terms of the Armistice for Germany

File No. 763.72119/9050

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 3, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received 3.33 p. m.]

38. For the President:

Yesterday afternoon we had a meeting of the Supreme Council at Versailles in which we made further progress on the military terms of armistice for Germany. We did not reach the naval terms because both Lloyd George and Clemenceau wanted to wait for Austria's reply which [must?] come in by Sunday midnight. I disagreed with this procedure believing it a waste of time.

The Belgians are protesting articles 3 and 5 of the fourteen points. The Italians are protesting article 9.

The three Prime Ministers meet this afternoon at 3 o'clock at my headquarters to discuss the fourteen points. As a matter of fact Clemenceau and Orlando will accept anything that the English will agree to concerning article 2. I have spent almost every minute outside my conference discussing this article with the British. I am insisting that they must recognize the principle, that it is a strong case for discussion at the peace conference or before and I am having the greatest difficulty in getting them to admit even that much.

I have contended that they might notwithstanding [*as well*] refuse to accept the principle that laws governing war upon land was not [*formed*] a subject for discussion. I believe if I could get the matter postponed until you come that some satisfactory solution might be arrived at.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 861.00/3102, 3151

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, October 29, 1918, 8 p. m., and

November 2, 1 p. m.

[Received in sections, October 30, 4.16 p. m., and

November 3, 4.10 p. m.]

1290, 1297. The following English translation of a note in Russian handed by the Russian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Norwegian Legation at Petrograd was telegraphed by that Legation



to the Foreign Office under date of October 26 with the request it be forwarded to this Legation for transmission to President Wilson :<sup>1</sup>

In your address to the Congress of the United States of America on the 18th [8th] of January, point 6, you expressed the deep sympathy which you felt towards Russia, which at that moment was facing the necessity of carrying on negotiations with the powerful German imperialism. You said that your program consisted in the clearing of all Russian territory and in an adjustment of all questions concerning Russia. You said that Russia should be guaranteed an absolutely effective assistance from the other nations in her effort to be able to take an independent decision concerning her own political development and her national policy. This would assure her a hearty welcome from the social union of free nations, whatever the form of government that she may elect for herself would be. You would also give Russia every kind of support that would answer to her wishes. You added that the relations assumed towards Russia by all great powers during the coming months would be the proof of their good feelings towards her, the proof of their comprehending of Russia's needs, even when these might not be in accordance with their own interests, and also a proof of their wisdom and the disinterestedness of their sympathy.

The supreme struggle we had with German imperialism in Brest Litovsk apparently increased your sympathies towards Soviet Russia, since you sent your greetings to the Congress of Councils which ratified the Brest predatory peace under the threat of a German offensive, and assured it that Soviet Russia could depend on the support of America.

This was six months ago and the Russian people have had ample time to experience *de facto* the good feelings of your Government, the good feelings of your allies, the realization on the part of the Allies of Russia's needs and the wisdom and the disinterestedness of their sympathy. These feelings have been expressed firstly through the fact that, with financial assistance on the part of your allies and with the diplomatic support of your Government, the conspiracy of the Czecho-Slovaks was organized on Russian territory, and to this conspiracy your Government showed every kind of assistance. During a certain period attempts were made to create a *casus belli* between the United States and Russia by spreading rumors about the German occupation of the Siberian railway. Your own officers, however, and after them the head of your Red Cross Mission, Colonel Robins, could convince themselves of the libelousness of these rumors. The Czecho-Slovak movement was organized under the pretext of protecting these unfortunate misguided individuals from being delivered into the hands of Germany and Austria. You can, however, learn among other things from the open letter of Captain Sadoul, member of the

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<sup>1</sup>This translation is very inaccurate, but is printed here with only verbal corrections of the telegraphic text, based on comparison with the one later received as enclosure to the Minister's despatch No. 1033 of Nov. 2, 1918 (File No. 861.00/3393), because the original in Russian did not arrive until Dec. 11, 1918.



French military mission, how much this lacked any actual foundation. The Czecho-Slovaks had not left Russia at the beginning of the year only because the French Government had not given them any ships for their use. For several months we waited in vain for Allies to grant them a possibility for leaving the country; apparently their presence in Russia was more desirable for these Governments than their departure to France to take part in the war on the French frontier. Ultimate events have made clear to us the motives. The best proof of the true character of the Czecho-Slovak revolt is the fact that, having occupied the Siberian railway, they did not profit by this means of departure, but at the order of the Governments of the Allied Powers, who were directing them, preferred to become the basis of Russian counter-revolution. This counter-revolutionary revolt which has made all transport of food and naphtha on the Volga impossible, which has cut off all the peasants and workmen of Russia from the bread and other supplies of Siberia, and which has exposed these peasants and workmen to hunger. [Beginning of section 2.] This is the first fruit which the workmen and peasants of Russia have reaped from your Government and the Governments of your allies. This is the result of your promises given in the beginning of the year. And then the Russian people were made subject to the offensive of Allied troops, including American, in the north. Russian territory has been invaded without cause or declaration of war. Russian towns and villages have been occupied, Soviet officials have been executed, and acts of violence have been directed towards the peaceful Russian population.

You have given promise, [Mr.] President, to offer Russia your assistance in her aim of taking an independent decision concerning her own political development and her national policy. Actually, however, this assistance has found expression in the attempts made in Archangel, Murmansk and the Far East by Czecho-Slovak troops, and later on your allies, to impose by force on the Russian people the power of the subjugators, the exploiting classes, the supremacy of which classes was overthrown in October of last year. The Russian people, instead of an assistance in the independent expression of their will, which was promised to them, [Mr.] President, in your declarations, have met with a revival of the Russian counter-revolution which had already become a corpse, and attempts to establish in a predatory way [its] sanguinary supremacy over the Russian Nation.

You had also promised the Russian people, [Mr.] President, to offer your support in their struggle for independence. Actually, however, when the Russian Nation was struggling on the southern front with counter-revolution which had sold itself to German imperialism and threatened their independence, when on the western front the Russian people were using all their forces in their effort to organize a defense of their territory, they were compelled to move their troops to the east against the Czecho-Slovaks who were bringing back the [old] yoke and subjugation, and to the south against the intruders in the shape of your troops and those of your allies and the counter-revolution organized by them.

The touching story [*touchstone*] of the relations between the United States and Russia has not given quite the results which could be expected from your address to Congress, [Mr.] President. But we have reason not to be entirely displeased with these results, for the violence of the counter-revolution in the east and in the north has opened the eyes of the workmen and peasants of Russia as to the aims of the Russian counter-revolution and of [its] foreign assistants. Through this experience has been carried the iron will for the protection of the freedom acquired by the revolution for the protection of the land that the latter has given to the peasants, the factories that it has given to the workmen. After the fall of Kasan, Simbirsk, Sysran, Tamopa [*Samara*], you must have realized, [Mr.] President, what results the actual suppressions of your promises of the 18th [*8th*] of January have had for us. What we have gone through has assisted us in creating a disciplined, united Red Army which grows daily, renews [its] strength and power and learns to defend the Revolution. Your relations to us, shown by your Government's actions, have not been capable of annihilating us. [They have] helped us to become stronger than we were a few months ago, and the international negotiations on general peace which you propose now find us vital and strong and allow us to express in the name of Russia our consent to take part in them. As an interlude [*prerequisite*] for the armistice during which the peace negotiations are to begin, you have placed on Germany the condition of withdrawing troops from the occupied territory. We argue [*are ready*, Mr.] President, to conclude an armistice on these conditions and beg you to inform us [as to] when you, [Mr.] President, and your allies intend to withdraw your troops from Murmansk, Archangel, and Siberia. You will not consent, [Mr.] President, to an armistice [unless] Germany, in withdrawing the troops, will indulge in [*abstain from*] violence and robbery, etc. We presume that this means as well that you and your allies will order the Czecho-Slovaks to return us that part of our gold fund that they robbed us of in Kasan, that you will forbid them during their compelled withdrawal in which we will assist them, without awaiting your orders, to continue their predatory actions and the violence they inflicted on the workmen and the peasants up to now.

As regards your further conditions of peace, namely, that the governments concluding peace must be the representatives of the will of the people, our Government, as you know, answers to it fully. Our Government expresses the will of the councils of the workmen, peasants, and Red Army deputies which represent at least 80 per cent of the Russian people, which cannot be said, [Mr.] President, of your Government. But in the name of humanity and peace we do not place as the condition of general peace negotiations that all the participating nations should be represented by councils of people's commissars, elected at congresses of councils of workmen's, peasants' and soldiers' deputies. We know that this form of governing nations will soon become a general form and that only general peace will protect nations from the threat of intrusion and will give them the liberty of dealing with the form of government and the gangs which have thrust humanity into this international slaughter, and will naturally express their will.

Though consenting to participate at present in negotiations even with such governments which do not express yet the will of the people, we, on our side, would like to learn in detail from you, [Mr.] President, in what character you figure to yourself the union of nations which according to you ought to crown the work of peace. You demand the independence of Poland, Belgium, freedom for the people of Austria-Hungary. Presumably you mean that at first the people will have to come to the decision of their future development for themselves and then join in a union of nations. But strangely enough you do not mention in your demands the freedom of Ireland, Egypt, India, or even the Philippines, and we would deeply regret if [these] nations would be deprived of the possibility to participate with us [in] the organization of a union of nations through their freely-elected representatives. We would like to learn too, [Mr.] President, before starting negotiations concerning the creation of the union of nations, how you figure to yourself the solution of the many questions of economic nature which have a profound importance for the work of the future peace. You do not mention the war expenses which will be spread with their whole abnormal weight on the people if the union of nations will not abolish the payment of war loans to the capitalists of all the world. You know as well as we do, [Mr.] President, that this war is the result of the policy of all capitalistic governments, that the governments all over the world competed in their mutual armament, that all governing groups of civilized nations participated in this predatory policy, and that therefore it would be highly unjust if the people who have paid for this policy with the blood of millions, having settled accounts at the expense of an [economic] disaster, should pay a tribute to the groups actually responsible for this policy that has led them to ruin. We propose therefore, [Mr.] President, that the union of nations should be based on the refusal of payment of war loans. As regards the restoration of the territories ruined by the war, we find it just that all nations should participate in assisting unfortunate Belgium, Poland, Serbia; and, as exhausted as Russia may appear, she is ready on her side to do her utmost to assist them, and she expects that American capital which has not suffered from the war but acquired many a million of profit will on its side come to the assistance of these nations.

But the union of nations has got not only to settle the present war, it has got to render further wars impossible. You cannot ignore, [Mr.] President, that the capitalists of your country intend to continue the policy of requiring superprofit in China and Siberia and that, fearing the competition of the Japanese capitalists, they prepare a military power which enables them to offer resistance to any measures undertaken by Japan. You are undoubtedly aware of similar plans on the side of capitalist governing circles in other countries in relation to other territories and other nations. Knowing this you cannot refrain from agreeing with us that we cannot leave factories, banks, mines in the hands of private individuals who always use the great means of the industry created by the people in order to export the products and the capital to foreign countries and in return for these favors obtain a superprofit, which involves the countries [through] their struggles [in] imperialistic wars. We



propose, therefore, [Mr.] President, that expropriation of the capitalists of all the world should be made the basis of the union of nations. In your country, [Mr.] President, banks and industry are in the hands of such a small group of capitalists that, according to the statement of your personal friend, Colonel Robins, it would be sufficient to arrest twenty leaders of the capitalistic group and deliver into the hands of the people all that, by means of the methods usual to the capitalists' world, they have concentrated in their hands and in that way abolish the chief source of new wars. If you consent to this, [Mr.] President, if in that manner the sources of wars will be settled with for the future, there is no doubt that there will be no difficulty in breaking down all economic barriers and that all nations finding themselves in possession of all means of industry will be intensely interested in the exchange of what they need. The matter will then be confined to an exchange of what they need. The matter will then be an exchange of products between nations according to their capacity of production, and the union of nations will become a union of mutual support of the working classes. It will [not] be a difficult matter for them to diminish the military forces to the limits necessary for interior safety. We know well that the grasping class of capitalists will try to create this interior danger just as now the great Russian landowners, Russian capitalists, with the support of American, English and French armed forces try to withdraw factories from the workmen and land from the peasants. But if American workmen, led by the idea of a union of nations, will break the resistance of American capitalists in the same way as we have broken the resistance of Russian capitalists, in that case neither German capitalists nor any other capitalists will present a sufficiently serious danger for a victorious labor class; and it will be sufficient then if any member of society, working six hours at the factory, will learn to use arms during two hours a day for several months, and then the whole nation will know how to deal with the interior danger.

As it is, [Mr.] President, in spite of having experienced what your promises mean, we have nevertheless accepted the basis of your proposals concerning an international peace and a union of nations, but we strive to deepen your proposals in order that the results should not contradict your promises as it happened with your support of Russia. We have tried to formulate your proposals concerning a union of nations so precisely that a union of nations should not become a union of capitalistic nations. If you do not agree with us in detail, [Mr.] President, we shall not protest against an open discussion of your peace proposals as is stated in the first point of your peace program. We will find a way of agreeing in detail as long as you accept the basis of our proposals.

There is another possibility. We have had to deal with the President of the Archangel and Siberian invasion, we have also had to deal with the President [omission]. What if the [real President turns out to be the director of the] policy of the capitalistic American Government? What if the American Government should prove to be the Government of American limited companies, American industrial, commercial and railway trusts, American banks, in one word, the Government of American capitalists? And what if the proposals issuing from such a government concerning the creation



of a union of nations should lead only to thrusting new chains [on] the people, organizing an international trust for the exploitation of helpless workmen? In this case, [Mr.] President, you will be incapable of answering our questions and we will say to the workmen of all the countries: "Beware! Millions of your fellow brothers are still shedding their blood in this war, thrown against one another by the [bourgeoisie] of all the countries, and leaders of capital are already appearing to hasten to come to a final arrangement in order to crush those remaining alive, when they will demand an answer from those who are responsible for the war."

However, [Mr.] President, as we by no means wish to fight with America even if [your] Government is not yet replaced by a soviet of people's commissars and your place is not occupied by Eugene Debs who is still kept in prison; as we do not want to fight with England, although the cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George is not yet replaced by a council of people's commissars with [Maclean] at head; or with France, although Clemenceau's Government is not yet replaced by a Labor government of [Merrheim]; in the same way as we concluded peace with an Imperial German Government with the Emperor William II at the head—towards whom you are not better disposed than we—we propose to discuss together with your allies all the following questions and give us clear, precise, businesslike answers: Do the Governments of America, England, and France intend to stop shedding the blood of the Russian citizens if the Russian people consent to pay ransom? In that case what payment do the Governments of America, England and France expect from the Russian people? Do they demand concessions, delivery of railways on certain conditions, mines, gold mines, etc.? Or territorial concessions, part of Siberia or the Caucasus, the Murman coast? We expect you, [Mr.] President, to declare decidedly what are your demands and those of your allies. We also should like to know whether the alliance between your Government and those of the other Allied Powers has the character of a union which could be compared to a limited company for the reception of dividends [from] Russia; or does your Government and the other Governments of the Allied Powers put up separate demands, and what are these?

It would interest us particularly to know, what do your French allies demand in exchange for the milliards of roubles with which Paris bankers [subsidized] the subjugators of Russia, the enemy of their own people, the criminal [Czarist] Government? You are aware as well as your French allies, that the Russian Nation is exhausted by the war and not yet capable of profiting by the efforts of the people's Soviet authorities which are endeavoring to augment the national economy. You therefore know that Russia will not be enabled to pay fully to the French bankers the milliards spent for the nation's ruin by the Government of the Czar even if you and your allies succeed in invading all the territory of Russia which our heroic revolutionary Red Army will not allow. We therefore put you the following questions: Do your French allies consent to a payment in part, and if so, in what measure, and do they foresee that their demands will lead to similar ones on the part of all other creditors of the shameful Government of the Czar overthrown by the people?

We cannot admit that your Government and that of your allies should not have got a ready answer on this question at the moment when your and their troops attempt to advance on our territory with the evident aim of invading our country. The Russian people represented by the national Red Army are keeping guard on their territory and fight splendidly against your invasion and the advance of your allies. But your Government and the Governments of the other Allied Powers have undoubtedly prepared plans according to which you are shedding the blood of your soldiers. We wait for you to state clearly and decidedly all your demands. If our questions remain unanswered we will then presume that we are not mistaken in supposing that your Government and the Governments of your allies expect from the Russian Nation a payment with Russia's natural wealth as well as a monetary one and also territorial concessions. We will announce to the Russian people and the working classes of other countries that the absence of an answer on your part will be already a silent answer [*assent*]. The Russian people will realize that the demands of your Government and [those] of your allies are so limitless and heavy that you cannot present them to the Russian Government.

SCHMEDEMAN

File No. 763.72119/9051

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 3, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received November 3, 8.57 p. m.]

41. My entire time outside of the scheduled conferences of Prime Ministers has been spent in working for a solution of the difficulties mentioned in my No. 38.<sup>1</sup> It had become very clear that the conference to be held at my headquarters at 3 o'clock this afternoon was to be a critical one and I was fully prepared to exert strong pressure in order to secure from the Allies an acceptance of the President's fourteen points set forth in his speech of January 8, 1918, and of his subsequent addresses.

At 3 o'clock this afternoon, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando and Hymans (representing the Belgian Government) met with me at my headquarters for a talk over the fourteen points. George opened the discussion by stating that he was prepared to stand by the proposed answer cabled in my No. 12.<sup>2</sup> I pointed out that the following phrase of this answer was not satisfactory to the President inasmuch as it was not clear that the Allies accepted the principle of the freedom of the seas: "They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference." I then read to the conference a paraphrase of the President's telegram to me dated October 31,<sup>3</sup> in answer to my

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 448.

<sup>2</sup>Ante, p. 425.

<sup>3</sup>Ante, p. 427.

No. 12. Clemenceau then stated, "We accepted the principle of the freedom of the seas," and turning to George he said, "You do, also, do you not?" George answered: "No, it is impossible for any British Prime Minister to do this." He then stated: "We are quite willing to discuss the freedom of the seas in the light of the new conditions which have arisen by reason of the war." I stated: "Why do you not say so?" He said: "I am perfectly willing to say that to the President and I will instruct the British Ambassador in Washington to so inform the President." I said: "I would prefer to have you so inform me and I will inform the President."

I am now in receipt of the following letter:

British Embassy  
Paris, November 3d, 1918.

My Dear Colonel House: I write to confirm the statement I made in the course of our talk this afternoon at your house when I told you that "We were quite willing to discuss the freedom of the sea in the light of the new conditions which have arisen in the course of the present war." In our judgment this most important subject can only be dealt with satisfactorily through the freest debate and the most liberal exchange of views.

I send you this letter after having had an opportunity of talking the matter over with the Foreign Secretary, who quite agrees.

Ever sincerely,

D. Lloyd George

The Belgian representative proposed a number of modifications of point number 3. None of these received approval. One change, however, was requested by the Allied representatives to point 3. They wish it to be understood that the words ["so far as possible"] qualify the entire point. This they suggest could be accomplished by transposing them to the beginning of the point, so that point 3 would read: "So far as possible the removal, etc., etc." I assented to this suggestion and stated that I thought it would probably be unnecessary for the President to point out this change to Germany. All other points were agreed upon without reservation.

Situation now is therefore as follows. The proposed answer cabled you in my No. 12 will be sent to the President along with the terms of the military and naval armistice to be offered to Germany. The President will then send the answer received from the Allies to the German Government with the statement that the military authorities of the Allies and the United States are prepared to receive the German military authorities and to communicate to them the terms upon which an armistice will be granted to Germany. The letter quoted above that I received from George must not be published unless it becomes necessary. If I do not hear from you to the contrary, I shall assume that you accept the situation as it



now is. This I strongly advise. Any other decision would cause serious friction and delay.

A conference will be held at my headquarters Monday morning at 11 o'clock. In the afternoon at 3 o'clock a full conference to be held at Versailles. At these meetings the terms of the naval and military armistice to be offered Germany will be finally agreed upon.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72/12080

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, November 3, 1918.

[Received November 4, 9.45 a. m.]

4927. Following interview reported to have been granted correspondent of Dutch news agency by Chancellor, November 1. Explaining purpose of his errand, correspondent remarked that recent changes in German Constitution seemed to be so far-reaching that one might almost think of a form of revolution. "Revolution!" replied Chancellor, "a complete revolution, although, thank God and thanks to good sense of German people, an unbloody one. What you see taking place in German Empire as well as in Confederate States is outcome of silent underground movement of many years. The war and acts of militarism and servile leaders with their political wisdom having gone shipwrecked merely strengthened in tremendous way the movement. We are giving definitely an upper hand to democratic element today. Democratic idea had made its victorious entrance in single states of Empire, change therefore isn't under pressure of moment but simply rooted in will of German people. Any doubt concerning sincerity of change of system is refuted by fact it is firmly moored in Constitution. In this connection I frankly acknowledge assistance given to democratic idea by President Wilson whose reiterated solemn declarations to effect that a truly democratic German Government can absolutely depend on right and justice in final settlements has essentially fortified position of Germany's democratic leaders. New Government has therefore seen fit to acquaint Wilson with change in German Constitution by memorandum transmitted to Swiss Chargé d'Affaires at Washington."

Discussing new position of German Empire Chancellor continued: "Although we have always had free republics among our Confederate States, namely Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, majority of German people continues to give decided preference to monarchical system in form of parliamentary government. Idea before those who formed constitutional amendments was this, how the position



of Emperor could be made similar to that for instance of Queen of Holland. In consequence position of Emperor as supreme war lord of German Army and Navy has been entirely abolished. According to amended Constitution Emperor cannot perform any political act nor any similar act of political consequence without formal approval of Chancellor. Latter is now constitutionally responsible for acts of political significance on part of Emperor, even the personal public deeds or writings as far as they are apt to influence interior political or foreign affairs of Empire."

Considering new Constitution Chancellor Prince Max says: "As you are aware, Chancellor was thus far verily trusted minister of Emperor who alone decided on his appointments or dismissals from office. By amended Constitution Chancellor cannot be appointed unless he has confidence of Majority of Reichstag and can hold office only as this confidence is assured him. You will appreciate this very far-[reaching] change in our affairs which isn't merely based, as in several other countries with parliamentary governments, on customs but based on explicit clause of Constitution. You know, of course, that in recent sitting of Reichstag, for first time in our history formal clause of confidence was passed in favor of new Government and their publicly declared policy. If ever in future a vote of nonconfidence shall be passed by Reichstag, Chancellor will be obliged by law to retire at once. As far as participating of members of Reichstag in new Government concerned that development has naturally not been entirely closed as yet. However, after abolition of constitutional clause providing that members of Reichstag accepting paid office lost thereby [their] mandates, participating of prominent parliamentary men is practically unlimited. Appointment of Secretary of State depends entirely on Majority party constitutionally and decisively to form Government of Empire. As you are aware a considerable [number] of leaders of these parties are already nominated secretaries and undersecretaries of state within new democratic government. By all these changes," Prince Max concluded, "power of Reichstag has been increasing exceedingly, [unintelligible passage] particularly on all questions of war and peace, expressing true voice of majority of German people."

Correspondent added that by great increase of influence of Reichstag on German public affairs people abroad might possibly think that as long as Bundesrat was unchanged reform wasn't far-reaching enough. Chancellor replied: "This opinion might not be unnatural if Governments of Confederate States which send their delegates to Bundesrat were to remain unchanged. As matter of fact change of system in those states is carefully choosing [*following*] that of Empire. Everywhere, particularly Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, etc., tendency of hour is for democratizing. By new

Prussian electoral law majority of Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus will take similar part in Government of Prussia as members of Reichstag take in Government of Empire, so it will be constituted along lines of Reichstag. It is therefore unthinkable that delegates of Prussian Government to Bundesrat should ever get instructions bringing them into conflict with principles of Reichstag. Besides you forget one most powerful prerogative of Reichstag, namely, exclusive right to decision of budget of Empire, which [in] most matters nowadays is most convincing factor. So," concluded Chancellor, "ancient regime has gone, it will never return. I confidently trust that new German democracy will soon live in peace with sister democracies and complete her part of Germany's reformation."

BLISS

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 File No. 763.72/12098a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1918, noon.

2334. Cable at once full text of constitutional amendments passed by Reichstag and Bundesrat.

LANSING

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 File No. 862.001W64/34

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1918, 3 p. m.

2335. A telegram has been received from Department agent, through American Legation, Berne,<sup>1</sup> stating that German Chancellor delayed action on Kaiser's abdication on presentation of report by Solf from Baron Rosen, German Minister at The Hague, that the President did not insist upon abdication. German Minister gives Kirk as his authority, alleging he communicated that opinion to one named [Hahn], who in turn informed Rosen.

Department cannot believe that Kirk has ever made any such statement.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, if there is any reason to think that Hahn received such an impression from Kirk, he should be advised that his impression as to the views of the President of the United States is wholly unwarranted and should not be considered.

LANSING

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed, but see telegram from the Vice Consul at Zürich, Oct. 23, ante, p. 394.

<sup>2</sup> The Chargé replied, in telegram No. 4943 of Nov. 5: "Kirk states that question of Kaiser's abdication was never discussed with Hahn and that at no time has anything been said which would give impression of reflecting views of American Government." (File No. 862.001W64/36.)

File No. 763.72119/9054

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 4, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received November 4, 3.52 p. m.]

45. You may announce to newspapers that the terms of the armistice to be offered Germany have been agreed to and signed by the Inter-Allied Conference unanimously. Diplomatic unity completely achieved under conditions of utmost harmony. Do not permit this report to be cabled back to Europe or out of the United States.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/9052

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 4, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 4.24 p. m.]

42. For the President:

A meeting was held at my headquarters this morning at 11 o'clock attended by Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando, Doctor Beneš (representing the Czecho-Slovaks) and myself. Marshal Foch and the Allied military and naval authorities were in attendance also.

The conference agreed to the following resolutions:

1. To approve the plan of operations against Germany through Austria proposed by Marshal Foch, General Bliss, General Wilson and General di Robilant.

2. That Marshal Foch shall have the supreme strategical direction of operations against Germany on all fronts including the southern and eastern.

3. That the military advisers of the British, French and Italian and the United States Government shall immediately examine the following:

- (a) The possibility of taking immediate steps to send a force which shall include the Czecho-Slovak forces on the French and Italian fronts to Bohemia and Galicia with the following [objects]: to organize these countries against invasion by Germany; to prevent the export to Germany of oil, coal or any other material, and to render these available to the Allied forces; to establish airdromes for the purpose of bombing Germany.
- (b) The immediate cooperation of General Franchet d'Espérey in these objects.

The procedure to be adopted by the Supreme War Council this afternoon was agreed upon as follows:

The Supreme War Council decide as follows:

- (a) To approve the attached terms for an armistice with Germany.
- (b) To communicate the terms of armistice to President Wilson, inviting him to notify the German Government that the next step for them to take is to send a *parlementaire* to Marshal Foch who will receive instructions to act on behalf of the Associated Governments.
- (c) To communicate to President Wilson the attached memorandum [of] observations by the Allied Governments on the correspondence which has passed between the President and the German Government, in order that they may be forwarded to Germany together with the communication in regard to an armistice.
- (d) To invite Colonel House to make the above communications on their behalf to President Wilson.
- (e) To authorize Marshal Foch to communicate the terms as finally approved to envoys properly accredited by the German Government.
- (f) To associate a British admiral with Marshal Foch on [the] naval aspects of the armistice.
- (g) To leave [discretion to] Marshal Foch and the British admiral in regard to minor technical points in the armistice.

The memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on the correspondence which has passed between the President and the German Government now reads as follows:

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must therefore reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed; the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property (by the forces of Germany) [*sic*] by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.

Main change in this from draft cabled you in my No. 12<sup>1</sup> is the insertion of the words "by the aggression of Germany" in the last

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 425.



sentence. This, with Lloyd George's letter quoted in my No. 38 [41],<sup>1</sup> makes the situation quite satisfactory for the moment. The terms of the military and naval armistice will be finally adopted this afternoon at Versailles and will be cabled you in full as soon as they have been adopted. Lloyd George leaves today at 2 o'clock for England, accordingly he will not be present at the conference this afternoon.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72/12061

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, November 4, 1918.

[Received November 5, 5 a. m.]

4930. German press comment.

*Norddeutsche Allgemeine*, 3d. Emperor sent following proclamation to Chancellor:

I return to your Grand Ducal Highness herewith enclosed, with view to its early publication, bill for amendment of Imperial Constitution and of the laws of March 7, 1878, relative to representation of Imperial Chancellor, sent me for execution. I have the wish to give expression to that which is moving me on occasion of this step of such great importance for further history of German people. Prepared by series of Government's acts, a new system now takes effect which transfers fundamental rights from person of Emperor to people. This concludes period which will be held in honor by future generations. Despite all struggles between constituted authorities and forces striving upwards, it has made possible for our people that tremendous development manifested immortally in wonderful achievements of this war. But in terrible storms of four war years old forms have been broken, not to leave ruins behind, but to make room for new forms of life. After accomplishment of this time, German people has a title that no right guaranteeing free and happy future shall be withheld from it. Measures of Federated Governments now accepted and added to by Reichstag owe their origin to this conviction. I accept with my high allies these acts of popular representative body with firm will to cooperate to best of my ability in their full application, convinced that in so doing I serve welfare of German people. Office of Emperor is service of the people. May, then, new institutions realize all forces of good which our people needs to endure sore trials which have fallen upon Empire and to gain with firm step a bright future after darkness of the present.

Berlin, October 28, 1918. Signed, William.

Countersigned, Prince Max of Baden.

BLISS

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 455.

File No. 763.72119/9056

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 4, 1918, noon.

[Received November 5, 6.32 a. m.]

## 47. For the President:

In order that there may be no misunderstanding I venture to repeat the procedure agreed upon for the handling of the armistice negotiations with Germany. The terms of the armistice to be offered Germany and the memorandum of the observations of the Allied Governments on the correspondence which has passed between the President and the German Government both having been communicated by me to the President and having been accepted by him, the President is expected to proceed as follows:

(1) To notify the German Government to send a *parlementaire* to Marshal Foch who has been advised of the views of the Allied and United States Governments respecting the terms of the armistice to be offered Germany.

(2) To forward to Germany, together with the communication mentioned in (1) *supra*, the memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on the correspondence which has passed between the President and the German Government.

It must be clearly understood that the terms of the armistice to be offered Germany are not to be made public until these terms have been accepted by Germany.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/9055

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 4, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received November 5, 6.50 a. m.]

## 46. For the President:

The following are the terms of the military and naval armistice that have been agreed upon. It is understood that the terms of armistice are not to be made public until Germany has agreed to them. The duty of communicating them to Germany has been entrusted to Marshal Foch and a British Admiral.

CONDITIONS OF AN ARMISTICE WITH GERMANY <sup>1</sup>

## A. Military clauses on western front

1. Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

<sup>1</sup>Telegraphic text brought into accord with the final text appended to the minutes of the Supreme War Council, Nov. 4, 1918 (File No. 763.72Su/109).

2. Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within 14 days from the signature of the armistice.

German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war.

Occupation by the Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas.

All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note (annexure 1<sup>1</sup>).

3. Repatriation, beginning at once, to be completed within 14 days, of all inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial or convicted).

4. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following equipment:

- 5,000 guns (2,500 heavy, 2,500 field)
- 30,000 machine guns
- 3,000 *minenwerfer*
- 2,000 aeroplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly D.-7's—and night bombing machines)

The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexure 1).

5. Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. These countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation.

The occupation of these territories will be carried out by Allied and United State garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne) together with bridgeheads at these points of a 30-kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions.

A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to it 40 kilometers to the east from the frontier of Holland to the parallel of Gernsheim and at a distance of 30 kilometers only east of the stream from this parallel up to the Swiss frontier.

Evacuation by the enemy of the Rhinelands shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 11 days, in all, 25 days after the signature of the armistice.

All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated according to the note (annexure 1).

6. In all territory evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants.

No destruction of any kind to be committed.

Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munitions, equipment not removed during the periods fixed for evacuation.

Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be moved.

7. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired.

All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain.

5,000 locomotives, 150,000 wagons and 10,000 motor lorries in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed for the evacuation of Belgium and Luxemburg.

The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the same period together with all pre-war personnel and material.

Further, material necessary for the working of railways in the country on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*.

All stores of coal and material for upkeep of permanent way, signals, and repair shops shall be left *in situ* and kept in an efficient state by Germany during the whole period of the armistice.

All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them; the note appended as annexure 2<sup>1</sup> regulates the detail of these measures.

8. The German Command shall be responsible for revealing all mines or delay action fuses disposed on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction.

The German Command shall also reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or pollution of springs, wells, etc.), under penalty of reprisals.

9. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States armies in all occupied territory.

The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

10. The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war. The Allied Powers and the United States of America shall be able to dispose of these prisoners as they wish.

11. Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

#### *B. Dispositions relative to the eastern frontiers of Germany*

12. All German troops at present in any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Roumania or Turkey shall withdraw within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914.

13. Evacuation by German troops to begin at once and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilian as well as military agents now on the territory of Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914) to be recalled.

14. German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other undertaking with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Roumania and Russia (as defined on August 1, 1914).

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



15. Abandonment of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

16. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories or for any other purpose.

*C. Clause concerning East Africa*

17. Unconditional capitulation of all German forces operating in East Africa, within one month.

*D. General clauses*

18. Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month, in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all civilians interned or deported who may be citizens of other Allied or Associated states than those mentioned in clause 3.

19. With the reservation that any future claims and demands of the Allies and United States of America remain unaffected, the following financial conditions are required:

Reparation for damage done.

While the armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery or reparation for war losses.

Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium and, in general, immediate return of all documents, specie, stock, shares, paper money together with plant for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries.

Restitution of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power.

This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

*E. Naval conditions*

20. Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships.

Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

21. All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of war of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned, without reciprocity.

22. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of America of 160 German submarines (including all submarine cruisers and mine-laying submarines) with their complete armament and equipment, in ports which will be specified by the Allies and the United States of America. All other submarines to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America.

23. The following German surface warships, which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports to be

designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and placed under the surveillance of the Allies and the United States of America, only caretakers being left on board, namely:

- 6 battle cruisers
- 10 battleships
- 8 light cruisers, including 2 mine layers
- 50 destroyers of the most modern types

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States of America, and are to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States of America. All vessels of the auxiliary fleet (trawlers, motor vessels, etc.) are to be disarmed.

24. The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

25. Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers. To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries and defense works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Cattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters without any questions of neutrality being raised, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.

26. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture.

27. All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

28. In evacuating the Belgian coasts and ports, Germany shall abandon all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, cranes and all other harbor materials, all materials for inland navigation, all aircraft and air materials and stores, all arms and armaments, and all stores and apparatus of all kinds.

29. All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian warships of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant ships seized are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those ports are to be returned and German materials as specified in clause 28 are to be abandoned.

30. All merchant ships in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

31. No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender or restoration.

32. The German Government shall formally notify the neutral governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Holland, that all restrictions placed

on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions such as the export of shipbuilding materials or not, are immediately canceled.

33. No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

*F. Duration of armistice*

34. The duration of the armistice is to be 30 days, with option to extend. During this period, on failure of execution of any of the above clauses, the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, on 48 hours' previous notice.

*G. Time limit for reply*

35. This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within 72 hours of notification.

EDWARD HOUSE

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American Note to Germany, November 5, Transmitting the Allied Memorandum and Referring Further Communications to Marshal Foch—Appeal of President Wilson to the Peoples of Austria-Hungary for Moderation—Further Inquiry of the Soviet Government Regarding Negotiations—False Report of the Signature of the Armistice

File No. 763.72119/3813k

*The Secretary of State to the Swiss Minister (Sulzer)*

No. 286

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to request you to transmit the following communication to the German Government:

In my note of October 23, 1918,<sup>1</sup> I advised you that the President had transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the Associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military point of view.

The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence, which is as follows:

The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January

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<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 381.



1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses. They must point out, however, that clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed, the Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea and from the air.

I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted. I am further instructed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government, and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2484

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

No. 10108

LONDON, *October 22, 1918.*

[*Received November 5.*]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit, herewith enclosed, the copy of a communication which I have received from the Executive Committee of the Union of Democratic Control in support of the President's peace terms as outlined in his speech of September 27.

The communication is signed by Messrs. Arthur Ponsonby, Philip Snowden, Charles Roden Buxton, F. Seymour Cocks, F. W. Pethick Lawrence, Charles Trevelyan, John A. Hobson, E. D. Morel, F. W. Jowett, H. M. Swanwick, and J. Ramsay MacDonald, who are, and have been since the beginning of the war, the leading pacifists of this country.

I have [etc.]

IRWIN LAUGHLIN

[Enclosure]

*The Executive Committee of the Union of Democratic Control to the American Ambassador*

LONDON, *October 15, 1918.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The Executive Committee of the Union of Democratic Control, which, apart from its thousands of members in all sections of the community, has now affiliated to it 271 bodies of organised labour with a combined membership of 975,900, and



which is holding successful meetings in all parts of Great Britain, desires to convey to the American Embassy its assurance that this vast mass of public opinion in the country supports President Wilson in outlining terms of peace in his famous fourteen points, more recently and fully expounded in his speech of September 27th; and will further support him in resisting any attempt to enlarge these demands in a manner calculated to delay peace.

We have the honour to be,

Yours faithfully,

CHARLES TREVELYAN

JOHN A. HOBSON

E. D. MOREL

F. W. JOWETT

H. M. SWANWICK

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD

ARTHUR PONSONBY

PHILIP SNOWDEN

CHARLES RODEN BUXTON

F. SEYMOUR COCKS

F. W. PETHICK LAWRENCE

File No. 863.00/106a

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1918, 4 p. m.

3275. Department sends you herewith an appeal by the President to be issued through [Committee on Public Information's] office in Berne to the peoples of the constituent nations of Austria-Hungary that have achieved liberation from the yoke of an Austro-Hungarian Empire. Please hand to Mrs. Whitehouse and say that the President directs that she have the necessary translations prepared and widest possible distribution given this appeal. The appeal follows:

May I not say, as speaking for multitudes of your most sincere friends, that it is the earnest hope and expectation of all friends of freedom everywhere and particularly of those whose present and immediate task it is to assist the liberated peoples of the world to establish themselves in genuine freedom, that both the leaders and the peoples of the countries recently set free shall see to it that the momentous changes now being brought about are carried through with order, with moderation, with mercy as well as firmness, and that violence and cruelty of every kind are checked and prevented, so that nothing inhumane may stain the annals of the new age of achievement. They know that such things would only delay the great things we are all striving for, and they therefore confidently appeal to you to restrain every force that may threaten either to delay or to discredit the noble processes of liberty. Signed, Woodrow Wilson.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2491

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, November 5, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 7.34 p. m.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs handed me today a memorandum which reads in translation as follows:

According to a telegraphic information from the Norwegian Legation at Petrograd the Russian Commissaire for Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, has inquired whether the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires at Petrograd was willing to request the Norwegian Government to act as intermediary in negotiations between the Bolshevik Government and the Allied Powers. Mr. Chicherin stated privately that the Bolshevik Government was prepared to make far more concessions to the Entente Powers in order to arrive at an understanding and that, for this purpose, it is particularly desired that an opportunity be afforded it to enter into negotiations with the United States.

Chargé d'Affaires Prytz has requested the Norwegian Government to ascertain privately whether the Allied Powers would be willing to enter into such negotiations and has asked for a telegraphic reply.

An identical note has been handed to the Allied Ministers by the Minister for Foreign Affairs who stated to me that the Norwegian Government will be glad to transmit any reply from our Government.

SCHMEDEMAN

File No. 763.72/12107

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, November 5, 1918.

[Received November 6, 2.40 a. m.]

4964. *Kölnische Zeitung*, 5th: There were disorders at Kiel on Sunday; street demonstrations of sailors and workers conducted by Independent Socialists were followed by conflict with military authorities; 8 killed, 29 wounded.

*Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, 5th, gives following account: Haase and Ledebour telegraphically summoned from Berlin to Kiel to complete committee. On battleship *Kaiser* officers defended German war flag with pistols in hands but were overpowered by crew who pulled down war flag and hoisted red flag; two officers killed including commander, many injured. Three of four companies infantry arriving at Kiel last night immediately joined movement, fourth company was disarmed. During night hussars were sent

from Hamburg but were met one hour's distance from Kiel by marines armed with machine gun and forced to return. Committee of soldiers decided officers should retain their positions but must obey orders of committee, original order that officers must remove insignia afterwards revoked. Governor, Admiral Souchon, met at station Monday evening and detained several hours because apprehended more troops would be sent to Kiel. Food control in hands of soldiers' committee. Machine guns at various parts in city, civilians move freely. Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven quiet thus far.

BLISS

File No. 763.72/12094

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, November 4, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 6, 4.17 a. m.]

5579. Baron [de] Vaux, Counselor Austrian Legation, called on Francis McNutt, American citizen, and impressed on him immediate danger of Bolshevik menace in Austria and her insistence that American troops be sent to occupy Vienna to prevent disorders, at the same time that a statement be made explaining that they came in friendly spirit to safeguard the peace.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/2470

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1918, 4 p. m.

2356. Your 4765, October 12.<sup>1</sup> The President wishes you to make in his behalf a very courteous acknowledgment of message from Luxemburg, with statement to effect that you have been asked by him to say that he will have every disposition to regard the interests of Luxemburg in the most friendly way.

LANSING

File No. 863.00/102

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, November 5, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received November 6, 5.34 p. m.]

5595. The points of special interest in Austria-Hungary remain Budapest and Vienna which as the greatest centers of population are most seriously threatened by the Bolsheviki movement. In

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 356.

Prague the formation of the independent Bohemian state is proceeding smoothly and without bloodshed. The Hungarian troops are leaving the country and their places are slowly being taken by Czech recruits from classes that had not been previously enrolled. Both the railway and postal service appear to be completely under the control of the new Czech state. It is reported that the German consul at Prague called upon representatives of the new Government and expressed the hope of the German Government that the most friendly relations might be established between the Bohemian state and the German Empire. Kramárz while in Switzerland expressed surprise at the rapidity with which the administration had been taken over in Bohemia but regretted that it had been necessary to do this at a time when it was possible to assume control only of the Czech portions of the country which would leave the Germans of Bohemia to be incorporated into the Czech state at some future time.

In the Yugo-Slav countries there are two serious dangers: (1) differences between the Slav and the Italian people of the Istrian and Dalmatian coast, and (2) the brigandage of the deserters.

In Vienna the Lammasch Cabinet has entirely fallen into the background and its task of liquidating the Monarchy is finished as far as this can be done at the present time. The resignation of Andrásy and Spitzmüller, the common Minister of Finance, leaves the Minister of War as the only remaining Austro-Hungarian Minister. He is still occupied in endeavoring to effect the peaceful transfer to the various states of their respective nationals as soon as they can be demobilized. According to the last reports Victor Adler has assumed the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs for the new Austro-German state and has succeeded Andrásy in the Ballplatz. The agitation in Vienna in favor of the formation of Red guards and soldiers' committees is evidence of the Bolshevik danger which will increase greatly with the return of the demobilized troops and which I fear may triumph unless the Allies have food to offer and forces to maintain order throughout the centers of population of Austria.

The Emperor is still at Vienna and has kept entirely in the background during the constitutional changes in the country. It is now rumored that the imperial court is to be dissolved and that the Emperor is planning to take refuge in Switzerland. The controlling influence in the German-Austrian state of such Socialist leaders as Adler, and in Hungary of Károlyi, makes it doubtful whether the Emperor could fall back on either of these states to maintain a humbler crown.

*Hungary:* Károlyi and the National Council secured an easy victory over the legal Government of Hadik. A strong Cabinet has



been formed under Károlyi's leadership which includes Batthyány and Lovaszy, the prominent members of his party and old opponents of the German alliance, Jászi, the Radical leader who was one of the few Magyars to consistently support the cause of the oppressed nationalities of Hungary, Garami, the Socialist leader. The complexion of this Cabinet is extremely radical and a step further to the Left could mean the acceptance of Bolshevism. Károlyi realizes the critical position of his Government and is making every possible concession to the laboring and soldier classes, favoring a republic, announcing the surrender of Hungary in order to secure an immediate end of hostilities, declaring Austrian responsibility for the war rests with former Monarchy, raising the pay of the soldiers, promising agrarian reforms and universal suffrage including women's suffrage and the dissolution of the present parliament if it refuses to accept. It is still a question whether Károlyi will be able to hold his own against the Bolshevik movement and in Hungary as in Austria this is largely dependent on military assistance from the Allies.

STOVALL

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 File No. 763.72119/2499

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, November 6, 1918.

[Received 6.40 p. m.]

4962. Wolff despatch, Berlin, states German delegation to conclude armistice and open peace negotiations left this afternoon for the west.

BLISS

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 File No. 763.72119/2498

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, November 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 7.05 p. m.]

3473. Note received today from Foreign Office states that British Government have always shared views of United States Government as set forth in your 1738, October 2, noon,<sup>1</sup> regarding relation between conclusion of armistice with separate Balkan states and settlement of political questions affecting such states by eventual peace congress.

LAUGHLIN

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<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 334.

File No. 763.72/12123

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

LONDON, November 6, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received November 7, 2.25 a. m.]

3463.

The attitude of Labor regarding peace has not yet clearly defined itself because everyone is still awaiting the effect upon Germany of the armistice proposals. From the great Labor demonstration held on Sunday, the 3d, at the Albert Hall at which the chief speaker was J. H. Thomas it is, however, plain that the majority support a just and moderate settlement on the lines laid down by the President, as indorsed by the London inter-Allied conference of last September.

A rival demonstration of the extreme anti-German groups addressed by Bottomley, Lord Beresford and Havelock Wilson was held at the Albert Hall on Saturday, the 2d, and reiterated their demands for indemnities, 10,000,000,000 [*sic*] pounds being the figure mentioned, and other forms of condign punishment. There is no more reasonable doubt that this represents the settled policy of Labor now than it did last September, when the proposals of Havelock Wilson were defeated at the Derby Trade Union Congress. The action of Havelock Wilson and the Seamen's and Firemen's Union in preventing Henderson from going to France on October 25, where he was to have met the American labor mission and the French Socialists, has been criticised as high-handed interference with a journey to which the Government had given its approval and the object of which could not possibly be regarded as pacific. The parliamentary committee of the Trade Union Congress is taking steps to condemn that action and it is possible that Havelock Wilson may ultimately find that it was unwise. Meanwhile, however, he has been returned unopposed as M.P. for South Shields and his sentiments are approved by papers such as the *Morning Post* and the *Globe*.

A Labor conference will be held on the 14th instant to determine the attitude of Labor towards the coalition Government at the approaching general election.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 763.72/12113

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, November 6, 1918.

[Received November 7, 4 a. m.]

4944. Your 2334, 4th.<sup>1</sup> Following is text of constitutional changes according to *North German Gazette*.

Paragraph 2 is omitted from article 21 of Constitution. Bundesrath, October 8, Reichstag, October 24, signed by Emperor November 2. Article 11 amended to read: "Consent of Bundesrath and Reichstag required for declaration war in name of Empire. Peace treaties as well as treaties with foreign countries pertaining to matters of imperial legislation require consent of Bundesrath and Reichstag." Following added to article 15: "Imperial Chancellor requires confidence of Reichstag in order to conduct his office. Imperial Chancellor bears responsibility for all acts of political importance performed by Emperor in exercise of powers to which he is entitled according to Imperial Constitutions. Imperial Chancellor and his representatives are responsible for their conduct of office to Bundesrath and Reichstag." In article 17 the words "who hereby take over the responsibility" are omitted. Following added to article 53: "The appointment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of officers and officials of navy is effected with countersignature of Imperial Chancellor." In article 64, first sentence, following words are inserted after "Emperor": "With the counter-signature of the Imperial Chancellor." In article 66 the following paragraphs 5 and 6 are added: "Appointment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of officials and military officials of contingent is effected with counter-signature of Minister of War of such contingent. Ministers of War are responsible to Bundesrath and Reichstag for the administration of their respective contingents." Foregoing passed Reichstag October 26, Bundesrath [October] 28, signed by Emperor November 2.

BLISS

File No. 763.72/12170

*The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State*

No. 270

SOFIA, October 10, 1918.

[Received November 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that at 7.30 p.m. Wednesday, the 25th of September, Mr. Liaptcheff, Bulgarian Minister of Finance, called upon me to say that the Cabinet had just decided to break with Germany—and that all the members united in the request that I should accompany to the Macedonian front the delegates who had been selected to open negotiations for an immediate armistice as a preliminary to peace with the Entente.

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 459.

Mr. Liaptcheff spoke freely of the situation in which Bulgaria found herself—a situation with which I had already become perfectly familiar. He reminded me of the long-existing dissatisfaction which had become intensified and had developed into such a universal hatred that the army at the front had become exceedingly discontented—three entire divisions refusing to fight longer on the German side.

I informed Mr. Liaptcheff that I had no instructions to guide me in such an emergency—but that if he could positively assure me that Tsar Ferdinand assented to the step about [to be] taken, I would accompany the delegates to the front and immediately notify the Department of my action. I was assured that the Tsar was fully in accord with the Cabinet and had accepted its decision without question.

I then sent a telegram to the Department advising of the situation and of my intention to leave for the front with the Bulgarian delegates. At 9.15 p. m. of the 25th, Mr. Liaptcheff, Minister of Finance, Mr. Radeff, Minister Plenipotentiary, Mr. Vassileff, a distinguished lawyer of Sofia, Mr. Walker and I left the city—the three first named going in one automobile, Mr. Walker<sup>1</sup> and I in the other. We travelled at full speed all night without stopping,—except once or twice when halted by patrols—and at 5 o'clock on the morning of the 26th we arrived at the headquarters of the general in chief of the Bulgarian forces.

The reason for the violent haste of the journey was to get to the front and open negotiations with the Entente commander in chief so quickly as to forestall action by the Germans and Austrians. And here it is proper to say that by the convention between Germany and Bulgaria, entered into in September 1915, it was provided that in case the latter should find herself in danger of invasion from the Entente forces, Germany would, upon receiving notice, immediately send six full divisions to aid the Bulgarians. Austria-Hungary likewise solemnly agreed that in such a contingency, she would despatch six other divisions. Two months ago, the new Government notified Germany that help was needed as the Entente pressure on the Macedonian front was too heavy to be borne long—but the answer was: "No troops can be spared." The last request made on the 12th of August last, by Mr. Malinoff, Prime Minister, was answered by General Hindenburg, in effect, that as German forces were engaged in the decisive battle on the western front, no men could be sent—but that a corps would be ordered to Bulgaria from Sebastopol. Translation of the Hindenburg letter will be found herewith.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For other activities of Mr. Walker in connection with the Bulgarian armistice negotiations, see *ante*, p. 329.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



This Hindenburg letter was the "last straw". At once the Cabinet was called together—the session lasting all night. The unanimous verdict was that as Germany had violated her solemn compact with Bulgaria, the moment had come for a severance of relations. Hence Mr. Liaptcheff's visit to me—and hence my journey to the front.

#### WHAT HAPPENED AT THE FRONT

Arriving at headquarters on the Strouma front, a Bulgarian captain was sent across the lines under flag of truce to General Milne, the British commander of the Salonica forces. The captain not returning, it was thought proper to send Mr. Walker over under another flag of truce early on Friday morning. Mr. Walker carried to General Milne a letter from me introducing the Bulgarian delegates and asking his good offices in putting them in touch with the commander in chief of the Army of the Orient with as little delay as practicable. As Mr. Walker had not returned by midnight Saturday, the 28th, I determined to return to Sofia,—the delegates having passed over the lines early that morning. On Sunday morning at 6 o'clock I started, accompanied by the adjutant of the Bulgarian commander in chief, a guard and a chauffeur.

It was subsequently learned that it was necessary for Mr. Walker to go to Salonica which place he left on the 30th.

On the return journey, in making a sharp turn in a narrow defile, we found ourselves in the midst of a German division of artillery in full retreat. We went about four miles through their lines until there was a block caused by a broken bridge. The damage was repaired in an hour—but in the meantime nine British aviators attacked the German column—inflicting considerable loss. None of my party were injured—nor was the automobile damaged—although the bombardment by bombs and rapid gun fire was terrific, lasting about twenty-five minutes.

Forty minutes later there was another attack—lasting twenty minutes—and again none of the party were hurt. It should be said that the adjutant, when questioned about me by the officer in command of the German division, answered him that I was a Swiss writer who had been to the front. We were four hours working our way through the enemy's lines—and it was early Monday morning, the 30th September, before I reached Sofia.

Mr. Walker had an experience also, as he was passing through Dupnitsa, in the evening of the same day. At this place, the Bolsheviks, as they are now called—Bulgarian divisions which refused to fight longer—established a republic. A crowd gathered about the automobile in which Mr. Walker was returning and hurled rocks and stones—their purpose being to kill the officer who accom-

panied him. A large piece of rock struck Mr. Walker on the right side of the head, inflicting a severe wound from which he is now but recovering. The ridiculous "Republic of Dupnitsa" lasted for the whole of forty-eight hours, when it disappeared from "the family of nations."

#### WHAT HAPPENED IN SOFIA

As soon as news was received that an armistice had been declared, there was great rejoicing in Sofia—but it was soon learned that the three retreating divisions of the Bulgarian Army were marching on the city with the avowed purpose of taking the heads of Tsar Ferdinand and former Prime Minister Radoslavoff—the two men, more than any others, being held responsible for the alliance with Germany and the evil days that had fallen upon Bulgaria in consequence.

A battle was fought on the outskirts of Sofia lasting three whole days, many being killed and wounded on both sides, but the victory was with the Government. Then followed the abdication of the Tsar, the enthronement of the Crown Prince, Boris III, the Germans ordered to leave Bulgaria within eight days, the establishment of order in the country, and more than all the decisive blow given to German hegemony in the east and the weakening of the Central Powers by the defection of Bulgaria. And as was said in a recent telegram,<sup>1</sup> Bulgaria, if needed, will fight on the side of the Entente. To-day again, I have had the assurance from an authoritative source that Bulgaria is ready at the word of invitation, to join forces with the Entente and the United States.

If it is at all possible, American troops should be sent to Bulgaria. They will be royally welcomed by the people—and their coming will mean that American influence in the Balkans will be permanent. Munro in his book *Bulgaria and Her People* well said—"Bulgaria is the only country in Europe in which the United States has played an important rôle in the development of a state . . . and the Bulgarians gratefully recognize their obligation."

A large Red Cross contingent should also be sent to Bulgaria with ample supplies, for there is widespread suffering and much sickness. There is likewise a most lamentable lack of food as well as medicines and surgical supplies.

In conclusion I have to state that the Germans in evacuating Bulgaria are playing their usual rôle of violence and robbery. They are carrying off everything they can put hands to—robbing people of food, clothing and about everything they possess. At Nish they robbed the Bulgarian officers of all their belongings leaving them to get to their homes as best they could with nothing but underclothing,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

shoes and pantaloons. Here in Sofia, they have been sullen and impudent, refusing to leave the hotels until they were ready. In consequence, I am forced to entertain the French and English officers—with their eight chauffeurs. The Legation, which has been a decided centre of activity, is crowded—every room being occupied.

The English and French military officers are very well received—Bulgarians, without exception, being rejoiced that peace has been made with the Entente. My particular regret at this time is that no American officers are here.

I have [etc.]

D. I. MURPHY

File No. 763.72119/9092a

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1918, 11 a. m.

15. Warburton<sup>1</sup> informs War Department armistice signed. Please confirm and notify us of when we may publish armistice.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/9088

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received November 7, 2.04 p. m.]

55. Your No. 15, November 7, 11 a. m. Armistice has not yet been signed. German representatives will not meet Marshal Foch until this afternoon at 5 o'clock. The terms of the armistice must not be published until it is a fact that signed. We will notify you promptly.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/2542a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1918, 4 p. m.

6198. United Press received telegram today before 1 p. m. announcing armistice had been signed. Telegram published at once and greatest excitement and enthusiasm prevails. This Department and War Department have been informed no foundation for story. Please find out why censor passed this report as the incident is most unfortunate.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Maj. Barclay H. Warburton, military attaché at Paris.

The Armistice Negotiations with the Germans—Revolution in Germany and Abdication of the Kaiser—Refusal of the American Government to Negotiate with the Soviet Government—The Armistice with Germany, Signed November 11

File No. 763.72119/9094

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 7, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received November 7, 8.31 p. m.]

58. For the President:

German Government at 12.30 last night transmitted the following radio to Marshal Foch:

German Government have been informed by the President of the United States that Marshal Foch has received full power to receive the accredited representatives of the German Government and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice. The following plenipotentiaries have been named by the German Government: General [of Infantry] von Gündell, Secretary of State Erzberger, Ambassador von Oberndorff, General von Winterfeldt, Lieutenant Commander Vanselow. The plenipotentiaries [are] ready to leave at once [to proceed] to place agreed upon. The German Government would be happy if in the interest of humanity the arrival of the German delegation on the Allied front would bring [about] a provisional suspension of arms. Please acknowledge.

Marshal Foch sent in reply at 1.19 the following:

If the German plenipotentiaries desire to meet Marshal Foch to ask for an armistice they shall present themselves to the French advanced posts by the Chimay-Fourmies-La Capelle-Guise [road]. Orders have been given to receive them and to conduct them to the place fixed for the meeting.

Two further German radios were received. Number 1, received at 1 o'clock this morning from the General Headquarters, the German commander in chief, to Marshal Foch:

The German plenipotentiaries for an armistice are leaving Spa today and will be here at midday, and at 5 o'clock in the afternoon will reach the French advanced posts along the Chimay-Fourmies-La Capelle-Guise [road]. There are altogether ten persons, at the head of which is Secretary of State Erzberger.

The second one was received at 1.30 o'clock this morning from the supreme commander of the German Army to Marshal Foch:

To permit the passage of the German delegation through the two lines, orders have been given to stop firing on that part of the front today after 3.30 this afternoon until further orders. From the German advanced posts to the French advanced posts the delegation will be accompanied by a company of road menders to permit the



automobiles to follow the [La Capelle road] which has been destroyed.

A third radio was sent at 4 o'clock this afternoon from the supreme German commander to Marshal Foch:

On account of a delay the German delegation cannot cross the line of the advanced posts until between 8 and 10 o'clock in the evening at Haudroy, two kilometers to the northwest of La Capelle.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72/12146

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

No. 4858

BERNE, October 16, 1918.

[Received November 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed a memorandum<sup>1</sup> which I have received from a well-informed Pole in close touch with the Regency Government at Warsaw in regard to the danger of anarchy subsequent to the withdrawal of German troops unless some measure is taken to maintain order in the country.

I was informed from another reliable source that an occupation of Poland and the Baltic states during the peace conference and subsequent to it would be necessary, as these states would never come to an agreement among themselves. While certain territories might be allocated to them on paper, they would fight among themselves unless there was a proper Allied force to insure order and carry out the agreements which had been made.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/9096

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 8, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received November 8, 10.29 a. m.]

62. For the President:

French Minister for Foreign Affairs has this moment brought following message sent by Marshal Foch at 10.25 this morning:

They have arrived with full powers from the Chancellor. They formally asked for an armistice. The text was read out to them and then delivered to them. They appeared to be in a state of consternation. They requested that hostilities might be stopped at once. This request was refused them. They seemed disposed to give us satisfaction.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs further informed me that the German plenipotentiaries had telegraphed to Spa, German headquarters, not to send any further representatives for the present.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/9100

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, November 8, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received November 8, 5.10 p. m.]

65. For Polk from Auchincloss:

Your 16, November 7, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> I have investigated this matter and I understand Embassy is reporting fully concerning it. My information coincides with that given Embassy. Most of the officials in Paris and practically every non-official person here believed yesterday that the armistice had been signed. Captain Jackson, naval attaché at the Embassy, sent Admiral Wilson at Brest a wire to that effect. Wilson showed wire to Roy Howard at Brest and sent an aide with him to cable censor so that Howard would be permitted to send through a despatch stating that the armistice had been signed. It is perfectly clear that United Press was not at fault in this matter and that the fault, if any, lies with Jackson or the French official who started the rumor. I suggest that War and Navy Departments instruct their representatives in Europe to discontinue sending despatches respecting matters peculiarly within our knowledge without consulting us.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72/12158

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, November 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 10.45 p. m.]

1325. There is a rumor that the Germans have been trying to sell their tonnage in Scandinavia. In this connection the British Chargé d'Affaires informs me that he has received instructions from the Government informally to advise the Norwegian Government that inasmuch as the question of tonnage will probably be discussed at the peace conference the British Government refuses to recognize any such transfer of German tonnage.

SCHMEDEMAN

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see telegram No. 6198 to the Ambassador at the same hour, ante, p. 480.

File No. 763.72/12179

*The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, November 8, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received November 9, 4.45 a. m.]

1324. The following is text of a note from the Russian Commissaire for Foreign Affairs, which was communicated telegraphically to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Norwegian Legation at Petrograd under date of October [November] 6, for transmission to the Government of the United States.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs requests the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires in Petrograd, through his Government, to transmit to the Government of the United States of America the following:

The Russian Soviet Government, in its desire to terminate the hostilities between Russian and American troops, offers to the Government of the United States of America to take up negotiations with regard to the liquidation of the above-mentioned hostilities and is desirous of being informed when and where may representatives from both sides meet. It is of no consequence to the Russian Soviet Government what place may be chosen for such negotiations. The Russian Soviet Government has forwarded identical proposals to the British, the Japanese, the Italian and the French Governments. In the hope that the Norwegian Government with satisfaction will secure the termination of the hostilities, the People's Commissariat wishes in advance to extend their thanks to the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires for [his] kind assistance in the matter. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. Tchitcherine.

Presumably translated from the Russian.

SCHMEDEMAN

File No. 862.01/3

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, November 9, 1918.

[Received 10.01 a. m.]

5012. Dutch news agency reports German Chancellor publishes following proclamation:

The Emperor and King has resolved to renounce the throne. Chancellor remains in office until the abdication of Emperor and Crown Prince and resultant questions of regency are formally settled. He intends to propose to regent that Ebert be appointed Chancellor and measure be introduced for immediate general elections to German national constituent [assembly] whose duty it would be finally to establish future form of government of German people including those sections of people who wish to come within Imperial frontiers.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/9103

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 9, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received November 9, 10.23 a. m.]

70. For the President:

German delegation after first preliminary conference passed through French lines and attempted to pass German lines so as to return to Spa. German artillery continued heavy bombardment destroying roads and bridges and so made it impossible for German delegation to pass through their own lines. It is expected that German delegation will not be able to reach Spa until tonight. We will probably not receive any definite news until Sunday night or Monday morning.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/2543

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 8, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received November 9, 11.43 a. m.]

5772. Supplementing 5675, November 8, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Paris representative of United Press states that he has been in communication [by] telephone with Mr. Howard at Brest who informs him that Admiral Wilson, having received a telegram from the naval attaché at the Embassy that armistice had been signed, gave out the news to the local press at Brest, also to Mr. Howard; the latter accompanied by one of Admiral Wilson's aides filed the cable to the United States which was passed by the censor.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/9102

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 9, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received November 9, 1.48 p. m.]

72. For the President and the Secretary of State:

At a conference with Clemenceau this morning I stated that the United States was inclined to favor Versailles as the meeting place for the peace conference. He assured me that if it was finally determined to have the conference at Versailles all possible facilities would be extended to the United States representatives, such as

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



living accommodations and communication service. He begged me not to ask him for any particular thing but to rest assured that anything we wanted would be made available to us. He said that he would prefer to have the conference almost any place than in Geneva, even going so far as to say that he would prefer London or Washington if it were not possible to agree on Versailles. No final decision can be reached until I have had an opportunity to communicate with both George and Orlando inasmuch as before these gentlemen left Paris we had tentatively agreed on Geneva. Orlando stated, however, that any place the United States was in favor of would be satisfactory to Italy. As soon as the matter is agreed upon I shall take the necessary steps to secure appropriate accommodations.

It would greatly assist me to receive from you a definite approval of secrecy plan respecting communications set forth in my No. 51.<sup>1</sup>

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72/12190

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, November 8, 1918.

[Received November 9, 4.18 p. m.]

5002. German press comment:

Papers of 7th print following proclamation of Chancellor to German people:

President Wilson today replied to German note and informed us that his allies assented to the fourteen points under which he formulated his peace terms in January last, with the exception of the freedom of the seas, and that the armistice conditions would be communicated to Marshal Foch. Hereby the premises for peace and armistice negotiations alike have been furnished. In order to terminate bloodshed, German delegation for conclusion armistice and opening of peace negotiations were appointed today and left for west.

The successful progress of negotiations is seriously imperilled by disorders and lack of discipline. For four years the German people has suffered the woe and sacrifice of war. If the internal forces fail us at the decisive hour when nothing but absolute unity of the whole German people can avert great perils for its future, the consequences can not be foreseen. Maintenance of the order thus far preserved in voluntary self-discipline is an indispensable demand in this critical hour which must be made by every people's government.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

May every citizen remain conscious of the high responsibility which he bears in the fulfillment of this duty towards his people. Prince Max of Baden, Imperial Chancellor.

*Allgemeine*, 7th: The commanding general of Berlin and vicinity issues following proclamation:

The intention prevails in certain circles to disregard the provisions of law and organize committees of workmen and soldiers on the Russian model. Such institutions conflict with the existing public order and endanger public security. On the ground of paragraph 9(b) of the act relative to the state of siege I prohibit the organization of such societies and the participation therein. Signed, Lieutenant General Linsingen.

*Weser-Zeitung*, 6th, writes: Majority Socialists arrived at Kiel too late to stem tide.

*Vorwärts*, 8th: Socialist Party issues following proclamation:

Peace is assured. In few hours there will be armistice. Avoid all thoughtless action whereby country would be transformed into sea of blood. Socialist Party has made following demands to Chancellor:

- (1) Free right of meeting;
- (2) Police and military authorities must be admonished to exercise all possible prudence;
- (3) Abdication of Emperor and Crown Prince Friday noon at latest;
- (4) Strengthening of Socialist influence in Government;
- (5) Reconstruction of Prussian Cabinet in agreement with Majority parties of Reichstag.

*Kölnische Zeitung*, 7th: Hamburg completely controlled by committee of soldiers and workmen after street fighting. Bremen also in hands of committee without bloodshed.

[Dutch] press. *Het Vaderland*, 8th: Munich, November 8. In conjunction with mass meeting on Theresien Meadow which took place yesterday disturbances happened in Munich. In course of it Republic of Bavaria was proclaimed. Last night meeting was held by council of laborers, soldiers, and peasants, and Kurt Eisner was elected chairman. Council has issued following proclamation at Munich:

Terrible distress which has come over German people has caused an elementary movement among Munich laborers and soldiers. Temporary council of laborers, soldiers, and peasants has been formed in the building of the Diet in night of November 8. Bavaria will in future be free state. National government born by the confidence of the masses will be instantly established. Constituent national assem-

bly chosen by all adult men and women is to be called together as quickly as possible.

[New] time is beginning. Bavaria desires to prepare Germany for league of nations. Democratic and Socialistic republic of Bavaria has strength to obtain for Germany peace which will protect our country from worst. Present revolution was necessary in order at last moment to bring an end to development of conditions without too terrible a shock by means of self-government of people, before enemy's armies stream across frontiers and before German troops should cause a chaos after armistice.

The council of laborers, peasants, and soldiers will uphold strict order and will suppress disorders without respect of persons. The safety of personal property is guaranteed. Soldiers in barracks are to govern themselves through soldiers' councils and shall uphold discipline. Officers who do not oppose the demands of changed situation are to continue to do duty without hindrance. We count on beneficial collaboration of the whole population. Everyone is welcome to collaborate in this new freedom. All officials remain [at] their posts. Fundamental social and political reforms shall be begun immediately. The peasants shall supply the cities with articles of food, old contrast between country and city shall disappear. Distribution of articles of food shall be organized in national way.

Laborers and citizens of Munich, trust in the greatness and immensity of what is being prepared in these difficult times. Let all of you collaborate in order that unavoidable change may take place in entirely peaceful a manner in this time of senseless fratricide. We [deplore] all shedding of blood. Every human life must be sacred. Keep your calmness and collaborate in the construction of new world. War of brother against brother has been ended for Bavaria by the Socialists. On revolutionary basis which is now created, masses of laborers are to be established into unity.

Long live the Bavarian Republic! Long live peace! Long live the creative labor of all workers!

Munich Diet Building in night of November 8, 1918. In name of Council of Laborers, Soldiers, and Peasants, the chairman, Kurt Eisner.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/2491

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Schmedeman)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your November 5, 2 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Department prefers to make no answer to message of Bolshevik Minister for Foreign Affairs and is not prepared to negotiate with Bolshevik authorities.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 471

File No. 763.72119/9104

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 9, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received November 9, 9.23 p. m.]

74. For the President and the Secretary of State:

I have just received the following communication from the French Foreign Office:

The President of the Council, Minister of War, to Colonel House:

In case the Germans should refuse the armistice, nothing will be published. But I regard it as almost certain that they will accept it. If they were to communicate the clauses of the armistice to the foreign newspapers we would allow the newspapers to reproduce them, reserving to the Chamber of Deputies the news of the signing when that shall take place. I have just seen Foch who has communicated to me the minutes of the proceedings which I shall address to you as soon as they shall be typewritten.

They have made no remark either as to the bridgeheads or as to the fleet. Their theme is to say that they will succumb to Bolshevism if we do not help them to resist [it] and that after them we ourselves will be invaded by the same scourge. They have asked that they be permitted to retire more slowly from the left bank of Rhine saying that they required the means of forming an army to combat Bolshevism and reestablish order. Foch replied to them that they could form this army on the right bank. They likewise objected that we were taking from them too many machine guns and that they would have none left to fire upon their fellow citizens. Foch replied to them that they would have their rifles left. They also asked what we wanted to do on the left bank of the Rhine. Foch replied to them that he did not know and that it was none of his business. Finally they asked to be reprovisioned by us, saying that they were going to die of hunger. Foch replied to them that it would suffice them to put their merchant marine into our programs and that in this way they could be reprovisioned. They replied that they preferred to be given permits for their vessels. They complained that we were taking much too many locomotives, in view of the fact that theirs were scattered everywhere. Foch replied to them that we were asking only what they had taken from us. They are very much depressed. From time to time a sob escaped the throat of Winterfeldt.

Under these conditions, the signing does not appear to me a matter of doubt, but the present situation in Germany brings us face to face with the unknown. It is [in] the interest of the armies that we should have a few days for our military action. This eventually must be taken into account because the signature of a government which might not [last] could only increase the confusion. It seems, moreover, that we are already at that point, because it is the impossibility of finding military authorities who can get obedience in the German lines which has indefinitely delayed the messenger who



carried the clauses of the armistice to the German Great Headquarters.

As long as he does not find in front of him an authority capable of definitely regulating the matter, Foch will continue his march forward. Clemenceau.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/2546

*The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, November 9, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received November 10, 3 a. m.]

Prime Minister of Australia, W. M. Hughes, sends letter to *Times* protesting that the peace terms were settled at Versailles without consultation with Dominions. He continues:

My Government are of opinion that certain of President Wilson's fourteen points are not satisfactory. It specifically objects, *inter alia*, to point 3 which deals with the post-war economic policy and limits right of Commonwealth to make such tariff distinctions between one nation and another as it may think proper; and to point 5 relating to colonies in Pacific formerly held by Germany, retention of which my Government deems vital to national safety of Australia.

I have remained here at my Government's request for purpose of setting forth its views, with which I need hardly say I agree, before any terms of peace were definitely settled, but no opportunity has been given me to do so. I was not even informed that peace terms were being discussed at the Versailles conference, which I had presumed was engaged in settling the terms of the armistice with Germany as it had done in the case of Austria. The first intimation I received that terms of peace had been discussed at Versailles was conveyed in the document which notified me that they had been definitely settled.

That is the position. I venture to say it is one which fully justifies my expression of regret that Australia was not asked to express its opinions on these terms before they were settled. It is quite true that representatives of Dominions have during sittings of Imperial Cabinet discussed at large questions of peace. But most certainly Doctor Wilson's fourteen points were never agreed to, they were not even specifically discussed. We were told Dominions would be given an opportunity of discussing actual terms of peace before they were settled. This has not been done.

I know of no reason why not only views of myself as the representative of Australia but of those of other Dominions also should not have been ascertained or at least sought. Had conditions of peace as set out left no room for criticism, the mode of their settlement would still be quite incompatible with relations which ought to exist between the self-governing Dominions and Britain. But the

clauses to which I have referred are most certainly not satisfactory to Australia and protest on her behalf is my clear duty.

SKINNER

File No. 862.001W64/39

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *November 10, 1918.*

[Received 11.41 a. m.]

The Emperor of Germany is reported to have crossed into Holland this morning near Maestricht. He was accompanied by a numerous suite and is now staying at Medachten,<sup>1</sup> the country place of Count Bentinck.

BLISS

File No. 862.00/305

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *November 10, 1918.*

[Received 4.46 p. m.]

5017. Wolff Bureau reports revolution has splendid, almost bloodless success in Berlin. General strike led to complete standstill in all factories. Saturday noon, outstanding regiments have joined movement; officers took to flight. Quiet and orderly in city but great enthusiasm shown. Wolff Bureau under control committee. Chancellor Ebert issued following proclamation:

Fellow Citizens: Prince Max of Baden, until now Chancellor, has transferred to me with the consent of all Secretaries of State the functions of the office of Chancellor. I have begun to form new Government, in consultation with parties, and shall speedily furnish information concerning result. The new Government will be people's government. Its endeavor will be to bring peace to German people quickly and to establish liberty which it had gained. Fellow citizens, I ask the support of all of you for the difficult task which awaits us. I know how greatly the question of the alimentation of the people, which is the first condition of political life, threatens us. The political upheaval must not disturb the food supply. The first duty of town and country is not to diminish but improve production and supply of food. Scarcity of food is liable to result in plundering and stealing with resultant misery for all. The poorest will suffer the most acutely and the workmen in the industries will be hit the hardest. Whosoever unlawfully takes food or other indispensable things or interferes with the means of transportation necessary for their distribution sins heavily against his fellow citizens. I urgently request you all to leave the streets and maintain quiet and order.

<sup>1</sup> Corrected to "Amerongen" by a telegram next day.

Chancellor Ebert issues second proclamation:

The new Government has taken up its task of preserving German people from civil war and starvation and of enforcing its just demand for the right of self-determination. It can only perform this task if all authorities and officials in town and country lend their assistance. I know that it will be difficult for many to work together with the new rulers but I appeal to their love of our people. If the organization fails, serious hours would ensue and Germany would be delivered up to anarchy. Help the Fatherland by continuing to work sedulously. Let every man remain at his post until relieved. Signed, Ebert.

*Vossische*, 9th: Berlin Committee of Soldiers and Workmen is composed of both Independent and Majority Socialists who have joined hands. Committees formed in Mannheim, Ludwigshafen, Nuremberg, Cassel, Düsseldorf.

Dutch press reports revolution spread to Emmerich, Wesel, Essen. Frontier guards left posts at many points. Twenty-five thousand Dutch workmen returning to Holland from Krupp's.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/9129

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 11, 1918, 6 a. m.

[Received November 11, 2.25 a. m.]

86. For the President:

Armistice signed 5 o'clock this morning. Hostilities to cease 11 a. m. today. We have no information as yet as to whether terms were in any way changed but we shall know definitely concerning this within three hours and will promptly cable.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 862.00/302

*The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, November 11, 1918.

[Received 10.57 p. m.]

5026. Wolff Bureau reports *North German Gazette* is organ of Independent Socialist Party and bears name *Internationale*. Reports from various cities in Empire show revolution took place in general without disturbance of order or bloodshed. Committees everywhere urge discipline and order to protect great work of renewal. Königsberg, Danzig, Halle, Osnabrück, Darmstadt, Heidelberg, Strassburg, Dresden, in hands of revolutionaries. Darmstadt committees declared Hesse-Darmstadt free Socialist republic. Grand Duke of Baden recognized new Government formed without consulting him.

Stuttgart committee proclaimed republic of Württemberg. Provisional government issued proclamation stating constitutional convention would be convened, extending brotherly greeting to soldiers and workmen all countries and [inviting] them to cooperate with revolutionary German people. Berlin committee assumed full control military affairs, urging soldiers to preserve [order]. Landsturm battalions formed committee in Warsaw. Poles hostile toward German troops, refusing them passage; street fighting in Warsaw. German-Austrian National Assembly will vote Tuesday whether to join Germany, leaving form of government for later settlement.

Interview of Chancellor Ebert with representative of Dutch news agency:

The cause of liberty has had one of its greatest victories today in Germany. German people has conquered, and long-established rules of Hohenzollern, Wittelsbach, Guelph, etc., have been overthrown. After Emperor's abdication, Prince Max, who had already tendered resignation, formally transferred [office of] Chancellor [to me]. When we resigned from Government this morning because Emperor question was not settled according to our will, the soldiers and workmen of Berlin almost unitedly rose up and stopped entire old Government machinery. We thus had in fact all powers in our hands before representatives of old rule transferred them to us.

This revolution has been prepared for long time in Germany, since war's beginning, and would probably have broken forth immediately no matter what peace concluded; but now even the most sceptical must recognize that the day of monarchy and imperialism in Germany has finally passed. All who have fought us from apprehensions or hatred of that power must now be completely satisfied. The German Republic will know no higher ambition than to assemble all Germans for constructive work of peace. The constitutional convention of the German people's republic will install a government which will be responsive to the will of the people as far as possible.

Our victory has been almost bloodless; I might say easy and complete. It appears to me entirely out of the question that the old powers can once again fight for mastery. The republic will be the future form of government of Germany and the free German people's country will be happy to become an equal member of the league of nations of all free countries.

BLISS

File No. 763.72119/9110

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 11, 1918, 3 a. m.

[Received 11.44 p. m.]

85. For the President:

Mr. Clemenceau has just communicated to me the following reply sent by the German Government to the plenipotentiaries:



The Supreme Command of the German Army to the Plenipotentiaries at the High Command of the Allies:

The German Government communicates to the Supreme Command of the Army the following for Secretary of State Erzberger:

Your Excellency has full power to sign an armistice. Kindly make the following declaration in your *procès verbal*:

The German Government will undertake the execution of the conditions laid down with all its force but the undersigned consider it their duty to point out that the execution of certain points of the conditions will introduce famine into that part of Germany which is not to be occupied. The abandonment of all the stores of provisions in the regions to be evacuated which were destined for the feeding of troops, the curtailment of the means of operating the transport service, taking place at the same time as the limitation of transport service, the blockade remaining in force would render revictualing impossible as well as any organization for its distribution. The undersigned consequently ask for power to negotiate any modification of the points in question susceptible of rendering revictualing possible.

The Supreme Command of the German Army charges General von Winterfeldt to notify it of the signature of the armistice in referring to the points communicated this afternoon.

The German Government to the German Plenipotentiaries at the High Command of the Allies:

The German Government accepts the conditions of the armistice which have been submitted to it the 8th of November.

Signed, the Chancellor of the Empire.

Please acknowledge receipt.

Mr. Clemenceau informs me at the same time that he believes that we should consider this signature good in accepting the marginal note regarding revictualing. I have replied to Mr. Clemenceau that I entirely agree with him.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72119/9125

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 11, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received November 12, 1.30 a. m.]

96. Armistice terms as finally signed are substantially the same as cabled you <sup>1</sup> with exception of changes in following articles which now read as follows:

Article 3. Repatriation beginning at once, to be completed within 15 days, of all the inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial or convicted).

<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 46 of Nov. 4, *ante*, p. 463.

Article 4. Surrender in good condition by the German armies of the following war material:

- 5,000 guns (2,500 heavy and 2,500 field-)
- 25,000 machine guns
- 3,000 *minenwerfer*
- 1,700 aeroplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly, all of the D-7's—and all the night bombing machines)

The above to be delivered *in situ* to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexure No. 1) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Article 5. Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. The countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local troops of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be carried out by Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne) together with the bridgeheads at these points of a 30-kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions.

A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the stream at a distance of ten kilometers, from the frontier of Holland up to the frontier of Switzerland.

The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhinelands (left and right bank) shall be so ordered as to be completed within a further period of 16 days, in all 31 days after the signing of the armistice. All the movements of evacuation or occupation are regulated by the note (annexure No. 1) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Article 6. In all the territories evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No person shall be prosecuted for offenses of participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice. No destruction of any kind shall be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact as well as military stores of food, munitions, and equipment not removed during the period fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left *in situ*. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be removed.

Article 7. Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraphs, telephones shall be in no manner impaired. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain. Five thousand locomotives and 150,000 wagons in good working order with all necessary spare parts and fittings shall be delivered to the Associated Powers within the period fixed in annexure No. 2 and total of which shall not exceed 31 days. There shall likewise be delivered 5,000 motor lorries (*camions automobiles*) in good order within the period of 36 days. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the

period of 31 days together with pre-war personnel and material. Further, the material necessary for the working of railways in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left *in situ*. All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent way, signals and repair shops shall be left *in situ*. These stores shall be maintained by Germany insofar as concerns the working of the railroads in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The note (annexure No. 2) regulates the details of these measures.

Article 8. The German Command shall be responsible for revealing within the period of 48 hours after the signing of the armistice all mines or delayed action fuses on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. It also shall reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs and wells, etc.). All under penalty of reprisals.

Article 9. The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern. The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

Article 10. The immediate repatriation, without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including persons under trial or convicted. The Allied Powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of them as they wish. This condition annuls the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war including the one of July 1918 in course of ratification. However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of German prisoners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

Article 12. All German troops at present in the territories which before the war belonged to Austria-Hungary, Roumania, Turkey, shall withdraw immediately within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August 1, 1914. All German troops at present in the territories which before the war belonged to Russia shall likewise withdraw within the frontiers of Germany, defined as above, as soon as the Allies, taking into account the internal situation of these territories, shall decide that the time for this has come.

Article 15. Renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

Article 16. The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig, or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

Article 17. Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies.

Article 18. Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum period of one month in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed, of all interned civilians (including hostages, persons under trial or convicted) belonging to the Allied or Associated Powers other than those enumerated in article 3.



Article 22. Surrender to the Allies and the United States of all submarines (including submarine cruisers and all mine-laying submarines) now existing, with their complete armament and equipment, in ports which shall be specified by the Allies and United States. Those which cannot take the sea shall be disarmed of the personnel and material and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The submarines which are ready for the sea shall be prepared to leave the German ports as soon as orders shall be received by wireless for their voyage to the port designed for their delivery, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment. The conditions of this article shall be carried into effect within the period of 14 days after the signing of the armistice.

Article 23. German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States shall be immediately disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports or, in default of them, in Allied ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States. They will there remain under the supervision of the Allies and of the United States, only caretakers being left on board. The following warships are designated by the Allies:

- 6 battle cruisers
- 10 battleships
- 8 light cruisers (including 2 mine layers)
- 50 destroyers of the most modern types

All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States and are to be completely disarmed and classed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The military armament of all ships of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore. All vessels designated to be interned shall be ready to leave the German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice. Directions for the voyage will be given by wireless.

Article 26. The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and the United States should give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary.

Article 28. In evacuating the Belgian coast and ports Germany shall abandon *in situ* and in fact all port and navel navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all navel aeronautic apparatus, material and supplies, and all arms, apparatus and supplies of every kind.

Article 34. The duration of the armistice is to be 30 days with option to extend. During this period if its clauses are not carried into execution the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties which must give warning 48 hours in advance. It is understood that the execution of articles 3 and 18 shall not warrant the denunciation of the armistice on the ground of insufficient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution. In order to assure the execution of this convention under the best conditions the principle of a permanent



international armistice commission is admitted. This commission will act under the authority of the Allied military and naval commanders in chief.

This armistice has been signed the 11th of November, 1918, at 5 o'clock French time.

F. Foch  
R. E. Wemyss  
Erzberger  
A. Oberndorff  
Winterfeldt  
Vanselow

The above changes were just received.

EDWARD HOUSE

#### COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ALLIED POWERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF SHIPPING: THE ALLIED MARITIME TRANSPORT COUNCIL

Representation of the United States on the Allied Maritime Transport Council—First and Second Meetings of the Council, March 11-14, April 23-25—Resolution Recommending the Establishment of Program Committees, April 25—Discussion of the Utilization of German Ships Chartered by France from Brazil—Application of the Agreement for Equal Division of Chartered Neutral Tonnage between Great Britain and the United States—French Representations against this Agreement—Proposed Reapportionment under an Allied Chartering Committee—Refusal of the United States to Enter into the Proposed Arrangement

File No. 195/166a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 2, 1918, 7 p. m.*

3018. In view of the resolution of the recent inter-Allied conference in Paris whereby "interned tonnage obtained through any channels, and by whatever country, shall be used in such a way as to increase to an equal extent the tonnage in direct war service,"<sup>1</sup> you are instructed to ascertain from the French Government what plans have been made for the allocation and use of the 30 steamers recently placed at the disposal of France by the Brazilian Government.<sup>2</sup> Before approaching French Government on this matter, you should consult with the British Ambassador in Paris.

For your private information, French Ambassador here has requested Department for share of Austrian tonnage in Spanish and

<sup>1</sup> For complete text of the resolution, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 420-423.

<sup>2</sup> For documents relating to the disposition of enemy tonnage in Brazilian ports, see *ibid.*, Supplement 1, pp. 293 *et seq.*

Uruguayan ports that may be acquired by this Government if pending negotiations for the acquisition of this tonnage are successfully terminated. While Department would look with favor on plan of equal division of tonnage for war needs between France, Great Britain and this country, at the same time Department expects reciprocal division of tonnage secured by France from Brazil. Report by cable.

LANSING

File No. 411.57N83/193

*The Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy (Crawford) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)*

No. 42

WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1918.*

[*Received January 12.*]

MY DEAR POLK: We have now received a telegram from Mr. Balfour in reply to our telegram of November 25th,<sup>1</sup> informing us that His Majesty's Government fully agree with the United States Government that the principle of equal division of control should be applied to Norwegian ships and it is assumed that this division will similarly apply to all other neutral and inter-Allied tonnage. As regards Norwegian tonnage it is proposed that the principle should be applied as follows:—

Points Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of our telegram of November 25th to be put into force. This telegram was submitted to you and to Mr. Munson<sup>2</sup> before despatch and a copy is enclosed.

This will give the Shipping Board control of vessels under charter to American citizens on November 23d and the European Allies will retain similar control over vessels in their service at that date.

Point 4. The control of the balance of Norwegian tonnage to be equally divided between the United States Shipping Board and His Majesty's Government. The British authorities will prepare and forward a list of Norwegian ships which were in Allied service on November 23d and they would be glad if the Shipping Board would forward a corresponding list of the vessels which they regard as coming under the control of the Shipping Board.

On receipt of this list a statement will be prepared of the total balance of ships so that arrangements can be made for their division in equal proportions.

<sup>1</sup> See draft telegram enclosed with note of Nov. 24, 1917, from the Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy, *ibid.*, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 639-640.

<sup>2</sup> Frank C. Munson, Shipping Board representative on the War Trade Board until Aug. 31, 1918.

It is considered that the charters of ships chartered since November 23d should remain good and that they should be taken into account in the division of the balance to avoid unnecessary dislocation of tonnage.

Yours very truly,

RICHARD CRAWFORD

File No. 832.85/64

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, January 19, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received January 21, 3.55 a. m.]

3060. Referring to my 3022, January 11, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The Foreign Office has just sent me the following note on this subject:

1. The Franco-Brazilian arrangement was concluded December 30 [3] last and consequently is not posterior to the conference.

2. It results from the discussions which took place at Washington during October 1917 that the Federal Government has declared it has no objection to the assignment of this tonnage to France. On October 25 Mr. Polk was kind enough to inform the Ambassador of France that the Shipping Board made no opposition to the negotiations undertaken by the French Government and that the American Ambassador at Rio would be informed that the United States relinquished its interest in the question of the German ships.

3. It should be noted that the agreement of December 3 of which the Ambassador of the Republic at Washington was given the means of fully informing the Department, treated of not an acquisition of the boats but a chartering for a certain length of time (until April 1, 1919).

4. The situation as regards French tonnage is such that the French quota is in relation to the general means of transportation of the Allies proportionately in the position of creditor. There would appear then to be practically no advantage in giving back a part of the Brazilian tonnage only to receive back afterwards in the Allied or neutral ships a tonnage superior to the tonnage ceded. The Minister for Foreign Affairs does not doubt, in view of the preceding explanations, that it will be easy for technical organisms to harmonize the situation where preceding negotiations placed France and the stipulations of the recent inter-Allied conference which regulated the partitioning of the tonnage.

Copy and translation of note follows by mail.<sup>2</sup>

SHARP

[For the application in the Swedish *modus vivendi* of the principle of equal division of chartered neutral tonnage between Great

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Copy and translation of the note, dated Jan. 17, 1918, were transmitted with the Ambassador's despatch No. 5963 of Jan. 18, not printed.

Britain and the United States, see telegrams from Great Britain, January 21, 1918; to Great Britain, January 24; from Great Britain, January 29 (clause 9 of the provisional tonnage arrangement)—volume II, pages 1203–1207.]

File No. 103.9502/9f

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 1, 1918, 6 p. m.

6411. You may formally advise the Government to which you are accredited that pursuant to the resolution of inter-Allied conference at Paris, November, 1917, creating inter-Allied shipping council,<sup>1</sup> President has appointed Raymond B. Stevens, vice chairman of the United States Shipping Board, as the representative of the Government of the United States on this council.

Stevens, accompanied by a staff of six or seven assistants and about fourteen or fifteen clerks and stenographers, is proceeding to London by steamship *Adriatic*. Please arrange to facilitate their trip from point of debarkation to London and also reserve suitable temporary hotel accommodations for entire party.

Stevens will also want office accommodations but no definite arrangements about these should be made until his arrival.

LANSING

File No. 195./409

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1918.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have pleasure in certifying to you that Sir Samuel Hardman Lever, K.C.B., Financial Secretary of the British Treasury, and Mr. T. Ashley Sparks, are the official representatives in the United States of the British Treasury and the British Ministry of Shipping respectively, and that their signatures to the agreement of the 30th January 1918,<sup>2</sup> covering the payment of eighty million, seven hundred and ninety-four thousand, forty-one dollars and sixty-five cents (\$80,794,041.65), in respect of the requisitioning of certain ships under the operation of an order made by the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation on August 3d, 1917,<sup>3</sup> are recognized as binding on His Majesty's

<sup>1</sup> For text of the resolution, see *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 420–423.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 614.



Government and as holding the United States Government harmless from any liability in respect of any private or international claims which may hereafter arise in connection with any transactions prior to August 4th, 1917, covered by the agreement referred to above.

READING.

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File No. 195/177

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: Referring to your note of February 18, 1918, I have the honor to advise you that I am in receipt of a letter from the Honorable Edward N. Hurley, Chairman of the United States Shipping Board and President of the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation, enclosing an original agreement dated January 30, 1918, covering the payment of eighty million, seven hundred ninety-four thousand, forty-one dollars and sixty-five cents (\$80,794,041.65), to Sir Hardman Lever, Financial Secretary to His Britannic Majesty's Treasury, and party of the fourth part to said agreement.

This agreement is dated January 30, 1918, and is between the United States Shipping Board and the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, parties of the first part; the Cunard Steamship Company, Ltd., party of the second part; Sir Joseph Paton Maclay, Privy Counsellor, as British Controller of Shipping, party of the third part; and Sir Hardman Lever, K.C.B., as Financial Secretary to His Britannic Majesty's Treasury, party of the fourth part.

The agreement is signed in behalf of the United States Shipping Board by Edward N. Hurley, Chairman, and for the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation by Edward N. Hurley, President.

I take pleasure in certifying to you that Mr. Hurley is chairman of the United States Shipping Board and president of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation.

Mr. Hurley has advised me that this document has been executed in accordance with the provisions of the emergency shipping fund clause of the urgent deficiency act of June 15, 1917, and the executive order of the President of July 11, 1917.<sup>1</sup>

I take pleasure in advising you that this agreement as signed and executed has the support of the Government of the United States.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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<sup>1</sup> 40 Stat. 182, ch. 29, and *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 603.

War Trade Board Files: Norwegian Negotiations, Vol. II

*The Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy (Crawford) to the  
Chairman of the War Trade Board (McCormick)*

WASHINGTON, February 25, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. MCCORMICK: You will doubtless recollect that on January 11th I informed Mr. Polk that the British Government were prepared to put into force articles Nos. 1, 2 and 3 of the draft agreement arrived at between the Embassy and the Board on November 23d regarding the division between Great Britain and the United States of Norwegian tonnage.

The articles in question read as follows:—

(1) Ships on time charter to United States citizens and ships operating between the United States and South and Central America or [on?] the Caribbean to be taken on time charter by the United States Shipping Board.

(2) Ships on charter to British subjects to remain at the disposal of the British Government.

(3) Ships now in the service of France and Italy to be re-allocated to such service on the expiry of their present engagements, if the war situation so requires.

In the same letter to Mr. Polk I promised that the British authorities would prepare and forward a list of Norwegian ships which were in Allied service on November 23d and I suggested that the Shipping Board should prepare a corresponding list of the vessels which they regard as coming under their control.

Captain Fisher has now brought out with him the British list in accordance with this proposal.

From a conversation which took place a week ago with Mr. Munson it became obvious that the authorities in London had put upon the provisions of the agreement which I have quoted above an interpretation differing in several points from that which had been put upon them here.

In view of this fact Lord Reading telegraphed to Mr. Balfour asking for full discretion to settle the division finally with the War Trade Board and the Shipping Board. Mr. Balfour has now given the full authority asked for and Captain Fisher is ready to proceed with the final discussion. It is proposed to go through the lists prepared by our respective Governments in detail ship by ship, so that the most complete and definite agreement may be reached between us.

As the agreement in question was an official one made with the War Trade Board acting, as I understand, on behalf of the State

Department and the Shipping Board, I should be glad if you could inform me of the manner in which you wish these discussions to be taken up.

Yours very truly,

[No signature indicated]

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[For the application in the contract for chartering German ships in Uruguayan ports of the principle of equal division of chartered tonnage between Great Britain and the United States, see the *note verbale* addressed to the Uruguayan Minister, March 12, 1918, *post*, page 676.]

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File No. 654.51251/1

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

LONDON, *March 14, 1918, 11 p. m.*

[Received 11.55 p. m.]

9060. For the Acting Secretary only [from Stevens]:

Delegates of Allied Powers in session as Allied Maritime Transport Council have unanimously agreed upon dispositions, making possible to send to Italy amount of coal absolutely for military and civil requirements. . . . Stevens.

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File No. 832.85/75

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 16, 1918, 5 p. m.*

3322. The Department has been advised by American Ambassador to Brazil that 10 out of the 30 ex-German steamers are in commission and at sea of which the *Itu* is *en route* to New York. General repairs in machinery being made on 20 in five Brazilian ports, of which 7 will be presumably ready for sea during March.

Also that on March 1 the Havas Agency distributed press reports quoting Pichon as stating in Chamber of Deputies that "Brazil in fact had an opportunity to choose between identical offers from the United States and France and selected the French proposals in the friendliest manner. In no less friendly a manner the United States acquiesced in this determination." The statement regarding identical offers is inaccurate since the United States Government submitted a definite offer for these boats. Negotiations were instituted in

August 1917 between the United States Government and the Government of Brazil for the utilization of these boats. The Government of Brazil met our advances in the friendliest manner but stated that they hoped that the American and French Governments would combine their projects so as to relieve Brazilian Government from the embarrassment of choosing between the plans of two friends. The Department asked the French Government to agree to the United States continuing these negotiations with Brazil for the purpose of securing the vessels for the benefit of all the Allies. The French Government replied that their negotiations with Brazil were almost closed and that it would seriously embarrass them and prejudice the successful outcome of the negotiations if the United States Government pressed its negotiations. It appearing to the Department that our withdrawal and support of the French negotiations would bring about the most rapid employment of the vessels, which was the object desired, the Department instructed the American Ambassador at Brazil to withdraw from all negotiations for these boats.

This Government is prepared to live up to the resolution taken at the inter-Allied conference in Paris in November 1917, which resolution is quoted in Department's 3018, January 2, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The Department believes that the memorandum the British Ambassador has been instructed to communicate to the Foreign Office, the substance of which is quoted in your 3127, February 2, 3 a. m.,<sup>2</sup> should be supported by you and it should be pointed out to the French Government that the United States Government believes that these German boats secured by France from Brazil are not exempt from the resolution of the inter-Allied conference.

However, the Department is not interested in pressing this question to any great extent provided these boats, when repaired, are used by the French for the best possible use of the Allies. Accordingly, you are instructed to ascertain from the Government to which you are accredited exactly what use is being made of such of these boats as are now in operation and what use the French Government proposes to make of the remaining boats when repaired.

The need for shipping at the present time is so great that the Department is desirous of ascertaining whether these boats are being used simply for purpose of carrying coffee from Brazil to France, or whether they are actually being used in the best possible interest of all the Allies.

LANSING

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<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 498.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed.



File No. 832.85/78

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 20, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received March 21, 4.20 a. m.]

3413. Department's No. 3322, March 16, 5 p. m. Mr. de Margerie of the Foreign Office told me today that while he was unable at the moment to inform me as to the particular service in which the 30 German vessels interned by Brazil, but controlled by France, would be used, yet he was certain that they would be employed only in such a manner as would meet the most urgent transportation needs of the war.

He informed me that not any of the great stock of coffee purchased by France from Brazil had yet been shipped over, and it was not expected that any of these 30 ships would be used for that purpose. Mr. de Margerie has promised to give me an early answer as to the uses to which these ships will be devoted.<sup>1</sup>

SHARP

File No. 600.119/598

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 22, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received March 23, 2.08 a. m.]

## 9180. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]:

No. 326. Have had several interviews with Stevens on the question of dividing neutral tonnage secured by agreements fifty-fifty with the British. The French never officially signed the Swedish *modus vivendi* owing to their reluctance to admit the principle of this division of boats obtained thereby, and subsequently the French have made representations, both to Shipping Mission and to me, to have this division altered. The French state they were unaware of any agreement between the British and ourselves as to such arranged division and had such agreement been come to, feel that they should have been advised. So far as I know no agreement has been arranged except what took place verbally between Doctor Taylor<sup>2</sup> and Cecil. Definite instructions, however, were received

<sup>1</sup> No record has been found of further communication on the subject.<sup>2</sup> Of the War Trade Board.

by the Embassy from the War Trade Board in telegram 6103, December 22, 1917.<sup>1</sup> These instructions have been acted on by me in all subsequent negotiations and were particularly referred to in telegram from Embassy to State Department, 8117, January 1, 1918, 3 p. m.<sup>2</sup> I understand that Stevens is cabling today suggesting that the principle of equal division with the British might be modified so that a proper inter-Allied shipping committee should allocate charters on such boats as may be obtained by agreement with Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, the Dutch boats being in a separate category. I have suggested to Stevens that should the War Trade Board agree to a new division, no definite arrangements be made for such division until all outstanding minor disagreements between the Allies on charters such as, for instance, the Greek ships be satisfactorily arranged. The American Shipping Mission here feel, I think, that there are very few disadvantages in agreeing in principle to a new division while there is undoubted advantage to be gained in removing what seems to be the cause of considerable irritation, particularly to the French and somewhat to the Italians.

PAGE

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[For a statement of the American program of military transport, as expanded after the beginning of the German offensive in France, and of the conditions with respect to shipping consequent thereon, see telegram to the Ambassador in Great Britain, No. 7144, April 5, 1918, *ante*, page 198.]

File No. 763.72/9499a

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*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1918, 1 p. m.

7201. Department would appreciate a cable from you setting out following details concerning Allied Maritime Transport Council: (1) Names of representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy on this council. (2) Statement of its functions and the character of the questions it considers.

This information undoubtedly can be obtained by you after consultation with Stevens and with other members of Council.

LANSING

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<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 651.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. II, p. 1377.

File No. 800.852/91

*The French High Commissioner (Tardieu) to the Counselor for the  
Department of State (Polk)*

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1918.

[Received April 11.]

MY DEAR COUNSELOR: Following my conversation of yesterday, I have the honour to expose to you the following facts:

By letters dated respectively the 23d February, 13th March and 28th March,<sup>1</sup> and in numerous conversations with Mr. Bainbridge Colby, I made known to the Shipping Board the views and propositions of the French Government as regards the signature of charters of neutral ships at the service of the Allies.

The prospects of the French Government are, being understood that the use of the ships in question will be made secure, in common accord, for the better prosecution of war, in conformity with the Paris conference of the 3d of December last, that the signature of said charters shall be distributed equally among the Allies.

The British Government, by an agreement of the 23d November with the Federal Government—agreement concluded previous to the inter-Allied Paris conference—had, at first, reckoned that this signature would be distributed by reason of 50 per cent each between the United States and Great Britain, but now, since the month of February, shares the views of the French Government.

On the 13th March last, an agreement was arrived at, in London, between France, England and Italy, which resolves that:

1. The charters shall be signed by representatives of each power in proportions (as equal as possible) to be established by a subsequent arrangement.
2. These operations shall be managed by the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee, reorganized, and acting as representative of the Inter-Allied Maritime Council whereat Mr. Stevens is acting in the name of the American Government.

Lord Reading has apprised the Shipping Board, last week, of the agreement entered into on the 13th March. But this agreement shall only be practically feasible when the Federal Government shall be associated therein.

To hasten this solution which is indispensable to a logical use of neutral tonnage at the service of the Allies, I have the honour to ask you:

1. The adhesion of the Federal Government to the reorganization of the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee, guaranteeing an equal representation of the inter-Allied countries in the midst of this committee. The French Government would see with

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

pleasure the presidency of this committee given to Mr. Stevens, representing the United States at the Inter-Allied Maritime Council.

2. The adhesion of the Federal Government to the agreement of the 13th March above referred to.

My Government has requested me to lay stress on the importance of a prompt reply, and I would be very grateful if you would inform me of your decision as soon as you conveniently can.

I need hardly add that should you deem it necessary that a conference should take place between you, the Shipping Board and the Allied representatives, I am entirely at your disposal.

Believe me [etc.]

ANDRÉ TARDIEU

File No. 763.72/9590

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, April 11, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 3.50 p. m.]

9450. Your 7201, April 9, 1 p. m.

1. The membership of the Allied Maritime Transport Council is as follows:

France, M. Clémentel, Minister of Commerce and Industry and M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions;

Italy, Signor Crespi, Minister of Supplies, and the Honorable Salvatore Orlando, Commissioner for Mercantile Marine Construction;

Great Britain, Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade and Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Sir Joseph P. Maclay, Shipping Controller; and

United States, the Honorable Raymond B. Stevens, Vice Chairman United States Shipping Board; Secretary to the Council, Mr. J. A. Salter.

As the Council itself will meet about once a month, the current work will be carried out by the permanent organization situated in London in which the national representatives are the following: France, M. Monnet; Italy, Professor Attolico; Great Britain, Mr. J. A. Salter; and United States, Mr. G. Rublee. The work of this latter body will be coordinated and presided over by the secretary to the Council.

2. The purpose of the Council is to supervise the general conduct of Allied transport in order to obtain the most effective use of tonnage for the prosecution of the war while leaving each nation responsible for the management of the tonnage under its own control. With this object the Council will secure the necessary exchange of information and will coordinate the policy and action of the four



Governments in adjusting their programs of imports to the carrying capacity of the available Allied tonnage (having regard to naval and military requirements) and in making the most advantageous allocation and disposition of such tonnage in accordance with the urgency of war needs.

A more complete description of the organization and functions of the Council will be forwarded in the pouch leaving today.<sup>1</sup>

PAGE

File No. 600.119/598

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page).*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1918, 8 p. m.

7261. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 335. Your No. 326, Embassy No. 9180, March 22, 6 p. m., and Ship Mission No. 44.<sup>2</sup> While the agreement as to dividing equally between Great Britain and United States neutral tonnage which might be obtained, may not strictly apply to Dutch tonnage obtained by requisition, nevertheless the Shipping Board and we feel that Dutch tonnage comes within the spirit of this understanding and you and Stevens are authorized to notify the proper officials of the British Government that we will treat agreement as applying to tonnage which we have secured in this manner with understanding that British will act reciprocally in respect of Dutch tonnage requisitioned by them. A correct method of sharing the expense and burdens must be reached at some near date.

We desire to point out that this division of requisitioned Dutch tonnage will have a bookkeeping rather than a practical effect, inasmuch as the Dutch tonnage which we hold in excess of our share will be offset against the Norwegian tonnage heretofore allotted to us but retained by Great Britain under an obligation to return.<sup>3</sup> England's obligation to return large amount of Norwegian tonnage will therefore be reduced by the amount of Dutch tonnage which we hold in excess of 50 per cent of total.

This extension of the principle of equal division to Dutch tonnage must, however, be understood to be without prejudice to our right to suggest some more effective and more equitable method of dealing with neutral tonnage which will take into account the objections of the French and Italian Governments to an appropriation to their exclusion of control of neutral tonnage.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> The latter not printed.

<sup>3</sup> See also paragraph numbered 7 in telegram No. 7301, Apr. 16, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, vol. II, p. 1220.

File No. 103.95/577a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain*  
(Page)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 20, 1918, 6 p. m.

7362. For Stevens from Hurley:

No. 19. With regard to proposed arrangement between Great Britain, France and Italy, whereby Great Britain seems to have agreed to charter directly to France and Italy certain proportions of her share of all neutral tonnage on understanding that such proportions of tonnage will be placed by Italy and France under control of Inter-Allied Chartering Committee which shall direct its employment, we remind you that the assent of this country has not as yet been given to proposed plan. Our present view is that if we assent it would practically place under control of the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee a considerable proportion of our share of neutral ships and to that extent would be in conflict with the understanding and agreement that we have with Great Britain, namely, that all neutral tonnage shall be equally allocated between Great Britain and ourselves with the understanding that we will each employ it only in war service, but neither submitting the questions of actual employment to the executive power of any inter-Allied body. Please continue to bear in mind that the inter-Allied committee which was discussed at Paris conference was intended only to collect data as to respective needs of the Allies and to formulate recommendations and suggestions looking to the economical and co-ordinated employment of tonnage. All parties to the Paris conference fully realized it was not intended that this committee should have any executive power. We say this for your guidance pending receipt of our letter setting forth fully the proceedings of the Paris conference on this subject and copy of resolutions there adopted.

We request that you attend the inter-Allied council for maritime transportation whose session begins in Paris on April 23. It was contemplated at inter-Allied conference at Paris in December that this country would appoint a representative on this committee or council, and we assume the committee is the outgrowth and expression of the resolutions adopted at the Paris conference. We suggest further that you receive and report any requests and suggestions that are there made and transmit to us your recommendation with full report of the proceedings, and avoid any commitment or action until your report is received and instructions can be formulated on your report as basis. We have no official confirmation that Great Britain has made the arrangement above set forth as to turning over a portion of her neutral tonnage to France and Italy. Please con-

firm fact if true and if possible advise us what are the reasons for French urgency that these proportionate allocations be made of neutral tonnage. As a practical matter it would interfere with the free movement of such vessels all of which are now being employed to the fullest capacity in the service of emergency war needs.

Please cable us the exact function and relationships of the Allied Maritime Transport Council on which we understand you are now sitting.

POLK

File No. 763.72/9758

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 29, 1918, 6 p. m., and April 30, 6 p. m.

[Received in sections, April 30, 3.10 a. m., and May 1, 12.05 a. m.]

3738. From Stevens for the President:

No. 138a. The second meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council in Paris has just closed. The recommendations of the Council are of such importance that I deem it my duty to report them directly to you.

At its first meeting held in London early in March, the Council created a permanent organization to gather facts relating to the tonnage resources of the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy, and to the demands upon such tonnage for all requirements of each of these countries, including military and naval requirements, and general imports.

The organization so created presented the results of its work for the consideration of the Council at the meeting just ended. Among the data submitted were the estimates of military and naval demands and also the estimated quantities of specific commodities to be imported in 1918 by the three European Governments and the total number of tons of estimated imports to be brought into the United States in that year without, however, any statement in the case of the United States of the quantities of the specific commodities. Upon the information so submitted, the Council found that the total estimated essential imports for the year 1919 [1918] exceeded the carrying capacity of the tonnage available for that service by 8,500,000 tons, or stated in terms of shipping tonnage that there would be a deficit of 1,890,000 dead weight tons of shipping.

Since the statement presented to the Council was made up, the German offensive has crippled the use of the French coal mines in the northern district, thus necessitating large additional importations of coal by France and thereby putting an additional strain upon ton-

nage. The result will be to increase substantially the above estimated deficit.

In estimating the total tonnage available for all Allied uses in 1918, allowance was made for gains from new construction in all the countries and for losses from submarine warfare and marine risk. There was also included, as available, the Dutch requisitioned ships and all other neutral shipping controlled by the Allies. Consequently the deficit shown can be met only by reducing the demands on tonnage.

The problem is to find means by which the total demands upon tonnage may be so reduced as to come within the carrying capacity of the total available tonnage.

The Council considered and adopted the following statement of the Allied tonnage resources and of the demands thereon:

#### GENERAL STATEMENT ON THE IMPORT AND TONNAGE POSITION FOR 1918

In order to judge the general situation from the point of view of tonnage in the service of the Allies, and of imports which Great Britain, France, and Italy need to bring in during the year 1918, the permanent staff of the Allied Maritime Transport Council have considered together:

- (a) The programme of imports of Great Britain, France, and Italy, for the year 1918;
- (b) The average tonnage which these three nations estimate that they will have at their disposal during the same period for import work;
- (c) The amount of imports which it is estimated can be brought into these three countries by neutral vessels not under their control, by contributions from services primarily used for purposes other than imports, by return and triangular voyages, etc.

Calculations based upon these different elements show the following results in round figures: programme of imports for 1918 (in tons of 2,240 pounds) excluding oil carried in tankers, Great Britain 30,200,000, France 33,300,000, Italy 16,500,000, total 80,000,000. Total dead weight tonnage required (excluding tankers) 16,340,000. Estimated dead weight tonnage available directly or indirectly for imports of Allies (see *b* and *c* above excluding tankers) 14,450,000. Deficit in dead weight tonnage (excluding tankers) 1,890,000. It is estimated that this deficit of 1,890,000 dead weight tonnage of shipping, unless made up, will cause a deficit of roughly 8,500,000 tons in the imports contemplated by the programmes of the Allies for 1918 as stated above.

In explanation of the foregoing summarized statement the following is submitted.

1. *Imports.* Great Britain, France, and Italy have furnished statements showing their programmes of imports for the year 1918. In the case of cereals, the Wheat Executive has subjected the require-



ments of the [several] Allies to thorough Allied examination and agreement up to the end of the present cereal year, August 31, 1918, but the other programmes, while having been the subject of examination and revision by the respective Governments, have not as yet been adjusted by joint Allied action.

Compared with the imports of 1917, 1916 and 1913, the programmes of imports for 1918, in tons weight, are as follows:

	1918	1917	1916	1913
Great Britain.....	30, 200, 000	34, 417, 000	42, 326, 000	52, 793, 000
France.....	33, 300, 000	32, 202, 000	36, 000, 000	43, 500, 000
Italy.....	16, 500, 000	11, 109, 000	15, 500, 000	18, 000, 000

Grouped in broad classes of commodities, the 1918 import requirements of the Allies are made up approximately as follows:

	Great Britain	France	Italy
Food.....	13, 600, 000	7, 100, 000	4, 700, 000
Munitions.....	4, 400, 000	5, 400, 000	2, 000, 000
Coal and iron ores.....	7, 300, 000	19, 200, 000	8, 600, 000
Raw materials, etc.....	4, 900, 000	1, 600, 000	1, 200, 000
Totals.....	30, 200, 000	33, 300, 000	16, 500, 000

2. *Tonnage.* (a) Total tonnage under control of the Allies during the year 1918, making due allowance for losses by submarines and for new building in Great Britain, France, and Italy. The Allies estimate that they will have under their control during the year 1918 the following average dead weight tonnage: British flag 18,000,000, French flag 1,650,000, Italian 1,200,000 (approximate), neutral flag 1,400,000, total 22,250,000 (exclusive of tankers).

(b) Tonnage reserved by the Allies for military or naval use or services other than general import work.

Out of the total of controlled tonnage, the three Allies have at present allocated for naval and military services certain tonnage which for the year 1918 is estimated as follows (dead weight tons):

	Great Britain	France	Italy
Naval services.....	2, 760, 000		
and.....		525, 000	184, 000
Military services.....	2, 205, 000		
Colonial services unsuitable for import work.....	2, 560, 000	95, 000	155, 000
Total.....	7, 525, 000	620, 000	339, 000

Grand total of reserved services: 8,484,000.

It is recognized that the military and naval requirements can be determined only upon the advice of the military and naval organizations. Unless and until these requirements are redetermined, the Allied Maritime Transport Council must consider that the tonnage reserved for these purposes is to be maintained regardless of the fluctuations in sinkings, or new building. The result of so treating the military and naval requirements is that losses in tonnage must necessarily fall upon that portion of the tonnage remaining for import work even though a substantial proportion of the import work consists of the conveyance of munitions and other articles exclusively required for military programme.

(c) The American military programme. In the foregoing statement, the tonnage of the United States has not been relied upon for the import needs of Great Britain, France, and Italy, for the reason that advice has been received from the American Government that they estimate that all the tonnage of the United States (including any that she may hereafter acquire or construct) except such portion thereof as she must use for her own indispensable imports and for such provision as she is already under obligation to make for the services of neutrals or the Allies, will be required to convey supplies, stores, construction material, railway equipment, etc., for the number of American troops which is being sent in accordance with the programme adopted by the Supreme War Council and accepted by the United States.

(d) Tonnage available for general imports. The total dead weight tonnage under control of Great Britain, France, and Italy, as shown in paragraph (a) is 22,250,000. The dead weight tonnage allotted to military, naval and other services, as shown in paragraph (b) is 8,484,000. Therefore, the dead weight tonnage under the control of the Allies remaining available for Allied imports during 1918 is 13,766,000. In calculating, however, carrying capacity of the tonnage available for importing work, it is necessary to make allowance on the one hand for tonnage under repair or otherwise out of action and, on the other hand, for importing work done by neutral vessels not under Allied control by vessels not used primarily importing and by vessels on return and triangular voyages, etc. After allowance for these factors, the mean dead weight tonnage available for importing work throughout the year 1918 may be taken at 4,450,000.

The import needs of the Allies having thus been set against the tonnage allocated for the carrying of those imports with a resultant deficit of some 8,500,000 tons in imports, it is now necessary for the council to find the means by which the problem of dealing with this deficit can be solved.

3. Programmes of importation, which exceed by 8,500,000 tons the carrying capacity of the tonnage remaining for importing work.

It is obvious that the problem of providing tonnage for imports of the European Allies can be solved only if all the demands upon tonnage are reconsidered jointly by the proper authorities of the Allies with a view to securing such reduction and readjustment of those demands as will bring them within the carrying capacity of the total tonnage available. This problem which is now before the

Council, involves the consideration of the following demands upon tonnage:

(1) Military, naval, and other reserved services of Great Britain, France, and Italy, which it is estimated will require an average tonnage of 8,484,000, dead weight tons.

(2) The programme of transporting supplies, stores, construction material, railway equipment, etc., in connection with the despatch of troops which are being sent in accordance with the military programme adopted by the Supreme War Council and accepted by the United States Government.

[Beginning of section 2.] After deliberation and discussion of the situation upon the bases of foregoing statement of facts, the Council adopted a resolution in which are set forth the immediate steps which the Council believes should be taken in order to enable the Associated Governments to make their plans fit the use of tonnage actually at their disposal. This resolution is as follows:

1. The Allied Maritime Transport Council has considered and adopted the attached statement of the general import and tonnage position.

2. In view of the gravity of the situation as disclosed by this statement, the Council considers it to be their duty to bring the position before their respective Governments with a view to immediate action.

It is clear to the Council that the deficit is so serious that it cannot be met without a reconsideration of the military and naval demands, as well as the requirements of imports, particularly in view of the fact that any further drastic reduction of imports would have important military effects, as a large proportion of them are destined for military uses. The import of coal into France, for instance, so far from being capable of reduction, requires to be substantially increased as an immediate military necessity arising from the recent offensive, and the military necessity for maintaining, if possible increasing, the supply of coal into Italy, is well known.

The Council feel that if the deficit falls (as in the absence of a prearranged plan it must fall) in a relatively haphazard manner and at short notice upon the several services, whether import, naval or military, which demand tonnage, the resulting dislocation and disaster are likely to be made more serious than if satisfactory measures had been taken.

3. In these circumstances the Council considers that the following action is necessary:

(a) That a further drastic revision of the import [programmes] of the several countries should be undertaken, and that the necessary orders to this end should be given to the appropriate nations and Allied bodies which are now entrusted with the duty of arranging reductions and adjustment of programmes.



Further, that in order that this work may be adequately performed, either Allied executives or Allied committees appointed specifically for the purpose of adjusting Allied programmes of imports should be constituted immediately to deal with such questions as are not dealt with by existing executives.

Further, that it is desirable that there should be an American representative on each of these executives or committees, who would be a full member in the same sense as the representatives of the three European Allies (the American delegate did not vote on this).

(b) That the permanent organization of the Council should examine the possibility of rendering available for import work any vessels now engaged in colonial service and vessels hitherto regarded as unsuitable.

(c) That there should be an examination by the appropriate military authorities of the Allied military supply programmes (including the American programme) with a view to ascertaining in what ways the demands on mercantile tonnage could be diminished.

(d) That there should be a similar examination by the Allied naval authorities of the possibility of reducing the demand by the Allied navies on mercantile tonnage.

The Council then instructed the delegates of the several Governments to report the foregoing statement of facts and the foregoing resolution to the heads of their respective Governments. In accordance with that instruction, I am making this report to you.

I refrained from voting upon the paragraph which expresses the recommendation of the Council that there should be an American representative on each of the Allied executives or committees constituted for the purpose of adjusting Allied programmes of imports, because I was without information as to the policy of my Government on this subject. My personal view is that representation of the United States on these executives or committees is necessary and desirable. In a later cablegram I will transmit full information concerning such executives as now exist, and those that are planned, with the reasons why it would be to the advantage of the United States to be represented thereon.<sup>1</sup>

SHARP

File No. 800.88/164a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1918, 5 p. m.

1584. The United States Government has felt it would be advisable to have Japan represented in the Inter-Allied Maritime Trans-

<sup>1</sup> *Post*, p. 566.

<sup>2</sup> The same, on the same date, to the Ambassadors in Great Britain (No. 399) and France (No. 5111).



port Council in London and has suggested it here to representatives of England, France and Italy. Japan has a natural interest because of the large number of boats which they have put at our disposal. Membership in the Council would give Japan a voice in the administration and control of ships and would bring her in close contact with the shipping situation in the Atlantic Ocean. It would further be a tangible recognition of the contributions she has made to help the Allied shipping situation.

If Japan should be a member of the Council she might more easily co-operate with the other nations represented for the allocation of all ships and aid in reducing the tonnage used for non-essentials in the Pacific in order to produce tonnage essential for the conduct of the war. This has not been suggested directly and is for your confidential information. If broached on the subject you may use it very discreetly.

POLK

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File No. 800.88/165a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain*  
(Page)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1918, 2 p. m.

438. Please inform the Government to which you are accredited that Mr. George Rublee has been appointed by the United States Government a co-member with Mr. Stevens on the Allied Maritime Transport Council. Repeat to Paris as No. 5135 and Rome as No. 1591.

POLK

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File No. 611.006/501e

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain* (Page)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1918, 7 p. m.

1127. The Department after consultation with the War Trade Board advises you as follows:

In order to meet the continuing heavy demand on tonnage for its army program, the United States is committed to a policy of drastic reduction of imports in order to release tonnage for military purposes. The progress of such policy is indicated by the following figures for the years 1918 and 1919, which figures exclude tanker traffic and back haul from Europe: The estimated long tons necessary for overseas imports in 1918 are 12,000,000 requiring deadweight tons 2,400,000. The estimated long tons necessary for overseas imports in 1919 are 11,500,000 requiring deadweight tons 1,900,000. These figures include surplus of imports of commodities such as vegetable oils from transpacific to release corresponding transatlantic shipments to Allies. For 1919, not all necessary imports will come in vessels controlled by the United States, but the figure of estimated deadweight tons required is believed to be lower than amount under the United States control, which is actually unavailable for war zone use.

The War Trade Board of the United States pledges itself to the policy of eliminating non-essentials, reducing necessary importation to the lowest possible amounts, and preventing the utilization of ships suitable for war zone work by cargo for trades which are not essential to the conduct of the military program or the maintenance of the civilian population. In case any circumstances should appear indicating a failure to adhere to the foregoing policy, the War Trade Board would be happy to have the circumstances referred to it for such action or explanation as may be appropriate.

The foregoing should be communicated by you at once to Sheldon, and it is desired that you and he at once take steps informally to acquaint British officials and commercial leaders and American representatives with the foregoing statement. It is believed that Lord Reading should be furnished with the foregoing declaration. It is hoped that this can be advantageously used to strengthen the hands of those who are opposing that element which Department understands is endeavoring to secure an increased utilization of British tonnage for commercial purposes not essential to the prosecution of the war. Additional and more detailed data bearing on imports will be sent in subsequent cable.

LANSING

Third Meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, August 29-30: Difficulties Presented by the Programs for Transportation of American Troops and of Food—Request of the Allied Governments for the Submission of American Import Programs to General Scrutiny—Fourth Meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, September 30-October 2—Commitment of the United States by the Secretary of War to the Submission of Its Import Programs—Allocation of Additional Shipping for American Army Transport at the Expense of European Imports

File No. 763.72/13764

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading), temporarily at London, to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

*Undated.*

[Received August 31, 1918.]

The request of the United States Administration for cargo tonnage in connection with the proposed programme of transport of 80 divisions of American troops to France has been before the Allied Maritime Transport Council which has been sitting this week in London to consider the demands upon the world tonnage made by the various programme committees which include not only the food committees dealing with requirements for munitions and those raw materials which go into munitions. The American representatives did not take part as they had no instructions from their Government.

It is plain that the furnishing of further cargo tonnage can only be effected if the three European Allies agree to sacrifice the importation of part of these commodities which had hitherto been considered essential both for military purposes and for the maintenance of the morale of the civilian population. This raises a very serious question. The Governments of the three Allied nations are prepared to ask their people to make every possible sacrifice but it must be remembered that these cannot go beyond a certain point. Reductions have already been made in order to ensure the uninterrupted shipment and maintenance of the American troops. For instance, the use of British transports now promised until the end of this year means an additional loss of 250,000 tons of cargo space per month, that is, of 1,500,000 tons in six months. The further grave reductions required in order to comply with the request in the telegram to General Bliss must be examined with the greatest care. There is not sufficient information before us with regard to the basis of calculation of the War Department to enable the necessary consideration to be given to the possibility of France and England furnishing part of the supplies now proposed to be transported. This information will doubtless be supplied within a short period by the War Department. Something further is, however, required.

<sup>1</sup> Communicated via the British Embassy at Washington.

In order that the three European Governments may impose upon themselves any further sacrifice that this supreme effort for a victory in 1919 may entail a sacrifice which we know full well that America will be ready now as in the past to share, it is vital that the Governments with whom the responsibility will rest for imposing these restrictions upon imports be able to assure that the sacrifices are imperative and are made in pursuance of a common policy followed by the four Governments. This involves joint consideration of the resources in relation to needs.

The representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments fully realise how vital and urgent it is that the question of cargo tonnage of the army supply programme should be settled at the earliest possible moment. Therefore the British and Allied Governments would earnestly request that those responsible for the allocation of American tonnage and limitation of American imports should come to London as soon as possible. We will arrange for the Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy to meet them in London and determine the final action. It is in proof the promptest and most effective way of arriving at a decision.

The representatives of France and Italy have joined in preparing this cable and are instructing their Ambassadors at Washington to support the request contained therein in such a manner as may be deemed most suitable.

[No signature indicated]

File No. 800.88/177

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, August 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received September 2, 2.21 a. m.]

1525. For Hurley [from Stevens and Rublee]:

No. 489. A meeting of Allied Transport Council has just ended. Lord Reading presented to the Council General Bliss' telegram requesting use of British tonnage as one condition of adoption of 80-division programme. We at once declined to take part in consideration of this matter on the ground that we had no instructions from our Government, and also that the time had not come for action by the Council. Our view was agreed to and it was decided that the Allied Governments should communicate directly with the United States through the regular diplomatic channels.

We have seen a copy of Lord Reading's cable to the British Embassy in Washington, for communication to the State Department. While we are aware that the 80-division plan has never been before us officially and we therefore have been careful not to dis-



cuss it officially, still we have been in a position to know what is thought here of the possibility of carrying out the plan. For your information we will give you our personal impressions in regard to the situation.

It seems to us of the utmost importance that the 80-division plan should be carried out. If this is done there is real hope of ending the war with victory next year, and so stopping the waste of life and resources.

We believe the necessary shipping can be found if every one of the Allies is willing to make additional sacrifices. It will, however, be a most difficult thing to do, and the additional privations which must be imposed on France, Great Britain and Italy will be very hard on the peoples of these nations. The French, British and the Italian Governments are nevertheless disposed to call upon their peoples to accept these privations in order to bring the war to a speedy close. They feel, however, that before demanding these further great sacrifices they should have the fullest information in regard to the American Army supply programme so as to be sure that no tonnage is to be [misused], and also the fullest information in regard to American imports and the employment of American tonnage in order to furnish the tonnage required for the 80-division plan. It will be necessary to take every boat of each of the four countries that is not required for other absolutely indispensable war needs. The other Governments feel that they cannot successfully call upon their peoples to undergo great additional hardships unless their people know that the United States is cooperating with them on the basis of equality of sacrifice, with a disloyally [*an equally*] strict limitation of imports.

It is not possible to clear all these matters up quickly by cable. We believe the only way to reach a prompt agreement to adopt the 80-division plan is for our highest officials having the responsibility for dealing with tonnage and imports to come here at once as Lord Reading proposes, and meet the British, French and Italian Ministers. We think the men to come should be yourself, Franklin, McCormick and Gay. In no other way, in our judgment, can a satisfactory settlement be promptly reached. The 80-division plan with its demand for so large an amount of tonnage which must come from other service introduces an entirely new element into the situation. Until a decision with regard to it is reached it is impossible for the programme committees to know how to make up their programmes. If it is adopted the programmes of imports must be cut down to a point not hitherto contemplated.

As requested by the State Department, the Shipping Board and the War Trade Board, we proposed to the Council that it should

invite Japan to send delegates to the Council. The Council agreed to this and it was decided that a full explanation should be made to Japan of the constitution of the Council and its purposes, and that Japan should be invited to send delegates.

The Council considered question of tonnage for Swiss needs. It decided that the supply of minimum import requirements to Switzerland should be an Allied obligation and be met by the use of Allied tonnage. They further decided that Swiss minimum requirements should be determined in conjunction with a settlement in regard to the supplies to be furnished by Switzerland to the Allies and other pending negotiations with Switzerland, contrary to the view expressed by us. The Council resolved that it was inexpedient, in view principally of the existing political situation in Spain, to approve the proposed purchase by Switzerland for the duration of the war of German vessels interned in Spain.

The Council adopted a general statement of import and tonnage position for 1918 which is much more definite and informing than a similar statement adopted at the last meeting of their Council in April. We shall forward this to you at once by mail.

The Council considered the use of double bottoms for carriage of fuel oil and recommended that every effort be made to place additional tanker tonnage in service so as to eliminate the use of double bottoms for oil, and so increase the cargo carrying capacity of the ships.

The Council considered the food programme presented to it by the Food Council and decided to begin provisionally to lift that part of it which was recognized as absolutely indispensable, leaving the remainder of the programme to be considered after the other programmes have come in and more reliable information in regard to the harvests is available.

The Council also dealt with several other matters which are not of sufficient American concern to require specific mention in this cable. As soon as the minutes of the proceedings of the Council are printed we shall send you copies thereof. Stevens. Rublee.

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File No. 800.88/183

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, September 2, 1918.

[Received September 3.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Following a meeting of the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council of London and on the advice of the several committees concerned, the British Government has instructed its representatives to hand to Your Excellency a note on the subject

of tonnage which was drawn up in accord with the representatives of France and Italy. After a brief statement of the restrictions under which the three Allied great European Powers have quite naturally placed themselves in order to provide for the uninterrupted transportation of the American troops under existing conditions, the note most earnestly proposes that the Government of the United States kindly agree to send to London at the earliest possible date the persons who have charge of and are responsible for the allotment of American tonnage and limitations of American imports. Those delegates would consult with the Ministers of England, France and Italy and join in the study of the resources and needs of the countries concerned.

My Government directs me earnestly to recommend to Your Excellency that this measure which it regards as the most satisfactory toward an early settlement of the vital question of tonnage be adopted.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 611.006/502

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

LONDON, *September 4, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received September 5, 1 p. m.*]

1619. War Trade Board for McCormick [from Sheldon]:

No. 1370. Referring to Department's telegram to the Embassy No. 1127, August 31, 7 p. m. The instructions contained therein as to informally acquainting various officials with the statement are being carried out. From informal conversations with the British and the heads of some of our missions here [I feel] called upon to inform [you] that in my opinion the additional and detailed data on the question of United States imports which it is announced will be sent in a subsequent cable will, if convincing, be much more effective than any general statement of policy in inducing the authorities of the Associated Governments to restrict their import programs and general use of tonnage in such a manner as will make possible our full military programs which all seem to desire to have carried out for next year. I therefore strongly urge you to send data in detail with the quickest despatch. I need hardly add that the more drastic the cuts are that are made in our own imports program when the details are completed the easier it will be to get the other Governments to reduce their programs to a point which will make possible the military program desired. I suggest that you see in this connection telegram from Stevens and Rublee to Hurley, Ship Mission 289 [489], Embassy's 1525, August 31, 6 p. m.

File No. 800.88/182

*The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State*

No. 18840/C-1

WASHINGTON, September 6, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have the honor to refer to the communication made by Lord Reading to Your Excellency in regard to the request of the United States Administration for cargo tonnage, in connection with the proposed program for the transportation of troops to France.

Lord Reading has informed you that while the subject has been discussed at the last meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, the American representatives did not take part at the sitting of the above said Council as they had no instructions from their Government to do so.

No doubt you have before yourself all the considerations that have been communicated to Your Excellency by Lord Reading, and therefore, I refrain from going over again, to emphasize on behalf of my Government, the subject of Lord Reading's communication.

My Government has sent me instructions to the effect that I should assent to and support the contents of the communication made by His Excellency, Lord Reading, and I hasten to do so, in the hope that Your Excellency will put me in a position to inform my Government about the decision taken by the United States Government on this very important question.

Please accept [etc.]

MACCHI DI CELLERE

File No. 800.88/180

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, September 7, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received September 8, 12.45 p. m.]

1710. Ship Mission for Lansing, Hurley, Hoover, Baruch, and McCormick [from Stevens and Rublee]:

No. 514. A meeting of Allied Maritime Transport Council was held in London on the 29th and 30th of August. We attended as representatives of the United States.

The Council unanimously arrived at the following decisions subject to the assent of the respective Governments.

## 1. FOOD PROGRAMME FOR CEREAL YEAR 1918-1919

The Food Council presented a programme calling for importations aggregating 27,000,000 tons for the three European Allies; this was an increase of 4,500,000 tons over the actual importations for the last cereal year, including an increase in the requirements for military



oats from 2,250,000 to 3,500,000 tons. It appeared that the cereal harvests of France, Italy and Great Britain were about 2,000,000 tons greater than last year but complete information in regard to all harvests was not yet available.

### *Decision*

Programme to be commenced on the purely provisional basis of importation at the rate of 18,500,000 tons excluding military oats, the military oats programme to be further investigated and in the meantime to proceed on the basis of the old programme, the final programme to be worked out for food as a whole to be reconsidered at the next meeting of the Council. Meantime tonnage to be arranged on the basis of the above total figure and distributed between the Allies in accordance with the ratios recommended by the Food Council.

This decision involves the allocation of British<sup>r</sup> tonnage for the importation of Allied food as a whole instead of, as hitherto, Allied cereals only on an agreed basis of requirements. The British representatives assented to this decision provisionally and on the understanding that the continuance of the system would be conditional upon satisfactory shipping arrangements being made with France and Italy and upon America's programme being included and working out on equal terms.

## 2. CIVILIAN COMMODITIES

### *Decision*

That until further order the actual consumption of civilian commodities generally during the past year should be taken as setting the maximum limit for importation during the ensuing year. This decision not however preventing a different distribution as between our allies or a greater importation of a particular commodity than last year where stocks have been used up and a larger importation is required to avoid reduction of consumption.

## 3. INVITATION TO JAPAN TO JOIN COUNCIL

### *Decision*

That Japan should be invited to join the Council, a memorandum explaining the main objects of the Council, viz., to secure such allocation of Allied tonnage as would best assist the prosecution of the war, accompanying the invitation but no actual conditions being attached to acceptance of membership.

## 4. SUPPLY OF COAL TO ITALY VIA FRANCE AND SHORTAGE OF RAILWAY CARS

The Inter-Allied Transportation Council presented a recommendation that 350,000 tons of coal should be sent to Italy by the long sea route, United Kingdom to Italy, the supply from and by way

of France being reduced to 250,000 with the object of relieving the congestion on the French railways by the release of some twelve [omission] railway cars.

The programme previously agreed to provided for 150,000 tons by the long sea route and 450,000 from and by way of France; an increase of the 150,000 to 250,000 with the corresponding reduction of 100,000 in the quantities shipped by railroad through France had already been authorized.

The further increase of 100,000 tons by the long sea route would mean the continuous employment of about 150,000 tons of shipping.

#### *Decision*

That while the present shipment by long sea route of 250,000 tons instead of 150,000 tons of the programme should be continued the further increase is impracticable. Every possible effort should, however, be made to increase the importation of railway cars into France.

#### [5.] TONNAGE FOR SWISS NEEDS

The Swiss Government had represented that in view of the extension of control over neutral vessels by the Allied Governments they were no longer able to charter tonnage for their essential requirements.

#### *Decision*

(a) That the Allied Governments should accept the responsibility for what the Council agreed to be Switzerland's minimum requirements.

(b) That the assumption of this responsibility should be in conjunction with a satisfactory arrangement as to other negotiations the Allies may desire to conclude with Switzerland.

(c) That the foregoing resolutions should be communicated to the Allied Governments with the recommendation that they shall take immediate steps to carry resolution (b) into effect.

(d) That the proposal that the German Government should share the responsibility for the provision of tonnage from vessels interned in Spanish or Dutch ports which the Swiss Government believed the German Government were prepared to do should not be encouraged.

Referring to resolution (d) we took the position that in view of the shortage of tonnage it would be advisable to authorize the Swiss Government to charter the German [ships]. Since, however, we were without instructions from our Government on this subject and since Lord Robert Cecil and the other delegates were strongly of the opinion that it would have a bad effect in Spain now to encourage such a transaction between the Swiss Government and the German Government, we did not oppose the adoption of the decision.

## 6. [OTHER QUESTIONS]

A number of other questions as to no end of requests for tonnage for France and Italy, the use of double bottoms for oil fuel, and the permanent organization of the Council were also discussed and referred to the executive of the Council.

In assenting to the above decisions we accepted the responsibility for recommending them for acceptance by the United States Government and accordingly now submit that they should be so accepted. Stevens, Rublee.

PAGE

File No. 800.88/212

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 26, 1918, 2 p. m.*

2425. [For Lord Reading from Secretary of War Baker]:

Information has reached me that a change has been made in the allotment of the 500,000 tons of British shipping to be assigned the American service during the months of October, November and December. It is my understanding that the resolution as passed on October 1 at the meeting of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, which I attended, provided that in addition to the 200,000 dead weight tons allotted for the month of October, an increase would be made by additional allocation of tonnage so that 500,000 tons would be in the American Army program service during the months of November and December.

Representatives British Ministry of Shipping here have been informed that only 150,000 dead weight tons in addition to the 200,000 dead weight tons allotted for October, will be assigned for service in November and the remaining 150,000 dead weight tons assigned the service in December.

The demands of the American Expeditionary Force for animals, motor transportation, locomotives and cars, and other supplies needed to make our forces abroad effective, greatly exceeds tonnage available and I cannot urge too strongly the assignment for November of at least the 300,000 dead weight tons originally contemplated and as much more as can possibly be diverted.

It will be remembered that I stated to the Allied Maritime Transport Council that we felt that 200,000 tons of shipping should be put into service at once and that an increase of 400,000 tons for each of the months of November and December was needed, making a total of 1,000,000 dead weight tons by the first of the year. The original resolution above referred to was allowed to stand of record

with the understanding that our needs were greatly in excess of the contemplated allotment.

I will much appreciate your efforts to obtain the maximum assignment possible for the month of November and believe that such allocation is of prime importance to the Allied cause. Baker.

LANSING

File No. 600.119/1647e

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 26, 1918, 6 p. m.

2445. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 1494. The division upon a fifty-fifty basis between the United States and Great Britain of the tonnage which has been acquired by either country from Norway and Holland by agreement and requisitioning has been extended to Norwegian sailing vessels<sup>1</sup> and 23,000 tons of such vessels now lying off the east coast of South America have been transferred by the Shipping Board to British control to be used in carrying essential commodities from South America to Great Britain. These vessels will carry linseed, tallow and other animal fats.

LANSING

File No. 600.119/1645c

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1918, 4 p. m.

2533. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 1533. For several months we have been discussing with Captain Fisher<sup>2</sup> an arrangement to be entered into between Great Britain and the United States providing for the supply of coal to South America. As a result of these negotiations, the War Trade Board have approved and are prepared to adhere to the following arrangement:

WHEREAS the Governments of Great Britain and of the United States have both independently adopted the principle that vessels utilizable for war zone service shall be employed to carry exports to South America only to the extent that such tonnage must be sent there to carry back from South America commodities essential for the prosecution of the war, and for the maintenance of the civilian population; and

WHEREAS it is desired to supply the essential coal requirements of South America by the employment of vessels which in accordance

<sup>1</sup> See vol. II, p. 1163.

<sup>2</sup> Of the British War Mission.



with the foregoing principle must be sent to South America by Great Britain and the United States to lift essential imports;

Now, therefore, the following arrangement has been reached:

1. The estimated annual coal requirements of the several South American states are in long tons as follows:

	Minimum	Average	Maximum
Argentine.....			1, 000, 000
Bolivia.....	10, 000	20,000	
		(to be received through Chile)	
Brazil.....	600, 000		1, 000, 000
Chile.....			500, 000
Colombia.....	3, 000	10, 000	
Ecuador.....	10, 000	30, 000	
British Guiana.....	10, 000	30, 000	
Dutch Guiana.....	2, 000	5, 000	
Peru.....	50, 000	110, 000	
		(includes 20,000 coke as a minimum basis; 30,000 as average basis)	
Uruguay.....			600, 000

2. Great Britain assumes the responsibility of supplying the needs of Argentina and Uruguay. In case Great Britain directs vessels controlled by her to load coal in the United States, the United States will facilitate the shipment from United States ports of up to 400,000 tons of coal. The United States assumes the responsibility of supplying the needs of Brazil and of Chile. With respect to the other South American states mentioned in paragraph 1, no apportionment of responsibility as between Great Britain and the United States is made at the present time.

3. It is realized that the requirements of Great Britain and the United States for imports from Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina may vary and become subject to desirable modifications to such an extent that strict compliance with the foregoing arrangement relative to supplying these countries with coal may be inadvisable from the standpoint of conservation of tonnage. Accordingly, the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will keep the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council fully informed relative to their programs for imports from the three countries named. If, in the light of this information, the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council determines wise, the United States, provided the coal is available, will carry to Argentina and/or Uruguay in bottoms controlled by the United States up to but not more than 150,000 tons of coal, relieving to this extent the obligation of Great Britain above referred to. The 150,000 tons of coal here mentioned is in addition to the 400,000 tons referred to in the preceding paragraph 2. Similarly, Great Britain will, if requested by the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council, and if coal be available, furnish coal cargoes from Wales to vessels of any registry or flag operating in the so-called "Triangular Route" (Brazil-United States-Europe), to this extent relieving the

responsibility of the United States with reference to supplying Brazil with coal.

4. Control of distribution of coal in the several South American countries will rest with the country primarily responsible for exporting the coal to such country. It is understood that this control will be exercised by the Coal Exports Committee, or other controlling body, for England, and by the War Trade Board, or other controlling body, for the United States. Great Britain and the United States will, however, each keep the other fully advised as to the manner and method of distribution adopted by it. In determining upon distribution, due regard shall be had to the business done during the three years preceding the date of this arrangement, so that established import trade interests shall be protected.

5. It is understood that Great Britain will establish a parity for her freight rates to the River Plate, both for coal carried directly from England and for coal carried on vessels under her control from the United States at such a level as will work no hardships to the importing countries.

6. The United States and Great Britain will adopt the policy of requiring payment for both coal and freight to be made in currency of the purchasing country at par of exchange. Currency so secured in each country to be apportioned between the two shipping countries in proportion to the aggregate sums due to them respectively for coal and freights to all South American countries. Ships chartered by either country to be treated in all respects as if owned by that country—the charter money to be provided by the chartering country out of its own finance.

7. Neutral vessels, which being outward bound from Europe for the South Atlantic in ballast are by agreement exempted from calling for examination at a port in the United Kingdom and permitted to call at a port in North America, shall be chartered by the Shipping Board and the Minister of Shipping in the proportion of one-half to each, and when so chartered shall be deemed to be under the control of the chartering country; but such division of neutral vessels shall be applied *pro tanto* in satisfaction of the obligations under existing agreements for the division between the United States and Great Britain of neutral vessels.

8. This agreement is designed only to fix the relative responsibilities of Great Britain and the United States in respect of such coal shipments as, in the interest of the successful prosecution of the war, should be made to South America. The agreement shall give rise to no right or claim on the part of any South American nation to the benefits hereof, but the terms and conditions upon which any South American nation shall receive coal, as contemplated hereunder, are left open for negotiation and determination by the Governments of Great Britain and of the United States, acting in accord.

9. In the event that coal shall be loaded in the United States for shipment to Argentina or Uruguay pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 hereof, participation in such shipments shall be allocated by the War Trade Board, or other controlling agencies of the United States, among American exporters with due regard to the

shipments made by them to said countries during the three years preceding the date of this arrangement.

Captain Fisher is now *en route* to England, and immediately upon his arrival you should present to him the text of this arrangement with the view to securing adherence thereto by the competent British authorities at the earliest possible date. In the meantime, you will please inform Stevens and Rublee of this proposed arrangement. Please ascertain whether in their opinion this arrangement should receive the sanction of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. If they think this is advisable, you should communicate with us, stating the reasons therefor, before submitting the proposed arrangement to the Transport Council.

LANSING

File No. 800.88/210

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *October 31, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received November 1, 1 a. m.*]

3256. War Trade Board for McCormick [from Sheldon]:

No. 1775. Following is text of a telegram which is being sent to Secretary Baker and which I am forwarding to you for your information.

For Baker from Stevens and Rublee, Allied Maritime Transport Council; L. L. Summers, War Industries Board; L. P. Sheldon, War Trade Board; J. P. Cotton, Food Administration:

Gay's report of the shipping situation in America shows that there are now employed in American commercial trades 780,000 dead weight tons of American-controlled ships and 1,500,000 dead weight tons of foreign shipping in excess of an amount of shipping required to carry out the essential import program of the United States. This report, if correct, presents a serious responsibility to the American representatives on the Allied organizations dealing not only with ships but with food, munitions, and raw materials. The food programs of the European Allies have been cut in essentials to a dangerous minimum, the carrying out of even this minimum program has been postponed in order to furnish ships for the American Army supplies, the shipping available for munitions is not sufficient to carry out the reduced program of the Munitions Council, French shipments are now about 100,000 tons below the reduced programs.

While the programs of the various raw materials committees are not yet complete, enough work has been done to make it evident the



tonnage available after food and munitions are taken care of will not be sufficient to carry out the programs.

With these conditions existing among the European Allies, it is essential that we on our part should cut off the import of non-essentials and limit the import of essentials to the programs agreed upon or to be agreed upon. In fact, it was entirely upon your commitment in this sense to the Allied Maritime Transport Council that the 500,000 tons of shipping already collected from European sources was secured.

We have hitherto assumed that this was in fact being done and that American shipping was being used solely for essential imports. Gay's report, if correct, clearly shows that this is not the case. Unless it can be clearly demonstrated that Gay's report is incorrect, or if correct, unless the situation is remedied by withdrawing ships not needed for the essential import programs, we all concur that the European nations can not be asked to further cut their essential programs.

In explanation of the sending of this telegram, I would remind you that for some months past the question as to whether the war was to be won rapidly or allowed to drift into a long struggle, has rested largely on the number of troops that America can put into the field in the near future and fully maintain. The so-called 80-division programme which was to produce the desired results could only be accomplished from a shipping point of view by encroaching on the tonnage which was calculated as necessary to lift the regular programs of essential commodities such as food, munitions, and some of the other vital raw materials.

When Secretary Baker was present at the Allied Maritime Transport Council on October 1, he made a statement containing among other things the following, as reported in the minutes of the meeting which so far as my recollection serves me seems accurately to convey what he said :

I am entirely in accord with the views [ . . . ] that we ought to exhibit our import programmes in the programme committees, that we ought to be advised and informed by any counsel of those associated in the examination of those programmes, and in the disposition of any shipping which the United States has under its control it ought to be fully informed as to the needs of the Allies surveyed and examined as they would be in a body of this sort where the one moving view of everybody is the best interest of the common cause at the moment. I think there will be no difficulty whatever in committing the American Government, and indeed I do commit the American Government to that view, that the United States will inform itself by participation in the programme committees and in



the deliberations of this body as to what the needs are, and will, except in the exceptional cases which are enumerated in the resolution itself, be guided by the deliberations of this body in determining the disposition of its own shipping.

Although this general discussion was largely one of shipping, it naturally does vitally affect the functions of the War Trade Board as being the administrative agency controlling both imports and exports of the United States and I therefore feel it my duty to report to you fully on the subject as being one of the agencies most closely concerned to supply the corrective measures if Gay's statements are substantiated.

LAUGHLIN

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File No. 600.119/1681a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1918, 5 p. m.

2689. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 1577. Referring Department's 2533, October 31, 4 p. m., our 1533. It is felt by some of the authorities here that Great Britain may possibly find difficulty in supplying to the River Plate district the quantities of coal provided in the arrangement to be supplied by her. It should be clearly understood that the proposed arrangement is of no avail whatsoever unless it constitutes an unequivocal and binding obligation upon Great Britain to furnish and carry to the River Plate district the amounts of coal provided for in the arrangement; and in any discussions upon this matter you should take occasion to give due emphasis to this understanding.

LANSING

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File No. 800.88/208

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 8, 1918, 5 p. m.

2706. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 1587. Embassy's 3256, October 31, 5 p. m., your 1775. The situation with regard to the import restrictions and the position of the War Trade Board with relation thereto will be fully explained in a cablegram to be sent shortly by the Secretary of War to Rublee and Stevens.

LANSING

## COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ALLIED POWERS IN THE SUPPLY AND DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD: THE FOOD COUNCIL

American Measures to Meet the Allies' Need of Wheat—Efforts of the Food Administration to Secure Acceptance by the Allies of Increased Shipments of Pork Products

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 1, 1918.

After conferences with Robson<sup>1</sup> and Barnes<sup>2</sup> I have written following letter to Robson:

With regard to the various estimates of the position of wheat exports from the United States, I would like to say that, disregarding altogether the calculations made in London as at the 1st of November, we can now approach the whole matter as from the 1st of January.

From your analysis I gather that you consider the total Canadian export surplus from this year's harvest to be 140,000,000 from which must be deducted 20,000,000 carry-over as at July 1 and 30,000,000 exports to January 1, leaving a net exportable balance on January 1 of 90,000,000 bushels.

On the other hand inasmuch as there has been exported from the United States out of last harvest and up to January 1 fully 60,000,000 bushels, I think you will agree with me that the theoretical export surplus from the United States is rather more than fully exhausted on the 1st of January and that on a statistical basis we have only to deal with the 90,000,000 bushels of Canadian wheat.

From Barnes programme for January, February, March and April, a total amount of 1,565,000 tons, which is mostly flour, is proposed to be exported from United States supplies to Allies, or say 70,000,000 bushels of wheat. Such an export from the United States is obviously a bet on results of our conservation and while I have every hope that the measures which we have adopted and that we will still further strengthen will result in such a surplus I do not think we are justified in allowing this export without a reservation, and that we should regard this export as an advance to Allies to be replaced from Canadian stocks already in United States or from further shipments to United States upon our demand if it should prove necessary in order to maintain our flour supplies until next harvest. We will make no such demand unless it is critically necessary.

Will you add to Lord Rhondda that as at January 1 we are making a survey of wheat in farmers' hands and at that time will revise the above accordingly.

HOOPER

<sup>1</sup>H. T. Robson, Chairman of the Wheat Export Co.

<sup>2</sup>Julius H. Barnes, President of the U. S. Food Administration Grain Corpn.

File No. 103.97/94a

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 14, 1918, 3 p. m.

Referring to my telegram January 1. We are about to inaugurate a more intensive conservation drive to try and save the 75,000,000 bushels of wheat referred to. Would you get Lord Rhondda to cable me expressing the imperative necessity of this provision without trenching on Canadian wheat, also similar cable from Wheat Executive to Robson for transmission to me.

[HOOVER]

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*

[Telegram]

LONDON, January 17, 1918, 3.44 p. m.

No. 103. Rhondda communicates following:

Unless you are able to send the Allies at least 75,000,000 bushels wheat over and above what you have exported up to January 1 and in addition to the total exportable surplus from Canada I cannot take the responsibility of assuring our people that there will be food enough to win the war. Imperative necessity compels me to cable you in this blunt way. No one knows better than I that the American people regardless of national and individual sacrifice have so far refused nothing that is needed for the war, but it now lies with America to decide whether or not the Allies in Europe shall have enough bread to hold out until the United States is able to throw its force into the field. I have not minced words because I am convinced that the American people if they know the truth will not hesitate to meet the emergency.

SHELDON

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1918.

Inform Rhondda, your cable, we will export every grain of wheat that the American people save from their normal consumption. We shall appeal to them for greater endeavor and have already intro-

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (No. 6237) for Sheldon.

duced stronger measures and we believe our people will not fail to meet the emergency.

HOOVER

Food Administrator's File

*The British and Italian Ambassadors and the French High Commissioner (Reading, Macchi di Cellere, Tardieu) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1918.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: We saw Mr. McAdoo on Thursday morning, and he expressed himself most anxious to meet the situation.

As you are aware, he has arranged to carry the 150,000 tons of pork products and meat from Chicago by special trains, so that this problem is in a process of solution. Mr. McAdoo definitely stated that he was prepared to go to any length to overcome the present difficulty of carrying food to the seaboard and said that if we would keep him informed of the places where the grain was collected he would see that it was fetched as quickly as possible. We undertook to give him this information in full and also as to our ship tonnage capacity at the different ports, and also to tell him where cars were specially needed and where there was delay in carrying out his directions.

We are in fact supplying him with all this information, so if the grain is available it will be brought to the seaboard even if we have to ask for wholly exceptional measures. We have all the ships necessary to take it.

February is so far advanced that there is not much prospect of doing more than has already been done, but the vital necessity of a very large shipment in March or April cannot be exaggerated.

We feel that every endeavour must be made to ship at least 1,100,000 tons in March and more than that if possible. With that object in view we have got together the necessary shipping, and we are now met with the probability of being unable to procure sufficient grain to load full cargoes. A situation such as that would be nothing short of a calamity, and we most earnestly seek your assistance.

Mr. Robson, in a letter dated February 20th addressed to the President of the U.S.F.A. Grain Corporation, summarized the position as regards amounts available for March. These totals show a deficiency of at least 250,000 tons, which we cannot reasonably anticipate obtaining in the market.

The course which Mr. Robson has suggested and which seems to us to be the only solution is to ask you to help us at this most critical juncture by releasing to us 300,000 tons of bulk wheat from your re-



serves. In this way and in this way alone can the situation be relieved. You are so familiar with the grave urgency of this problem that we do not recapitulate the facts, but we *must* meet and overcome the present crisis.

Apart from the special need for the 300,000 tons, our attention must be concentrated on securing month by month a constant supply of cereals, and we ask your aid in securing this as well.

Now that we have got the pledged word of Mr. McAdoo that cars shall be available and the congestion dispersed, and now that we have at great sacrifice sent ships here specially to collect food, we most earnestly appeal to you to secure us the certainty of being able to obtain the necessary cereals.

We make both of these requests to you conscious that you will do your utmost, as you have persistently done, to help meet our nations' needs. Our excuse for our insistence is the fact, which is well known to you, that a failure to make adequate shipments in March may produce events of incalculable gravity in both Europe and America.

We are [etc.]

V. MACCHI DI CELLERE  
READING  
ANDRÉ TARDIEU

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, *February 26, 1918.*

DEAR LORD READING: With respect to wheat for March, we will, in the course of to-day or to-morrow, pass to the Railway Administration the location of 5,000,000 bushels of wheat—125,000 tons—in the Pacific Northwest, and are asking them to undertake its transportation to the Gulf for March loading. This, together with the 300,000 tons of flour arranged for—subject to the movement of certain wheat to the mills—is, I feel, all that we can do on the wheat line at the moment and this involves some bread shortage in this country. Our Grain Division have great hopes of the arrangements made for buying of corn in the terminal markets. They feel that it should be possible to buy up to 15,000,000 bushels of corn for March loading, or, say 400,000 tons, if present railway movement maintains. This of course will also be accomplished with a great deal of jeopardy to the domestic trade, but it is a risk we will take. If these totals are accomplished it will, according to Mr. Robson's letter of February 20 give a total of 1,285,000 tons—or a margin of safety of 185,000 tons.

Yours faithfully,

[HERBERT HOOVER]

File No. 103.97/113a

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 2, 1918, 7 p. m.

. . . I addressed the following memorandum to Lord Reading to-day.<sup>2</sup> Wish you would present it at once to Lord Rhondda. Matter is of urgent importance; we must know within next two or three days whether Allies will purchase this foodstuff. It must not be regarded by them as any favor to us but as a service performed to them.

Several forces are in operation upon our beef and pork production: the internal transportation delays in bringing livestock from the farms to market and transportation delays in export of products to the Allies, delays in Allied purchases, and to some extent Allied contraction of shipping. The soft corn is endangered by the end of March and consequently producers are forcing the early finishing of animals. All these cumulate in a very acute situation. The result of the freer transportation movement with better weather is going not only to multiply the arrivals of stock in slaughtering centers, but these arrivals are of heavier weights and therefore the total quantity of meat very much larger. On the other hand this earlier marketing of meat is going to create a shortage in arrivals from June to September.

We cannot allow the result of this glut to break the price to lower levels than at present or we will discourage our farmers and demoralize the whole of next year's production. To solve this situation we are confronted with several alternatives.

The first is to remove all of our restrictions on the consumption of meat for at least two or three months. This will greatly destroy the whole sentiment towards food conservation and will mean that our population will be eating excessive quantities of meat which will be interpreted into decreased exports to the Allies at a later date.

The second alternative is for the Allies to undertake a blanket order for all excess production of pork products until the end of April and to either ship them to the Allied countries for storage against the period of shortage, or alternatively to make such financial arrangements as will allow the extension of storage in this country. This will mean that the Allies will have to be prepared to take up to 450,000 tons of pork products in March and April.

On the other hand, as you are aware, we are entirely short of breadstuffs in the United States and I do not see how we can go on exporting at the present rate per month. It appears to me that in this situation food is food and that the natural thing would be that the Allies should take the whole of our excess production where we

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (No. 6747) for Sheldon.

<sup>2</sup> Sent as a letter to Lord Reading under date of Mar. 1 (Food Administrator's File).

have an excess and not drain our shortages deeper in other directions. If the consumption of pork products in Europe could be materially increased, it would certainly reduce the demands for butter, cheese and breadstuffs.

In the matter of beef we will need if we are to continue our present conservation to increase the export, but as to the approximate quantity I am not prepared at the present moment to say. If we are to maintain the beef industry it will be necessary for the Allies to take beef products of the higher class, as it is generally on these products that conservation has taken place and it will be necessary to take them at somewhat higher prices than at present otherwise we must abandon conservation in this direction.

HERBERT HOOVER

Food Administrator's File

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1918.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: Your letter of the 1st of March is of such importance that I thought it right immediately to consult with the Italian Ambassador and Monsieur Tardieu.

With regard to your suggestion that the Allies should give a large order for the excess production of pork products until the end of April, as you state in the letter and as you explained to me in conversation, it is necessary to ascertain the storage capacity and secondly whether financial arrangements can be made to meet the requirements of the packers. Whilst the Allies are quite ready to fall in with the suggestion if it becomes practicable, it must be pointed out that although, as you say, food is food, beef and pork are not substitutes for bread, and particularly France and Italy, not to speak of Great Britain, require breadstuffs. Further, if this plan of purchasing these products became effective, it could not avail for substitutes for breadstuffs in April and May since the greater part of the products would not be ready for use till after those months. But we are anxious to make plain to you that this is, in the main, a question of making satisfactory arrangements.

The most serious part of your letter is the statement—which I quote—"We are entirely short of breadstuffs in the United States and I do not see how we can go on exporting at the present rate per month." We can hardly think that this is intended to mean that no breadstuffs will be available for shipment in April except the residue, if any, of the projected shipment for March. But in any event it is a statement of an alarming character, and we beg of you to inform us as soon as you possibly can whether we are to understand not only that

the promised shipment for April can not be made but that it must fall far short of that quantity.

It is imperative that we should immediately communicate with our respective Governments in order that they may consider the position in which they will find themselves if there is so serious a deficiency in the shipment of breadstuffs.

We are quite satisfied now as in the past that you have done and are anxious to do all that is possible to meet the requirements for breadstuffs in our countries, but we are anxious to ascertain where we stand at the present moment in relation to shipments for April and May.

Yours sincerely,

READING

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Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1918.

Have had to remove part of restrictions on consumption of meats as delay in securing some definite expression from Allied Governments threatens us with acute crisis in prices of livestock which would be disastrous to the whole Allied cause. Nothing I regret more than the necessity to allow any increase in consumption in these times but I could see no other solution.

We can supply any amount that the Allies will agree to take of meat products during the next two months. After that the seasonal slump in market arrivals of animals will make the situation most difficult to maintain unlimited supplies although we are prepared to go to any measure to try and fill their requirements. We must have however definite programme at first of each month at least sixty days in advance.

HOOVER

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Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, March 21, 1918.

DEAR LORD READING: At the inter-Allied conference last November a definite programme of cereal exports from the United States and elsewhere was agreed upon, and I attach a table showing this understanding.



The totals from the United States from December 1 to August 1 are:

	Tons
Wheat (or flour in terms of wheat)-----	900,000
Corn-----	1,350,000
Barley-----	400,000
Rye-----	580,000
Cereal Products-----	375,000
Total-----	3,605,000

Further, as it was strongly presented to the conference that the United States surplus of wheat was at that time already exhausted, it was agreed that the above wheat was to be considered an advance to be liquidated from Canada later in the year.

Up to the end of March there will have been placed at the disposal of the Allies approximately the following quantities as compared to the programme to that date:

	Actual	Programme	Surplus	Deficiency
Wheat (or flour in terms of wheat)-----	1,160,533	900,000	260,533	-----
Corn-----	207,899	535,000	-----	327,101
Barley-----	176,584	200,000	-----	23,416
Rye-----	120,599	280,000	-----	159,401
Cereal products-----	125,505	175,000	-----	49,495
Totals-----	1,791,120	2,090,000	260,533	559,413

Net deficiency: 298,880

As against this supply we have received some 16,000,000 bushels or 430,000 tons from Canada. The Canadian exports were agreed in the inter-Allied conference at 2,725,000 tons of wheat as from December 1. Their shipments of wheat (or flour reduced from wheat) have been:

To Europe—	
December-----	291,000
January-----	367,000
February-----	191,000
March-----	241,000
To United States-----	430,000
	1,520,000

They have therefore a balance to ship of about 1,200,000 tons (now estimated at 1,100,000).

Since the date that programme was agreed, two misfortunes have supervened:

*First:* Of the corn crop, only about one-half matured to merchantable quality.

*Second:* The wheat crop proves to have been about 40,000,000 bushels less than estimated by the Department of Agriculture at harvest time, and, in consequence, we had *no* export surplus of wheat at all although we have already exported from the United States and placed contracts for export of over 90,000,000 bushels above Canadian receipts.

We are now taking measures to reduce our wheat consumption to approximately 50 per cent of normal for the balance of the year and thus to afford some further wheat exports beyond that shipped at the end of March. This means our population will have to live on less than two pounds of wheat bread per week against over five pounds to Allied countries.

A prime difficulty has, however, been created in the internal distribution of our wheat supplies, for in extracting wheat to date the pressure has been unduly large in various sections, due to internal transportation conditions, and the further amounts we can abstract must come from certain areas. In order to rectify this situation and give further supplies we must consolidate Canadian supplies with our own. For instance we should ship by sea from the Pacific Northwest to the Allies and draw from Canada into our milling centers at Minneapolis and Lake ports. I understand that the Canadian surplus April 1 is about 1,100,000 tons, or say, 40,000,000 bushels. In order to organize the matter in our joint interest, I would suggest the following plan,—

That for every two bushels of wheat (or flour in terms of wheat) we export to the Allies and Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, from April 1, we should draw from Canada one bushel at such times and places as we may direct.

Our shipments of wheat (or flour in terms of wheat) have been:

January-----	305, 372 tons
February-----	298, 921 "
March-----	381, 571 "

I do not believe we can pour through our distributing machinery more than 350,000 tons per month on average, taking the whole transport problem in bulk as to the necessary receipt from the farms to centers and out again, et cetera.

To export 350,000 tons would mean that we need an intake from Canada of 175,000 tons, or 6,500,000 bushels per month. The Canadian surplus at April 1 would permit 250,000 tons direct export to the Allies and 175,000 to us per month for three months, or, until July 1. During this period there would be—provided railway transportation is available—a total of 600,000 tons of wheat per month from the United States and Canada. In addition it should be possible to ship 200,000 tons of corn and cereal products monthly, bringing the

Atlantic programme up to 800,000 tons for April, May and June, which means a net further shipment from us as from April 1, of 20,000,000 bushels wheat or of products therefrom. If it should prove with experience that we can do more, we will send the last grain.

You will realize that we have neither adequate authority nor can we feasibly erect exact machinery for control of distribution, therefore all these plans must be taken as intentions to the best of our ability.

It seems to us that under the very hard conditions we are imposing upon our own people that this can only be defended if severe restrictions are imposed upon Canadian consumption.

Yours faithfully,

[HERBERT HOOVER]

File No. 103.97/130a

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 28, 1918, 5 p. m.

78. Your 136.<sup>2</sup> Hotels requested limit service wheat products to two ounces per meal per person. Food Administration has authorized baking three-quarter pound loaf as conservation measure. People asked make it do work of pound loaf. After April 14 bakers must bake Victory bread containing at least 25 per cent wheat flour substitutes. Householders requested consume not over pound half wheat product per person per week.

HOOVER

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the British Food Controller (Rhondda)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1918.

At a special meeting in Washington to-day 500 leading hotel men from all parts of the country resolved to absolutely abolish the use of wheat products in their hotels until the next harvest in order that through their savings and their example shipments of wheat to the Allies may proceed without interruption.

HERBERT HOOVER

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (No. 7059) for Sheldon.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

File No. 103.97/127

*The Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon) to  
the Food Administrator (Hoover)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

LONDON, March 30, 1918.

[Received 11.41 a. m.]

139. Rhondda communicates following for you:

The willingness of the American people voluntarily to reduce their consumption of wheat products and the new measures you are taking to meet the emergency and provide the Allies with bread are deeply appreciated. Such self-sacrifice and whole-hearted effort inspire us with renewed determination.

[SHELDON]

Food Administrator's File

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Food  
Administrator (Hoover)*

WASHINGTON, March 30, 1918.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: We have been carefully considering your letter of March 21st, and during my recent visit to New York I discussed it with our representatives on the Wheat Export Company. Your proposals turn mainly on the supply of wheat available in Canada; and I have therefore thought it necessary to summon Mr. Stewart from Winnipeg in order that we may have the fullest and latest information at our disposal. He can not arrive until next week and I must therefore ask you to allow me to wait till then before I deal with the substance of your scheme.

In the meantime there are several points relating to the figures given in your letter where I find that there is some doubt or divergence in our information. It is very desirable to clear up these in order that we may as far as possible have an agreed statistical basis upon which to discuss what it is best to do.

1. After giving the programme of shipments agreed upon at the inter-Allied conference of November last, you say, "As it was strongly presented to the conference that the United States surplus of wheat was at the time already exhausted it was agreed that the above wheat" (i. e. 900,000 tons) "was to be considered an advance to be liquidated from Canada later in the year." Neither I nor my French or Italian colleagues find any trace of such an

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by the Ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State (No. 9290) for Hoover.



agreement in the documents of the conference. It would, indeed, have been inconsistent with the figures of the programme then set out. The total Canadian exportable surplus was at that time estimated at 3,200,000 tons. Out of this, 618,000 tons had already been exported before December 1st, and the programme put the exports from December 1st to August 1st at 2,725,000 tons, making a total of 3,343,000 tons. This shows clearly that at that time there could not have been any intention of repaying from Canada the 900,000 tons to be exported from the United States. The question was raised, so far as I know, for the first time, in your letter of December 29th.<sup>1</sup> We have done our best to meet your needs by sending 430,000 tons of wheat from Canada to the United States; but our ability to carry replacement further must necessarily depend upon the available supplies.

2. You next give the figures of the cereals placed at the disposal of the Allies up to the end of March as compared with the programme, showing a total net deficiency of 298,880 tons. In order to arrive at the *net* figure, the 430,000 tons of Canadian wheat should be deducted from the 1,160,633 tons of wheat placed at our disposal in the United States. It must also be remembered that the programme was a programme of *shipments*; and as there are some 400,000 tons of flour on the books of the Export Company still remaining to be shipped after March 31st, this amount also should be deducted for the purpose of comparison with the programme. Thus the net amount of wheat (or flour in the terms of wheat) shipped to the Allies up to the end of March is only 330,000 tons, and the net deficiency, as compared with the programme, is 1,128,000 tons instead of 298,880.

3. Our representatives find difficulty in agreeing to the figures given in the latter part of your letter for the shipments of wheat (or flour in terms of wheat) in January, February and March. Our figures for the shipments to the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Switzerland on a basis of 80 per cent milling are:—

January .....	268, 943 tons
February .....	279, 297 tons
March (approximate) .....	285, 000 tons

It is possible that your figures may include shipments to other countries.

4. In working out your programme you arrive at a shipment of 800,000 tons for April, May and June. It is necessary to bear in mind that this includes shipments to Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and must not therefore be taken as being all available for the United Kingdom, France and Italy.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

5. I may point out that your figures result in an export from Canada during April, May and June of 1,275,000 tons, whereas the figure which you have taken as representing the Canadian surplus is 1,100,000 tons. It appears very doubtful whether even this latter figure will be actually available; but, as I have already mentioned, I await further information on the Canadian position, and in the meantime I refrain from discussing it.

It would, I think, materially assist us in considering your proposals if it is possible for you to give any indication of the probable places and dates for delivering the supplies which you contemplate. I assume of course that you do not include in these supplies the flour which has already been assigned to the Export Company and is already awaiting shipment.

I need hardly say that I fully appreciate the difficulty of the wheat situation in the United States and the great efforts you are making to conserve supplies for the Allies and the neutrals, and I would beg you not to think that the questions which I raise upon your figures are intended by way of criticism. I am only anxious to remove any obscurity or misunderstanding as to the figures.

I would suggest that when we have the necessary materials a discussion might with advantage take place between the various interests concerned, including of course French and Italian representatives.

Believe me [etc.]

READING

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Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1918.

DEAR LORD READING: I am in receipt of your note of March 30.

1. As to the first paragraph, I am somewhat astonished, but the difference may arise from the fact that the meetings of the inter-Allied council, *per se*, were confined to general terms and all detailed discussions with regard to wheat took place with the Wheat Executive. I find abundant evidence in memoranda of the Wheat Executive of last autumn as to my statement of March 21 and furthermore, as you rightly state, it was confirmed in my letter to Mr. Robson of January 1. The exhaustion of the American surplus is repeatedly referred to and likewise the necessity of replacement of exports which were to be advanced pending the arrival of Argentine wheat.

2. As to the exportable surplus of Canada, I do think it is desirable that we should have some reliable figures on this subject. The Agricultural Department of Canada in January gave the total

wheat yield for 1917 as 233,743,000 bushels. I assume that the carry-over next year need be no larger than last; seed and human consumption will require 60,000,000 bushels, leaving available for export 173,000,000 bushels for the whole season. The total exports to March 1 are about 100,000,000 bushels, leaving a balance of some 70,000,000 bushels or nearly 2,000,000 tons. I am utterly unable to understand how the official statement could be reduced between 30 and 40 per cent. It is true we can all expect some reduction in official crop estimates—in the case of the American crop we had an actual reduction of 7 per cent—but a 30 or 40 per cent error seems incomprehensible and I assume that a revision of Canadian figures will find a much larger supply available.

3. As to the quantities referred to in my letter of March 21, if you will refer to the programme agreed upon you will observe that the advances to be made by the United States were to be a total of 900,000 tons of wheat after December 1, this being the entire allotted task of the United States and, as set out above, even this being replaceable from Canada and elsewhere. The actual exports of wheat (or flour in terms of wheat) from the first of December to the end of March from the United States for the Allies have been (our milling was originally 70 per cent, now 74 per cent—not 80 per cent) :

December.....	174, 169
January.....	305, 372
February.....	289, 287
March.....	339, 935
Total.....	1, 108, 763

Of this 1,108,763 tons, only 57,000 tons represent shipments to Switzerland, Belgium and Portugal, up to the end of February. This represents an excess of our promise of an advance against replacement by fully 150,000 tons. Against this we have had actual replacement of 430,000 tons of Canadian wheat as agreed, leaving an actual deficiency in returns to us of over 700,000 tons. I am however making no claims for replacement of this amount as we take it that we have saved this amount from consumption and therefore in accord with our assurance that we would ship everything we could save, the matter is ended.

4. We are making every effort humanly possible to reduce our consumption to a point that renders it possible to continue shipments and we do intend to continue shipments to the last grain that we can extract from our population. We must assume Canada will do the same. In this connection I would commend to the Allies the action of our leading hotels in stopping the use of wheat entirely—a practicable measure for even continental conditions as it bears upon the well-to-do population and not upon the poor.

5. The points at which we need ultimate delivery of further Canadian wheat will be at Minneapolis and Lake ports. The detailed routes and sources can be worked out later. The main point is, the arrangement proposed by me allows us to ship unreservedly from all points, which we can not do without such assured distribution to and consequent preservation of tranquility in our industrial population.

Yours faithfully,

[HERBERT HOOVER]

Food Administrator's File

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1918.

DEAR MR. HOOVER: I have to-day received a reply to the telegram which was despatched to London after the discussion on Thursday last of your proposals about wheat. I am glad to be able to tell you that the Wheat Executive agree to the supply of 2,000,000 bushels of Canadian wheat for the Buffalo mills in May, as a final allocation of Canadian wheat for this cereal year. They say that they are naturally reluctant that the supply of bulk wheat should be reduced, but they warmly appreciate the efforts you are making to increase the supply available for export in the coming months, and are therefore most anxious to assist as far as practicable in the solution of your distribution problem.

Yours sincerely,

READING

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1918.

MY DEAR LORD READING: With respect to your favor of April 16, I am glad to learn that the Wheat Executive agrees to the allocation of Canadian wheat.

I note, however, that you speak of this as a "final allocation". This is not exactly what was discussed at the time. The whole discussion centered on the May program from the seaboard. It was quite definitely decided that we would make an effort not to interfere with your May program, but that the whole question after June 1 was left open. I merely wish to make this point clear, as in that sense, the allocation is not final.

Faithfully yours,

[HERBERT HOOVER]



Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 4, 1918.

[No. 89.] Please inform Rhondda that I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by him in his cable to Lord Reading of 18th.<sup>1</sup> Also I am in agreement with his views as to the constantly disconcerting position in France and Italy.

Our reduction in wheat consumption now amounts to 60 per cent of normal and will I believe hold until harvest. This should permit our continued shipment of present programme in flour until July 1. We can maintain a very large meat programme steadily. After July 1 we will have a bad period in wheat until new harvest is generally available about middle of September although we hope to maintain some shipments. Present harvest prospects here, France and Italy if realized will permit relaxation of all bread restrictions except possibly dilution and even this might be reconsidered if harvest proves its maximum possibilities.

HOOVER

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*

[Telegram]

LONDON, May 8, 1918.

No. 160. Rhondda communicates following:

Many thanks for your No. 89 received through Sheldon. I am relieved to hear of the improved outlook and congratulate you most heartily upon the success of your untiring efforts on behalf of the Allies.

SHELDON

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1918.

Will you and Durand<sup>2</sup> go into the whole question of pork products imports into England from the United States with the English Food Controller with view to developing for us some kind of a positive programme month by month from now until the end of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> E. D. Durand, Food Administration representative at Paris and Rome, en route to his post.

September. It is necessary for us to know this in order to arrange conservation, storage and inland transportation. We are not particular if they find difficulty in giving any concise position if they will give us their minimum and their maximum monthly requirements for shipment from the United States as from April 1.

HERBERT HOOVER

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Mission of the Food Administrator to Europe—Conference of Food Controllers at London: Resolution of July 29, Providing for an Inter-Allied Food Council, Committee of Representatives, Executives, and Program Committees

File No. 103.97/211a

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1918, 7 p. m.

Will you kindly inform Sheldon, Durand, Simms and others interested that do not believe any conclusive program of next year's food supplies to Allies can be arrived at before the middle of July when all our crops are defined and our animal resources recounted. In this view I propose to come myself to Europe with technical staff to consider the whole situation with our European food colleagues.

[HOOVER]

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File No. 841.50/102

*The Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

LONDON, May 20, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 8.40 p. m.]

No. 168. After further investigation we report on British meat situation as follows:

Each adult has four meat coupons weekly, before May 5 only three could be used for beef or mutton, since then only two, and others are chiefly used for bacon and hams, hereafter called pork. May 5 value coupon for bacon was raised from 5 to 8 ounces and for ham from 5 to 12 ounces. This means temporarily large use pork. May 5 value coupon for beef or mutton was raised from 5 to 6 pence worth and May 19 to 8 pence, so quantity now obtainable about the same as before May 5. Present price beef about 16 pence per pound. These increases in rations due to overcrowding cold storage especially

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by the Secretary of State, No. 7836.

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted by the Chargé in Great Britain to the Secretary of State (No. 10143) for Hoover.

with pork due to large recent arrivals, these representing about 65,000 tons of beef, mutton and equal quantity pork monthly. British Ministry were considering mutton [*cutting*] pork ration after July 15 to about quantity before May 5 with some further increase in beef, mutton ration, presumably figuring on civilian consumption thereafter for several months of about 80,000 tons monthly of beef, mutton and 25,000 pork. Army takes 10,000 tons pork monthly. Tentative programme of contemplated import from United States, about 15,000 tons pork monthly July and August, 25,000 September and 35,000 October and November, also 5,000 monthly from Canada. Proposed increased beef ration after July would be met by increased home slaughter. Production of beef to be forty or possibly only thirty thousand tons monthly besides mutton. Ministry says British civilians now get and during summer will get practically no North American beef and comparatively little South American. Future British beef imports from United States depend on proportion army beef drain from there which depends on shipping programme. Army takes 46,000 tons carcass beef monthly all imported. Some Food Ministry men anticipated reduction of present 32,500 tons monthly all from United States. Italy and France together import about 42,000 tons beef monthly from South America for army use chiefly.

Durand told British the programme contemplated after July seemed great inconvenience your pork production conservation programme and American conditions of production and stocks of which he submitted statistics prepared for you before he left. We suggested adjustment of [programme] to take approximately 50,000 tons pork monthly from United States even if at same time home supplies permitted increased beef, mutton ration. Ministry say they are anxious to meet American conditions and will consider possibility increasing pork programme above described, however they doubt willingness of consumers to take large quantity hard cured pork, in which case possibility of large orders during summer would depend on use refrigerator ships for mild cured product. We pointed out that refrigerator space so far as used for civilian beef could be used for pork if necessary, part of army beef requirements could be prohibited [*provided by*] home production, releasing refrigerator tonnage. They are inquiring further regarding probable shipping situation. They will also shortly report on lard programme.

Lusk and Chittenden<sup>1</sup> who are here insist armies and also British civilians get far too little fat and expect Scientific Commission so to

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<sup>1</sup> Graham Lusk and R. H. Chittenden, United States representatives on the Inter-Allied Commission on Scientific Alimentation; see letter of Jan. 21, 1918, from Dr. Taylor of the Food Administration to the Counselor for the Department of State, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 665-666.

report. They think you are justified in insisting on preference pork over beef in our exports.

Also expressed some dissatisfaction with pork prices though admitting consumers have at start fairly absorbed recently increased ration at present prices. We told them appreciably lowered prices are inconsistent with your promises to farmers.

British Ministry still anxious to secure storage for pork at American seaboard and say would increase purchases if storage available and if credits for advance buying granted. We told them packers could probably hold product if orders were placed or even if definite programme involving sufficient purchasers later were assured. British realize need of definite orders or programme but say you should appreciate advantages from uncertainty regarding attitude of consumers though [*toward*] hard cure regardless ocean transport and storage facilities here.

We suggest you inquire from packers regarding quantities pork hard cured under British instructions with view to possible rescinding of instructions. Also request you cable Sheldon official stock figures cured and frozen pork as of May 1.

We believe France and Italy might be influenced to take more pork for either civilian or army use especially during winter; unless you otherwise direct Durand will urge them to do so.

Finally we suggest you constantly emphasize to A[llied] P[rovisions] E[xport] C[ommission] and Meats and Fats Executive your desires and American situation. They apparently have not fully apprehended relation your pork programme to relative consumption beef and pork here and considerable pressure may be necessary, and it is especially desirable in general that A.P.E.C. report to the authorities here your point of view on all situations, as authorities here must be very largely guided by the reports of their own agent.

[SHELDON]

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Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1918.

95. Your 168. Present export of beef from the United States represents about what can be counted on. It can be continued and gradually somewhat increased as freezer facilities enlarge. It would not embarrass our problems if beef export were somewhat de-



creased but we do not desire it and should be kept informed in advance.

Pork situation is very different. Stocks are large and prospects of increased production good. Necessary in order to hold this favorable situation that we have steady and large orders particularly in fall and winter months. Question of how cured or whether frozen is entirely question of transport under weather conditions. Mild cure during summer will require refrigerator transport.

Appreciably lower prices for beef or pork are inconsistent with our promises to farmers and with continuation production on present scale. On general question we are clear that we must insist that on account our production situation United States meat exports should continue to be largely pork.

Tentative pork program 10,000 tons British Army, 15,000 British civilian and perhaps 15,000 French and Italian civilian is small but would not embarrass us for summer months but prefer your suggestion of 50,000 tons monthly. But by fall desirable that very much heavier pork orders be made which we should like to see at about 100,000 tons monthly for all Allied requirements. Any part of this may be frozen or mild cure if refrigeration available. United States packers can continue storage of accumulated pork on this side if regular program assured.

Orders of shipment through June recently placed by Allied Provisions Export Commission total about 120,000 tons pork. No promises made beyond June shipment nor beyond this order. Packers expressly told we are not informed beyond that date.

Official figures commercial stock frozen pork 112,000,000 pounds, cut pork meats 800,000,000 which is well above usual domestic demand, but these stocks not highly significant except to show our ability to respond to emergency calls. Practically we expect to be able to fill future pork requisitions by Allies even if larger than March and April shipments.

We will see Allied Provisions Export Commission on this side. Believe their views coincide with ours.

Please ask Durand proceed France, Italy and attempt to ascertain facts as to this situation fully before July 1 at about which time Cotton and I expect to come over to consult on whole food program.

HOOPER

File No. 103.97/222

*The Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

LONDON, June 1, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received 12.12 p. m.]

No. 176. British pork programme was practically settled at 35,000 tons per month up to November 1, from then at 85,000 tons. The sole questions remaining to be settled are finance and shipping. As far as finance goes, you could possibly bring pressure on Oscar Crosby to procure same but the Ministry of Shipping yesterday turned down Ministry of Food's estimated requirements after October because they could not guarantee sufficient shipping towards end of 1918. If you do not adopt suggestions in Ministry of Food's cable No. 1258<sup>2</sup> to Granet<sup>3</sup> and if you do desire immediate decision on pork programme for remainder 1918, as outlined above, can you bring any pressure on shipping authorities for the provision of sufficient tonnage? I think that Italians would purchase 15,000 tons pork monthly from the United States of America to be stored there until they can find shipping thinking they might have better chances of securing shipping if these purchases were already made in America. Suggest you sound Oscar Crosby on finances for this if you approve this plan. Have wired Durand urging him press French to take large share pork products. In your cable No. 95, do you include lard in your estimate of pork products?

[SHELDON]

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the Food Administration Representative at London (Sheldon)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1918.

Answering No. 176, British pork program unsatisfactory but think wise to leave further argument as to program until I come over. Our cable 95, lard not included in figures given.

HOOVER

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by the Chargé in Great Britain to the Secretary of State, for Hoover.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> Sir William Guy Granet, British Director-General of Movements and Railways, member of the British War Mission to the United States.

Food Administrator's File

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Food Administrator (Hoover)*

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. HOOVER: I have just received a telegram from Mr. Balfour asking me to convey to you an invitation from His Majesty's Government to be their guest during your forthcoming visit to England.

I hope that you will feel that this invitation is from the British people as much as from the British Government, and I trust that you may be able to authorize me to inform Mr. Balfour that you will be able to accept it.

Believe me [etc.]

READING

Food Administrator's File

*The Food Administrator (Hoover) to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1918.

MY DEAR LORD READING: I greatly appreciate the kindness of your note of June 12 and I shall be honoured indeed to be the guest of His Majesty's Government.

I do not expect to remain in Europe more than a fortnight as I believe that will be sufficient time to discuss food programmes for next year, so far as they can be determined in advance.

I have a feeling that a personal conference with the food administrators abroad would enable us to co-ordinate our problems of production, transportation and supply to better advantage than last year, which has been more or less an experimental and experience-gaining period.

Yours faithfully,

[HERBERT HOOVER]

File No. 103.97/296

*The Food Administrator's Secretary (Strauss) to the Acting Food Administrator (Rickard)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

LONDON, July 27, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received July 28, 12.30 a. m.]

229. Please give following joint resolution of the Food Controllers of the United States, France, Italy and Great Britain wide publicity:

Resolved, that while the increased production of the United States renders it possible to relax some of the restrictions, which have been

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted by the Ambassador in Great Britain (No. 654) to the Secretary of State, for Rickard.

borne with peculiar hardship upon all our peoples, yet it is absolutely necessary that rigid economy and elimination of waste in the consumption and handling of all foodstuffs, as well as increased production, should be maintained throughout the European Allied countries and in North America. It is only by such economy and elimination of waste that the transportation of the necessary men and supplies from North America to the European front can be accomplished and that stocks of foodstuffs can be built up in North America as an insurance against the ever present danger of harvest failure and the possible necessity for large and emergency drafts to Europe. We cannot administer the food problem on the basis of one year's war. We must prepare for its long continuance if we are to insure absolute victory.

STRAUSS

Food Administrator's File

*Resolutions Adopted by the American, British, French, and Italian Food Controllers (Hoover, Clynes, Boret, Crespi), July 29, 1918<sup>1</sup>*

The Food Controllers of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States having met together to examine their respective requirements of food in relation to the supplies available, are of opinion that the time has now arrived when further steps should be taken to co-ordinate the food programmes of each of the Allied countries in the light of:—

- (a) Their import necessities,
- (b) Tonnage available,
- (c) Finance, and
- (d) Elimination of competition in purchase and transport.

(2) The aim of such co-ordination should be to preserve a proper balance between the needs of the Allied countries, not only in respect of single commodities or groups of commodities as has hitherto been the case, but in regard to their food supplies as a whole and to secure the purchase and transport of overseas supplies.

(3) They have therefore agreed, subject to the approval of their respective Governments, upon the formation of an Inter-Allied Food Council, which shall be composed of the Food Controllers of the four Allied countries above-mentioned, which shall meet every three months, or as often as may be necessary, and shall within the limits of the powers conferred on it by the respective Governments agree upon a programme and method of food imports embracing the needs of all the Allied countries and determine questions of common interest and policy.

<sup>1</sup> According to telegram No. 783, Aug. 1, from the Ambassador in Great Britain (File No. 600.119/1093), these resolutions were part of a memorandum which was preceded, as a preamble, by the American memorandum on programs in general, transmitted to the Chargé in Great Britain in telegram No. 184, July 12, *post*, p. 597.



(4) They have further agreed that the four Food Controllers should each appoint an equal number of representatives to form a body called the "Inter-Allied Food Council Committee of Representatives," having its headquarters in London.

The Committee of Representatives shall, with the approval of the Food Council, elect an independent chairman, from outside their own members, who shall have no vote.

The Inter-Allied Maritime Council, the Inter-Allied Finance Council, and the Inter-Allied Scientific Commission will each be asked to appoint a delegate to assist the Committee of Representatives. When the Committee of Representatives finds that the interests of other countries are involved they may invite representatives of these countries to attend.

(5) The functions of the Committee of Representatives shall be, subject to the direction of their Food Controllers, to secure and co-ordinate the programmes of the various food executives (specified below) dealing with particular classes of food-stuffs, and to consolidate these programmes into a general food programme for all foods and all Allied countries; to act as the sole channel of communication as to general policy between these executives and the Inter-Allied Maritime Council and Inter-Allied Finance Council; to adjust the food programme from time to time according to circumstances; to supervise and ensure the purchase and shipping programme and to generally carry on the work of the Council in accordance with the powers delegated to it by the respective Food Controllers.

(6) The following committees or executives are set up or continued:

- (a) Wheat Executive,
- (b) Meats and Fats Executive,
- (c) Sugar Programme Committee,
- (d) Oil Seed Programme Committee

and such other committees as may become necessary from time to time.

These executives and committees shall from time to time formulate programmes for the equitable provision and distribution of imports among the different countries and shall cooperate in directing the execution of such programmes, subject to the policy set out by the Food Controllers through the Committee of Representatives. These executives and committees are to be constituted of equal numbers of representatives from England, France, Italy, and the United States.

*Confirmed:*

J. R. CLYNES  
HERBERT HOOVER  
BORET  
CRESPI

COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ALLIED POWERS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIAL RAW MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS: THE MUNITIONS COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVES AND PROGRAM COMMITTEES

British-American Tank Agreement, January 22—Participation of the United States in the Inter-Allied Metals Conference—Consideration of the Formation of a Munitions Council—Plans for a System of Program Committees; Recommendations that the United States be Represented on Them—American Proposal for a Tin Executive

File No. 800.24/44

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 23, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 4.50 p. m.]

3082. The Ministry of Armament informs me that the British Government desires to hold a conference in Paris as soon as possible for the purpose of discussing measures for allocation of chrome, silicate of calcium, tungsten filaments, aluminum, lead and munitions. Before replying to the British Government the Ministry of Armament wishes to know whether United States will be represented at this conference.

SHARP

File No. 800.24/49a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 6, 1918, 7 p. m.

3148. Your 3082, January 23, 3 p. m., and 3143, February 4, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Secretary of War has been consulted and he approves Department's instruction to you to confer with General Pershing and to request him to assign one of his staff to attend conference mentioned. Report whom General Pershing designates.<sup>2</sup>

POLK

File No. 763.72/8912a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>3</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 13, 1918, 6 p. m.

6557. Upon the return of the House mission from Europe, the conclusions of the munitions committee of the inter-Allied conference held in Paris in November, 1917, were submitted to the War Depart-

<sup>1</sup> The latter not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See telegram No. 3530 from the Ambassador in France, Apr. 5, *post*, p. 562.

<sup>3</sup> See last paragraph for instruction to repeat to Rome and Paris.

ment for its consideration with the request by this Department that it be advised of the decision of the War Department respecting these resolutions so that this might be communicated by this Department to the Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy.

The Department is now in receipt of the following from the Secretary of War:

(1) As the result of a careful consideration of the matter by this Department, it is requested that the Governments concerned be advised that the Government of the United States is in entire accord with the general principles of the resolutions adopted by the conference referred to, and that it will cooperate in carrying out, to as full extent as possible, the general program outlined by this conference.

(2) The resolutions of the Paris conference contemplated that in case of the approval, by the Governments of the three great Powers concerned, of the general principles of the resolutions adopted by this conference, the precise measures of manufacture and supply should be concerted by a technical commission composed of representatives of these three Powers.

(3) Upon the receipt, at an early date, from Generals Bliss and Pershing, of certain recommendations relative to the organization of this commission, this Department will advise you as to the tentative basis for this organization which is regarded as desirable, in order that this information may be communicated to the Governments concerned.

You will please formally advise the Government to which you are accredited in the sense of the foregoing. Repeat to Rome as No. 1075 and Paris as No. 3176.

LANSING

File No. 800.24/53

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

No. 8076

LONDON, January 22, 1918.

[Received February 23.]

SIR: With reference to my cipher telegram No. 8207 of January 9,<sup>1</sup> communicating the agreement regarding the joint manufacture of tanks by the United States and British Governments, and your telegram No. 6303 of January 18,<sup>1</sup> authorizing me on behalf of our Government to sign the said agreement, I have the honor to transmit herewith the original document which His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and I signed this afternoon. There are also enclosed two photographic copies of the agreement.

I have [etc.]

WALTER HINES PAGE

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

[Enclosure]

*Agreement between the American and British Governments for the Joint Manufacture of Tanks*

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of His Britannic Majesty, being desirous of cooperating in the use of their respective resources for the production of the war machines known as the tanks, and having considered the joint recommendation made to them by Lieutenant Colonel A. G. Stern, C.M.G. and Major J. A. Drain, U.S.R., whom they had appointed as their Commissioners to investigate the possibilities of such joint production, the undersigned, duly authorised to that effect by their respective Governments, have agreed upon the following articles:—

1. The above-mentioned Commissioners are authorised by the respective Governments—

(1) To build a factory in France, the cost of which is to be defrayed in equal parts by the contracting Governments. The factory shall be of sufficient capacity to produce three hundred completed tanks per month and capable of being extended to produce at least twelve hundred tanks per month. The materials required for the construction of the factory shall be obtained in France and in England. The unskilled labour for the erection of the factory shall be supplied by the British Government. Skilled labour shall be supplied by the British or by the United States Government as the Commissioners may elect.

(2) To arrange for the production of, and to produce, fifteen hundred tanks during the year 1918, or as many more as may be required and authorised by the respective Governments, and to arrange for the provision of the components for these tanks in the United States and Great Britain substantially as follows:—

In the United States: Engines complete, with starter and clutch, radiator, fan and piping, silencer, electric lighting, dynamo and battery, propeller shaft, complete transmission, including main gear-box, brakes, roller sprockets, gear shifting and brake control, track links and pins, rear track sprockets, hub and shafts, front idler hub and shafts, track roller, track spindles and bushings.

In Great Britain: Bullet and bomb-proof plates, structural members, track shoes and rollers, guns, machine guns and mountings, ammunition racks and ammunition.

2. The respective Governments undertake to give the necessary priority in respect of material, labour, shipping, and other requirements to enable the programme to be carried out in the most expeditious manner.



3. It is understood that the tanks produced by the factory are to be allocated between the United States, France and Great Britain according to a determination to be reached later between the Governments of the three countries, provided that the first six hundred tanks produced shall be allocated to the United States Government, and provided further that the latter and the British Government shall each take one half of the number of tanks not taken by the French Government, unless unequal allocation between them shall be subsequently agreed upon.

4. The price which shall be charged to the French, British and United States Governments, should there be an unequal allocation between the two latter, shall be five thousand pounds sterling per tank, which price shall be subject to adjustment at the close of the operations occurring under this agreement, and the liquidation of all assets upon a basis of actual cost, such actual cost to include no charge for overhead by either Government.

5. The capital necessary to carry out this programme shall be supplied in equal parts by the United States and British Governments. Expenditure in France shall in the first instance be paid by the British Government.

Materials purchased in Great Britain shall be paid for by the British Government and those purchased in the United States of America shall be paid for by the United States Government.

An adjustment of the accounts shall be made every six months.

6. It is further agreed that the United States Government shall replace the steel provided by the British Government for armour plate. The replacement shall be in the form of ship plates and shall be made on or about the date of delivery of armour plate to the factory, on the basis of ton per ton, the necessary allowance for difference in value to be made in the adjustment of the accounts.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE at London in duplicate the 22nd day of January, 1918.

[SEAL] WALTER HINES PAGE

[SEAL] ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

File No. 103.96/421

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 5, 1918.

[Received April 6, 4.30 a. m.]

3530. War Trade Board [from McFadden]:

No. 31. [There] is permanent Inter-Allied Metal Committee, Paris, of advisory character. Committee devotes itself to develop-

ment of production and distribution of metal supplies in accordance with requirements of the several Allies, always taking into consideration conservation and economic employment of tonnage. Committee further undertakes to prevent competition between Allies in purchasing. Metals considered are wolfram, emery, antimony, chrome ore, etc. American representative on this committee has been General C. C. Williams who is returning United States, and General Pershing has requested me to represent him thereon. As War Trade Board directly interested in these commodities, believe we should be represented thereon or have direct connection therewith, but before accepting wish know if such action on my part would meet your approval. Please show Woolley. McFadden.

SHARP

File No. 103.96/457

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 15, 1918.

[Received April 16, 7.07 a. m.]

3621. War Trade Board [from McFadden]:

No. 38. Our No. 31. Inter-Allied Metal Conference calls attention to urgency of American cooperation in control of supply, price and distribution of wolfram.

[1] United States is requested to agree to first resolution adopted at meeting February 21, attended by General Williams, at which England, Italy agreed to make no purchases of wolfram in Portugal and Spain, leaving representative of French Government as sole purchaser Portuguese and Spanish wolfram.

(2) United States is requested to license no imports of wolfram ore from Portugal and Spain, leaving this production exclusively for France who will allocate agreed quantity of same obtained from this source to England, Italy.

(3) United States is requested to agree to following distribution of Chinese and Latin American wolfram. China production is allocated two-sixths to United States, three-sixths to England, one-sixth to France. South and Central American production is allocated two-sixths to United States, one-sixth to England, three-sixths to France. Italy to be supplied in both instances from French spare. Wolfram production in colonies to be reserved exclusively in each case to mother country. United States to cease exporting wolfram ore or metal to France and England.

(4) Central inter-Allied office to be established in various producing countries to fix prices and effect distribution wolfram.

Advise promptly your consent or otherwise to these four proposals. It appears to us that if you consent to this arrangement in principle,

then necessary price control would be secured by refusing to grant licenses to importers of Chinese and Latin American wolfram who make contracts exceeding inter-Allied prices. McFadden.

SHARP

File No. 103.96/483h

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 19, 1918, 4 p. m.

3609. For your information supplementing cable today from Woolley for McFadden,<sup>2</sup> the following explanatory statement is sent at the request of Baruch, Chairman War Industries Board.

With reference to Inter-Allied Metals Conference, negotiations have already been undertaken here under direction of War Industries [Board] chairman with representatives of Great Britain and France for international arrangements controlling procurement and distribution for Allied requirements of tin, tungsten, and various other raw materials, substantial proportions of which must be procured from neutral countries. It is regarded as exceedingly important that these questions be dealt with in direct negotiations here instead of through committees in Paris or London. As soon as arrangements are agreed upon, it is intended to intrust their execution to a joint committee in London or Paris. Any suggestion or pressure that can be used to this end will facilitate the result which we all desire and which is highly necessary. Delay in securing the assent of the Allied Governments to these arrangements is affecting and will affect military programs and place additional financial burdens upon our shoulders.

LANSING

File No. 103.96/457

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

3692. For McFadden [from War Trade Board]:

No. 44. Embassy's 3530, April 5, your 31, and Embassy's 3621, April 15, your 38. War Trade Board authorizes you or your nominee to act as representative of the War Trade Board upon Inter-Allied Metals Committee to act for the Board in connection with any matters pertaining specially to the licensing of imports or exports of metals. In this connection, however, you should be ad-

<sup>1</sup>The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, No. 7344, for Sheldon (File No. 103.96/491a).

<sup>2</sup>Not printed.

vised that the War Industries Board, of which Baruch is chairman, has full authority and responsibility for conducting all transactions pertaining to the procurement of metals and minerals.

Baruch fears that the Metals Conference might negotiate and decide without his knowledge or approval problems other than those relating to wolfram and chrome. This of course would be embarrassing and might possibly confuse negotiations now proceeding in Washington which Baruch prefers to continue here.

Under these circumstances, you should continue in the Conference, acting for us so far as questions relating to import and export licensing are concerned, and reporting all other transactions to Mr. Baruch through us for his information. You should use your discretion in explaining situation to the Conference.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/9770

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1918.

[Received April 29.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government has reminded me that the inter-Allied conference which met at Paris in December, last, decided to create an Inter-Allied Munitions Council whose headquarters shall be at Paris. The various other inter-Allied committees which it was decided to organize at that time being now in operation, it appears to be indispensable to constitute without further delay the Inter-Allied Munitions Committee which is to examine mainly the best apportionment of the common resources with respect to the production of all that refers to the material made of steel or other metals and of all that relates to chemical industries.

It had been suggested in Paris that the representatives of each nation should be the Minister of Munitions, assisted by three persons, one of whom could, with advantage, be a representative either of the General Staff or of the Ministry of War.

The representative of the United States at the Paris conference having declared that he was without the necessary powers to concur in the constitution of the committee, but having indicated, at the same time, that he would refer the question to his Government with his favorable recommendation, I am instructed and now have the honor to beg Your Excellency kindly to acquaint me with the decision reached in this matter by the Government of the United States.

If, as my Government deems it safe to hope, the American Government should wish to join in the labors of the committee, it would be well to proceed, as soon as possible, to the designation of its represent-



atives, as the first meeting of the committee will be held in Paris during the first half of next month, the date to be set by common accord.

It is needless to say that the Federal Secretary having charge of munitions may be represented by any person whom he may choose to designate, as was done in the case of the tonnage committee.

I should be thankful to Your Excellency if you will kindly enable me to report to my Government, at the earliest possible date, the action taken on my request and to give it the names of the American delegates appointed to participate in the labors of the Inter-Allied Munitions Committee.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 800.88/328

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

LONDON, May 6, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received 7.15 p. m.]

9877. For President Wilson from Stevens:

In reporting to you the resolutions adopted by the Allied Maritime Transport Council,<sup>1</sup> I stated that I would later send you fuller information in relation to recommendation of the Council that the United States should be represented on each of the Allied executives or program committees now existing or to be constituted for the purpose of agreeing upon the quantities of imports to be brought into Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States. This is the subject of the present cablegram.

When the inter-Allied conference in which Colonel House participated, held at Paris in November and December, 1917, decided upon the council [*creation*] of the Allied Maritime Transport Council it also resolved that for the purpose of adjusting the import requirements of the four Associated Governments to the capacity of the available tonnage, there should be formed Allied bodies modeled after the Wheat Executive to estimate and agree upon import requirements of the four countries and that the United States should be represented on these bodies.

It is in pursuance of this instruction from the Paris conference that the Allied Maritime Transport Council has recommended the creation of a sufficient number of Allied executives or program committees to cover all import requirements of the four countries and has further recommended that the United States should have a representative on each of such executives or program committees.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 512.

As stated in my previous report, I refrained from voting on the resolution containing these recommendations because I thought that in the absence of instructions from my Government I ought not to take any official position in regard to the matter. My personal view, however, is that the creation of the proposed Allied bodies is essential to the successful working out of the plan of reducing import requirements within the carrying capacity of the tonnage available and apportioning this tonnage justly among the four nations. I also believe that representation of the United States on these bodies is essential to their effectiveness and would be advantageous to our Government.

It is contemplated that each executive or program committee will deal with one or more classes of imports such as wheat, meat and fats, sugar, vegetable oils, wool, cotton, etc. The executives or program committees are to be composed of representatives of the Associated Governments. It will be the duty of the representative of each Government to present a program of imports into his country of the commodity in question. Then all the representatives, after thoroughly studying together and mutually criticising these programs, are to agree upon a joint program. The agreement, of course, will not be concluded until after the assent thereto of the proper authority of the several Governments. When the various import programs have been agreed to in this way they will be submitted to the Allied Maritime Transport Council in order that it may recommend the necessary division and allocation of tonnage. In case the programs of imports agreed to in the manner described should still require more tonnage than is available, the Allied Maritime [Transport] Council, with aid of the several Allied executives or program committees, will have to consider and recommend the best way of meeting the deficit.

Among the existing executives the most effectively organized is the Wheat Executive. That executive has had a record of successful accomplishment extending over many months and everyone recognizes the importance of its services to the Allies but it is not necessary that all the new Allied bodies should be patterned closely after the Wheat Executive. All that is required for the purpose of the Allied Maritime Transport Council is that there should be joint Allied consideration of an agreement upon the import requirements of the four Associated nations. That is why the term program committee is used as a possible description of the proposed bodies. I agree with my colleagues on the Allied Maritime Transport Council in thinking that in order to deal effectively with an extremely serious deficit of tonnage, it is necessary, among other things, that the Associated Governments should consider together through technically competent representatives, their several import

requirements, commodity by commodity, with a view to agreeing upon joint programs which, while providing for the essential war and civilian needs of the several countries, will reduce as far as possible the demands upon tonnage for these purposes. The plan I have the synopsis of is [designed] to provide the machinery for accomplishing the desired result.

The advantage to the United States from participation in the proposed plan is the opportunity that will be afforded to examine and discuss the import programs of the other countries so as to make sure (1) that the demands upon tonnage resulting therefrom are not unjustly great and (2) that the imports of those countries to be brought from the United States are not excessive in view of the requirements for supplying the United States and its people with the commodities so to be taken from the United States for use of the other countries.

In case you should approve of the proposed plan, it is desirable that the American representatives should be appointed and begin work as speedily as possible, as it is necessary that the various import programs should be agreed to and the allocation of tonnage made as early in the summer as practicable. Since the War Trade Board has had charge of the reduction of imports for the United States, it might be desirable to have it represented on the Allied executives or program committees in case you should decide to have the United States participate in carrying out the proposed plan. In case you approve the proposed plan, I will send you a list of existing executives and those that are proposed with full details concerning them. Stevens.

PAGE

File No. 103.96/547

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*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 13, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 8.40 p. m.]

3874. War Trade Board [from McFadden]:

No. 91. Attention of Woolley for Baruch. As a result of conference with Loucheur, Minister of Munitions, today, they state they will make no definite decision in connection with your proposal at present for the reason that the Minister of Munitions intends sending immediately a commission to Washington for the purpose of discussing with you all subjects relating to munitions, including distribution of raw materials. Therefore, before making definite decision, they prefer to await arrival and the receipt of recommendations and report of commission. McFadden.

SHARP

File No. 800.24/57

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 13, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received May 14, 3 a. m.]

3875. For Crosby from Cravath:

No. 230. Both French and British Governments are very anxious that proposed Inter-Allied Munitions Council should be organized as promptly as possible in order to insure early settlement of important questions, including more adequate provision for munition needs of Italy. Loucheur has received no answer to his cable on the subject communicated to our Government through French Ambassador about April 15.<sup>1</sup> Meantime, French, British and Italian Governments have made their designations who are: Churchill, Minister of Munitions, Sir Charles Ellis, Layton [of Ministry of Munitions], and also a representative of the War Office. French and Italians have designated representatives of substantially corresponding rank; it is hoped that corresponding designation will be made by our Government if principle of organization approved at Washington. It is especially desired that our delegation shall include one representative permanently resident in Paris.

If principle of our representation approved, suggest advisability of early organization with temporary attendance on behalf of our Government by General Pershing representatives, and by representatives of our Council<sup>2</sup> and Maritime Council.

SHARP

File No. 103.96/557

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 15, 1918.

[Received May 16, 12 p. m.]

3902. War Trade Board [from McFadden], attention Woolley for Baruch, War Industries Board:

No. 95. A formal meeting of the Inter-Allied Metal Conference was called today by the French Minister of Munitions. The Conference was attended by official [delegates] of the French, British, Italian and United States Governments. The particular subject under discussion at the conference was the supply, distribution, etc., of wolfram.

We were requested to present the reply of the United States in connection with the recommendation of the Conference of February 21 as described in our cable No. 38<sup>3</sup> which has since been approved

<sup>1</sup>The French Ambassador's note, actually dated Apr. 27, is printed, *ante*, p. 565.

<sup>2</sup>Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance.

<sup>3</sup>*Ante*, p. 563.



by the Associated Governments, other than ourselves. We replied that the United States preferred to [reserve] its decision in connection with the said recommendations, both as regards wolfram and all other metals, pending a conference of delegates of the Associated Governments for the purpose of discussing the subject, which we desired should be held in Washington. It was the sense of the meeting, in view of the fact that it would be impossible to hold a conference of this character in the immediate future, that therefore the United States should provisionally approve the recommendations of February 21 in connection with wolfram, for the reason (1) in order to avoid competition between the agents of the respective Associated Governments in the producing markets, such as Portugal, Bolivia and China; (2) it was felt that the distribution and allocation for wolfram, as recommended in the resolutions of February 21, was on an economical and scientific basis as regards the distribution and employment of tonnage.

The British and French delegates were of opinion that an increase in the price basis f.o.b. of wolfram in such markets as Portugal, Bolivia, China, etc., would not lead to an increase in production and Sir [Leonard] Llewellyn was of the opinion that it would probably have the reverse effect in certain markets. It was suggested by the British delegates that the world's production of wolfram be geographically divided for the purpose of effecting purchasing without competition, leaving the question of subsequent allocation of same entirely separate to be later determined. The French delegates, supported by the British delegates, expressed the desire to be the exclusive buyers of wolfram in the Portuguese market, and further requested that the entire Portuguese production of wolfram should be allocated to France. The British delegates supported by the French suggested that all purchases of wolfram in Bolivia, or other countries in South America, should be effected by agents of the War Industries Board, and the question of subsequent allocation of same to be later determined.

Our reply to both the British and French was that we were not authorized to either approve or disapprove any of the above suggestions, but we again stated that it was the desire of the War Industries Board to invite an immediate discussion of subject, not only of wolfram, but of all other metals heretofore covered by the Inter-Allied Metal Conference at Washington, and in consequence of same the following resolution was approved:

The Inter-Allied Metal Conference at the suggestion of the American delegate recommend that a meeting of the delegates of the dif-

ferent inter-Allied Governments be held with the least possible delay at Washington in order to examine all questions dealing with non-ferrous metals and alloys.

McFadden.

SHARP

File No. 800.24/58a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 23, 1918, 6 p. m.*

7911. For Cravath from Crosby:

Treasury No. 186. Your cables May 12<sup>1</sup> and 13 from Paris relating to Munitions Council. Had conference last night with Baruch and Stettinius. Latter will take the matter up with the Secretary of War today and will recommend American representation along the lines indicated in your despatches. He believes, however, that no decision can be made until the matter can be presented to the President.

LANSING

File No. 103.96/621a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 25, 1918, 6 p. m.*

7942. For Sheldon [from Woolley, War Trade Board]:

No. 561. Baruch has handed us following:

April 8 War Industries Board submitted to British Embassy here definite proposal for establishment tin executive in London and for controlling the procurement and distribution of tin to meet requirements of United States and Allies. British Embassy and British War Mission asked for authority from their Government to come to agreement with War Industries Board along lines of this proposal. It is regarded as essential that the general plan must be settled by direct negotiations here instead of in London. When general principles determined it is intended to entrust their execution to an inter-Allied central bureau in London. Support this plan urgently explaining necessity for granting immediate authority to British Embassy and British War Mission to conclude agreement here with War Industries Board which has sole authority to negotiate for this country.

Any assistance you can render Baruch will be greatly appreciated by War Trade Board. Woolley.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 800.88/142

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *May 25, 1918.*

[*Received 10 p. m.*]

10246. To Hurley, Gay, McAdoo, McCormick and Hoover from Stevens:

Ship Mission No. 186. Referring to my Embassy No. 9877 of May 4 [6] to President Wilson and to Board's Navy No. 118.<sup>1</sup> The British War Cabinet [has] adopted the recommendation of the Allied Maritime Transport Council and of the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance, that Allied committees should be constituted immediately for the purpose of adjusting Allied programs of imports and purchases, and has ordered the various governmental agencies specially concerned with particular classes of imports to name British representatives for the appropriate Allied committees. The French and Italian Governments have taken similar action. All three Governments are most anxious that the United States shall appoint representatives on each of the committees in order that they may get to work immediately.

My own belief is that such action by the United States is necessary in order to secure the most effective use of the tonnage and financial resources of the Associated Governments and I hope it may be taken promptly.

The Allied import program committees now existing or to be constituted are the following: Wheat Executive, Meats and Fats Executive, Sugar Executive, Oil Seed Executive, Munitions Council, Nitrates Executive,<sup>2</sup> Petroleum Conference, Wool Committee, Cotton Committee, Jute, Hemp and Flax Committee, Timber Committee, Hides and Leather Committee, Paper Committee. The foregoing organizations are to cover all imports including finished products as well as raw materials.

The exact scope of the Munitions Council, which will sit in Paris, has not yet been determined, but as at present contemplated it is to make the program for finished products used by the armies and raw materials required, therefore including tanks and motor trucks and perhaps railway materials and equipment, but possibly excluding quartermaster's supplies. The Nitrates Committee will sit in London and will report to the Munitions Council being in fact a subcommittee of that council. All the committees except the Munitions Council are to sit in London.

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<sup>1</sup> The latter not printed.

<sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 666 *et seq.*

The proposal to create these program committees did not originate with the British Government, but first received support from the French and Italian Governments. The British Government was rather reluctant to accept it and only did so after becoming convinced of the practical necessity of forming the committees in order to utilize Allied tonnage and financial resources to the best advantage in prosecuting the war, and after satisfying itself as to the committees' functions and powers [which] are enumerated below.

The United States, in addition to its general interest in securing the effective use of Allied resources, has a special interest for the following reasons: It already is the principal source of financial support of the Allied cause. By reason of its rapidly increasing construction of ships, it will soon command an important and constantly growing share of the tonnage in the service of war needs. Therefore it has an obvious special interest in making sure that the credit and tonnage furnished by it are not wastefully or improvidently used. The purpose in creating the program committees is to secure this end.

It is not now possible to give you the details of the method of work of these committees. They will each work out their own methods in accordance with the necessities of their specific problems. I can only indicate the scope of their action in a general way.

The program committees are to have no executive power. The name executive by which some of those now in existence are called is therefore a misnomer. Their function will be merely to agree upon and recommend the adoption of joint Allied programs of purchases and imports, after ascertaining and considering jointly minimum requirements of each of the Associated Nations in the light of the shortage of tonnage, of knowledge of existing stocks in each country, of available financial resource, and all other relevant facts. It is hoped that their recommendations, while in no way binding, will be acceptable to all the Governments. The national representatives on the committees are expected to be men of ability, whose judgment will be trusted, and should include men of high technical qualifications. They will be in constant communication with the appropriate departments of their Governments, so that it is unlikely that they will agree in conclusions which will not be approved. They will have to satisfy themselves and their Governments of the real needs of the other Associated Nations, and the decision of each Government in regard to its own program, will thus be influenced by the knowledge so obtained of the true situation in the other countries, and of the importations necessary for each country to maintain its national life, and to secure the means of effectively carrying on the war.



There is no disposition here by means of this new organization to press the United States to make unreasonable reductions of its imports. The other Governments realize that the United States cannot be expected in one year to go as far as they have gone in four years, and also the tonnage required to carry American imports is relatively small as compared with that required by other countries, but it is generally felt that the plan cannot work satisfactorily if the United States does not come in. The presence of the United States on the committees is desired in large part as a moderating and arbitrating element. France and Italy, for example, feel they will be quite overshadowed by Great Britain with its great tonnage resources if the United States is not there to make its influence count.

I strongly urge that the United States join the other Allied countries in creating the program committees, and that its representatives may be appointed as soon as possible. In my judgment this is essential for the success of the work not only of the Allied Maritime Transport Council, but also of the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance. Stevens.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 800.88/144

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, May 26, 1918.

[Received 2.30 p. m.]

10248. For Crosby and Leffingwell from Cravath:

No. 308. British War Cabinet has approved plan recommended by Allied Maritime Council and our Council that inter-Allied program-making committee be promptly organized for every important class of purchases and imports, the existing organizations to be utilized so far as practicable. The British, French and Italians join in urging our Government be represented on each committee by representatives who will have same authority to join in recommendations as representatives of the Allied Governments. Situation presented fully in a cable of this date from Stevens in which I heartily concur.<sup>1</sup> You will receive copy.

I fully concur in Stevens' recommendation respecting our Government's representation upon the committees and the character of that representation. At no time have I been so strongly impressed with the importance of our Government being represented in each organization which controls or influences inter-Allied activities af-

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<sup>1</sup> Apparently referring to the telegram, *supra*, dated May 25, transmitted by the Chargé in Great Britain.

fecting the conduct of the war. The difficulties in the way of effective cooperation between the British, French and Italians have never been greater than now. They all look to the American representatives to take leading part in preventing misunderstandings and in coordinating efforts. I regard this as the most important function of the American representatives; therefore, there should be upon each committee an American representative who has the necessary position, experience, tact and other personal qualities for this rather difficult and delicate task. These qualities are more important than mere technical attainments, which can be furnished by technical advisers, although of course preferable that, so far as practicable, all the qualities be combined in same man. Crosby with his intimate knowledge of conditions here is in a position to advise regarding the extent to which the same man can effectively sit on two or more of the committees, dealing with subjects which can be grouped together. Stevens suggests that copy of this cable go to Hurley, Gay, McCormick and Hoover.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 800.24/58

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 28, 1918.

[Received 8.25 p. m.]

4009. War Trade Board [from McFadden], attention of Woolley for Baruch:

No. 116. At a conference between House Mission and the British and French Ministers of Munitions, in Paris, late November 1917, it was proposed to create an Inter-Allied Munition Council to sit in Paris. As a result of this conference and of subsequent conferences and correspondence between the French and British Ministries of Munitions it is now definitely decided that the Council should be created and its composition, function and general activities shall be along the following general lines.

1. Council is to consist of four delegates from each of the Associated Governments representing the following interests:

- (a) The Ministers of Munitions and American War Industries Board;
- (b) Representative of the Minister of War or general staff of each of the Associated armies;
- (c) Technical representative from each of the Associated Governments;
- (d) Permanent representatives in Paris of the Ministries of Munitions and American War Industries Board.

2. The Council to be permanent in character, to sit daily in Paris with formal meetings monthly to be attended by Ministers of Munitions of the Associated Governments.

3. The authority of the Council is to be both executive and advisory. The executive authority of the Council is to consist of—

- (a) To arrange for the most advantageous employment of raw materials and manufacturing resources of the Allied countries in order that their munition programmes might be coordinated and carried out to the greatest possible extent and defining the word munitions so as to include all war materials based upon steel and other metals and chemical industries;
- (b) To consider and advise the munition programmes of the Associated Governments in relation to available supplies and transport.

4. The advisory functions of the Council to be—

- (a) To act as general advisors to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance in connection with purchases of munitions not only in the United States but also in neutral countries, occupying and performing about the same functions in this connection as are now performed by the wheat, oil, fat, etc., executives;
- (b) To assist the Inter-Allied Maritime Council in revising allocation of tonnage, advising them to what extent requirements put forward by each of the Allies are in accordance with military necessity;
- (c) To coordinate the American munition programme with those of its associates and also the entire munition programme of the Associated Governments.

5. The creation of a permanent Inter-Allied Statistical Bureau to be composed of ordnance and statistical experts for the purpose of providing the Inter-Allied Munition Council with all necessary data and statistics in connection with the production and possibilities of production of munitions by the Associated Governments.

6. It was not definitely determined to whom the Council should be responsible but it was suggested that they make reports to—

- (a) The Supreme War Council;
- (b) Inter-Allied Council of War Purchases and Finance;
- (c) Inter-Allied Transport Committee;
- (d) Ministers of Munitions and War Industries Board of the United States.

The above plan about reflects the general views of Loucheur and Churchill in connection with the composition and activity of this Council. In April, Pichon cabled Jusserand as follows:

I wish to remind you that the inter-Allied conference which took place in Paris, last December, has decided to organize an Inter-Allied Munitions Committee which will sit in Paris. The various other

inter-Allied committees whose organization had been decided, at that time, are now working regularly and it is necessary to institute, without delay, the Inter-Allied Munitions Committee whose duty would be, more particularly, to examine the best repartition to be made of the common resources for the production of all that concerns the material constituted with steel and other metals and all that concerns chemical industries. It had been said, in Paris, that the representatives of each country would be the Minister of Munitions assisted by three persons of which one could usefully be a representative of either the General Staff or the War Minister. I beg you to ask the Government to be kind enough to let us know the names of its representatives and I propose that the first meeting of the Inter-Allied Munitions Committee be held in Paris during the first fortnight of May, the date to be decided upon by common agreement. Pichon.

At the request of Churchill the French have called a meeting of the Council at Paris for June 4 and same will be attended by Churchill, three British delegates and also by the Minister of Munitions of Italy together with three other Italian delegates. The French desire to know as to whether the American delegates have been nominated and if so, their names. They state that unless conference is attended by American delegates, the whole object of conference fails. We presented memorandum covering the subject to Colonel Dawes<sup>1</sup> who, after consultation with General Pershing, informed us that they considered subject civilian rather than military problem. We have also consulted chief ordnance officer of A.E.F. and they are without information in connection with the appointment of American delegates to conference.

In case you wish further information in connection with objects of Council we suggest you consult with Crosby who is thoroughly familiar with subject. The above has been brought to our attention through our association in connection with the Inter-Allied Metal Conference and we submit the above to you at request of French Ministry of Munitions. McFadden.

SHARP

File No. 800.24/59

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *May 31, 1918, noon.*

[Received 5.10 p. m.]

10357. For Crosby from Cravath:

No. 325. No further word in London as to attitude of our Government toward munitions program council which holds its first meet-

<sup>1</sup> Col. Charles G. Dawes, United States Army; chairman of the General Purchasing Board, American Expeditionary Force; member of the Military Board of Allied Supply.



ing in Paris Tuesday. Receive impression from Paris that Secretary of War will shortly appoint a representative, now in America, who will come over shortly. Have recommended that Pershing appoint temporary representatives but my last information indicated that he was in doubt as to his procedure. Presume it is likely he will receive instructions by Tuesday. Unless I receive other instructions by Tuesday morning, shall attend meeting simply as observer and to offer advice if requested. Dawes, representing Pershing, thinks this desirable.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 103.96/557

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

4292. For McFadden [from Woolley, War Trade Board]:

No. 99. Referring further to Embassy's 3912, May 16, your 98, also Embassy's 3902, May 15, your 95, 3874, May 13, 6 p. m., your 91, 3840, May 10, 11 a. m., your 86, 3837, May 9, noon, your 85, for War Industries Board.<sup>1</sup> After several preliminary discussions a written proposal about tungsten was submitted to representatives of French and British war missions here agreeing in principle to appointment of a central bureau, as provided in Metals Conference resolutions February 21, subject to certain modifications which upon receipt of further information from British and French representatives, were formulated and submitted to them on May 20. It was understood that these proposals would be communicated promptly to the respective Governments, and there seems no reason why agreement about tungsten should not be concluded as result of these proposals without awaiting arrival of commission Loucheur proposes to send to Washington.

As to other raw materials Baruch is prepared to negotiate similar agreements about them, and believes these negotiations would be greatly facilitated by authorizing representatives here of the other Governments to negotiate directly with him, but he has not proposed and does not insist as a condition of making these arrangements that negotiations for this purpose must be carried on through a conference here of delegates from the Associated Governments, as suggested in your 95, and he wishes this made clear to the Metals Conference, although he regards it as exceedingly important, as stated in Department's No. 3609 to Embassy,<sup>2</sup> that these questions be dealt with in

<sup>1</sup> Telegrams Nos. 3902 and 3874 only are printed; see *ante*, pp. 568 and 569.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 564.

direct negotiations here instead of through your committee, with the understanding that as soon as arrangements are agreed upon their execution will be intrusted to a joint committee sitting in London or Paris. Woolley.

LANSING.

File No. 103.96/616

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, May 31, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 10.20 p. m.]

10373. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]:

No. 697. Referring to your 561, Department's 7942, May 25.<sup>1</sup> I had an interview with the authorities here and think that they will agree to a preliminary discussion taking place in Washington on the subject of tin. I believe that they will be unwilling to grant authority to conclude an agreement except on very general lines and only after referring their recommendations in detail to London. Should by this means an agreement be reached on general principles, I am sure that it would be only on condition that the executive work be handled here subsequently by a tin executive. I have seen McFadden's telegram No. 95 of May 15<sup>2</sup> in which he mentions a resolution adopted at the Inter-Allied Metal Conference in Paris recommending that a meeting of the delegates of the different inter-Allied Governments be held in Washington in order to examine all questions dealing with non-ferrous metals and alloys. I am informed that this should not be taken as meaning that the question of constitution of a tin executive should be postponed, and that the resolution was not suited to apply especially to tin except that whatever were done in the way of constituting a tin executive would later be coalesced into a general plan for handling all the non-ferrous metals on which a commission would sit in the United States.

I find an opposition here to delegating sufficient powers to any British representative now in the United States to make any agreement except of a very general nature as regards tin and, as I mentioned in a previous telegram, I think one can well realize the unwillingness on the part of the British to give up control of this metal which in the past has been so largely in their hands. At any rate as regards the Straits Settlements, the Colonial Office are very jealous of any interference on the part of other departments and the authorities here are very familiar with the best means of obtaining

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 571.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 569.

the maximum output and the methods of smelting and they have in their hands the best means of bringing pressure to bear for controlling the price. The constitution of an executive is considered a matter of urgent importance and I believe the Foreign Office are cabling fully their views to Lord Reading.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 800.24/62

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 4, 1918, noon.

[Received June 5, 6.40 a. m.]

4074. War Trade Board [from McFadden]. Attention of War Industries Board:

No. 140. Loucheur and members of the French Ministry of Munitions and Inter-Allied Metal Conference are distinctly irritated and annoyed through our failure to reply to the proposals of the Metal Conference<sup>1</sup> and we think the calling of the Tin Conference is a direct result of same. We beg to call your attention to the fact that the seat of the French Ministry of Munitions is Paris and further that the British Ministry of Munitions has a permanent representative in Paris, Sir Charles Ellis, and further that the British Minister of Munitions or his representatives are constantly visiting Paris in connection with these subjects. The French and the British have already expressed their willingness to send a committee to Washington to confer with you on all these questions but we think they will insist on the permanent council dealing with these matters remaining in Paris. Therefore we take the liberty of strongly urging the War Industries Board to send a permanent competent representative to Paris for the purpose of representing you in Paris in these matters.

In the meantime we feel confident that, if you will promptly inform and direct us as to your wishes in connection therewith, we can accomplish anything within reason you desire as we are in close relations with the French Ministry of Munitions and also with Sir Charles Ellis in Paris and we have up to the present been able to exercise considerable influence at all formal and informal conferences. McFadden.

SHARP

<sup>1</sup> See telegram, Apr. 15, transmitted by the Ambassador in France, *ante*, p. 563.

Formation of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council, June 4—Discussion of American Representation on the Munitions Council and the Program Committees—American Efforts to Conduct the Negotiations in the United States

File No. 800.24/60

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 4, 1918.

[Received June 5, 10.01 a. m.]

4084. War Trade Board [from McFadden], for attention War Department and War Industries Board:

No. 149. Formal meeting of Munitions Council was held today attended by Churchill and British delegates and Nava and Italian delegates. We [McFadden and Cravath] were invited by Loucheur to attend Council. We made it very plain to Council that we attended unofficially and without authority of any character and purely for the purpose of reporting to you the result of the conference. The plan as described in our No. 144<sup>1</sup> was approved in practically all respects. We will cable you tomorrow after receiving copy of the minutes concerning unimportant modification of the plan. McFadden.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/10187

*The Counselor for the Department of State (Polk) to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Referring to your note of April 27, 1918,<sup>2</sup> in regard to the creation by the French Government of the Inter-Allied Muniton Committee, which is to examine the question of the best apportionment of the common resources with respect to the production of everything connected with war supplies, composed of steel or other metals, and of everything that relates to chemical industries, I beg to advise you of the receipt of a letter of May 27, 1918,<sup>3</sup> from the Chairman of the War Industries Board, who advises the Department that action on this subject has been delayed by reason of the necessity for consultation with the other interests concerned.

In the meanwhile, Mr. Baruch points out, the French Government appears to have reconsidered the request submitted in your note,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see the final memorandum, *post*, p. 584.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 565.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.



according to a cablegram received through the American Embassy at Paris from the representative of the War Trade Board there, which cablegram states that the French Minister of Munitions intends to send immediately to Washington a commission for the purpose of discussing with the Chairman of the War Industries Board all subjects relating to munitions, including the distribution of raw materials.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Baruch adds that the French High Commissioner has also addressed him on this subject, and that he, Mr. Baruch, is calling the attention of the High Commission to the reported plan above mentioned, which, if carried out, Mr. Baruch understands will supersede the plan originally proposed.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 800.24/70

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 6, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

4113. War Trade Board [from McFadden], attention of Woolley and War Industries Board:

No. 158. Your No. 99.<sup>2</sup> It was decided at the meeting yesterday of Munitions Council to make the Inter-Allied Metal Conference a permanent subcommittee of Munitions Council which would sit in Paris or London for the purpose of considering all questions relative to non-ferrous metals, and the recommendations of Metal Conference to be referred for final decision to the Munitions Council. Loucheur and Churchill stated that they were willing for their missions to undertake preliminary reviews of these questions with you in Washington but they considered it essential that the formal discussions of same should be undertaken by the Metal Conference and the final decisions in connection therewith should be made by the Munitions Council. We communicated to them the contents of your cable No. 99. Both French and British state they have received no information from their missions in Washington in connection therewith, and furthermore the French state that there was no one connected with their mission in Washington qualified to discuss these subjects. We interpret your cable No. 99 to mean that you accept in general with some minor modifications the distribution, etc., of wolfram as recommended by Metal Conference February 21. McFadden.

SHARP

<sup>1</sup> Telegram No. 3874 from the Ambassador in France, May 13, *ante*, p. 568.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 578.

File No. 800.24/64

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 8, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received June 9, 3.44 a. m.]

4130. War Trade Board [from McFadden], attention of War Department and War Industries Board:

No. 160. The following is an unofficial communication received from the Munitions Council which they desire shall be brought promptly to your attention.

Memorandum of the principal points to which the Inter-Allied Conference has requested the American delegates to draw the special attention of the American Government, and same will be the object of official communications

1. The American Government is requested to appoint its representative as soon as possible upon this Council.

2. *Powder.* It is called to the attention of the American Government that the arrangements for the manufacture of propelling powder foreseen by the United States seemed to very much exceed the production necessary for the needs of the American Army itself at its maximum development as well as for the supplying of powder by the United States to France and Great Britain.

3. *Artillery on caterpillars.* It is of first importance for the success of the war to facilitate the movement of artillery when off roads by means of tractors equipped with caterpillars. The United States is asked to make a great effort in this direction. America ought to be able to manufacture these particular gun carriages or tractors or at least the caterpillars. France with the help of Great Britain would guarantee to furnish the artillery material and the mounting thereof.

4. *Tanks.* It is of equal importance to develop largely and rapidly the manufacture of tanks of various categories. France can assure the manufacture of small tanks but United States is urgently requested to develop the manufacture of large tanks (Chatteauroux).

5. *Chemical material.* It is of imperative importance finally to keep the Allied armies supplied with abundance of gas shells especially hyperite and collongite shells the basis of which is chlorine. The United States is requested to place at the disposal of this manufacturing programme from now on all chlorine which it has at its disposal and to develop as soon as possible in America the complete manufacture of these products.

The following are the salient points developed at the conference which we venture to bring to your attention:

(1) The French and British delegates constantly referred to the fact that the original suggestions, etc., in connection with the organization of the council had been inspired by agencies

of the United States and therefore it was a matter of great regret and disappointment that the United States was not officially represented.

(2) It was strongly urged that the proper departments of the United States Government should immediately establish a permanent committee in Paris of technical munitions experts familiar with our munitions programme for the purpose of conferring continuously with corresponding technical committees established by the French, British, and Italian ministries in Paris.

(3) The subcommittee on explosives and propellants stated that in their judgment the production of the United States in connection with explosives and propellants was largely in excess of any possible requirements of the Associated Governments.

(4) An increase in the production of chlorine was considered of the greatest importance and it was particularly emphasized that same be brought to the attention of the United States.

The quartermaster departments of the Associated Governments have agreed to pool all military supplies after arrival in France including railway transports and materials, motor transports, warehouses, etc., with a view to the coordination and most economical employment and distribution of same.

We respectfully urge you to not only appoint immediately the proper representatives of the United States Government upon the Munitions Council, but also to send a committee of technical experts to remain permanently in Paris. McFadden.

SHARP

File No. 800.24/65

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 8, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received June 9, 2.28 p. m.]

4127. War Trade Board [from McFadden], attention War Department and War Industries Board:

No. 159. The following is approved memorandum on the organization of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council.

1. The Inter-Allied Munitions Council is an organization having authority, composition and sources of information which enable it to study, criticise, and make all kinds of propositions in regard to programmes for the manufacture of munitions of war. They will have for deliberation four principal objects, namely:

- (a) The basis of military requirements which might be modified by a study of Allied experiences, notably in regard to those Allies who have only recently entered the war and whose programs are still in the course of elaboration;
- (b) The adoption of the most efficient methods in the arsenals of the Allies as a result of experience of the Allies;

- (c) The specialization in particular categories of production by each of the Allies respectively;
- (d) The allocation and transport of raw material for munitions to the various Allied countries.

2. The Council has a second important function. A number of inter-Allied organizations have developed, some with executive power and others with advisory functions. It is necessary to coordinate all these special organizations occupied with munitions and to have their operations approved by the Inter-Allied Munitions Council. All those organizations whose operations seem desirable should be subordinated to the principal council of munitions conforming in principle to all those [*the scheme*] set forth in the table annexed hereto.<sup>1</sup>

3. In regard to the special committees indicated on the annexed table, it was understood at the conference in Paris held in November, 1917, that it was necessary to have a technical committee for the discussion between the Allies of technical questions connected with war materials, which committee should be charged to exchange information on inventions, experiences, and improvements, not only in regard to study of these questions, but also in regard to their manufacture. This committee to be composed in the case of each of the Allies of an officer for the study of plans and another for actual manufacture but there would be no advantage in drawing too strict a line of demarcation between these two functions. This committee should be able to centralize a great deal of the liaison work which is carried on between the different countries on the subject of inventions, and the officers and ministries of munitions as well as those from G.H.Q. occupied with these questions in Paris should render account to this committee. Specialists could be attached for the consideration of any particular question. This committee would be a committee for consultation only. Each ally to retain entire responsibility for those models if adopted by each of the armies respectively in accordance with the authority of their respective representatives.

(a) The aviation committee, which is already in existence, to render account to the principal council.

(b) The chemical committee under similar conditions will do likewise.

(c) As yet there is no explosives committee existing but it will be necessary to create one for the purpose of handling questions of division of supplies. (There are already certain very important questions under consideration such as the amount of explosives with which we should provision Italy and the amount of powder which America should be prepared to furnish in 1919, also questions as to the most economical mixtures to be employed.) The executive committee on nitrates should be subordinate to this committee but would continue to sit in London where it will exercise its executive functions.

(d) At present no committee on nonferrous metals is in existence but constant conferences are being held and it is desir-

<sup>1</sup> Not transmitted.



able that these should be [put] on a methodical basis with certain executive subcommittees to be formed when necessary to deal with any particular metal.

(e) In regard to steel, at present moment there are arrangements between the different Allies for the division of cast iron and steel of various qualities. But these questions are not discussed at present in their entirety. Evidently it is very desirable that the division of American and English steel should be examined by the principal council but outside of the general function of the secretariat to furnish particulars on this subject, it will probably be necessary to have a separate committee examine any questions which may be raised on the subject of steel. If it is understood that an inter-Allied committee is to be charged with this question, it should hold its meetings in London.

(f) There remains the question of railway material (rails and wagons). There is an inter-Allied organization at Versailles charged with railway transport. This organization cannot be subordinate to the Munitions Council because this transport, with all the Allies, is not under the Ministry of Munitions. But a liaison should be established between this committee and the Munitions Council in regard to manufactured and raw materials.

This list of committees is not limited in any way and may be added to as circumstances demand. In order that the Munitions Council may be qualified to exercise a comprehensive and inter-Allied view of the comparative urgency of Allied demands for railway material, rolling stock, etc., at the time when the Munitions Council shall be called upon to make its final decision with respect to the allocation of steel, the inter-Allied railway transport committee should be asked to gather together for the Munitions Council all information covering the programme of railway construction of each of the Allies and to classify the various programmes according to their urgency.

4. The Council shall meet every month or every six weeks at Paris. It shall be composed of the Ministers of Munitions except in the case of the United States which shall be represented by a special delegate accredited by the American Government. The Ministers and the American delegate shall be two in number from each Allied country, one of whom shall, if possible, reside in Paris. And if each of the Ministers of Munitions deem it necessary, there shall also be a representative of the Ministries of War who shall be either a member of the general staff or an officer qualified to speak in their names. The Council shall have a permanent secretariat including, if necessary, one member for each ally. This secretariat shall be charged with the collection and concentration of the work of the various special committees and to make *résumés* and reports therefrom periodically to the several Governments. It shall also keep itself informed of the decisions and resolutions of the Council and shall prepare a regular account of the same for the Council. The Inter-Allied Bureau of Statistics is understood to be included in the secretariat. In addition to the regular meetings arranged for above,

special meetings could be called as occasion arose for the same either between delegates residing in Paris or between special delegates designated by their Governments.

5. The secretariat shall assemble and collate particulars received regarding those subjects under the consideration of the Council in such form and manner as shall be found to be most expedient for the use of the Council and shall bring the same periodically up to date. In carrying out this plan, it shall follow the principal lines of the memorandum prepared by the Ministry of [Munitions] entitled the Review of Allies' Munitions Programmes in such matters as are not outside the plan or folio of documentary [material] periodically distributed by the Inter-Allied Statistical Bureau. It shall prepare in addition special reports and minutes on such other subjects as may be indicated by the Council. The secretariat should be responsible for preparing for the Inter-Allied Council of War Purchases and Finance and for the Allied Maritime Transport Council all necessary documents relating to munitions and the manufacture of war supplies. The secretariat will receive in return, from the councils above mentioned, all necessary [information] relating to the dispositions made or proposed to be made by the councils with respect thereto.

6. There being no single definition indicating the authority of the Ministries of Munitions in each Allied country respectively, it is understood that in principle the authority of the Council shall extend to all productions having for their basis steel, other metals, and chemical manufactures, such modifications excepted as may be found needed to accord with special conditions in the respective countries.

McFadden.

SHARP

File No. 800.24/67

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, June 12, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received June 13, 1.35 a. m.]

10583. The following cable has been approved by Stevens, Sheldon, and Cravath, and should be delivered to Hurley and Gay as a cable from Stevens, to the War Trade Board as a cable from Sheldon, and to the Secretary of the Treasury as a cable from Cravath; also send copy to Baruch. It will be numbered Ship Mission No. 228 from Stevens, No. 762 from Sheldon, No. 335 from Cravath.

The British, French, and Italian Governments having accepted the principle of the organization of programme-making committees covering the entire field of Allied imports, have approved the organization of the committees of which a list and description are given below. Certain of these committees are already in existence and will continue with their original or modified powers.

So far as we know the American representation upon existing committees is confined to Robert P. Skinner, our Consul General at

London, who is member of the Nitrate Executive, and Commander Paul Foley of the Navy and L. I. Thomas, who are members of the Petroleum Conference. Mr. Sheldon, the London representative of the War Trade Board, sits with the Wheat Executive and the Meats and Fats Executive and [has] taken an important part in their deliberations, [though not] formally a member of either body. James H. Skinner, who recently arrived to represent the Food Administration upon the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance, has been attending the meetings of the Wheat Executive and the Meats and Fats Executive but does not regard himself as a member of either [body]. Bigelow, the wool expert, who is a member of Sheldon's staff, has been attending to purchases of wool from the British Government for the United States Navy and Army and also to some extent to other American Government wool purchases.

Programme committees are not executive bodies, though two existing Allied bodies, the Wheat Executive and the Nitrate Executive, which have the duty of purchasing, will for convenience undertake the duties of programme committees for cereals and nitrates respectively. The proceedings of the programme committees will be as follows:

1. To obtain such information as is necessary to determine the requirements of each Allied country for the commodity or class of commodities with which the programme committee is concerned, including past consumption and stocks.

2. To secure effective Allied criticism of requirements so that the sacrifice entailed by any necessary shortage may be distributed as equitably as possible between the different countries in such a way as to best aid in the prosecution of the war.

3. To prepare programmes for such periods and on such bases as the Allied Maritime Transport Council may desire, the programmes of all being as nearly as possible comparable and uniform.

4. To discuss possible reductions of programmes with the Allied Maritime Transport Council when the forecast of available tonnage shows any deficiency as compared with the aggregate proposed requirements of all the Allies.

5. To pass upon and certify the statements of the requirements of the Allies for purchases in the United States which are periodically submitted to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance, and to cooperate with that Council in effecting any reductions in purchasing programmes that may be required to meet limitations of finance.

All agree that London should be the headquarters of all the committees excepting the Munitions Council, whose principal headquarters will be Paris, although certain of its subcommittees, such as the nitrate committee and the steel committee, will have their headquarters in London.

The following is a list of the committees now contemplated, with their respective powers:

*First programme committee.* This is the Inter-Allied Munitions Council organized in Paris last week, of which the British members are Winston Churchill, Minister of Munitions, W. T.



Layton, his director of requirements and statistics, Sir Charles Ellis, his Paris representative, General Furse, Master General of the Ordnance, War Office. For France, M. Loucheur, Minister of Munitions, and associates corresponding to Winston Churchill's associates. For Italy, Nava, Under Secretary of State for War, who is in effect Minister of Munitions, and appropriate subordinates. This council is to hold regular meetings about once a month at its head office in Paris, is to have a permanent secretariat at Paris which it is hoped will include one representative of each Government, and is to have various technical subcommittees including the following:

1. Munitions technical committee.
2. Aircraft committee. Already existing in Paris as the Inter-Allied Aviation Committee.
3. Chemical committee. Already existing in Paris.
4. Explosives committee, which may embrace the existing Nitrate Executive<sup>1</sup> which would otherwise continue as a separate subcommittee of the Munitions Council.
5. Non-ferrous metals committee, which has three sections, viz.: tin committee, tungsten committee, and committee for copper and other metals. This section would probably meet in London as does the Nitrate Executive.
6. Tanks committee.
7. Steel committee,<sup>2</sup> and probably
8. A committee on railway and transport supplies which would act in liaison with the existing Inter-Allied Transport Committee at Versailles.

Doubtless other subcommittees or sections of subcommittees will be added.

It is desired that the United States should be represented upon this Council by at least one principal member, who should have a rank approaching as nearly as practicable that of the Munitions Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy. He should be supported by an American [secretariat] including a technical staff qualified to represent him upon the various subcommittees to the end that there would be in France an American technical organization qualified to deal with the similar organizations of the Allies in relation to questions arising from time to time affecting the design and production of munitions and other military supplies coming within the scope of the Council's jurisdiction.

*Second programme committee.* This will be the wheat committee and will practically be a continuation of the existing Wheat Executive<sup>3</sup> and will deal with wheat and other cereals and with dried pulses.

<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 666 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> According to minutes in the files of the War Industries Board, this committee held its first meeting on Aug. 7, 1918, with no American member, but at its meeting on Aug. 9 it was joined by Summers and Mackall of the War Industries Board Mission; see telegram No. 5175, Aug. 1, to the Ambassador in France, *post*, p. 600.

<sup>3</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 653, footnote.



*Third programme committee.* This will be the meats and fats committee and be therefore a continuation of the present Meats and Fats Executive<sup>1</sup> and will deal with meats, edible animal fats, dairy produce and canned fruits and vegetables.

*Fourth programme committee.* This will be the oil and seeds committee<sup>2</sup> and will deal with edible vegetable oils, with the nuts, seeds, etc., from which they are prepared and with castor seeds and castor oil for purposes of lubrication.

*Fifth programme committee.* This will be the sugar committee<sup>3</sup> dealing with sugar, molasses and syrups.

*Sixth programme committee.*<sup>4</sup> This will be the wool committee and will deal with wool and woolen textiles.

*Seventh programme committee.* This will be the hemp, flax and jute committee and will deal with these and similar fibers and their products.

*Eighth programme committee.* This will be the hides and leather committee and will deal with hides, leather, and their products, tanning materials and leather manufactures, such as boots, shoes and saddlery.

*Ninth programme committee.* This will be the horses and mules committee.

*Tenth programme committee.* This will be the cotton committee and will deal with cotton textiles and other cotton products other than for explosives.

*Eleventh programme committee.* This will be the timber committee.

*Twelfth programme committee.* This will be the paper committee and will deal with pulp wood, wood pulp and other paper making materials and with paper and paper products.

*Thirteenth programme committee.* This will be the tobacco and matches committee.

*Fourteenth programme committee.* This will be the coal and coke committee and will deal with coal, coke and manufactured fuels other than petroleum products.

*Fifteenth programme committee.* This will be the petroleum committee and will be practically a continuation of the Petroleum Conference and will deal with fuel oil, aviation and motor

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<sup>1</sup> See letter of Sept. 7, 1917, from the Food Administration Representative at London to the Food Administrator, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 656.

<sup>2</sup> According to minutes in the files of the War Industries Board the Oil Seeds Executive held its first meeting on July 26, with Dr. A. E. Taylor of the War Trade Board representing the United States.

<sup>3</sup> See public statement issued by the Food Administration, Sept. 21, 1917, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 657.

<sup>4</sup> Incomplete minutes and other records in the files of the War Industries Board show that of the committees which follow some held their first meetings in July, as the cotton committee, July 10, the timber committee, July 12, and the leather and hides committee, July 19. As no regular American representatives had been appointed, the three named were attended by James A. Field of the Shipping Mission, to maintain a semi-official connection until full representation could be arranged. Various members of the War Industries Board Mission (see *post*, p. 600) were later assigned to these committees according to their competence.

spirit and lubricating oils and various petroleum products to be used for mechanical purposes.<sup>1</sup>

It is proposed that any commodity not obviously comprised in the above lists will be dealt with by extending the scope of some one of the above program committees or possibly in special cases such as rubber by the creation of an additional committee. The committees dealing with food may be grouped under a central food committee; <sup>2</sup> there may be a similar group of other committees.

It is desired that the United States shall as promptly as possible appoint a representative upon each of the committees. It will be possible for the same person to act as our representative upon two or more committees dealing with allied subjects but if not himself an expert he should be supported by technical advisers. There should also be several capable secretaries who could act with the British, French and Italian representatives upon the secretariats of the various committees. Stevens.

[No signature indicated]

File No. 800.24/62

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1918, 4 p. m.

4525. For McFadden [from Woolley, War Trade Board]:

No. 132. Embassy's No. 4063, June 3, your No. 141,<sup>3</sup> also Embassy's No. 4074, June 4, 12 noon, your No. 140.

March 27, Baruch wrote Tardieu, French High Commissioner, requesting preliminary information on requirements, estimated supply, etc., of tin. April 8, sent Tardieu for transmission to his Government draft of plan for inter-Allied control, procurement and distribution of tin to meet Allied requirements, substantially as follows:

1. An inter-Allied central bureau in London, to be constituted by the participating Governments, and composed of one or more representatives of each Government, to execute arrangements agreed upon.

2. An agreed allocation to each country of the supply available for its essential requirements, subject to such revision and readjustment as may be demanded from time to time, by changing conditions in accordance with the best interests of all concerned.

3. An agreed allocation among the countries concerned of the world markets in which each may purchase tin, and their

<sup>1</sup> See also the section headed "Cooperation of the United States with the Allied Powers in the Distribution of Oil and Oil-Well Equipment," *post*, p. 617.

<sup>2</sup> For the organization of the Food Council, see *ante*, p. 557.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

respective shares of the purchasable supply of tin in such markets.

4. The establishment of purchasing agencies in each market for purchasing under the direction of the central bureau the supply allocated to each country participating.

5. The regulation from time to time under the direction of the central bureau of maximum and/or minimum prices to be paid in the different markets, with the view on the one hand of preventing price raising by competitive buying, and on the other hand of stimulating production by increasing the profits of the producers.

The Government of the United States will participate in the arrangement outlined in each of the foregoing paragraphs as follows:

As to paragraph 1. An American official in London will be designated to act as the representative of the United States on the inter-Allied central bureau and an expert in the tin business will also be designated to assist him as an associate or substitute or alternate member, or as an expert adviser.

As to paragraph 2. It is estimated that the United States will require for essential war products in this country for the United States and the Allied Governments approximately two-thirds of the world's output of tin, which is estimated in round figures at 120,000 tons per year, two-thirds of which is 80,000 tons.

As to paragraph 3. It is estimated that the United States will require at least 60 per cent of the output of Straits tin. The allocation of the output of tin from other sources of production is subject to adjustment by mutual agreement in accordance with the best interests of all concerned.

As to paragraph 4. The allocation for the United States will all be purchased through a purchasing agency designated for that purpose by the United States.

In purchasing in neutral markets the United States purchasing agency will act either in concert with other similar agencies for the other countries participating in this agreement or, as in the case of the Nitrate Executive, under the direction of a single director of purchases representing the central bureau.

The question of pooling purchases made for different countries in a common market will require consideration. Purchases of Straits tin for the United States will be made through the United States purchasing agency and pursuant to some plan to be worked out with the British Government for determining the price.

As to paragraph 5. In case price fixing results in inequality of prices in the different markets to the disadvantage of any country on account of the allocation of markets the question of equalizing the cost of purchases in the different markets will require consideration.

No replies yet received beyond routine acknowledgment of receipt. Identical notes same dates sent to representatives of British Government in Washington who replied promptly and have been negotiating since with us along lines of the proposal. We understand they were arranging to provide amount of tin required by France.

Negotiations with Baruch through representative of France here along lines suggested would undoubtedly bring agreement within few days and proposed inter-Allied central bureau could then immediately be established in London or Paris. Negotiations with Great Britain already well advanced but the serious delay complained of concerning France has been due to failure to receive any reply to the above communications. Request immediate action by France in reply to our proposals.

Baruch has sole authority to negotiate for United States and as he has no representative abroad authorized to speak for him it is preferred that the French proposals should be discussed with the French representatives here. Questions stated in your cable June 4 may be discussed here if thought desirable or referred to inter-Allied central bureau when constituted.

We agree with your statement that the tin negotiations in Washington should be separate and distinct from the inter-Allied conference on metals. Woolley.

LANSING

File No. 800.24/73b

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

8410. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 709. Your 762, Embassy 10583, June 12, 7 p. m. The several cables on this subject are receiving very careful consideration and it is hoped that a definite decision may be arrived at along the lines suggested, in the near future.

LANSING

File No. 800.24/73

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, June 24, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 11 p. m.]

10836. War Trade Board for McCormick [from Sheldon]:

No. 876. I refer to telegram No. 762, Embassy's No. 10583, June 12, 7 p. m., sent jointly by some of the Government representatives



here in London. I sincerely hope that a favorable decision will be reached on the general subject of program committees and more particularly would like to impress upon you the advisability of a proper representation of the War Industries Board on this side and particularly here in London. I am convinced that much valuable time is being lost both as regards securing a satisfactory supply of raw materials for war purposes and their distribution and control. My reason for bringing this matter to your attention is because I have noticed in many departments of the British and French Governments a failure to understand why a better cooperation is not available from our side, which is affecting disadvantageously British supplies, and, it is to be assumed, the supplies that are being secured by America. The connection between the work of the War Industries Board and that of the War Trade Board here must in any event be very close, and until such time as the War Industries Board are properly represented here by a competent staff, I would suggest that more active use be made of War Trade Board staff here. We are now sufficiently well organized to be able to render them considerable assistance and with additions to our staff could, I feel, give them full satisfaction. I am sending you this suggestion really as an offering on our part here for you to make such use of as you see fit. On Doctor Taylor's arrival, I will discuss the matter more fully and possibly cable you further.

Cable number 874,<sup>1</sup> which I am sending you today on wool, is a good instance of assistance that we could render. Mr. Andrew Weir, Surveyor General of Supply, who handles wool for the British Government, is a personal friend of mine of long standing and he expressed the belief that we could handle here the Argentine situation to the entire satisfaction of the American Government if full authority were delegated, and earnestly requests that this authority be delegated to some one here if it is not desired that it be done by the War Trade Board.

LAUGHLIN

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File No. 800.24/75

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, July 1, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

1. War Trade Board [from Sheldon], for Vance McCormick: No. 917. In Paris and here I have run against several instances of lack of inter-Allied coordination which must lead to injurious results

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and calls specifically for efforts at correction. Endeavoring to get several War Trade points like caustic soda cleared. I had a long conference with Loucheur, Minister of Munitions, pointing out the direct relationship between production of caustic soda and of chlorine. He dilated upon the defective chlorine program of the Associated Governments and this proceeded to a general discussion of negotiations on program and stated that the experiences of the last four months have resulted in great changes in requirements. The program of manufacture of propellants by Associated Governments is disproportionate to that of manufacture of gas shells, in fact the program of manufacture of propellants as based on the nitrate program of the Nitrate Committee, is yielding propellants in excess of requirements and indeed in excess of the ability to transport them to the front and use them there. He regarded this program as 40 per cent excessive, with the consequent meaning in terms of tonnage that you can readily determine. On the other hand the gas shell production is lamentably low. Churchill has made the same statement to Cravath. Italians were unable to pursue Austrians for the same reason.

I do not see how it is possible to rectify this situation promptly, and in this every representative American in Paris and London agrees, except by the coming to Europe of Baruch and Stettinius and the placing in London and Paris of first caliber men representing W[ar] I[n]dustries B[oard]. The first question that every representative Frenchman and Englishman has asked me, whether in the diplomatic service or in other departments, is related to the coming over of the head of the W.I.B. I realize that it is not my function to offer this advice to Baruch, but I regard it as my duty to lay the facts before you and urge you personally to do so.

LAUGHLIN

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File No. 800.24/76b

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1918, 8 p. m.

32. For Sheldon [from Woolley, War Trade Board]:

No. 771. Embassy's No. 10836, June 24, 6 p. m., your No. 876. In order to correct the mistaken impression reported by you that many departments of British and French Governments believe that the War Industries Board is not cooperating about establishing executive committees in London or Paris for control and distribution of raw materials, and is responsible for delay which is affecting disadvantageously British supplies and supplies being secured by Amer-

ica, Baruch requests that you re-examine your previous instructions sent at his request about his negotiations here with the representatives of Great Britain and France for establishing executives on various raw materials, including tin; from which you will see that on April [*May*] 25 you were informed that War Industries Board submitted to British Embassy at Washington, April 8, a proposal for the establishment of an executive in London to control procurement and distribution of tin;<sup>1</sup> also by Department's cable to Embassy, April 19,<sup>2</sup> that Baruch believed it exceedingly important that negotiations for establishing these executives be carried on through Allied representatives here instead of through committees in Paris or London; but that when arrangements were agreed upon it was intended to intrust their execution to executive committees sitting in London or Paris; also by our cable May 24<sup>3</sup> to the same effect. Baruch further states that these negotiations actually began in January and simultaneously with them similar negotiations were being carried on with the representatives here of the French Government, and as a result of these negotiations the following proposals which he sends for your information were formulated, and on June 20 were cabled by the British Embassy here to the British Government.<sup>4</sup>

You will see from this record that Baruch has been urging both the British and French Governments for five or six months to agree upon arrangements establishing executive committees in London or Paris for the control and distribution of various raw materials including tin, proposals for which have been formulated and submitted after full discussion with their representatives here. Inasmuch as he is still awaiting definite replies from these Governments on the proposals submitted, the responsibility for the delay regarding these negotiations rests upon them and not upon him, and he would be much obliged to you if you would bring these facts to the attention of those government officials referred to in your cable who seem disposed to hold the War Industries Board responsible for this delay. Woolley.

LANSING

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<sup>1</sup> See telegram No. 7942, May 25, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, *ante*, p. 571.

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 564.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

<sup>4</sup> For the final text of the tin agreement, see *post*, p. 601.

American Memorandum on Coordination of Programs, July 12—Appointment of an American Representative on the Munitions Council—Mission of the War Industries Board to Europe—American Participation in the Meeting of the Munitions Council, August 14—Formation of the Tin Executive—Requests for the Submission of American Programs to the Committees

File No. 800.88/142

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain*  
(Laughlin)<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1918, 4 p. m.

184. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 826. Referring to Embassy's 10246, May 25, and subsequent cablegrams on the same subject, the following is the full text of a plan which has been approved by the President for the formulation and execution of common programmes for the Associated Governments and it is hoped that this plan will be adopted by these Governments.

The Government of the United States recognizes that in addition to military and naval action a careful coordination is necessary between the Governments now associated in the war against Germany in finance, shipping, export and import relations, foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured or partly manufactured products, exclusive of foodstuffs.

The activities which should be grouped under each of these heads are at present organized in the several Governments, where in each field ministers are charged with the formulation of national programmes. Responsibility for the formulation and execution of a common programme for the Associated Governments will naturally be vested in these ministers. By "ministers" is meant the departmental heads responsible directly to the President or the ministries of the respective Governments, whether called ministers, secretaries, departmental heads, chairmen of boards, or by whatever title.

The Government of the United States agrees that where the subject matter to be dealt with is intricate, voluminous, or in need of continuous attention, the several ministers should appoint representatives to sit upon joint committees or "executives" charged with making studies upon which the ministers are to formulate a common programme, and that these committees or "executives" should be charged with the carrying out of such programmes as have been adopted by the ministers upon their recommendation.

It being the primary object of this method of conference to insure better cooperation in activities which have to do with the provision of supplies, programmes should primarily be formed by or under the direction of the ministers representing foodstuffs, raw materials, and manufactured or partly manufactured products. The Government

<sup>1</sup> See last paragraph for instruction to repeat to McFadden, War Trade Board representative in Paris.



of the United States understands that the formulation of common programmes in these matters will be limited to cases—

- (a) Where two or more Governments are interested in supplies which must be transported overseas to supplement deficiencies in local production; or;
- (b) Where the several sources of supply should be agreed upon, and the allotment and method of their distribution or utilization; or,
- (c) Where there might without agreement be competition between Governments in procuring supplies or a wasteful duplication of productive effort.

When provisional programmes respecting the commodities mentioned above have been agreed upon within the limits specified by the ministers in charge of such commodities, such programmes will be—

- (a) Coordinated with finance through the Inter-Allied Commission.
- (b) Coordinated with shipping through the Inter-Allied Maritime Council.
- (c) Coordinated with export and import relations through an inter-Allied board made up of heads or representatives of the United States War Trade Board and similar departments of the other Governments.

If it is impossible to secure a unanimous acceptance of a programme by the various ministers, differences of opinion will be submitted to the President of the United States and the Premiers of the Allied Governments represented for final determination.

In the event that the ministers in charge of any of the groups of activities here dealt with feel that the formulation of programmes is delayed or rendered difficult by the geographical separation of the ministers from one another, and that the difficulties cannot be obviated by personal conference consistently with their other duties, any such minister may appoint a personal representative to sit at a foreign capital. This representative may exercise such control as the minister by whom he is appointed may determine over the minister's appointees or "executives" sitting at such capital.

So far as the War Trade Board is concerned, we see no reason for a change in our organization, as this is practically the way in which we are now operating. In this connection you should see copies of letters exchanged by Crosby and McCormick which are being sent to you by pouch today.<sup>1</sup>

Copies of this plan are being sent by the heads of other governmental departments to their respective representatives, if any, abroad. Representatives of the War Industries Board, we understand, will leave shortly for Europe and will discuss this plan with representatives of the corresponding bodies abroad; and Hoover, who is now

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

*en route*, will do likewise. If any further explanations are necessary, Hoover is fully informed upon the details of this plan.

For your confidential information, we understand the War Department has appointed Stettinius to represent it on the Munitions Council and that a representative of the War Industries Board will also sit on the Munitions Council.

Please repeat this cablegram in full to McFadden.

POLK

File No. 012.2/30c

*The Acting Secretary of State to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*<sup>1</sup>

WASHINGTON, July 16, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I transmit herewith, at the request of the Secretary of War, a memorandum prepared by him with reference to the representative capacity in which Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Second Assistant Secretary of War, is proceeding to Europe to attend the meetings of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council during his stay abroad.

The Secretary of War is particularly anxious to have it clearly understood by the British Government that the presence of Mr. Stettinius in Europe and at the meetings of the Munitions Council shall not be misunderstood, and that the limitations upon his representative capacity are definite, and as stated in this memorandum.

I have [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

[Enclosure]

File No. 800.24/79

*Memorandum of the Secretary of War (Baker), Dated July 11, 1918*

The Secretary of War has examined with interest the plans of the Inter-Allied Munitions Council, and welcomes the opportunity afforded by its organization to discuss with representatives of the Allied Governments arrangements by which the several munitions programs can best be met and to obtain from the Allies the benefit of their experience. Accordingly, Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Second Assistant Secretary of War, who is about to sail for France in connection with business of the War Department, has been directed, as representative of the War Department, to attend meetings of the Council during his stay abroad.

<sup>1</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the French and Italian Ambassadors.

It is understood, of course, that the functions of the Council are purely advisory, and that all questions affecting the allocation of materials and manufacturing facilities of the United States, or the modification of its munitions program, must be referred to Washington for action. Just as the British Minister of Munitions has pointed out that he cannot place in the hands of such a body the "right to overrule him on questions for example of quantity of British steel to be devoted either to merchant vessel or men-of-war construction," just so the United States Government is unable to delegate similar power. However, full discussion of matters relating to munitions cannot but be of advantage to all concerned, and the Secretary of War is glad to avail himself of the opportunity of participating in these discussions and thereby of obtaining the benefit of the experience of the Allied Governments.

File No. 103.94/307h

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1918, 4 p. m.

5175. War Industries Board is sending abroad a group in connection with arrangements for the participation of that Board in the discussion of inter-Allied organizations being formed in Paris and London. Personnel of this mission comprises Mr. Leland L. Summers, member of the Board, who will act as head of the mission, Mr. Chandler P. Anderson, counsel for the War Industries Board on international matters, Mr. George N. Armsby, Mr. Albert M. Patterson, Mr. Lincoln Hutchinson, Mr. John Hughes, Mr. Edward A. Pierce, Mr. Paul Mackall, Mr. Frederick K. Nixon, Mr. Arthur D. Whiteside, Mr. Henry W. Boyd, Mr. Hubert H. Brooker, Mr. Philio B. Galt and Mr. James Bernard Mahoney. This mission is only for the purpose of exchanging views and final action as result of this exchange is to be referred back here for any necessary decision.

Please communicate this information to French Government and repeat to Embassy London for its information and that of the British Government.

POLK

File No. 103.94/301

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, August 15, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received August 16, 6.41 p. m.]

4784. From Summers for Baruch:

Arrived in Paris to attend meeting of Inter-Allied Munition Council August 14. Have had number of meetings on various matters.

Indications are that United States will greatly increase military programme, calling particularly for steel. Italy is gravely short of pig iron and steel, will probably need 100,000 tons of pig iron from us balance of year. Recent military developments indicate France will need some steel for 75 millimeter shells. Am investigating all of these requirements. Suggest that all Allied inquiries for supplies be held up temporarily until programme committees can check. This applies particularly to chlorine for France. In view of the fact we have excess toluol at present, advise if you can let Italy have 250,000 gallons to meet urgent need.

Have agreed to represent Belgian requirements to Allied Mission [*Munitions Council?*]. Great Britain acting for Portugal, France for Greece, and Italy for Servia. This action will tend to keep council down to workable size. Expect to remain in Paris until August 20.

SHARP

File No. 103.94/489

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, August 28, 1918.

[Received August 29, 5.45 a. m.]

1451. For Baruch from Summers, Armsby:

Duly authorized representatives of Ministry of Munitions of Great Britain have accepted following formal agreement for controlling tin. British representative has signed this document:

In order to provide for controlling the procurement and distribution of tin to meet the requirements of the countries participating in this agreement it is agreed as follows:

## I

That an Inter-Allied Tin Executive be established in London composed of one or more representatives of each country participating with authority to carry out the arrangements agreed upon by the appropriate governmental agencies in each country. These arrangements shall be modified and readjusted from time to time by such further agreements as may be required in order to serve the best interests of all concerned.

## II

The present arrangements subject to modification and readjustment as above provided for are:

1. The allocation of pig tin to the countries participating shall be on the basis of the following estimated minimum annual requirements: for the United States 80,000 gross tons, for Great Britain 25,000 gross tons, for France 13,000 gross tons, for Italy 4,500 gross tons.



2. As part of the United States allotment 60 per cent of the Straits tin output shall, during the continuation of this arrangement, be allocated to the United States.

3. During the continuation of this arrangement Great Britain will refrain from purchasing tin from China (except Hong Kong), Mexico, the Dutch East Indies, Central America, South America or Australia or more than 30 per cent of the Hong Kong output. Great Britain and the United States shall both be at liberty to purchase ore and concentrates in South America in such proportions as may be required to enable so far as possible the smelters in both Great Britain and the United States to operate to their full capacity.

4. The French and Italian requirements will be supplied through Great Britain from its allocation of Straits tin and the output of smelters in Great Britain.

[5.] During the continuance of this agreement these countries will refrain from purchasing or procuring tin otherwise than as above specified on the understanding that their requirements will be fully supplied up to the amounts allocated to them. In case the total available annual supply of pig tin from all sources is found to be insufficient to provide the participating countries with the amounts allocated to them as above it is agreed that the respective allotments of the participating countries shall be reduced proportionately and their respective shares readjusted on that basis.

6. All purchases for the countries represented on the Executive exclusive of those already contracted for shall be made under the direction of the Executive. The Executive may appoint a director of purchases in London and buying agencies in any or each of the various producing centers, these agencies to be the sole channel through which the various participating countries are to purchase the quantities of tin allocated to them in accordance with this agreement.

7. As to tin produced in one of the participating countries and forming part of the allocation of another, the purchasing agency of the latter country will be permitted to procure its allotted share at the same price at the place of production as that paid by the producing country for its share. If necessary for this purpose all purchases for account of both countries will be pooled as to price at the place of production and the share of each paid for at the pool price.

8. The Executive may from time to time fix the maximum and/or minimum prices to be paid by the participating countries for pig tin or tin ore in any producing country with the view on the one hand of preventing price raising by competitive buying and on the other of stimulating production by increasing the profits of producers.

9. In case the allocation of markets results in disadvantage to any of the participating countries through inequality of prices in various markets the cost of purchases in the different markets may be equalized by monthly readjustments, so that all participating countries

will pay the same average price for their respective shares. The Executive may require all purchases made for account of more than one of the participating countries in a common market to be pooled as to quantity and price.

10. Each of the countries represented on the Executive shall keep the Executive fully informed of all purchases of tin from all sources for its own use.

11. The Executive will collect information as to the measures adopted in the participating countries for economy in the distribution in the use of tin and may whenever it is considered desirable make recommendations to this end, to any or all of the participating countries.

Representatives of France and Italy have attended conference and are in accord with plan and we expect France and Italy to join agreement. British Government asked Japanese Ambassador to appoint representative to attend conference on this matter but no reply received. British Government now asking Japanese Government through Japanese Ambassador to join in this agreement. Suggest our State Department in Washington make same request through Japanese Ambassador, Washington. Tin Executive has been formed comprising Sir Leonard Llewelyn, chairman, and Tennant representing Great Britain, Armsby and Hughes representing United States and one representative each from France and Italy. Japanese representative will be added if Japan becomes party to the agreement. The Tin Executive appointed executive committee composed of Tennant, Hughes and Armsby to consider all matters of organization, purchasing, price fixing, etc. Consider it very necessary that War Industries Board proceed immediately to arrange sole buying organization in United States to purchase United States allocations under direction of Tin Executive in London and receive and pay for same and distribute to users in United States under control and direction of War Industries Board. As it is of the greatest importance to get this machinery organized and in operation at the earliest possible moment, think best plan is ask United States Steel Corporation to act for War Industries Board in this matter, on same general basis on which they acted for Food Administration on palm oil. If you don't think this plan advisable or if Steel Corporation unwilling to act, will be necessary to have consumers form organization to function in this connection. Also think War Industries Board should arrange to license all users of tin in United States as has already been done in England.

File No. 103.94/363

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, August 31, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received September 1, 3.30 a. m.]

1514. For Baruch from Summers:

Churchill still working on nitrate situation and has advised you of developments. He is very anxious to have your support regarding a program for transporting guns and troops and has cabled you in detail. A special representative is leaving England for Washington carrying plans of this project.

Meeting past week of Inter-Allied Finance Council which I attended insisted that Transportation Council of Versailles consider total Allied railway program and not make inquiry piecemeal for engines, cars, and rails. French had submitted request for additional rails, locomotives and cars, shell steel and barbed wire. Italians had submitted request for rails, cars and locomotives. This was in addition to the Pershing program. I maintained these inquiries should be standardized and submitted to the Transportation Council so that some order of priority and the urgency of the demands could be determined. This action was taken by the Council.

The French Government have made very urgent representations in regard to the existing situation in France. The Germans in their retreat destroyed all railroads and the French insist that to support an advance they must greatly increase the railroad facilities and hold that America must supply these materials. Am leaving for Paris Thursday and will check over the details with Stettinius and Pershing's representative. Made it very plain to Financial Council that America's steel capacity was entirely allocated and that no increased programs could be met without depriving some essential program of steel. [Anderson] is sailing this week and will be able to give you information on the whole situation.

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File No. 103.94/361

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, September 3, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received 1.27 p. m.]

1571. For Baruch from Summers:

Representatives of the French and the Italian Governments have signed inter-Allied tin agreement. Armsby.

PAGE

File No. 103.94/397

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, September 10, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received 11.15 p. m.]

5021. To Baruch for Replogle<sup>1</sup> from Summers:

Your 5539.<sup>2</sup> I have had a number of interviews with Stettinius regarding Munitions Council. He has taken the position that the Council will be of more importance to the Allied Purchasing and to the Program Committee than to the War Department and evidently is counting on withholding active participation of the War Department. Do not think this has been definitely settled as Secretary Baker only arrived yesterday and it is probable Stettinius will reach a decision with him. Asked Stettinius for statement of Army steel requirements and he replied unable to furnish as all programs made here will be reviewed by General Staff in Washington and it will be safest to have War Industries Board get the figures in Washington. He has cabled War Department regarding these. The representatives of France and England criticize the American requirements for shell steel and it may be possible that War Department do not care to attempt to meet criticism that may be made of their extensive programs or defend their estimates. Should War Department definitely decide to withdraw from Munitions Council, there will be no possibility of the Allies challenging their estimates and this may be reason for taking this action.

It is absolutely necessary that total steel requirements be assembled so that allocation can be made. We have notified the various Governments that there is a distinct shortage that will require scaling down of all programs. We are making progress in getting figures of English production and hope to get figures of French and Italian production. The French Government have now withdrawn their request for further quantities of barbed wire and state an error was made in the estimates. I personally feel these programs will have to be carefully scanned to see that nonessential industrial consumption is eliminated and we are constantly working on this. It is of the utmost importance that all Allied requirements be scanned and approved from here before allocation is made there.

SHARP

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<sup>1</sup>J. Leonard Replogle, Director of Steel Supply, War Industries Board.

<sup>2</sup>Not printed.



File No. 103.94/403

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *September 11, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received 11.55 p. m.]

1809. To Baruch from Summers:

Maritime Transport Council has notified programme committees that recent changes in tonnage situation necessitate general survey of shipping and requirements position for cereal year ending August 31, 1919, and asks approximate provisional estimate of requirements. We have not yet received replies to our cables numbers 1450 and W133 seeking information for 1918 and 1919 programmes for jute, flax, hemp, miscellaneous fibers.<sup>1</sup> When may we expect such replies? Otherwise compelled to proceed to best of our ability.

Council further says, "the actual recorded consumption of civilian commodities generally during past year shall be taken as setting the maximum limit for programmes of importation during the ensuing year, this decision, however, not preventing a different distribution as between the Allies or greater importation of a particular commodity than last year where stocks have been used up and a larger importation is required to avoid reduction of consumption. This principle should be borne in mind in preparation of 1919 programme."

Patterson.

PAGE

File No. 103.94/413

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *September 12, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received September 13, 6.30 a. m.]

5054. For Baruch from Summers:

Further conferences indicate War Department are willing to submit programme to Munitions Council and programme committees. Feel this will result in a scaling down of the requirements for steel and explosives as these are so bitterly criticised by both French and English representatives. There is increasing evidence of necessity for scanning Allied requirements and ascertaining uses to which allocation of steel is being put. We should also perfect the organization of programme committees so there will follow the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

allocation of materials the Governments are producing. Am arranging a permanent organization of War Industries Board in Paris. Have you talked with Anderson? Would appreciate your suggestions.

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SHARP

File No. 103.94/416

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

LONDON, September 13, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 2.45 p. m.]

1853. To Baruch from Summers:

Maritime Council requires by September 20:

Approximate statement of amounts necessary to import, year commencing September 1, 1918, ending August 31, 1919. Also what, if any, shipping arranged for. State consumption imports and exports, also stocks on hand, if possible, of each fiber for year ending September 1, 1918, and ports of origin of imports for jute, flax, hemp, sisal and similar fibers.

An immediate answer imperative. Patterson.

PAGE

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File No. 103.94/455

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

PARIS, September 22, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received September 23, 1.50 a. m.]

5159. For Baruch from Summers:

No. 23. We have been continually at work on the American program for shells realizing that it was out of all proportion to the firing program. This is of fundamental importance not alone in steel but in explosives and propellants since it meant the creation of further facilities at a great sacrifice of capital and essential labor. Conferences yesterday and today with Pershing's officers led to conclusion that the program will be materially reduced with a considerable saving of steel, particularly 75 millimeter. Details of this will reach you through War Department as they are cabling revised calculations today.

Am investigating railroad situation and all indications are that with advance of the Allied armies extensive railroad construction will be necessary and it will be impossible to reduce Pershing's program. Will advise you after conference with General Atterbury. We are endeavoring to standardize size and shape of rails so as to use jointly any reserves created here.

SHARP

File No. 103.94/457

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 28, 1918, 8 p. m.*

1693. Summers from Baruch:

Your 2134, September 23, 6 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and your 1858 [1853], September 13, 2 p. m. Distinctly understood program committees would deal only with exportable surplus. Have no statistics regarding domestic stocks and will not submit any. Therefore do not delay program for this information. Legge.<sup>2</sup>

LANSING

File No. 102.94/487

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *September 28, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received September 29, 11.08 a. m.]

5224. To Baruch for Replogle from Summers:

No. 28. Transportation Council and the Steel Committee have passed resolutions that shipment of rails to Pershing, France, Italy and Belgium, is of such vital importance that it is absolutely necessary to maintain rate of shipment requested, namely Pershing's entire 200,000 tons to be shipped at rate of 50,000 tons per month. France's rate of shipment 67,500 tons per month, and Belgium and Italy each 30,000 over remainder of the year.

Artillery committee passed resolution with approval of Stettinius and Wheeler that preference be given to shipments of shell steel for England, France and Italy, over our own factories for next few months to absolutely insure steel going to factories who are now producing regularly, this being the only way to insure finished shells being at the front during this critical period. Stocks of finished shells getting low and must be replenished immediately. Advise Mackall.

SHARP

File No. 103.94/495

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *September 30, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received 7.06 p. m.]

2338. For Baruch from Summers:

Returned to London from Paris on account of important meeting of Transport Council today and Financial Council tomorrow, see

<sup>1</sup> Not printed. <sup>2</sup> Alexander Legge, Vice Chairman, War Industries Board.

our 2279 for Heidrich from Patterson.<sup>1</sup> I want to personally urge you to have all our programmes frankly submitted to programme committees. We do not commit ourselves to abide by any recommendations that programme committees may make, but any refusal to submit our data on the ground that it may interfere with our supplies will be taken advantage of and it is wholly unwarranted. We should deal frankly and honestly with all of these programmes and have nothing to lose thereby but everything to gain. Under these conditions, I want your personal interest in insisting that data be furnished to the programme committees.

See our 2274 for Scott from Patterson.<sup>1</sup> British Government at the solicitation of Andrew Weir<sup>2</sup> will probably insist on 10 per cent compensation for handling Australian wool situation. This is simply compensation to trade interests and [should] not be permitted by us. I shall formally decline to accept this and urge if British Government insist upon it that representation be made by our State Department to British Foreign Office in regard to establishing this precedent [which] may result in similar action on our part in regard to our fundamental commodities. This is an absolute violation of the policy we have been pursuing of giving the Allies the benefit of our prices. If we were to propose a similar charge against wheat and cotton furnished the Allies, you can appreciate what it would mean. . . .

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 File No. 103.94/503

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *September 30, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received October 1, 8.32 p. m.*]

5248. For Baruch from Summers:

No. 29. In further reference to steel requirements, Allied Munitions Council today passed unanimously following resolution:

Resolved that, viewing the military situation and the readiness of the French and British Governments to supply the requirements of artillery ammunition of the American Expeditionary Forces until the output of American plants is available in France, the committee is of the opinion that the demand for shell steel from America by the European Allies, consisting of 110,000 tons per month for France, 60,000 tons per month for Great Britain, and 11,000 tons per month for Italy should for the next sixty days be given priority over the American shell manufacturing program to as great an extent as possible without interfering with the continued manufacture of shells in American plants.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> British Surveyor-General of Supply.



I particularly call your attention to quantity of steel which is now being delivered to War Department. We have shipped for the first half of this year 42,000 tons of shell steel per week, and note the small output of shells that has resulted. It is manifestly impossible to continue to allow this steel to remain unutilized in view of the shortage existing and the heavy consumption now taking place on the front. Above action contemplates utilizing steel promptly with Allied manufacturing facilities, as there is a very heavy consumption of shells under existing conditions of warfare. The urgency of rail requirements has previously been cabled you.

SHARP

File No. 103.94/500

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, October 1, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 9.22 p. m.]

2369. For Baruch and Legge from Summers:

Your 1693 crossed mine to Baruch, No. 2338. Think the position taken in regard submitting data to programme committees may have to be changed. If Great Britain takes the same position with materials where she holds large stocks, efforts of Transport Council will be useless. The entire military programme depends upon available shipping. Transport Council have taken action to insist that all programmes be complete and understand Secretary of War has submitted matter to the President.

PAGE

**Engagement to Disclose American Programs, Made by the Secretary of War, October 2—Discussion of Post-War Economic Cooperation; Refusal of the American Government to Commit Itself**

File No. 103.94/507

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, October 2, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 2.45 p. m.]

2404. For Baruch from Summers:

Your 1693, September 29 [28], my 2369 of October 1. At meeting Maritime Transport Council to-day Secretary Baker definitely committed the United States to fully disclose its shipping programme, its import programme and its programmes of all kinds.<sup>1</sup> Understand the President authorized this. Suggest therefore that effort be made to supply information through our programme committees rather than through other sources.

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 533-534.

File No. 103.94/554

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *October 10, 1918, 6 p. m.*[*Received 11:47 p. m.*]2684. For Baruch, Legge<sup>1</sup> and Scott from Summers in Italy:

Present attitude of Raw Materials Department, of which Weir<sup>2</sup> and Goldfinch<sup>3</sup> responsible heads, renders further negotiations on leather, wool, flax impracticable without complete submission to their wishes.

August 29, made proposal for leather executive which France and Italy promptly accepted and Goldfinch ignored. Weir also ignored Summers' request for decision September 4, and Summers' reference to Chamberlin September 28 has had no action because Chamberlin ill. The reason is proposed location in Washington.

*Wool program committee.* Italy has asked that it be changed to executive but we disagree because Goldfinch as chairman would be unacceptable and if not chairman he would continue to nullify wishes of committee through his control of British supplies. His actions comprise refusal to put motions, refusal to comply with proper resolutions of committee on points within its discretion, excessive British civil and export program, refusal to separate as instructed by committee British provision for Allied military and civil needs which France and Italy demanded, because with all Allied provisions in a single item, they claimed inability to obtain due benefit of allocations. Also as between allocations of wool or tops to be manufactured by them or cloth made in England, they can only with great difficulty obtain the former. This is continuation of Goldfinch policy of 1917 which forced United States into South American market while accumulating 1,250,000 bales in Australia which by present crop is increased to 3,600,000 bales. His claim to Patterson August 1917 was that after providing for France and Italy there was insufficient wool for the United States. French representative states in March 1918 similar claim was made that provision for United States and Italy precluded supply of France.

*Wool purchase.* Goldfinch and Weir continue denial of principle of our claim for equal price treatment whose admission would require revision of contracts with colonies made last June with warning and full knowledge of our attitude. September 10 Goldfinch, formally, and October 9 Weir, informally, refused permission to continue loadings [to avoid issue of price].

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<sup>1</sup> Alexander Legge, Vice Chairman, War Industries Board.

<sup>2</sup> Andrew Weir, British Surveyor-General of Supply.

<sup>3</sup> Sir Arthur Horne Goldfinch, British Director of Raw Materials, War Office.

Flax grown in Ireland or imported is not licensed for export, likewise partial manufacture such as yarns. Gillings threads rationed to individual exporters on basis 1916 who further restrict exports by failure to use allocations. Manufacture and export of woven goods, table linen etc., although luxury, continues on large scale and existing restrictions are in process of removal in spite of assertions of necessity, using all excuses for refusal of War Trade Board requests, and poor Russian prospects reported by consuls. War Trade Board and other requests for licenses as exceptional acts of grace are proven useless and wrong in principle and Patterson is seeking modification of regulations as to yarn and Irish flax without promise of favorable consideration or prompt action pending meeting of Flax Control Board next week. Two thousand tons more Russian probably obtainable.

*General situation.* Commodities of Raw Materials Department are not pooled in Allied interest but used directly to benefit British trade during and after war and avowedly to employ Belfast and Bradford labor. French privately agree and Italian representative authorizes statement [approves] most of this memorandum. . . . We have stated case to Reading who promises consideration of general questions and intimates favorable decision tomorrow on interim wool shipments. Patterson and Boyd.<sup>1</sup>

LAUGHLIN

File No. 763.72119/10437

*The Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy (Crawford) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)*

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1918.

DEAR MR. POLK: With reference to our recent conversation, I think it may be useful to recapitulate the observations I made as to the policy of the British Government in relation to post-war economic problems.

1. The present object of the British Government is not the preparation of economic peace conditions to be imposed on the enemy; there is no intention of committing the Allied Governments in advance to any particular course of action at the peace conference; it is still less the intention of the British Government to prepare a boycott policy to be used instead of securing a victory on the field.

2. The purpose of the British Government is that the requirements of the Associated Nations during the period of reconstruction should be considered on their own merits. In addition to providing for the reconstruction of the territories which have been invaded, it will be necessary to obviate any industrial dislocation, the result of which

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<sup>1</sup> Of the War Industries Board Mission.

would be social unrest, which might in turn delay for an indefinite time the re-establishment of the peaceful international relations which it is the object of the War to safeguard and secure. The Allies have to face a very real danger in this direction, and the Associated Governments are under a moral obligation, in the interests of the Associated peoples, to carry on during the period of reconstruction that co-operation in the economic sphere which is being developed as a result of war conditions.

3. In the reconstruction process the first step is that regular employment in proper conditions of life and at a proper wage should be found for the enormous numbers of men who have during the War been removed from productive industry. As one of the essential steps in attaining this object, the British Government wish for such arrangements for maritime transport, and for such a control of raw materials, as will permit the industries of the Associated countries to be carried on with a proper insurance against fluctuations of price or shortage of supply.

4. A question of even more vital importance for the moment, is that of food, though, as far as Great Britain is concerned, the position will no doubt be relieved to a considerable extent as soon as it becomes possible to devote British tonnage to the importation of supplies from Australia.

5. It is, in fact, likely that the British Empire would be able to provide for most, if not all, of its vital requirements without help from outside, as soon as the British shipping now employed in the service of the Allies and the United States is released. The British Government, however, feel that the requirements of the Allies, and also those of neutrals, must also be considered, and that the close cooperation and mutual help which has been developed by the War among the Associated countries should be continued as far as this policy can be pursued without encroaching upon national independence.

6. Consideration must necessarily be given to neutral interests. The requirements of neutral powers for supplies, as far as a rough estimate can be made of them, must be regarded as an important factor in all programmes, and, indeed, every opportunity which may be furnished by the course of the War should be made use of in order to secure the adherence of these countries to the economic partnership of the Associated Governments, if only in order to extend the control over sources of supply exercised by this partnership.

7. If the principle is thus recognized that the only true basis for supply programmes in connection with raw materials and food is to be found in the requirements of the Allied consumers, the British Government trust that the way will have been opened to consider trade problems from a non-controversial point of view.



8. Immediate consultation among the Allies is necessary in order to ascertain the basis for such a policy, and to submit to the Governments concerned practical proposals for its execution. In the absence of such consultation there is danger that individual members of the Alliance may become prematurely committed to partial schemes, presumed to be in the interest of their own trade, but in fact not in conformity with the general interests of the Associated Governments, and of a nature which might lead to friction among these Governments. The British Government for their part are now constantly being pressed to lay down their economic policy for the post-War period, and soon after Parliament reassembles it will be necessary to make, in accordance with a promise which has been given, some statement on this question. It is strongly felt, however, that no complete statement as to this policy can be made until a full and frank exchange of views has taken place among the Allies, and that the final statement on the subject should be made after consultation, and, if possible, in agreement, with them, and especially after consultation, and in agreement, with the Government of the United States.

9. It is important, therefore, that each of the Governments now associated should, before the War ends, have in their possession an accurate knowledge of the requirements of the other associates, in order that available supplies may be, in the first place, equitably and opportunely distributed in relation to the particular needs of territories overrun by the enemy, and to the more immediate demands of the respective Associated Governments for the restoration and maintenance of their commerce and industry.

Believe me [etc.]

RICHARD CRAWFORD

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File No. 800.6354/1

*The Counselor of the Japanese Embassy (Tanaka) to the Acting Foreign Trade Adviser of the Department of State (Lay)*

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1918.*

[*Received October 25.*]

DEAR MR. LAY: The matter of joining the inter-Allied tin committee, which formed a part of our conversation on the 18th instant, has been duly taken up with my Government who now inform us that a telegraphic instruction was despatched on the 7th of September detailing a member of the Japanese Embassy at London to take part on that committee representing the Japanese Government.

Yours very truly,

T. TANAKA

File No. 800.88/208

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 30, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received November 1, 12.10 p. m.]

5639. For Hoover [from Cotton]:

No. 35. The French and British representatives will present tomorrow to the War Council, which is considering terms of armistice, the following recommendation:

It is therefore recommended that the merchant marine of the Central Powers should be placed under the direction of the Allied Maritime Transport Council and that such supplies of food or other commodities as may be allowed to the Central Powers shall be obtained through the institutions of the existing Allied organizations, and under such terms and conditions as those organizations may be required to impose.

This recommendation was formally adopted by the permanent representatives of Allied Maritime Transport Council and Food Council with whom Summers [and] Sheldon sat, as well as the British and French Foreign Offices and made the following statement as a preamble to it:

The permanent representatives of the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the Food Council have had under consideration possible effect on the year's supply arrangements of the Allies of the conclusion of an armistice pending the conclusion of peace. In this connection they had before them the prospect that additional supplies will in any event be required for neutral countries and for the liberated populations [and] the possibility that those in charge of the armistice and peace negotiations will contemplate also that certain supplies hitherto excluded from Germany through the blockade will during the period now in question be permitted to go through the blockade as one of the conditions or results of the armistice. The representatives in question unanimously agree that, even if only the first class of supplies, that is, those to neutral countries and the liberated populations, are under consideration, it is essential that any supplies so arranged should be made through the existing Allied organization of the Food Council and programme committees, etc., who would within the limits of the authority allowed them determine [needs?], guaranties, sources, terms, and conditions under which the supplies would be furnished and imported, and to make this control effective they consider it essential that all German and Austrian merchant vessels should be placed under the direction of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. It would in their view be disastrous if either neutral or enemy countries were able to go into the markets and purchase supplies required for the vital needs of the Allies in competition, but without co-operation with the Allies, the result of such action being necessarily the entire dislocation of the general economic position now prevailing with disastrous results

to the civilian population of both Allied and neutral countries. To avoid this result it appears essential, first, that the large block of enemy tonnage now idle in enemy or neutral ports should be brought into use; and secondly, that it should be used under Allied direction and in accordance with a general Allied plan. The ultimate disposition of the enemy merchant marine so placed under the direction of the Allied Maritime Transport Council could then await the final peace conference.

These recommendations have been unanimously [adopted] by the permanent representatives of the Food and Transport Councils. The same considerations would appear to apply to raw materials and other commodities generally, and so far as we have been able to consult those representing these commodities, they are in full accord with the above recommendations.

This morning Colonel House stated he has no instructions on this point and would like the view of the Washington Government in regard to it. Similar information goes forward to McCormick and Hurley, and Summers will cable Baruch. Tendency here at this time to consider only purely military terms of armistice, but we all hesitate to contemplate the effecting of an armistice which either leaves enemy powers free to trade or prevents them from trading. It is possible to obtain the results outlined in the recommendation by continuation of blockade but it seems that it is certainly a wiser part to have the principles stated in armistice terms, and it seems certain that better cooperation could be obtained from representatives of existing Allied organizations than by attempting to create new machinery in which the Allies might have weaker and certainly would have no better representatives. We cannot over-emphasize the need for prompt action. Kellogg joins in the recommendation. Cotton.

SHARP

File No. 103.97/715c

*The Secretary of State to the Special Representative (House)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 8, 1918, noon.*

20. For your information. The Department has sent the following despatch to the Embassy at London:<sup>1</sup>

No. 62. For Cotton from Hoover. Your 35. For your general advice and not to be communicated. This Government will not agree to any programme that even looks like inter-Allied control of our economic resources after peace. After peace over one-half of the whole export food supplies of the world will come from the United States and for the buyers of these supplies to sit in majority in dictation to us as to prices and distribution is wholly inconceivable. The same applies to raw materials. Our only hope of securing justice in distribution, proper appreciation abroad of the effort we make

<sup>1</sup> The telegram to London, dated Nov. 8, is numbered 2687.



to assist foreign nations, and proper return for the service that we will perform will revolve around complete independence of commitment to joint action on our part. I understand no provisions have been made in armistice such as recommended your 35. As to any intermediate action during armistice this can be handled as to its political aspects simply as a relaxation of blockade under present arrangements as to cooperation in this matter. As to commercial aspects of feeding Austria, Bulgaria, Turkey and Serbia, the efficient thing is to organize a duplication of Belgian Relief organization. Such machinery can determine the needs, arrange for the relaxation of blockade necessary. Can find help from Allied Governments. Can secure credits from liberated governments or municipalities or banks. Can operate Austrian and other shipping. Can buy and sell and distribute food and take independent action generally of commercial character impossible to the Inter-Allied Food and Maritime Councils. The representation of the Allies in such commission could be proportional to the actual resources in food, money or shipping that they find for its support. Such a commission can cooperate with the Food Administration here directly in food purchases where they will be coordinated with other buyers and in case of purchases in other localities can cooperate through existing agencies to avoid competition. Thus the international disorganization outlined in your 35 will be avoided and above all the extension of the functions and life of Inter-Allied Food and Maritime Councils either now or after peace will be prevented.

We cannot consent to the delegation of neutral buying in the United States to the Inter-Allied Food and Maritime Councils. We must continue to act with entire independence in our commercial relations with all neutrals and Belgian Relief. I trust, therefore, you will in representing this Government discourage any attempts to carry out the proposals of your 35.

The Department approves entirely the policy above set forth. Hoover is leaving within a few days for London on his way to Vienna and will see you in Paris.

LANSING

COOPERATION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ALLIED  
POWERS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF OIL AND OIL-WELL  
EQUIPMENT

File No. 800.6363/-

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the  
Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)*

No. 550

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1918.

[Received May 23.]

MY DEAR MR. PHILLIPS: In our conversation to-day I brought to your attention a question relating to the supply and transport of petroleum products. It may be convenient to you if I state, as briefly as possible, the facts of the case, so far as they are necessary to explain the political aspect of the matter.



Discussions have been proceeding for some time in London, between the British Minister of Shipping and Mr. Walter Long's committee on the one hand and Messrs. Foley and Thomas, representing the American Shipping Board, on the other, as to the scheme to be adopted for the distribution of mineral oil products.

An agreement has been reached on all the main features of an elaborate scheme, which will effect a considerable saving of tonnage. It is very satisfactory to find that the trade interests concerned have come into agreement on all the main points of the scheme, in subordination always to the general interest of the Allies.

There is, however, one point on which a difference of opinion remains. The British scheme contemplates the supply of benzine to southern France and northern Italy from Eastern sources, while Messrs. Foley and Thomas's scheme supplies these regions from North America. It is admitted that Messrs. Foley and Thomas's scheme will effect a somewhat larger saving of tonnage than the British proposal. There is a difference of opinion as to the amount of this additional saving, but it may be taken roughly as represented by 14,000 to 23,000 tons of tankers. On the other hand the Eastern benzine, which under the British scheme would go to France and Italy, cannot find any other market and cannot be stored. It would consequently be necessary to destroy it to the extent of about 150,000 tons per annum; and as we are dependent on these Eastern sources for the supply of toluol for Great Britain and France, it would be necessary to pay, in some form, for these 150,000 tons per annum, the probable cost being about £3,000,000 per annum.

This heavy expenditure is quite out of proportion to the saving of tonnage secured, and there are obvious objections to the destruction of large quantities of a valuable product, for which the requirements may increase as the war proceeds.

But apart from this, there are serious political objections to the course proposed. There can be no doubt that the destruction of the benzine (of which five-sixths comes from Dutch sources) would meet with strong objection on the part of the Dutch Government. Even if on financial grounds the Dutch Home Government's objections to wastage of the benzine could be overcome, it must be remembered that there has been serious difficulty in dealing with the Government of the Dutch East Indies in regard to detentions of tanker steamers. For the smooth working of the revised arrangements for the supply of kerosene to the Eastern markets, which form an important part of the scheme accepted by the American representatives, we need the cordial co-operation of the Dutch Company and of the Dutch Governor-General, and also the free use of tankers under the Dutch flag for the general purposes of the scheme.

From a general standpoint the British Government feel that it would be impolitic to exercise pressure on the Dutch Government at the present moment, owing to the position between Holland and Germany. This consideration makes it important to avoid anything likely to alienate Dutch feeling, and thereby to give a pretext for the acceptance of German terms.

The schemes are no doubt being considered on their merits and on the technical side by the Shipping Board and the Fuel Oil Administration. The matter is brought to the attention of the State Department at the present stage because of the importance of the political aspect which specially concerns that department. I beg to suggest that it is desirable to communicate with the two departments concerned, in order to secure that due weight is given to the political considerations involved.

Yours sincerely,

READING

File No. 800.6363/1

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*<sup>1</sup>

#### MEMORANDUM

A memorandum was addressed to the State Department by Lord Reading on May 21st 1918, in respect to certain aspects of negotiations then proceeding between the two Governments and the oil interests concerned, on the subject of petroleum supplies. One of the principal objects of the scheme under discussion was to supply the Eastern markets to a larger extent from the sources of production in the East instead of from America and so enable America the better to supply the war needs of the Allies in Europe and especially to facilitate the sea transportation of oil by employing tank steamers on the shortest routes.

In the subsequent developments an agreement has been reached on all main principles between the two Governments, and according to the latest advices from London, the matters still to be discussed before a final agreement is reached are principally the prices at which supplies shall be made from the Eastern refineries to the American distributing companies. The agreement provides for a considerable extension of production from the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies, Burmah and Persia, to enable some 200,000 tons additional kerosene (lighting oil) to be produced in the East and supplied to India and China from the nearest source of supply. All existing marketing interests are safeguarded on an equitable basis. Other petroleum products from the above-mentioned fields are used for war purposes.

<sup>1</sup> Covering note of Aug. 22 not printed.

It now becomes essential that the producing and refining companies operating in the East shall receive at the earliest possible date the necessary supplies of oil-well equipment such as steel casing pipes, drive and line pipes, various tools and general supplies.

Much communication has taken place between the British Embassy and War Mission, and the War Trade Board and the other departments concerned in regard to the manufacture and export of such material.

The British Government entirely appreciate the great demands that are made upon the steel industry of the United States for shipbuilding and other essential purposes, but it must be remembered that the efficiency of the Allied navies and the keeping open of the sea routes, and also the aviation and army transport services are dependent on the supply of petroleum products.

Large supplies are being shipped from the United States, but increased production from the Eastern fields and, *a fortiori*, the maintenance of existing production is essential for the reasons already stated. The British Government also attach importance to obtaining supplies of oil from Trinidad, which is also favourably situated.

The British Government have agreed that in supporting applications of the various oil companies in the Dutch East Indies, Sarawak, Burmah, Persia and Trinidad they will exercise the closest scrutiny and control over the demands of the companies to ensure that applications are not made for well equipment for speculative purposes, but only in fields where there is actual production for war purposes and where extensions for these purposes are necessary and practicable or of the highest promise.

The British Government are aware of the contraband regulations forbidding the export of certain classes of material to the Dutch East Indies. They regard it as essential however, under the agreed policy of the American and British Governments as to the increases of Eastern oil production, that the necessary supplies of oil-well equipment endorsed by the British Government should be made an exception to those regulations.

It is suggested that the necessary communication may now be addressed to the War Industries Board who are concerned in the granting of certificates of priority of manufacture, and to the War Trade Board who grant export licenses, and also the Shipping Board and the Oil Division of the Fuel Administration, to admit of certificates and export licenses being granted for the well equipment supplies endorsed by the British Government.

It is particularly suggested that, where manufacture is in hand or complete, and the British Government are satisfied that the supplies are necessary, export licences be granted promptly, in order



that opportunities of sea transport, which in present circumstances may be few and far between, may not be missed.

Recent cables from the British Government show that the delays in granting licences have brought certain companies, in Burmah in particular, to a serious point at which in spite of all economy in the use of old casings, etc., operations will have to be suspended.

It is vital to avert so grave a misfortune in any of the important fields engaged in meeting the war needs of the Allied fleets and forces.

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1918.

[Received August 23.]

File No. 600.119/1192

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1918, 3 p. m.

1113. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 1154. Embassy 1354, August 24, 1 p. m.<sup>1</sup> You will please advise Foreign Office that the Department has received and is giving immediate consideration to the note referred to in your 1354 and on the subject of export of oil-well materials to British oil companies. You will further state that it would assist the Government of the United States in a solution of the various questions raised by this note if the Government of the United States could be officially advised by the British Government whether the latter Government now controls the Royal Dutch Shell Company. If the Government of the United States can deal direct with the British Government on matters affecting this company, the various questions now under consideration can undoubtedly be disposed of much more effectively if they can be taken up with the British Government rather than by negotiations with private corporations.

LANSSING

File No. 600.119/1354

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, September 18, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 10.49 p. m.]

2013. My 1354, August 24, 1 p. m. Following note received from the Foreign Office in reply to representations made in accordance with your 1113, August 31, 3 p. m.:

<sup>1</sup>Not printed: transmitting a note from the Foreign Office similar in tenor to the British Embassy's memorandum, *supra*.



In reply to your inquiry, I have the honor to state that the Royal Dutch Shell group is not in any way controlled by His Majesty's Government. The recent purchase of Royal Dutch shares by His Majesty's Treasury, which has doubtless given rise to the suggestions that His Majesty's Government had acquired control of the group, was effected solely for exchange purposes, and the shares are being disposed of from time to time as circumstances require.

I have the honor to add that His Majesty's Government entirely concur in the proposal that the United States Government should deal direct with them on questions affecting the Royal Dutch Shell group, and I understand that this procedure has actually been in force for some time past.

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File No. 600.119/1419a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 25, 1918, 7 p. m.*

1608. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 1281. For your information only. We have had under discussion the disposition to be made of a large number of applications for the exportation of oil-well supplies, oil and other miscellaneous commodities filed on behalf of the Royal Dutch Shell and its subsidiaries. It is our present opinion that nothing should be done that would in any way interfere with or lessen the production of oil in the region from which the Associated Governments derive their supplies of mineral oil. In consequence, we are disposed to permit without hindrance the exportation of all supplies required to increase the production of mineral oils in the region from which the Associated Governments might secure petroleum. This, notwithstanding the fact that the withholding of licenses for the exportation of oil-well supplies has been instrumental in bringing to a head the negotiations for the pooling and re-routing of the oil production of the Far East. At the same time, we believe that the negotiations for the pooling and re-routing arrangement should be taken in hand by the Governments themselves and a speedy conclusion thereof insisted upon.

So far as concerns the exportation by the companies involved in the negotiations of commodities whose exportation would not aid in the increase of production of petroleum or conflict with existing arrangements for the allocation of oil between the two oil interests as in Scandinavia, we have determined to continue the withholding of the licenses for the purpose of assisting in the conclusion of the arrangement aforesaid.

LANSING

File No. 600.119/1420

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *September 27, 1918, 4 p. m.*[*Received September 27, 4 p. m.*]

2265. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]:

No. 1518. Your 1281, Department's 1608, September 25, 7 p. m. I am familiar with the negotiations that have been taking place here on the question of rerouting of oil tankers and the arrangement as to prices and supplies of oil that would be necessitated by such rerouting. I have seen cable from Petroleum Mission No. 50<sup>1</sup> from Foley and Thomas for Hurley and Requa.<sup>2</sup> I understand that if the proposal contained therein is approved by our Government, a satisfactory solution will have been found for these vexed questions that have been under discussion for a long time. This being the case, I think you would be warranted in granting licenses for the exportation of oil-well supplies, etc., and I should like to know your decision as soon as possible as the British Government have expressed themselves as very desirous of these licenses being granted.

PAGE

File No. 600.119/1420

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 4, 1918, 4 p. m.*

1803. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 1340. Embassy's 2265, your 1518, September 27, 4 p. m. Without waiting for the conclusion of the rerouting agreement, we decided some days ago to grant immediately licenses for the export of oil-well supplies where urgently needed to continue the production, when such production was in any way necessary for war needs. Oil-well supplies will be insufficient for American and Allied needs, and it will be necessary for all parties to reduce demands to the minimum. Sir Henry Babington-Smith at our request is supplying schedule of British necessary requirements, including Dutch Shell. Licenses will be granted at once for supplies urgently needed to be deducted from allotment to be subsequently determined.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> Mark L. Requa, General Director Oil Division, U. S. Fuel Administration.

File No. 800.6363/1

*The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)*

No. 305

WASHINGTON, November 7, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to refer to your note dated August 22, 1918,<sup>1</sup> and the accompanying memorandum<sup>2</sup> relative to the supplies required from the United States for the operation of the oil fields in the East and in Trinidad. The interested department of this Government states that steps have been taken to provide the needed articles; and that an understanding respecting the equipment satisfactory to the interests concerned has been reached.<sup>3</sup>

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

THE FAR EAST IN RELATION TO THE WAR<sup>4</sup>

Discussion of the Transportation of Chinese Troops to Europe—Negotiations Regarding the Purchase of Ships from Japanese Builders and the Export of Steel to Japan—Negotiations for the Chartering of Japanese Ships—Arrangements Regarding the Deportation to Australia of German Subjects in China—Assurances to China Regarding Treatment at the Peace Conference

File No. 763.72/8434

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 6, 1918.

[Received January 7, 3.19 p. m.]

For Secretary of Treasury [from Crosby]:

No. 33. Chinese question presented to Council of French Ministers; Council stated subject had not been officially considered by their War Cabinet, it was submitted following day with result that French Government asks for some delay before making final decision. Bonar Law also consulting his Government which had not yet officially considered matter. Understand from French that Chinese Government has not yet presented matter to France. Objections to suggestions by British and French based chiefly on the question as to whether tonnage should be allocated for transport of Chinese troops in the present critical situation, also in London certain Government officials assert that 50,000 Chinese coolies now in France,

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 619.<sup>3</sup> According to an attached note, the statement of the War Trade Board was made Nov. 4.<sup>4</sup> For papers relating to the policy and activities of the Allied and Associated Powers in Siberia and Manchuria, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vols. II and III.

relatively ineffective because the lack of interpreters. I have urged that action by both Governments be in common as soon as possible. Will wire correspondingly. Crosby.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/8582a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 10, 1918, 2 p. m.*

Has Japanese Government replaced military administration in South Sea islands with civil administration? If so mail copies of regulations. Newspapers report that Government intended to make the change December 1.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/8434

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 11, 1918, 4 p. m.*

3055. For Crosby [from Treasury]:

Your No. 33 for Treasury. Regarding matter of tonnage and whether it can be allocated for transport of troops you will please state that that can be taken up in future when we are faced with practical execution of plan. Please urge concurrence in principle on part of both Governments and state that political situation in China will be much improved by an evidence on part of Allies to allow her cooperation even if practical difficulties actually prevent it.

POLK

File No. 763.72/8523

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *January 15, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[Received 10.37 p. m.]

For Polk and Secretary of the Treasury [from Crosby]:

No. 47. Answering State Department's telegram 3055. Bonar Law, who took Chinese question to his Government from Council, authorizes me to say that proposals of our Government in this matter are in principle adopted by his Government, and that attention will promptly be given by British shipping authorities in connection with others, to determine when necessary transport can be obtained



for moving troops in question. Your telegram reached me Paris too late to be directly presented to French Ministers on Council but matter has again been presented in the light desired to French Government from here and am expecting similar action to that of British Government. Will wire soon as decision known. Crosby.

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File No. 195/171

*The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)*

No. 365/C-1

WASHINGTON, *January 14, 1918.*[*Received January 16.*]

MY DEAR MR. POLK: I wish to acknowledge receipt of your favor of January 10th informing me that at present the War Trade Board is negotiating with agents of private Japanese ship owners and ship builders with a view of securing Japanese tonnage for Allied war uses, and pending these negotiations you desire that other nations shall not negotiate for Japanese tonnage.<sup>1</sup>

I wish to inform you that I have cabled to my Government to this effect and as soon as I will receive their reply I will not fail to communicate with you again.<sup>2</sup>

Sincerely yours,

MACCHI DI CELLERE

File No. 763.72/8569

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *January 18, 1918, 5 p. m.*[*Received 11.30 p. m.*]

8298. For Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury from Crosby:

No. 50. Am advised through Bignon, French delegate on Council, that his Government assents in principle to the movement of Chinese troops referred to in State Department telegram 3055, January 11, expressing appreciation of Chinese Government's offer and will undertake, as soon as possible, inquiry into possibility obtaining necessary transport.

PAGE

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Jan. 10 not found.

<sup>2</sup> See also telegram No. 7679, May 10, to the Ambassador in Great Britain, *post*, p. 647, and letter of July 11 from the Italian Ambassador, *post*, p. 656.

File No. 763.72/8583

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, January 20, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received January 21, 9.18 a. m.]

Your January 10, 2 p. m. No decree has been issued transferring the islands from military to civil administration and the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs states that no such transfer has been effected or so far as he knows is contemplated by the Government.

MORRIS

File No. 694.119/57

*The Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy (Crawford) to the Assistant to the Counselor for the Department of State (Auchincloss)*

WASHINGTON, January 21, 1918.

[Received January 22.]

DEAR MR. AUCHINCLOSS: With reference to your letter of January 10th<sup>1</sup> regarding negotiations between the War Trade Board and Japanese shipping firms, I enclose herewith copy of a memorandum which was handed to the State Department on August 24th last and which appears to cover the point raised in your letter.<sup>2</sup>

Yours very truly,

RICHARD CRAWFORD

File No. 694.119/59a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1918, 2 p. m.

For your information. When our embargo commenced to operate it stopped export of over 300,000 tons ship plates and shapes purchased by Japanese at average price above 8 cents per pound. Sato on behalf his Government conducted negotiations with us until December for licensing this steel, when he officially requested us to transfer negotiations to Japanese shipbuilding concerns. Since then we have been negotiating with Suzuki, Asano, Mitsui and Kuhara, purchasers respectively of 180,000, 50,000, 40,000 and 28,000 tons said steel.

<sup>1</sup> Letter of Jan. 10 not found.<sup>2</sup> Memorandum of Aug. 24, 1917, states: ". . . the acquisition and employment of Japanese tonnage can be left entirely in the hands of the United States Government together with the supplying of all ship-building material." *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 685.*

January 26 Suzuki representatives agreed to cable their firm in Japan for authority to sell Shipping Board 250,000 deadweight tons of ships deliverable United States port at rate per month in excess of 30,000 tons from April to November inclusive, at price of \$225 per ton, if we would license export 125,000 tons their steel. Asano sailed 24th on *Korea* agreeing to recommend his firm give us 100,000 deadweight tons ships between now and June 30 deliverable United States at \$225 per ton in consideration our release their 50,000 tons of steel. Asano also intended recommending that his firm give additional ships at price of about \$175 per ton deadweight if we would license new steel at current price about  $3\frac{1}{4}$  cents per pound. Kuhara representative after attempting unsuccessfully to get basis of exchange modified to one ton of steel for one ton ships stated last night he would take up with his principals matter of making us a proposition based upon one ton steel for two tons ships but involving our releasing new steel at current prices to supplement their purchased steel at the higher prices.

Our proposals to date based upon steel already purchased because we are not yet certain we can spare any additional steel from our shipbuilding program; but for immediate deliveries of substantial tonnage at price in neighborhood of \$175 per ton deadweight we would urge delivery of limited amount new steel at current prices on same basis of one steel to two ships conditioned on old steel being taken in full. All large shipbuilding firms should be notified our basis and desire to trade. If by any means you can ascertain likelihood of our being able to trade with Japanese firms on this basis we would appreciate information, also your advice in the matter.

LANSING

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File No. 894.85/4a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1918, 7 p. m.

In connection with the desire of the Allied Governments greatly to increase the shipping in the transatlantic service during the next six months, please say to the Foreign Office that the American Government, knowing the desire of Japan to give all possible aid in the prosecution of the war, requests the Imperial Japanese Government to charter to the United States as large a portion of the Japanese tonnage as possible. The American Government suggests that out of the 2,500,000 tons belonging to Japan now in the Pacific service 600,000 tons might be chartered to the United States without any serious inconvenience to Japan. The Department trusts that

the suggestion will receive favorable consideration. It is hoped that deliveries can begin at once and extend over a period not later than March 31.

The American Government proposes—

- (1) That the charters be made to the United States Shipping Board;
- (2) That the period of the charter be six months;
- (3) That the rates to be paid by the United States Shipping Board be \$9 per deadweight ton a month, while the vessels are running in the American-European trade and that for any vessel used in trades other than to Europe and the Atlantic islands the rate be \$7 per ton;
- (4) That the United States Government will agree to bear the war risk insurance on the basis of a valuation of \$200 per ton on steamers up to 10 years old and \$175 per ton on those from 10 to 20 years old;
- (5) That either the New York Produce Exchange form of time charter party or the United States Government form be used.

The Japanese Government will be glad to learn that the American Government acting with Great Britain and France has been able during the past three months to arrange charters with neutrals for more than 1,500,000 deadweight tons of shipping. The American people count much upon the friendship of Japan and will be deeply stirred on learning that the Japanese Government have agreed to these proposals of the United States.

The assistance that will thus be given by Japan will be of the greatest importance to the common cause of our two nations in the war which they are waging together against the Central European Powers.

LANSING

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File No. 694.119/60

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, February 10, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received February 11, 9.26 a. m.]

Replying to your telegram January 30, 2 p. m., Captain Horne<sup>1</sup> and Mr. Frazer<sup>2</sup> have kept in close relations with Japanese ship-builders since negotiations commenced. They have advised me of all developments and since receipt of telegram have guided me in careful investigation of the shipping conditions here. British and

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<sup>1</sup> Frederick J. Horne, naval attaché of the Embassy.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Frazer, jr., Consul at Kobe.



French Embassies have submitted all their confidential data and their experts have generously cooperated. Captain Horne and Mr. Frazer associate themselves with me in following conclusions.

It would not be possible for Japanese shipbuilders to supply more than 400,000 to 500,000 deadweight tons ships within one year and possibly less on account of increasing labor troubles. Shipbuilders badly in need of steel plates. Every reason to believe that a trade can be made. Would suggest Shipping Board authorize Embassy to convey to shipbuilders, treating with group or with individuals, firm offer for purchase of 500,000 deadweight tons ships at per ton \$225, with the release of 250,000 tons of steel, yards taking old steel first at contract prices and balance of steel at [omission] per ton. Such an offer is more than fair to shipbuilders. Our calculations show profit to them of at least 18 per cent net.

Advise us promptly [to] complete transaction what [*whether?*] arrangements include value of licensed steel available for use other than selling single [*building ships for?*] United States.

MORRIS

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File No. 763.72119/1247

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 11, 1918, 5 p. m.*

Department's December 18, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> The Department learns that the Chinese Government requests of powers at war with Germany and Austria (1) that China be guaranteed against any demands which the enemy may make as a result of the deportation to Australia of enemy subjects or because of other measures against enemy trade and property, and (2) that China be assured of favorable treatment at the peace conference.

If such requests come to you you will say that in so far as the American Government is competent so to do it will (1) give the guarantee asked and (2) assure China of the same consideration at the peace conference as other powers concerned.

For your information and guidance:

The American Government prefers to act independently, not being in formal alliance with other powers. Your action even though similar to that of certain of your colleagues ought to be separate.

LANSING

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<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 709.*

File No. 763.72119/1247

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

## MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has received the Memorandum No. 157 of February 5, 1918,<sup>1</sup> from His Britannic Majesty's Embassy, communicating a report of His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking to the effect that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed him of the decision of the Chinese Government to deport to Australia all enemy subjects and had proposed an exchange of notes by which China would be guaranteed against any demands which the enemy might subsequently make as a result of the action decided upon and in connection generally with China's entry into the war.

The report of His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking further stated that the Chinese Government desired that, if possible, an assurance be added that the peace conference would grant favorable treatment to China. The opinion is expressed by His Britannic Majesty's Government that the Allied Governments ought to agree to give the guarantee as requested and assure the Chinese Government that its interests will receive at the peace conference equal consideration with those of her allies. The memorandum states that hope is entertained by His Britannic Majesty's Government that the American Government will concur in these views, and that the American Minister at Peking will be instructed to cooperate with the British Minister in preparing an exchange of notes on the lines indicated.

The American Government is sensible of the courtesy shown by His Britannic Majesty's Government in the memorandum under acknowledgment and has noted with lively satisfaction the decision of the Chinese Government to deport enemy subjects to Australia.

The American Government is happy, too, to find itself sharing the opinion of His Britannic Majesty's Government that the guarantees asked by the Chinese Government should be given by the other Governments at war with Germany and Austria.

The American Minister at Peking has already been instructed to assure the Chinese Government that in so far as the American Government is competent so to do the guarantees asked will be given. The American Government regrets to find itself unable fully to comply with the request of His Britannic Majesty's Government. The Minister's instructions do not permit him to participate in a

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed; a note, in terms similar to those of the British memorandum summarized in this reply, was transmitted by the French Ambassador under date of Feb. 11, and was answered by a note, dated Feb. 20, in terms similar to those of the memorandum here printed. (File No. 763.72/8875.)

joint note of guarantee. In accordance with the long-standing policy of the American Government he has been directed to arrange an independent exchange of notes, the purport of which, however, will be substantially as proposed by His Britannic Majesty's Government. The American Government is glad to believe that such a measure of cooperation meets in effect the request preferred in the memorandum.

WASHINGTON, *February 14, 1918.*

File No. 763.72115/3271

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, *February 20, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[*Received February 20, 11.36 a. m.*]

Your February 19, 7 p. m.<sup>1</sup> British Minister informs me the British Government hopes that the American Government may be willing to share with it and the French the expenses of deportation and internment of enemy subjects from China. I have asked him to suggest the matter be taken up with you at Washington with full information on probable cost.

REINSCH

File No. 103.95/344b

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 21, 1918, 8 p. m.*

Yesterday Japanese Embassy delivered us cable containing offer of Japanese shipbuilders to deliver us ships at rate of one and one-half tons deadweight for each ton steel bought by them at high prices hereinafter called old steel and ships at rate of two tons deadweight for each ton steel delivered them at our present Government price hereinafter called new steel. Total ships to be delivered 300,000 tons during this year. Deliveries to commence five months after receipt by them of steel. This proposal is entirely unsatisfactory both as to time of delivery and amount of tonnage. We have become convinced that it is impossible to continue negotiations by cable or to deal with representatives of shipbuilders here. Please take up negotiations there.

1. Your effort should be directed to having shipbuilders secure for us ships now in water for immediate delivery our ports. For all such (provided total tonnage shall be not less than 200,000 and

<sup>1</sup>No record of a Department telegram of this date and hour; possibly meant for the Minister's telegram of Feb. 19, 6 p. m., not printed. (File No. 763.72119/1347.)

all delivered prior to April 30 complete) you may agree to pay shipbuilders \$265 a ton and deliver to them at our ports one ton of old steel for each ton and a half deadweight ships. These ships must be not less than 5,000 tons each nor more than two years old and have speed of at least ten knots.

2. For such new ships as they can deliver at our Pacific ports on or before May 31 or ships in water as above (provided they shall have agreed to 1 above and the total tonnage under this clause be not less than 200,000 complete) you may agree to pay shipbuilders \$265 a ton and deliver to them at our ports one ton steel for each ton and half ships.

3. For such new ships as they can deliver at our Pacific ports on or before June 30 (provided they agree to 1 and 2 above and that the total tonnage delivered under this clause be not less than 200,000 complete) you may agree to pay them \$225 a ton and deliver to them at our ports one ton steel for each ton and half ships (old steel until contracts exhausted and then new steel) completed.

4. For such new ships as they can deliver at our ports during July, August and September (provided they agree to 1, 2 and 3 above and that the total tonnage each month be not less than 100,000 complete) you may agree to pay them \$200 per ton and deliver them our ports one ton new steel for each two tons ships.

The figures we have given you both price and steel are maximum and within them you will use your own judgment in trading. As you know the shipbuilders are now grouped and must be dealt with as a body. In asking that they secure ships in the water for immediate delivery we have in mind that the steel and price we are authorizing you to offer may induce them to buy ships from owners. We have never made them any offer better than \$225 a ton and delivery of one ton steel for two tons ships. Highly important you keep us fully advised your progress in negotiations. We shall do nothing more here.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72/9109

*Memorandum of the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs  
(Williams)*

[Extract <sup>1</sup>]

*February 25, 1918.*

Mr. Laboulaye of the French Embassy called on February 21 at 5 p. m., and stated that the French Government was very eager to have the Chinese send a military expedition to the western battle front. He hoped that the United States would support the proposal.

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<sup>1</sup> Portion not printed is a discussion of proposed currency loan to China.



I informed him of the telegram received from Mr. Crosby to the effect that the British Government was of opinion that no tonnage could be spared for the transport of such an expedition, that a great deal of tonnage would have to be withdrawn from present uses to transport American troops and that this would render impossible a supply for the other purpose.

Mr. Laboulaye expressed surprise, but added that of course France would prefer to have the American troops, but that from a political viewpoint the other was to be regarded as of great importance. I agreed with him in this statement.

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File No. 763.72115/3277

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

No. 209

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy present their compliments to the Department of State and have the honour to inform them that a telegram has been received from the Foreign Office from which it appears that it is understood that a telegram has been addressed by the United States Minister at Peking to the Department of State, recommending that the United States Government should accept their share of the cost of transporting to Australia the enemy subjects who are to be deported from China and also the cost of their internment. The total number of enemy subjects in question is about 3,390 of whom 1,724 are women and children. The approximate cost of transportation has been calculated on a commercial basis at £55 and £25 respectively for saloon and steerage passengers. The cost of internment in Australia has, moreover, been estimated as follows:—

The probable cost of guard, maintenance, clothing, etc., 3/6d a day all round. The cost of erecting temporary buildings would be about £100,000, but it is possible that accommodation could be found in unused buildings in several country towns, and in this case the expenditure on quarters for single men, say to the number of 1,000, would be about £7,000 only.

The British Embassy are instructed to ask the State Department to be so good as to inform them at as early a date as possible, whether the United States Government are prepared to share the above expenses.

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1918.

[Received February 26.]

File No. 763.72119/1360

*The Department of State to the British Embassy*

## MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has the honor to acknowledge the receipt on February 21 of the memorandum of His Britannic Majesty's Embassy,<sup>1</sup> relating to the decision of the Chinese Government to deport to Australia all enemy subjects in China and modifying somewhat the statement made in the Embassy's memorandum of February 5, 1918.<sup>2</sup> It is noted that a recent telegram from His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Peking to the British Foreign Office explains that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs did not actually ask for an assurance in regard to favorable treatment of China at the peace conference and that the Embassy therefore is instructed to inform the State Department that His Britannic Majesty's Government no longer consider it necessary that the Allied Governments should give the assurance suggested in regard to the consideration of China's interests at the peace conference, but only to guarantee her against reprisals by the enemy.

The Department of State in replying to the Embassy's note of February 5, 1918, had the honor to state that the American Minister at Peking was some time before instructed to give the Chinese Government, in so far as the American Government was competent so to do, the assurance that their interests would have the same consideration in the peace conference as those of other powers at war with Germany and Austria. The American Government understood from the representations made by the American Minister in Peking that China desired such assurances and the American Government trusts that His Britannic Majesty's Government, which were disposed to give this assurance when under the impression that China had asked it, would yet give it should the request be made.

WASHINGTON, *February 27, 1918.*

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed; the British memorandum is dated Feb. 14 (File No. 763.72119/1360); a note in similar terms was transmitted by the French Ambassador, under date of Feb. 20, and was answered by a note, dated Mar. 6, in terms similar to those of the memorandum here printed (File No. 763.72115/3288).

<sup>2</sup>Not printed; see the memorandum addressed to the British Embassy, Feb. 14, *ante*, p. 631.

File No. 894.85/5

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *February 28, 1918, midnight.*

[*Received March 1, 11.40 a. m.*]

Japanese Government today handed me a lengthy memorandum in reply to request contained in your telegram February 9, 7 p. m. The following is a summary:

Desiring to contribute whatever lies at our disposal towards the common cause of the Allies, Japanese Government proposes the following plan of adjustment:

- (1) To place at the service of the United States Government 150,000 dead weight tons for six months;
- (2) Delivery to be effected at the earliest possible date, the first 100,000 tons leaving Japan by the end of April and the remaining 50,000 tons by the end of May;
- (3) Charges for the use of the ships to be not less than the charter rate fixed by the Inter-Allied Chartering Committee;
- (4) The United States Government to extend to the crews of such ships the same measure of relief as is accorded to the crews of American citizens on board the ships requisitioned by the United States in case of death, injury, illness or other casualties while on duty;
- (5) Suitable formula to be agreed upon concerning the contract or arrangement for use of the ships.

Japanese Government includes the following explanations. Total dead weight tonnage of Japanese shipping in the Pacific service end of December was not more than 600,000 dead weight tons. Total tonnage afloat registered in Japan approximately 2,021,000 tons. Total tonnage of Japanese ships over 5,000 dead weight not over 1,350,000 dead weight tons, which represents the whole of Japanese merchant fleet fit for ocean service. Regular liners in foreign service 159,000 dead weight tons. Necessary to keep these intact for the maintenance of supplies, mails, of the other service. In addition to regular liners, 124,000 tons now in employ of Allies. Remaining available tonnage therefore not more than 266,000 tons of which Japanese Government has decided to set apart 50,000 tons for the transportation of munitions and supplies between France, Japan and (French Colonies?). Deliveries by March 30 cannot be made as ships must be recalled from distant seas. Charterage here now \$20 per ton but Japanese Government will make up to us the difference as well as possible difference in war risks.

As the Japanese Diet is now in session and as the offer here made will require an appropriation to meet the obligation assumed by the Government, an immediate answer is imperative.

MORRIS

File No. 894.85/5

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 2, 1918, 7 p. m.*

Your February 28, midnight. We accept the proposal of the Japanese Government to charter to the United States Government 150,000 tons deadweight steamers for six months, delivery to be effected at the earliest possible date. All conditions as enumerated in your cable, it being understood, of course, that these steamers all have the privilege of trading to and from Europe and Atlantic islands. We agree to pay inter-Allied charter rates, which for your information, are as follows:

4000 to 6000 tons deadweight.....	43/6
Over 6000 tons deadweight.....	41/6

these rates being for transatlantic service. United States Government will treat the Japanese crews in the same manner as American crews, as requested.

We thank you for explanation about total tonnage of Japan which is of value in connection with all these considerations.

Department wishes you to express to Minister for Foreign Affairs the appreciation of this Government for the cooperation shown by the Japanese Government in this very important matter. Department gratified at result of your negotiations.

POLK

File No. 763.72115/3271

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1918, 6 p. m.*

Your February 20, 4 p. m. Department today informing British Ambassador, Washington, that Government of the United States is willing to incur its share of expenses of deportation and internment of enemy alien subjects from China.<sup>1</sup>

POLK

<sup>1</sup> The memorandum conveying this information, prepared as an answer to the British Embassy's memorandum of Feb. 23, *ante*, p. 634, bears annotations showing that it was not sent (File No. 763.72115/3277).



File No. 894.85/8

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, March 15, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received March 16, 3.55 a. m.]

For McCormick:

Your telegram March 13.<sup>1</sup> On March 1, I made a proposal to Japanese shipbuilders as follows: For not less than 200,000 deadweight tons of ships, with conditions specified in your telegram of February 21, 8 p. m., as to size, age, speed, etc., to be delivered at Pacific coast of the United States not later than April 30, we would pay \$250 per ton and would deliver one ton steel under old contracts for each one and one-half tons deadweight ships received.

On March 14, Japanese shipbuilders stated that after continued efforts they were unable to secure control of over 100,000 deadweight tons ships which they could deliver within next five months as follows: May, one ship 6,850 tons; June, two ships 14,000 tons; July, three ships 24,800 tons; August, three ships 27,350 tons; and September, three ships 26,150 tons.

They offered these twelve ships on following terms which I have refused:

- (1) Three tons deadweight ships for each 2¼ tons steel now under contract including plates, shapes, and bars;
- (2) Aside from the above, other materials necessary for construction of ships, such as pig iron, furnaces, tubes, etc., to be furnished irrespective of the above-mentioned ratio of exchange;
- (3) Price \$270 per ton deadweight for delivery at Pacific port of United States including Vancouver on September 30, 1918 (October 30, 1918, in the case of deliveries at an Atlantic port), for those ships delivered prior to September 30 premium of 50 cents gold per deadweight ton per diem to be paid;
- (4) Place of delivery as above at shipbuilders' option;
- (5) Place of inspection in Japan or at United States port at shipbuilders' option;
- (6) Export licenses to be issued immediately on conclusion contract;
- (7) All priority certificates to be issued for steel materials designated by shipbuilders.

I would recommend purchase of these twelve ships on following terms and authority is requested to make firm offer to this effect:

- (1) Ships and their delivery dates as specified by restrictions above;

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

- (2) One and one-half tons deadweight ships for one ton of steel plus any steel which is required for completion of certain designated ships now under contract with British and French Governments for construction, certificate of identity to be required from official representatives of these two Governments proving specific amounts of steel materials required for this purpose;
- (3) Prices for May delivery \$300 per ton deadweight, June delivery \$285, July delivery \$270, August delivery \$255, and September delivery \$240;
- (4) Delivery and inspection to be at Japanese port—this is because delivery at United States port will mean a voyage under incompetent Japanese crews with very probable result that ships will not be accepted upon arrival;
- (5) Freight to be carried under contracts made by shipbuilders and to their profit;
- (6) All priority certificates to be issued first for delivery and shipment of such steel materials as may be required for completion of ships under construction for Governments of Great Britain and then [*France?*] as designated by shipbuilders.

These recommendations are made because investigation has convinced me that available tonnage which shipbuilders can obtain has been exaggerated and it is believed this offer contains the very largest amount of tonnage which they can secure considering restrictions imposed by us and the ships we are receiving by charter, and without including regular subsidized liners, which are under Government control. I have had assistance of representatives of French and British Governments who have been engaged in purchase of ships in Japan for past three years, and who know definitely what ships there are and by whom they are owned.

The actual situation is that shipbuilders have not ships to trade with and are compelled to bargain in the open market with owners. I am now informed [it is] doubtful whether shipbuilders can induce owners to accept offer materially different from the one already made by them. Would you consider acceptance of that offer under any circumstances? Better terms can be made for new construction.

MORRIS

File No. 894.85/8

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 20, 1918, 7 p. m.*

Yours, March 15, 8 p. m. Mr. Hurley feels [we] cannot pay such high prices to Japanese builders without causing complications with

our American building program. We prefer to deliver more steel and secure lower price for ships. You may therefore make final offer for immediate acceptance as follows:

1. We buy twelve ships specified in your telegram of approximately 100,000 tons deadweight now constructed and under construction. We license for each deadweight ton of ships one ton of steel now under contract including plates, shapes and bars. No ship less than 6,000 tons. Age, speed, etc., as specified our telegram February 21, 8 p. m. Inspection and acceptance of workmanship and material at Japanese yards. Shipbuilders assume responsibility for delivery in good order at United States port. Freight to United States to be carried under contracts made by shipbuilders and to their profit. Payments for ships to be made on delivery at United States ports as follows: May \$265 and June delivery \$260 per deadweight ton, July delivery \$250, August \$240, September \$225.

We will endeavor to arrange about steel required for completion of any British and French Government ships with their representatives here and about priority certificates but this cannot be made condition of present negotiations.

Above prices and exchange of steel are our best terms and if you can do better hope you will do so but do not take too much time over negotiations. Prefer to close at once in order to secure the ships.

2. *New construction.* In addition to the foregoing we authorize you to arrange with Japanese shipbuilders for 200,000 deadweight tons ships to be built out of new steel for which ships we will pay on the basis of the present cost of building in American yards which is \$175 per deadweight ton. We will furnish 100,000 tons of steel at American Government price of  $3\frac{1}{4}$  cents per pound for plates, 3 cents per pound for shapes and 2.9 cents per pound for bars, delivery f.o.b. mills.

Inspection, approval and place of delivery as above. Date of delivery: 50,000 tons October, 50,000 November, 50,000 December and 50,000 January. No ship less than 6,000 tons. Following specifications: speed to be not less than  $10\frac{1}{2}$  knots; to class to 100A1. Lloyd's classification.

Japanese shipbuilders to receive the profit for freight to the United States on these ships built out of new ordered steel as well.

Ordinary Japanese specifications to be used as basis for building subject to such minor modifications as may be desired by us, each shipbuilding company to give suitable American bankers' guarantee.

Proposition 1 may be accepted without proposition 2 but proposition 2 cannot be accepted unless proposition 1 is accepted.

LANSING

File No. 894.85/9

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, March 26, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received 6.15 a. m.]

Shipbuilders today in each case accepted your first proposition, that is, for twelve ships on terms as specified your [my] telegram of March 15, 8 p. m. All twelve ships over 6,000 tons except one 12-knot steamer of 5,000 tons which on recommendation of naval attaché I included and hope you will approve.

Am I authorized to execute formation [formal?] contract and will you authorize employment of counsel? Maritime shipbuilders would appreciate payment on account of purchase price at time of signing contract and suggest 20 per cent. I would recommend that some payment be made at that time if possible.

Shipbuilders urgently request that following provisions may be included in formation [formal?] contract but these together are not conditions of acceptance:

Clause 1. Shipbuilders to have the privilege of selecting the kinds or classes of materials to be taken over under this arrangement.

Clause 2. License for shipment covering the materials (plates, shapes) to be issued immediately on conclusion of the contract to agents of Asano Company and Suzuki Company in the United States.

Clause 3. Tonnage of steel materials corresponding to the tonnage of any particular ship offered, to be delivered to builders at a United States port to be designated by them, at the latest not later than the time of sailing of that steamer from Japan. Materials already at a port to be shipped immediately.

Clause 4. Bankers confirmed credit to be issued guaranteeing that the payment will be duly made in New York.

Clause 5. Delivery of the ships to be made, magazine iron cased [in good order?], at a port on the Pacific coast of the United States (including Vancouver) or on the Atlantic coast of the United States at deliverer's option.

Clause 6. Twenty per cent of the total purchase money to be paid on signing of the contract.

Clause 7. License for shipment covering pig iron, tubes, furnaces, chains, etc., required for completion of these specific ships to be issued; also facilities to be given in Korea [regard to?] purchase of the same. These materials cannot be obtained in Japan at any price.

Clause 8. Contracts to be made and signed separately by each of the shipbuilders.

Shipbuilders are working on your second offer for 200,000 tons to be built and expect to report to me Wednesday. Some yards are not



equipped to build 6,000 tons ships (as herein). Could you reduce basis to 5,000 tons and speed to basis of 10 knots?

MORRIS

File No. 894.85/9

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 30, 1918, 4 p. m.*

Your March 26, 1 a. m. You are authorized to execute contract and employ counsel. We will pay 20 per cent upon signing contract, payment to be made United States. We approve clause 1 with understanding that it refers to plates and shapes ordinarily used in ship construction. We approve clause 2. We approve clause 3. Clause 4 satisfactory. We approve clause 5 excluding Vancouver. Clause 6 satisfactory. Clause 7—Materials referred to in this clause also scarce here and before making unqualified commitment we must know approximately quantity required and approximate dates of delivery. Clause 8 satisfactory, but will depend upon you for financial responsibility of each shipbuilder.

Second proposition: Will accept few 5,000 ton and 10-knot speed vessels but we prefer larger capacity and greater speed mentioned in earlier cable. Presume this concession required for some particular yard. Can you estimate number of ships to which this concession would be asked to apply?

If Japanese have any further ships for delivery prior to October 1 you are authorized to buy same on same terms as proposition 1 in our cable of March 19 [20].

LANSING

Purchase by the United States Shipping Board of 12 Japanese Ships—Abandonment of the Project of Sending Chinese Troops to Europe—Charter by the United States Shipping Board of 23 Japanese Ships—Conclusion of Contracts for the Construction of 35 Ships in Japan—Abandonment of the Project of Deporting German Subjects to Australia—Discussion with the Allied Governments Regarding the Chartering of Additional Japanese Tonnage

File No. 894.85/17

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *April 3, 1918, 3 p. m.*

[Received April 3, 11.28 a. m.]

For McCormick:

Your telegram March 30, 4 p. m. I have closed all details of contracts for 100,000 tons of shipping and will sign formal contracts in

a few days. It will help to advance times of delivery of these ships [if] you will call at once into conference Hashimoto of the Asano Company, Kashiwa of Suzuki Company and Fukushima of Kuhara Company and arrange for immediate release of old contract steel and through McAdoo arrange for delivery of this steel at Pacific coast at earliest possible date so as to take advantage of present available possibilities of transportation.

MORRIS

File No. 894.85/20

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, April 4, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received April 5, 3.50 a. m.]

After continued negotiations which have covered all the important elements governing ship construction in Japan, I have agreed to submit for your approval the following proposition which, I believe, is the best that the united shipbuilders can offer.

I can obtain three ships of 9,000 tons each now building, one to be delivered in November and two in December, for probably \$200 per ton dead weight with the release of one ton old steel for one ton ship.

I can at once close contract for the building of 32 ships aggregating 253,800 tons dead weight at \$175 per ton with deliveries as follows:

January, one ship of 9,000 tons;  
 February, four ships totaling 32,700 tons;  
 March, eight ships totaling 75,200 tons;  
 April, eleven ships totaling 79,700 tons;  
 May, seven ships totaling 50,400;  
 June, one ship of 6,800 tons.

Among these ships there are five which are between 5,000 and 6,000 tons.

These deliveries have been worked out with relation to conservative estimates which we have declared on steel deliveries and represent the best the Japanese shipyards can do. If we can arrange to hasten steel deliveries agreed upon under first proposition, that is, the 100,000 tons of old steel, we can probably improve the deliveries under second proposition by 30 days. All the shipbuilders in the group will guarantee performance of the contracts of each member. The group includes all the substantial shipbuilders in Japan and the tonnage contracted for would represent about 50 per cent of the total estimated output of their yards during the first six months of 1919. The remaining 50 per cent would represent fulfillment of actually existing private contracts. I would recommend the accept-

ance of these ships although we are at liberty to reject any part of the schedule we may desire.

Taken in connection with the 150,000 tons of chartered ships and the 100,000 tons purchased under our first proposition, this last proposal if accepted would complete an aggregate of approximately 530,000 tons added by Japan to the Allied shipping.

MORRIS

File No. 894.85/20

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your cable April 4, 1 a. m. Following drafted by War Trade Board expresses decision of United States Government:

We accept three ships 9,000 [tons] each on the basis ton for ton Japanese old contracts for steel, we to pay \$200 per deadweight ton for ships. Will accept delivery one November and two December, but extremely important that earlier delivery be made. Trust you can so arrange. Will authorize contract for 32 ships aggregating 253,800 tons at \$175 per ton, built of new steel, at the ratio of exchange one ton of steel for two tons of ships. While we will accept deliveries named in your cable as follows: one ship 9,000 tons January, four ships totaling 32,700 tons February, eight ships totaling 75,200 tons March, eleven ships totaling 79,700 tons April, seven ships totaling 50,400 tons May, one ship 6,800 tons June, we urge special effort to secure earlier dates. This is most important feature of the transaction. Will accept the five ships between 5,000 and 6,000 tons. Must be understood all these ships are to have sea speed of 10½ knots per hour, steamers to be fully laden and this average to be maintained for period of 24 hours, and that inspection and acceptance of workmanship and materials is to be approved by United States Shipping Board representatives at Japanese yards; that all vessels are to be classed 100A1, Lloyd's classification, and that shipbuilders assume responsibility for delivering the steamers in good order in United States port. We agree to pay 20 per cent on signing contracts and balance of payment to be arranged when each contract is signed.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/9615

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1918.

[Received April 18.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: Referring to my previous correspondence with the Department of State on the subject and, in particular, to my note of January 11 last,<sup>1</sup> I have the honor to inform Your Excel-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

lency that the inquiries conducted between the French Staff and the office of the Under Secretary of State for Ocean Transportation have led to the conclusion that notwithstanding the Government of the Republic's earnest desire to act upon Marshal Tuan's proposal to send Chinese troops to France it was physically impossible to procure the tonnage required for their transportation.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic has therefore advised the Chargé d'Affaires of France at Peking that the plan must necessarily be given up.

Under these conditions my Government no longer sees any advantage in advancing to the Chinese Government funds intended to recruit and equip the said troops.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 800.852/90

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, April 27, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received April 28, 5.47 a. m.]

No. 13. Supplementing my serial No. 3.<sup>1</sup> All charters formally executed. Certified copies being sent by pouch. *Shakano-o* leaves May 20 for Seattle; *Kunajiri* leaves in May for Tacoma; all others as previously reported in my No. 3. No chartered ships will be delivered at Japanese ports.

MORRIS

File No. 894.85/44

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, April 28 [27?], 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received April 28, 1.19 p. m.]

No. 16. I am preparing final draft of contracts covering ship-building programme in accordance with your telegram of April 12, 4 p. m. Will execute them as agent for United States Shipping Board. Contracts will cover about 35 ships, including 3 steamers mentioned in my No. 4,<sup>2</sup> and will aggregate approximately 287,000 tons dead weight. On signing of contracts there will be payable immediately 20 per cent of total purchase price, or approximately \$10,000,000 and export licenses for approximately 27,000 tons of old steel and agreement by United States Shipping Board to deliver

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; gives sailing dates and destinations of 23 chartered ships totaling 151,266 tons.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



130,000 tons of new steel f.o.b. San Francisco at rates as by your telegram March 20, 7 p. m. Please advise at once how new steel is to be contracted for and how far I can bind Shipping Board, as to times and amounts of steel deliveries; also please advise terms of payment for this steel; also, terms of payment of balance for ships. Japanese ship builders will give American bankers' guarantee for steel payments, and local guarantees acceptable to me for faithful performance of contract.

MORRIS

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File No. 894.85/33

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1918, 9 p. m.

War Trade Board No. 11.

Your No. 4, April 22, 5 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and ours accepting your proposition. We understand you have now closed the entire 380,000 tons of ships to be built. Proposal number 1 for 100,000 tons, one ton steel to one ton ships on which contracts are now being signed. Proposal number 2 being 27,000 tons one to one on which we agree to your price of \$212.50 and 127,000 of American Government steel, one ton steel for two tons ships at price of \$175 for ships. You have still to cable us the delivery dates as worked out on these 253,000 [254,000?] tons of ships to be built out of steel at American Government prices.

We still have a balance of old contract steel of approximately 150,000 tons on which we wish to begin new negotiations along the lines of present agreement and recommend your going into the matter further as understand probable additional deliveries of about 100,000 tons ships can be built in 1918. Please cable us result of your efforts on this third and new proposition.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72/9751

*The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Goto) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, undated.

[Received April 30, 1918, 10.27 a. m.]

Charged with the direction of Foreign Affairs, in this Ministry, owing to the regrettable illness and retirement of Viscount Motono, I need hardly assure you of as firm a determination as ever of this Government to promote and cement in every possible way the rela-

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

tions of mutual regard and confidence between our two nations, holding implicit faith in the final victory of our common cause to which we are unalterably committed. I am indeed proud of the privilege that is afforded me of associating myself with you in the great task before us.

Goto

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File No. 763.72/9751

*The Secretary of State to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs  
(Goto)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 1, 1918.*

I have received with gratification your telegram of yesterday which expresses so frankly the spirit of good will for this country and of devotion to the common cause to which we are pledged.

It is needless to assure Your Excellency that your words of confidence and esteem are fully reciprocated by this Government. Candor and friendship in all our relations are our supreme wish and purpose; and we feel confident that guided by this spirit the United States and Japan will enjoy an even better understanding, if that is possible, than the understanding which today characterizes their intercourse.

I appreciate your words concerning our personal association, and I am highly honored in this relationship looking forward as I do with confidence to a continuance of the cordial spirit of helpfulness which has been so manifest in these days of conflict when the bonds of mutual interest draw our countries so closely together.

Please accept my expressions of sincere esteem and of earnest desire to cooperate with you in vigorously and successfully resisting our common enemy who menaces the national safety of Japan as well as that of the United States.

ROBERT LANSING

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File No. 894.85/47

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 10, 1918, 6 p. m.*

7679. For Sheldon [from War Trade Board]:

No. 461. Embassy's 9886, May 6, 1 p. m. Your 522.<sup>1</sup> We have agreements here by authority of both French and Italian Governments that they will not allow purchase of Japanese steamers. We feel that these agreements should continue in force because as we furnish the steel to Japan we are able to secure better prices for

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ships than any of the other Allies. Fisher has stated that it is England's belief we should continue Japanese negotiations for ships. It is also true that United States will probably have to advance credits to Italy and France to pay for any ships that might be bought by them.

Letters of April 22 and May 4 from Munson to Stevens give you full details of United States-Japanese agreement both on chartered and purchased steamers.<sup>1</sup> Show to Stevens.

LANSING

War Trade Board Files: Japanese Tonnage Negotiations, Vol. II

*The Representative of the British Ministry of Shipping (Fisher) to the Chairman of the War Trade Board (McCormick)*

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1918.

SIR: I am directed to inform you that in view of the reported completion of your negotiations for the chartering of Japanese tonnage, my Government presumes that there is no necessity for them to refrain further from the chartering of Japanese vessels when opportunity offers, and I am to request that you will inform me whether this presumption is correct.

I am [etc.]

THOMAS FISHER

File No. 763.72115/3314

*The Swiss Minister (Sulzer) to the Secretary of State*

Department of  
German Interests

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1918.

[Received May 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to advise Your Excellency that I am in receipt of a cablegram from the Swiss Foreign Office, communicated to the Legation at the request of the German Government, as follows:

[Translation <sup>2</sup>]

German Government begs inform American Government that according to reliable information states of the Entente insist by every means that Chinese Government deport as promptly as possible to Australia German subjects including women and children. If deportation is carried out German Government will resort to most severe reprisals without any regard.

In conformity with my instructions, I have the honor to notify Your Excellency of the above, and shall be happy to transmit to my Government any statement you may desire to make in the premises.

HANS SULZER

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Made in the Department from the text quoted in French.

War Trade Board Files: Japanese Tonnage Negotiations, Vol. II

*The Chairman of the War Trade Board (McCormick) to the Representative of the British Ministry of Shipping (Fisher)*

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1918.

DEAR SIR: Referring to your two letters to me of May 11, regarding Japanese tonnage,<sup>1</sup> it has been our thought that negotiations for such tonnage should be carried on exclusively by that one of the Associated Governments which seemed to occupy the strongest position for the conduct of such negotiations. I feel that competitive bidding by the different Governments would subject us all to a serious disadvantage. I understand that this subject has been discussed fully between you and Mr. Munson within the last day or two.

In view of the steel and other supplies which Japan is receiving from the United States and in view of our geographical position, I feel that we are in a better position to secure ships and at lower prices than would be possible for any other of the Associated Governments. I venture to suggest therefore that you cable your Government that our views are as above expressed.

Very truly yours,

[VANCE McCORMICK]

File No. 763.72115/3316

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

No. 106

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your memorandum of May 23, 1918, relative to the proposal to deport to Australia enemy subjects in China.<sup>2</sup> I note the communication received from the German Government intimating that if the deportation takes place, the German Government will be compelled to resort to the severest retaliatory measures without any consideration whatever. I also note that [as] the German Government has not adduced any arguments to show that the contemplated deportation of enemy subjects from China to Australia is contrary to international law, His Majesty's Government does not propose to make any reply beyond a formal acknowledgment but suggests that the Associated Governments should agree on a course of action to be pursued in the event of the German Government taking the measures threatened when the deportation of enemy subjects from China is carried out.

<sup>1</sup> One not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



In reply I have the honor to inform you that this Government has received a similar communication from the German Government through the Swiss Legation and has made merely a formal acknowledgment in reply. Any suggestions which the British Government may desire to make relative to a joint course of action on the part of the Associated Governments will be given the most careful consideration by the Government of the United States.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72115/3320

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 600

MEMORANDUM

The British Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and with reference to the Embassy memorandum of May 23d relative to the proposed deportation to Australia of enemy subjects in China<sup>1</sup> has the honour to state that representations have been made by the Vatican and the King of Spain appealing to His Majesty's Government on the grounds of humanity to avoid suffering which the contemplated deportation and retaliatory measures threatened by the German Government will inflict on innocent persons of enemy and Allied nationalities.

The Chinese Government concur in His Majesty's Government's suggestions that the British Government should reply on behalf of all the Governments which are parties to the arrangement with the Chinese Government on the following lines:—

The representations are evidently based on a misunderstanding of the situation and of the reasons which have impelled the Chinese Government to arrange with the British, French, Italian, Japanese, Portuguese and the United States Governments for the removal to Australia of German and Austro-Hungarian subjects resident in China.

The presence of a great number of uncontrolled German and Austrian prisoners-of-war in Siberia, in close proximity to Chinese, with whom enemy subjects in China might attempt to hold communications and to concert measures which would disturb the internal tranquility of China, the unsettled conditions of parts of the Chinese dominions and the necessity of preventing China from continuing to be used, as she notoriously was before her entry into the war, as a dangerous centre of intrigue and conspiracy on the part of the nations of the Central Powers, claiming to shelter themselves behind extraterritorial privileges and rights of residents in foreign concessions and settlements in treaty ports, rendered it essential in the interests both of China herself and of her co-belligerents that

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

these enemy subjects should be placed under close supervision. It was obviously impossible for the Chinese authorities to exercise the necessary supervision and control over enemy residents, if they were left at large in foreign concessions in which they had been accustomed to live, nor outside of such concessions are there any places in China sufficiently remote from the northern frontier, where suitable accommodation exists for their internment. In these circumstances the closeness of supervision, to which it will be necessary to subject them, would be detrimental to the health of Europeans in the Chinese climate.

Deportation to and internment in a climate where Europeans thrive is, therefore, preferable in every way to internment in China, as well as more humane. The choice of Australia will, owing to its remoteness from the seat of war, enable much greater liberty to be allowed to enemy subjects when they arrive there.

Enemy deportees from China will be interned in Australia in precisely similar conditions to those adopted in the case of enemy subjects already placed under surveillance by the Government of the Commonwealth. Every reasonable provision will be made for the safety and comfort of deportees during the voyage, and arrangements will be made to avoid, as far as possible, separating families or causing any unnecessary hardships. It will be seen, therefore, that deportation to Australia, as arranged between the Chinese Government and the above-mentioned Associated Governments, will be of decided advantage to the health and comfort of German and Austro-Hungarian subjects now in China.

His Majesty's Government do not propose to submit the suggested reply to the Chinese Government, as the German threat does not appear to have been addressed to them, and they have already received, at their request from the Associated Governments a guarantee against enemy reprisals.

WASHINGTON, *May 31st, 1918.*

[*Received June 1.*]

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File No. 763.72115/3321

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the  
Secretary of State*

No. 599

MEMORANDUM

The British Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and, with reference to the British Embassy's memorandum of to-day's date, has the honour to enquire what attitude the United States Government consider the Allied Governments should adopt in view of the reprisals threatened by the German Government in the event of the deportation of enemy subjects to Australia from China. His Majesty's Government also enquire whether the United States Government would be prepared, if this course is accepted, to share the responsibility of refusing to give way to that threat.

His Majesty's Government are most anxious to receive a reply as to the attitude of the United States Government on this point, as they are about to enter into fresh negotiations with the German Government in regard to the exchange of prisoners.

WASHINGTON, *May 31st, 1918.*

[*Received June 1.*]

File No. 763.72/10309

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Secretary of State*

No. 638

MEMORANDUM

[Extract <sup>1</sup>]

The Allied Governments have come to the conclusion that a re-examination of the question of transporting German and Austrian subjects from China to Australia is necessary, owing to the threat of severe reprisals from the German Government and to a consequential request from the Belgian Government for a further consideration of the subject. . . .

WASHINGTON, *June 10th, 1918.*

[*Received June 11.*]

File No. 763.72115/3327

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, *June 12, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[*Received June 13, 5.35 p. m.*]

If the postponement of the deportation of enemy subjects from China is equivalent to an abandonment of this measure, it is urgently necessary to seek other means for discouraging German intrigue in China, unless we are to give to the Chinese authorities and population as well as to others the impression that we are powerless to protect ourselves. The Allied Powers would obtain to a certain extent the results expected from deportation if arrangements were made with the Chinese Government to repatriate in Germany the leaders of German influence in China. Repatriation is not a measure which the German Government could reasonably protest, nor is it subject to reprisal. The transportation of not more than 200 persons including women and children could undoubtedly be arranged for.

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum printed in full in *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, vol. II, pp. 199-200.

Therefore, I beg to request favorable consideration of this suggestion and, if it is found acceptable, the taking of joint decision with the other Governments concerned. Here it is necessary to act at the earliest possible moment in order to efface deplorable impression which will be produced on the Chinese, as well as on the other nationals, through the suspension of measures taken by the Chinese Government under the pressure of the Allied Governments. But it is first of all necessary that we should have the assurance that measures which shall be decreed in accord with the Chinese Government shall, as the result of execution, meet all obstacles. My colleagues, the British, French, Japanese, Italian Ministers are addressing a similar telegram to their Governments.

REINSCH

File No. 763.72115/3327

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Reinsch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 17, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your June 12, 4 p. m. Does the Chinese Government understand that, while this Government has agreed to guarantee China against demands by Germany and Austria because of the deportation and also to guarantee China's favorable treatment in the peace conference, Great Britain and France have not given the assurance about the peace conference? Do you understand that China agrees to the deportation without the guarantee from Great Britain and France as to the peace conference?

This Government might feel that, in case Great Britain and France do not join in the assurance, we should withdraw our assurance in view of the fact that the arrangement has not been completed. While we have every desire to aid the Government of China, we might feel that we should not stand as the sole sponsors for China's treatment at the peace conference.

LANSING

File No. 763.72115/3334

*The Minister in China (Reinsch) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, June 20, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received June 21, 1.30 p. m.]

Your June 17, 6 p. m. Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Italy, Portugal, Brazil, have all concurred in a promise to render effective support to the Chinese Government at the peace conference in order to guarantee it against any claim for damages on account of deportation or [other claims] arising out of the war, assuring the



interests of China the same consideration as the interests of the belligerent Allies—similar to assurances given by us.

Action upon proposal my telegram of June 13 [12], 4 p. m., is highly desirable.

REINSCH

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File No. 763.72115/3321

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

No. 147

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's two memoranda of May 31, 1918, numbered 599 and 600, respectively, relating to the proposed deportation to Australia of enemy subjects in China and the retaliatory measures threatened by the German Government if such deportation takes place.

In reply I have the honor to state that the reply to the representations of the Vatican and the King of Spain, which the Government of Great Britain proposes to make on behalf of all the governments which are parties to the arrangement with the Chinese Government, submitted in Your Excellency's memorandum No. 600, has received my careful consideration. The Government of the United States would not hesitate to share the responsibility of refusing to give way to the threat of the German Government that reprisals will be made if the proposed deportation is effected, but since in the Embassy's memorandum of June 10, 1918, it is stated that the Allied Governments have come to the conclusion that a re-examination of the question of transporting German and Austrian subjects from China to Australia is necessary, the Government of the United States will defer further consideration of the matter until a decision is reached as to what course will be pursued with reference to the proposed deportations. The Government of the United States understands from Your Excellency's memorandum of June 10 that a re-examination of this subject will probably require some time, and that it is not expected a decision can be reached at an early date.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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File No. 763.72115/3334

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your June 12, 4 p. m., and June 20, 1 p. m. Proposal for deportation of enemy subjects from China did not originate with this Government. Repatriation of such enemy subjects has not yet been suggested to American Government by those Allied Governments

whose Ministers in Peking, as your telegram states, are advising it. Should those Governments or China ask the American Government to support such a course the request will have careful consideration.

LANSING

File No. 763.72115/3342

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, July 11, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received July 12, 11.37 a. m.]

Your July 6, 4 p. m. British Minister has been instructed by his Government that it would sanction approaching the Chinese Government in regard to the measures to be taken for control of enemy subjects in China, only in the event that all Allied Governments except that of Belgium would unite in an agreement to support some proposal to be carried out without regard to possible reprisals; and has directed him to endeavor in consultation with his colleagues to elaborate such a project.

At a meeting convened by him yesterday in pursuance of that instruction it was resolved that each interested legation should despatch to its government the following telegram suggesting as a basis of concerted action a proposal just offered by the Chinese Government:

The Allied Ministers at their meeting today agreed to recommend to their Governments the proposals which the Chinese Government has for some time made to intern about 120 of the most dangerous enemy subjects in a town about 40 miles from Peking. In view of the failure of the recent negotiations is it considered advisable that the Chinese Government should be encouraged to adopt this measure as a first step with the least possible delay?

The Chinese Government will, with a view to exercising proper supervision over enemy subjects, supplement this step by enforcing passport regulations in a certain manner satisfactory to the Allies.

So soon as we learn that our respective Governments are prepared to sanction this proposal irrespective of any question of reprisals we would convey our approval of the measure to the Chinese Government.

The passport regulations which the Chinese Government has informally indicated its willingness to accept if so requested by the Allies provide all foreigners, except Japanese, shall be required to bear and to exhibit whenever requested passports or permits and that the presentation of such documents and the signature of a special register shall be required as a condition to the purchase of railway or steamship tickets anywhere in China.

I beg to request instructions as to acceptance of the Chinese Government's proposals concerning both [internment] and passport control.

MACMURRAY

File No. 894.85/143

*The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Secretary of State*

No. 6566/C-1

WASHINGTON, July 11, 1918.

[Received July 13.]

MY DEAR MR. LANSING: With reference to my letter of January 19,<sup>1</sup> I wish to inform you that my Government instructed Italian owners to abstain from any negotiations with agents of private Japanese ship owners and ship builders, leaving the American Government to deal with Japanese firms for securing their tonnage.

Sometime ago I asked the War Trade Board to let me know which was the policy of the Federal authorities regarding the distribution between the Allies of such tonnage as my Government was anxious to secure some of the Japanese steamers for the transportation of its commodities into Italy.

The War Trade Board informed me on the 15th of June last that it was not in a position to give me a definite reply as some negotiations were pending with the U. S. Shipping Board.

I shall be most pleased to hear from you if such negotiations have been definitely concluded and what is the policy of the U. S. Shipping Board and the War Trade Board in reference to the question of Japanese tonnage.

Very sincerely yours,

MACCHI DI CELLERE

File No. 763.72115/3357

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in China (MacMurray)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 1, 1918, 7 p. m.

The British Embassy here informs the Department that the representatives in Peking of the Allied Governments excepting the Belgian Minister sent to their Governments a telegram recommending the adoption of a proposal made by China to intern about 120 enemy subjects in a temple about 40 miles from Peking. The British Government is prepared to accept the proposal. When these Ministers excepting the Belgian are advised that their Governments have agreed to the proposal you are instructed to inform the Chinese Government that the American Government also agrees to it.

POLK

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed; see the Ambassador's letter of Jan. 14, *ante*, p. 626.

File No. 894.85/143

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Italian Ambassador  
(Macchi di Cellere)*

WASHINGTON, August 2, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of July 11 in which you inquire relative to the distribution to be made among the Associated Governments of certain tonnage secured as the result of negotiations between this Government and Japanese ship builders. You state that the Italian Government is anxious to obtain a part of this tonnage.

I think you will agree with me that the substantial results so far attained justify this Government in asking that it alone shall conduct with the Japanese ship builders any negotiations which may become necessary. Such a procedure appears to me to be as much in the interest of the Italian Government as in that of the United States Government. At the same time I am happy to inform you that the chartering to the Italian Government of some of the new tonnage built under contracts between the Shipping Board and the Japanese ship builders is receiving careful consideration and I suggest that you discuss this matter with Mr. Hurley.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 763.72115/3364

*The Chargé in China (MacMurray) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PEKING, August 3, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received August 3, 11.40 a. m.]

Your August 1, 7 p. m. In pursuance of your July 16, 8 [4] p. m.,<sup>1</sup> the Legation has already signified our Government's agreement to the Chinese proposal, and British Minister, as senior Allied representative, has conveyed to Foreign Office acceptance of proposals concerning internment and passport control on the part of all Allied Legations other than Belgian.

MACMURRAY

<sup>1</sup>Not printed; instructing the Minister "to agree to the proposal of the Chinese Government provided other interested Governments agree." (File No. 763.72115/3342.)



File No. 894.85/60

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1918, 4 p. m.

[From War Trade Board]:

No. 91. American requirements for steel so large that any negotiations for further contracts as suggested in our No. 11, April 27 [29],<sup>1</sup> and your No. 27, May 16,<sup>2</sup> are now not advisable.

LANSING

War Trade Board Files: Japanese Tonnage Negotiations, Vol. II

*The Representative of the British Ministry of Shipping (Fisher) to the Chairman of the War Trade Board (McCormick)*

No. S-173

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1918.

DEAR MR. MCCORMICK: You will remember that on May 11 last I wrote to you officially in the sense that London desired to be free to charter Japanese vessels now that your negotiations with Japan are completed.

You replied on May 28th that you felt it better that the United States Government should continue to be the sole bidders for Japanese ships and this reply was communicated to London. It now appears that Japanese vessels have been offered for liner business to British ports and London feels that there is nothing to be gained by refusing permission to British firms to charter such vessels.

I spoke with Mr. Munson about this and he advised I should write officially to Mr. Hurley acquainting him with London's views.

I take pleasure in enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Hurley for your information.

At our various conversations on this subject Mr. Munson gave me to understand that it was under consideration whether some of the Japanese vessels obtained by the United States Government as a result of their concessions to Japan should not be allocated to the other Associated Governments in the same manner that Great Britain allocates to France and Italy a share of such Norwegian vessels as she is able to control by reason of the special concessions made to Norway in the matter of British coal.

Nothing appears to have come of this proposal and it would seem that all the Japanese vessels secured by the United States Government are operating under their own exclusive control.

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS FISHER

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 646.<sup>2</sup>Not printed.

[Enclosure]

*The Representative of the British Ministry of Shipping (Fisher) to  
the Chairman of the Shipping Board (Hurley)*

No. S-173

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1918.

DEAR SIR: You will recollect that in the summer of 1917 the United States Government through the State Department addressed a request to the British Government that pending the completion of certain negotiations between the United States and Japan the British Ministry of Shipping should refrain from any attempt to charter Japanese vessels for British service.

In May 1918 when the negotiations between the United States and Japan had been brought to a satisfactory conclusion the British Ministry of Shipping informed me that they presumed there was no longer any reason why they should abstain from chartering Japanese ships should the opportunity offer.

As it was my understanding that the negotiations were being conducted by the United States War Trade Board I communicated this information to the chairman of that board and also to Mr. Munson. Mr. McCormick replied that he felt the United States was in a better position to charter Japanese ships on advantageous terms than any of the other Allies and that he felt competitive bidding would be disadvantageous.

In accordance with Mr. McCormick's request I conveyed his views to London and have now received a reply to the effect that in present circumstances the Ministry of Shipping are unable to see what advantage is gained by continuing to refrain from chartering such ships as may be offered for employment by their owners.

It appears that Japanese vessels are entirely free to engage in the Pacific and other Eastern trades and my Government feel that to prevent British firms from taking such vessels on charter is detrimental to British interests whilst it in no way assists to procure more Japanese ships for general Allied service.

It would seem that the number of Japanese vessels engaged in trade in the Pacific and Far East is in excess of the minimum necessary to maintain these trades and the Controller feels that if it is possible to charter such vessels to take the place of British ships withdrawn for the carriage of United States troops or other war services, the opportunity should not be missed. I am accordingly directed to advise you that the Ministry of Shipping feel obliged to hold themselves free to charter such Japanese ships as may be available.

Yours very truly,

[No signature indicated]

War Trade Board Files: Japanese Tonnage Negotiations, Vol. II

*The Chairman of the War Trade Board (McCormick) to the Representative of the British Ministry of Shipping (Fisher)*

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1918.

DEAR CAPTAIN FISHER: Your letter of August 13 and its enclosure is acknowledged. Whether there is or is not a net gain to the cause of the Associated Governments in London's proposal to enter into competition with us in bidding for charters in the Pacific appears to me to be open still to grave doubts. It is, however, quite clear that there is in this method an element of loss, a way to eliminate which might well be disclosed by further discussion. On behalf of the interests of the War Trade Board in this matter, Mr. E. F. Gay will be glad to consult with you at your convenience.

Allow me also to say that we have asked the American section of the Allied Maritime Transport Council to consider the whole problem of complete utilization of tonnage in the Pacific, so that the question may be faced from the broadest possible outlook.

Yours sincerely,

[VANCE McCORMICK]

War Trade Board Files: Japanese Tonnage Negotiations, Vol. II

*The Representative of the British Ministry of Shipping (Fisher) to the Chairman of the War Trade Board (McCormick)*

S 173

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. McCORMICK: In accordance with your suggestion, I have already consulted Mr. Gay in this matter<sup>1</sup> and I am happy to say that as a result of urgent representations, the Ministry of Shipping in London have agreed to take no action pending further consultation in order that we may jointly decide what is best to be done in the common interest.

Yours sincerely,

THOMAS FISHER

File No. 763.72119/2457a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 31, 1918, 4 p. m.

Cable brief summary of essential points of Okuma's<sup>2</sup> views on peace terms as published in recent number of *Kokumin*. Promptly

<sup>1</sup> The chartering of Japanese vessels.

<sup>2</sup> Marquis Shigenobu Okuma, Japanese Prime Minister 1914-16.

mail full translation, also three copies translation of Ozaki's book on democracy.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2458

*The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *November 3, 1918, 1 p. m.*

[Received November 3, 11.22 a. m.]

Department's October 30 [31], 4 p. m. Marquis Okuma stated that nothing short of a complete surrender by Germany will bring permanent peace. Urges that Japan should submit to the decision of the Allies in European adjustments; should leave to America and Great Britain disposal of the Samoa Archipelago; New Guinea and the Bismarck group should go to Great Britain; Marshall, Caroline and Ladron [islands] should be given to Japan; Tsingtau should be returned to China but Japan should own the cable between Tsingtau and the German Pacific islands and should retain possession of the foreign settlement and the Tsingtau railway. In regard to Siberia no power should be allowed to have a [predominant] voice therein, and in regard to China the principle of the open door and equal opportunity should be observed as hitherto.

MORRIS

#### LATIN AMERICA IN RELATION TO THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

Arrangements for the Cooperation of Brazilian Naval Forces with those of the United States at Gibraltar—Abandonment of the Argentine Plan for a Congress of Neutral States—Project of an Economic Agreement between Argentina and the Allied and Associated Powers: Attitude of the United States—Negotiations for the Chartering of German Ships in Uruguayan and Peruvian Ports

File No. 838.011/34

*The Minister in Haiti (Bailly-Blanchard) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PORT AU PRINCE, *January 15, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received January 16, 3.47 a. m.]

Minister for Foreign Affairs called today at the Legation and in view of the reported embargo by France on Haitian coffee again brought up the advisability of a declaration of war by Haiti against the Central Powers. He was informed in accordance with Department's July 3, 4 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> that the matter should be delayed until after

<sup>1</sup> Continued from *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 1, pp. 219 et seq.*; for papers relating to the treatment of enemy aliens and enemy property in Latin American countries, see *Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement 2, pp. 233-245 and 341-412.*

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



the adoption of the constitution conferring powers upon the Council of State.<sup>1</sup> He then inquired when the draft of constitution might be expected and urged earliest opportunity for submission to plebiscite.

BLANCHARD

File No. 763.72/8563

*The Ambassador in Chile (Shea) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SANTIAGO, January 18, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 7.30 p. m.]

Reply of Foreign Office to notice of our declaration of war against Austria as follows:

In line with the position maintained by my Government with respect to the present world conflagration, it cannot contemplate without regret the further extension of the radius of the struggle, but however that may be, it receives the information which Your Excellency transmitted with all the interest consequent to the old ties of friendship and sympathy that unite our respective countries.

SHEA

File No. 763.72119/1172

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, January 25, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 7.35 p. m.]

Cabrera and Mexican mission<sup>2</sup> accompanied by Mexican Chargé d'Affaires were received by the President yesterday afternoon. As announced beforehand, the reception appears to have been informal, though the Argentine Chief of Protocol introduced the mission. The press states that the President said that he hoped the purpose which had brought the mission would be successful. It is further stated that the President will again receive the mission in a few days.

STIMSON

File No. 763.72/8654

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1918.

Your January 7, 12 p. m.<sup>3</sup> Informed through Navy Department that Brazil through diplomatic channels asked to cooperate with

<sup>1</sup> By telegram of Jan. 18, the Minister was informed: "Your course of action approved." (File No. 838.011/34.)

<sup>2</sup> For notice of appointment of this mission see telegram No. 600, Dec. 3, 1917, from the Ambassador in Mexico, *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 1, p. 380.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

British naval forces at Gibraltar. The Brazilian Minister in London informed British Government on January 1 that the cruisers *Rio Grande do Sul* and *Bahia* and four British-built destroyers would proceed to Europe and operate under the orders of the British rear admiral of the naval command in the part [*port?*] which should be assigned to it and stated that the forces would arrive next February.

At the request of the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Sims informed the British Admiralty of the strong desire of the United States that the Brazilian naval forces should cooperate with those of this country. The British Admiralty replied that they were perfectly agreeable to the proposal that the Brazilian vessels should cooperate with our forces at Gibraltar. Admiral Sims also states that the operation of the Brazilian forces at the Azores would not appear essential to the execution of the proposed plan, and that the Brazilian vessels need repairs to their boilers which could best be made at Gibraltar.

In order to avoid presenting a second invitation to the Brazilian Government, the Department will take the matter up informally with the Brazilian Ambassador in Washington, advising him that this change has been decided upon by British Admiralty after consultation in regard to Allied interests with American naval representatives in London, to the end Ambassador may suggest to his Government the advisability of Brazilian cooperation with the United States in manner outlined.

The Department will keep you fully informed in regard to this matter.

POLK

File No. 862.85/299a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Uruguay (Wadsworth)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1918, 6 p. m.*

The Emergency Fleet Corporation has filed with the Uruguayan Minister in Washington the following bid for the German boats interned in Uruguay:

Vessels to be chartered either from the Government of Uruguay direct by the Fleet Corporation or from a Uruguayan corporation as the Government of Uruguay shall elect. Delivery of the vessels to be made to a representative of the Fleet Corporation at Montevideo or at port of repair. Re-delivery at Montevideo. Vessels to be chartered to the Fleet Corporation for the period of the war. Two of the vessels to be used in trade between the United States and Uruguay. Use of balance to be unrestricted. Rates of charter to be 41/6*d.* Uruguayan Government to be responsible for cost of marine

insurance, running repairs, stores, provisions, pay of officers and crews, but charterers to be liable for war risks to vessels at valuation of £35 per gross ton. Charterers reserve the right of providing officers and crews. Captains, officers and engineers should be American or British but we would agree to Uruguayan crews on American or British articles so far as reliable Uruguayans are available. Alternative rate of charter to be 33/- all expenses charterers who would provide officers and crews as above. Valuation of vessels for loss by either marine or war risk to be £35 per gross ton. Repairs to be made if the Government of Uruguay shall elect at the cost of the Fleet Corporation. The cost of such repairs, however, to be eventually deducted from the charter hire as payable. As the hire offered is calculated on the basis of current rates of freight it must be reduced correspondingly if there is any reduction required on such rates. If full cargoes are not available in Uruguay, vessels are to have the right to load elsewhere. Right is reserved by the charterers to pay charter hire in New York or Montevideo at their option. It is understood that the above tender is for the following eight vessels: *Bahia*, *Harzburg*, *Mera*, *Polynesia*, *Salatis*, *Sylvia*, *Thuringia*, and *Wiegand*.

You are instructed to present to the Government to which you are accredited the above bid, stating that it is a confirmation of a bid already filed by the Emergency Fleet Corporation with the Uruguayan Minister at Washington.

The British Embassy in Washington has stated that the Government of Great Britain will instruct its Minister at Montevideo to support this bid and not to present an identic bid in behalf of the British Government.

You are instructed to present the following note to the Government to which you are accredited:

The Emergency Fleet Corporation has filed with the Uruguayan Minister at Washington a bid looking to the utilization of the German vessels now taken over by the Government of Uruguay. The United States Government has had the opportunity of examining the provisions of this bid and wishes to advise the Uruguayan Government that this bid has the hearty endorsement and approval of the United States Government.

The United States Government trusts that the Uruguayan Government will accept the general terms of the bid submitted by the Emergency Fleet Corporation and that after the various details incident to this bid have been settled that delivery of the boats under the bid will be made to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, either in a Uruguayan port or in this country.

The United States Government requests that the Uruguayan Government advise it when a decision has been reached respecting the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1239

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 5, 1918, noon.*

[Received 5.45 p. m.]

My January 12, 1 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and January 25, 6 p. m. The President received the Mexican mission in farewell audience yesterday. *La Nacion* of today states that Cabrera will visit Paraguay and will then return to Argentine where he will visit the central and western provinces and that he will then visit Chile, Peru and Bolivia. It further states that one delegate, General Montes, will visit Chile and supposed another, Ugarte, Ecuador. [E. Hidalgo?] will visit Brazil. The Mexican mission has not been received at any diplomatic functions and none of the mission has called at this Embassy.

STIMSON

File No. 763.72119/1251

*The Chargé in Mexico (Summerlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MEXICO, *February 9, 1918, 1 p. m.*

[Received 10.53 p. m.]

759. *El [Universal]* published today a Buenos Aires despatch from Ernesto Hidalgo, publicity secretary of the Cabrera commission to the Argentine, to the effect that the congress of neutral nations probably will not be held; that nations especially friendly to the United States openly refuse to participate in the congress; that some Buenos Aires papers opposed the congress for fear it would be anti-Ally; that some papers of little importance ridiculed the Mexican commission; and that the members of the commission would separate February 9 after a final visit to the President of the Republic.

SUMMERLIN

File No. 763.72/8828

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 12, 1918, 7 p. m.*

Under date of February 11, 10 p. m., American Ambassador, London, cabled Department following paraphrase of a telegram sent the 5th instant by the British Foreign Office to British Minister at Rio.

Admiralty have decided that Brazilian squadron shall operate from Gibraltar in conjunction with United States and British naval

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



forces stationed there and be regarded as part of American forces for administrative purposes, the whole force being under the orders of the senior naval officer at Gibraltar.

Please do all you can to facilitate the cordial cooperation of the Brazilian and United States units.

LANSING

File No. 862.85/313

*The Secretary of State to the Peruvian Minister (Freyre y Santander)*

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum which you addressed to the Department of State on February 6,<sup>1</sup> stating that the Congress of Peru has approved a bill whereby the Government of Peru is authorized to take possession of all means of transportation, depositing previously their value in the Peruvian Caja de Depositos y Consignaciones, and further, that the bill grants the owners the right to regain possession of their property six months after the Government declares that the circumstances which justified this requisition exist no longer.

The memorandum further sets forth that the Government of Peru is empowered by the above mentioned bill to expropriate the German ships at present in Peruvian ports, after depositing their value, and that, in consequence, that Government is disposed to enter into an agreement with the Government of the United States with the purpose of utilizing these ships, provided the Government of the United States formally assures the Government of Peru of its support in case of reprisals by the Government of Germany against the Government of Peru after the termination of the war.

In reply to this memorandum, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States is equally desirous of entering into an agreement with your Government for the purpose of utilizing the above-mentioned vessels and wishes to present for its consideration the following proposal:

*First.* The vessels now interned in Peruvian ports shall be taken over by the Peruvian Government under their recent statute authorizing such action.

*Second.* The vessels shall then be repaired by and at the initial expense of the United States Shipping Board; the cost of such repairs, however, to be deducted from the charter hire as it shall eventually become payable.

*Third.* The United States Shipping Board shall proceed to repair these vessels with all expedition.

*Fourth.* From the moment when the vessels are repaired and placed in seaworthy condition, charter hire shall be paid monthly

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

by the United States Shipping Board to the Peruvian Government at the rate of \$8.25 per deadweight ton per month, all expenses charterers' account.

*Fifth.* The vessels shall be chartered for the period of the war.

*Sixth.* Delivery of the vessels to the United States Shipping Board shall be made at port of repair; redelivery at the expiration of the charter period to be made at a Peruvian port.

*Seventh.* If the Peruvian Government shall later determine to retain these vessels for a period after the war, the United States Shipping Board shall have the option of continuing their charter for the first six months of that additional period.

*Eighth.* The use of the vessels chartered to the United States Shipping Board shall be unrestricted.

*Ninth.* The valuation of the vessels shall be fixed, for purposes of marine and war-risk insurance, at \$175.00 per deadweight ton.

With reference to the requirements of the Peruvian law to the effect that the value of the vessels shall be deposited pending the termination of the war, the Government of the United States, through the United States Shipping Board, will be disposed to be of financial assistance to the Peruvian Government in this matter, provided the proposal is accepted in principle.

I also wish to add that the Government of the United States will be disposed, upon the acceptance of its above-mentioned proposal, to give to the Government of Peru its official undertaking, that it will accord to that Government all possible support in the case of any international claim being made upon the Government of Peru, after the termination of the war, by the Government of Germany, in connection with the use of these vessels.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 862.85/311

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Uruguay (Wadsworth)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 16, 1918, 6 p. m.*

With reference to Department's February 8, 7 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and in view of the fact that the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation will be modified by the Shipping Board to meet Uruguayan requirements, you will present textually to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the following memorandum:

The Government of the United States has given its entire support to the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which was made in accordance with the information then in possession of that cor-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

poration and in an endeavor to comply with the laws of Uruguay. The full texts and translation of the Uruguayan law of November 9, 1917, and of the decree of November 19, 1917, have now been received and the Emergency Fleet Corporation is enabled to understand the legal requirements in the case. It is therefore most desirable that this bid be accepted in principle as the Emergency Fleet Corporation is now ready to make such changes in its bid as may be necessary to meet legal requirements.

The Government of the United States feels that in supporting the present position of the Emergency Fleet Corporation it is incumbent upon it to remind the Government of Uruguay that it has endeavored to meet the desires of that Government in every possible way and has perfected arrangements to the end that a supply of coal may be furnished each month for the needs of Uruguay. In carrying out the program for coal supply, it is, however, felt necessary to point out that in view of the serious tonnage situation difficulties may present themselves in the future in obtaining bottoms for the transport of this coal and without those vessels which it is hoped may be acquired under the bid, the accomplishment of the above-mentioned program may encounter insuperable obstacles.

In regard to the obligation of the Government which supports bids presented to the Government of Uruguay, the Government of the United States wishes to make clear that it will accept responsibility, in case of the acceptance of the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, in the event of any international claim arising from the use of these ships being brought against the Government of Uruguay by the German Government.

The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous of obtaining these vessels through the bid which it supports, both on account of the urgent necessity for the use of this tonnage in connection with war purposes and in order that the policy of close cooperation between the United States and Uruguay may be satisfactorily carried out. This Government wishes that relations between the United States and Uruguay be maintained on the most friendly basis and desires you to exert every effort to effect this. The Department depends upon your tact and ability to retain the prestige which the United States now has in Uruguay and considers the present situation one of great importance.

LANSING

File No. 862.85/321

*The Chargé in Uruguay (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONTEVIDEO, *February 22, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received February 23, 5.11 a. m.]

Uruguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to me this morning that the committee has accepted bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation for the chartering of the German vessels, that another com-

mittee has been named to make out a project of contract to be signed between the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the Uruguayan Government. The Minister requested that the last paragraph of the memorandum presented to him (refer to your February 16, 6 p. m.) be altered to read: "In regard to the obligation of the Government which supports a bid accepted by the Uruguayan Government, the Government of the United States wishes to make it clear that on the acceptance of the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, it will take upon itself any responsibility which on account of the use of the ships Uruguay may for any cause incur." He stated that he requests this to insure the acceptance by the Blanco Party of the project of the law accepting the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. The alteration has been suggested by the leaders of the Blanco Party.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs added that although the agreement between Great Britain and Uruguay states that two ships are to ply between Uruguayan and North American ports and six between Uruguayan and European ports, the Uruguayan Government will be gratified if the United States can arrange with Great Britain that four shall ply between Uruguayan and North American ports. Minister for Foreign Affairs desires to be informed whether this Legation will sign contract or if agent will be appointed by the United States Government.

WADSWORTH

File No. 862.85/321

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Uruguay (Wadsworth)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 25, 1918, 5 p. m.*

Your February 22, 6 p. m., suggests desire of Uruguayan Government that four ships be allocated to direct trade between United States and Uruguay. Please explain to Minister of Foreign Affairs that in consultation with British authorities above allocation has been agreed upon, giving Uruguay three ships in direct trade and two with possible third in triangular trade Uruguay to Europe via United States.

The following letter was sent by this Department to the Uruguayan Minister in Washington on the 23d instant. You may read it to the Minister for Foreign Affairs:

With a full text and translation of the law of Uruguay now at hand, the Emergency Fleet Corporation desires to submit for the consideration of the Uruguayan Congress, certain amplifications and modifications of its recent bid for the use of the eight German steamers now interned in the port of Montevideo. The modifications,



which are chiefly concerned with the trades in which these vessels shall be employed, are as follows:

Three vessels to be nominated by the Emergency Fleet Corporation shall engage continuously in trade between the United States and Uruguay; three other vessels shall engage continuously in trade between Uruguay and England and/or French Atlantic ports and two vessels shall engage continuously in trade between Uruguay and England and/or French Atlantic ports via United States Atlantic ports. These vessels shall give priority in transportation to Uruguayan licensed imports and exports. Particularly, they shall carry coal to Uruguay,—the Emergency Fleet Corporation either supplying or guaranteeing transportation for Uruguay's stated need of 8,000 tons per month.

The Emergency Fleet Corporation have the right, upon giving proper notice, to nominate other vessels of equal or greater deadweight cargo carrying capacity to take the place of any of the eight vessels to which this offer applies. The substituted vessel shall thereafter be bound according to the trade obligations of the vessel whose place she takes, as these obligations are outlined above. Thereupon the Emergency Fleet Corporation shall have the right to use the Uruguayan vessel or vessels in unrestricted trades.

In view of the provision for substitution herein provided, it is urged that the Uruguayan Government agree to charter these vessels on net form, the obligation to provide crews resting with the charterers, and all expenses on charterers' account. For this form of charter, a rate of 35 shillings per deadweight ton per month is herewith offered, in lieu of the rate of 33 shillings previously tendered.

The Emergency Fleet Corporation shall have the right to sub-charter any of the vessels covered by this proposal to a shipping company nominated by the British Government.

It is respectfully urged that these provisions, together with the other provisions of the bid previously submitted by the Fleet Corporation, be accepted in principle by the Uruguayan Government, so that a detailed agreement in accordance with these principles may be drawn and submitted to the Uruguayan Congress for its approval.

LANSING

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File No. 862.85/326a

*The Secretary of State to the Uruguayan Minister (De Pena)*

No. 119

WASHINGTON, February 26, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you with reference to the conversation which you had at the State Department on February 21 in regard to the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which is supported by the Government of the United States, that I have been

advised by the above-mentioned corporation that it has addressed a communication directly to you, containing certain amplifications of the bid which the said corporation presented on January 29. In further reference to the conversation above referred to, I desire to set forth herewith the position assumed by the Government of the United States in supporting this bid.

*First:* In regard to the obligation of the Government which supports a bid accepted by the Uruguayan Government, the Government of the United States wishes to make it clear that upon the acceptance of the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation, it will take upon itself any responsibility which on account of the use of the ships Uruguay may for any cause incur.

*Second:* In the event of the acceptance of the bid of the Emergency Fleet Corporation the Government of the United States assures the Government of Uruguay that this bid will receive the consent of the British Government, and further assures the Government of Uruguay that it will take all possible steps which are in its power to obtain assurances from the British Government that no change of position will take place on the part of that Government in regard to the signing of the arbitration treaty.

*Third:* The Government of the United States understands that the question pertaining to the use of the ships has been directly taken up by the Emergency Fleet Corporation with the Government of Uruguay. The United States Government will agree to see that Uruguayan exports and imports are given most favorable treatment possible.

*Fourth:* The Department of State will address to the Uruguayan Legation separate communications in regard to the supply of coal to be sent to Uruguay and in regard to the exportation of arms and ammunition desired by the Government of Uruguay.<sup>1</sup>

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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File No. 635.119/202

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *February 26, 1918, 12 p. m.*

[*Received February 27, 9.50 a. m.*]

Stabler from Robbins:

As the Ambassador has gone away for a few days visit, Naón sent for me this evening to discuss the President's attitude with regard to the present situation. Naón proposed the following plan, which he begged me to consider as entirely confidential and informal. His

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

idea is that the following tentative plan for a declaration of Argentina's national policy be presented for his approval: that inasmuch as the international situation which prevailed before the war has so changed the circumstances affecting Argentina and for which Argentina is in no way responsible, that Government, in accordance with her international rights which permit her both to foster and maintain such commercial and economic interests as she may deem appropriate, should decide to enter into negotiations with the Allied Powers for the purpose of consolidating in a permanent way during the present war her economic and commercial ties with those powers, on the basis of a reciprocal cooperation which would permit the Allied Powers on one side to dispose of their products and Argentina on the other side to make use of the products of the Allies which she may need in the development of her industries. Naón thinks that through a negotiation of this kind the position of Argentina would be clearly defined, and that she would then appear before the world as definitely a friend of the Allies, and further that a political atmosphere would be created which would be propitious in future developments.

In discussing this plan with me he requested that I communicate the same to the Department and he has further suggested that he would greatly appreciate an expression of the views of the Government of the United States on this proposed plan.

For the Department's information, though Naón has given no definite assurances whatever, he has stated to me that he is hopeful of the approbation of this plan by the President, his explanation being that neither the President nor the Argentine people as a whole consider that there is an immediate cause for Argentina breaking relations with Germany and that therefore for the present this is the best solution.

STIMSON

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File No. 635.119/202

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 1, 1918, 3 p. m.

Stabler to Robbins:

Your February 26, 12 p. m. Your cable carefully noted. A more ample explanation by you of what is comprised in so-called tentative plan is desired. How would the position of Argentine be more clearly defined through "economic and commercial ties"? Make no comment to Naón unless instructed by Department. What are your views as to this situation?

LANSING

File No. 635.119/220

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *March 2, 1918, 2 p. m.*

[Received 5.30 p. m.]

Stabler from Robbins:

Your March 1, 1 [3] p. m. I have just seen Naón, but have made no comment to him concerning instructions from the Department. He seems somewhat hurt at what he terms "lack of action" on the part of the Department. I said that I expected a reply shortly; in the meantime would like to send a telegram defining more clearly the method by which "commercial and economic" ties between Argentina and the United States would be consolidated in a more permanent way. He replied that there were many ways, for example: (1) the opening by Argentina of an unlimited credit in favor of the Allied Powers to be used for possible future purchases in this country by those Powers; (2) the expropriation (not sequestration) of the *Compañía Alemana de Electricidad* by the Argentine Government; (3) the allotment of German tonnage interned in Argentine ports to the Allies. I definitely suggested that I should cable these proposals to the Department and he as definitely refused his "authorization" saying that this was not the moment for such proposals; that the object he desired was to create a political tone which he confessed he did not believe at present existed and that he thought the discussion of proposals by both sides should come subsequently.

I am inclined to believe that Naón's attitude as to the possibility of forcing Argentina into making a definite break with Germany has changed and that he is now of the opinion, as I have before stated, that there is no immediate cause for a rupture.

In view of the fact that Naón is to see the President on Monday at 3 I beg to suggest the desirability of giving him some form of answer before that time.

STIMSON

File No. 635.119/220

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 4, 1918, 1 p. m.*

Stabler to Robbins:

Your March 2, 2 p. m. Matter given careful consideration. You may say to Naón in most informal manner that any proposals coming from the Government of the Argentine Republic looking toward



closer relationship between that country and the United States will always receive most sympathetic consideration.

Department at a loss to understand what Naón really has in mind . . .

POLK

File No. 635.119/226

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *undated.*

[Received March 5, 1918, 7.15 p. m.]

My February 27 [26], 12 p. m., and March 2, 2 p. m. I have just had a long conversation with Naón on the lines his talks with Robbins. He is emphatic that there is no immediate possibility of even public opinion favoring a rupture with Germany and thinks that his plan of a treaty for mutual cooperation, commercial, financial and economic, between Argentina and the Allies is not an abstract idea but a concrete measure for [cooperation?] with the Allies. He will not concretely specify in advance the measures to be included in such a convention, but he adverted to the three points mentioned in Embassy's telegram of March 2, 2 p. m.

He accentuated the fact that all his past activities had been approved by the President, and that he was to be permitted to make declarations of a policy friendly to the United States.

He is to see the President today and I shall see him immediately afterwards. It is evident that he has now no intention of resigning.

STIMSON

File No. 862.85/333

*The Minister in Cuba (Gonzales) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HABANA, *March 6, 1918, 3 p. m.*

[Received 6.07 p. m.]

Your December 14, 5 p. m.<sup>1</sup> In peculiar conditions the Cuban Government found no means of placing vessels under Cuban flag except as attached to Navy and for that purpose President needed additional powers from Congress. He presented bill conveying such powers but while he has pressed for passage the deadlock on account of the absence of Liberal members continues and may continue much longer. The President wishes United States to operate vessels free of charter hire. The people who repaired vessels are in want of

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 1, p. 386.*

money and pressing me for action. Is there any method by which Shipping Board can operate vessels which were turned over to United States without further legislation?

GONZALES

File No. 862.85/328

*The Department of State to the Peruvian Legation*

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a memorandum from the Peruvian Legation dated the 2d instant,<sup>1</sup> regarding the proposal presented to the Government of Peru for the utilization of the ex-German vessels at present in Peruvian ports, which stated that public opinion in Peru would not countenance the acceptance of the proposal unless the vessels should be utilized under the flag of Peru and unless their employment should be to the advantage of the national trade of Peru. The memorandum concluded with the statement that should the Government of the United States deem it convenient to modify in the sense indicated its former proposal, the Government of Peru will be pleased to give its most careful consideration to the fresh suggestions it may receive.

The Shipping Board has informed the Department of State that they are anxious to meet the views of the Peruvian Government and that they will endeavor to modify the proposal for the utilization of the ex-German ships accordingly. The Shipping Board agrees that these ships, if utilized, shall fly the Peruvian flag, and agrees in principle that the employment of these vessels shall be to the national advantage of Peru.

The Shipping Board greatly desires that the Peruvian Government express its views as to its trade requirements. It is believed that if the principle of substitution was accepted it would be mutually advantageous. In that event the Shipping Board could supply the Peruvian Government in place of the deep draught ex-German vessels, with other vessels better adapted to the maritime trade of Peru.

The Department of State expresses the sincere hope that the negotiations for these vessels may be brought to an early conclusion, as it appears that, on account of the damaged condition, some months will be required to fit them for service.

WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1918.*

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 862.85/425d

*The Secretary of State to the Uruguayan Minister (De Pena)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Uruguayan Minister and desires to refer to the conversation which took place on the 5th instant between the Secretary of the Uruguayan Legation and Mr. Johnson, of the Latin American Division of the State Department, in regard to the following points which the Government of Uruguay desire to have incorporated in the contract for the charter of the eight German vessels now sheltered in Uruguayan ports:

1. The opinion of the Uruguayan Government must be asked and their consent obtained to the sub-chartering of the ex-German ships. The Uruguayan Government agrees to sub-chartering in principle.
2. Substitution of tonnage shall be limited to four vessels.
3. If one of the ex-German vessels is taken off a certain commercial route and some other vessel substituted for it, and the former vessel is sunk or lost, the latter must maintain the commercial route initiated by the former.

The Secretary of State has the honor to inform the Uruguayan Minister that this matter has been taken up with the Emergency Fleet Corporation, which has requested that the following information be conveyed to the Uruguayan Legation.

With reference to the first point it is desired to invite attention to the fact that inasmuch as an arrangement was made between Great Britain and the United States that the vessels acquired should be divided between the two countries, and also as the Government of Uruguay has requested that the Government of the United States obtain the consent and approval of the British authorities to the charter of these vessels by the Emergency Fleet Corporation and inasmuch as the consent and approval of the British authorities was based on the agreement that four vessels should be sub-chartered to a company nominated by Great Britain, it would be difficult to reserve to the Uruguayan Government the right to approve or disapprove of a company to which the vessels are chartered.

Informal advice has been received by the United States Shipping Board that it is the intention of the British authorities to charter these vessels to Houlder Brothers of Montevideo, and the Shipping Board feels confident that the foregoing explanation will place the present situation in such a clear light that the Government of Uruguay will offer no further objections to the reservation on the part of the Emergency Fleet Corporation of the right to select the company to whom the vessels will be chartered.

With reference to the second point attention is invited to the fact that the Emergency Fleet Corporation desires it to be understood

that it feels that the reservation of the right to substitute equal or greater tonnage for any or all of the ex-German ships cannot, in any way, work a disadvantage to Uruguay, in view of the fact that the effect of such a substitution is to place in the actual position of the vessel for which substitution has been made, another vessel of equal or greater deadweight tonnage. The Emergency Fleet Corporation considers that this matter is a most important element in the contract.

The Emergency Fleet Corporation considers that the third point is equitable and agrees to it.

WASHINGTON, *March 12, 1918.*

File No. 635.119/226

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina  
(Stimson)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 12, 1918, 8 p. m.*

Your March 2, 2 p. m. and March 8, 3 p. m.<sup>1</sup> French Ambassador has informed Department that he is in receipt of cable advices that Naón presented his plans for a commercial and financial convention to the French Minister in Buenos Aires. The French Minister discussed the matter with his British colleague who had also been approached by Naón and suggestion was made in their conversation that it would be advisable to suggest to Argentine Government that to consummate this arrangement tonnage was necessary which might be secured by the taking of German ships in Argentine ports.

For your strictly confidential information and guidance, should this matter come up, this Government will desire to conduct the negotiations to secure these ships for use of Allies and will wish to initiate and take the lead in these negotiations.

POLK

File No. 862.85/345

*The Minister in Cuba (Gonzales) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HABANA, *March 13, 1918, 3 p. m.*

[Received 6.28 p. m.]

Your December 14, 5 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> my March 6, 3 p. m. President sends me for comment before signing following proposed decree indorsed by Judge Advocate War and Navy:

Whereas ships *Bavaria*, *Olivant*, *Adelheid* and *Constancia*, which were turned over the Government of the United States in order that

<sup>1</sup> The latter not printed. <sup>2</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 1, p. 386.



this Allied nation may use them for common good of both republics and which now fly Cuban flag, should in view of their legal status arising from their seizure by this Government be considered as in the class of vessels which, while not forming a part of the navy, belong to the state and are, therefore, public property.

Therefore, in exercise of powers invested in me by the constitution and the laws, upon recommendation of the Secretary of War and Navy, I hereby resolve that until otherwise provided the ships *Bavaria*, *Olivant*, *Adelheid* and *Constancia* be considered in the class of national public ships and as predicated shall continue to fly the Cuban flag and that consequently the proper authorities will issue necessary papers to accredit the nationality and character of said ships.

Please answer as soon as possible if this is what Shipping Board wishes.

GONZALES

File No. 862.85/358

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract<sup>1</sup>]

BUENOS AIRES, March 21, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received 10.10 p. m.]

The Minister for Foreign Affairs called me this afternoon to the Foreign Office to inform me that he had mentioned to the President my request and his promise that in case of the sale of the German ships, the United States should have the preference; he stated that the President had authorized him to make a report that the President recognized the reasonableness of this request and confirmed the promise that in the event of the sale of the ships or any one of them by the Argentine Government the United States should have the first notification and the priority right of purchase.

STIMSON

File No. 635.119/309

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, March 26, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received March 27, 1.20 a. m.]

My March 14, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Your March 4, 12 [1] p. m. Naón had an interview with the President last night and came to see me early this morning to say that the President had approved the formula or sketch of project for an economic alliance between Argentina and

<sup>1</sup> Telegram printed in full, vol. II, p. 1746.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

the United States, England, France and Italy to last during the war. Literal translation follows:

#### ANTE-PROJECT

In the presence of the circumstances created by the present war and with the desire of contributing to the increase of the ties between the contracting countries with the idea of a reciprocal economic cooperation which shall correspond to their respective necessities during the time the present war may last, the Government of the Argentine Republic on the one part and those of the United States of America, France, Great Britain and Italy on the other, have designated as their respective plenipotentiaries the Messrs. (-----) to agree upon the following stipulations:

(1) The Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy, bind themselves to permit the exportation to the Argentine Republic during the time which the war may last of the following articles of their production—and of other articles indispensable for the development of the national life of Argentine or its industries and in such quantities as may be necessary for those ends, provided always, that the Argentine Government make official requisition for the same.

(2) The above-mentioned Governments of the United States, France, Great Britain and Italy will themselves contribute proportionately so far as possible the ships necessary for the conduct of the commercial interchange between those countries and the Argentine Republic during the time which the war may last after satisfying the exigencies of their vital necessities.

(3) The above-mentioned Governments or which ever one of them may be in condition to do so, shall facilitate to the Argentine Government if they be necessary the funds indispensable for the financing of the development of the national industries related to the increase of reciprocal commercial relations or to the exigencies of the life of the nation, the satisfaction of which necessarily needs the aid of the natural or manufactured products of the other four countries.

(4) In its turn the Argentine Government having satisfied its own necessities will facilitate the acquisition by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy of those national products which they may need for their [subsistence] and of those raw materials of Argentine production indispensable for the development of their industries and shall at the same time contribute within the resources of which it may be able to dispose to the financing made needful by the acquisition of such products.

(5) The Argentine Government shall at the same time cooperate in the stabilization of the international exchange between the Argentine, American, French, English and Italian markets by a process similar to the one which actually rules between the United States and the Argentine Government in such manner that this stabilization shall produce results during all the usual time that the present conflict may last.

Naón says that he has received encouragement from the Ministers of France and Italy and England and that he will stay in Buenos Aires until affair is determined. What he wants from the United States Government is merely a statement that it will entertain conversations upon such a five party treaty. He expects that in paragraph 2 the United States will wish to insert Argentina as also binding herself to secure ships (the German) and that in paragraph 3 at the words "national industries" we may move to insert a phrase excluding enemy's companies limitations [*especially*] electric-ity company from such classification. No exports will be permitted to Argentina from the United States except on request and statement of the Argentine Government that they are necessary for Argentine industries. Under paragraph 4 it is intended that the credit shall be adequate to the necessities of each country; and under paragraph 5 that the exchange credit shall have no limit.

Naón expects the Argentine Government will acquire and operate all the German ships as national transports.

I made no comment whatever other than to promise to request of the Department earnest consideration and an early answer.

STIMSON

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File No. 862.85/345

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Cuba (Gonzales)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 27, 1918, 4 p. m.*

Your March 13, 3 p. m., regarding German ships seized by Cuba. Representative of the Shipping Board states that decree appears to cover what is desired. It is understood decree will make it possible to have vessels placed under Cuban flag. It is suggested that, in order that the vessels may promptly be properly documented, the appropriate Cuban representative in the United States might be authorized to issue Cuban registry or provisional registry to them. Shipping Board will be glad to co-operate with such representative in this matter. So inform Cuban Government.

LANSING

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File No. 834.032/8

*The Chargé in Paraguay (Sussdorff) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ASUNCIÓN, *April 2, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received April 3, 9.23 a. m.*]

The Paraguayan Congress convened today for the regular session of 1918. The President of the Republic read his message which con-

tains the following very important statement regarding Paraguay's foreign relations:

During the past year some of the nations of America have declared the existence of a state of war with Germany; others have broken off diplomatic relations with that Empire. This participation [gives] the conflict a new character in so far as we are concerned. There exists between the peoples and Governments of the continent an effective solidarity confirmed in recent years by international acts never before now realized in the reciprocal relations of so large a number of sovereign states. This solidarity, which Paraguay accepts in its entirety and desires to see strengthened in the future, creates identical interests of a high political order. Thus the fortune of the peoples who have seen the necessity of intervening in the contest is not a matter of indifference to those who remain apart from it: there is no divergence between the American countries when it is a question of events which may profoundly alter the international status of the world.

Inspired by this thought, the Paraguayan Government has felt from the very beginning, in view of the imminent intervention of America, that a continental conference ought to be convoked in order to determine upon a line of conduct which should be uniform and if possible identical. It is to be regretted that under circumstances which are so grave for the future of America, this spirit of fraternity and cooperation could not be manifested in a collective declaration of purpose, an expression of the sentiments and aspirations of the new world. But in spite of this, the tradition of our peoples, the free institutions which govern them and the moral criterion which constitutes their conception of international [relations] will always cause them to feel united by the call of democracy and justice. The principles of the Americas have been formulated by the President of the United States of America. The assurance of peace and the guarantee of the moral and material progress of the community of nations depend upon the definite triumph of those ideals.

SUSSDORFF

File No. 635.119/309

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your March 26, 3 p. m. Should you be approached by Naón or any representative of the Argentine Government with a request for a statement of this Government's position you will say that as the matter contains so many questions of great importance the Government of the United States feels that it deserves the most careful consideration and that such consideration is being given to it by the Department of State.

The Department desires you to make no personal comment regarding this matter to any Argentine official.

LANSING



File No. 862.85/378

*The Minister in Cuba (Gonzales) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

HABANA, April 10, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received 1.46 p. m.]

Your March 27, 4 p. m. Presidential decree issued carrying authority Shipping Board desires for placing vessels under Cuban flag. Copy will be forwarded Cuban Minister at Washington with authority to act in cooperation with representative of Shipping Board.

GONZALES

File No. 763.72/9485

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, April 10, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 9.18 p. m.]

The Uruguayan Minister informs me that he is going to Montevideo tonight to discuss with the President of Uruguay the incident of the detention of the Uruguayan military mission by a German submarine. It is reported here in the press that the members of the mission, before they were permitted to proceed, were compelled to give their parole not to go to the Allied front, and are now detained in Spain. The Minister will urge that the Uruguayan Government demand of Germany whether it considers itself in a state of war with Uruguay.

If the answer is in the affirmative Argentina will be obliged to reconsider its attitude as regards the war, in view of the existing treaties which guarantee the immunity of the River Plate, and because of President Irigoyen's recent note to Uruguay, and his speech promising support to Uruguay in the event of German aggression.

STIMSON

File No. 763.72/9618

*Memorandum of the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs (Stabler)*

April 11, 1918.

The Guatemalan Minister called to see Mr. Stabler this afternoon and spoke with him in regard to a letter which he had received from the President of Guatemala in which it was stated that serious consideration was being given to the matter of declaration of war against Germany on the part of Guatemala, and he further stated that the matter of expropriation of German property was also being

given attention. The Minister stated that he was also advised that further instructions were being sent him by the Guatemalan Foreign Office in regard to German property in Guatemala and, as soon as he received them, he would inform the Department.<sup>1</sup>

The Minister further informed Mr. Stabler that he was informed that the Guatemalan Assembly had passed a law authorizing the Government to contract for an amount up to \$30,000,000. He informed Mr. Stabler that, as soon as further details were received, he wished to discuss the matter with the Department looking toward some arrangements for a loan in the United States.

STABLER

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File No. 763.72/9539

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *April 12, 1918, 1 p. m.*

[Received 5.49 p. m.]

My April 11 [10], 3 p. m. The Uruguayan Minister has returned from his visit to Montevideo. He informs me that the demand of the Uruguayan Government as to whether the German Government considers itself in a state of war with Uruguay, was made (three?) days since. He further informs me confidentially that the German Government, through its Ambassador to Spain, suggested that the matter of the detention of the Uruguayan military mission be arbitrated by the Spanish Government, but that Uruguay has refused to consider it.

STIMSON

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File No. 611.326/11a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 15, 1918, 5 p. m.*

With the object of diverting as much tonnage as possible immediately to the North Atlantic for the purpose of carrying troops and munitions of war to France, the Shipping Board has put in force, effective April 15, an import embargo on the articles already telegraphed you, Department's telegraphic circular March 21,<sup>2</sup> and proposes at an early date to embargo and restrict import of other articles which this country can go without. In the list telegraphed you the only article of serious importance to Brazil is Brazil nuts.

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<sup>1</sup> For later correspondence regarding German property in Guatemala, see Supplement 2, pp. 366-373.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

The Brazilian Ambassador has pointed out to the Department the serious consequences of an embargo on Brazil nuts on the economic, labor and probably the local political situation in Amazonas.

The Shipping Board offers as a compensating arrangement to take the oil from the Brazil nuts which would employ about one-half the tonnage used for the nuts, and for this purpose Shipping Board suggests that a crushing and extracting plant be installed in Brazil.

The major articles affected by embargoes now effective or proposed are: Brazil nuts, tobacco leaf, meat products, bees wax, art works, brass and woods (not cedar or mahogany).

While it is not intended to embargo any of the principal articles of Brazil's exports to the United States, it is expected that the imports of these will be limited to the amounts necessary to meet essential needs in order that shipping space may not be devoted to carrying unnecessary amounts of those commodities. It is proposed by the Shipping Board that imports of coffee be restricted to 376,000 bags per month, saving 65,400 tons shipping or if put into North Atlantic trade equivalent to 100,000 tons. Cocoa will probably be restricted somewhat, exact restrictions not yet determined, possibly 50 per cent. Manganese ore probably will be reduced to two-thirds amount imported last year.

To offset reduction in value imports manganese and cocoa, proposed importation of chromite ore which was not imported by United States from Brazil in 1917. Similarly proposed increase imports rubber from Brazil at least to 30,000 tons, or 20 per cent over last year. This increase in importation of chromite and rubber means an addition of \$6,500,000 in imports over last year.

To-day the winning of the war depends absolutely upon the supply of ships. In this tremendous battle for the freedom of mankind we cannot be justified in using ships for any purpose not directly helpful in winning the war. While thus limiting imports from our close friends, like Brazil, we propose to withdraw American ships and neutral ships chartered to us and put them in the danger zone, and will look to Brazil, if she can, to carry the South American trade. If, with the help of the ex-German boats, Brazil can carry the imports which we must have and still have tonnage to spare, we hope that Brazil will offer as part of her war contribution all surplus ships for the great cause and thereby assist us in rushing America's blood and money across the Atlantic to check the menace to the peace of the world.

These facts, figures and arguments have been presented to Brazilian Ambassador but are sent to you for your information and use if you find them necessary.

Declaration of a State of War with Germany by Guatemala, April 21, Nicaragua, May 8, and Costa Rica, May 23—Conclusion of the Contract for the Chartering of German Ships in Uruguayan Ports, May 24—Renewal of Discussions with Peru Regarding German Ships—Arrangements for a Conference at Washington on the Situation of Brazil—Arrangements for Naval Cooperation with Cuba

File No. 763.72/9748

*The Guatemalan Minister (Méndez) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, April 21, 1918.

[Received April 24.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: On the date of this day I received from the President of Guatemala a cablegram reading as follows:

Minister of Guatemala, Washington. By a decree of this day of the National Legislative Assembly, Guatemala assumes the same attitude of belligerency as the United States toward the German Empire. M. Estrada C[abrera].

In having the honor to transmit to Your Excellency the President's telegram and pending receipt of a copy of the decree of the National Legislative Assembly, I am as ever glad to express to Your Excellency the determination of the Government of Guatemala, voicing the wishes of the people, to stand by the side of the United States in the defence of the rights of America and mankind which German autocracy in its effort to substitute military despotism for liberty and civilization in the world is threatening more harshly and tenaciously every day.

Guatemala, like the United States, will maintain its belligerency until a lasting peace founded on the respect of Right and Justice may be established for the guaranty of nations.

I avail myself [etc.]

JOAQUÍN MÉNDEZ.

File No. 033.4120

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, April 24, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 9.08 p. m.]

9684. Sir Maurice de Bunsen, formerly British Ambassador at Vienna, who has been acting during the war as extra assistant under-secretary at the Foreign Office, left last week for South America on a mission the nature of which I understand has been communicated to you by Lord Reading.<sup>1</sup>

PAGE

<sup>1</sup> See telegrams to the Ambassador in Great Britain, No. 7761, May 16, and from the Ambassador in Great Britain, No. 10106, May 17, *post*, pp. 689 and 690, respectively.



File No. 763.72/9748

*The Secretary of State to the Guatemalan Minister (Méndez)*

No. 107

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1918.

SIR: It is with profound gratification that my Government has received the information that the Republic of Guatemala has declared that a state of war exists between it and the Imperial German Government. Your Government was among the very first to take a stand with the Government of the United States in the defense of the rights of humanity and of international law and justice, and showed proofs of this attitude by breaking relations with the Imperial German Government and offering all cooperation to the United States.

The declaration of the assumption of a state of belligerency toward the German Empire announced by President Manuel Estrada Cabrera, is but another proof of the strong ties of friendship and similarity of views uniting by lasting bonds of common interest the free peoples of Guatemala and of the United States of America. Shoulder to shoulder both countries will prosecute this war, not alone against the enemy in the field, but against his secret machinations in our very midst.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72/9924

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

No. 560

BUENOS AIRES, April 12, 1918.

[Received May 8.]

SIR: Referring to my cable of April 10, 3 p. m., and of April 12, 1 p. m., concerning the relations between Uruguay and Germany, I have only to add that even in case the German Government refuses to receive Uruguay's representations and a state of war results between those two countries, I have considerable doubt—in view of the manner in which President Irigoyen has always talked to me—whether he will take any further action before some actual aggression is made upon the waters of the River Plate.

There is a very general impression that the basin of the Plate is within the national sovereignty, and that its immunity from belligerent activities is guaranteed by treaty, and in view of the recent declarations of President Irigoyen to the President of Uruguay, or his Minister, we may indeed assume that that is his own attitude. In fact, it is a kind of Monroe Doctrine for Argentina that it will join with neighboring countries in defending the River Plate and its tributaries.

President Irigoyen's attitude is best shown in the inaugural message of the President of Uruguay to the new Legislature, on the 15th of February last, in which these words occur:

By reason of having very serious suspicions that the German Government was fomenting an insurrection of German colonists in the south of Brazil, with the intention of invading the north of Uruguay, the Uruguayan Government made President Irigoyen acquainted with this state of affairs and asked him to express what would be the attitude of the Argentine Government in case Uruguay would direct to it a demand for munitions of war to arm the troops that it mobilized.

President Irigoyen made known to the representative of our country in Argentina that in the case of such an attack the Argentine Government would put all its resources in defense of the sovereignty of the Uruguayan Nation, and assume all consequent responsibilities.

As this extract was printed in black type on the front page of *La Epoca*, the Government organ, on the 16th of February, the following day, under the headline, "A Great Revelation—Noble Act of the Argentine President—American Sovereignty," it may be assumed to be not only accurate but again emphasized by President Irigoyen, as these leaders in the *Epoca* are always shown to him before publication.

The treaties concerning the subject are, so far as I can find, only the convention with Brazil of November 20, 1857, guaranteeing the Paraná, Uruguay and Paraguay rivers, that with Great Britain of November 24, 1849, section IV, concerning the Paraná and Uruguay rivers, and the treaty of July 10, 1853, with Great Britain on the same subject. None of these specifically cover the River Plate, but I will further refer to my despatch No. 456, of November 7, 1917,<sup>1</sup> which covers the subject at some length.

I have [etc.]

F. J. STIMSON

File No. 763.72/9901

*The Minister in Nicaragua (Jefferson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MANAGUA, May 8, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received 9.25 p. m.]

Referring to my cable of May 6, noon.<sup>1</sup> Minister for Foreign Affairs officially informed the Legation today of the passage by Congress of the following decree:

ARTICLE 1. From this date there exists and is declared a state of war between Nicaragua and the Imperial Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ARTICLE 2. Nicaragua [declares] itself united with the United States of America and with the other Latin American republics which are now at war with the above-mentioned Imperial Governments.

ARTICLE 3. Therefore martial law is declared in the Republic and the Executive Power is empowered to take all measures which he may judge proper and necessary for the efficacious cooperation of Nicaragua in carrying out this decree.

JEFFERSON

File No. 763.72/10058a

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Haiti (Bailly-Blanchard)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 10, 1918, 2 p. m.*

Legation's September 19, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and subsequent cables and correspondence on this subject.

You are instructed to approach the President in regard to above matters initiated by Minister Foreign Affairs in September 1917, and referred to again as reported by your cable of January 15, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup>

As a basis for this conversation, you will recall to the Haitian Government the former suggestion of the Department that a declaration of war against Germany by Haitian Government should be deferred until the adoption of a constitution which would provide a legislative body competent to make such a declaration; that in view of the imminent adoption of the constitution concerning the substance of which the two Governments have cooperated so successfully, the Department considers it fitting to state that the United States Government is deeply appreciative of the desire of the Haitian Government to enter the war on the side of the United States, Brazil, Cuba, Panama, Guatemala and the Entente Allies. Further that this Government considers that by so doing, Haiti could eliminate the grave future menace which a continued presence of German trade control in Haiti will occasion; that the United States would give every proper assistance available to Haiti if she declared war but that country should realize that the magnitude of the struggle necessitates in many instances, real sacrifices at present from those nations associated therein. Therefore, if Haiti joins their ranks she should not anticipate any economic or financial advantages at this time other than those participated in by the other Associated Nations. As noted above, however, the United States is of the opinion that the advantages to Haiti which would accrue from an elimination of

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 661.

German interests there would be of the greatest value when the war is over.

You will keep before the President the fact that the Haitian Government initiated a discussion of this subject and that the United States is only replying to the request of the Haitian Government for advice and counsel in that relation.

Report by cable the substance of the President's remarks in this connection.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/9998

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *May 16, 1918, 11 a. m.*

[Received 3.28 p. m.]

The Uruguayan Minister informed me last night that the German Government had disavowed its action in stopping the officers of the Uruguayan military mission and that when asking them as to whether the German Government considered itself at war with Uruguay, the answer was in the negative. It has been further agreed by the German Government to allow the Uruguayan officers to visit whatever battlefield they wish.

STIMSON

File No. 033.4120

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 16, 1918, 4 p. m.*

7761. Your 9684, April 24, 4 p. m.<sup>1</sup> British Ambassador has given Department no information regarding mission. Cable Department nature of mission.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10034

*The Chargé in Honduras (Curtis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEGUCIGALPA, *May 16, 1918, 10 a. m.*

[Received May 17, 6.25 a. m.]

In the course of a conversation yesterday afternoon I intimated to the President that the position of Honduras as to claims by Germany after the war would be stronger if it declared war and he said

<sup>1</sup>Ante, p. 685.



that he was only awaiting the return of the Minister for Foreign Affairs who has been ill for about two months to ask for a report as to the international law on the subject. I suggest that you have prepared and send me a memorandum along these lines citing authorities with editions and pages.

CURTIS

File No. 033.4120/2

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

LONDON, May 17, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received May 18, 1.28 a. m.]

10106. Your 7761, May 16, 4 p. m. On De Bunsen's arrival at Rio following notice appeared in *Times* of May 10:

An official British mission is visiting South America. It reached Rio de Janeiro on Wednesday. The head of the mission is Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna at the time of the outbreak of war, who is accompanied by representatives of the Navy and Army, of the Department of Overseas Trade, and of the Foreign Trade Department of the Foreign Office. An official announcement issued last night defines as follows the objects of the mission: [1] to congratulate the countries which have taken action to show their sympathy with the cause of the Allies, and by personal contact with their statesmen to bring to their knowledge with increased force the principles at stake and the ideals which form the aim of this country in [persevering] in the war; [2] to discuss with South American Governments the intricate economic questions which have arisen between them and His Majesty's Government out of the war, regarding which it is, in many cases, difficult to come to a perfect understanding by [correspondence]; [3] to permit His Majesty's representatives in South America, after an absence of some years from the United Kingdom, to gain the thorough knowledge of the views of His Majesty's Government on questions of policy, which is essential to enable them to carry out their instructions in the spirit as well as in the letter.

PAGE

File No. 763.72/10059

*The Minister in Haiti (Baillly-Blanchard) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

PORT AU PRINCE, May 18, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received May 19, 3.30 p. m.]

Your confidential May 10, 2 p. m. Instructions complied with. President in perfect accord, and states that declaration will be made after adoption of constitution.

BLANCHARD

File No. 701.1237/2

*The Minister in Cuba (Gonzales) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

HABANA, May 21, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received 3.02 p. m.]

Foreign Office informs me confidentially that Mexican Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed by his Government to turn over Legation archives to Mexican Consul General and return to Mexico.<sup>1</sup> Foreign Office does not know whether this means breaking off diplomatic relations and has telegraphed for further information to its representative in Mexico.

GONZALES

File No. 701.3511/140

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, May 23, 1918, noon.

[Received 4 p. m.]

Your May 22, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Full text of decree appointing Naón financial commissioner was cabled in my May 8, 1 p. m.<sup>2</sup> The comment given in the President's messages was merely reiterative. The paragraph referring to it is [as follows]:

The new aspects which the present world convulsion give to the relations of external commerce have determined the Government to confide to our Ambassador in Washington the charge of high financial commissioner in the United States, intending by this designation to facilitate his acts and remove as far as it can difficulties created in the matter of exchange.

I may add that in conversation some two months since when Naón was first urging his appointment as such commissioner he told me that he had endeavored to have his powers more broadly stated, but that the President had insisted on limiting them to economic matters. See my telegram of March 26, 3 p. m.,<sup>3</sup> giving assurance that Naón's plan for an economic alliance [has the approval of the President].

It appears to me that all the President has in mind is the furtherance of exportation of articles needed in Argentina by the United States conceding therefor perpetual exchange credits as may prove necessary.

STIMSON

<sup>1</sup> According to telegram from the Ambassador in Mexico, No. 1106, May 25 (File No. 701.1237/5), the date of the instruction referred to was May 18.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

<sup>3</sup> *Ante*, p. 678.

File No. 763.72/10132

*The Chargé in Costa Rica (Johnson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SAN JOSÉ, May 24, 1918, 8 a. m.

[Received 11.41 p. m.]

Congressional resolution authorizing and Executive decree proclaiming that a state of war exists with German Government, both dated yesterday, published today; officially given out as well, that Germans will not be molested in either person or property. In the decree it is declared that Costa Rica enters war for principles of humanity. No specific causes alleged. Decrees by mail.<sup>1</sup>

JOHNSON

File No. 862.85/438

*The Chargé in Uruguay (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONTEVIDEO, May 24, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 11.45 p. m.]

Charter contract for ex-German vessels signed this afternoon will be handed to Congress today. Minister of Foreign Affairs expects that it will pass Senate Wednesday, from there must go to House of Representatives.<sup>2</sup> Referring to article 10 of contract, what arrangements have been made as to payment of the advance on charter price for repairs?

WADSWORTH

File No. 763.72/9901

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Nicaragua (Jefferson)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 25, 1918.

President desires you to deliver following to President Chamorro:

I have received with very great pleasure and satisfaction the announcement of Nicaragua's declaration of war against the Imperial Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Such action against the common enemy of freedom, civilization, and human rights and welfare is the noblest that any nation can take under existing conditions, and is appreciated most deeply by me and by

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> The signature, on June 3, of the Executive decree promulgating the legislative approval of the contract was reported by the Chargé in telegram of June 12, 11 p. m. (File No. 862.85/468.)

the American people, who are highly honored by your cooperation and that of your friendly and progressive nation. Woodrow Wilson.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10034

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Honduras (Curtis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 25, 1918, 4 p. m.*

Your May 16, 10 a. m. It is clear that a belligerent may exercise greater powers in control of its resources and persons within its borders, and for a different purpose, than can a neutral. The belligerents in the present war are exercising their sovereign rights in the interest of preventing the products of their soil or industry from being used by or for the enemy; of preventing persons within their jurisdiction from trading with the enemy, directly or indirectly; of preventing the use of their means of communication by or for the enemy, and of limiting their financial resources for their own necessities and the needs of their allies. These measures are so obviously founded upon the exercise of sovereign rights that it is unnecessary to cite authorities therefor. In a state of neutrality, none of these measures might be put into effect—certainly not unless both groups of belligerents are treated equally—an equality which it would be quite impossible to maintain to the satisfaction of the belligerents.

In the exercise of the rights above-mentioned, the United States controls by license all exports and imports; all trade and communication between the United States and foreign countries; all financial relations with foreign countries, including the transfer of gold, bullion, and evidences of indebtedness (see "Intercourse with the Enemy": Hall, *Int. Law*, 7th ed., pp. 403-404; Moore's *Digest*, vol. 7, pp. 192-195 and 237-257; Oppenheim, *Int. Law*, 2d ed., pp. 135-138; Phillipson, *Int. Law and the Great War*, pp. 93-106); the activities of enemy aliens and other suspicious aliens within its borders (see Hall, pp. 408*n*, 410; Phillipson, pp. 81-92; Moore's *Digest*, vol. 4, p. 138, and vol. 7, pp. 191, 192); the entry and departure of all persons, including citizens of the United States (see *The American Passport*, by G. Hunt, p. 50); the censorship of all incoming and outgoing communications by mail, wire, or otherwise (see in part 7 Moore, 256); property in the United States owned by enemy aliens (see 7 Moore, p. 280 *et seq.*), etc. Some of these references are applicable only in part.

You may use this information in your further conversations with respect to the advantages of Honduras entering the war.

LANSING



File No. 701.1237/4

*The Ambassador in Mexico (Fletcher) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MEXICO, May 24, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received May 25, 5.44 p. m.]

1105. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has issued the following statement with reference to the suspension of diplomatic relations between Mexico and Cuba:

In order to avoid distorted and malevolent interpretations the public is informed that the Government of Mexico by direction of the President of the Republic at a meeting of the Cabinet announces that it is under the most absolute necessity of retiring its diplomatic representative to the Government of Cuba, and of suspending for an indefinite time the sending of a new representative, as it considers this measure indispensable in behalf of the highest interest of the two nations at this time of the world's acute crisis.

In effect, by reason of the state of war in which the Republic of Cuba finds itself at this time, the Cuban Government has been obliged to take steps which in many cases are prejudicial to the interests of the Mexican Government or its nationals;<sup>1</sup> and for this reason the Legation of Mexico would unavoidably be forced to make frequent representations to the Government of Cuba, which would be useless, and would obstruct unduly the freedom of action of a friendly people who find themselves in a difficult situation. As a consequence our diplomatic representations would not produce at this time any appreciable practical results, and would solely create tenseness and bitterness, which it would be necessary to make disappear later in order to maintain unbroken the fraternal sentiments of solidarity which have always bound us to the people of Cuba, and to all Spanish-American nations.

In retiring its diplomatic representative from Cuba the Government of Mexico gives an eloquent proof of consideration and respect for the sovereignty of a friendly Government which is now passing through a critical period, and it is also a proof of confidence in that the Government of Mexico trusts that its citizens will be treated by the Government of Cuba with all the kindness its laws and institutions permit, under whose protection they will remain in that Republic on the same terms as its nationals.

In acting in this manner the Government of Mexico does no more than follow faithfully the policies outlined by Citizen Venustiano Carranza, President of the United Mexican States, so often proclaimed as the highest ideal of the true society of nationals, that is: The equality of nationals and aliens and complete submission to the national sovereignty.

After the crisis has disappeared, as that which originated the revolution in our country is now passing, Mexico and Cuba will be in a position to renew their diplomatic relations on a basis of justice and equality, the great and only aspiration of the Government of Mexico in its international relations.

FLETCHER

<sup>1</sup> See vol. II, pp. 1729 *et seq.*

File No. 862.85/433

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Colombia (Belden)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1918, 2 p. m.

You are instructed to call upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to state to him that the Government of the United States had noted the destruction of the Hamburg-American steamship *Prinz August Wilhelm* at Puerto Colombia, concerning whose purchase representatives of the United States Shipping Board had been negotiating for some time with representatives of the steamship company, who were in practical agreement as to the terms of transfer of title at the time of the vessel's destruction apparently as the result of the activities of German subjects. In view of these facts and by reason of reports which have reached the Department regarding a possible repetition of German wanton action in connection with the *Mecklenburg* at Cartagena, the Government of the United States desires the Minister for Foreign Affairs to know the interest which the United States has in the protection of the *Mecklenburg* from injury or destruction. This you will explain is due to the fact that negotiations are now in progress looking to the acquisition of the vessel by United States interests.

For your guidance in your conversation with the Colombian Government in connection with the above you are informed that while the Department desires that the Colombian Government should realize clearly the interest which the United States has in the protection of the *Mecklenburg*, the Department does not wish the Colombian Government to receive the impression that it is being coerced in this regard. Rather, you should intimate to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the feeling of the United States is that the agents of the German Government have taken unfair advantage of the hospitality and protection of Colombia to operate under these privileges against the interests of United States.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10178

*The Chargé in Honduras (Curtis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEGUCIGALPA, May 27, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received May 29, 1.45 a. m.]

Your May 25, 4 p. m. Of the works cited by you, the Legation has only the 5th edition of Hall, the 1st of Oppenheim, and Moore's *Digest* and I am unable to locate anything of real use in the first of these. Please send immediately the editions cited and also Phillipson.

The Honduran Government is little interested in anything except the regularising of its position as to the alleged sequestration of the German lighters at Amapala<sup>1</sup> and the control of the activities of enemy aliens and other suspicious aliens. As to the rest, it is accomplishing its purposes either openly in accordance with the provisions of martial law or surreptitiously, or else it lacks capacity or power to accomplish them.

CURTIS

File No. 701.1237/12

*The Mexican Ambassador (Bonillas) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

No. A-1967

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Citizen General Cándido Aguilar, Secretary of Relations of the Mexican Government, supplementing his official declarations concerning the present state of relations between the Republics of Cuba and Mexico, informs me that the said relations have not been severed and that the diplomatic representative of Mexico in Cuba was recalled for the sole purpose of averting further complications between the two Governments; Mexico will hereafter transact its business with the Government of Cuba through its representative at the capital of Mexico or directly with the Minister of Relations.

I avail myself [etc.]

Y. BONILLAS

File No. 862.85/396

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Peru (Smith)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1918, 3 p. m.

You are instructed to present the following note textually to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Peru, impressing upon him the great importance of this matter and requesting that he bring it to the personal attention of the President of Peru at the earliest opportunity, stating that the Government of the United States feels that further delay in working out a satisfactory arrangement for the employment of these ships will be very detrimental to the best interests of the Government of Peru and the Government of the United States in connection with the cause which has been championed by Peru and for which the United States of America is battling:

During the past seven months the Government of the United States and the Government of Peru have been carrying on discussions looking toward an arrangement for the efficacious employment of the German ships now in Peruvian ports, which ships, it is understood, the Peruvian Government contemplates putting into com-

<sup>1</sup> For correspondence regarding the German lighters, see Supplement 2, pp. 379 et seq.



mission. These discussions had reached a point which appeared to be satisfactory to both parties when suddenly the Government of Peru apparently changed its views and to all intents and purposes seemed to hesitate about placing the above-mentioned ships in service.

In view of the public feeling in the United States, that for the successful prosecution of the war, all ships should be made use of which are controlled by those countries having at heart the desire for the triumph of the cause of the Allies, the Government of the United States feels that it is incumbent upon it to say to the Government of Peru that the above-mentioned hesitation on the part of that Government has produced an unfortunate impression upon the American people.

In order to set clear its own position in this matter before the people of the United States and to prove to them that the American Government has been doing everything in its power to secure the operation for the benefit of the common cause of the German ships in Peruvian ports, it is desired to inform the Government of Peru that it may become necessary to make a public declaration in regard to the above-mentioned discussions with the Peruvian Government. The Government of the United States trusts that the Government of Peru will have no objection to the publication of such a statement should it become necessary.

In view of the assurance of friendship and cooperation which the Government of Peru has given to the Government of the United States, especially at the time when the former broke diplomatic relations with the Imperial German Government, the Government of the United States trusts that there will be no need for the publication of such a statement, as it is confident that the Government of Peru will immediately take whatever steps are necessary for the putting into commission of the above-mentioned ships under some arrangement which will be satisfactory to both Governments.

Such cooperation on the part of the Government of Peru at this time, when all available tonnage is most necessary for the good of the cause which has been espoused by both nations, will be received with much gratification by the Government of the United States and in this connection it is desired to state further that the Government of the United States will be glad to guarantee the Government of Peru against any consequences which may result from any action in regard to making use of these German ships in a manner decided upon by the two Governments.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10261a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1918, 4 p. m.

7992. A few days ago the Department was approached by the French High Commission with the view of enlisting the assistance

<sup>1</sup>The same, on the same date, to the Ambassador in France, No. 4242; *mutatis mutandis*, to the Ambassador in Italy, No. 1431, June 12, with added reference to Italian participation in the discussions (File No. 611.326/53a).



of this Government in securing greater coordination between the English, French and United States Governments in negotiations with Brazil. A frank discussion of the problem was had with these gentlemen and later with Sir Richard Crawford of the British Embassy. Two points were made very clear by the Department to both the French and British representatives.

1. The United States Government is most desirous that Brazil on account of the close friendship evidenced by that country towards the United States should be treated throughout all negotiations as a most valued associate of the countries at war against the Central Powers and that great care should be taken to assist Brazil in bearing the burden of her share in the prosecution of the war.

2. That the United States Government is strongly of the opinion that all future negotiations between Brazil on the one side and the United States and the Allies on the other should be carried on in Washington and not in Rio de Janeiro.

The reasons which prompted this Government to lay stress on 1 and 2 *supra* are as follows:

1. Brazil is more actively participating in the war than almost any other South American country and for this reason if for no other she should receive preferential treatment from this country and the Allies.

2. The negotiations now pending between the United States and Brazil involve the following:

- (a) A proposal on the part of this Government in order to place more tonnage at the disposal of the War Department and the Allies to declare an embargo on such important commodities coming from Brazil as coffee and Brazilian nuts. If this embargo is put in force a considerable amount of tonnage will become available for the carrying of essential commodities such as manganese from Brazil to the United States and for trans-Atlantic service for the benefit of the Allies. However, the embargo cannot be imposed except on such terms as may be agreed upon between this country and Brazil for the protection of the coffee and nut industry of that country. These terms may involve the expenditure by this Government of a large sum of money in the purchase of these commodities which cannot be transported to market except by using present Brazilian tonnage and certain interned German boats not heretofore acquired by the French.

- (b) Certain financial transactions which may result in a loan from this country to Brazil and certain other financial arrangements with reference to the financing of Italian purchases in Brazil.

- (c) Purchases by United States Food Administration and by War Industries Board in Brazil.

The above clearly indicates that these negotiations are intricate and important and that inasmuch as they involve many departments of this Government they should be conducted in Washington in close cooperation with the British and French representatives now here.

You are accordingly instructed to present this matter at once to the Foreign Office. If you find there is substantial agreement with the position of this Government you will suggest that no action be taken by the Government to which you are accredited until a further discussion is had in Washington with the British and French representatives as to the best procedure to be adopted in notifying Brazil of our desire to conduct all negotiations in Washington.

This matter is considered urgent and a prompt report is requested.

For your confidential information, Department understands that Lord Reading has urged his Government to accept this proposal. Further the French High Commission is entirely sympathetic to this plan.

LANSING

File No. 862.85/456

*The Chargé in Peru (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

LIMA, June 3, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received June 4, 9.20 a. m.]

Department's May 29, 3 p. m. I was called to Foreign Office this afternoon and handed by Minister of Foreign Affairs the reply to Department's note a translation of which follows:

That the Peruvian Government absolutely ratifies its declarations of solidarity with the policy of the United States in the present war, and that the Peruvian Government will firmly [maintain] this declaration whatever the outcome of the conflict may be.

That its determination to use the German ships now at anchor in the national ports has always been in accordance with the purpose to proceed in absolute accord with the Government of the United States.

That the Peruvian Chargé d'Affaires' proposition for the organization of an international company made October 27, 1917, with the object of giving a more ample character and equality in participation for the utilization of the German ships was considered impracticable by the Government of the United States as late as the 18th December and after Governments of Uruguay and Brazil had already adopted a different mode of procedure.

That our Legation in Washington was informed January 7 of the present year unofficially that the Government of the United States

would only give guarantees of an economic character for the claims that possibly could be filed against the Government of Peru arising from the use of the German ships.

That even at such a recent date as February 15 [14]<sup>1</sup> the Department of State informed the Legation of Peru at Washington that the American Government would be disposed to offer to the Government of Peru its official guarantee to lend it all the possible help in case that the German Government after the end of the war should present any international claims against Peru for the use of the vessels of German nationality.

That it is the belief of the Peruvian Government that taking into consideration the sentiments of mutual friendship and community of principles that unite both countries the Government of the United States cannot fail to understand especially in actions [relating] to the present war the international political situation of Peru, something that the United States cannot fail to understand in view of the legal doctrines amply proclaimed by President Wilson for the triumph of which the American Union is generously giving her blood and her resources.

That the Peruvian Government replying [*relying?*] on the broad point of view of the United States' policies accepts with pleasure the offer just made of the guarantee of the American Government against any possible consequences which may come from the use of the German ships, in any manner agreed to by both Governments; and that it will proceed, as soon as said offer is perfected, to take the necessary measures to make possible the use of said [ships] and to close the agreement.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs states that in order to expedite matters he has instructed Peruvian Minister at Washington to suggest that negotiations be carried on here.

SMITH

File No. 611.326/49

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

RIO DE JANEIRO, June 4, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 10.30 p. m.]

A serious situation is developing here. The President has called me to a conference during which he stated that the recent restrictions of our Government boards on the exportation of coffee and rubber were choking the economic life of Brazil and were creating resentment. Many senators and deputies were complaining that while the United States purported to be Brazil's best friend, she was disregarding Brazil's essential interests and preventing her from contributing her quota to the cause of the Allies. Cuban Legation

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, p. 666.

on the other hand, in the person of special missions, were offering Brazil advantages and facilities, and the necessities of the Argentine, which is not an ally, were receiving more consideration than those of Brazil. The Government understood that the shortage of tonnage was the prime cause of these restrictions, but the people did not take that view.

The President asked that the tonnage now in service between the United States and Brazil should be allowed to transport coffee and rubber without special restrictions, Brazil determining the amount of exportation; that the coal supply might be maintained on the basis of the present arrangement and that a tank steamer might be released for a full cargo of gasoline, the supply of which was only sufficient for one month more. Transportation in Brazilian cities is largely made by motor traction and if gasoline gives out communication will stop.

Suggest that the Department make a statement covering above points which either Da Gama or I can give President.

Da Gama has telegraphed that he "can do nothing more." . . .

MORGAN

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File No. 611.326/156

*The French High Commissioner (Tardieu) to the Assistant to the Counselor for the Department of State (Auchincloss)*

WASHINGTON, June 5, 1918.

DEAR MR. AUCHINCLOSS: In confirmation of the conversation I had with you yesterday, I have the honor of informing you that the Government of the Republic is favorable to the constitution and working at Washington of an inter-Allied committee intrusted with the duties of coordinating the purchasing operations of the Allies in Brazil.

Informing me of this decision they instruct me to notify the Federal Government of it.

My Government calls my attention to the fact that, although they are in favor of the constitution of the committee at Rio de Janeiro, they have been anxious to be in agreement with Mr. Lansing's opinion, giving in that way a new proof of their wish, always to agree in Brazil as anywhere else, in complete accordance with the American Government.

In my Government's opinion, the committee to create, would be a committee of affairs, in which the High Commissioner would be the representative of France.

Please accept [etc.]

For the High Commissioner:

BILLY



File No. 763.72/10262

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, June 5, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received June 5, 1918, 155 p. m.]

Your 7992, May 29, 4 p. m. I find British Government in complete accord with your attitude. They have so informed Reading by cable. The fear was expressed that some misunderstanding had arisen owing to the fact that Sir Maurice de Bunsen had conferred only with the French Minister at Rio, but it was added with emphasis that this was so solely because an interview had not been accorded him by Morgan.<sup>1</sup>

LAUGHLIN

File No. 763.72/10488b

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in Central and South America*

[Circular telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1918, 6 p. m.

There appears to have been considerable exaggeration in South America concerning submarine activities off the American coast. The submarines have been operating for a week and have sunk fifteen ships nearly all of which were coastwise sailing vessels. Several ports were temporarily partially closed as a military precaution. The success of the enemy vessels has not been great. There has been no material interruption in commerce nor any whatever in the steady progress of military preparations. You may utilize the foregoing for publicity.

POLK

File No. 763.72/10519a

*The Secretary of State to the Cuban Minister (De Céspedes)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Cuban Minister and has the honor to hand him for his information the substance of a memorandum received from the Secretary of the Navy, concerning maritime activities:

A submarine of the converted *Deutschland* type carrying two 6-inch guns, torpedoes and probably mines, has been operating since May 25 between Nantucket Shoals and Cape Hatteras. There may be other submarines but this fact has not yet been ascertained.

All protection possible is being extended to shipping. Vessels from all points bound up and down the coast are routed and pro-

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<sup>1</sup> U. S. Ambassador in Brazil.

tected by the naval commandants of coast districts. All other shipping will receive routing instructions when possible at the port of departure.

It is proposed to place duly qualified routing officers of our Navy at Matanzas, Antilla, Cienfuegos and Santiago de Cuba. These will be in addition to the routing office at Havana. These officers will be equipped with all routing instructions and latest information for the guidance of all ships leaving Cuba.

There are indications that submarine activities may shift to waters in the vicinity of Cuba and the cooperation of the Cuban Government in all matters pertaining to submarine activity is earnestly requested.

The Secretary of the Navy considers that the close cooperation of the Cuban Government with the anti-submarine operations of the Government of the United States is of the first importance, for which reason the United States naval attaché at the American Legation in Havana will be telegraphically informed of the changes which occur in the situation from time to time, this information being then communicated by the American Minister at Havana to the Government of the Republic of Cuba.

WASHINGTON, *June 10, 1918.*

File No. 763.72/10520

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*The Cuban Minister (De Céspedes) to the Secretary of State*

The Minister of Cuba presents his compliments to His Excellency the Secretary of State and has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of his signed *note verbale* of June 10, the importance of which is duly appreciated, as also the effective measures taken by the Navy Department for the guidance of all ships leaving Cuba and in order to inform the Cuban Government, through the United States Legation at Habana, from time to time, of the changes that may occur in the submarine situation.

The Honorable Secretary of the Navy expresses the earnest request that the close cooperation of the Cuban Government in all matters pertaining to submarine activities be given; such close cooperation with the antisubmarine operations of the Government of the United States being esteemed of the first importance.

It was with this same object in view that the Cuban Minister respectfully requested that regular information be supplied the Cuban Government with regard to the submarine situation, and has asked that some of the submarine chasers that were to be turned over to the Cuban Government be made available at the earliest possible moment, in order to cooperate in the operations to the best of Cuba's ability.

Considering the practically defenseless state of Habana and other important Cuban ports, exposed to an attack by sea from the enemy, that might result in loss of life and property, since the levying of a forced contribution seems hardly possible due to the vigilance and timely action of the Allied nations, the Cuban Minister respectfully reiterates the petition of his Government for such ordnance as might be spared without detriment to the requirements of the armies in Europe.

A special Cuban military purchasing commission has been endeavoring to secure for the coast defence of Habana twelve 6-inch, .30-caliber Navy guns on pedestal mounts formerly of the flagship *Newark*, now owned by Francis Bannerman of 101 Broadway, New York. Mr. Bannerman has given the Cuban Government an option on these guns, subject to the decision of the United States Government, but it would appear that the Ordnance Department has stated that it intends to purchase these guns, with eighteen others owned by Mr. Bannerman, to be put on carriages and sent to France.

While not informed as to any ulterior decision in this matter, the Cuban Minister entertains doubts as to whether or not the guns are now available, and, in the first case, would be highly gratified to be able to advise his Government that there exists no obstacle at the present to the purchase of those pieces which, if not entirely sufficient, might serve to materially improve the coast defences of the Cuban capital.

WASHINGTON, *June 15, 1918.*

File No. 862.85/456

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*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Peru (Smith)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 19, 1918, 3 p. m.*

Your June 3, 9 p. m. Department coincides with opinion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that in order to expedite matters, negotiations regarding the ships should be carried on at Lima and the United States Shipping Board will immediately send a representative to Peru to cooperate with American Legation in these negotiations.

Convey the following informally and orally to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, even though military guards have been placed on board German vessels.

The attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs is invited to the importance and necessity of maintaining complete control over vessels and of definitely excluding the German crews from access to them. In Colombia the German crew destroyed a vessel in spite of the fact that negotiations had been concluded between the United

States Shipping Board and the German owners of this vessel for its purchase. It is believed that unless some action as suggested above is taken the crews of the vessels now in Peruvian waters, under instructions from the German Government may make a determined effort to destroy them.<sup>1</sup>

Howland Gardner, representative of Shipping Board, will leave for Peru in about a week's time. Department feels that all technical negotiations should await his arrival.

LANSING

File No. 611.326/64

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, June 24, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received June 25, 9.52 a. m.]

1763. Your 1475, June 21, 3 p. m.<sup>2</sup> In conversation this morning with Minister of Foreign Affairs he states that I am authorized to say that he will act in entire harmony with the other Allies.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 611.326/49

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 27, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your June 4, 5 p. m. You should ask for an interview with the President and read to him the following leaving with him a copy thereof:

I have not failed to inform my Government of Your Excellency's remarks to me at our conference on June —. My Government finds it difficult to understand Your Excellency's statement that the United States is disregarding Brazil's essential interests and preventing her from contributing her quota to the cause of the Allies. I am instructed to point out to Your Excellency that the United States Government out of sincere friendship for Brazil and on account of the fact that Brazil is associated with this Government in the war against the Central Empires, has refrained up to the present time from placing embargo restrictions upon the importation of coffee from Brazil to the United States. It is true that there are not now as many ships operating between the United States and Brazil as there were before the United States entered the war, due of course to the pressing need for military purposes of all available tonnage. Consequently it has not been possible either to transport from Brazil to the United States or from the United States to Brazil as great

<sup>1</sup> In a telegram of June 28 the Chargé reported that the crews had been disembarked on the 25th (File No. 763.72/10550).

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see footnote 1, *ante*, p. 697.



an amount of the products of each country as was customary before the United States entered the war. It is feared that in the future this situation will grow worse rather than better inasmuch as the United States in cooperation with the Allies is planning to adopt for itself a program involving an embargo against the importation into the United States of all commodities not essential for war purposes and for the civilian needs of this country. My Government has explained to Ambassador da Gama that full conference with Brazil was desired before any further steps were taken in this respect so that means might be devised to safeguard properly the interests of the Brazilian people whose cooperation in everything pertaining to the war the United States earnestly desires.

Your Excellency's statement that the present position of this Government is considered by many senators and deputies of Brazil as calculated to prevent Brazil from contributing her quota to the cause of the Allies has led my Government to consult with the French, British and Italian Governments through the medium of the French High Commissioner to the United States, Lord Reading and the Italian Ambassador and High Commissioner. The British, French and Italian Governments have advised their representatives in Washington to state to my Government that they are interested in the situation in Brazil and that in order to afford positive proof to the Government and people of Brazil that the closest possible cooperation exists between Brazil and the other Governments associated in the war against the Central Powers, they would gladly join in any conference to be held in Washington having as its purpose the devising of a plan under which Brazil, the essential interests of her people being adequately protected, might contribute to an even greater extent than she heretofore has to the efforts of the United States and the Allies successfully to terminate the war against the Central Powers. Accordingly my Government, fully appreciating the many economic and industrial questions which will confront Brazil on account of interferences caused by military necessity to the customary trade relations between the United States and Brazil and mindful of the traditional friendship long existing between our two countries, closer now than ever before, united as we are in purpose to defeat the common foe, proposes to Your Excellency that a conference be speedily held in Washington to be attended by Lord Reading, the French High Commissioner, the Italian Ambassador, His Excellency Ambassador da Gama and the Secretary of State of the United States to adopt a plan whereby the essential economic interests of Brazil may be properly protected so as to permit her to utilize her great resources in the most effective manner possible in the prosecution of the war. My Government believes that only in this way can the difficult problems presented be properly solved.

You should discreetly point out to the President that this Government would be most gratified if Da Gama could for the purposes of these negotiations be named a special commissioner. . . . you should also make it clear to the President that unless these negotiations take place in the near future and unless the Brazilian representative is

clothed with power sufficient to enable him, after of course receiving his Government's approval, to enter into arrangements whereby the fourteen German interned vessels and such other boats under Brazilian control as can be spared shall be used in the most economical way possible in the interests of the Associated Governments, this Government fears that great injury will necessarily result to Brazil by reason of very drastic regulations prohibiting the importation of coffee from Brazil to the United States. In the event that a satisfactory arrangement can be arrived at whereby a considerable amount of tonnage is placed at the disposal of the Associated Governments this Government would be prepared to assume its share of the financial obligation made necessary by the resultant interference with the Brazilian coffee and other industries. The Department believes however that commitments of this nature should be made only after the fullest conference between the representatives named above who will of course call in expert advisers to assist them.

This whole matter is considered urgent and important and you are requested to use every effort you properly can to have the proposal of this Government adopted at once. The quoted part of this telegram has been shown to the British, French and Italian representatives and they have promised to cable their representatives definite instructions to confer with you and to support your representations for this conference. Please confer with your French and British colleagues before calling on the President. It is essential that in this matter the French, British and ourselves act as one.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72/10520

*The Secretary of State to the Cuban Minister (De Céspedes)*

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Minister of Cuba, and referring to the memorandum of the Cuban Legation dated June 15, 1918, has the honor to say that he has received a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated June 28, taking due note of the statements made in the Cuban memorandum regarding the close cooperation of the Cuban Government with the Government of the United States in all matters pertaining to submarine activities. With reference to the second portion of the Cuban Legation's memorandum, respecting the desire of the Cuban military commission to obtain twelve guns, formerly mounted on the United States Steamship *Newark*, the Secretary of the Navy states that these guns were sold some time ago from the Navy Yard at Norfolk, to Francis Bannerman of 101 Broadway, New York City. The Secretary of the Navy adds that it is understood that these guns are at present on Bannerman's Island, and that the Ordnance Department

of the Army has secured an option on the purchase of the guns from Mr. Bannerman. The Secretary of the Navy further states that the Navy Department understands that the Government of Cuba can obtain the guns provided the United States Army authorities are willing to release them.

WASHINGTON, July 2, 1918.

File No. 611.326/76

*The Brazilian Ambassador (Da Gama) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1918.

[Received July 9.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received a telegram from my Government accepting the proposal Your Excellency made through Ambassador Morgan<sup>1</sup> to meet in conference with the Italian, British and French High Commissioners and myself, with the purpose of studying the economic, commercial and financial difficulties brought upon Brazil by the restrictions in the international trade and transportation and devising means of removing or at least attenuating them.

I shall have the honor to attend to Your Excellency's appointment of any day and hour for that meeting and I avail myself [etc.]

D. DA GAMA

Declaration of a State of War with Germany by Haiti, July 12, and by Honduras, July 19—Adjustment of Difficulties with Chile Regarding Oil Shipments—Discussion of the Chartering of German Ships in Chilean and Argentine Ports—Revival of the Project of an Economic Agreement with Argentina—Conclusion of the Contract for the Chartering of German Ships in Peruvian Ports, September 6—The Washington Conference Regarding Brazilian Affairs: Discussion of Measures Affecting the Coffee Trade and of the Disposition of German Ships Remaining in Brazilian Ports—Project for a Cuban Expeditionary Force to Europe

File No. 763.72/10781

*The Haitian Minister (Ménos) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, July 15, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to announce officially to Your Excellency that the Council of State of the Republic of Haiti, exercising the legislative power by virtue of the Constitution in force, has declared, on the report of the Executive branch, that a state of war exists between the Republic of Haiti and the Empire of Germany as from July 12 instant.

This decision, called forth by the aggressive and offensive attitude of the Imperial German Government toward the Haitian Nation,

<sup>1</sup> See telegram of June 27, *ante*, p. 705.



implies at the same time a full indorsement by my Government of the noble views which the President of the United States expressed, notably in his memorable address of July 4.<sup>1</sup>

I take pleasure [etc.]

SOLON MÉNOS

File No. 763.72/10781

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Haitian Minister (Ménos)*

WASHINGTON, July 17, 1918.

SIR: In acknowledging your note of July 15, announcing officially that the Council of State of the Republic of Haiti has declared a state of war to exist between the Republic of Haiti and the German Empire, commencing July 12 current, I have the honor to express on the part of the Government of the United States to the Government of Haiti, the active sympathy which this action by the Haitian Government evokes in the Government and people of the United States. They deeply appreciate the association of the Government and people of Haiti in this World War and are proud to see the flag of another American republic added to the standards of those already raised in the common cause of world liberty.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 825.6374/314

*The Chilean Embassy to the Department of State*

#### MEMORANDUM

In 1915 with previous authorization by the British Government and, apparently, with the previous knowledge of the United States, the firm of Sloman & Company and Messrs. Gildemeister & Company entered into a contract relating to the supplying of petroleum.

Messrs. Williamson, Balfour & Company, agents of the vendors having failed to deliver the petroleum to Messrs. Gildemeister & Company, the latter appeared to file suit some eight months ago before the Court of Valparaiso to enforce the delivery of the petroleum, and in spite of having offered and expected a settlement such has not been accomplished and they were, a month ago, obliged to petition for an attachment covering 16,000 tons. This attachment was made effective only as to 10,500 tons, lying in warehouses.

This procedure is in accordance with the Chilean Constitution and laws and the Government is perforce required to lend the aid of its public powers as called upon by the judicial authority, in accordance with the terms of a positive provision of the organic law covering judicial power. It has been said that the Government of the United States has forbidden the exportation of petroleum to Chile and ordered vessels *en route* to return.

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 268.



The Government of the United States should take into consideration the difficulties which will develop for the nitrate industries and the state finances of Chile. If it would be convenient approach the Department of State and lay before it the foregoing facts and ask the Department to interpose its good offices for the settlement of the difficulties indicated.

To this end the Government proposes to delay the delivery of the petroleum to the German firms indicated until after the termination of the war, when 50 per cent of the quantity mentioned should be delivered in compensation. It would be an advantage if the Government of the United States would intervene to bring about the acceptance of this proposition which was sometime ago submitted to the vendors.

WASHINGTON, *undated*.

[Received July 18, 1918.]

File No. 763.72/10766

*The Chargé in Honduras (Curtis) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEGUCIGALPA, *July 19, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[Received July 20, 8.25 p. m.]

Note from Minister for Foreign Affairs transmitting decree declaring war asks me to express to the Government of the United States the lively sentiments of cordiality on the part of his Government and the desires which animate it in favor of the cause which the United States defends in favor of the liberty of peoples. The text of the decree follows:

DECREE No. 58

Francisco Bertrand, Constitutional President of the Republic of Honduras.

Considering: That the motives which originated the severing of the diplomatic relations of this Republic with the German Empire have become accentuated, being characterized every day by greater gravity for the international life of all the peoples.

Considering: That continental solidarity imposes upon the states of America the duty [of contributing] according to the measure of their abilities towards the triumph of the cause of civilization and of right which, with the Allied nations, the United States of America defends; and consequently demands a definite attitude in the present conflict of the world.

Therefore, in council of ministers, decrees:

ARTICLE 1. It is declared that there exists a state of war between the Republic of Honduras and the Government of the German Empire.

ARTICLE 2. [Concerning] the present decree, account shall be rendered to the National Congress at its next session.

Given in Tegucigalpa the 19th day of July, 1918.

Signatures of the President, of all of the members of the Cabinet follow.

CURTIS

File No. 763.72/10766

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Honduras (Curtis)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 23, 1918, 5 p. m.

Your July 19, 6 [10] p. m. Department has also received a note from Bonilla, Minister on Special Mission from Honduras, quoting telegram he had received from President of Honduras in regard to declaration of state of war and officially informing Department of this action on the part of the Government of Honduras.<sup>1</sup>

You may deliver a note to the Government of Honduras in the sense of the following: The Government of the United States has received with deep satisfaction the announcement that the Government of Honduras has decreed that there exists a state of war between that Republic and the Imperial German Government. This action on the part of Honduras against the common enemy of civilization, human rights and freedom is a further proof of its firm espousal of the cause of democracy. In tendering its congratulations on this momentous occasion to its sister republic, the Government of the United States wishes to congratulate the Government of Honduras upon the noble and high-minded position which it has assumed in association with the other free nations which are battling for the rights of humanity.

POLK

File No. 825.6374/304

*The Chilean Chargé (Munizaga Varela) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

No. 763

WASHINGTON, July 25, 1918.

SIR: Referring to the Embassy's memorandum of the 16th instant<sup>2</sup> relative to the embargo placed upon petroleum owned by Messrs. Williamson Balfour & Co. and to the various conferences had on the subject at the Department of State, I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I have received from my Government the following telegrams:

<sup>1</sup> Note from the Honduran Minister not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Apparently refers to the undated memorandum, *ante*, p. 709, received July 18.

Please inform the Government to which you are accredited that the difficulties regarding petroleum have been adjusted and that the embargo placed on reservoir has been raised. The English Government has also been informed.

The firm of Duncan Fox & Co., which represents the Union Oil, tells me that the steamers *La Brea*, *San Joaquin*, and *Coalinga*, bound for Antofagasta, were stopped at Panama, landed the petroleum at Balboa, and afterwards cleared for Tampico. It adds that it received notice by cable on the 22d instant from the Union Oil that lubricants and petroleum can no longer be shipped, as license to export cannot be obtained from the Government of the United States. All the difficulties over the embargo being now adjusted, not to occur again, you will please endeavor to bring about the resumption of normal exportation of petroleum and lubricants to Chile, as otherwise the plants must be disabled in a few days more and the output of nitrate will be suspended to the detriment of the purchasers themselves.

I repeat that the German embargoes at Iquique and Tocopilla have been adjusted and the Government guarantees they will not occur again and that nothing hereafter will disturb the free production of nitrate. The English Government has declared itself satisfied and we beg you so to advise the Government to which you are accredited and to obtain from the authorities of the departments concerned permission for the free exportation of petroleum to Chile, so as to avert the paralyzation of the nitrate industry from which those who need the product would suffer.

I hope, Mr. Secretary of State, that Your Excellency's Government, on the strength of the contents of the telegrams above quoted, will deign to issue the orders needed to make inoperative the measures taken in the matter of exporting petroleum and lubricants that are urgently needed by my country for the production of nitrate and the operation of the Chilean railways.

I avail myself [etc.]

G. MUNIZAGA VARELA

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File No. 825.6374/304

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chilean Chargé (Munizaga Varela)*

No. 81

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1918.

SIR: The Department has received with much pleasure your note of the 25th instant wherein you state that you had received a telegram from your Government requesting you to inform the Government of the United States that the difficulties regarding petroleum

have been adjusted, and that the embargo placed on the reservoir has been raised.

The telegram from your Government also states that all the difficulties over the embargo have been now adjusted not to occur again, and referring specifically to the German embargoes at Iquique and Tocopilla, states that they "have been adjusted and the Government guarantees they will not occur again, and that nothing hereafter will disturb the free production of nitrate."

You conclude your note by expressing the hope that the United States Government, on the strength of the contents of the telegram above quoted, will issue the orders needed to make inoperative the measures taken in the matter of importing petroleum and lubricants that are urgently needed by Chile for the production of nitrate and the operation of the Chilean railways.

In reply I am glad to be able to inform you that relying upon your Government's above-mentioned guarantees, the War Trade Board has resumed the granting of licenses for the exportation of petroleum from the United States destined for Chile.

The action of the War Trade Board in refusing to sanction exports of petroleum to Chile has been the result of the litigation in the Chilean courts against the Union Oil Company and the International Petroleum Company, which in turn resulted in a situation by which exportation of oil would be indirectly trading by the Union Oil Company and the International Petroleum Company with *oficinas* in Chile belonging to enemies of the United States. Since the Union Oil Company and the International Petroleum Company still remain subject to the operations of the Statutes of the United States, the War Trade Board assumes that consistently with the assurances received in your note of July 25, the decree hereinbefore entered in the suit of Gildemeister, which brought about the embargo of oil to be imported into Chile from the United States, will be vacated, and that a new decree to that effect will be formally entered upon the court record.

It is further assumed in view of your assurances that the existing litigation against the Union Oil Company asking for the same remedy granted against the International Petroleum Company will be withdrawn, and that a formal court order designating the litigation will be entered.

The Department would be glad to be informed if its above-mentioned assumptions are not correct.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK



File No. 862.85/522

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Peru (Smith)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1918, 6 p. m.

Department's May 29, 3 p. m., June 19, 3 p. m., August 1, 6 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> your June 3, 9 p. m. Cable Department full report of present status of negotiations for lease from Peru of ex-German ships.

You are cautioned against saying anything to Peruvian Government regarding guarantee which the United States Government is prepared to make to Peru, against possible consequences which may come from use of German ships. When it becomes necessary again to discuss this guarantee the Department desires to make it a financial one and include it in the actual contract for the ships as was done in the lease for the ex-German ships in Uruguay.

Before undertaking patrol duty in Peruvian harbors, Navy Department desires specific assurance that arrangement is approved by Peruvian Government.

POLK

File No. 862.85/535

*The Chargé in Peru (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LIMA, August 5, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received August 6, 8.45 a. m.]

For your information and for Page, Shipping Board:

Negotiations concluded and ready to sign, approval delayed by State Department cable August 2 [1], 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Contract gives to Shipping Board unrestricted use of *Sierra Cordoba*, *Luxor*, *Rhakotis* and the four sailing vessels. *Anubis* and *Uarda*, after repairs, to trade between Peru, England, France or the United States as Peru may request with cargo which may be licensed by the United States. If not sufficient cargo at the port ready for loading Shipping Board have right to send the ship elsewhere to obtain full cargo and have right to substitute other steamers same as Uruguayan contract. Shipping Board will set aside in the United States pre-war sound value of ships. Their estimate of sound value 549,098 pounds sterling. [From] this will be taken, as due, cost of repairs. . . . Shipping Board will pay as advance charter an amount equal to 6 per cent per annum on sound value of 549,098 pounds sterling on such part of that amount as is not used for payment repairs as those

<sup>1</sup>Telegram of Aug. 1 not printed.

repairs may become due. Peru reserves *Marie* for their own use. We finance repairs and deduct value of same from charter hire of all the steamers. In the same way we make repairs to their steamer *Constitution* if on examination she is found to be worth repairing. We agree to charter three [thousand] ton ship as soon as possible for service between Callao, San Francisco and Australia to carry only licensed cargo.

Shipping Board will have option to purchase these ships six months after the war for the price fixed by the Peruvian Government for their expropriation in accordance with Peruvian law No. 2696. Price fixed is the sound pre-war value less repairs which will make price practically nothing. Under the law as we understand it, however, Germany can have the boats back by paying cost of repairs plus other charges such as cost to Government of keeping boats, protection of same, port charges, and all other incidental expenses including claims arising from the sinking of the *Lorton* and damage to Peruvian trade through unrestricted submarine campaign. The value of our option depends on fulfillment of these or your understandings. Aside from that in my opinion it has a problematical value hope you approve. In any event the best trade we could make, and I consider it most advantageous, ships could not be purchased now under their present laws. This is purely a commercial contract and contains no agreement or guarantees binding the United States Government. The success of these negotiations is due to the assistance and cooperation of Mr. Smith and Lieutenant Hufnagel.<sup>1</sup>

As [Foreign Minister?] is to be interpellated in Congress upon the question of ex-German vessels, he earnestly requests that these negotiations be terminated at the earliest possible moment, and we urge approval of this contract. Gardner.

SMITH

File No. 763.72/10977

*The Ambassador in Chile (Shea) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SANTIAGO, August 9, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received 9 p. m.]

I am informed, through sources generally reliable, that Chilean Government is willing to directly negotiate with Embassy terms for seizing ships and breaking relations with Germany. . . .

SHEA

<sup>1</sup> Lieut. Luis F. E. Hufnagel, assistant naval attaché in Chile and Peru.

File No. 763.72/10977

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Shea)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1918, 7 p. m.

Your August 9, 2 p. m. Department very interested in attitude of Chilean Government that you report. You may intimate that you will be glad to receive more specific information on this subject. If you deem it advisable, you may also state that United States Government would be glad to consider making a contract with the Chilean Government for the use of ex-German ships in Chile. . . .

LANSING

File No. 763.72/11099

*The Ambassador in Chile (Shea) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SANTIAGO, August 26, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received 5.21 p. m.]

Embassy's telegram of August 9, 2 p. m. Much activity in official quarters. *La Nacion*, controlled by Señor Yanez, in leading editorial yesterday urges action be taken to acquire German ships. *Mercurio* of this morning has editorial on the same lines. Am of opinion that a direct intimation that it will be necessary very soon to divert the *Santa Ana* and one or two British vessels from west coast trade would have good effect and might bring quick settlement. For good of local conditions intimation should be made quickly. It will also help the situation if it is intimated that hereafter our ships will be devoted to nitrate trade exclusively and will therefore not come south of Antofagasta.

SHEA

File No. 862.85/558

*The Secretary of State to the Peruvian Minister (Freyre y Santander)*

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of August 21,<sup>1</sup> wherein you state that you have been informed that an agreement has been reached between your Government and the representative of the Shipping Board at Lima for the purpose of utilizing the German ships interned in Peruvian ports. You state that these negotiations had their origin in the declarations made by the American Chargé d'Affaires at Lima with regard to the guarantee which the United States Government was disposed to offer against any

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

consequences prejudicial to Peru caused by the use of the German ships interned in her ports. The Government of Peru considered that when these assurances were formally sanctioned that it would remove the objections felt towards taking a step laden with certain dangers. You conclude your note by stating that as hitherto no formal confirmation of this undertaking has been given by the United States Government, the Government of Peru would greatly appreciate that this Government would, in order to conclude speedily the pending negotiations, ratify explicitly the above-mentioned declarations of the American Chargé at Lima.

In answer to your note, I take pleasure in informing you that the Government of the United States will accept the responsibility, in case negotiations are concluded between the United States Shipping Board and the Peruvian Government, for the use of the ex-German ships in Peru, in the event of any international claim arising from the use of these ships being brought against the Government of Peru.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72/11099

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Shea)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 28, 1918, 6 p. m.

Your August 26, 12 a. m. You may inform Foreign Office of the following: The United States Government intends to send at least three million men to France by next spring. This additional number of men will make it possible in the opinion of the American Chief of Staff for the Allies to break through the German lines wherever planned. In order to transport these American armies and to transport food and supplies which are necessary for them, it will be necessary for the Government of the United States to make use of every ton of shipping it can secure for that purpose.

You may inquire of the Foreign Office what provisions the Chilean Government would be able to make to take care of Chilean commerce when it becomes necessary for this Government to deflect to the above-mentioned uses American shipping now used in trade with Chile.

LANSING

File No. 825.6374/355

*The Chilean Chargé (Munizaga Varela) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

No. 891

WASHINGTON, August 27, 1918.

[Received August 29.]

SIR: Referring to note No. 81 of July 27, last, from the Department of State relative to the favorable settlement of the difficulties



arising from the embargo placed upon certain petroleum stored in Iquique and Tocopilla,<sup>1</sup> I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that I transmitted its contents to my Government and have received in reply the following telegram from the Minister of Foreign Relations:

There has been no judgment whatever against the Union Oil Co., nor any embargo of that company's petroleum, but only against the International Petroleum Co., whose agents here are Williamson & Co. [*sic*], and whose petroleum in the tanks at Iquique and Tocopilla was embargoed. The embargo declared against Williamson & Co. in the action brought by Gildemeister, has been finally raised by a judicial decree, and the Government has guaranteed that there shall not be any embargo again declared.

I avail myself [etc.]

G. MUNIZAGA VARELA

File No. 862.85/572

*The Minister in Peru (McMillin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LIMA, September 7, 1918, 10 p. m.

[Received 10.42 p. m.]

The contract between the Shipping Board and the Peruvian Government concerning interned German ships was approved by Peruvian Congress September 5, signed the 6th, and on same night Gardner departed with two of them.

McMILLIN

File No. 763.72111/7140a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Shea)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

Department's August 12, 7 p. m.<sup>2</sup> Your September 5, 10 p. m.<sup>3</sup> You may informally advise the Foreign Office of the following:

A cable has just been sent by the Department directing the Embassy in London to inform British officials and commercial leaders that the War Trade Board of the United States pledges itself to the policy of eliminating non-essentials, reducing necessary importations to the lowest possible amounts and preventing the utilization of ships suitable for war zone work by cargo for trades which are not essential to the conduct of the military program or the maintenance of the civilian population. You should explain that this pledge is convincing evidence that this Government is determined to utilize every available ship for military purposes in order that a

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 712.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 716.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed.

sufficient force of American soldiers may be transported to France before next spring to defeat the German forces.

You may informally ask the Chilean Foreign Office whether it has in mind any plans whereby Chile may obtain products from the United States and send commodities to us under the circumstances.

Your September 3, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> You may also state to the Foreign Office . . . the hope of this Government that adequate means will be taken by the Chilean Government to prevent further damage to German ships in the Chilean ports. Also state that this Government has received with great interest the information that the Chilean Government has issued orders for the Chilean authorities to take possession of the German ships in Chilean ports. In this connection say that this Government hopes that the Chilean Government may see its way clear to make some arrangement with it by which the German ships may be made use of to care for commerce between Chile and the United States.

LANSING

File No. 862.85/576

*The Ambassador in Chile (Shea) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SANTIAGO, *September 12, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received *September 13, 7.30 a. m.*]

After first official reception of diplomatic corps by Foreign Minister this afternoon, had conference with him complying with Department's instruction June [September] 9, 6 p. m. He said that Government was seriously considering the acquisition of the German vessels not damaged without delay and would then take up the question of utilizing the others, that they were anxious to cooperate with United States in maintaining commerce. Would inform me at once when plan had been worked out. . . .

SHEA

File No. 611.326/135

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

RIO DE JANEIRO, *September 13, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[Received *September 14, 11.32 a. m.*]

Press despatches reporting Food Administration's campaign to reduce consumption of coffee in the United States have produced drop in prices at Santos and consternation in São Paulo. State authorities have appealed to Foreign Office and Embassy, explaining that the State's financial position, already jeopardized by recent

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

frost, which will reduce production for the next few years from between 12,000,000 and 14,000,000 sacks to between 4,000,000 and 6,000,000, will become pitiable if the only market for Brazilian coffee is closed.

Cannot compensation be arranged, such as the purchase of coffee in Brazil for consumption of American forces in Europe, transportation being afforded by French steamship lines which have recently increased their service to two boats per month?

If Brazil's financial situation is further complicated, the effort to arouse and prepare public opinion to send troops to Europe will be checked. The sending of these troops appears favorable, essential to interesting Brazilian people in the war to the extent which is desired.

MORGAN

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File No. 800.88/186

*The Chargé in Colombia (Belden) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BOGOTÁ, September 16, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 3.05 p. m.]

Colombian Government has been informed that the United States Government has advised United Fruit Company that its vessels will be taken over by the Government. President Suarez has asked me to explain to the Department of State the great suffering which would result in Colombia should these vessels be taken from the Colombian trade, especially in the present fiscal crisis. He is extremely worried. I cannot but emphasize the President's anxiety in this matter and I add the withdrawal of these ships, which would amount to a commercial blockade, might cause most serious complications politically for the Suarez Government which the large number of unemployed in the banana districts assist.

BELDEN

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File No. 611.326/135

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your September 13, 5 p. m. For your own information: Department has been informed under date of September 18 that the United States Food Administrator upon his recent visit to Europe discussed the international food program with various Allied countries and that a complete control of food imports with a view to reduction in tonnage of such imports has been set up. In order that the margins necessary for the transportation of the American Army may be provided for, the whole of the food imports has been placed in the hands

of the Inter-Allied Food Council, and the administration of the various commodities has been set up in different places. Coffee imports into Allied countries are to be handled through the Food Administration in Washington, so far as any contracts or purchases outside of those already in existence are concerned, and in order to economize tonnage, coffee imports into the United States must be reduced through the usual conservation methods in consumption. On behalf of this Government an organization for the handling of coffee called the Sugar Equalization Board, with a capital sum for handling all food imports into the United States, has been created, and a single agent for the purchase of coffee in Brazil for the above-mentioned board is being appointed. This agent will allot purchases to different coffee importers into the United States and will simply purchase coffee at the market price from day to day as may be required in order to effect the necessary supplies. The Food Administrator informed the Department that this method has been adopted by all the Allies in respect to practically all commodities except coffee, it being put in force in this final issue. The Food Administrator further informed the Department that arrangements are being made so that a continuous supply of coffee may be brought to the United States from Brazil in sailing vessels in order that the market and trade may be regularly and equitably supplied, and that there is no intention on the part of that Administration to order a drastic reduction of consumption but desires all users of coffee in this country to be economical in its consumption.

The Brazilian Ambassador was today informed of the above-mentioned plan and stated that he was confident that if a notice in the sense of the above plan were published at this time without any attempt on the part of the United States or the Allies to protect Brazil's coffee industry through some plan of purchase and storage, a very serious financial situation would arise in the coffee-producing states and the relations between the United States and Brazil would be seriously jeopardized. The Ambassador has suggested that the suggestion made by the President of Brazil regarding the purchase and storage of coffee be put in effect and has asked that no definite steps be taken or any notice given to the public in regard to this plan until such time as something along these lines can be arranged. The Department asked the Ambassador to obtain from his Government information as to the exact situation in São Paulo and definite information in regard to the amount of coffee considered necessary to be purchased and stored. This the Ambassador promised to do and a further conference will be held next week, prior to any publication of the plan.



Cable Department your views in this connection and also what Brazil's present foreign interest obligations are for this year and whether you think she will be able to meet them and whether she has taken any means to obtain a loan for this purpose. Also inform Department what in your opinion would be the amount of coffee necessary to be purchased and stored in order to prevent further complication of the financial situation.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/11493

*The Cuban Minister (De Céspedes) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

No. 196

WASHINGTON, *September 19, 1918.*

[*Received September 21.*]

MR. SECRETARY: At several of the interviews which I had the high honor to have with Your Excellency in connection with the entrance of Cuba into the World War and its desire to cooperate as far as it could in the triumph of democracy and liberty, I made known to Your Excellency the purpose of the Cuban people to have an active part in the struggle under the guidance of the same generous impulse and spirit of devotion to the great ideals of humanity which prompted the Government of the United States of America when it declared war on the Imperial Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Upon offering the military cooperation of my country for the time when the plans of our allies could admit troops other than those of the United States among the contingents that should be and have been prepared and transported to Europe, my Government sent to this capital a military and naval mission which in accord with the Departments of War and Navy made on that initial occasion the necessary preparations for the defense of Cuba, putting off the consideration of the details of our participation in the war until it should be practicable to undertake it. In the meanwhile the Cuban people heeding the prompting of their allies devoted to the great harvest of sugar, which has just been completed, its every energy and effort, and the Honorable Congress took up the compulsory military service law which was approved on the 3d of August last.

In connection with the training of a squadron of aviators which Cuba desired to send to France and other details of a technical nature, the military attaché of this Legation had the opportunity to become acquainted with the position of the staff of the Army of the United States concerning the scope of the military cooperation which might be at any time asked of Cuba. The liaison

officer of the War Department told our military attaché that the Chief of Staff had said to him that he entertained the best will toward Cuba and would do anything he could do for her with pleasure, but he believed that at present the request concerning the training of the squadron could not be acceded to because the plan laid down in advance, which could not be departed from, was to devote all available resources to strengthening the organization and *matériel* of the American Army and of those of the great powers now battling against Germany; that he believed that the said squadron, as well as all the other elements that Cuba could organize of whatever nature, would give much greater assistance to the Allied cause by being kept in Cuba for the protection of its coasts, maintenance of order at home and aid in the anti-submarine campaign; that Brazil and other nations had made similar requests which on like grounds could not be acceded to, because the problem by which they were confronted was really so vast, owing to the training of so many recruits in their own army in ever increasing numbers, that they could not cope with anything else for the present. He, the chief, as well as the other officers of the staff were firm in that opinion and believed that it would not be expedient to take any action at present looking to the sending of our forces to Europe, for if the matter was referred to the staff they would have to report accordingly on the grounds above stated and that many months would still have to go by before the matter could be looked into with greater chance of being accepted. They believed that Cuba should make the best possible preparation but with nothing in mind at the present but home defense, coast defense and the anti-submarine campaign. They all were very thankful for all that Cuba was doing. They were aware of the noble purposes which actuated our Government, but such was the real state of affairs at the time. To sum up: The plan was to prepare the largest possible forces for the American Army and those of the other three great powers and nothing more for the present, in order to secure the greatest possible homogeneity, and Cuba should prepare itself for the future; its participation in the European campaign was believed for the present to be against the purpose in view.

The Cuban Government has taken due note of what was stated by the representative of the War Department to the military attaché of the Legation, but it nevertheless instructs me to inform Your Excellency that the law of August 3 last above referred to provided by its article 62 the following:

The Executive will take measures for the immediate dispatch of a contingent of our present volunteer army to the battle fields of Europe, adding to the said contingent as far as possible the volun-

teers who may make application therefor. The Executive is also empowered to send military missions to the United States, France, England and Italy.

The foregoing provision, which is mandatory, places the Executive under the obligation of taking steps to send the aforesaid expedition without loss of time, and under that law the main element of the said contingent must consist of forces of our present regular army, composed of staff and field officers, non-commissioned officers and privates well instructed and trained, a large number of whom have already had occasion to do creditable service in war operations, and the contingent would be supplemented by volunteers, preference being given to those who already had military instruction as having served in the army or militia. Inasmuch as that contingent should be properly prepared for war as it is waged on the battle fields of Europe, provided with the adequate armament and equipment, and transported, when the time comes, to the theater of war with all the requisite material in vessels suitably outfitted and convoyed, and Cuba being without the necessaries for these various and imperative requirements which none of the other belligerent states of America, except the United States, now possess, it will be impossible to carry out the purposes of the aforesaid law which are those of the people and Government of Cuba, without the cooperation of the Government of the United States.

Bearing in mind the close bonds which connect us with this great nation, so close that its decision to enter the war was singularly effective in bringing about our firm and spontaneous resolution to cast the lot of our Republic with that of the nations who are struggling against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, it is to that nation that we must now apply and present our case and the circumstances which support our offer to take an active part in the European campaign.

In view of the foregoing, I wish to say to Your Excellency in the name of my Government that Cuba is ready to organize and send without delay the contingent specified in the law of August 3 last and to that effect I have the honor to inquire what is the judgment of Your Excellency's Government as to the expediency of bringing it into effect and whether it is found convenient to extend to us now the cooperation we are applying for or whether it is better for the Allied cause that the participation of Cuba should take the form described to the military attaché of the Legation by the representative of the War Department, in the understanding that if this Government should find a way of utilizing the military contingent under consideration and deign to inform me of the manner in which it should be organized, the Cuban Government would accept the sug-



gestions that might be made for the better achievement of that purpose and is ready to draw up the agreement relative thereto and assume all attendant military and financial obligations, our earnest desire being to cooperate to the full extent of our forces in the triumph of the Allied cause.

I renew [etc.]

CARLOS MANUEL DE CÉSPEDES

File No. 763.72/11493

*The Secretary of State to the Cuban Minister (De Céspedes)*

No. 280

WASHINGTON, *September 23, 1918.*

SIR: Your confidential note No. 196 of September 19, 1918, wherein the Government of Cuba in accordance with the recent legislation, expresses the wish to send a military expedition to the European battle front, has been received with the keenest pleasure by the Government of the United States. This gratifying offer was at once communicated to the General Staff of the United States Army. A study as to the practicability of making the new distributions of shipping and production which the maintenance of a Cuban Army in Europe would require was at once undertaken.

As the result of the most serious study of the matter from a practical standpoint, the following situation was found to obtain: The productions of both the civil and military manufacturing plants of the United States are already pledged far ahead and enormous commitments have been undertaken in order to arm and equip and supply the ever-increasing American armies and the armies of these countries which have been in the field for over four years. Practically every machine and every ship has for many months been allocated to some particular vital war work. The exigences of the situation, the needs of the Allies now actively engaged in the war, and the carefully planned and delicately interrelated schedules of the various governmental activities do not lend themselves, at the present moment, to the readjustments necessary were the Government of the United States to accept the offer of the Government of Cuba.

The Government of the United States deeply regrets, therefore, that it is not in a position to permit it at this time to avail itself of the greatly appreciated offer of the Cuban Government to send a force to Europe. For the ready cooperation and spirit of sacrifice of the Cuban people, the Government and people of the United States are profoundly grateful. The military forces of Cuba have already been of very great help in the protection of the Cuban coasts, as the island of Cuba occupies an important strategic position in the defence of that part of the Western Hemisphere which has opposed all its forces to the Imperial German Government.



It is therefore earnestly requested that the Republic of Cuba will continue to utilize its Army in its present valuable service and it is hoped that the time may come when conditions may have changed so that her generous wish to send men to the fighting line in Europe may be given such a reception as is merited by the high-minded motives of the Cuban Government, which have inspired it.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 611.326/175

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

RIO DE JANEIRO, *September 24, 1918, 2 p. m.*

[Received September 25, 1.30 a. m.]

Department's September 20, 4 p. m. Fully concur with Brazilian Ambassador's opinion that we should open credits for the purchase and storage by Brazilian Government of sufficient coffee to stabilize Government's financial situation. Unfortunate as it may be, coffee is still the keynote of Brazil's prosperity, and in view of the possibilities opening to us, and also probable composition of incoming administration, material assistance to the new Government upon its assumption of office would create a situation of great advantage.

Brazil's interest obligations for 1918 are 7,500,000 pounds sterling, a half of which at least are provided for. Her interest obligations for 1919 are also 7,500,000 pounds sterling. The only steps taken to cover them were the negotiations recently carried on with Treasury Department through Doctor Rodrigues and Brazilian Ambassador, on the basis of sale and purchase of manganese. President is consulting incoming President regarding the number of bags of coffee a year which should be purchased to meet interest obligations. Will report on this in a day or two.

MORGAN

File No. 862.85/585

*The Ambassador in Chile (Shea) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SANTIAGO, *September 24, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[Received September 25, 2.30 a. m.]

If announcement can be made emphatically from Washington that *Santa Ana* is withdrawn after present trip, it will help the situation here. If oil shipments can be somewhat restricted it will have good effect. Minister of Foreign Affairs informed me to-day he had demanded immediate answer to Chile's proposition to utilize uninjured German vessels.

SHEA

File No. 862.85/584

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Shea)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 26, 1918, 4 p. m.*

Your September 21.<sup>1</sup> *Santa Ana* will be permitted to make another round trip to Chile. Shipping Board informs Department that this is the last trip of the *Santa Ana* to Chile and when she returns she will be taken off. You may make this news public.

LANSING

File No. 862.85/589

*The Ambassador in Chile (Shea) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SANTIAGO, *September 26, 1918, 12 p. m.*

[Received September 27, 4.30 a. m.]

Unofficial report that Government has ordered Chilean naval crews to take possession of all [interned] German boats.<sup>2</sup> At Valparaiso order is being executed.

SHEA

File No. 800.88/186

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Colombia (Belden)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 28, 1918, 6 p. m.*

Legation's September 16, 10 a. m. The imperative necessities of the war demand that all available tonnage be put into transatlantic service. We appreciate in fullest degree importance of maintaining all possible service for foreign countries, and you may present our assurances that nothing will be done except what the vigorous prosecution of the war makes necessary, and then only after careful consideration of the needs of all the countries involved. All the ships it is found possible to leave in Caribbean service will be handled by Shipping Control Committee for the best interests of all parties.

LANSING

File No. 832.85/92b

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 30, 1918, 4 p. m.*

Department just advised that French representative on Allied Maritime Transport Council sitting in London made suggestion

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.<sup>2</sup> See also the Ambassador's telegram of Nov. 4, *post*, p. 738.

about three weeks ago to Council that French representatives at Rio be permitted to negotiate in behalf of the Council for charter of remaining German boats interned in Brazil. American representatives cabled to Shipping Board asking for instructions and Shipping Board, without the knowledge of the Department, cabled through the Navy Department authorizing American representatives on Council to acquiesce in plan proposed by French.

As soon as this information was given to Department, Department insisted that Shipping Board cancel its authorization to its representatives on Council and that British and French also instruct their representatives not to proceed further with arrangement.

Department's action was taken because negotiations which have been in progress in Washington with respect to economic situation in Brazil are now coming to a satisfactory conclusion and these ships have always been considered as part and parcel of these negotiations.

The above is for your confidential information and you are instructed to intimate to the proper Brazilian authorities that this Government would not look with favor on any transaction by which the disposition of these ships was taken out of the conferences now being held in Washington which were instituted and conducted with the full consent of Great Britain, France, Italy, Brazil and the United States. It is unnecessary for you to mention this matter to your French colleague.

LANSING

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File No. 800.88/193a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina (Robbins)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 30, 1918, 4 p. m.*

You may informally inform Foreign Office of the following:

The United States Government intends to send three million men to France by next spring. This additional number of men will make it possible in the opinion of the American Chief of Staff for the Allies to break through the German lines wherever planned. In order to transport these American armies and to transport food and supplies which are necessary for them, it will be necessary for the Government of the United States to make use of every ton of shipping it can secure for that purpose.

You may inquire of the Foreign Office what provisions the Argentine Government would be able to make to take care of Argentine commerce when it becomes necessary for this Government to deflect to the above-mentioned uses American shipping now used in trade with Argentina.

LANSING

File No. 800.88/194

*The Chargé in Argentina (Robbins) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 1, 1918, 7 p. m.*

[Received 11.55 p. m.]

Your September 30, 4 p. m. I called this afternoon upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs and presented to him the contents of the Department's cable.

The Minister almost immediately authorized me to say that with the exception of the three national transports, *Pampa*, *Chaco*, and *Guardia Nacional* the Argentine Government has at present no means of caring for Argentine commerce with the United States. He added that the Government is endeavoring to purchase or charter three of the interned German vessels here. (There are, I understand, ten in all.) All appear to be damaged or in bad repair, and he explained that only three would be of use and then after undergoing serious repairs which would take the better part of a year.

He also stated that the Government was *en pourparlers* with the Chilean Government for the acquisition of these [*three?*] ships in Chile but that the condition of these ships was much worse than that of the ships here.

It is my firm conviction that the Argentine Republic will be entirely dependent on foreign shipping for her trade with the United States (except for the three national transports referred to) for the greater part of the year at least and that the possibility of repairing such ships as she may acquire is very unlikely.

ROBBINS

File No. 832.85/933

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

RIO DE JANEIRO, *October 2, 1918, 3 p. m.*

[Received October 3, 4 a. m.]

Department's September 30, 4 p. m. Have obtained assurance from President's office, Foreign Office and Finance Minister that French authorities have not made propositions regarding remaining German ships and that if they do they will not be entertained. Brazilian Government realizes the importance of negotiations in Washington for which it hopes a satisfactory conclusion.

Minister of Finance states that there is much discontent with French ship convention. French Government has only purchased half of the coffee included in the agreement and is very backward in its payments. When the renewal of the contract comes up nothing will be decided before consulting the Department.

MORGAN



File No. 611.3531/59

*The Secretary of State to the Argentine Ambassador (Naón)*

The Secretary of State has the honor to refer to the *note verbale* of the Argentine Ambassador addressed to Mr. Phillips, dated July 29,<sup>1</sup> in which a memorandum of the basis for the discussion of a proposed treaty, of which the Argentine Ambassador had spoken to Mr. Phillips on the morning of July 5, was enclosed, as well as a list of Argentine citizens who have been drawn into the military service of the United States and whose freedom has been especially asked.

In view of the informal nature of the communication from the Argentine Ambassador, it is assumed that he desires an informal discussion of the provisions contained in the memorandum.

The United States Government receives with pleasure suggestions tending toward a closer commercial union between the Argentine and the United States. It cannot see its way clear, however, to enter into negotiations for a treaty of the proposed nature with a neutral country at this time, but feels that it may be possible for arrangements to be made through the War Trade Board and other Government agencies which may accomplish, in the main, the results contemplated by the plan suggested. Arrangements of a somewhat similar nature have already been made by the United States Government with the Governments of Spain, Switzerland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, and the United States Government would be very glad indeed to facilitate such arrangements with the Government of Argentine.

In the memorandum accompanying the Argentine Ambassador's *note verbale* of July 29, nine provisions are mentioned as the basis of an agreement.

The first provision reads as follows:

The Government of the United States of America will permit the exportation to the Argentine Republic during the period of this war of all the articles of its production which may be indispensable for the development of the Argentine national life or of her industries, and in quantities and amounts that would be possible to the United States within the exigencies imposed upon her by the war.

The War Trade Board will be glad to permit the exportation to the Argentine during the period of the war of those articles indispensable to the Argentine in those quantities that would be possible to the United States taking into account the needs of the United States and her cobelligerents and other obligations of the United States.

The second provision reads as follows:

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

In order to determine both the articles to be exported as well as the quantities and amounts within the exigencies of one of the parties and the possibilities of the other, the contracting Governments will endeavor to establish by common agreement, annually, and with the largest amplitude permitted by the circumstances, the list of such articles and the importance of such exportations.

The War Trade Board would be agreeable to carry on discussions for an arrangement in the sense of the suggestions contained in this provision.

The third provision reads as follows:

The Government of the United States will also facilitate a regular minimum service of cargo vessels representing forty thousand tons monthly to serve the needs of the commercial interchange between both countries while the war lasts, without prejudice to the service (interests) of private property that could be secured to stimulate the same source.

The Department of State understands that there have been variable amounts of American shipping engaged in commerce with the Argentine. It is probable, however, that much of this shipping will have to be withdrawn, for the United States Government intends by next spring to send at least three million men to France, and in order to transport these American armies and transport food and supplies which are necessary for them, it will be necessary for the Government of the United States to make use of every ton of shipping it can secure for that purpose. The question of shipping will be further discussed under provision number eight.

The fourth provision reads as follows:

The Government of Argentine also agrees not to allow the exportation from the Argentine ports of any one of the products that may have been shipped to Argentine from the United States, without a special agreement in each case between the two Governments.

The Department of State agrees to the advisability of some such provision in any arrangement that may be made as a corollary to provision number one.

The fifth provision reads as follows:

On its part, the Government of the Argentine Republic once satisfied that its own needs will be met, will facilitate the exportation to the United States of the national products that the needs of the American national life, her industries, or her present conveniences might demand (require), during the period of the war.

The Department of State receives with pleasure the suggestion that the Government of Argentine will facilitate the export to the United States of products essential to the national life of the

United States and of her industries to the extent that such products can be spared by the Argentine.

The sixth provision reads as follows:

The quantities and amounts of such exportations will also be fixed annually by common agreement between the contracting Governments, within the greatest amplitude permitted by the vital exigencies of the population or the industries of either Government.

The appropriate departments of the Government of the United States would be glad to discuss this provision looking toward some satisfactory arrangement.

The seventh provision reads as follows:

The Argentine Government will contribute in the measure permitted of its own resources, to the financing required by the acquisition of such products.

Considerable importance is attached to this provision, as it would facilitate the purchase of large supplies of wool and other materials in the Argentine to the mutual benefit of the Argentine and the United States.

The eighth provision reads as follows:

The Argentine Government agrees also to devote to the service of the commercial interchange between the two countries all the shipping of which it can dispose at present, as well as that acquired during the period of the war, but on the clear understanding that this will be done after satisfying the needs of its coastwise trade.

As was pointed out in the discussion of the third provision, the United States will have to make use of every available ton of shipping for war purposes. Therefore, the lack of shipping would appear to be a great if not insuperable difficulty in meeting the suggestions of the Argentine Ambassador for an arrangement along the lines described above. Should the Argentine Government, however, see its way clear to make use of the large amount of German tonnage now in Argentine ports, for commerce between the Argentine and the United States, this difficulty would be completely overcome. Under the commercial arrangements with Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Spain above alluded to, these countries, despite many difficulties, have provided the shipping wherewith to lift imports from the United States. They have thus not only made possible the actual transportation of goods from the United States, but in so doing have given unmistakable evidence of their real need for the goods in question.

The ninth provision reads as follows:

The Argentine Republic will cooperate toward the regularization of the present situation of the international exchange between the



Argentine and the American markets, in order to stabilize it in such form that the maintenance of the regular situation of the rate of exchange can be achieved for the entire period of the war.

The Treasury Department receives the suggestion in this provision cordially, as it believes that the maintenance of the usual rate of exchange between the United States and the Argentine will be of great benefit to both countries.

WASHINGTON, *October 4, 1918.*

File No. 763.72119/2042

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

RIO DE JANEIRO, *October 7, 1918, 1 p. m.*

[*Received October 8, 6 a. m.*]

Following is a translation of Brazil's reply to Austro-Hungarian note. Desire that this may be given to Committee on Public Information for publication in Tuesday's papers.

The President of the Republic has given due consideration to the proposal which he has just received from the Imperial and Royal Government of Austria-Hungary "that all of the belligerents should send delegates to a neutral country empowered to begin confidential conversations of a nonobligatory nature regarding the basis of possible peace negotiations. It would be the duty of these delegates to express the opinions of their respective Governments on this subject and to mutually inform themselves with entire liberty and frankness regarding the questions whose consideration is essential to the conclusion of negotiations for the establishment of peace."

The Imperial and Royal Government in submitting this proposal emphasizes the statement that "without denying the great diversity of opinions which exist between the two belligerent groups, it may be pointed out that if it were possible to dispose of certain radical demands of the belligerents a certain agreement would exist as to the fundamental basis of universal peace"; and it adds that "it is the sacred and humane duty of all of the nations involved to endeavor to end this terrible war which after so many years of struggle and after such great sacrifices continues indecisively."

The President of the Republic is not in a position to consider this proposal except in conjunction with the nations to which Brazil has definitively allied herself; his attitude at a common conference would be influenced by the opinion of certain of the belligerent powers and especially of those which are taking the most active part in the war.

It is not possible however that Governments which are dependent upon public opinion shall hide their policy and we believe that the war can only terminate by the complete surrender of the militarism which caused it and which has been the ruin of Europe.

We do not believe that an agreement on this subject would result in the peace of the world or would reestablish confidence in treaties and international agreements while this spirit of conquest, of absorp-



tion and of force prevails, which Germany has sowed everywhere and which threatens the civil and political liberty of all nations.

Placing the question on a more elevated plane than that of mere desire for territories and markets, the fortune of war will determine whether after sacrifices of blood such as man has never before made in defence of his rights the powers shall continue to subordinate everything to the increase of their armies and navies, in justification of the doctrine which Bismarck taught half a century ago in Parliament in 1863—that might is the basis of treaties which are only rendered valid by a majority of bayonets,—or whether a new international jurisdiction shall be established based on justice and equality of sovereignty, on the freedom of oppressed nationalities, which will permit the powers which are accustomed to settle their controversies through the medium of courts and arbitration to live tranquilly within their own frontiers and to offer inducements to foreigners to share with them both property and wellbeing as a reward for their labor, granting them the same rights as those enjoyed by their own people; the discipline of social forces being stimulated by the desire for order—the only preoccupation of the people being the wish for peace.

To Brazil, therefore, it would seem that peace at the present moment is both illusive and precarious, especially under an agreement maintained and tolerated by the military spirit which brought the whole world into war which would have ended in slavery had this militarism been victorious.

MORGAN

File No. 611.326/175

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 8, 1918, 8 p. m.*

Department's September 20, 4 p. m. Your September 24, 2 p. m. As you know for the past two months conferences have been held in Washington between representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Brazil and the United States respecting the following matters:

- (1) Disposition of remaining German ships interned in Brazil and the placing of them in Allied service;
- (2) Liquidation of enemy interests in Brazil by the Brazilian Government with the assistance of Allied representatives;<sup>1</sup>
- (3) Assistance to Brazil respecting disposition of coffee holdings;
- (4) Protection of rubber interests of Brazil against competition with Straits rubber;
- (5) Elimination of published black list for Brazil;<sup>1</sup>
- (6) Financial arrangements to permit Brazil to meet her exterior obligations.

<sup>1</sup> For further correspondence on this subject, see Supplement 2, pp. 341 *et seq.*

The Allied and United States conferees have been industriously working on these problems and will probably be in a position to make proposals to the Brazilian Ambassador with respect to each of these matters some time next week.

While these discussions were being carried on, the Food Administration informed the Department that in order to control the distribution and sale of coffee in this country at reasonable prices, it is necessary for resolutions to be passed by the War Trade Board requiring that all licenses for importation of coffee from every part of the world shall be through the agency of the Food Administration and shall run in their name. This measure is not designed against Brazil any more than it is against Central America and Colombia, which are at the present time importing a large amount of coffee into the United States without restriction, except that imposed by shortage of shipping. The proposal of the Food Administration has been communicated to the Brazilian Ambassador and he has expressed concern and has stated that he feared that unless this action was properly explained to his Government, considerable embarrassment would be caused the incoming administration and himself personally. The Ambassador stated that his Government and the incoming administration and he personally would be embarrassed if this action was taken by the Food Administration and the War Trade Board without first advising the Brazilian Government of the necessity therefor and of the fact that this action would be taken.

The reasons for the Food Administration's action are the following:

- (1) Equitable distribution among merchants and the consuming public of coffee,
- (2) Preventing speculation, and
- (3) Effecting conservation where necessary on account of shipping space which will aid in the control of the price to the ultimate consumer.

You should at once seek an interview with the President, giving him the above as confidential information and stating to him that at the urgent request of the Brazilian Ambassador, this plan will not be announced to the public until publication of Saturday morning's papers and will be put into operation at 9 o'clock Saturday morning<sup>1</sup> on the express understanding that no publicity will be given to it either in Brazil or in the United States until that time so that merchants in both countries will not have an opportunity to speculate and anticipate this ruling.

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<sup>1</sup> Oct. 12, 1918.

You should impress upon the President that this measure is not designed as an embargo on coffee from Brazil but that the unprecedented rise in the price of all coffee during the past weeks has made it essential for the Food Administration to obtain control over this commodity within this country. You should further point out to the President that the Allies and the United States expect to make proposals next week concerning the other matters mentioned above which will materially assist Brazil in this situation. Cable at once report of your interview.

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LANSING

File No. 611.326/137

*The Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

RIO DE JANEIRO, *October 9, 1918, 5 p. m.*

*[Received October 10, 1 a. m.]*

Department's October 8, 8 p. m. Have just returned from Palace where President expressed his urgent desire that the Food Administration would concede the favor to Brazil of withholding announcement regarding coffee until one could simultaneously be made regarding the successful termination of negotiations relative to subject 3 mentioned in your telegram received today. President believes time between now and Saturday will not permit public opinion to be properly prepared but that if his suggestion is accepted, much of the embarrassment which he fears, may be avoided.

MORGAN

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File No. 611.326/137

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Brazil (Morgan)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 10, 1918, 4 p. m.*

Your October 9, 5 p. m. You may confidentially inform President that as a special concession to his wishes announcement will be withheld until Monday morning, October 14, but that it will be impossible to hold it any longer.

POLK

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File No. 862.85/606

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 22, 1918, 3 p. m.*

*[Received 10.16 p. m.]*

At my first audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, I again brought up the matter of the German ships. He

told me that he was now proposing a project in Congress to take all the ships of German ownership though under Argentine flag such as the *Presidente Mitre*; the Argentine Government making a deposit of what it deems them worth; seven or eight ships in all, about 5,000 tons and in good repair which they could use for transportation to the United States. I urged the advisability of expropriating the ships actually under the German flag (see Embassy's telegram of October 1, 7 p. m.) and he replied that the principal objection was that their state of repair was so bad that they could not be utilized in any event until a year or more, that is to say, after the probable termination of the war.

STIMSON

File No. 825.6374/416b

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Chile (Shea)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 23, 1918, 7 p. m.*

The President has handed over to Baruch, chairman of the War Industries Board, negotiations for purchase of nitrates in Chile and for utilization of German tonnage interned in Chile. After careful consideration and in order that these negotiations might be carried on by one man located in London, the meeting place of the Nitrate Executive, Baruch has handed over all of these negotiations to Winston Churchill, British Minister of Munitions, with the understanding that before taking any important move Mr. Churchill would consult with Baruch. As you probably know Churchill has already made nitrate purchases for 1918 amounting to over 600,000 tons and has begun, through Edwards, Chilean Ambassador in London, negotiations for 1919 purchases and for use of German interned boats. It is probable that in the future practically all of these negotiations will be carried on in London through Edwards.

It is clearly understood by Churchill and Baruch that Churchill is acting simply as the agent of the Associated Governments and that all nitrate purchases carried on are for the account of the Associated Governments. The contracts for the purchase of nitrates for American account are signed by American firms. If ships are chartered or purchased as the result of these negotiations the charters thereof shall either be signed jointly by the authorities of the United States and Great Britain, or said authorities will each charter one-half of such ships. If ships are purchased, a similar arrangement will be worked out.

Churchill and Baruch further understand that all political phases of these negotiations will be dealt with in the usual manner, that is,



by the Foreign Office in London and by the State Department in Washington, and that negotiations respecting the position of Chile in the war . . . must be carried on through the medium of this Department. Churchill and Baruch both agree that the negotiations which Churchill is expected to conduct for the account of the United States and the Allies are business negotiations involving simply the purchasing of nitrates and the acquisition of boats and that if, at any time, these negotiations involve political questions of the character described, they should be carried on through the Foreign Offices of the respective Government[s].

You should make clear to the Foreign Office the character of Churchill's agency in this matter. You should point out also, that, inasmuch as the United States and Great Britain are acting jointly in this matter, . . . the United States Government does not look with favor upon negotiations for the use of the German boats interned in Chile on the part of any private citizens of the United States, or, in fact, on the part of any one other than Winston Churchill, the agent approved by the United States and British Governments.

You should continue to report fully to the Department any information that you may obtain concerning the progress of these negotiations as reflected in Chile. Hand Keena a copy of this telegram.

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LANSING

File No. 862.85/617

*The Ambassador in Chile (Shea) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

SANTIAGO, November 4, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 9.45 p. m.]

Reported from authentic sources all German vessels in Chilean ports occupied early this morning by Chilean marines.

SHEA

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File No. 862.85/620

*The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, November 5, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 3.36 p. m.]

My October 22, 3 p. m. The Argentine naval authorities yesterday took possession of the two German steamships *Seydlitz*, 8,600 tons, and *Patagonia*, 3,000 tons, at Puerto Militar as well as the *Sevilla*, 5,100 tons, at Puerto Belgrano, and placed upon them a guard of marines as well as naval mechanics to keep watch over the

machinery of the vessels. Of these three ships two were interned and one was a refugee.<sup>1</sup>

No official indication has yet been made as to their ultimate disposition.

STIMSON

File No. 611.326/131

*The Secretary of State to the Brazilian Chargé (Ipanema Moreira)*

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of October 30,<sup>2</sup> in which you ask me to forward to the proper Department of the Government a telegram which you have received from the Government of Brazil in relation to the situation which has arisen in regard to the importation of coffee from Brazil into the United States.

In reply I beg to advise you that I have consulted with the proper governmental authorities in this connection and desire to inform you that the Government of Brazil must be under some misapprehension as regards the action of the Government of the United States with reference to the entrance of Brazilian coffee into the United States.

I have been informed by that branch of the Government which has to do directly with the question of the importation of coffee into this country that with the exception of a brief space of time, viz., from October 14 to October 23 of this year, absolutely no restriction has been placed on the importation of Brazilian coffee into the United States. A notice issued by the War Trade Board on October 23, removed any restriction whatsoever and the only stipulation in that notice which could be possibly construed as a restriction was that portion which reads:

Import licenses may be refused to importers whose imports for the calendar year exceed the average of their imports for the years 1916 and 1917.

As your Government will clearly see, this measure was taken in order to prevent excessive speculation by American importers.

It is thought well to point out that the great decrease in the importation into the United States of Brazilian coffee for the past few months has been solely caused by the extremely high prices ruling in

<sup>1</sup> In a telegram of Nov. 6, vol. II, p. 1752, the Ambassador reported further: "A guard was placed upon the other German vessels in Buenos Aires and Rosario yesterday. The official announcement published in *La Epoca* of last night is that they 'have been occupied by military forces by order of the Government in the exercise of its sovereignty and in prevision of any possible event.'"

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

Brazil, as compared with those of other producing countries; the natural result being that American dealers have bought not only very freely from other producing countries but are still doing so, as their prices are very materially below prices at present existing in Brazil.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

LIBERIA IN RELATION TO THE WAR

File No. 763.72/8494

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, January 13, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received January 14, 6.18 a. m.]

Legation informed yesterday that at the request of Government of Germany the Spanish Government has instructed its representative here to transmit to the Liberian Government a declaration by Germany announcing among other things that from January 11, 1918, waters of entire Liberian coast are in zone of submarine activity.

BUNDY

File No. 763.72/9592

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, April 10, 1918.

[Received 9.07 p. m.]

German submarine now in harbor of Monrovia. Commander sent President, Liberia, following letter this morning:

Sir: I have not the wish to do unnecessary damage to the Liberian people, being sure that you were driven into the war against your true interest; therefore I send you back those prisoners I made beating your armed ship *President* [Howard?]. In the same time I want to draw your attention to the fact that the capital of Liberia is at present helpless under German guns. Like many other allies of England and France you are not being supported by them in the moment of the most critical danger. If the wireless and cable station of Monrovia do not at once cease their work I shall regret being obliged to open fire on them. If you wish to avoid this you will have to send on to me a boat under a flag of truce and declare that you consent to stop them yourself. [Your obedient] servant, Gercke, Kapitan Lieutenant and Commandant S.M.U. Kreuzer U.

Liberian Government has not yet given its final answer to these demands but in any case it looks as if the wireless and cable stations at Monrovia will be put out of commission accordingly. This is probably the last message I will be able to send the Department. It

is urgently requested that assistance be sent at earliest possible moment.

BUNDY

File No. 763.72/9593

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, April 10, 1918.

[Received 9.17 p. m.]

Liberian Government agreed to stop operation of wireless and cable stations and in reply to its communications commander of submarine makes following demands:

Extreme urgency, *dernier ultimatum*. Have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your answer to my note from this morning. Being sure of your earnest good will to comply with my demands I will not open fire on the cable and wireless stations which I was in the act of doing when just in time your boat was sent out. I am glad to be able to do so because my gun fire might have hurt innocent people. In answer for this I must put to you the following demands:

- (1) The French flag is to be removed from its place shown to your commissioners;
- (2) Fire is to be set on all houses belonging to the wireless and cable stations, the apparatus of each station to be destroyed;
- (3) One and two to be executed within one hour after your commissioners have reached the shore.

I have the honor to be, Sir, your obedient servant, Gercke, Kapitan Lieutenant and Commandant S.M.U. Kreuzer U.

Liberian Government has not yet given its final answer to these demands but in any case it looks as if the wireless and cable stations at Monrovia will be put out of commission accordingly. This is probably the last message I will be able to send the Department. It is urgently requested that assistance be sent at the earliest possible moment.

BUNDY

File No. 763.72/9593

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)<sup>1</sup>*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1918.

7209. Following telegrams just received from Monrovia:

[Here follow the two preceding telegrams.]

Communicate above to Foreign Office and express the hope that help may be sent immediately.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup>The same, on the same date, to the Ambassador in France (No. 3494).



File No. 763.72/9486

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, April 10, 1918.

[Received April 11, 4 a. m.]

Liberian Government's final reply to demands of submarine commander was considered unsatisfactory by him. At about 4 this afternoon submarine bombarded French wireless station rendering it inoperative. As result bombardment two Liberian persons killed and two wounded. Submarine is now engaging merchant steamer off Monrovia, result as yet not known. No public disorder. Believe submarine will return to complete demolition of cable and wireless station.

BUNDY

File No. 763.72/9493

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, undated.

[Received April 11, 1918, 12.07 p. m.]

9451. Your 7209, April 10. Copies submitted Foreign Office, Admiralty, naval and military attachés. Admiral Sims informs me Admiralty already had reports of this matter and that assistance has been dispatched to Monrovia.

PAGE

File No. 763.72/9499

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, April 11, 1918.

[Received April 12, 10.35 a. m.]

As yet threatened destruction of cable station by submarine has not been attempted. Submarine not seen since about 7 last evening. Liberian Government vessel, named *President Howard*, sunk yesterday by submarine. Result of running fight yesterday in view of Monrovia between merchant steamer and submarine obscured by darkness. No casualties among foreigners.

BUNDY

File No. 763.72/9594

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1918, 4 p. m.

7245. Referring to Liberian situation, please ascertain what protection, if any, the British Admiralty intend in future to extend to Liberia.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/9552

*The Consul at Dakar (Yerby) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

DAKAR, April 13, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 10.23 p. m.]

Monrovia requesting from French Governor General protection from the destruction French cable and the other property by a submarine. Governor General offers cannons and all equipments same as furnished Conakry and Cotonou. Monrovia has refused and insists upon naval protection which he nor Sierra Leone can furnish. Governor General exhibited correspondence between the two Governments, asks to request the United States to advise Monrovia to accept the protection offered, else submarine may capture Allied officials. Discussed details; would recommend Monrovia should be advised to accept.

YERBY

File No. 763.72/9551

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, April 14, 1918, 8 p. m.

[Received April 15, 4.37 a. m.]

Acute situation has apparently arisen between Liberian Government and French Government [*Governor*] General, Dakar, over measures proposed by latter for the protection of French wireless and cable stations here. These measures are understood to be: (1) erection of sand bag defence around cable and wireless buildings; (2) that Liberia permit landing of guns, gunners and ammunition now on the way to Monrovia on French patrol boat, expected tomorrow.

<sup>1</sup> The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, by telegram No. 3528 to the Ambassador in France (File No. 763.72/9704a).

At a conference today composed of British, French and American representatives, President of Liberia and Secretary of State, the following were stated as Liberia's position with reference to proposed measures: (1) Liberian Government refuses to permit erection of sand bag defense outside cable and wireless buildings but will allow machinery inside wireless buildings to be covered with sand bags; (2) that landing of large guns, gunners and ammunition now on the way on French patrol boat will not be permitted; (3) that small arms and ammunition therefor for use of its own troops will be accepted but landing of foreign troops or artillery of any kind will not be permitted; (4) that Liberian troops are considered sufficient to protect foreign life and property if small arms and ammunition were furnished; (5) that Liberian Government is prepared to consider recommendation from Governments of Great Britain, France and United States on the question of land defense; (6) that better naval protection is desired and some evidence shown that patrol is being kept on Liberian coast, especially in the vicinity of Monrovia.

Liberian Government asserts that position outlined in the foregoing is taken upon the official expression of the British Government that it would pay Liberia better to have her ports as they exist at present rather than have them inadequately fortified.

Not having received instructions to conclude fortification of Liberian ports I have refrained from advising Government although asked.

BUNDY

File No. 763.72/9570

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, *April 15, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[*Received April 16, 2.15 a. m.*]

Verbally informed this morning by French Chargé d'Affaires that Governor General at Dakar has instructed him to have sand bag defense erected outside wireless buildings regardless of objections of Liberian Government. As position of Liberian Government on this question, reported in Legation's April 14, 7 [8] p. m., remains unaltered, very serious situation threatens to develop. British representative and myself have earnestly endeavored unofficially to prevent crisis. Our efforts drew from Liberian Government the following statement which we were asked to hand French Chargé d'Affaires:

Understanding that its protection is intrusted to Great Britain, Liberian Government cannot accept authority of Governor General of Dakar and can only treat with Great Britain and Allies jointly.

Liberian Government refuses permission to erect outside defense to wireless building until Allied Powers send expert opinion to consider again whole question of defense. Meanwhile Liberian Government is prepared, if required, to accept full responsibility for its policy as regards any further damage by submarine attack.

BUNDY

File No. 763.72/9895a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Bundy)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1918, 6 p. m.

U.S.S. *Raleigh* due to arrive at Monrovia on or about May 6. Commanding officer has appropriate instructions. Report fully by cable result of conference between commanding officer and Liberian authorities. Department has advised British and French Governments.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/9914

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, May 8, 1918, 8 a. m.

[Received 6 p. m.]

Department's May 1, 6 p. m. *Raleigh* arrived yesterday morning, commanding officer conferred with Liberian authorities who stated that Government does not desire to fortify Monrovia or any other Liberian port unless such fortification is entirely adequate to repel gun fire attack by submarine and therefore offer of 5-inch gun was not accepted. Small arms and ammunition were desired to resist any hostile landing from submarine and to suppress disorder on the part of native tribes. Commanding officer delivered to Government 15,000 rounds Krag ammunition and one Colt automatic machine gun with 15,000 rounds of ammunition therefor.

Later at an informal conference at which Allied representatives and commanding officer were present Government announced its decision relative to fortifying Liberian ports as above stated. Commanding officer expressed to the Legation the opinion that this decision of the Government is wise. *Raleigh* [leaves] here for Dakar 9th.

Liberian Government has shown me a communication dated April 26 marked secret from acting British Consul here which is construed by the Government as completely supporting its position on the question of fortification and defense. Does Department desire text of this communication cabled? I have furnished commanding officer a copy.

BUNDY



File No. 763.72/9973

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *May 13, 1918, 6 p. m.*[Received *May 14, 4.19 a. m.*]

10031. Your 7245, April 12, 4 p. m. Foreign Office today considered the question of furnishing protection to Liberia and have taken measures to restore confidence to Government of that country; acting British Consul General at Monrovia reports French authorities at Dakar, shortly after bombardment of wireless station at Monrovia, offered to land certain number of field guns for its defense and that French citizens requested permission to cause remains of wireless station to be protected by sand bags; Liberian Government declined to accept either of these measures until they should have discussed question of defense with Allies jointly following expert advice on whole question. British acting Consul General has been instructed to inform Liberian Government that British Government cannot keep ships in Liberian waters owing to lack of harbor facilities, but that four armed drifters are being sent to Sierra Leone for service in Liberia, if further attacks are made, and that the despatch of more protective forces is under consideration and will be arranged if practicable.

Military authorities feel that French offer to send guns can only be recommended if the assurance is given that these guns be efficiently handled, and are capable of dealing with armament of German submarines, that is, two 6-inch and two 4-inch guns and that shore guns are also supplied with searchlights. They further consider it wise to leave remains of wireless station unprotected, but that if field guns are landed any protection that can be constructed locally should be erected. They add that if [reerection] of wireless station is contemplated they strongly advise its being outside the range of 6-inch submarine guns. This information under instructions was communicated to the Liberian Government confidentially.

PAGE

File No. 763.72/10101

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, *May 21, 1918, 10 a. m.*[Received *May 22, 12.13 p. m.*]

Legation informed that French wireless station here has been put in condition to be again operated. Liberian Government has withheld its approval of this procedure and insisted that station be immediately dismantled as its use might invite another submarine at-

tack. Replying French Chargé d'Affaires stated that station had not been operated and would not be operated until instructions were received from French Government to which he had referred controversy. On the 18th over protest of French Chargé d'Affaires Liberian Government through its own agents took down antenna and sealed operating mechanism of station.

BUNDY

File No. 763.72/10101

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Bundy)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1918, 3 p. m.

Your May 21, 10 a. m. Say to Liberian Government that the Government of the United States, while fully appreciating the apprehension which induced Liberia's action, would as her best friend desire to point out that Liberia having declared war against Germany, should act in the common interest and recognize that wireless communication with Liberia is necessary not only for the successful operation of the ships of the Associated Governments on the west coast of Africa, but for the very protection of Liberia herself, and that by depriving these Governments of the use of the wireless station at Monrovia in the operation of their vessels, Liberia would seem to be, in fact, furthering the interests of the common enemy which this Government is confident Liberia will not wish to do.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10352a

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Bundy)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1918, 5 p. m.

Department's May 31, 3 p. m. Department is advised by French Embassy here that French wireless station in Liberia cannot be put in condition for service for some time and that meanwhile it is necessary to utilize the German wireless station. Cable if Liberian Government is offering objection to use of German station.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10335

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, June 11, 1918, midnight.

[Received June 12, 4.25 a. m.]

Legation promptly made to Liberian Government representations indicated in Department's May 31, 3 p. m. After expressing grate-

ful thanks to the Government of the United States for its friendly advice which is accepted, the reply of Liberian Government continues in substance that Liberia is determined to remain loyal to the common cause and would not knowingly take any action which would appear in fact to further the interests of the common enemy; refusal to permit operation of French wireless station was based on genuine fears of Liberian Government and people; that further operation in Monrovia without that protection which Liberia has been advised would be necessary effectively to cope with submarine attacks would invite another bombardment and thereby endanger foreign as well as Liberian life and property; in modifying its decision to protect operation of wireless station Liberian Government urges that it be supplied with sufficient arms and ammunition to control native tribes which have given evidence of causing serious trouble if Monrovia is again bombarded.

Legation understands that arms and ammunition requested in its cable May 1, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> are deemed sufficient by Liberian Government for the purpose of control above mentioned.

BUNDY

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File No. 763.72/10353

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, June 12, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received June 13, 6.30 a. m.]

Department's June 3, 3 [5] p. m. French Chargé d'Affaires here has verbally confirmed to me in the presence of acting British Consul Legation's information reported in its cable May 21, 10 a. m., that French wireless station at Monrovia is now in condition to be again operated. Accordingly no effort is being made at present by France to secure consent of Liberian Government to utilize German wireless station.

The reply of Liberian Government to Legation's inquiry as to whether it is offering objection to France using German station follows:

Owing to the exposed situation of the German wireless in this city to submarine attack it would seem to the Liberian Government that the advice confidentially given it with respect to reerection of the French wireless station and now in the same sense communicated through you to your Government, to wit, "if the reerection of the French wireless station is contemplated it would be most unwise to leave it within range of a submarine mounting 6-inch guns", ought under the circumstances equally apply to the German wireless station.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Confidential advice above referred to was given by British Government to Liberia in a secret communication dated April 26; same was mentioned in Legation's cable May 8, 8 a. m.

BUNDY

File No. 768.72/10457

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, June 21, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received June 22, 3.50 a. m.]

British vessel *Astræa* visited Monrovia June 19. Commander conferred with Liberian Government relative to wireless situation. Acting British Consul verbally informed me today that during conference at which neither French Chargé d'Affaires nor myself was present Liberian Government stated that it was awaiting advice of British Minister before modifying its attitude with respect to reopening French wireless station. Liberian Government apparently believes that British Government holds, in view of advice already confidentially given by it to Liberia, different opinion to that given to the United States as to the advisability of French wireless station resuming operation. Under the circumstances it seems necessary that Liberia should be made definitely aware that the Governments of France, Great Britain and the United States are in complete accord concerning the question of the French station operating again. To date station remains closed.

BUNDY

File No. 882.242/17

*The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Bundy)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1918, 6 p. m.

War Department will sell to Liberia arms and ammunition mentioned your May 1, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> namely, 100 Krag Jorgensen carbines and 250,000 rounds of ammunition. Awaits shipping directions.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10524

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

MONROVIA, June 27, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received June 28, 9.54 a. m.]

French Chargé d'Affaires here informed Legation yesterday that Liberian Government had notified him in a communication dated June 25 that French wireless station may be reopened.

BUNDY

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



File No. 763.72/10939

*The Chargé in Liberia (Bundy) to the Secretary of State*

No. 225

MONROVIA, June 28, 1918.

[Received August 5.]

SIR: In continuation of Legation's despatch No. 224, dated June 22, 1918,<sup>1</sup> and in confirmation of its cable of June 27, 4 p. m., relative to the French wireless station at Monrovia, I have the honor to make the following report:

The Legation is reliably informed that President Howard and his Cabinet very carefully considered the whole controversy anew at a meeting on June 24, and that as a result of this consideration it was unanimously decided that the Liberian Government should permit at once the re-opening of the French wireless station. This decision was communicated to the French Chargé d'Affaires, so he informed me, in a note from the Secretary of State dated June 25. The information received from the Chargé d'Affaires was confirmed on June 27 in a communication to the Legation from the Secretary of State, see enclosure.<sup>1</sup>

From what I have been able to learn it seems that there were two reasons which mainly influenced the action of the Government, namely:

1. Liberian authorities have finally become impressed that the Allies really regard the use of the station as of great importance in handling their shipping and naval craft along the west coast of Africa, and in her own interest, as well as that of the common cause, Liberia could not afford to keep the wireless station closed any longer.

2. Adequate protection as it had been interpreted came to be recognized as presenting difficulties that were, under the circumstances, almost insuperable; and moreover to insist on adequate protection simply meant to urge the Allies, perhaps through Great Britain, to fortify Monrovia and this in turn involved international arrangements and understandings which might become very annoying. Therefore it was concluded that nothing more would be said on this phase of the question at present.

Now that the Government has decided that the wireless station may be again operated this particular controversy ought, it would seem, right speedily to become a closed incident, much to the relief of all parties concerned.

I have [etc.]

RICHARD C. BUNDY

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

RUMANIA'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE WAR<sup>1</sup>

Suggestions for Assurances to Rumania Regarding Her Treatment in the Peace Settlement—Negotiations between Rumania and the Central Powers—Efforts of the Ministers of the Allied and Associated Powers to Avert a Separate Peace—Declarations of the American Government to Rumania, February 21, April 26, and May 3

File No. 763.72119/1103

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2044

WASHINGTON, January 16, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of January 7, 1918,<sup>2</sup> wherein you advise me that your Government is of the opinion that, notwithstanding the obstacles raised by the attitude of the Russian Maximalists on the peace question, nothing should be overlooked to prevent Roumania from concluding a separate peace with the Central Empires; that, in any event, the French Government believes it important absolutely to set aside the idea of a separate peace legally concluded by the present King and Government appointed by him; that if, on the contrary, the Allies should be confronted by a peace concluded by a *de facto* Roumanian Government set up by the Germans after the royal family and the present Government had left the country and taken appropriate measures to transfer the Army to the territory of southern Russia, the situation would be different; that, Roumania having remained faithful to the Allies to the last, they would be in a position to extend to her, at the time of the final peace conference, their whole support in having that provisional peace revised and obtaining for her the terms to which she will be entitled; that the French Minister at Jassy has been advised of the views of the French Government and instructed to deliver a declaration in that sense to the President of the Roumanian Council; and that, in bringing the foregoing to my knowledge, you have been directed by your Government to inquire whether the Government of the United States coincides in the French view and whether instructions will be sent to the American Minister at Jassy to take action similar to that of the French Minister there.

In reply I have the honor to say that the President of the United States has already conveyed a message to King Ferdinand in which he expressed the determination of this Government to assist the King and the people of Roumania in their struggle to preserve their national integrity and freedom, furthermore giving assurance that

<sup>1</sup> For papers dealing with Rumania's relations with Russia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

in any final negotiations for peace the United States will use its constant efforts to see to it that the integrity of Roumania as a free and independent nation is adequately safeguarded.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the instructions given to the French Minister, I shall now direct the American Minister at Jassy to reiterate to Mr. Bratiano the assurances already conveyed to the King.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1131

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, *January 12, 1918, 6 a. m.*

[Received *January 17, 6.50 a. m.*]

7. The President's peace programme as reported by telegraph here has made the situation a great deal more critical than ever before and now demands for immediate peace with Germany are heard on all sides. Roumanian Government claims that if Roumania should now have her occupied territory returned without occupying Transylvania there is no necessity to stay in the war any further. It is claimed that Germany is to restore Roumania integrally so soon as peace will be signed with it. Not being certain whether report of the speech is correct I beg to ask for repetition of that part which concerns Roumania. If paragraph about Roumania had been the same as that regarding Italy it would have been quite satisfactory to Roumania.

VOPICKA

File No. 763.72/7794

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1918, 7 p. m.*

130. Referring to Department's 91, November 28,<sup>2</sup> please reiterate assurances conveyed by the President to the King of Roumania. Full text of President's address to Congress was repeated to you by radio from Saloniki. This Government has no knowledge of any understanding between Roumania and her other allies in regard to peace terms,<sup>3</sup> but is, however, committed to safeguard the integrity and freedom of smaller nations.

POLK

<sup>1</sup>The message referred to was transmitted by telegram No. 91 of Nov. 28, 1917, to the Minister in Rumania, *Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 325.*

<sup>2</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Referring to the Minister's telegram No. 161, Nov. 17, 1917, *ibid.*, p. 309.

File No. 763.72/8701

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, January 29, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received 3.22 p. m.]

3108. Joint telegram dated Jassy, January 28, from ministers of United States, England, France, and Italy:

Mr. Bratiano has convened us again to call our attention to the situation in Roumania which each day becomes more critical in view of the imminence of a separate peace by the Ukraine, where furthermore the Austro-German preponderance seems to become decisive as a consequence of Government's resignation. He read us his instructions to General Coanda with a view to obtaining, at any rate, a clause in the treaty to be concluded, reserving for Roumania the disposal of her depots and her supplies. He added that he doubted whether the Austro-Germans would agree. The statements made by Mr. Kühlmann following upon the negotiations with the Ukraine concerning the desire of the Central Empires to conclude peace with Roumania are still encouraging for the loyalists, which situation is all the more dangerous as Parliament is on the eve of reassembling. For our part we continue to impress on the Roumanian Government the unlikelihood at present of any serious offensive by the Austro-Germans on this front.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/8762

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 5, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 11.11 p. m.]

3129. Following joint telegram received from ministers of United States, Great Britain, and France dated Jassy, February 3:

After submitting today, February 2, the message of Mackensen to a military council presided over by the King, assisted by the President and Vice-President of the Council, we addressed a collective letter to Mr. Bratiano, the essential paragraph of which is as follows:

Our Governments have confirmed to us their full confidence that Roumania, faithful to her noble traditions and vital interests, will continue the struggle with the same energy as in the past and will cast in her lot with the Allies.

We can not conceal our apprehensions if Roumania be confronted with the alternative of a German offensive or an advantageous peace. In this event the best means of counteracting pacifist tendencies



would be, failing one of the new measures indicated in our telegram of January 9 last,<sup>1</sup> a military action on the other fronts if this is possible.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/8773

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *February 6, 1918, 11 p. m.*

[*Received February 7, 4 a. m.*]

3156. Joint telegram from the ministers of United States, France, England and Italy, dated Jassy, February 5 :

In his reply to our collective letter, Mr. Bratiano, after having thanked us for the feelings of solidarity that we expressed to him, especially lays stress upon the sacrifices that Roumania has made in the cause of the Allied Powers and on her present situation resulting from the rupture with the Maximalists. He recalls that it was in agreement with us that he undertook police action against the Maximalist elements of the Roumanian front. He confirms his previous declaration that in case this otherwise indispensable action entails serious consequences the Allied Powers must consider that Roumania has fulfilled her duty and they must uphold their engagements with regard to her, even if the continuation of the struggle against the Germans were impossible. His letter concludes with an appeal to the solidarity of the Allied Powers with Roumania on the attitude to be ostensibly adopted towards the Maximalists and with a request that the situation of Roumania be examined by the Entente on the basis of the above-mentioned declarations and the present military conditions.

This language reflects the state of mind of the Roumanian Government and of the predominating public opinion, faced with the extreme difficulties of the situation, the [likelihood] of advantageous propositions to be made by Germany and the impossibility till now of the Allied Powers manifesting their assistance in a concrete form in the military domain.

We have been informed of the arrival at Jassy of the former Austrian [military attaché] at Bucharest in the character of an envoy of peace. We shall call on Mr. Bratiano tomorrow to question him on this matter and shall seize the opportunity to combat as forcibly as possible the state of opinion shown by the communication [from] the President of the Council.

SHARP

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72/8824

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 9.50 p. m.]

3173. Joint telegram from the ministers of United States, Italy, France and England at Jassy, February 8:

Mr. Bratiano has acquainted us with the discussion which took place yesterday at the Council of Ministers on the attitude to be adopted with regard to the German ultimatum. He told us that the Council could not arrive at a decision, a certain number of the Ministers, while declaring themselves against assuming power alone, being opposed to any peace negotiations. Mr. Bratiano added that in his opinion choice must be made of one of the three following solutions: (1) a separate peace; (2) immediate rupture; (3) peace negotiations with a view to delay. The President of the Council declared that personally his decision was already made. He rejects the two first solutions and only consents to remain in power if the third is adopted. According to him this would have the advantage of possibly permitting the opportunity of benefiting by some successful event to improve the situation by bringing about a closer union with the Maximalists and aggravation of the [crisis in Austria, etc.]. He concluded by assuring us that if the Conservative Ministers form a cabinet of resistance to the utmost, he will give it his full support, will authorize the members of his party who would dissociate themselves from him to enter this cabinet.

We replied to Mr. Bratiano that the point of view of our Governments had been clearly defined in our collective letter of February 2 (see our telegram of the same day<sup>1</sup>), that consequently we could only pronounce against any negotiations for peace. We added that as a matter of fact there were only two solutions to be faced, peace or war. All so-called dilatory negotiations could only result in the early conclusion of a separate peace. We are told on the other hand that the controlling centers have the presentiment that the Germans are disposed to accept advantageous conditions, for Roumania and especially the maintenance of King Ferdinand on the throne. This feeling if not immediately counteracted by successes on the part of the Allied Powers risks to become decisive in the direction of peace.

SHARP

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<sup>1</sup>Transmitted by telegram No. 3129 of Feb. 5 from the Ambassador in France, *ante*, p. 753.

File No. 763.72/9023

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Counselor for the  
Department of State (Polk)*

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. COUNSELOR: The urgent telegram I alluded to in our talk yesterday arrived piecemeal and the last part (supposing it be really the last part which is not quite clear) reached me only this afternoon.

You will find herewith a paraphrase of it. Will you be so good as to let me know whether the American Government may decide to join us in the very urgent and important *démarche* to be made with the Roumanian King.

Believe me [etc.]

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure—Telegram—Paraphrase—Translation]

*The Allied Ministers in Rumania to the French Minister of  
Foreign Affairs*

King Ferdinand has commissioned General Averesco to form the Cabinet. The General's ideas concerning the situation of his country are set forth in our identical telegram of yesterday.

It must be expected that under these circumstances a separate peace will shortly be concluded unless the Entente takes initiatives apt to bring a decisive change in the situation. That object cannot be achieved, in our opinion, except by an immediate declaration to the King by the four Allies to the effect:

That the Allied Powers adhere to all the engagements made with Roumania, in accordance with the terms of the convention concluded at Bucharest in August 1916; that in any event they will not conclude any peace unless Roumania be reconstituted in her integrity and, should the King be compelled to leave the country, he be, as well as his dynasty, restored to his throne; that in any event, the King and Government of Roumania will take part, even though they have had to leave the national territory, in the peace negotiations. Finally, that every financial or other means needed for the conduct of the Roumanian Government shall be supplied to that Government, the King, the Roumanian Army and the Parliament, even though they be out of the national territory.

We consider it highly desirable that this declaration be made also in the name of the American Government although it is not a signatory of the Bucharest Convention.

File No. 763.72/9024

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)*

WASHINGTON, February 12, 1918.

MY DEAR COUNSELOR: A continuation of the telegram I sent you a moment ago has reached me since. It proposes that, besides the statement in my previous note, it be declared by the Allied Powers to the Rumanian Government, that all that may be done in the invaded territories will be considered by us as null and void; that an energetic military action will be maintained on all our battle fronts, and that all that may be possible will be tried to smooth over the difficulties between Rumania and the Maximalists.

Believe me [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 763.72/8832

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, February 9, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 12, 12.20 p. m.]

33. Prime Minister Bratiano and his successor, General Averesco, named yesterday, both argued that there was no use for Roumania to keep on fighting because according to the speeches of President Wilson and Lloyd George even if the Allies win Roumania is not to get any additional territory. This argument is also used by Roumanian peace party. I told the Prime Ministers that our Government sent a letter to the King,<sup>1</sup> copies of which were given to them, and they as diplomats all could, if they wished, read between the lines, and therefore their arguments were worthless.

The Queen sent for me last night and asked that I and the other Allied ministers should stand by the King in his hour of trial and to have our respective Governments assure the King his dynasty and guarantee all other contracts entered into by the Allies, especially in case he should be forced to leave Roumania. It is secretly circulated that the Allies are about to make peace with Turkey and Bulgaria and that America and Japan are sending soldiers to Siberia. If there is any foundation in these rumors the Queen said it would greatly strengthen Roumania's position. I asked her to use all her influence against making immediate peace at this time. Peace just signed between Central Powers and Ukraine strengthens peace party here.

VOPICKA

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<sup>1</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 325.



File No. 763.72/8871

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, February 15, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received February 16, 2.22 a. m.]

Joint telegram from the ministers of the United States, France, Great Britain, and Italy from Jassy, undated:

General Aversco having asked the German Command for a delay so as to constitute [his] Cabinet, Mackensen replied expressing the hope that the result would be obtained in 48 hours. He added that he presumed that the Ministry would comprise no person notoriously hostile to the Central Empires, nor any member of the Bratiano Cabinet. The insolence of this reply has caused considerable emotion. The King has given the order that when announcing to the commander in chief the immediate sending of delegates, the Roumanian chief of staff shall declare that negotiations cannot be opened unless both parties are inspired with the principles in force among independent states. Germany's attitude foretells demands far from compatible with the dignity of a country even reduced to the extremity in which Roumania finds herself. The result may be a situation which will permit the taking advantage of such military events as are favorable to the Entente to produce a complete change of public opinion.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/9025

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, February 21, 1918, 7 p. m.

163. It has been represented to this Government that the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States should make a declaration to the King of Roumania defining specifically the principles which they have determined to adopt in view of the grave conditions which confront the Roumanian people in spite of their unswerving loyalty and courage in maintaining the struggle against the Central Powers.

You are accordingly instructed to represent to the King and to the Government of Roumania that this Government is unwilling to unite in a joint declaration as suggested but that acting independently it desires to give assurance that it will, so far as it may, give support to the following propositions:

- (1) That in any treaty of peace to which the United States is a party, the political and territorial integrity of Roumania shall be adequately safeguarded.

(2) That the people of Roumania shall have entire freedom in the determination of their Government.

(3) That the Government of the United States will consider with the Governments of its co-belligerents the furnishing of financial and other means necessary to maintain the Roumanian Government and Roumanian Army whether the same are located within or outside the national territorial limits of Roumania.

(4) That measures or actions by the Central Powers or their allies in the invaded territory of Roumania will be considered as null and void in so far as they adversely affect the title or authority of Roumania and its allies.

(5) That the United States is determined to continue with all its resources of men and of national wealth, its struggle against the Central Powers until the principles for which it entered the war have been attained.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/8985

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *February 25, 1918, 11 p. m.*

[*Received February 25, 10 p. m.*]

3246. Joint telegram from the Allied ministers at Jassy dated February 24:

General Averesco left yesterday for Bucharest where he will meet Messrs. von Kühlmann and Czernin. The advance of the Austro-Germans in Russia without any resistance being offered as well as the aggravation of anarchy and hostility against Roumanians strengthens every day the pacifist tendency. Peace must be fully considered, therefore, as inevitable unless the enemy's conditions are too humiliating. We are endeavoring by all means possible to strive against this current. The President of the Council having been informed of the arrest of General Coanda at Kiev by the Maximalists asked us to intervene in order to obtain his repatriation. We therefore request our Governments to give the necessary instructions to their representatives at St. Petersburg. On our side we are endeavoring to enter into communication with our agents at Kiev regarding this matter.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1395

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *February 27, 1918, 6 p. m.*

[*Received 10 p. m.*]

3259. Joint telegram from the Allied ministers at Jassy dated February 26:

General Averesco returned this morning from Bucharest where, after a preliminary interview, the negotiations were postponed, Kühlmann and Czernin having left suddenly for Brest-Litovsk.

The principal part on the side of the representatives of the Central Powers was played by the Austrian Minister which agrees with the statements made to the Parliaments of Vienna and Berlin. The remaining delegates were struck with the violence of the language of Count Czernin which spread broadcast recriminations concerning the attitude of the Roumanian Government during the period of neutrality and the treatment which he received at the time of his departure from Bucharest.

The essential points of the different questions were not touched. Regarding the Dobroudja the Ministers of the Central Empires confined themselves to contesting in principle the rights of Roumania to this region, whether from a geographical point of view or from an historical and juridical point of view, the Dobroudja having been ceded in compensation for part of Bessarabia and the Governments of Vienna and Berlin having made no objections, so their representatives declared, to the Roumanian aspirations to this latter region. As regards the economic conditions, Von Kühlmann indicated that [they] might be an obstacle to the conclusion of peace and that they particularly [affected] the supplies of wheat and petroleum.

The attitude of the representatives of the Central Powers, their hurried departure for Brest, postponing the negotiations, have appeared to indicate the feeling with them that the events in Russia, where the Austro-German troops are advancing aided by the railroads without any difficulty, will soon put Roumania at their mercy.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1410

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, March 1, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received March 3, 10.07 p. m.]

46. Additional to joint [telegram of] the Allied ministers yesterday.<sup>1</sup> I beg to ask for instructions in the matter which the Prime Minister asks us to submit to our respective Governments, as to whether I should oppose making of a separate peace by Roumania or whether I would urge Roumanian Government to fight to the end. Roumania is quite isolated and could resist attack by the Central Powers at the utmost only about two months which is also the opinion of the military attaché. It would seem that Roumania has made up her mind to make separate peace ever since armistice was

<sup>1</sup> Apparently referring to telegram of the same date, *infra*.



signed. The Department will remember both myself and military attaché protested against armistice, as result has been demoralization of the Army.

There is danger that if the Allies oppose Roumanians' peace plans, [in return] for a territorial concession Roumania may agree to fight with the Central Powers against the Allies. I do not wish to make this charge but everything is possible in the war.

I have attended meetings of the Allied ministers at their request, although our country is not one of the signatory powers. I have done this in order to obtain information regarding Roumania and also to keep the Department fully posted concerning the situation on the Russian-Roumanian front. When the above question came up yesterday I stated that it was a matter to be decided by British, French and Italian Governments, but the Allied ministers as well as Prime Minister and King ask me to obtain the opinion and consent of the United States and therefore I am asking for instructions. The Allied Governments should fight [*believe?*] the two months resistance of the Roumanians would give them advantage on the western front.

Prime Minister stated that he would resign if the Allies insist on Roumania fighting, in which case a new Government would surely make peace without consulting the Allies.

VOPICKA

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File No. 763.72/9081

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 5, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received March 6, 1.17 a. m.]

3293. Joint telegram from the Allied ministers at Jassy dated March 1:

The President of the Council, on his return from Bacau where he had accompanied the King, called us together to communicate the status of negotiations. Count Czernin confirmed to the King his former statements, while insisting on behalf of his Sovereign on the necessity of accepting the conditions, otherwise the dynasty would disappear and Roumania would be shared between Hungary and Bulgaria. Count Czernin stated clearly that the Dobroudja would be entirely ceded, that is to say, up to the most southern arm of the Danube; furthermore that the cession would be made not to Bulgaria but to the Quadruple Alliance. The object of this latter stipulation is evidently to give the Austro-Germans a means of bringing pressure to bear on Bulgaria and permitting them, if need be, to profit by the rivalry between this power and Roumania. As for the rectifica-



tions of the frontier in favor of Austria-Hungary, they affect the three following points: the Iron Gates, the Valley of Jin, and the region of Dorna-Vatra. The economic conditions have still not been defined. Count Czernin confines himself to stating that they concern the wheat and petroleum, that is to say, all the riches of the country, and "that they will not be harsher than the territorial conditions."

General Averesco told us that from the position in which the Roumanian Government finds itself, if it does not consent to negotiate on this basis, there only remain the following alternatives:

(1) Capitulation, which would have the political advantage of avoiding a peace concluded between legal authorities, but which would present the drawback of allowing to fall into the hands of the enemy the railroads, war material, etc. Furthermore, Roumania would lose for an indefinite time all independence without any profit resulting for the Entente, according to the President of the Council.

(2) The struggle to the end which always, according to General Averesco, would only have a limited duration and would result in a certain catastrophe, with the same drawbacks as the preceding solution. He again mentioned the absolute impossibility in which the Allies find themselves henceforth to bring opportune assistance to Roumania. He repeated that the retreat into Russia of the Government, the royal family and a small portion of the Army is absolutely impossible, the Allies not having improved the relations of Roumania with the Maximalists, who, on the contrary, are redoubling their hostility against her.

The President of the Council asked us afterwards if the continuation of the negotiations on the basis of the Austro-German [proposals] would not be, in spite of their [harshness], the least prejudicial decision both for Roumania and for the Allies. He added that in the event of a peace under such conditions, Roumania would consider herself as always united to the Entente. It was necessary to put the following question: Could Roumania, at the time of the congress, count on the support of the Allies to obtain the revision of such a peace, notably, of the conditions relative to the Dobroudja and to the frontier as [indicated]?

We replied in the most emphatic terms by referring to our former statements concerning the necessity of struggling to the end and preparing at the same time, despite all the difficulties, the evacuation of the whole or part of the Army as well as of the royal family and the Government.

The President of the Council insisted on his point of view and drew attention to the danger for the Entente of incurring, by its uncompromising attitude, the resentment of the Roumanian popu-

lation and throwing it completely into the arms of the Germans. He urgently requested us to communicate his statements to our Governments so that they might give us instructions if they considered it desirable to do so.

We were [omission] the interest to be gained by giving the widest publicity to the German ultimatum by comparing it with the denial of Nauen (see our telegram of February 14<sup>1</sup>) as well as to the monstrous threat of dividing Roumania between Hungary and Bulgaria.

No radiogram of the countries of the Entente appears yet to have turned to account the impudence of this attitude and the flagrant contradiction presented by it in the same way as the Berlin and Vienna Governments have done in order to hold public opinion in their own countries.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/9073

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*  
[Telegram]

JASSY, March 5, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received March 6, 4.24 a. m.]

47. It seems as if Roumania will make peace and our military attaché with his staff and Colonel Anderson with medical and nursing units will be obliged to leave at the end of week. Absolutely necessary Department telegraph at once by wireless to American Ambassador and Consul of the United States at Moscow and obtain from Bolshevik authorities safe conduct for them through Russia. It is probable that legations will be permitted to remain here. If not I shall leave with military attaché, otherwise I shall proceed with other legations to Bucharest.

VOPICKA

File No. 763.72/9073

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*  
[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1918, 1 p. m.

175. Your 32 [47], 5th. Department has wired Petrograd and Moscow to endeavor secure safe conduct military and Red Cross mission. Department relies on your judgment as to leaving Jassy but hopes situation may develop so that you can remain.

POLK

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72119/1410

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 8, 1918, 2 p. m.*

176. Your 31 [46], 1st. Department does not wish you to join in representations regarding peace but you may reiterate assurances already given.

POLK

File No. 763.72119/1449

*The Rumanian Minister (Angelescu) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1918.*

[Received March 9.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: By a telegram which was unfortunately much delayed my Government wishes to bring to Your Excellency's knowledge the extremely grave situation in which was placed Roumania, hemmed in on all sides, cut off from her allies, unable to procure supplies of any kind and, as it were, at the mercy of the enemy.

Although the armistice had not yet expired, Marshal Mackensen surprised our Government with an ultimatum sent on the 14th of February stating that the armistice had been granted with the sole object of preparing the ground for a peace parley and that he expected to be informed by our Government on February 20 of the names of our plenipotentiaries in order that peace negotiations might begin on February 22.

Under the pressure of that ultimatum the Government found itself constrained to get in touch with the enemy so as to learn his pretensions.

On February 18 the President of the Council had an interview with Marshal Mackensen for the purpose of obtaining precise information about the Central Powers' intentions. As Marshal Mackensen was not prepared to furnish it, the President of the Council had a conversation with Messrs. Kühlmann and Czernin on the 24th of February. The extremely harsh terms imposed by the representatives of the Central Powers imply a cession of territory.

Those representatives made it known at the same time that, if rejected by the Roumanian Government, those imposed terms would be made worse after the defeat of our Army and bring into question the dynasty and very existence of Roumania.

The Roumanian Government, after receipt of that communication, bearing in mind the tragical situation to which Roumania is now reduced by her inability to receive any material aid from her allies

on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the fact that an invasion of the whole country by the enemy would be attended by extremely grave consequences not only to Roumania but also to the Allies—seeing that our war material and ammunition would in that event fall into the hands of the enemy—decided to take the enemy's proposals into consideration.

In the decision to be reached the Roumanian Government will be compelled to bow to the inexorable circumstances of the local situation but its efforts will ever be bent on reconciling that decision with the present and future interests of the Allies.

It firmly cherishes the hope of finding the Government of the United States as well as its other allies ready to extend to it their moral support at this time and their effective support hereafter.

I beg you to accept [etc.]

DR. ANGELESCU

File No. 763.72119/1453

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 11, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 11.54 p. m.]

3228 [3328]. Joint telegram from Allied ministers at Jassy dated March 9:

We made [the President of] the Council the presumptive declaration announced in [our] telegram of yesterday regarding war material.<sup>1</sup> General Averesco assured us in the clearest terms that no demand for the delivery of Russian or Roumanian material had ever been formulated by the Germans. He added that if such a demand were made it would be rejected considering that when accepting to negotiate with the enemy he had had especially in view the preservation of the Army so as to reserve the future and that the Army without material in the geographical situation of Roumania would be non-existing. We have taken note of these assurances which, however, we transmit with the reservations that the present situation . . . impose.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1455

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, March 11, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received March 12, 3.55 p. m.]

3327. Joint telegram from the Allied ministers at Jassy, dated March 9:

<sup>1</sup> Apparently referring to telegram of the same date, *infra*.



Germany considering Roumania as henceforth at her mercy formulates demands more and more exorbitant in proportion as they are satisfied. The frontier rectification asked on certain points of the Carpathians will now be much more extended. If this territorial condition, susceptible of revision in the future, only affects Roumania, it is to be feared that the enemy will demand others such as the delivery of war material which would prejudice the immediate interests of the Allied Powers. An interview of this morning between General Berthelot and the President of the Council seems to justify some apprehension.

In order to avoid this danger, the only loop-hole was [*should be?*] tried, that of provoking if possible a desperate resistance without, however, taking the direct responsibility. We ask for the authorization to declare that, in case of delivery to the enemy of Roumanian war material or Russian material abandoned in Roumanian territory, we may solicit urgent instructions from our Governments concerning the attitude to observe toward Roumania. In view of the extreme urgency we ask from now that it may be understood that this attitude may imply, if not the rupture of diplomatic relations, which would be playing the enemy's game, at least the recall of the heads of missions and the complete isolation of Roumania at the general peace conference. As regards the Russian war material, we have collectively notified the Roumanian Government that this material, not having been paid for by Russia, must be considered as the property of the Allied Powers who ceded it to her.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/9167

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, *March 12, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received March 13, 11.10 p. m.*]

54. Referring to Department's telegram No. 175, March 8, 1 p. m. Allied military attachés will watch that no ammunition, whether Roumanian or Russian, is taken, given, or sold to the Germans taking further into consideration assurances of the King and Prime Minister as to the munition. It is agreed that the Allied Legations with military attachés and assistants, including our Legation, will remain in Roumania. Of course it is in the first place understood that the military and sanitary missions who left Jassy for Russia will not be stopped on their way. The court will probably move to Bucharest in six weeks.

VOPICKA

File No. 763.72119/1449

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Rumanian Minister  
(Angelescu)*WASHINGTON, *March 15, 1918.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 7, 1918, in which you bring to my attention the grave situation which has confronted Roumania and forced the Roumanian Government to enter into negotiations with the Central Powers.

This Government understands the circumstances which have forced Roumania to negotiate with the Central Powers and has already telegraphed to the American Minister at Jassy and at the same time communicated to the French Government the assurances which it desired to have conveyed to the Roumanian Government.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 763.72/9318

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *March 29, 1918, 3 p. m.*

[Received March 29, 12.55 p. m.]

3470. Following joint telegram from Allied ministers dated Jassy, March 27:

The Swiss Legation, which was nevertheless charged, since the intervention of Roumania, with the protection of German, Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian interests, has not been authorized to send an official courier to its Government. This courier, stopped at Focșani by order of Mackensen, was obliged to return to Jassy. The German Command in order to justify this arbitrary act explicitly invoked the necessity of completely isolating Roumania. If the Central Empires persist in this attitude they may make it absolutely impossible for us to correspond with our Governments, by taking possession of the wireless telegraphy, the only means of communication of which we still dispose. We ask our Governments to send us their instructions in anticipation of this contingency.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/9846b

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 4, 1918, 6 p. m.*

183. Telegram of Allied ministers, March 27. Department relies on your judgment as to leaving Jassy after conference with col-

leagues. In event of telegraphic communications being cut and you still remain, desire you to reflect friendly purpose of United States in regard to Roumania, not committing this Government beyond the instructions you have already received.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72/9557

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, April 12, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received April 14, 6.35 a. m.]

70. I beg to report that I had a conference with the new Prime Minister Marghiloman in which he stated that he believes that the Germans will be victorious in Europe and our country will not bring the necessary help in time to France. I told him his opinion was incorrect; that Germany will be beaten and that the Allies will dictate the terms of peace. He further stated that the Roumanian Government will probably stay in Jassy and no German soldiers will be allowed to enter Moldavia. The German Army will stay in the occupied territory until the general peace is made. He expects that Roumania will sign peace next week.

VOPICKA

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File No. 763.72/9881

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 15, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received April 16, 2.55 a. m.]

3627. Following joint telegram from Allied ministers, dated Jassy, April 14:

[We] believe it is correct that in a conversation with the United States Minister, Mr. Marghiloman declared that he has no doubt concerning a victory of the Central Empires in Europe. An endeavor should be made to counteract this tendency of the President of the Council to establish a distinction between the cause of the United States and that of the other Allies. We consider therefore, that the United States Minister should be invited to declare that his country will not lay down arms until after the definitive victory of the Entente and will spare no effort to hasten it by sending troops to the Austrian front as well as into Russia, where the total abstention of the Allied Powers is interpreted here as a confession of powerlessness. Furthermore only an energetic inter-Allied action can constitute a serious obstacle to the limited [*unlimited?*] food

supplies which the Central Powers will otherwise obtain from Russia at the next harvest.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1603

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 20, 1918, noon.

[Received 10.11 p. m.]

3650. Following joint telegram from Allied ministers dated Jassy, April 16:

Information has reached us from a reliable source that Mr. Marghiloman is more and more convinced of the victory of the Central Powers. Doubtless relying on German information, he expresses the opinion, which is widely shared here, that the latest events on the western front prove the powerlessness of the Allied Powers to oppose the Central Powers, before the latter have had time to utilize the various immense resources of Russia. Marghiloman adds that even under the hypothesis, inadmissible in his eyes, of the victory of the Entente, Roumania would have nothing to expect in spite of the enormous sacrifices imposed on her by her intervention. He bases this opinion on information given him at Bucharest according to which the United States is said to have undertaken that Austria-Hungary shall have her hands left free as regards the Balkans.

By reason of the delicate origin of this information no [exact] allusion should be made concerning it in press telegrams. But it is of the highest importance that the American Government should be induced to make an immediate declaration denying any negotiation [with] Austria-Hungary and especially any engagement as regards the Balkans. This declaration should be widely published without delay. It would be more efficacious if the other Allies associated themselves thereto. It would be well to exercise care also that the radiograms concerning the military situation are drawn up so as to reestablish faith in the victory of the Allied Powers. We must not conceal from ourselves that if Roumanian opinion prevents [*inclines*] in this direction we shall be exposed to the danger of seeing the Roumanian Army lend the enemy its indirect assistance in the form of an expedition of contingents to southern Russia. On the other hand there is reason to call attention to the violent discontent created by the demands of the Austro-Germans and to general yearning towards Transylvania by reason of the union with Bessarabia. This aspiration was most pronounced on the occasion of the coming to Jassy of the delegates from Bessarabia.

SHARP



File No. 763.72/9557

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1918, 1 p. m.<sup>1</sup>

189. Referring to joint telegram of Allied ministers dated April 14. The purpose of the United States to continue the war in order to achieve those ideals to which the people and Government of the United States are dedicated was fully represented by the President in his speech at Baltimore April 6 on the occasion of the opening of the third Liberty Loan campaign. Special attention is called to the President's reference to his earlier statements as follows:

The answer, when I proposed such a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer.

I accept the challenge. I know that you accept it. All the world shall know that you accept it. It shall appear in the utter sacrifice and self-forgetfulness with which we shall give all that we love and all that we have, to redeem the world and make it fit for free men like ourselves to live in. This now is the meaning of all that we do. Let everything that we say, my fellow-countrymen, everything that we henceforth plan and accomplish, ring true to this response till the majesty and might of our concerted power shall fill the thought and utterly defeat the force of those who flout and misprize what we honour and hold dear. Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and Peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether Right as America conceives it or Dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force. Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.

Referring to your 70, April 12, 5 p. m. You are instructed to hand a copy of the text of this telegram to the Prime Minister.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1603

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1918.

191. You are instructed to inform the Minister of Foreign Affairs and your diplomatic colleagues of the following:

It has come to the knowledge of the Government of the United States that a rumor is in circulation in Roumania, which is received in some quarters with credence, that this Government has given

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<sup>1</sup> Resent May 6.

assurances to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the latter will be given a free hand in the Balkans in the adjustment of the territorial and political sovereignty of the nations which claim priority in that region.

This rumor which has become current is utterly false and without foundation. The Government of the United States has not and will not commit itself to a policy which denies the rights of small nations and recognizes in Austria-Hungary a supremacy which it does not and ought not to possess. The United States entered this war in opposition to this idea of the primacy of the strong over the weak, and it will never relinquish its purpose to maintain the full sovereignty of small nations which the great nations seek to subordinate and control.

You may give such publicity to the foregoing as you deem proper.

LANSING

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The Treaty of Peace between Rumania and the Central Powers, May 7—Statement by the Allied and Associated Ministers of Nonrecognition of its Terms—Rulings of the American Government as to the International Status of Rumania—Declaration by the American Government of Sympathy with Rumanian Aspirations for National Unity, November 5

File Nos. 763.72119/1670, 1678

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, *May 14 and May 20, 1918.*

[Received in sections, *May 19, 4.48 p. m., and May 22, 12.14 a. m.*]

77. Referring to Department's 180, March 23.<sup>1</sup> Following is copy of peace treaty between Roumania and Central Powers as published by the press. No official copy has yet been received, but should there be any difference I shall telegraph the corrections and also any additions there may be:

TEXT OF THE PEACE TREATY MADE BETWEEN ROUMANIA AND THE  
CENTRAL POWERS <sup>2</sup>

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey of the one part and Roumania of the other, led by the desire to stop the state of war between them, and to establish friendly relations between their people in political, judicial and economic respects, have decided to transform the preliminaries of peace signed at Bacau, March 5, old style, into a definitive peace treaty. Thus the plenipotentiaries of the several Governments shown above [ . . . ] having assembled at Bucharest to continue the peace negotiations, and after presenting their full powers have come to a common understanding on the following articles.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> With slight corrections based on the text later received by pouch (File No. 763.72119/1780).

## CHAPTER I

ARTICLE 1. The Central Powers on one side and Roumania on the other declare that the state of war between them is finished; the contracting parties have decided from now on to live in peace and friendship.

ART. 2. Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will commence immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty.

In reference to the mutual admission of consuls there will be a future convention.

## CHAPTER II

ART. 3. Demobilization of the Roumanian Army will take place immediately after the peace treaty is signed in conformity with the dispositions in articles 4-7.

ART. 4. General military services, superior headquarters, and military establishments will remain as provided for in the last peace budget.

Divisions 11-15 will be demobilized as decided in the convention of Focșani on March 8, old style.

Of the Roumanian divisions 1-10, the two infantry divisions now in Bessarabia, including also the chasseur battalions and the two cavalry divisions of the Roumanian Army, will remain on a war footing up to the time when, due to military operations of the Central Powers in the Ukraine, there will be no danger for the Roumanian frontiers.

The other eight divisions will be kept in Moldavia at reduced peace strength, maintaining their general staff and headquarters. Each division will be composed of four infantry regiments, each of three battalions; two cavalry regiments, each of four squadrons; two field artillery regiments, each of seven batteries; one engineer battalion; and the necessary technical troops and trains which will be decided later; however, the total strength of these eight divisions must not be over 20,000 infantry, 3,200 cavalry, and 9,000 men for the entire Roumanian artillery, exclusive of the divisions which remain mobilized.

The divisions remaining mobilized in Bessarabia will be brought in case of demobilization to the same reduced peace strength as the eight divisions mentioned above.

Military units which were not a part of the peace establishment will be abolished. The length of the active military service will remain the same as in time of peace. Reservists, comprising also men from the cavalry regiments, will not be called up for manœuvres until after the general peace.

ART. 5. The artillery, machine-guns, rifles, horses, vehicles and munition deposits on hand after the demobilization or abolishment of various corps will be delivered for safe keeping till the general peace to the High Command of the allied military forces in the occupied territory, where they will be guarded and administered by troops of the Roumanian Army under the supervision of the High Command.



The munitions which will be left in the possession of the Roumanian troops in Moldavia are fixed at 250 rounds per rifle, 2,500 rounds per machine gun, and 150 shells per cannon.

The Roumanian Army has the right with the consent of the High Command of the allied military forces to replace from the deposits in the occupied territory material no longer fit for service, and to the replacing of munitions used.

The divisions which remain mobilized in Bessarabia will retain the necessary war munitions.

ART. 6. Until the evacuation of occupied Rumanian territory the demobilized troops must remain in Moldavia. [There] are excepted from this the services and troops mentioned in article 5, paragraph 1, needed for guarding the arms and material deposited in the occupied territory.

Reserve officers and men who are demobilized may return to the occupied territory, active officers must receive permission from the High Command of the allied forces to return there.

ART. 7. To the Chief Roumanian Headquarters in Moldavia an officer of the General Staff of the allied powers will be attached as liaison officer with staff; an officer of the Roumanian General Staff will be attached as liaison officer with staff to the allied High Command in the occupied territory.

[Paragraph dealing with railways not received in telegraphic text.]

ART. 8. Up to the time of establishment of order in Bessarabia the river and sea forces will be left with their entire man power and armament, except as reduced by article 9. After that, these forces will be reduced to peace strength.

From this are excepted the military forces used as river police and for the protection of commercial navigation on the Black Sea, as also those needed for clearing the mine fields. Immediately after the signing of peace these naval river forces will be put at the disposition of the river police organization as provided in a special convention in regard to the naval military forces. The Naval Technical Commission of the Black Sea has the right of disposal. To establish connection with this commission, a Roumanian naval officer will be attached to it.

ART. 9. All men in the army and navy who, during peace time, were working in ports or in navigation, must on demobilization be set free so they may be able to commence work in their former occupations.

### CHAPTER III

ART. 10. Roumania cedes to the allied powers Dobruja to the Danube, namely between the *thalweg* and Black Sea to the Channel of Saint George.

The allied powers guarantee that Roumania secures an assured commercial route to the Black Sea through Cernavoda-Constantza.

ART. 11. Roumania consents that her frontier shall be rectified in favor of Austria-Hungary in such manner that the new frontier will be in future as follows: (Here follows a long detailed description of the line of the new north and west frontiers as shown on the map



which is a part of the peace treaty. As this description is useless without the map I have not telegraphed same, but will endeavor to send later). Two mixed missions composed of an equal number of representatives of the interested powers will establish the new frontier line after the ratification of peace.

ART. 12. The Roumanian state possessions in the territory ceded pass to the state who receives these lands, without charge and without obligations; however, the rights of civilians will be respected. The fact that the lands formerly belonged to Roumania will put no obligation either on Roumania or the state receiving the lands.

In addition, the states to whom these territories are ceded will conclude with Roumania, among others, conventions regarding the following points:

1. With regard to the citizenship of the former Roumanian inhabitants of these territories they must be accorded in each case the right of option and emigration;
2. With regard to the arrangements for the property of communes which are cut by the new frontiers;
3. With regard to arrangements for the archives and official documents of the courts and civil administrations;
4. With regard to the policing of the new frontier;
5. With regard to the effect of the change of territory on religious jurisdiction;
6. With regard to the effect of territorial change in reference to state conventions.

#### CHAPTER IV

ART. 13. The contracting parties reciprocally renounce any war damages, that is, as to the expenses of the states for the carrying on of the war.

For the regulation of the losses the war has caused special conventions will be made.

#### CHAPTER V

ART. 14. The Roumanian territory occupied by the military forces of the allied powers, taking into account the dispositions in chapter III, will be evacuated during a period which will be determined later. During the time of occupation the strength of the army of occupation, not including the formations necessary for economic needs, will not exceed six divisions.

ART. 15. Until the ratification of the treaty of peace the present administration of the occupied territory with all its rights will remain in power. Immediately after the signing of the peace treaty the Roumanian Government will have the right to appoint, and to retire from service, those whom they wish.

ART. 16. After the ratification of the treaty of peace,<sup>1</sup> the civil administration of the occupied territory will be delivered again to the Roumanian authorities in accordance with articles 17 and 18 [17 to 23?].

ART. 17. Until the evacuation of the occupied territories, in accordance with the wish of the Roumanian Government, there will

<sup>1</sup> End of first section of the telegram.

be attached to each of the Roumanian ministries a civil official of the administration of occupation, who will facilitate as much as possible the passage of the civil administration into the hand of the Roumanian authorities.

On the other hand, the Roumanian authorities must give effect to the dispositions which the commanders of the army of occupation will judge necessary in the interest of the security of the occupied territories, as also the security, lodging and rationing of their troops.

The means of communication, especially railroad, postal and telegraph services, will remain until new dispositions under military administration but they will also be put at the disposition of the Roumanian authorities and civil population in accordance with understandings which will be arrived at in this regard.

The cooperation of the High Command in regard to questions of the circulation of money and payments as well as in finance and operations of the National Bank and the Central Office of Popular Banks will be settled later by a special convention.

ART. 18. The jurisdiction in the occupied territory will be taken over by the Roumanian courts under reservation of the provisions made in paragraphs 2 and 3.

The jurisdiction in regard to persons belonging to the army of the occupation, in penal as well as civil cases, as also the police power with reference to these persons, remains in the hands of the allied powers.

Penal acts against the army of occupation will be judged by military courts, as also acts against the orders of the administration of occupation, as long as these orders remain in force as per article 22, paragraph 1. Also, the affairs which were being adjudicated by the tribunals established by the administration of occupation before the ratification of the treaty of peace will be terminated by them.

ART. 19. Concerning communications between the occupied and unoccupied territories, the High Command of the army of occupation will make the necessary arrangements with the Roumanian Government. The return to the occupied territory can be made only in such measure as the Roumanian Government will assure the upkeep of those returning by importing a corresponding supply of food from Moldavia or Bessarabia.

ART. 20. After the ratification of the peace treaty the army of occupation will not be able to make requisitions either in money or in kind except as provided in paragraph 2.

The right of the High Command of the army of occupation to requisition cereals, vegetables, forage, wool, cattle and meat from the products of 1918, also wood and petrol and the derivatives of petrol, remains in force as also the right to make the necessary dispositions in regard to the acquisition, manufacture, transport and distribution of the products. For this will be taken into consideration the establishing of a regulated plan for taking the same over, as also for the supply necessary for Roumanian needs; this is to be regulated by future conventions between the High Command and the Roumanian Government.

Besides this the Roumanian Government must give effect to the requests of the High Command for the execution of requisitions for the needs of the army of occupation as also for other requisitions

which must be delivered by Roumania in conformity with future conventions which will be made.

ART. 21. Beginning with the ratification of the peace treaty the support of the army of occupation as also the requisitions made for it will be made on account of Roumania. Objects which are not requisitioned for the army of occupation will be paid for beginning from the ratification of peace by the allied powers from their own means.

ART. 22. In regard to the details of the delivery provided for in article 16 to the civil administration, as also in regard to the withdrawal of orders published by the administration of occupation, a special convention will be made. From the fact of these orders claims of damage cannot be brought. Also will be respected the rights of third parties gained on the basis of orders. Forced administrators and liquidators appointed by the administration of occupation can be called to penal or civil account for any departure from their duties only with the approval of the High Command of the army of occupation; afterwards, for their activities as such, no punishment or prejudice can result.

ART. 23. The expenses incurred in the occupied territory by the allied powers for public works, comprising also industrial enterprises, will be returned to these powers at the time of surrender.

Up to the time of withdrawal from the occupied territories the industrial enterprises mentioned in paragraph 1 will remain under military administration, but in the use of their products will be taken into consideration the internal needs of Roumania.

#### CHAPTER VI

ART. 24. Roumania will conclude an act for navigation of the Danube with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the following basis: (Dispositions in regard to this treaty follow.)

ART. 25. Missing. [Provides for the administration by Roumania of property of the Commission of the Mouths of the Danube.]

ART. 26. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey and Roumania have the right to keep war vessels on the Danube. These can navigate downstream to the sea and upstream to the upper frontier of their own state.

They cannot, however, enter into connection with the bank of another state or anchor there except with the approval obtained through diplomatic channels of such state, except in case of *force majeure*.

Each power represented in the Commission of the Mouths of the Danube has the right to keep two light war vessels at the mouth of the Danube as stationary vessels. These can also stay as far up the river as Braila without special authorization. In the ports and waters of the Danube will be recognized to the war vessels mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 all privileges and usages for war vessels.

#### CHAPTER VII

ART. 27. In Roumania will be recognized to the Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Greek United, Protestant, Mohammedan and Jew-



ish religions the same liberty and legal and administrative protection as the Roman [*Rumanian*] Orthodox religion. Particularly must be recognized the right to establish parishes or religious communities and schools, which will be considered as private schools and will not be impeded in their activities except in the case when such affect the security of the state or public order.

The students can be obliged to take part in the religious study in all public and private schools only in so far as the professors are teaching them their own confession.

ART. 28. Difference in religious belief must not exercise in Roumania any influence over political and civil rights.

The principle expressed in paragraph 1 will be brought to fulfillment also in regard to the naturalization of the inhabitants of Roumania who are not subjects of other states, comprising also the Jews regarded formerly as foreigners. There will be decreed in Roumania at the time of the ratification of peace a law by which in each case all those without nationality who have taken part in the war either in active military service or in the auxiliary service or those resident in the country who were born there of parents born there, will be recognized without other considerations as Roumanian citizens with full rights and as such will be registered at the tribunals. The acquisition of Roumanian citizenship will extend also to the wives, widows, and minor children of such persons.

#### CHAPTER VIII

ART. 29. The economic relations between the allied powers and Roumania will be settled by special conventions which form an integral part of the peace treaty and enter into force at the same time unless it is otherwise provided. The same applies also in regard to the reestablishment of public and private relations, the regulation of war and civil damages, the exchange of prisoners and interned civilians, the grant of amnesty, as well as in regard to the treatment of vessels and any other means of transportation which fell into the hands of the adversaries.

ART. 30. For the interpretation of this treaty the following texts are authoritative: the German and Roumanian texts for relations between Germany and Roumania; German, Hungarian and Roumanian texts for relations between Austria-Hungary and Roumania; Bulgarian and Roumanian texts for relations between Bulgaria and Roumania; Turkish and Roumanian texts for relations between Turkey and Roumania.

ART. 31. This treaty of peace will be ratified and the documents for the ratification will be exchanged as soon as possible at Vienna.

This treaty of peace enters into force, unless otherwise agreed, immediately on its ratification.

In which faith the plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty of peace and affixed their official seals.

Done at Bucharest, in five copies, May 7, 1918.



File No. 763.72119/1679

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 22, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received May 23, 5.45 a. m.]

3956. Following joint telegram of the four Allied ministers dated Jassy, April [May] 18:

The following collective letter was sent by the four Allied ministers to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on May 14, 1918:

By your letters of April 26/May 9, you were good enough to inform us that peace between Roumania and the Central Empires was signed April 27[24]/May 7. In their quality of representatives of the signatory powers of the Bucharest convention of August 17, 1916, the ministers of France, Great Britain and Italy confirm the statements which they have repeatedly made to your predecessors. On the other hand, as regards the terms, the four undersigned ministers, while leaving to their Governments the task of stating in a more precise manner their point of view, are under the obligation of declaring from now on that they consider as null and void all the stipulations of this peace which would be contrary to the principles the violation of which constrains the Entente to take up arms, and which are all contrary to the rights and interests of the powers which we represent.

Signatures follow.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1680

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, May 21, 1918.

[Received May 24, 1.09 p. m.]

80. Replying to Department's 195, May 16.<sup>1</sup> Bulgaria has taken from Roumania as follows: Silistria, former Bulgarian territory ceded to Roumania by the peace treaty of 1913 and also that portion of Dobruja south of line drawn about seven to ten kilometers south of the railroad from Cernavoda to Constanza and running almost parallel with the railroad. The line commences at Cochirleni, passes through Mircea Voda, Idris Kiruos [*Cuius?*], just north of Omurcea, and reaches Black Sea just north of Agigea, three kilometers north of Tekirghiol. The balance of Dobruja up to the Channel of Saint George has been taken by Central Powers. Altogether Dobruja with Silistria is a loss of about 20,600 square kilometers with a population exceeding 700,000.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Austria-Hungary has taken from Roumania an irregular strip of frontier running from Herta right in the north to just west of Turnu Severin on the Danube. This strip varies in width from one to two kilometers to fifteen or sixteen kilometers and in one or two places where Roumania projected [into] Austria-Hungary to more. This strip includes all the mountain passes, forests worth about three milliards of lei, and many villages, including Voinescu, Caineni, Predeal, and Palanca. The total area taken by Austria-Hungary amounts to between six and seven thousand square kilometers with population of about 100,000.

Please acknowledge receipt.

VOPICKA

File No. 763.72119/1697

*The British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading) to the Secretary of State*<sup>1</sup>

No. 602

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1918.

[Received June 1.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received a telegram from Mr. Balfour informing me that he proposes shortly to make a statement in Parliament in connection with the peace between the Central Powers and Roumania, to the effect that the British Government will do all they can, at the eventual peace conference, to obtain a revision of the harsh terms imposed by the enemy upon Roumania. Mr. Balfour proposes to refer at the same time to the protest made at Jassy by the ministers of the Allied Powers, as well as to the reserves which were formulated by the Allies in connection with the Danube convention.

Mr. Balfour has requested me to acquaint you in advance with his intention to make a statement on the above lines.

I am [etc.]

READING

File No. 763.72112/8943

*The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, June 7, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received 7.13 p. m.]

10498. War Trade Board [from Sheldon]:

No. 744. A meeting has been held at the Foreign Office to discuss the question of remittance to Roumania in view of the recent peace treaty which places all Roumania's railways, posts, telegraphs and

<sup>1</sup> Acknowledged without comment June 6, 1918.

indirectly banks under German control. The following recommendations were made in which it is hoped that you will concur:

- [1] That so far as remittances are concerned Roumania should be considered as a neutral in the same way as Finland and that Defense of the Realm Regulation No. 41*b* should be applied with the proviso that exceptions could be made under license;
- (2) That no distinction should be made in future between occupied and unoccupied Roumania;
- (3) That in bringing these decisions to the notice of the Roumanian Government it should be clearly stated that this action has been rendered necessary by the terms of the peace treaty and to again express the Allied determination to secure a revision of that treaty at the peace congress.

LAUGHLIN

File No. 763.72/10245

*The Secretary of State to the Director of the Bureau of Enemy Trade, War Trade Board (McGonigal)*

WASHINGTON, June 13, 1918.

SIR: In reply to your inquiry of June 1, 1918,<sup>1</sup> the Department begs to inform you that for purposes of the dispatch of postal correspondence and the remittance of funds, Roumania should be regarded, for the present, as territory occupied by the enemy. For your information, I may add that there is no consular office of the United States in Roumania at present.

I am [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

File No. 763.72/9644

*The Secretary of State to the Alien Property Custodian (Palmer)*

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1918.

SIR: The Department has received your letter of June 13,<sup>1</sup> enclosing a copy of a letter dated April 15,<sup>1</sup> in which you refer to a deposit of approximately \$73,800 said to be standing in the name of the Kingdom of Roumania with the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, and inquiring whether Roumania is to be treated as an ally of Germany or as a neutral power so far as concerns the Trading with the Enemy Act.

In reply you are informed that the Department is advised that the greater part of the territory of Roumania has been occupied by German troops for the past eighteen months; that the remaining

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

part, Moldavia, is not occupied by such forces, and that the Roumanian Government is located in and functioning from Jassy, which is in unoccupied Moldavia. It appears also that the Roumanian Government has concluded a treaty of peace, not of alliance, with the Central Powers. It would seem, therefore, that the funds alleged to belong to the King of Roumania on deposit with the Guaranty Trust Company of New York should not, so far as the Department is at present informed, be regarded as belonging to an enemy as that term is defined in the Trading with the Enemy Act.

I am [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

ALVEY A. ADEE

File No. 763.72112/9527

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1918, 5 p. m.

839. From War Trade Board [for Sheldon]:

Replying to cables 744, 847 and 999.<sup>1</sup>

(1) Regarding matter of remittances of funds to Roumania, War Trade Board concurs with attitude taken by Foreign Office.

(2) With reference to the matter of drawing no distinction in future between occupied and unoccupied Roumania, War Trade Board concurs insofar as affects matters within its jurisdiction.

(3) Regarding expression of Allied determination to secure revision of Roumanian-German treaty at peace congress, War Trade Board feels this is matter entirely within jurisdiction of the State Department and must be answered by that Department.

LANSING

File No. 763.72112/9937

*The Assistant to the Counselor for the Department of State (Auchincloss) to the Commercial Adviser of the British Embassy (Crawford)*

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1918.

MY DEAR SIR RICHARD: I have your note of August 24, 1918,<sup>2</sup> in which you ask me to inform you whether the State Department concurs in the proposal that, in communicating to the Roumanian Government the restrictions imposed on the transmission of funds, it should be clearly intimated that these restrictions have become necessary by reason of the terms of the Bucharest treaty, and that the communication should also reaffirm the determination of the Allies to secure a revision of that treaty at the peace conference. I have

<sup>1</sup> No. 744, *ante*, p. 779; Nos. 847 and 999 not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



taken this matter up with the Secretary and I beg to advise you that he is not prepared at present to give an expression of opinion on this point.

I am [etc.]

GORDON AUCHINCLOSS

File No. 763.72/11434

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, September 16, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received September 17, 10.15 a. m.]

5099. Following joint telegram received from Allied ministers dated Jassy, September 14:

In reporting a recent speech of the American Senator Lodge, the newspapers of Bucharest call attention that of all the countries who have taken part in the war on the side of the Entente mention of Roumania alone is omitted. They conclude therefrom that Roumania has sacrificed everything in vain, that she has nothing to expect from the Entente.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/11434

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 23, 1918, 2 p. m.

5694. For Jassy:

In reply to your joint telegram dated September 14, you may assure Roumanian Government and people that purpose of the Government and people of the United States has not been modified in any way and remains as expressed in message from the President telegraphed to you November 1 [28], 1917.<sup>1</sup> You may reiterate the sense of that message emphatically.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2377R

*The Secretary of State to the Rumanian Chargé (Lahovary)*

No. 8

WASHINGTON, October 25, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith certain communications which have passed between the Government of the United States and the Government of Germany, relative to an armistice and the terms

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, p. 325.

of a treaty of peace between the belligerents in the present war, with the request that you transmit the same to your Government.<sup>1</sup>

The President instructs me to make request that your Government take this correspondence under careful consideration and communicate at its convenience its views and conclusions concerning it.

This is specially desirable because reference in this correspondence to "invaded territory" includes Roumania.

The Government of the United States is further prompted to bring this matter to the attention of your Government because it has appreciated that the treaties of peace concluded between Roumania and the Central Powers were agreed to only because of the disastrous consequences which would have resulted from further military resistance by the Roumanian armies. Allow me to assure you that the Government of the United States appreciates the present position of Roumania and wishes in no way to make that position more difficult; at the same time it is deemed the part of friendship to consult Roumania, especially where her interests are concerned to so important a degree as now.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2446

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

JASSY, *October 21, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[*Received November 1, 1.50 p. m.*]

124. In addition to the Allied ministers' telegram of today and my telegram No. 121(?),<sup>2</sup> I beg to say that I am daily besieged by Roumanians who wish to have information from me regarding Transylvania. They seem to consider that their future is in the hands of America only. Of course all the old ministers of the Liberal Party, who favored the war on the side of the Entente, consider the question of Transylvania life or death for themselves and for Roumania. The National Council of Roumanians in Transylvania proclaimed their independence in the Hungarian Parliament. There were many meetings of Roumanians held in different parts of Transylvania indorsing this programme and proclaiming themselves in favor of union with Roumania. The Roumanians here ask the President of the United States, before the peace is made with Austria, to be in favor of the independence of Transylvania as they do not wish to have anything to do with Hungarians who always maltreated and persecuted them.

[VOPICKA]

<sup>1</sup>The correspondence with Germany was also submitted, on Oct. 23, to the representatives of other governments; see *ante*, p. 383.

<sup>2</sup>Neither printed.

File No. 763.72/12059

*The Minister in Rumania (Vopicka) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

JASSY, *October 26, 1918, 11 a. m.*

[Received November 3, 2 p. m.]

No. 125. Two weeks ago I renewed my request for permission to send cipher telegrams, stating that I wish to communicate to the Department a very important affair regarding Roumania. Yesterday evening the Prime Minister . . . sent for me and told me that the Germans consented to send my cipher telegrams and that I can also receive from the Department in cipher. Many telegrams have been sent by me personally and by the Allied ministers here but I do not know whether they have reached the Department, therefore I quote substance of them.

The Roumanians very anxiously expected to hear from the President whether they have any hope to receive Transylvania at the peace conference. The reported declaration of the President communicated here by wireless from Lyons that the Italians and Roumanians of Austria-Hungary probably would prefer to join their original countries caused great enthusiasm here and now the President is idolized by the Roumanians. The French and English Governments have promised to Roumania, if she will enter the war, Transylvania, [Bukovina] and part of the Banat, but they wanted to have our country confirm this agreement but the President proclaimed that the nations of Austria-Hungary can choose their future destiny and therefore could not do what the Roumanians wanted. But now they are satisfied because they know that the Roumanians of Transylvania will select either their independence or will join Roumania. I believe that for their sacrifice in the war they deserve consideration.

Day before yesterday an Allied airplane arrived here from Saloniki and brought the request from the Allied military authorities that Roumania should prepare for necessary action. It was assured yesterday by the French military [attaché] here who has charge of the matter that the Roumanians will again take up arms on the side of the Allies as soon as necessary and the danger is not too great for them. Myself and our military [attaché] are in constant communication with the two generals who will lead the Roumanian troops and from them we have received the same information.

. . . . .  
VOPICKA

File No. 763.72119/2446

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Rumania (Vopicka)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 5, 1918, 5 p. m.

233. Referring your 124, October 21, 10 p. m. Please convey the following message to the Roumanian Government and inform me of their reply. Copy has also been transmitted to the Roumanian Chargé d'Affaires at Washington.

The Government of the United States is not unmindful of the aspirations of the Roumanian people without as well as within the boundaries of the Kingdom. It has witnessed their struggles and sufferings and sacrifices in the cause of freedom from their enemies and their oppressors. With the spirit of national unity and the aspirations of the Roumanians everywhere the Government of the United States deeply sympathizes and will not neglect at the proper time to exert its influence that the just political and territorial rights of the Roumanian people may be obtained and made secure from all foreign aggression.

LANSING

ESTABLISHMENT OF A MONTENEGRIN LEGATION IN THE  
UNITED STATES

File No. 701.7311/1a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 5, 1917, 3 p. m.

2606. Italian Embassy informs Department Montenegrin Government desirous of establishing legation in Washington, and that inquiry was made through you. Have you received such inquiry from Montenegrin Government?

LANSING

File No. 701.7311/2

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, September 6, 1917, 7 p. m.

[Received 11.20 p. m.]

2462. Your 2606, September 5, 3 p. m. Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me to ask whether it would be agreeable to the American Government that the King of Montenegro create a legation in Washington. Copy of his letter forwarded in my despatch 5622 of August 22.<sup>1</sup>

SHARP

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



File No. 701.7311/3

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 8, 1917, 3 p. m.

2702. Your despatch 5622, August 22.<sup>1</sup> Inform Mr. Popovitch Government of United States has learned of proposed establishment by Montenegrin Government of legation at Washington and will be happy to receive an accredited minister from that Government.

LANSING

File No. 701.7341

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1917, 3 p. m.

5655. United States Government has been requested by Government of Montenegro to receive a minister from that country. Assuming that a similar request was made to the British Government by Montenegro the Department desires to know the attitude of the British Government towards this request. Investigate and report promptly.

LANSING

File No. 701.7341/1

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, October 25, 1917, 5 p. m.

[Received October 26, 1.45 a. m.]

7521. Your 5655, October 24, 3 p. m. British Government has received a request from Montenegrin Government to recognize as its minister here a British subject. The Foreign Office has replied that they will willingly receive a minister but that he must be a Montenegrin subject.

PAGE

File No. 701.7311/12

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 22, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received 9.30 p. m.]

3696. My 2987, January 3, 11 a. m., and previous telegrams.<sup>1</sup> The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Montenegro has just informed me that the King proposes to name as envoy extraordinary and minis-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

ter plenipotentiary to United States, General Doctor Antoine Gvosdenovitch, aide-de-camp to the King, and would be glad to know if this person would be *persona grata* to the Federal Government.

SHARP

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File No. 701.7311/18

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 12, 1918, 6 p. m.

4997. Your 4386, July 7, noon.<sup>1</sup> Doctor Gvosdenovitch acceptable as minister from Montenegro.

POLK

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File No. 701.7311/32

*Remarks of General A. Gvosdenovitch, Newly Appointed Minister of Montenegro, on the Occasion of His Reception by President Wilson, September 20, 1918*

[Translation]

MR. PRESIDENT: The King, my august Sovereign, has deigned to entrust me with the high mission of representing his Government near the Federal Government of the United States and I have the honor to present to Your Excellency the letters which accredit me in the capacity of minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary.

I am instructed to express to you, Mr. President, the profound satisfaction which His Majesty the King, his Government and all the Montenegrins experience in having the relations of sincere friendship and sympathy which already bound our small country to your great nation made closer by this new tie.

You will permit me to add that I realize with feelings of emotion the honor of being, near your great Republic, the first minister plenipotentiary sent by Montenegro.

My country's admiration and enthusiasm for the United States rest on well-defined and deep-seated grounds.

With us, as with you, ideas of justice and liberty are not imported and artificially infused in our minds; they are the natural offspring of the race.

For five centuries we have fought without respite our enemy who had succeeded in crushing the pride of the strongest nations. Neither were we fighting for our own land only, but also for the oppressed people of our blood, our Jugo-Slav brothers, so that they might have their day of freedom. Thanks to our tenacity, never during those five centuries, in spite of all the hurricanes and cata-

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

clysms, was there any extinction at the summit of our mountains of that beacon of independence that we strained with our every effort to keep alive, of that small, flickering, but burning light to which all the unfortunate Balkan peoples turned their eyes and their hopes.

Impelled by that tradition which for the sake of Slavic solidarity has been, is and will be our law, we entered at once the present war and attempted to achieve the impossible. That the task was overwhelming this time, was no fault of ours.

So for many years our poor little country, incessantly constrained to depend on arms for its very existence, failed to develop its domestic and foreign commerce, to create industries, to improve the agricultural opportunities offered by the territory it lately acquired, to exploit its material reserves that have not yet been broached. In the hours of truce many of our young men had to leave the homes that their bravery had just saved. This country of bold initiative is that to which they came. Their appeal to your nation for employment of their activities and strength, for their daily bread and for the comfort of their old age when they would see again the wild scenery of their beloved motherland was not in vain.

By degrees and through those Montenegrins who crossed the ocean, America has come to be known and beloved in our mountains. It has grown to be looked to as a tender hearted friend. At this very moment the emigrants from Tzrnagora scattered over the vast territory of the greatest of the republics watch in enthusiastic interest your magnificent preparation for victory. But while they acclaim your soldiers leaving for Europe, I know that their enthusiasm is mingled with a regret that they cannot join in the struggle under the colors of their King and country. Deep will be their joy when they hear today that I have spoken for them their gratefulness for the generous hospitality extended to them in their day of misfortune by the United States.

But that, Mr. President, is not I am sure the only word of gratitude I shall have to bring you in the name of Montenegro. My venerable Sovereign and his Government know indeed how strongly the intentions of the Federal Republic coincide with their legitimate expectations and they are aware of the most rare and precious support they will find in your mind, one of the leading minds of the century.

The Montenegrins never entertained a doubt of the outcome of the struggle for Right now carried on by the Allies among whom so many of their countrymen are voluntarily paying their mite of abnegation and heroism.

We are confidently waiting for the day when the American troops whose gallantry is already famed, will achieve final victory with

the grand soldiers of the Entente. Thanks to the United States, thanks to the powerful nations that have not forsaken us, victory, I firmly believe, will soon dispel my unfortunate country's memories of the distressing horrors of invasion and famine. At that moment I trust I may, as I do now, rely, in the discharge of my mission, on that benevolence of which the Federal Republic has given such courteous evidence in agreeing to the creation of a Montenegrin legation in Washington.

Mr. President, I am sure I am voicing the sentiments of my Sovereign and of all the people of Montenegro when I beg you to accept the very sincere wishes I make for the victory of the Allies, the glory of the United States, and your personal happiness.

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File No. 701.7311/32

*Reply of President Wilson to General A. Gvosdenovitch, Newly Appointed Minister of Montenegro, on the Occasion of His Reception, September 20, 1918*

MR. MINISTER: I am happy to accept the credential letters by which His Majesty, the King of Montenegro, accredits you as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary near the Government of the United States and to accord you formal recognition in that high capacity.

For a number of years the Government of the United States has had a diplomatic representative accredited to Montenegro, in consequence of which it is appropriate that the existing Government of Montenegro, though forced to find a refuge on foreign soil, should send a diplomatic representative to the United States Government.

The cruel hand of a most pitiless war has fallen heavily upon your gallant country, so long among the bravest champions of the liberty of its race.

With your brothers the Jugo-Slavs, and your cousins the Czecho-Slovaks, and with the Roumanians as well, you have suffered from the rapacity of a heartless military organization which knew only the attainment of material ambition through the use of brute force. The Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government, in league with the German military autocracy, from the very outset of this fatal war, has brought its reign of terror to the door-steps and hearth-stones of the smallest countries within its reach. Murder, rapine, and pillage have left in their wake disrupted families, smouldering ruins and bleeding hearts. Proud and patriotic peoples have been brought to the verge of desperation, overcome by superior strength, and driven from their countries. Such is the sad plight of Montenegro and its neighbors, who have fallen victims to the desire of the Ger-



man and Austrian Governments to enlarge their territorial possessions, and to subject to their insidious influence the peoples of different countries, in spite of the desire of those peoples for distinct existence, and in the face of racial differences which are incompatible with the purposes of those who direct the movements of the German and Austrian Governments.

It is against these motives and ambitions, and against this centralized and dominating military power that the United States Government, in its sympathy for small nations, and in harmony with movements for racial independence has assumed an aggressive attitude and is fighting for the preservation of the rights of all nations fully determined to overcome the enemies of justice and liberty.

As regards those Montenegrins to whom you refer, who have come to live among us, and through whom the United States has become better known to their fellow countrymen at home, we owe them a debt of gratitude in that they have contributed in no small measure, to the friendly relations and mutual good feeling which so happily prevail, and which it is my sincere hope, Mr. Minister, will continue to prevail and increase day by day, fostered by your beneficent influence.

Permit me to assure you that you may confidently rely on my efforts and those of the officers of this Government to aid you with the most cordial good will in the performance of the duties of your mission and in the promotion of the common interests of the United States and Montenegro.

#### RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE CZECHO-SLOVAK AND JUGO-SLAV NATIONAL MOVEMENTS <sup>1</sup>

Dissatisfaction of the Serbian Government with the Utterances of Lloyd George and President Wilson Regarding Jugo-Slav Aspirations—Qualified Assurances Given by the American Government, March 14—The Congress of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary at Rome, April 9—11—Military Conventions between the Czecho-Slovak National Council and the French and Italian Governments—Recommendations that the American Government Recognize the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav National Aims

File No. 763.72119/1165

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, January 22, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received January 24, 2.37 p. m.]

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs has read British Minister and myself long telegram in reply to request of Acting Minister for

<sup>1</sup> For papers relating to the Czecho-Slovak Army in Russia, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vols. I and II.

Foreign Affairs from Premier Pashitch now at Salonica giving his impressions of the recent message of the President of the United States<sup>1</sup> and the speech of the British Premier.<sup>2</sup> The following is the substance of these remarks which the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs requests me to telegraph immediately although adding that the Prime Minister will speak further to me upon his impending return.

The speech of British Premier as far as known to me by apparently conclusive extracts has surprised, disillusioned, and given anxiety for the future and liberty of Servian people, having apparently renounced principle that every people should have right of self-disposition and of determining its destinies. Nothing is said of the desire and struggle of Servian people to unite, nor of Jugo-Slavia, which alone could be strong bulwark against Austrian-German eastern pressure. Nor are the Servian people placed on an equal footing with Italians, Roumanians, and Poles, as the Allies said [nothing] of satisfaction of Servian national aspirations. There is mention only of restoration for Serbia and not of reparation as for Belgium although Serbia has suffered more. The Serbs, Croats and Slovenes have shown far greater determination for union and have made far greater efforts and sacrifices than peoples of the Trentino and Transylvania. Reparation for the violation of the neutrality of Belgium mentioned but nothing about violation by Austro-Hungarian Empire of the treaty of Berlin nor regarding reparation for Bosnia-Herzegovina now under the terrible Austrian yoke which demand the right of self disposition and which furnished pretext for this war. Dismemberment of Austro-Hungarian Empire is stated not to be intended but only the assurance of liberty for her peoples although Austro-Hungarian Empire have suppressed all the rights and liberties of peoples who only consented to have a common chief of the state on condition of retaining their internal autonomy. The same omissions are also made in the President's message with this difference that he mentioned Serbia's right of access to the sea although the sea coast of Servian Dalmatia extends 500 kilometers. Although desiring liberty of the peoples, 43 millions foreign peoples are left in the Austro-Hungarian Empire which so long as Hapsburg dynasty remains will remain instruments of German militarist policy.

DODGE

File No. 763.72119/1200

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, January 28, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received January 29, 9.51 a. m.]

Premier now returned. Has spoken to me in the sense of my January 22, 4 p. m., laying stress upon the effect of any plan involving retention of Austro-Hungarian Empire while separating its

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 4.

Polish, Italian and Roumanian peoples which he declared would lead to its complete Germanization owing to the Germans and Magyars being thus left in majority. He emphasized necessity of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in order to enable Slavs of Austro-Hungarian Empire, exercising the right of self-disposition, to form independent states which would constitute barrier to Germany. Premier appeared as usual but I learn is depressed and anxious.

From French Minister, just returned from Salonica, and others I learn President's and Lloyd George's speeches caused almost panic among Serbs there, Cabinet Ministers even wishing to resign. Serious consequences avoided chiefly through strong influence of Pashitch who arrived at this time.

Parliament called for February 15 when a change to coalition ministry under Pashitch expected.

DODGE

File No. 763.72119/1354

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, February 19, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 20, 2.28 p. m.]

Prime Minister Pashitch considers the President's message<sup>1</sup> to be somewhat more favorable to Southern Slav aspirations and hopes that in a future message reparation from the violation of the Berlin treaty caused by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina may be claimed, considering this violation analogous to that of the Belgian treaty, and that consequently Bosnia-Herzegovina has claim to independence even if full right of self-determination of the other Southern Slavs involving their separation from the Austro-Hungarian Empire is not to have support.

Parliament is about to meet. The deputies are depressed and the opposition are expected to attack the cabinet for the alleged over-severe punishment of the leaders of the Black Hand conspiracy (my despatch No. 15, October 5<sup>2</sup>), for failure to obtain from the Allies pronouncements more favorable to a union of Southern Slavs with Servia, and for refusing to hold the prior session in Paris or in London with Southern Slav representatives. Pashitch has asked British and French Ministers to request their Governments to make communications to him supporting his refusal. Notwithstanding the considerable opposition to Pashitch largely personal, his forced

<sup>1</sup> Of Feb. 11, ante, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; the conspiracy is only briefly referred to in one paragraph.



resignation fortunately seems improbable, and he will most probably be able to form coalition cabinet with dissenting and young Radicals.

DODGE

File No. 763.72119/1446

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, March 8, 1918, 9 p. m.

[Received March 9, 10.43 a. m.]

Premier Pashitch requests me to telegraph that the parliamentary opposition seriously complains that he failed to inform the Allies regarding Serbia's national aspirations and that they declare that consequently the President of the United States and Lloyd George's speeches did not mention realization of Serbia's vital national aspirations but only her restoration and access to the sea. Premier inquires whether the Government of the United States would have any objection to his stating in Parliament if necessary that the President of the United States' speeches did not describe detailed programme of war aims but only briefly summarized them and that if Serbia's allies won the war they would meet Serbo-Croat national aspirations as far as possible. Although if the Government of the United States found such a statement opportune he would be greatly obliged and thought that it would quiet the opposition and strengthen them to resist the enemy to the end, he did not wish to ask for anything which the Government of the United States would not care to grant. He had made similar request to the British Minister.

Premier referred to reports from The Hague of peace offers made by Serbia to the Central Powers, indignantly denying them. Crown Prince also emphatically denied them to the British Minister. Deadlock regarding formation of a Cabinet mentioned in my February 27, 10 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> continues, all the opposition groups showing greatest irritation against Pashitch.

DODGE

File No. 763.72119/1446

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge)*<sup>2</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, March 14, 1918, 4 p. m.

This Government would have no objection to Mr. Pashitch's stating in Parliament, if necessary, that the speeches of the President did not describe detailed program of war aims but only briefly sum-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

<sup>2</sup> Substance repeated, by telegram No. 6891 of the same date, to the Ambassador in Great Britain.



marized them. The Government of the United States would furthermore have no objections on its part to his declaring that if Serbia's allies won the war they would meet Serbo-Croat national aspirations as far as possible.

POLK

File No. 763.72119/1504

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *March 25, 1918, 5 p. m.*

[*Received March 25, 3.15 p. m.*]

9204: I communicated to Foreign Office contents of your 6891, March 14, 6 p. m., regarding Serbo-Croat national aspirations and they have today replied that British Minister at Corfu has been instructed to inform Servian Prime Minister relative to certain observations M. Pashitch made regarding speeches delivered by Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson that the latter expressly referred to the fact that secure and free access to the sea should be accorded to Serbia, and that the former referred also to Serbia being accorded full reparation.

British Minister was directed to state that Lloyd George speech expresses terms on which British Government were prepared to negotiate with Central Powers and that the future of nationalities under Austro-Hungarian and Turkish domination was referred to in very vague terms. British Government conveyed to M. Pashitch their sympathy for Serbia's sufferings in the common cause, their admiration for the way in which her duties as an ally have been carried out and their sincere hope that under terms of eventual peace Serbia may secure the fulfillment of her legitimate national aspirations and security for her territory.

Sir C. Des Graz was instructed to state in reply to later inquiry by M. Pashitch that British Government saw no objection to Prime Minister stating in Skupshtina that not only full restoration for Serbia but realization as far as possible of her legitimate national aspirations would result if Allies are victorious.

PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1530

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, *March 30, 1918, 9 p. m.*

[*Received April 1, 5.35 a. m.*]

Premier today read foreign affairs statement in Parliament, declaring that the Government of the United States, by entering into the

war to defend civilization and the right of self determination of peoples, had filled the place abandoned by Russia; and that Servia, repelling Austrian intrigues, will remain faithful to her allies, and claims creation of free state to include all the Southern Slavs. This state, closely associated with Italy, will promote establishment of a durable peace, impossible of establishment so long as subject peoples remain in the Hapsburg Empire. Parliament unanimously resolved to send congratulations to French and British Parliaments for splendid resistance of their armies.

DODGE

File No. 763.72/9418

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, April 4, 1918, noon.

[Received April 5, 2 a. m.]

Delegation representing all parties in Servian Parliament called upon me requesting me to convey to my Government the thanks of Parliament for the great American financial and Red Cross assistance to Servia, profound appreciation of the policy of the Government of the United States regarding small nations, and conviction that with the help of the American Army the Allies will win complete victory. I am calling on the President of Parliament to express appreciation and I have to suggest that a message may be sent to me to deliver to him.

DODGE

File No. 763.72119/1569

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, April 9, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received April 11, 8.28 p. m.]

1507. Conference of nationalities under Austria is meeting here, many Italian associations being represented. Also present delegations of Czechs, Slavs [*Slovaks*], Roumanians, Poles, Jugo-Slavs, likewise, for France, Franklin-Bouillon and Thomas; Steed and Watson for the United [Kingdom]. Nelson Gay, a well-known American citizen, is the only American member and says he has made it plain that he has no association behind him and has no [instructions]. He has stated to me that object is to bring together nations now suffering under Austrian yoke and obtain liberty for their nationalities, also that he understands that the conference is in accord with the President's views on preserving nationalities. Conference will continue for two days. Many of the delegations

self-appointed. No Montenegrins present due to Jugo-Slav jealousies. It is stated that the Italian deputies and senators present [are] representatives of Italian Parliament. Important section of the Italian press also represented. Senator Rondelini [*Ruffini*] was elected president of the congress. Signor Amendola, correspondent of the *Corriere della Sera*, was elected general secretary.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1585

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, April 12, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received April 13, 6.05 a. m.]

1515. [My] 1507. Conference for agreement between races oppressed by Austria-Hungary closed here yesterday and adopted resolutions of which following is *résumé* and which it is understood were confidential and not for publication.

First commission's resolutions. Military organization outside nations oppressed by Austria-Hungary should be considered by Entente Governments as not only military but moral factors of greatest importance in the struggle [against] Central Powers. Desires such elements be used on the Austro-Italian front. All organizations adherent to congress agree to lay aside disputes which would help Central Empires and distort Allied public opinion. That Entente Governments refrain from supporting propaganda instigated to aggravate quarrels between oppressed nations. Expressed hope that organs of Allied propaganda will announce that—

- (1) Allied states admit as combatants all those expressing their desire to be liberated from German-Magyar yoke and made independent states;
- (2) All soldiers or members of these races in Allied countries are acting in perfect harmony with principles of the decrees of the Entente;
- (3) All members of these races in Allied countries enjoy a status as friends and allies under jurisdiction of and guarantee of national committees;
- (4) All members of these races who have been found with Allies may acquire civilian rights in Entente countries;
- (5) Right of these races to constitute themselves independent states recognized by Entente.

Second commission's resolutions. Expresses wish that—

- (1) Allied Governments assure these races that Entente entered war in order to liberate races oppressed by German-Magyar domination;
- (2) Allied Governments encourage movements having for object complete emancipation of these races.

Third commission's resolutions. Considers necessary—

- (1) Creation in Allied capitals committees of accord composed of oppressed nations' representatives and those of Entente;
- (2) The collaborating of representatives of principal nations in such committees based on principle of autonomy of each national group;
- (3) Next congress to convene at Paris without delay for the immediate formation of committees at Rome, London, and Washington, according to rules indicated by the present committee.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/10097a

*The Secretary of State to the Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1918, 4 p. m.

Your April 4, noon. You may say that it has not only been the patriotic duty of the Government of the United States to aid Serbia in its heroic struggle against the cruel aggressions of a relentless foreign power but a sincere gratification growing out of a deep fraternal affection which the people of this country feel for war stricken Serbia. You may say further that your countrymen share the conviction of the Serbian Parliament that with the cooperation of our friendly nations victory will be assured with a lasting peace and a glorious future for Serbia.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1630

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

No. 55

CORFU, March 27, 1918.

[Received April 29.]

SIR: I have the honor to report the following information which was given to me to-day by Mr. Pashitch, President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, regarding the negotiations which are now taking place with a view to reaching an understanding between Italy and the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary, and especially the Yugo-Slavs.

During the last visit to London of the Italian Premier, Signor Orlando, he had an interview at his request with Dr. Ante Trumbitch, president of the Yugo-Slav Committee, lasting over two hours (despatch No. 46 of February 8, page 3<sup>1</sup>). The Italian Ambassador and military attaché were present at this interview and at its close the Italian Premier invited Doctor Trumbitch to visit him in Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



The views expressed during the interview allowed of hopes that an understanding might be reached between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs and accordingly not long afterwards Signor Torre, an Italian deputy, went to London and there began a series of conferences with Doctor Trumbitch. Signor Torre represented an Italian committee "for an understanding with the subject nationalities of Austria-Hungary" and the conferences, although in no way official or binding to the Italian or Serbian Governments, were held with their knowledge and approval. They lasted for about a week at the end of which an agreement was signed by Doctor Trumbitch and Signor Torre, which Mr. Pashitch considered to be extremely important and which he stated was substantially as follows:

1. In determining the future boundaries between Italy and the Yugo-Slav nationalities, the principle of nationalities is to be followed and not the treaty between Italy and the Allies of April 26, 1915. In determining these boundaries however, regard is to be paid to Italy's proper protection by giving to her certain strategic points.

2. Foci of Italian population remaining in "Yugo-Slavia" and, vice-versa, foci of Yugo-Slav population remaining in Italy are to have certain rights guaranteed to them, as the use of their native language, special schools where their children can be taught in this language, etc.

3. All questions of conflicting interests shall be treated in a spirit of mutual sacrifice and with a desire to arrive at an understanding.

Mr. Pashitch stated that the next step would be the holding in Rome early next month of a conference at which there would be present two representatives of each of the subject races of Austria-Hungary, representatives of the Italian Parliament, and representatives of the Skupshtina who would include one representative of each one of the party groups. The procedure to be followed by this conference had not yet been settled but probably the agreement signed by Doctor Trumbitch and Signor Torre would be communicated and discussed by it and then submitted by the conference to the Serbian and Italian Governments with a request that some agreement based upon it should be entered into between them.

Mr. Pashitch believed that Signor Orlando and the other members of the Italian Cabinet would be ready to enter into an agreement on the basis of the Trumbitch-Torre memorandum. He thought that Baron Sonnino was less inclined to it perhaps but would allow himself to accept it. The conference and the possible agreement would have a profound effect in Austria-Hungary where already the first knowledge of the London conferences had produced a considerable effect.

Mr. Pashitch stated that he considered that the great change in the views of the Italian Government towards the Yugo-Slavs was in great part owing to President Wilson's expressions touching the principle of nationalities: the Italian Government realized that at the peace conference at the close of the war, the whole influence of the United States would oppose the execution of the Italian treaty of April 26, 1915, which violated the principle of nationalities so grossly. Accordingly Italy preferred to come voluntarily to an agreement with the Yugo-Slavs now if possible, rather than possibly later to be forced to make renunciations to them.

The conciliatory disposition shown regarding a Yugo-Slav understanding seems also to be facilitating the decision of another question of great importance to the Serbian Government, namely the release by Italy of some 20,000 Yugo-Slav prisoners, most of whom are said to be anxious to fight in the Serbian Army (despatches Nos. 24, of November 7, 1917, p. 2, and 40, of January 8, 1918, p. 6<sup>1</sup>). Mr. Pashitch states that the Italian Government now seems disposed to take this matter into more favorable consideration.

I have [etc.]

H. PERCIVAL DODGE

File No. 763.72/9817

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, May 3, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received 8.29 p. m.]

1570. For information sending report received yesterday and telegram received this morning by military attaché from American military mission at Italian front on the Austrian and Jugo-Slav situation.

POLISH, CZECH AND JUGO-SLAV MOVEMENT IN ITS RELATIONSHIP TO  
THE ITALIAN FRONT

[1.] By fostering the aims of the Czechs and the Jugo-Slavs, the Allies are attempting to cause internal trouble in Austria, to cause disaffections among Austrian troops, and to obtain troops to fight in the Allied ranks against Austria. The Allied activity is chiefly in the nature of organized propaganda.

[2.] Representatives of the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs met in London some time ago with official representatives of the British, French and Italian Governments and a policy was drawn up and officially approved by the three Allied Governments mentioned recognizing the rights of the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs. Following this the "Council of the Oppressed Races of Austria Hungary" was held in Rome and of which meeting we received reports from our military attaché at Rome.

<sup>1</sup> Neither printed.

3. There is located in this city an Allied central committee on propaganda in Austria. This committee consists of a British, a French and an Italian officer together with officially designated representatives of Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, etc. The British representative is Lieutenant Colonel Baker, British cavalry officer. The French officer is Major Gruss of the French mission.

4. Concrete results to date:

(a) There is being formed in Italy now, a Czech division composed chiefly of deserters from the Austrian Army and of volunteers from among the Austrian prisoners. This division has not as yet been armed but will be armed in the near future I understand. Col. M. R. Štefánik of the French Army is commanding this division. There is another division being formed in France now of Czech volunteers coming from the United States. In addition there is said to be a considerable body of Czechs and Jugo-Slavs already organized and composed of former deserters from the Austrian Army on the Russian front who are now marching in Siberia toward Vladivostok. It is expected that [upon] the arrival of these bands at Vladivostok they will be transported to Europe via the United States. They are expected to arrive at Vladivostok before the end of May.

(b) There is evidence that the movement is causing trouble in Austria as reports have been received by the Italian *Commando Supremo* that Czech regiments have been withdrawn from this front. Other reports are to the effect that some of these organizations have been totally disbanded. Numerous reports are to the effect that the expected Austrian offensive is to be made by Hungarian and German troops.

(c) Serious revolts have been reported recently among the naval crews at Pola and Cattaro in which the Czech and Jugo-Slav elements are said to have joined in with self-styled Austrian Bolsheviks.

5. America's relation to this movement. Although America was not officially represented at the conference in London mentioned in paragraph 2 above, it is understood that an unofficial representative was present. Colonel Štefánik stated that this matter had been likewise brought to the attention of Colonel House, President Wilson's representative in Europe. Colonel Baker states that there are about two million Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, etc., in America and that when the United States declared war, large numbers of the men voluntarily enlisted in the American Army. Reports from the Servian mission here state that an appreciable number of Servians are now returning from the United States and are being formed into separate organizations. Colonel Štefánik states that the subject of propaganda among these people in America had been taken up as early as last autumn and he cited a meeting in New York City which was addressed by former Mayor Mitchell and himself. The example was cited of the Polish Legion with which Paderewski is associated. That Austria herself considers the influence of the United States as important is evidenced, according to Colonel Štefánik, by circulars now being scattered throughout the Austrian Army stating that the United States does not favor the aims of the Czechs and Jugo-Slavs.



6. How America could aid this movement (suggestions made by Colonel Baker and Colonel Štefánik):

(a) By a public announcement by the Government that the movement was approved of by the American Government;

(b) By the appointing of an American representative to the propaganda committee located here;

(c) By a vigorous propaganda in the United States among the Czechs, Jugo-Slavs, Poles, and Servians now in the United States Army;

(d) By the formation in the United States of special legions of these nationalities and sending these legions to join the Czech forces now being organized on this front;

(e) By the appointing in due course of time of an American liaison officer to duty with the Czech troops here;

(f) By an enthusiastic reception in the United States of the Czech, Jugo-Slav units who are supposed to be *en route* now in Siberia.

Signed, Paules, Major Engineers.

Following is the telegram referred to above:

Report received by British Secret Service indicates a general feeling of disapproval in Bohemia among Czechs on account of the fact that United States Government has not openly approved of proceedings of the Congress of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary held in Rome early last month. Such proceedings are reported by British mission to have been openly approved by Italian and British Government. British Secret Service reports show internal conditions in Austria-Hungary to be very critical and a serious railroad strike possible especially if present German offensive continues unsuccessful. A central revolutionary committee appears to have been organized. Numerous mutinies have occurred among Austrian troops and in the Navy and the morale of a great part of the Austrian organization is said to be very poor. There are, however, Austrian divisions that are undoubtedly still unaffected. The general impression here is that Austria-Hungary does not desire to make an offensive on this front but that they will be forced by Germany to do so. Preparations appear to be practically complete and offensive expected to start between May 15 and June 1. British mission here attaches great importance to the United States recognizing the Czech-Slav movement and remarks [*recommends?*] that the action taken by the United States Government to approve of this movement be taken if possible within the next few weeks. Colonel Štefánik, French officer now at Foligno, whose address is care of Grand Hotel, is familiar with all details of the movement. I will send officer posted on British information as to internal conditions if you deem it necessary. British very desirous you consult with Štefánik before you cable. Signed, Swift.

In a conversation with Baron Sonnino I got his views of Jugo-Slav situation as follows: That whatever tends to create disaster in Austria-Hungary and weaken her military power is advantageous;



and that this propaganda commission on the Italian front is, to the extent of their ability to subserve this purpose, a good thing and he would be glad to have an American representative on the commission; but he does not believe it wise to add at this time new items to the program of peace such as declarations in favor of independence of a new Jugo-Slav state with the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary which would make the latter fight desperately and would bring about possible amalgamation of Austria with Germany greatly strengthening latter. He says that the recent Jugo-Slav Congress here was not recognized officially by the Italian Government but its members were received informally by Orlando evidencing the fact that Italians are not hostile to Jugo-Slavs as charged by German-Austrian propagandists.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/9893½

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, May 7, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received May 8, 7 a. m.]

1589. Referring my telegram No. 1515, April 12, 7 p. m. Following *résumé* of memorandum of secret convention entered into between Italian Government and Czecho-Slovak National Council, Rome, April 21, 1918, signed by Orlando and Štefánik. Sonnino and all other Ministers present. Memorandum was obtained by military attaché from Štefánik. There were also verbal conventions strengthening written instrument.

Italian Government recognizes Czecho-Slovak Army as Allied army and with autonomy. Supreme authority judicial, political, and military vested in National Czecho-Slovak Council. Council consists of Masaryk, President, Štefánik, Vice President, Secretary-General Beneš. Headquarters 18 Rue Bonaparte, Paris. Other bureaus Rome, New York, Geneva, London, Moscow. Representatives in the United States, Pergler for political functions, Kopecký for commercial relations. Offices in Tribune Building, New York. Army will fight effectively with all characteristics autonomy against Central Powers under own flag and uniform. All functions under command Czecho-Slovak officers. If personnel insufficient Allies will be asked to complete ranks of officers which will necessarily be supplied by French Army. Approval of nomination of foreign officers subjected to Council. Financing of army done by Council. If funds lacking, French, Italian Governments obligated to supply necessary funds and material as convention made with French Government signed by Clemenceau February 6, 1918. Council

demands all loans mentioned above be converted into national debt. Recognition of Council by Italian Government in consequence of political program and aspirations being identical with those of Entente and in accordance with their collective aspirations. This agreement cannot be changed or modified by Italian Government without consent of Council. Advances to be applied Czecho-Slovak nationals in Italy only when personally guaranteed or vouched for by Council. One copy of convention in possession of Italian Government, one copy Council. Italian Government has not nominated military attaché to Czecho-Slovak Army and general headquarters now in France.

Štefánik informed Colonel Buckey that high court organized in Italy now in session and functioning and has power of life and death over Czecho-Slovak National Council and entirely independent of Italian authority or approval. Within past two weeks 80 per cent of Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war voluntarily enlisted and now formed in Italy, strength about 12,000, commanded by General Graziani. This only part. Commander in chief, General Janin, a French general. Lieutenant Colonel Štefánik nominated second in command by order of Foch. Their equipment is French and Italian, flag and uniform their own. British Government considering similar and stronger convention. Probably second "oppressed races in Austria" congress will be held in next three weeks Paris. Probably a provisional Government with all functions will then be organized.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/9817

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1918, 3 p. m.

1277. Your 1515, April 12, and 1570, May 3. The Government of the United States has been deeply interested in following the proceedings of the Congress of the Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary which was held in Rome in April. The United States has the utmost sympathy for the general principles involved and desires that you should make known to the proper authorities that the aims of the Czech and Yugo-Slav peoples of Austria for free and independent development have the earnest support of this Government. You will make known the position of the United States to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and inquire what suggestions he may have towards the active cooperation of the United States in this whole movement. The Department would also be glad to receive an expression of your own views.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/1669

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, May 16, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received May 18, 11.17 a. m.]

3391. Ackerman's<sup>1</sup> views concerning the attitude that our Government could advantageously adopt towards the Austrian nationalities transmitted in my telegram 3346, May 13, noon,<sup>2</sup> coincide with mine. I believe that present is psychological moment for America to influence claims of oppressed nationalities because:

- (1) Especially hostile attitude recently shown by Austrian Government towards Czech and Yugoslav demands;
- (2) Adjournment of Austrian Parliament which is open admission that Government is unable to control nationalities or carry through promised constitutional reform;
- (3) Threatened division of Bohemia into Czech and German districts which would be a blow to Czech ambitions to restore historical kingdom of Bohemia;
- (4) Meeting of German and Austrian Emperors at general headquarters and reported renewing and widening of scope of the alliance between the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments;
- (5) Roumanian peace which crushes hope of creation of state including Roumanian populations;
- (6) Present food conditions in Austria which are more critical than at any previous moment;
- (7) The effect of the Rome conference of oppressed nationalities which is beginning to be felt and for which propaganda is advanced on the Italian front;
- (8) Reenforced domination of Magyars in Hungary through apparent defeat of projected electoral reform.

I believe that delay is inadvisable because:

- (1) There are repeated rumors that Germany and Austria are searching for an immediate and definite solution of the Polish question in their own interests and to present *fait accompli* to Allies;
- (2) Since conclusion of Eastern and Roumanian peace Austria and Germany will undoubtedly attack Servian problem and endeavor to force solution in way to thwart Yugoslav ambitions and here also to present *fait accompli* at peace conference.

In addition to the obvious military advantages of the break-up of Austria, such a dissolution appears to offer the most effective barrier to German ambitions after the war. The hostility to Germany which is apparent in the non-Germanic races and even to a lesser extent in a minority of the Austrian Germans was a known fact before

<sup>1</sup> Carl W. Ackerman, correspondent of the *Saturday Evening Post*.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed.



the war and has certainly existed since its beginning. The Allies' hopes of detaching Austria have been based on the possibility that this hostility would control the action of the Austrian Government. Such hopes have not only been fruitless before the war, but the Austrian Government, which was well controlled by Germany before 1914, has since that date fallen even more under the domination of her more powerful neighbor. Apparently therefore further hopes based on this hostility are groundless.

But the hostility of the Yugoslavs, Czechs and Poles to the Germans and Magyars is a tangible factor which, instead of being weakened as this war progresses, has increased its menace to Austro-Hungarian Government until at present, I learn from confidential source, Bohemia is fully prepared for a revolutionary outbreak when signal is given. The Yugoslavs are in a lesser state of preparation, but are actively perfecting their arrangements. Is it not therefore clear that every possible effort should be made to fan the hostility which appears capable of bringing results rather than that which has been tried and found wanting? In this connection it should be borne in mind that every effort to separate Austria from Germany through the Austro-Hungarian Government, or to show sympathy for that Government, by so much discourages the ambitions of the oppressed nationalities who look toward us.

Admitting that we should favor the oppressed nationalities and that the time is ripe for such action I can only reiterate Ackerman's statement that a public declaration by President Wilson is the only means of assuring the dissemination of a message from America in the Central Powers.

STOVALL

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File No. 763.72/10103

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, May 18, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received May 20, 7.23 a. m.]

1635. Your 1227, May 17, 1 p. m. [1277, May 11, 3 p. m.] Have seen the Minister for Foreign Affairs who reiterates views expressed in last paragraph my 1570. He thinks that however favorable we may be towards these peoples it is unwise to make at this time new declarations which add to war aims and may add to discussion and even discussions [*dissensions*] among those now acting with us. He draws distinction between Allies' relation to Jugo-Slav and Czecho-Slovak situation. The latter he thinks in a condition to be helpfully encouraged, as substantially all these are against Central Empires. The former on the contrary are divided, some wishing to be close to Austria-Hungary, others not. Very confidentially he evidently



thinks a doubtful Jugo-Slav-Servian state would in the future be drawn by commercial and other bonds close to Austria-Hungary and Germany, would become serious rival to Italy and would certainly fall under Austrian influence.

His only suggestion to aid these peoples is that we encourage their co-nationals in America to volunteer in the Czech-Slav Legion now acting in Italy with Italian Army; they number about 12,000, or, as they claim, 17,000. Such volunteers will, he believes, have great effect on their people.

My own opinion is not very different from those expressed above except on point touching Jugo-Slav-Servian state which I do not feel will necessarily fall under Austrian influence. I believe in encouraging generally their aspirations for right but not in declaring in favor of detailed aims which will make Austria more desperate and lead to divisions on peculiarities among those who at present seem fairly solid. I feel that President's policy has ever been wise in this matter, showing sympathy with oppressed peoples.

The Czecho-Slovaks appear to me to deserve all encouragement possible within above limits. It is believed here that what amounts to revolution is expected in Bohemia where the propaganda for liberty seems making progress.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 863.00/79

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, May 23, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received 10.50 a. m.]

3419. From the *Narodni Listi* of Prague dated 16th instant I learn great demonstration took place at fiftieth anniversary of city theatre on 15th under presidency of Kramář and that resolutions of most important character were adopted. This meeting is of unusual importance in that for the first time representatives of Yugo-Slavs, Galicians, Ukrainians and Poles met with Czechs and were united in their declarations against their common enemies, Austria and Germany. Austrian official *communiqué* speaks of serious nature of resolutions adopted and of order for severe preventive measures to be taken. The above-mentioned paper has been suppressed. From independent sources the gravity of this meeting is emphasized.

Reading between the lines, it appears possible that the first step has been taken in the long-expected revolt of the oppressed nationalities against Austria. (See my 3391, May 16, 11 a. m.) It is doubtless taken at the present time before repressive measures can be adopted in accordance with program presumably drawn up between the two Emperors at recent meeting.

It seems urgently important that every moral assistance be given in the way of demonstrations in the United States by the nationalities affected by this news. I suggest that if it meets with approval of the Department, Professor Masaryk of Chicago, one of the Czech leaders, be advised.

STOVALL

File No. 763.72119/1690

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council  
(Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, May 28, 1918, midnight.

[Received May 29, 5.50 a. m.]

62. For the Secretary and Colonel House:

Referring to my 46, April 20, 10 p. m.<sup>1</sup> A deserter from the Austrian Army and a former resident of the Trentino now in the Italian air-service called on me yesterday and informed me that the congress of the subject races of Austria which took place in Rome a short time ago had succeeded beyond all expectations as it had directly brought about the manifestation of the subject races of Austria at Prague on the 16th instant. He was of the opinion that a few words from President Wilson recognizing the aspirations of the subject races of Austria would be of incalculable help to the revolutionary movement in Austria-Hungary.

Doctor Beneš, Secretary of the National Committee of the Czecho-Slovak Party in Paris, with whom I discussed this matter at length today, entirely bore out the statements of the Austrian deserter above mentioned. He told me that at the manifestations of the 16th of May, President Wilson's name had repeatedly been acclaimed, and that the speakers made supreme use of the phrases regarding the ideals of democracy, league of nations, etc., proclaimed in President Wilson's recent utterances. Doctor Beneš assures me that the Czecho-Slovak, Jugo-Slav and Polish movements are essentially democratic in spirit and he anticipates the formation of independent states in Bohemia, Poland and the territory occupied by the Jugo-Slavs. All of these could be united by close alliances, especially Poland and Bohemia which have a common frontier and which comprise a total of 40,000,000 inhabitants. He thinks it is a mistake to suppose that Austria-Hungary is on the verge of an immediate collapse: although the state is tottering, the forces of the army, the bureaucracy, the church and the dynasty still bind the heterogeneous elements together. The Czechs he tells me are preparing for a revolutionary movement which will take place at a moment when the Allies are able to deal a successful blow on the western front. For this reason

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

a message from President Wilson to the subject races of Austria would be a moral consolation and would enable them to await the decisive moment with patience. At the present time an uprising would merely mean further massacres in Bohemia. Doctor Beneš thinks that the final collapse of Austria will come in March of next year and that it will be preceded by outbreaks of Bolshevism in Galicia, Hungary, and German Austria. Bolshevism he thinks can make no headway amongst the Czechs as there are no illiterates amongst the people. The national movement and the passion for independence in Bohemia Doctor Beneš states was not dictated by the *bourgeoisie* or the upper classes but is derived from the lower classes who have been inspired by their own history of systematic oppression. Doctor Beneš informed me that Professor Masaryk, President of the National Common Council of the Czecho-Slovak Party, at present in Washington, exercised an authority in Bohemia almost comparable to that of President Wilson. ➤

In view of all the facts, Doctor Beneš, I may add, has during the last few days discussed the subject of this telegram with Mr. Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil, and Mr. Clemenceau all of which statesmen, he tells me, are in sympathy with his views and have promised support, but he is convinced that President Wilson's words would carry far greater weight than those of any European statesman.

FRAZIER

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Public Statement by the Secretary of State, May 29, of the American Government's Sympathy with the Nationalistic Aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs—Statement of the Allied Governments, June 6—Dissatisfaction of the Jugo-Slav Leaders with these Declarations—Supplementary Statements by the Secretary of State, June 24 and 28—French Declaration in Favor of Czecho-Slovak Independence, June 30—Statement of the Secretary of State on the Fourth Anniversary of Austria's Declaration of War against Serbia—The President's Message to Premier Pashitch, July 30—Recognition by Great Britain of the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied Nation, August 9

File No. 763.72/10103

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1918, 1 p. m.

1363. Your 1635, May 18. The Secretary of State has made public the following announcement:<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The public statement was telegraphed on the same date, to the diplomatic representatives in Bulgaria, China, Denmark (No. 888), Great Britain (No. 7987), France (No. 4241), Greece (No. 486), Japan, the Netherlands (No. 1315), Norway (No. 336), Persia (No. 59), Rumania (No. 199), Russia (No. 145), Spain (No. 1175), Sweden (No. 805), and Switzerland (No. 998), and at Corfu [for Serbia], for communication to the respective governments; also sent to the Diplomatic Agents at Cairo and Tangier, the Consul General at Saloniki, and the Consul at Moscow.



The Secretary of State desires to announce that the proceedings of the Congress of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary, which was held in Rome in April, have been followed with great interest by the Government of the United States, and that the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs for freedom have the earnest sympathy of this Government.

Explain confidentially and orally to the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs that it was believed that this announcement would result in benefit both to the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, to the cause of the Entente in general and to that of Italy in particular, since it was thought such an announcement would give great encouragement to the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs in the United States on their support of the United States in this war, would encourage and greatly increase enlistments in this country for the Czecho-Slav Legion now acting in Italy with Italian Army, and would encourage the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs in Austria in their efforts to hamper the Austrian military operations against Italy.

LANSING

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File No. 763.72/10241

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, June 3, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received June 4, 9.32 a. m.]

Your 29th communicated to Premier who replies expressing profound appreciation and certainty that with the help of the Government of the United States and its sympathy, hour approaches of complete fulfillment of national aspirations of his people which is one in fact although having three names. Trumbitch, President of Southern Slav Committee, also expresses deep appreciation.

DODGE

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File No. 763.72Su/37

*The Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council (Frazier) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 4, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received 9.54 p. m.]

82. Following Polish and Jugo-Slav declarations will be published in Thursday morning's papers:

The Allied Governments have noted with pleasure the declaration made by the Secretary of State of the United States Government and desire to associate themselves in an expression of earnest sympathy for the nationalistic aspirations towards freedom of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav peoples.



The creation of a united and independent Polish state with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace, and of the rule of right in Europe.

It will be specifically stated in press announcement that above declarations emanate from three Prime Ministers present at Supreme War Council.

FRAZIER

File No. 763.72/10291

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, June 7, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received (June 8?) 12.05 p. m.]

1707. The Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav movements acquiring increased energy, the former much strengthened by having sent some 12,000 troops to war zone under Italian general. The Allied Council at Paris issued a *coup de grâce* in favor of independence of Poland and limited itself to any other [a mere?] declaration of sympathy with the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav aspirations for independence, associating itself with the views of the Government of the United States expressed by Mr. Lansing. This intuition [distinction?] seems to have hit Jugo-Slav leaders; Signor Trumbić, the president of that body, has personally called my attention to it.

The Esthonian delegates were received by Baron Sonnino who is reported to have said that the Italian Government is disposed to recognize in a provisional way their National Council as *de facto* independent organization, reserving till the peace congress, the decision as to their future independence.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/10279

*The British Embassy to the Department of State*

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Ambassador has received a telegram from Mr. Balfour, stating that in view of the fact that the Czecho-Slovaks on the Italian and western fronts have been so active in co-operating with the Allies, and also of the fact that there are approximately 50,000 men of this nationality in Russia, composed partly of prisoners and deserters, whom it is hoped to organize so as to use them against the enemy either in France or Russia, he has informed the representative of the Czecho-Slovak National Council that His Majesty's

Government are prepared to recognize the Council in the same manner as it has been recognized by the French and Italian Governments. He is giving them an assurance of recognition of their Army as an organized unit labouring in the cause of the Allies, adding that His Majesty's Government will be ready to attach a British liaison officer to that Army as soon as such a step appears advisable. His Majesty's Government have also given an assurance that they will grant the Council the same political rights as regards the civil force of the Czecho-Slovaks as have already been accorded to the Polish National Committee.

WASHINGTON, *June 7th, 1918.*

[*Received June 8.*]

File No. 763.72/10303

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, *June 9, 1918, 1 p. m.*

[*Received 9.51 p. m.*]

1715. Have received a call from Jugo-Slav representative, Signor Trumbić, who expresses great appreciation of your statement touching their aspirations for independence. He says that the provision in the secret treaty of London touching Jugo-Slav territory had disastrous effect which is now subsiding. That Jugo-Slavs must in the future be independent of all other powers including Italy. He referred to the Allies' statement of sympathy at Versailles; [expressed] great disappointment because both drew clear line of division between Poland's and Jugo-Slav aspirations. He says that they have many Jugo-Slav prisoners here in Italy who wish to form a legion like Czecho-Slovak Legion and fight on Allied side. I pointed out that Polish independence had long been declared to be one of the war aims of the Allies whereas the Jugo-Slav movement is comparatively recent and an expression of sympathy with it is a distinct step in advance.

Roumanian Minister has called on me with a suggestion that the Roumanians of Galicia who are prisoners here wish to fight for the Allies. He says that they have some 7,000 who would do [so].

Confidentially, I think there is a difference in the Italian view of the Jugo-Slav movement and of the others due in part to want of confidence in the Jugo-Slav idea. I question whether they would at present accede to Trumbić's proposed legion for the Italian front though they might send some of them to join the Servian forces.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72119/1747

*The Serbian Minister (Michailovitch) to the Secretary of State*

No. 647

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I beg to forward to you the enclosed copy of a letter that I have addressed to the Ambassadors of France, Great Britain, and Italy, concerning the Allied declaration at the Versailles conference on the fate of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary,—which will, I feel confident, interest you on account of its great importance for our common cause.

I beg to remain [etc.]

L. MICHAÏLOVITCH

[Enclosure—Translation]

*The Serbian Minister at Washington (Michailovitch) to the British, French, and Italian Ambassadors (Reading, Jusserand, Macchi di Cellere)*

No. 647

WASHINGTON, June 14, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: The Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav movement in Austria-Hungary has drawn the sympathetic attention of the Allied Governments on account of the help it may bring to the Allied military action and also by reason of the justice of the demand of the oppressed nationalities in the Hapsburg Monarchy. The declaration of the Government of the United States is unquestionably important from that standpoint and that is why it was enthusiastically received wherever the Slav element is found because it is regarded as an encouragement to carry on the fight.

A few days after that declaration the Allied Council of War at Versailles expressed its opinion on the question of the national aspirations of the peoples of Austria-Hungary in a manner that puzzled the Czecho-Slovaks and the Yugo-Slavs and also furnished to our enemy—Austria-Hungary—the opportunity to turn it to advantage. Although we, the interested parties, have received no official communication relative to that declaration of Versailles—similar to that which acquainted us with the declaration of the Government of the United States,—we gather from the information given to the press that the Versailles declaration establishes a distinction between the independence of Poland and that of the other nationalities in extending nothing but sympathy to the Czecho-Slovak and Yugo-Slav movements. The Austrian press took advantage of this as the enclosed newspaper clipping will show.<sup>1</sup>

I take the liberty of drawing Your Excellency's attention to that fact which demonstrates the necessity of maintaining closer relations.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

as to those questions, with those who are interested therein, not because they are entitled to such a treatment but because it is the only way to avoid possible mistakes and more effectively to carry on that action. Cooperation in those questions is not a matter of right but it is a duty for us all to act so as to achieve results that will promote our common cause. This, Excellency, is the reason for my addressing you with a request that you kindly bring your great influence to bear in having that important question advanced in a direction that would not only respond to the sentiments of the oppressed nationalities, but also, and particularly so, conform to our common interests.

Be pleased to accept [etc.] [No signature indicated]

File No. 763.72/10415

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*  
[Translation]

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: With a view to broadening the national action it is now taking in Austria-Hungary, the success of which is already noticeable, the Czech National Council, whose headquarters is at Paris, deemed it expedient to define and strengthen the situation of the Czech Nation with the Allied Governments and, to that end, submitted to the Government of the Republic a political program embodying the following articles:

1. Recognition by the Government of the Republic of the existence of a Czecho-Slovak state.

2. *De facto* recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Council as constituting the lawful Government of that state.

3. *De facto* recognition of all the prerogatives of a government as appertaining to the National Council and in particular—

(a) In financial matters. A loan (there is no question of subsidies) should be granted to it; the first would be in the amount of 20,000,000 francs.

(b) Every customary facility should be awarded to it in its relations with its foreign agents (passports, cipher telegrams, diplomatic pouches).

4. A bureau which would serve as a permanent channel of communication between the National Council and the French Government should be created near that Government.

While reserving the right to scan and perfect the foregoing formulas, the Government of the Republic feels inclined to grant special prerogatives to the Czech National Council as it did some time ago in the case of the Polish Council and the Polish National Committee which also have their headquarters in Paris.



The question, in a general way, is to recognize the *de facto* existence of a Czech Nation with a national entity and to permit the Czech National Council to represent near the French Government the political and administrative interests of that Nation until it is able to adopt a final constitution.

The firmness of the principles by which the President of the United States is inspired and the public declarations made by him concerning the rights of the nationalities, have led my Government to believe that in so acting it thoroughly comports with the ideas for which the American people under the energetic impulsion of their President are fighting by the side of the French people.

Before proceeding with the political and administrative organization which is more precisely to fix the relations that it has been for a long time maintaining, in fact, with the Czech National Council, however, the Government of the Republic wished to have its views and intentions on the subject imparted to the President of the United States in order to be assured that they fully harmonize with his views.

I have the honor to beg Your Excellency kindly to enable me to report to my Government whether, as it hopes, it was not mistaken as to its plans coinciding with the views of the President of the United States.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 763.72/10279

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 18, 1918, 4 p. m.

4612. Department is informed that British Government is prepared to recognize the Czecho-Slovak National Council in the same manner as it has been recognized by French and Italian Governments. Furnish Department promptly full information relative to this Council and its recognition by the various Governments.

The Department desires this information to aid it in its consideration of question of possible recognition of this Council.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10463

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, June 22, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received June 23, 9.45 a. m.]

4264. Department's 4612, June 18. This afternoon I had a conversation at some length with Mr. Edward Beneš, Secretary Gen-

eral of the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Before his coming to Paris he was until two years ago a professor of sociology and philosophy in the University at Prague and he seems to possess a wonderful knowledge of the political and economic conditions of his people as well as of their relations to the Austro-Hungarian Government. He speaks very good English and impresses me as a man of the highest principles. The information which he gave me was of such importance that I believe it would be of great interest to the Department and I shall send a despatch in the next pouch giving an outline of its principal features.

Mr. Beneš informed me that he had visited London a short time ago and had given to Mr. Balfour a statement setting forth the purposes of this Council and also an account of its activities. He added that he had recently received a reply from Mr. Balfour promising its recognition on the part of the British Government. The President of this body having its headquarters in Paris is Mr. Masaryk formerly deputy of the Reichstag in Vienna and just now in New York. He tells me that they have a representative in Washington; also that Representative Sabath of Illinois, formerly my colleague in Congress and a Bohemian by nationality, was in hearty sympathy with the purposes of the Council. At the present time its chief object seems to formulate plans for the placing of Czecho[-Slovak] troops formerly prisoners of war in Russia at the disposition of the Allies, 80,000 of whom it was expected might be sent to France. Mr. Beneš described the internal conditions in Austria-Hungary concerning which he had constant communication with his friends in Prague as being very grave and threatening the unity of its war effort.

SHARP

File No. 763.72119/1747

*The Secretary of State to the Serbian Minister (Michailovitch)*

No. 72

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1918.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June 14, enclosing a copy of a letter sent by you to the Ambassadors of France, Great Britain, and Italy, concerning the Allied declaration at the Versailles conference on the fate of the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary.

In this connection, in order that there may be no misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the statement issued by the Department on May 29 to the effect that the nationalistic aspirations for freedom of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs have the earnest sympathy of the United States Government, I beg to state that the position of

the United States Government is that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule.<sup>1</sup>

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72/10568a

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers*<sup>2</sup>

[Circular telegram]

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1918.

Since the issuance by this Government on May 29 of the statement regarding the nationalistic aspirations for freedom of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, German and Austrian officials and sympathizers have sought to misinterpret and distort its manifest interpretation. In order that there may be no misunderstanding concerning the meaning of the statement, the Secretary of State has today further announced the position of the United States Government to be that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/10592

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1918.

[Received June 30.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I am informed by my Government that the President of the Republic will to-morrow deliver its flag to the Czech Army of France and on that occasion will make a solemn declaration affirming the wishes of our country for the independence of that nation.

This manifestation will take place at a moment which, owing to the agitation for freedom now going on in the Czech countries, appears to be particularly propitious. My Government believes that its effect will be greatly enhanced if similar sentiments among the Allies were manifested on that occasion, and would be glad if telegrams could be exchanged to that effect between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries united in the defense of the principles of liberty.

Referring to the oral statement by which I had given an intimation of the proposition to Your Excellency's Department, I have

<sup>1</sup> The second paragraph was repeated to the Ambassador in Italy in telegram No. 1496, June 27, answering his No. 1707, June 7, *ante*, p. 810.

<sup>2</sup> The diplomatic representatives in China, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Persia, Rumania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, and at Corfu; the Consul General at Saloniki; and the Consul at Moscow. The same text was published in *The Official Bulletin*, Washington, June 28, 1918 (vol. 2, No. 347), p. 1.

the honor to append hereto in compliance with my instructions the text of the telegram sent to you by His Excellency Mr. Pichon, and I should be very thankful to you if you should see fit to answer it so that your telegram could be published in the French newspapers on Tuesday. The fact that President Wilson's and Your Excellency's declarations again repeated yesterday entirely agree with our own inclinations affords me the hope that you will kindly accede to the proposition I have the honor to lay before you, and inform Mr. Pichon that the Government of the United States shares our views and is disposed to uphold them in accord with us.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure—Telegram—Translation]

*The French Minister of Foreign Affairs (Pichon) to the Secretary of State*

The President of the Republic is delivering to-day its flag to the Czecho-Slovak Army organized through voluntary enlistments on the French front.

The Government of the Republic, true to the principles of respect for nationalities and the liberty of oppressed peoples for which it is fighting by the side of its Allies, takes this opportunity to recognize the National Council as the supreme organization of the Czecho-Slovak movement in the Entente countries, and, inspired by the high, idealistic sentiments expressed by President Wilson, considers to be just and well-founded the claims of the Czecho-Slovak people, as well as of the other oppressed nationalities of Slav origin, and declares that it will support in all earnestness the aspirations to independence for which its soldiers are fighting in the ranks of the Allies.

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File No. 763.72/10592

*The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2183

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of June 29, 1918, wherein you advised this Department that your Government would, on June 30, deliver its flag to the Czech Army of France; that it would on that occasion make a solemn declaration affirming the wishes of France for the independence of the Czechs; and that your Government believes that the effect of this manifestation for the freedom of the Czech countries would be greatly enhanced if equal sentiments among the Allies were manifested on that occasion.



In this relation I beg to refer to the oral statement made to Your Excellency as to the position of the United States in the matter of the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Council.

Accept [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 763.72/10884

*The President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council (Masaryk)  
to the Acting Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, July 20, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: Sending you the enclosed memorandum<sup>1</sup> I may be allowed to say a few words on the question of recognition.

You will understand our wish that the great American Republic would join the French Republic in recognizing our National Council (in Paris) as the representative of the future Government of the Czecho-Slovak free state. I think that this recognition has become practically necessary: I dispose of three armies (in Russia, France, and Italy), I am, as a wit said, the master of Siberia and half Russia, and yet I am in the United States formally a private man.

There may be perhaps some apprehension that other national councils might demand the same recognition. I do not think so; our position is quite different, similar only to the position of the Poles. Everybody understands that an Irish committee, should there be any, cannot be recognized; the Jugoslavs are represented by Serbia, the Rumanians by Rumania, and need no recognition like ourselves. Armenian and other committees are also in a quite different position. We have an army, the most essential attribute of sovereignty according to international views, not having a territory—yet, the French Republic by her recognition has solved the question and created a precedent. I hope the United States will join France.

This recognition has for us a great practical value: we can more effectively protect our soldiers who are taken prisoners by the Austrians, etc.

Believe me [etc.]

PROF. MASARYK

File No. 861.00/2346

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

No. 6417

PARIS, July 11, 1918.

[Received July 26.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram No. 4264 of June 21 [22], 1918, I have now the honor to transmit in substance more fully than would be warranted in a telegram, the statements of Prof. Edward Beneš.

<sup>1</sup> Memorandum on the Czecho-Slovak Army in Russia not printed; for papers relating to this army, see *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Russia, vol. II.

General Secretary of the Czecho-Slovak National Council having its headquarters in Paris.

In addition, I enclose three very interesting maps showing the location of the different peoples of Europe, the relative size of their territory, location of principal railways, etc.<sup>1</sup> Inasmuch as Department's telegram No. 4612 of June 18, 1918,<sup>2</sup> referred to the previous recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Council by the British and French Governments, I am pleased to enclose also copies of the correspondence bearing upon this subject between Professor Beneš and Mr. Balfour.<sup>3</sup> The statements, especially those embraced in the memorandum to Mr. Balfour under date of May 10, 1918, may possess particular interest to those who are giving special study to the problems growing out of the Balkan situation.

After having sent my telegram No. 4264, I desired a further talk with Professor Beneš in order that I might confirm my recollection of some of his statements. For this purpose he came in a few days ago.

Informing me that he had been a professor of sociology and philosophy in the University of Prague, remaining there during the first fifteen months of the war, he gave me an outline of the purposes of the organization and a brief description of his native country, which he and his associates earnestly hope to see a republic, as one of the evolutions of the war.

Professor Beneš impressed me as being not only a scholarly man but one very familiar with the political history of Austria-Hungary. However, like the leaders of a number of other similar councils existing here in Paris and having for their object the attainment of certain aims for the country which they unofficially represent, I found him very uncompromising and unyielding as to the acceptance of any kind of a concession short of absolute independence of the authority of Austria-Hungary. Complete separation by geographical lines, as well as that of Government itself involving autonomy in all its political affairs, was demanded by him for the entire territory occupied by his people. He expressed the belief that, as a matter of fact, the power of Austria-Hungary would be less able to successfully oppose such a separation than would that of Germany, which, on account of her machinations, his people most feared.

While extolling the principles enunciated by President Wilson, particularly as they advocated justice and equality to the smaller powers, he yet voiced disappointment that the President, according

<sup>1</sup> Not reproduced.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 814.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed; the substance of Mr. Balfour's letter of June 3 to Professor Beneš is contained in the British Embassy's memorandum of June 7, *ante*, p. 810.

to quotations which he had seen, had assured Austria that he did not aim at the dismemberment of that Empire. He expressed the opinion that complete autonomy for the Czecho-Slovak people could not come in any other way, except by dismemberment of what at present constitutes Austria-Hungary. The deep and evidently sincere conviction with which he made this assertion only served to the more greatly impress me with the difficulty of satisfactorily adjusting the Balkan problems which must be met at the close of the war.

The hopes engendered by the display of their undoubted patriotism and devotion to their own particular cause, and, withal, their sacrifices, would be raised very high by an Allied victory; with equal certainty it may be said that the manifestation of selfishness on their part which it will be hard to keep out of the consideration of their claims will but add to the embarrassment in harmoniously adjusting them.

While these people have a common interest in the aspirations of the Poles, and, in a way, have somewhat the same problems, yet this is probably more than can be said of the other contending smaller powers. Confidentially, I may say that at various times I have had brought to me through the accredited representatives of such peoples as the Montenegrins, the Serbians, the Yugo-Slavs, the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks, and even from certain factors in Greece, complaints that disclose such a discord and such a fear of the aggressions of the larger Allied Powers as to give unmistakable signs of the gravity of the task of meeting these "after-the-war" problems.

It is perhaps not unnatural that the events growing out of each new conference of the larger Allied Powers held in Paris bring out a new crop of such fears. I would say again in confidence that probably the most disturbing question with which my Serbian colleague is just now concerned is the fear of the influence which Italy may exert at such conferences.

But if in turn—and the situation would be humorous if it were not so freighted with serious portent—Serbia fears the aggressions of Italy, the little mountain power of Montenegro fears the designs of Serbia; while at the conference of last November Greece was greatly concerned over the claims of Italy to the exercise of certain rights of control in her territory.

Within the past fortnight Mr. Vesnitch, the Serbian Minister, complained with much bitterness of the seeming willingness of Mr. Sonnino at the recent conference at Versailles to disregard the claims of his country and the Slav people to their "after-the-war" protection in dealing with Austria.

I have spoken only of the smaller Allied Powers. I need only add that one may not expect to find human nature very different when applied to those directing the destinies of the greater Powers.



Explaining that there were at the present time about ten million of his people located in Bohemia, Moravia and northern Hungary—all of contiguous territory—he said that in many respects that country represented the wealth in natural resources and agricultural development of Austria-Hungary. In addition to the territory which they occupied being compact and embracing nearly 100,000 square miles—about twice the size of the State of New York, I believe—he stated that the people were united in civilization, language and culture. There are no Jews among them.

Austria-Hungary comes fourth in importance in regard to the coal mines of the whole world; 83 per cent of these mines are in Bohemia and Moravia. Ninety-three per cent of the sugar exported from Austria-Hungary (beet sugar) is also produced in these two provinces. The same remark applies to the manufacture of glass, metallurgical works and textiles, more than half the whole production emanating from these same regions—unwitting reasons, indeed, for Hungarian domination.

Professor Beneš stated also that at present his people are represented in the Reichstag in Vienna by 108 members who are distinctively Czechs. The headquarters of their political organization are at Prague, having a population there of 600,000 Czechs. He said that they already had a considerable army which was under the direction of his committee. From reports now coming in almost daily of the achievements of the Czech forces, consisting of former prisoners in Siberia, in waging war against the Bolshevik authorities, there would seem to be proof of his statements. He estimates that this army now in Russia, ranging along the Siberian railway, numbers from 80,000 to 90,000. It is intended that many of them will ultimately find their way to France, to become a part of the Czecho-Slovak forces on the western front.

I have [etc.]

WM. G. SHARP

File No. 763.72/10848a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 27, 1918.

1587. The Secretary of State issued the following statement on July 26:

On Sunday, the 28th of the present month, will occur the fourth anniversary of the day when the gallant people of Serbia, rather than submit to the studied and ignoble exactions of a carefully prepared attack, were called upon by the war declaration of Austria-Hungary to defend their territory and their homes against an enemy bent upon their destruction. Nobly did they respond. So valiantly

<sup>1</sup> See last paragraph for instruction to repeat to Corfu.



and courageously did they oppose the forces of a country ten times greater in population and resources that it was only after they had thrice driven the Austrians back and Germany and Bulgaria had come to the aid of Austria that their armies were compelled to retreat into Albania. While their territory has been devastated and their homes despoiled, the spirit of the Serbian people has not been broken. Though overwhelmed by superior forces their love of freedom remains unabated. Brutal force has left unaffected their firm determination to sacrifice everything for liberty and independence.

It is fitting that the people of the United States, dedicated to the self-evident truth that it is the right of the people of all nations, small as well as great, to live their own lives and choose their own Government, and remembering that the principles for which Serbia has so nobly fought and suffered are those for which the United States is fighting, should on the occasion of this anniversary manifest in an appropriate manner their warm sympathy with this oppressed people who have so heroically resisted the aims of the Germanic nations to master the world. At the same time, we should not forget the kindred people of the great Slavič race who, now dominated and oppressed by alien races, yearn for independence and national unity.

This can be done in a manner no more appropriate than by its general observance in the churches. The Department of State feels that the people of the United States of all faiths and creeds will wish to assemble in their several places of worship on Sunday, July 28, for the purpose of giving expression to their sympathy with this wronged people, and their oppressed and dominated kindred in other lands, and to invoke the blessings of Almighty God upon them and upon the cause to which they are pledged.

Repeat to Corfu.

POLK.

File No. 763.72/10860

*The Serbian President of the Council (Pashitch) to President Wilson*

[Telegram]

CORFU, undated.

[Received July 28, 1918.]

Just four years ago to-day Austria declared war on Serbia and a treacherous attack was made on the liberty of a small nation keeping the gates of Europe for the east. After heavy fights of a year and a half, attacked on the front by the Germans and in the back by the Bulgarians, we fell on this bulwark of the world's civilization, and four years have passed since German and Bulgarian barbarians are persecuting our country. With the cry of distress which comes to us from our own country in which Austrians and Bulgarians trample upon the most sacred rights of humanity, killing and oppressing our nation, comes also a similar cry of distress from our wider fatherland country of the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes inhabiting Austria-Hungary who are enduring already four

years the most terrible physical and moral persecutions, are being hung, killed and oppressed, and who, together with the nation from Serbia, are looking up to America, that through you has so often emphasized the principles of liberation of nations from brutal conquerors and of free self-determination of all nations, and that has already sent for this purpose a million warriors to Europe with enormous quantities of material that they may realize, together with the Allied armies, the great war aims which you have proclaimed on the Fourth of July before Washington's grave. The Serbian Nation, together with their brothers by blood and tongue, with the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes in Austria-Hungary, the people that suffer to-day from the Germans and Bulgarians, as well as those who are fighting on the different fronts against our common enemies, all of them are expecting full of hope the day when your principles will be realized and when, after all their sacrifices, they will, united and strengthened, join the society of the great civilized nations that are fighting to-day for liberty, right and civilization in order to defend in the future as well as in the past with all their might these principles on the southeast of Europe against barbarians and conquerors.

PASHITCH

File No. 763.72/10903a

*President Wilson to the Serbian President of the Council (Pashitch)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1918.

Your telegram sent on July 28 has met with a very hearty response in my own heart and I am sure will meet with an equally warm response in the hearts of everybody in the United States. We know the deep waters of suffering through which Serbia has passed and our sympathies not only, but our profound friendship and an eager desire to help, follows your courageous people throughout every stage of the present tragical course of the war. I am sure that justice to Serbia stands at the very top of any programme of justice in the thoughts of every thinking and patriotic man in the United States. Please accept my warm personal greetings.

WOODROW WILSON

File No. 763.72119/1854a

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

Department desires from time to time confidential reports on Serbian Government's position as to character of relation to be established between Serbia and Jugo-Slav portion of Austria-Hungary if latter secure their liberty.

POLK

File No. 763.72/11116

*The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State*

No. 6605

LONDON, August 14, 1918.

[Received August 27.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the following declaration is officially announced this morning in all London newspapers as having been made by the British Government: <sup>1</sup>

Since the beginning of the war the Czecho-Slovak Nation has resisted the common enemy by every means in its power. The Czecho-Slovaks have constituted a considerable army, fighting on three different battlefields and attempting, in Russia and Siberia, to arrest the Germanic invasion.

In consideration of its efforts to achieve independence, Great Britain regards the Czecho-Slovaks as an Allied nation, and recognizes the unity of the three Czecho-Slovak armies as an Allied and belligerent army waging regular warfare against Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Great Britain also recognizes the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the supreme organ of the Czecho-Slovak national interests, and as the present trustee of the future Czecho-Slovak Government, to exercise supreme authority over this Allied and belligerent army.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT P. SKINNER

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Recognition by the United States, September 3, of the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a de facto Belligerent Government—Agreement between the British Government and the Czecho-Slovak National Council, September 3—Recognition of the Council by Japan, September 9—Italian Declaration in Favor of Jugo-Slav Independence, September 26—Announcement of the Recruiting of a Slavic Legion in the United States—Reports on the Relations of Italy and Serbia to the Jugo-Slav Nationalist Aspirations—The Czecho-Slovak Declaration of Independence, October 18

File No. 763.72/11343c

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 3, 1918.

Following statement issued today by Secretary of State.<sup>2</sup> Give publicity and repeat to Harbin, Vladivostock and Peking.

The Secretary of State makes the following announcement:

The Czecho-Slovak peoples having taken up arms against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and having placed or-

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<sup>1</sup> The declaration was issued Aug. 9; see *post*, p. 844.

<sup>2</sup> The statement was also telegraphed to the Consul at Archangel with instructions to "give widest publicity." It was circulated in other countries by the Committee on Public Information.



ganized armies in the field which are waging war against those Empires under officers of their own nationality and in accordance with the rules and practices of civilized nations; and

The Czecho-Slovaks having, in prosecution of their independent purposes in the present war, confided supreme political authority to the Czecho-Slovak National Council,

The Government of the United States recognizes that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks thus organized and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

It also recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a *de facto* belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks.

The Government of the United States further declares that it is prepared to enter formally into relations with the *de facto* government thus recognized for the purpose of prosecuting the war against the common enemy, the Empires of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/11191

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Italy (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, September 7, 1918, 3 p. m.

1670. Department will be glad to have full report from you as soon as possible by despatch on the present attitude of the Italian Government and of the various Italian parties towards the territorial aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs. Department considers this matter of great importance. See first paragraph your 1967, August 31, 11 a. m.<sup>1</sup>

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2709

*The Chargé in Japan (Spencer) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TOKYO, September 17, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received September 18, 6.03 a. m.]

Foreign Office confirms their public announcement made yesterday to the effect that Japan recognizes Czecho-Slovak as Allied army under Czecho-Slovak National Council.<sup>2</sup> Reuter given full text.

SPENCER

<sup>1</sup>Not printed. The passage especially referred to read: "There appears to be a growing feeling of distrust against Jugo-Slav National Committee and publication of extracts unflattering to Italy from a book recently issued in Paris by above committee has increased this."

<sup>2</sup>The date of the recognition was Sept. 9.



File No. 763.72/11554

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, September 26, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received September 28, 12.33 a. m.]

2051. Government has issued today the *communiqué* on the subject of Italian sympathies for Jugo-Slav aspirations which it had previously referred to Allies for their approval.

Press comment so far favorable. It is pointed out that declaration in no way abrogates stipulations made for Italy by pact of London and press adds that [there is no cause for?] uneasiness. Further explanations will be made when Chamber opens next week.

NELSON PAGE

File No. 763.72/11729

*The Italian Ambassador (Macchi di Cellere) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips)*

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1918.

[Received October 1.]

MY DEAR MR. PHILLIPS: With reference to our conversation of today I hasten to inform you that the Royal Italian Government has recently declared that they consider "the movement of the Jugo-Slav peoples for the conquest of their independence and for their constitution into a free state as being in accordance with the principles for which the Allies are fighting and with the aims of a just and lasting peace."

Believe me [etc.]

MACCHI DI CELLERE

File No. 763.72/11613

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, September 27, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 1, 6.50 p. m.]

2056. Referring to Embassy's No. 2051, September 26, 4 p. m. In interview with Baron Sonnino yesterday, Jugo-Slav problem was taken up. He said he had no right or wish to prevent any people from rising or developing their nationality; that his wish was simply to secure Italy against peril from the outside; that he favored the League of Nations, but that the League of Nations of the world resembled protective power in a state where it was necessary to have a police organization and other organizations for the protection of the people, and that even the police required that the people whom they protected should shut their doors in the evening so as at least to

keep out intruders until the police could be [effective]. So in this manner it was necessary for Italy to have frontier which she could protect, at least until the international police, which might be at a great distance, could be put into effective activities.

He said that there were two movements now in Austria which might or might not develop into successful movements. One represented those who desired to be autonomous, but have their state or states united with Austria and Hungary as a triple or a quadruple monarchy, if there should be more than one; the other which was for a Pan-Servia. His conviction is that in either case owing to the geographic and other conditions there, Austria will in time become so potent that even if she does not absorb them through economic and other relations, they will fall greatly under Austrian influence or power, and thus the great highways to the east which play so notable a part in this war. In view of this, he feels it essential for [Italy to] keep in security that frontier.

He added with great earnestness that it is necessary for Italy to have a frontier taking in the Brenner; that there is a little strip there under the Brenner which is occupied by German people, but that he must have the Brenner to make Italy safe in the future, even though they have an international police, for Italy may be swamped before the police begin.

I gather that he has doubts about the Jugo-Slav great hostility to Austria. He mentioned that Servia in exchanging prisoners with Austria exchanged none who did not wish to be exchanged and thought that most of the Jugo-Slavs did not wish to be so, but it turned out differently and a large number of those exchanged were Jugo-Slavs who wished to go back in Austria and have gone back.

NELSON PAGE

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*Statement Issued by the War Department*<sup>1</sup>

[Extracts]

By direction of the President, the following regulations will govern in raising troops for a Slavic Legion, to be composed of Jugo-Slavs, Czecho-Slovaks and Ruthenians (Ukrainians):

They will be organized, armed and equipped as infantry regiments. Companies will, if practicable, be composed of members of the same race, which will also be true so far as practicable of battalions and regiments. At present there will be no units larger than regiments.

After regiments have been formed and assigned to divisions, a sufficient number of officers and enlisted men will be retained in

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<sup>1</sup> Published in *The Official U.S. Bulletin*, Washington, Oct. 5, 1918 (vol. 2, No. 430), pp. 5 and 7.

replacement and training camps to provide for the training of replacements, the units formed being limited by this consideration.

All officers, except field officers, of these regiments will be, so far as practicable, of those races of which the units are composed, and will be appointed after a special course of training to be instituted at the Central Officers' Training School at Camp Lee, Va.

Aliens commissioned as officers in the Slavic Legion must furnish proof of their loyalty to the United States, and of their desire to fight the Imperial Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary and the allies thereof, and must execute the following oath of office:

Enlisted men will be obtained by voluntary induction. They must be Jugo-Slavs, Czecho-Slovaks, or Ruthenians (Ukrainians) belonging to the oppressed races of the Austro-Hungarian or German Empire resident in the United States but not citizens thereof nor subject to the draft, and must be qualified for general military service (Group A, sec. 282, Selective Service Regulations, Sept. 16, 1918). Only applicants possessing the foregoing qualifications and between the ages of 18 and 45 will be received. Applications will be made to the local draft boards which will be authorized through the Provost Marshal General to induct applicants possessing required qualifications. Draft boards in coal-mining districts will not entertain applications for the Slavic Legion.

Draft boards will require satisfactory proof of loyalty to the United States and that the applicant desires to fight the Imperial Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary and their allies.

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File No. 763.72119/2061

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

No. 107

CORFU, August 26, 1918.

[Received October 8.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt, late on the 8th instant, of your telegram of the 7th instant, 6 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> informing me that confidential reports were desired by the Department from time to time regarding the position of the Serbian Government as to the character of the relation to be established between Serbia and the Yugo-Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary in the event that the latter obtained their freedom.

Such reports will be furnished as desired. I may mention that during my residence here I have heard and seen in the Serbian and

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<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 823.



Yugo-Slav press little as to the details of this matter, the broad outlines of which are laid down in the so-called "Declaration of Corfu", the text and a translation of which were enclosed in my despatch No. 2 of July 27, 1917.<sup>1</sup> The members of the Government and other Serbs with whom I have talked upon this subject always assume that the constitution of the desired Yugo-Slav state will be based upon the principles laid down in this declaration. Unfortunately at present several of the principal members of the Government, including Mr. Pashitch, are absent from Corfu and expecting to remain away for some time. I have, however, taken advantage of my recent trip to Salonica (to be reported in a later despatch) during which I was constantly with Mr. Nintchitch, Minister of Public Works, and Mr. Gavrilovitch, now in charge of the Foreign Office, to ascertain from them what I could as to this matter. In so doing I have of course made no mention of the Department's desire. The following is the substance of what I learned:

*Mr. Nintchitch:* The character of the relation to be established between Serbia and the Yugo-Slav populations of Austria-Hungary is determined in its outlines by the Act of Corfu which declares that the new state shall be a free democracy in which all the citizens shall be equal and having equal rights before the state and the law. It also prescribes that all elections whether national, departmental or communal shall be by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot. This act was signed by Mr. Pashitch, representing the Serbian Government, and by Dr. Ante Trumbitch, representing the other Yugo-Slav peoples. It was drafted at conferences at which there took part for Serbia, in addition to Mr. Pashitch, representatives of the principal other Serbian political parties and, in addition to Doctor Trumbitch, who is a Dalmatian, two other members of the Yugo-Slav Committee, one a Slovene and the other a Croatian. All the members of the conference unanimously approved of the act. Its text had immediately been published in Austria-Hungary and in Germany and became well-known to the Austro-Hungarian Yugo-Slavs and, so far as could be ascertained, won the approval of a very large majority of them. Of course, owing to the strict censorship and the difficulty of direct communication with these Yugo-Slavs as a whole, their sentiments could not be ascertained as exactly as they could in normal conditions. Nevertheless enough was known to make Mr. Nintchitch feel convinced that a very large majority of the Austro-Hungarian Yugo-Slavs enthusiastically supported the act. Yugo-Slavs abroad in Allied or neutral countries had also shown clearly their entire approval, including those in the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



The act only attempted to determine the broad outlines of the future government, as it had been considered unwise to go into details both because the members of the conference might not in that case be able to agree upon them unanimously and because such details might have caused differences of opinion outside the conference leading to discussion which in the present circumstances it was most important to avoid. Further the conference, which was not an elected body and was only in a sense representative, it being impossible to elect a truly representative body at the time, felt that it should not go beyond the outlines which all were practically certain to accept or attempt to bind the Yugo-Slav people as to details.

For the same reason and as freedom of expression was denied to the Yugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary, it had been considered best to discourage any discussion of the details of the future government in the Serbian and Yugo-Slav press abroad. Very little such discussion had therefore appeared.

According to the Act of Corfu, the future state was not to be a federal one but a centralized state with local autonomies. So much was clear and was considered necessary, as the future state must be strong, as it would have enemies on or near its borders, Bulgaria and Germany: to the latter it must be a barrier to prevent German schemes of conquest in the Near East. Such a centralized state was understood to be desired by the Croatians and Slovenes. Regarding the organization of such a centralized state, Mr. Nintchitch declared that this would be left entirely to the decision of the freely-elected representatives of all the Yugo-Slav people. As soon as practicable after the Yugo-Slavs of Austria-Hungary had obtained their freedom, a constitutional convention would be called and this convention would freely draft the constitution of the future state. According to the Act of Corfu, the members of the convention would be elected by equal, direct, secret and universal suffrage.

Mr. Nintchitch discussed a few further details as to the future form of government but was careful to mention that the ideas he expressed were merely his own personal ones. The capital of the new state he thought should be Belgrade but in that case the King would be obliged to be in residence during regular periods of the year at cities in Croatia, Slovenia, etc., and especially at Agram. He mentioned a strong argument, to his thinking, against the maintenance of the present boundaries of the Yugo-Slav portions of Austria-Hungary in the new state, for the Serbs in Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina would in that case desire to be united with Serbia, and as they must have the right of self-disposition this would of itself produce a very material modification of the present boundaries. Moreover the Croatians of Dalmatia, Bosnia

and Herzegovina would also be desirous of being united to Croatia. There were, he thought, about three million Serbs left in the present Kingdom and as many more in the Banat, [Bachka], Montenegro, Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new state would include from twelve to thirteen million inhabitants about one-half of whom would be Serbs.

In a general way Mr. Nintchitch thought that the political organization of the new state should be like that of the present Kingdom of Serbia although the departments into which it would be divided might well have more local autonomy. It would be a parliamentary form of government with the Parliament elected, as prescribed by the Act of Corfu, by equal, direct, secret and universal suffrage. Ministers would be responsible to Parliament. Each of the present Serbian departments has a local assembly elected by universal suffrage. Its legislative powers are determined by the various laws passed by the Skupshtina and are usually limited to small local matters such as primary schools, communal roads, minor sanitary and police matters, etc. The acts of these assemblies are, however, subject to the veto of the Minister of the Interior who is himself responsible to the Skupshtina. Under the new constitution the powers of the departmental assemblies might be considerably enlarged.

Mr. Nintchitch did not think that the various portions of the new Kingdom would be found to differ to any great extent in the degree of their culture and civilization nor that the undoubtedly different interests of different portions would present any difficulties to harmonious co-operation. The different interests would be given free expression through local autonomies and the freely elected central parliament. It was true, however, that Serbia would enter the new state in a far more exhausted condition than the other Yugo-Slavs. He admitted that the new constitution would naturally be a good deal of an experiment, but changes would subsequently be made as found necessary, and with the profound desire for union of all the component parts of the new state, an arrangement satisfactory to all would eventually be found.

The statements made to me by Mr. Gavrilovitch were, so far as they went, similar to those of Mr. Nintchitch. Mr. Gavrilovitch, however, appeared anxious to avoid entering into details or expressing any personal opinion, stating that all discussion of such matters should be left for after the war and for the constitutional convention. It was sufficient for the present to fight for the liberation of the Yugo-Slav portions of Austria-Hungary. After their liberation it would be time enough to discuss details of the future state which must be based upon the Act of Corfu.

I have [etc.]

H. PERCIVAL DODGE

File No. 763.72/11690

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge), temporarily at Nice, to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

NICE, *October 8, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[Received October 9, 11 p. m.]

Minister of Works and Minister Public Instruction, now at Nice, state Pashitch lately informed Trumbitch, President of Southern Slav Committee, that he did not agree with Trumbitch's desire to obtain same recognition for his committee as that given by Entente to the Czecho-Slovak committee, since the Southern Slavs already had Servian Government to act for them, and it would be a mistake to have two Southern Slav governmental bodies. This attitude of Pashitch had caused considerable disappointment to the Southern Slav Committee. Minister of Works and Minister of Public Instruction considered formation of coalition cabinet extremely desirable on account of approaching return to Servia and state that Pashitch was to renew conference with opposition leaders for this purpose.

DODGE

File No. 763.72/11730

*The Chargé in Italy (Jay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 1005

ROME, *September 17, 1918.*

[Received October 14.]

SIR: In accordance with instructions contained in the Department's cablegram No. 1670 of September 7, 1918, I have the honor to forward herewith a full report on the Italian attitude with reference to the Jugo-Slavs, which has been very carefully prepared by Mr. Gino C. Speranza of this Embassy.

I have [etc.]

PETER A. JAY

[Enclosure]

*Report on the Italian Attitude Toward the Jugo-Slavs*

## GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

The first general impression of the Italian attitude regarding the Jugo-Slavs and the Jugo-Slav movement is that such attitude is characterized by indefiniteness and instability. This appears true both of the attitude of the Italian Government and of that of parties and representatives of popular opinion.

Italians and Jugo-Slavs may fairly be said to be eyeing each other and measuring each other, mutually cogitating whether it is better



to take chances as trusting friends between whom mutual concessions and amicable agreements are possible, or to follow a policy of guarded and watchful circumspection as between probable future competitors, if not opponents.

The causes behind such attitude are many; there are traditional, almost racial antipathies between Italians and Croats of a historic-sentimental character which this Embassy has summarized in a special report on "Some Italian Views on the Jugo-Slav Movement" (September 3, 1918), a copy of which is hereto annexed.<sup>1</sup> There is also the mutual fear that both the territorial claims and the national aspirations of Italy in this war and of the nascent Jugo-Slavia may be in certain respects not only incompatible but beyond reasonable adjustment.

Recognizing this basic element of mutual mistrust, or perhaps, more exactly, this lack of friendly confidence, we can proceed to examine the Italian attitude toward the Jugo-Slav movement in more detail, seeking out specifically its causes by inquiring into the views of (1) the Italian Government, (2) the various political parties and leaders, and (3) the Italian people.

#### THE GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE

The attitude or policy of the Italian Government can largely be traced to explicit state documents or to official or semi-official declarations.

In the Italian *Green Book* we find the Italian demands on Austro-Hungary before Italy entered into the war, and as a condition of keeping out of it. They were tentative and diplomatically argumentative, and therefore, not conclusive or binding on Italy to-day; but they are indicative of Italian official territorial aims before the sacrifices of war. These aims included the Trentino as far as Bozen, the Gorizian district, the Dalmatian islands of the central Adriatic, the recognition of Trieste as a free city, a free hand in the Albanian problem, and the recognition of Italian control of the Dodecanese.

The next known official document is the treaty of London, signed in April, 1915, by which Italy accepts the pact of London which had been signed already by France, Great Britain and Russia in September, 1914; by said treaty Great Britain, France and Russia guaranteed to Italy under the future general peace treaty the following territorial claims: the Trentino and the upper Adige, the Gorizian district, the Trieste litoral, Istria and Liburnia nearly to Fiume, the districts of Zara and Sebenico in continental Dalmatia as far south as Tran [*Travù*], the outer islands of the Quarnero and of the

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



Dalmatian archipelago, Valona with a strategic strip on the mainland, the Dodecanese, and in case of France or England enlarging their African possessions at the cost of Germany, Italy to have her proportionate share thereof.

The above territorial claims of Italy were obviously made and guaranteed by the other signatory powers, not merely as a recognition of the national aspirations of the Italians, but in order to assure the strategic safety of Italy against a powerful and unfriendly Austro-Hungary. Hence it may well be asserted that at the time when the treaty of London was signed Italy, Great Britain, France and Russia did not officially aim at the dismemberment of Austro-Hungary. This belief, at least on the official Italian side, finds confirmation in Baron Sonnino's statement made to the Italian Parliament on October 25, 1917, as follows: "Among our war-aims there are included neither the dismemberment of enemy states nor changes in their internal order." Premier Orlando also, in an interview in the *Journal des Débats* (April 24, 1918) is reported as saying: "When the treaty of London was discussed and concluded it had reference to an enemy Austria against which Italy was bound to take the utmost possible safeguards."

Up to this point we have official definiteness; that is, we have specific territorial claims, national and strategic, solemnly set forth. On the political side, up to such period and for some time thereafter, the policy of the European Allies may be said to have been essentially anti-German rather than anti-Austrian, all aiming at the weakening rather than the destruction of Austro-Hungary.

It is with the Russian *débâcle* and the rise and development of President Wilson's war-principle of the right of racial autodecision in the field of government, that the Italian official policy and the Allied attitude changes; the idea gains ground that the war must be specifically anti-Austrian as well as anti-German, or, in other words, that the Hapsburg Empire must not only be weakened but dismembered.

This change in a political policy which even the United States seemed for a time to favor led inevitably to a change in attitude (it cannot be a change in policy while the treaties of September, 1914, and April, 1915, above cited, hold) in regard to the territorial provisions of the treaty and of the pact of London. But such change of policy in the political aims, and such change of attitude in the territorial aims affected and affect Italy and the Italians most profoundly, in a way, indeed, as no other of the Allies could be affected.

Hence there has come about in Italian official policy or action an almost unavoidable uncertainty, indefiniteness and feeling about which, *inter alia*, has given the impression of a duality of views in

the foreign outlook in the present Italian Cabinet, a duality popularly represented by Sonnino as the conservative defender of the treaty of London and of Orlando as the representative of the less rigid and more liberal policy of Italy taking the lead in the movement for the liberation of all the oppressed races of Austria-Hungary.

This duality, if it exists, is probably not so much personal, as generally believed, as inherent in the very situation. For the Italian Government is bound, as a matter of political necessity even at the cost of seeming illiberal, to hold on to its guaranteed territorial claims under the treaty of London until a more up-to-date, more liberal, but equally binding and solemn agreement can be obtained by Italy as the nation most vitally affected by any variation from existing Allied pacts.

#### IS THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT WILLING TO SUBSTITUTE THE TREATY OF LONDON?

Until such new agreement can be reached, Italian policy in this field is bound to appear uncertain and vacillating, and Sonnino's motives be subject to misapprehension and suspicion. Passing now from the field of fact to that of impression, it may reasonably be asserted that the majority of the men in the Government, including Sonnino, are willing to recede from the claims of the London treaty but on condition of an equally binding agreement, substantially recognizing legitimate Italian national aspirations. The summary reports of interviews had by this Embassy with members of the Italian Cabinet cabled to the Department corroborate such belief.

On the side of practical politics we must not overlook that if Sonnino should recede from the treaty of London without a "substitute of equal quantity and better quality" all his now quiescent enemies (Clericals, official and reform Socialists and Giolittians) would arise and destroy him. For example, Sonnino has kept the Giolittians in subjection by his very insistence on the treaty of London which gives Italy far more than the "*parecchio*" which Giolitti contended would be obtainable from Austria merely by Italian neutrality. It is a commonplace that even in the recent *Corriere della Sera* attack against the Foreign Minister, the Giolittian deputies and press actually defended Sonnino, not because they hate him any less than they did, but because they know the treaty of London will eventually be changed and that such change will furnish them the excuse for a frontal attack against Sonnino. So Sonnino, both as a matter of patriotic statesmanship and of practical politics, cannot renounce anything under the treaty of London unless he can submit to his country an equally strong guarantee.

## MAJOR DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY

There are two outstanding and obvious difficulties in the way of an official Italo-Jugo-Slav agreement: first, the lack of a truly representative organization of the Jugo-Slav people, and, second, assuming that such representative organization can be secured, can the territorial aims of the Italians and Jugo-Slavs be mutually adjusted, and can they have as binding international guarantees as Italy now has under the treaty of London?

On the first point the attitude of the Italian Government (which reflects the majority opinion of the people), is that the Jugo-Slavs have yet to prove their desire and intention to contribute to the dismemberment of Austro-Hungary, that in internal politics they have labored and struggled, if at all, for autonomy within the Empire rather than for independence without, and that they have yet to prove their capacity for national unity or for undertaking international responsibilities.

In this regard it may be pointed out that in Italian opinion up to the present time, the actions and activities of the Jugo-Slavs, in either the political or the military fields, do not seem to measure up to the standards for recognition which are implied in Secretary of State Lansing's official announcement of the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak Nation. The Secretary's statement justifies recognition of a *de facto* Czecho-Slovak Government on the following grounds:

- (1) That the Czecho-Slovaks have taken up arms against Germany and Austro-Hungary,
- (2) That they have organized armies under their own officers and are carrying on war under the rules and usages of civilized states,
- (3) That they are fighting for their independence,
- (4) That they have entrusted the supreme public authority to the Czecho-Slovak National Council.

The Italian official reluctance to treating with or recognizing the Jugo-Slavs would seem, therefore, to have some definite and defensible political justification and be not wholly the result of selfish considerations; and this would seem further proved by the fact that Italians, official and non-official, are united regarding the wisdom and justness of recognizing and supporting the Czecho-Slovak movement.

## SOME MINOR DIFFICULTIES

This reluctance is accentuated by certain minor facts which, however somewhat personal in character, have some weight. There is an undoubted mistrust by the Italians of the representative character of Dr. Ante Trumbić and a suspicion that he is, as a great many



Slavs undoubtedly are, anti-Italian. There is also considerable feeling of resentment in Italy at the undiplomatic, if not imperialistic and extremist, character of some of the Jugo-Slav claims and propaganda in Allied countries, either through *The New Europe* or in other publications or utterances. Certain historic-sentimental reasons, of a powerful character, as hereinbefore pointed out, also stand in the way of official recognition.

#### ARE TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS POSSIBLE?

But assuming that the Jugo-Slavs could, by political and military action, come within the tests of American recognition as set forth by our Secretary of State, is an adjustment of territorial claims between Italians and Jugo-Slavs possible and probable?

Here we enter into the field of political conjecture; but it may be reasonably assumed that even Baron Sonnino would be willing to make territorial concessions upon two conditions: first, that the Jugo-Slavs officially recognize and guarantee the minimum Italian territorial program, to wit: the boundaries claimed in Istria, the Italian naval bases in the Dalmatian islands, Italian influence in Albania, etc.; and, secondly, that any Italo-Jugo-Slav agreement be brought about in such a way and be of such character as will disarm the varied and numerous opponents of any change in or "renunciation" of the provisions of the treaty of London.

In this respect we should distinguish between the forcing out of Sonnino from the Italian War Cabinet as a real popular reaction against him or his policies, and his ministerial decapitation as the result of the maneuvers of the Giolittians, pacifists and other politicians who want him out so as to replace him by one of their own stripe. In other words, any change in the treaty of London, as I said, would be at the present time a dangerous political step, requiring extreme caution and fine play, both with friends and foes; but I believe that Sonnino is not only willing to take it but has been for some time, laying out his plans possibly even secretly with Doctor Trumbić for an Italo-Jugo-Slav agreement.

What is essential is that such agreement should have as gilt-edged a guarantee as has the treaty of London. That guarantee [is] constituted by the international promise by England, France and Russia to support at the peace conference the Italian territorial claims set forth in the treaty. Can the Jugo-Slavs secure a like guarantee from France and Great Britain for any agreement they may make with Italy? That is the question and that, in a way, would be a test of Jugo-Slav capacity for international action.

Sonnino, unfortunately, does not know America and still less does he wholly and deeply "feel" and gauge the American influence in



this war; yet if American diplomacy could "win him over" and he, on his part, would and could secure American sympathy and recognition, if not a formal official guarantee by the United States, of any Italo-Jugo-Slav agreement, it would seem not unlikely that the Italian people would be willing to modify some of the claims in the treaty of London.

#### ATTITUDE OF ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO THE JUGO-SLAV MOVEMENT

Passing to a consideration of the attitude of Italian parties and of the Italian people to the Jugo-Slav movement, the same lack of definiteness is found, and, largely, for the same reasons as were pointed out under the official Government attitude. But the variation between parties and popular groups centers largely around territorial questions. Indeed, so sensitive are both sides on this point that the most definite and promising nongovernmental agreement so far secured regarding Italo-Jugo-Slav understanding excludes all specific territorial considerations.

#### THE "PACT OF ROME"

This non-official agreement, known as the Pact of Rome,<sup>1</sup> recites, *inter alia*, (article 4) that:

The representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo-Slav people agree in particular as follows: In the relations between the Italian Nation and the Nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes known also under the name of the Jugo-Slav Nation, the representatives of the two peoples recognize that the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav Nation is of vital interest to Italy, exactly as the completion of the national Italian unification is a vital interest of the Jugo-Slav Nation. Therefore, the representatives of the two peoples undertake to develop all their efforts (*opera*) to the end that during the war and at the moment of peace, these aims (*finalità*) of the two nations may be wholly reached; (5th article) they affirm that the liberation of the Adriatic Sea and its defense against every present and eventual enemy is a vital interest of the two peoples; (6th article) they undertake to settle amicably, in the interest also of the future good and sincere relations between the two peoples, each of the territorial controversies on the basis of the principles of nationality and the right of peoples to decide their own destinies, in such manner as not to injure vital interests of the two nations which will be settled at the moment of peace; (article 7th) such groups (*nuclei*) of one of the peoples who may have to be included within the boundaries of the other, will have the recognition of and the guarantee of the right of respect of their language, of their intellectual and historic traditions (*coltura*) and of their moral and economic interests.

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<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 797-799.

Such "Pact of Rome" was not only a great step in the right direction but it outlined the basis of a method of coming together. Its political value and influence, however, are problematical and conjectural because the signatories thereof could be recognized as "representatives of the Italian people and of the Jugo-Slav people" only by a pretty long stretch of the most benevolent imagination. For instance, Deputy Andrea Torre, chief Italian signatory, could hardly claim to represent any large group of the Italian people or even definite Italian political force. This weakness has since been overcome, in a distinct measure, by declarations of men in the Italian Government, notably by Premier Orlando, and by leaders in Italian political life; but, on the other hand, Dr. Ante Trumbić's signature as "representative of the Jugo-Slav people" has not received, as yet, any substantial additional suffrage or representative recognition among Jugo-Slavs in Austro-Hungary.

The Pact of Rome, excellent as it is, has not been vivified by any increased real mutual trust between the two peoples, except among certain intellectuals and in the political field among the handful of Italian Radicals.

#### THE CHIEF CAUSES WHICH PREVENT A POPULAR ITALO-JUGO-SLAV ENTENTE

The slow growth of such real trust between the two peoples, preventing the Pact of Rome from becoming a real *entente*, is due to three principal causes: first, the absence of real leaders on either side—of leaders of vision, courage and "carrying" qualities; second, the policy of not courageously facing the real essence of the causes of mutual mistrust, that is, the policy of dodging the presentation of a reasonable territorial program; third, the propaganda carried on on a great scale by Austro-Hungary in all the Allied countries and especially in Italy to incite and strengthen the mutual mistrust and so excite the hostile sentiments and passions between Italians and Slavs. Within the Empire the Austro-Hungarian Government pursues the plan of "supporting" the Jugo-Slav movement within its boundaries but urges the Slavs to make territorial claims of such unreasonableness as to increase the enmity of the Italians. By such support it gains a double purpose: It renders an Italo-Jugo-Slav *entente* ever more difficult, and, it seeks to make the Allies believe that the real Jugo-Slav movement is not for national independence but for autonomy within the Empire.

Of the three reasons above given, only through the first (real and courageous leadership) could the other two be effectively overcome. It is the absence of such leadership which makes so many Italians think that the best policy is to avoid the territorial subject; but

such a policy is the "best policy" only because there are no men of vision and courage to urge the prompt solution of all differences and diffidences on a truly liberal basis on both sides.

### ITALIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Among the various Italian political parties we find either opposition, mistrust, "watchful waiting," benevolent but inert approval, or indifference. The only real exceptions are the Reform Socialists and the Radicals, of whom, later [*sic*] the Regular Socialists are, of course, alien to the question; the Clericals, as distinguished from patriotic Catholics, cannot be expected to support a policy which would mean the end of the one imperial remnant left to the Vatican; the Giolittians have never been anti-Austrian and are out for themselves rather than for Italy and least of all for the "rights of peoples." The Liberals, in their various groupings, wish an Italo-Jugo-Slav *entente* but are still groping and restrained in their enthusiasm; their hopes are with Orlando who is probably today the most representative political leader of the majority opinion of the Italian people regarding the Jugo-Slav movement. What that majority opinion is may be gauged by Orlando's stand which is a skillful balancing between the official Pact of London and the unofficial Pact of Rome. This same balancing and half-measures find evidence in the most recent resolutions of the Central Committee of the Fascio (League of National Defense) which is supposed to represent the most patriotic elements of independent Italian opinion. The resolutions state, among other things: "We view with satisfaction that there is in the Nation a strong sense of the unchallengeable right of Italy to the realization, wholly and completely, of all her national aspirations" and also that the "defense of the country and the realization of all Italian aspirations are in no way incompatible with the right to liberty and independence of the oppressed nationalities under Hapsburg domination." But a word to show how they can be made compatible.

### THE REFORM SOCIALISTS

The Reform Socialists and the Radicals have the advantage of more definite programs. The Reform Socialists are strong for the absolute dismemberment of Austro-Hungary and for aiding the oppressed races to gain their independence, but (especially the more extreme wing under Benito Mussolini of the *Popolo d'Italia*) they hold that the treaty of London is a minimum of Italian strategic aims, that it was drafted when the claims of Russia had to be considered and that now that those claims do not exist Italy should have something of what she gave up for Russia's sake. They believe, in substance, in an independent Jugo-Slavia but hold that the



Slavs on the Adriatic litoral are outside their natural and ethnic boundaries, that strategic reasons necessitate Italian control of the Dalmatian coast and historic reasons the inclusion into Italy of the Italian cities of Dalmatia excluded by the treaty of London.

#### THE RADICALS

The Radicals have the most liberal program; they believe that the Jugo-Slav movement should be powerfully aided and encouraged to the end that the future Jugo-Slavia shall be Italy's best friend; that such friendship is worth more to Italy than any strategic advantages secured in the Adriatic and that its value is such that it is well worth making reasonably ample concessions in order to secure it. But the Radicals are few and Deputy de Viti de Marco as their leader on the Jugo-Slav question is too rigid, unpopular and unmagnetic a personality to arouse popular sentiment or enthusiasm, or to create a real following even in political spheres.

#### THE PEOPLE'S ATTITUDE

Among the Italian people the Jugo-Slav movement meets with an almost instinctive diffidence and mistrust. But for this there is a reason so basic and deep-rooted even in the masses that it deserves the greatest consideration; indeed any disregard of such sentiment by the Allies, even for the great stake of a vast theoretical liberal program, may be the one and only cause of a popular uprising in Italy.

The one universal, unifying, deeply national sentiment of Italy-at-war is the liberation of all Italians from the Austrian yoke and their inclusion within the strategically safe boundaries of United Italy. This is the mainspring and the vivifying force of Italy-at-war; without the assurance that such complete liberation and unification would be accomplished through joining the Allies Italy would probably not have entered the war or, at least, would not have so steadily stuck to it. Conversely, any movement which, even remotely, threatens the complete realization of this essentially popular national war program, strikes at the deepest sentiment of the Italian people.

It is because the Jugo-Slav movement holds the possibility of renunciations on these deeply cherished aspirations of the Italian people, that only the highest statesmanship and the most intelligent and patriotic leadership could make such Jugo-Slav movement acceptable to Italian opinion.

#### THE ESSENCE OF THE ITALIAN POPULAR DISTRUST OF THE JUGO-SLAVS

It is this deep sentiment of the people, hallowed by nearly a century of sacrifices and heroisms, which is the real substratum of



the Italian lack of real support to the Jugo-Slav movement. The Italian Government, Austro-Hungary, the Allies and party leaders of every color have each used this sentiment for their own ends for it is both a strength and a weakness, but from the human standpoint which informs and leads American statesmanship, such a deep popular sentiment will be recognized as an element deserving great consideration even in political councils and decisions.

#### CAN SUCH SENTIMENT BE OVERCOME?

Such sentiment, can, I think, be reached and influenced to a more liberal attitude by a serious, courageous, intelligent and honest appeal to that reasonableness and good sense which the writer of this has always contended is at the base of Italian character. Such an appeal, however, cannot, or rather must not come from any of the European Allies, for any campaign of this nature undertaken by them would be held, and justly, to be suspect if not selfish.

#### AMERICAN OPPORTUNITY

The hope of a solution would seem to be in the willingness of the United States to undertake this task. It seems a superb opportunity for American diplomacy, essentially in the spirit of that "human liberalism" which has characterized American intervention in the Great War. Its success would mean the adjustment of a grave international problem, the peace of mind of a friendly nation seeking to do what is right, and the gratitude to our country of a nascent nationality in its first steps towards the new freedom.

GINO. C. SPERANZA

ROME, *September 17, 1918.*

File No. 763.72119/2261

*The Serbian Chargé (Simitch) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *October 14, 1918.*

[*Received October 15.*]

EXCELLENCY: I am instructed by the Serbian Government to submit to Your Excellency the following:

The present war, provoked and imposed upon the Allies by the Germanic Powers, supported by Bulgaria and Turkey, and its evolution during the last four years, has clearly revealed, not only its primordial cause, but also its aim. It is in the general interest that these two facts (the cause and the aim) should be ascertained so as to guard the Entente against the intrigues which would tend to nullify the results of this gigantic struggle to-day, as well as to prevent further complications.

At the end of the Balkan War, especially after our victory in 1913, and the check given to the Albanian invasions into our terri-

tory, fomented and inspired by foreign agents, Serbia revealed herself as a bulwark against the Austro-German plans in the Near East, and at the same time the center of attraction for the Serbs, Croats and the Slovenes under the German-Magyar yoke.

For some time past the House of Hapsburg has decided to unite in a single state the Serb, Croat and Slovene countries, and to create a Jugoslavia-Illyria under its own nomination [*domination?*], which would be for the Hapsburgs a new stage in their march on the Balkans. The Serbian victories have administered a check to this policy, a policy which was designed to overthrow the barrier which had been raised against their advance toward the Orient.

Germany and Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, desiring in this manner, to settle at the same time their accounts with the rival powers. The Powers of the Entente, desirous of preventing all violence in international relations and of hindering the Austro-Hungarian conquests in the Balkans, made every effort to prevent an armed conflict by proposing a solution by arbitration. Germany and Austria would not admit this defense of the western states, and declared war on them. The first phase of the Great War was synthetized by the defense of the little countries, like Belgium and Serbia, against an unjust aggression.

Since the intervention of the United States this struggle has taken the aspect of a conflict between the two principles of victory on which the future of the whole world will depend, on one side, brutal force, on the other, the liberty and the rights of nations.

After our country was attacked in this manner, and for these motives, the Royal Government declared, in the month of November, 1914, in the National Parliament, that Serbia was fighting for her existence, and at the same time for the liberation and union of her Serb, Croat, and Slovene brothers-in-race, oppressed by the Germans and the Magyars.

Our allies, resolved not to hesitate to make any sacrifice that would aid them to achieve this aim, have, in the course of the war, and especially since the intervention of the United States, declared that it was their intention to reestablish Poland in all its parts, with an exit on the Baltic Sea, and to collaborate with the Czech-Slovaks as their allies.

We believe, in consequence, that we are within our rights when we await a declaration on their part, according to which they will proclaim Serbia as their loyal ally since the beginning of the war, and will, therefore, also consider as such the brothers-in-race of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary, and that they are ready to favor their union with Serbia in a free and democratic state, such as was provided for in the Declaration of Corfu.

The eclipse of Russia with her pretensions to Constantinople and the Straits on the one hand and the intervention of the United States on the other have still more accentuated the character of this war as defense alone. The immense sacrifices which the peoples have had to support in this struggle without example in history have given rise to a general desire to found international peace on the principles of liberty and the right of all the peoples, relegating to the secondary place individual interests and the pretensions of the states.

With a view to assuring new conditions and a more solid basis for the security of a just and equitable international peace, we consider that the declaration which we demand will be in full conformity with the new spirit, substituting the new principles to the former treaties; that it will completely concord with the interests of our great allies; that it will contribute to bring about the end of the war, and that it will assure a peace based on fraternal sincerity of the future society of nations, redeemed by so much bloodshed.

Serbia has made the supreme sacrifice for the realization of her national ideals. Her Government has been and intends to remain on all international relations the representative and the defender of her oppressed brothers-in-race. It, therefore, believes it is authorized to hope that her proposal will be sympathetically and benevolently received by the Allied Governments.

In bringing the above to the knowledge of Your Excellency I have [etc.]

Y. SIMITCH

File No. 861.00/3068

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Acting Secretary of State*

No. 1135

WASHINGTON, October 14, 1918.

[Received October 16.]

MY DEAR MR. POLK: I enclose, herewith, a copy of the agreement between His Majesty's Government and the Czecho-Slovak National Council of September 3d, 1918.

I understand that this agreement was also communicated at the time of its signature to the American Chargé d'Affaires in London.

Believe me [etc.]

COLVILLE BARCLAY

[Enclosure]

*Agreement between the British Government and the Czecho-Slovak National Council*

In furtherance of the declaration issued by His Majesty's Government on August 9th, 1918, recognizing the Czecho-Slovaks as an allied nation and recognizing the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, as the supreme organ of the Czecho-Slovak national interest, to exercise supreme authority over the Allied and belligerent Czecho-Slovak Army, His Majesty's Government and the Czecho-Slovak National Council have determined to enter into the following agreement.

1. His Majesty's Government will until the organization of the future Czecho-Slovak Government maintain relations with the Czecho-Slovak National Council and will deal with it direct on all questions within the competence of such Council.



2. His Majesty's Government agree to the Czecho-Slovak armies being placed under the general control of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in all matters other than those which fall within the sphere of the Allied commanders in chief under whose command the units of the Czecho-Slovak armies may be placed.

3. The Czecho-Slovak National Council will frame a budget for the maintenance of its administration and of its armies, but due regard shall be paid therein to any arrangements made for the advance of funds to Czecho-Slovak forces under existing agreements between the British and Allied Governments.

4. In the event of a loan being advanced to the Czecho-Slovak National Council on behalf of the future Czecho-Slovak Government, His Majesty's Government agree to participate therein on terms of equality with their allies.

5. The Czecho-Slovak National Council will on behalf of the future Czecho-Slovak Government forthwith institute a financial commission and will invite His Majesty's Government to appoint a member thereof. The Czecho-Slovak budget will be placed under the control of this commission.

6. His Majesty's Government will recognize the right of the Czecho-Slovak National Council to be represented at any Allied conference when questions affecting the interests of the Czecho-Slovaks are under discussion.

7. His Majesty's Government will recognize the passports issued by the Czecho-Slovak National Council or by its duly authorized representatives.

8. The Czecho-Slovak National Council will appoint a representative in London through whom relations with His Majesty's Government will be maintained.

9. His Majesty's Government will recognize and will treat as alien friends and as members of an allied nation all persons who may be certified to them as Czecho-Slovaks by the Czecho-Slovak representative in London or by his authorized agents or to whom passports may be issued by the Czecho-Slovak National Council or its authorized representatives.

10. His Majesty's Government will treat official communications passing between the Czecho-Slovak National Council and its representatives in London upon the same footing as communications passing between a friendly Government and its representative in London.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized thereto by His Majesty's Government and the Czecho-Slovak National Council respectively, have signed the present agreement.

Done in duplicate at London, the 3d day of September, 1918.

[No signatures indicated]



File No. 861.00/2970

*The President of the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government  
(Masaryk) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 16, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: I take the liberty of submitting to you the first draft of our Declaration of Independence: <sup>1</sup> some weeks ago we have decided to publish it because of the insincere promises of the Austro-Hungarian Government to reorganize the Empire. It so happens that the answer of President Wilson to Austria-Hungary is promised just the day on which I was going to publish the declaration. Should you wish that we do not publish it till after the President's answer, we shall gladly comply with your wishes.

Believe me [etc.]

T. G. MASARYK

File No. 861.00/2967

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 16, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 17, 3.45 p. m.]

5444. A letter of which the following is a translation [received for transmission to you] under date of October 14: <sup>2</sup>

Sir: In pursuance of the decision of the Provisional Czechoslovak Government, I have the honor to transmit [to you] the following communication:

By the declaration of the Government of the United States of September 3, 1918, the National Czecho-Slovak Council situated in Paris was recognized as the *de facto* Czecho-Slovak Government.

This recognition was confirmed by the Allied Governments as follows: by England in its agreement with the National Council of September 3, 1918, by France in its agreement of September 28, 1918, and by Italy in the declaration of the President of the Council of October 3, 1918.

I have the honor to inform you that in view of these repeated recognitions, the Czechoslovak Provisional Government was constituted by the decision of September 26, 1918, its seat being officially fixed in Paris:

- M. T. G. Masaryk, President of the Provisional Government  
and of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Finance;
- M. Edward Beneš, Minister of Foreign Affairs and of the  
Interior;
- M. Milan Štefánik, Minister of War.

<sup>1</sup> Not printed; for final text of this declaration, see *post*, p. 848.

<sup>2</sup> Telegraphic text corrected to accord with that later received by pouch as enclosure to the Ambassador's despatch No. 6696 of Oct. 16, 1918 (File No. 861.00/3150).

The Ministry then decided to accredit near the Allied Powers the following representatives:

- M. Stephen Osuský, Chargé d'Affaires at the Czechoslovak Legation in London, near the Government of Great Britain;
  - M. Leon Sychrava, Chargé d'Affaires at the Czechoslovak Legation in Paris, near the Government of France;
  - M. Leon Borský, Chargé d'Affaires at the Czechoslovak Legation in Rome, near the Italian Government;
  - M. Charles Pergler, Chargé d'Affaires at the Czechoslovak Legation at Washington, near the United States Government;
  - M. Bogdan Pavlů, at present at Omsk, will represent our Government in Russia;
- The representatives for Japan and Servia will be appointed at a later date.

I have the honor to inform you that our decisions have been taken in agreement with the political chiefs of our countries. During three years our entire political and military action was exercised in complete understanding with them. Finally, on October 2, 1918, the Czecho-Slovak Deputy Staněk, President of the Czech Union in the Parliament at Vienna, announced solemnly that the Czecho-Slovak National Council of Paris as the supreme organ of the Council's armies is called upon to represent the Czechoslovak Nation near the Allies and at the peace conference. On the 9th of October his colleague Deputy Zahradník speaking in the name of the same union announced that the Czecho-Slovaks had definitely left the Parliament of Vienna, thus breaking for ever all ties with Austria-Hungary.

By the decision of our nation and of our armies we take in our hands from this time on as the National Provisional Government direction of the political destinies of the Czech and Slovak countries, and in this capacity we enter officially into relations with the Allied Governments, basing our action either upon the reciprocal agreements with them or their solemn declarations.

We desire to affirm this in the most solemn manner, at this time when great political events summon all nations to take part in decisions which will, perhaps, give to Europe for several centuries a new political regime.

Accept [etc.]

In the name of the Government of the Czechoslovak countries:

Edward Beneš  
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Original follows by pouch.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/3124

*The President of the Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government  
(Masaryk) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] *October 18, 1918.*

MR. SECRETARY: Political reasons as well as administrative exigencies induced our National Council to assume, in accordance with

the recognition by your and the Allied Governments, the title of Government, and to publish the enclosed declaration.

As you, Mr. Secretary, did not express any wish concerning the date of publication, I assume that it is of no consequence and publish the declaration to-day, forced to do so by the rapid developments in Austria-Hungary.

Our Government has been constituted in the following manner:

Prime Minister and Minister of Finance:

Professor Thomas G. Masaryk;

Minister of National Defense:

Gen. Dr. Milan R. Štefánik;

Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Interior:

Dr. Edward Beneš.

The seat of the Government is in Paris.

Believe me [etc.]

T. G. MASARYK

[Enclosure]

*Declaration of Independence of the Czechoslovak Nation by its Provisional Government*

At this grave moment, when the Hohenzollerns are offering peace in order to stop the victorious advance of the Allied armies and to prevent the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary and Turkey, and when the Habsburgs are promising the federalization of the Empire and autonomy to the dissatisfied nationalities committed to their rule, we, the Czechoslovak National Council, recognized by the Allied and American Governments as the Provisional Government of the Czechoslovak State and Nation, in complete accord with the declaration of the Czech Deputies made in Prague on January 6, 1918, and realizing that federalization, and still more, autonomy, mean nothing under a Habsburg dynasty, do hereby make and declare this our Declaration of Independence.

We do this because of our belief that no people should be forced to live under a sovereignty they do not recognize, and because of our knowledge and firm conviction that our nation cannot freely develop in a Habsburg mock-federation, which is only a new form of the denationalizing oppression under which we have suffered for the past three hundred years. We consider freedom to be the first prerequisite for federalization, and believe that the free nations of central and eastern Europe may easily federate should they find it necessary.

We make this declaration on the basis of our historic and natural right. We have been an independent state since the seventh century; and, in 1526, as an independent state, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, we joined with Austria and Hungary in a defen-

sive union against the Turkish danger. We have never voluntarily surrendered our rights as an independent state in this confederation. The Habsburgs broke their compact with our nation by illegally transgressing our rights and violating the Constitution of our state which they had pledged themselves to uphold, and we therefore refuse longer to remain a part of Austria-Hungary in any form.

We claim the right of Bohemia to be re-united with her Slovak brethren of Slovakia, once part of our national state, later torn from our national body, and fifty years ago incorporated in the Hungarian state of the Magyars, who, by their unspeakable violence and ruthless oppression of their subject races have lost all moral and human right to rule anybody but themselves.

The world knows the history of our struggle against the Habsburg oppression, intensified and systematized by the Austro-Hungarian dualistic compromise of 1867. This dualism is only a shameless organization of brute force and exploitation of the majority by the minority; it is a political conspiracy of the Germans and Magyars against our own as well as the other Slav and the Latin nations of the Monarchy. The world knows the justice of our claims, which the Habsburgs themselves dared not deny. Francis Joseph, in the most solemn manner, repeatedly recognized the sovereign rights of our nation. The Germans and Magyars opposed this recognition, and Austria-Hungary, bowing before the Pan-Germans, became a colony of Germany, and as her vanguard to the east, provoked the last Balkan conflict, as well as the present World War, which was begun by the Habsburgs alone without the consent of the representatives of the people.

We cannot and will not continue to live under the rule—direct or indirect—of the violators of Belgium, France, and Serbia, the would-be murderers of Russia and Rumania, the murderers of tens of thousands of civilians and soldiers of our blood, and the accomplices in numberless unspeakable crimes committed in this war against humanity by the two degenerate and irresponsible dynasties. We will not remain a part of a state which has no justification for existence, and which, refusing to accept the fundamental principles of modern world-organization, remains only an artificial and immoral political structure, hindering every movement toward democratic and social progress. The Habsburg dynasty, weighed down by a huge inheritance of error and crime, is a perpetual menace to the peace of the world, and we deem it our duty toward humanity and civilization to aid in bringing about its downfall and destruction.

We reject the sacrilegious assertion that the power of the Habsburg and Hohenzollern dynasties is of divine origin; we refuse to recognize the divine right of kings. Our nation elected the Habsburgs



to the throne of Bohemia of its own free will and by the same right deposes them. We hereby declare the Habsburg dynasty unworthy of leading our nation, and deny all of their claims to rule in the Czechoslovak land, which we here and now declare shall henceforth be a free and independent people and nation.

We accept and shall adhere to the ideals of modern democracy, as they have been the ideals of our nation for centuries. We accept the American principles as laid down by President Wilson: the principles of liberated mankind,—of the actual equality of nations,—and of governments deriving all their just powers from the consent of the governed. We, the nation of Comenius, cannot but accept these principles expressed in the American Declaration of Independence, the principles of Lincoln, and of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. For these principles our nation shed its blood in the memorable Hussite Wars five hundred years ago, for these same principles, beside her allies in Russia, Italy, and France, our nation is shedding its blood today.

We shall outline only the main principles of the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Nation; the final decision as to the Constitution itself falls to the legally chosen representatives of the liberated and united people.

The Czechoslovak State shall be a republic. In constant endeavor for progress it will guarantee complete freedom of conscience, religion and science, literature and art, speech, the press and the right of assembly and petition. The church shall be separated from the state. Our democracy shall rest on universal suffrage; women shall be placed on an equal footing with men, politically, socially, and culturally. The rights of the minority shall be safeguarded by proportional representation; national minorities shall enjoy equal rights. The Government shall be parliamentary in form and shall recognize the principles of initiative and referendum. The standing army will be replaced by militia.

The Czechoslovak Nation will carry out far-reaching social and economic reforms; the large estates will be redeemed for home colonization, patents of nobility will be abolished. Our nation will assume its part of the Austro-Hungarian pre-war debt;—the debts for this war we leave to those who incurred them.

In its foreign policy the Czechoslovak Nation will accept its full share of responsibility in the reorganization of eastern Europe. It accepts fully the democratic and social principle of nationalism and subscribes to the doctrine that all covenants and treaties shall be entered into openly and frankly without secret diplomacy.

Our Constitution shall provide an efficient, rational, and just government, which will exclude all special privileges and prohibit class legislation.

Democracy has defeated theocratic autocracy. Militarism is overcome,—democracy is victorious;—on the basis of democracy mankind will be reorganized. The forces of darkness have served the victory of light,—the longed-for age of humanity is dawning.

We believe in democracy,—we believe in liberty,—and liberty evermore.

Given in Paris, on the 18th day of October 1918.

PROFESSOR THOMAS G. MASARYK

*Prime Minister and Minister of Finance*

GENERAL DR. MILAN R. ŠTEFÁNIK

*Minister of National Defense*

DR. EDWARD BENEŠ

*Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Interior*

Rejection by President Wilson of Autonomy as a Solution of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Questions, October 19—Arrangements for a Loan to the Czecho-Slovak National Council—The Establishment of National Authorities in Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav Territories—Friction between the Jugo-Slavs and Italians

[For the declaration to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the President no longer accepts “autonomy” of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav peoples as a basis of peace, see the note transmitted through the Swedish Legation, October 19, 1918, *ante*, page 368.]

File No. 861.00/3027a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 19, 1918, 2 p. m.*

5960. The Government of the United States has decided upon a loan to the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a *de facto* co-belligerent Government. Advances will be made by the Secretary of the Treasury under authority of the Second Liberty Bond Act and the acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto. In order to make the credits available to Professor Masaryk here it is necessary Department should be informed to its satisfaction that legal formalities concerning his authority to enter into the loan arrangement and sign the obligations, have been complied with. To this end Department must have (1) an authentic copy of the Constitution, by-laws or other fundamental law showing the power of the Council to contract foreign loans and to issue obligations therefor, and (2) the minutes of the proceedings of the Council or other appropriate document issued in accordance with its Constitution, by-laws or fundamental law authorizing Masaryk to enter into the loan agreement

and to sign the obligations thereunder and to receive the advances. Please communicate at once with Czecho-Slovak National Council and obtain the above documents in the original or by authenticated copy and telegraph complete text verbatim so that they will reach Washington not later than morning of October 23.

This Government desires that these documents should show authority of Masaryk to enter into the loan agreement in behalf of his Government which will be valid and binding internationally.

LANSING

File No. 763.72119/2229

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge), temporarily at Rome, to the Secretary of State*

No. 113

ROME, September 13, 1918.

[Received October 21.]

SIR: Referring to my despatch No. 107, of the 26th ultimo,<sup>1</sup> reporting, in accordance with your telegram of August 7, 6 p. m.,<sup>2</sup> regarding the position of the Serbian Government as to the character of the relation to be established between Serbia and the Yugo-Slav provinces of Austria-Hungary in the event that the latter obtain their freedom,—I have the honor to inform you that shortly before leaving Corfu I had a conversation upon this subject with Mr. Stoyan Protitch, Acting President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs. Mr. Protitch is generally considered to be closer to Mr. Pashitch than any other of his colleagues and comes immediately after Mr. Pashitch in importance in the Radical Party, which is now in power.

. . . I inquired of Mr. Protitch as to his views regarding the constitution of a future Yugo-Slav state. Mr. Protitch replied that the foundations for such a state must lie in the Declaration of Corfu, although this declaration might be made even more democratic. All the present Yugo-Slav portions of Austria-Hungary would enjoy absolute political equality with Serbia and there could be no possibility of any Serbian hegemony or superiority of any sort. Serbia moreover desired no such superiority. He saw no reason why sooner or later Bulgaria should not also join the Yugo-Slav state if she agreed to come in on the same footing as the others. Bulgarians spoke a tongue closely allied to Serbian and there was no very great racial difference between Bulgarians and Serbians, although the former had a considerable admixture of Turanian blood. This

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 828.

<sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 823.

would be the logical solution and he greatly hoped it would some day be possible.

Regarding the details of the form of government, these must naturally be left to be decided by the constitutional convention which would be called and elected (as all elections were prescribed to be made by the Declaration of Corfu) by equal, direct, secret and universal ballot. His own idea was, however, that the future state must possess strength. The central Government must, therefore, control military, naval and foreign affairs, national finances and national economic and commercial matters. Also, the civil and criminal law must be uniform for the whole state. Outside of these matters, the rest and all local matters must be left to local assemblies. The administrative divisions of the state might remain as at present, each division having its local assembly, or the present divisions might be somewhat modified or possibly entirely new divisions might be made: All this depended upon the decisions of the constitutional convention. The central Government would be a ministry, responsible to Parliament as at present. Parliament itself might well be composed of two Chambers instead of one Chamber as at present.

Mr. Protitch emphasized the democratic character of the new state and the absolute equality of all its inhabitants and territories.

I have also recently had an interview with General Rachitch, Minister of War, in which I was able to turn the conversation to the same subject. General Rachitch stated that it was quite impossible to go into any details at present as all of these must be settled by the constitutional convention. Nevertheless, he might say that the new state must, of course, be built upon thoroughly democratic principles and upon the outlines so clearly laid down in the Declaration of Corfu. Complete equality would be guaranteed to all portions of the territories and their inhabitants. Serbia must enjoy no position in the new state in any way privileged or different from the other portions. If Serbia should become pre-eminent in the new state it would only be through the individual merits of her population.

Several of my colleagues with whom I have talked on this subject express the opinion that the present Serbia, in the possible future state, will tend to be over-shadowed by Croatia which is only slightly smaller in population and is far more advanced educationally, economically and financially. Croatia has also suffered far less than Serbia in the present and recent Balkan wars. In addition to enormous losses of productive capital, Serbia, it is generally assumed, has lost fully one-quarter of her population since the first Balkan War.

I have [etc.]

H. PERCIVAL DODGE



File No. 861.00/3028

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 22, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received October 23, 12.37 p. m.]

5531. Your 5960, October 19, 2 p. m. Upon the founding of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in February, 1916, the Constitution and Federal laws of the Council were adopted February 6, 1916. Article 5 of the Constitution reads as follows:

The financial resources to enable the National Council to work politically, diplomatically and militarily for the liberation of the Czecho-Slovak countries are obtained as follows:

- (1) Gifts of compatriots in Allied countries;
- (2) By national contributions voluntarily accepted by our compatriots;
- (3) By loans concluded in Allied countries or in the United States by the issuing of obligations in those countries with their consent.

Under this article Professor Masaryk contracted loans for the Czecho-Slovak military activity with Russia in May, 1917. Later he contracted a new loan for the same purpose with the British and French Governments. This money was devoted to recruiting Czecho-Slovak soldiers in Russia.

Under the same article he issued notes for a loan of 5,000,000 francs. The subscriptions to this were made by the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia. The revolution put a stop to the subscriptions.

The powers of Professor Masaryk, President of the Council, were established by a decree of February 10, 1916, indicating the powers of the various members of the Council. This was a complement to the Constitution and fundamental laws of the National Council. In this decree it is said:

The President of the Council is charged with representing the Council, appointing its delegates and acting in all questions of general policy in the name of the Council. Furthermore, all financial questions concerning the Czecho-Slovak movement are under his jurisdiction. In this capacity he is charged—

- (1) With securing for the Council financial resources for its political, military activity in conformity with the fundamental law and constitution of the Council and particularly article 5 of the Constitution;
- (2) To oversee the expenses, decide as to the disposal of funds and to assign them to other departments of the council;
- (3) To contract loans, sign in the name of the Council all financial agreements and obligations, to receive all funds and advances and dispose of them according to the decisions already adopted.

When the Czecho-Slovak Government was established on September 26, 1918, Professor Masaryk was made President and continuing his previous functions was confirmed as Minister with his previous authority in matters of finance. On September 14, 1917, Professor Masaryk in virtue of the fundamental laws of the Council floated a loan in Russia. Following is the text of the bond:

Bond of the national Czecho-Slovak loan at 5 per cent for ----- francs. The National Council representing the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Bohemia and abroad will pay according to the contract stated the sum of ----- francs to Mr. ----- which have been loaned by him to the National Council for the War of Independence. In the name of the National Council, T. G. Masaryk, President.

The decision of the Provisional Government of September 26, 1918, confirming Professor Masaryk in his previous functions is in the customary terms:

Mr. Masaryk, President of the Government and of the Council of Ministers assumes the portfolio of finances and retains the functions in regard to financial affairs in the same measure as previously.

Upon the foregoing textual statements all previous loans have been floated. This information was given to Mr. Gibson by Mr. Beneš, head of the Council in the absence of Masaryk, with statement that it contains all the matter in the Constitution, by-laws and other documents pertaining to the subject of authority to contract foreign loans. Complete copy of these instruments, the Constitution being very long, are being forwarded by pouch.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/3028

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram—Extract]

WASHINGTON, *October 25, 1918, noon.*

6014. Your 5531, October 22.

The documents quoted by you appear to show that the President of the Council by its fundamental law has authority to make foreign loans and to sign obligations therefor, to receive the funds and to dispose of them. Although you state that Professor Masaryk was made President there is no decree or other proceeding quoted making Masaryk President of the Council. As a necessary legal formality the Department should be furnished with text of such paper at the earliest moment.

Department assumes that papers being forwarded by you or to be forwarded by you in this matter are authenticated copies of the

originals. You should satisfy yourself that these authenticated copies are correct.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/11902

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, [October 25, 1918.]

[Received 12 a. m.]

5391. Following telegraphed to Swiss press from Budapest, October 24:

During speech of Delegate Balba, Count Károlyi entered Parliament and handed speaker telegram from Fiume, stating that Croatian soldiers of 79th infantry regiment had crowded into Honved barracks and disarmed Hungarian troops. Public buildings were occupied and the state attorney was taken prisoner and city police disarmed. The railroad station was occupied, the tracks were torn up. The Governor begs for help. Session of Parliament was interrupted. Members of opposition demanded resignation of Wekerle Government. Apponyi and Andrássy supported this, but counseled calm.

*Pester Journal* reports: Traveller from Fiume states that conflict between the Croatian and Hungarian soldiers in Fiume cost many lives and hundreds of wounded. Shop signs in Hungarian, German and Italian languages and Hungarian coats of arms destroyed. Croatian tricolor raised over public buildings. Croatian companies proceeded according to prearranged plan. Garrison of regiment recruited from Otočac disarmed Styrian battalion which was defending itself and occupied the harbor. All Government offices and post offices stations were seized by Croatian military. Hungarian and Italian population fled from Fiume. City governor resists in an outlying part of Fiume with four Hungarian companies. Reinforcements not yet arrived.

City Governor Toerek telephones Government that Croatian soldiers continued to hold railway centers of city. State railway station was destroyed. Suburban crowds entered city in the evening and joined the soldiers in robbing the *bourgeois*.

*Az Uzag*, 24th, reports demonstrations from Karlovitz; two infantry regiments are reported have mutinied and the railway storehouses were entered and robbed.

STOVALL

File No. 861.00/3041

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 25, 1918, 12 a. m.

[Received October 26, 1.57 a. m.]

5569. French Government recognized Czecho-Slovak Provisional Government 15th instant, Italian Government 21st instant.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/11905

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *October 24, 1918, 2 p. m.*[Received (*October 26?*), 9.37 a. m.]

5376. It is reported that two Czech deputies of Austrian Parliament, Klofáč and Habermann, have received passports to proceed to Switzerland in order to obtain accurate information regarding the sentiment in the Allied countries especially as concerns the attitude towards the independence of Bohemia. In allowing them to leave, the Austrian authorities apparently hoped that information which they might receive here would serve to discourage the Czech extremists.

In view of America's clear recognition of Bohemian right of self-determination only two important questions present themselves that these deputies might inquire about:

(1) [Will] America support the Czechs in view of all claims to historic Bohemia, which now includes several million Germans or only oldest indisputably Czech portions of the country?

(2) What is America's attitude toward the formation of a Danube confederation of independent states, including Bohemia, German Austria, Hungary, Yugo-Slavia, Roumania?

STOVALL

[For a description of political conditions in Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, see telegram from the Minister in Switzerland, No. 5395, October 25, 1918, received October 27, *ante*, page 392.]

File No. 763.72119/2261

*The Secretary of State to the Serbian Chargé (Simitch)*WASHINGTON, *October 28, 1918.*

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of October 14,<sup>1</sup> requesting a declaration by the United States, and the other countries at war with Germany, in favor of the freedom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary and their union with Serbia in a free and democratic state, such as was provided for in the Declaration of Corfu.

In reply I beg to state that the United States has expressed itself freely in support of the right of the Jugo-Slavs to be entirely freed from Austrian domination and that at the present time it does not feel that it can go further in declaring a policy which manifestly depends upon the self-determination of the peoples involved.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 842.



File No. 763.72119/2464

*The President of the Czechoslovak Provisional Government  
(Masaryk) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1918.

MR. SECRETARY: You will allow me to express my views on the last Austro-Hungarian note,<sup>1</sup> as it primarily concerns our nation, and I can claim a fairly good knowledge of all questions involved.

The note again reveals the Austro-Hungarian and Hapsburg meanness and duplicity. The note says that the Austro-Hungarian Government "adheres to the same *point of view contained* in the last (President's) note"; that means that they accept some general views which can be deduced or inferred from the President's note. But the President clearly stated that our National Council is a *de facto* Government clothed with proper authority to direct not only the military, but also the political affairs of the Czechoslovaks. That means that Austria-Hungary must negotiate with us. President Wilson says so expressly in his note, insisting that not he, but our Nation, shall be the judge of how Austria-Hungary can satisfy our aspirations and rights. The National Council is not only the recognized representative of the Czechoslovak Nation, but also authorized to act as such by the Nation herself (repeated declaration of the Czech leaders, (Staněk, Stránský) who explicitly stated that the Austro-Hungarian Government must deal not with them, but with the National Council in Paris, also the action of the Czech deputies in leaving the Parliament on October 9, with the declaration that they forever sever all relations with Austria-Hungary).

It is for this reason that I think the President cannot answer the Austro-Hungarian note without weakening his position; it is quite evident that Austria-Hungary, like Germany, is trying to continue the discussion. Austria-Hungary apparently deserts Germany, but I am not quite sure whether this desertion is not made in Germany; at any rate even when we accept the services of a traitor, we do not respect him. The Hapsburgs betraying their ally, who in this war twice saved them from destruction (first against the Russians, then against the Italians), will betray their opponents.

I do not see any other possibility than that you, Mr. Secretary, notify the Austro-Hungarian Government that the President cannot enter into further parleys with them, giving the reasons.

In the question of "overtures" it is evident that Austria-Hungary, like Germany, is trying to induce the President to begin the

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<sup>1</sup>Text transmitted to the Secretary of State by the Swedish Minister's note No. 5328 of Oct. 29, *ante*, p. 404.

overtures in a way which would enable them to say that America is war-weary.

Finally, I must emphasize the fact that up to the present, Austria-Hungary was ruled in a quite absolute manner: if America cannot enter into negotiations with the absolute masters of Germany, she cannot enter into negotiations with the absolute masters of Austria-Hungary, who declared the war without ever thinking of asking for the sanction of Parliament or the people. That is required by political consistency and by President Wilson's repeated utterances. In case of Germany, it means negotiation with representatives of the German people; in case of Austria-Hungary with representatives of the different peoples of the Empire.

I enclose a copy of what I think should be included among the conditions under which an armistice could be granted.<sup>1</sup>

Believe me [etc.]

T. G. MASARYK

File No. 861.00/3071

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 28, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received October 29, 2.10 p. m..]

5600. Department's 6014, October 25, 12 noon. The following is the text of the decision of the Czecho-Slovak National Council whereby Professor Masaryk is made its president:

Composition of the Czecho-Slovak National Council: In pursuance of the decision of February 10, 1916, in regard to the internal organization of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, it was duly organized.

The decision on the subject is in the following terms: In virtue of the fundamental law of the National Council and the decision taken February 10, 1916, supplementing the fundamental law, the National Council is established as follows: Mr. Thomas G. Masaryk, President; Mr. Edward Beneš, Secretary General; Mr. Joseph Durich, member; Mr. Milan Štefánik, member. Sub-sections of the Council special bureau shall be established in Russia and the United States.

When the Council was changed to a provisional government, Masaryk was confirmed in his functions by the following decisions of the National Council under date September 26, 1918:

Decision of the National Council of September 26, 1918:

In view of the successive recognitions of the National Czecho-Slovak Council as a *de facto* Government by the Allied Governments

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and the United States, the declaration of the United States of September 3, agreement of the National Council with Great Britain of September 3, and with France of June [*September*] 28, the declaration of Mr. Orlando, President of the Italian Council of Ministers, in view of the situation of our national armies in Russia, France and Italy and their recognition as a belligerent army, in view of the general political situation in our countries and the attempts of the Central Empires to mislead Allied Governments and the United States by their pacifist maneuvers, the National Czecho-Slovak Council desires to establish itself as Provisional Government of the Czecho-Slovak countries. Mr. Masaryk is appointed President of the Government and of the Council of Ministers, Minister of Finance; M. M. Štefánik, Minister of [National Defense;] M. Edouard Beneš, Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the Interior. The attributions and jurisdiction of each are those which are generally inherent in the functions of such ministers in governments of other nations. But in view of the special situation of the Government of the Czecho-Slovak countries, the special functions which previously belonged to the President of the National Czecho-Slovak Council and to the General Secretary belong now also to the President of the Government and to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This applies particularly to the functions concerning the handling of finances by the President of the Government, Minister of Finance, and to the functions of the interior organizations of the Government belonging to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

SHARP

File No. 763.72/12038

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 1, 1918, 12 p. m.

[Received November 2, 11.49 a. m.]

5666. On hearing rumors today to the effect that the Jugo-Slavs had determined to retain possession of the Austrian fleet on the Adriatic in defiance of the Allied Powers but subject to the disposition of the United States, I asked Doctor Trumbich, now in Paris, to come to the Embassy that I might ascertain the exact situation. This was on the suggestion of Colonel House. Reference to Doctor Trumbich and his work was made at some length in my No. 5492, October 19, 12 midnight.<sup>1</sup>

Doctor Trumbich spent an hour with me going over the situation, which unless promptly dealt with will present some embarrassing if not serious considerations. He told me that Austrian naval commanders having been quite generally recalled, the ships had been left in possession of the Jugo-Slav crews even more inimical to Italy

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

than to Austria, that if Italian warships should appear in waters adjacent to the Austrian fleet thus manned they would be attacked. The doctor further stated that the Austrian fleet would be turned over only to war vessels of the United States, and this whether on the Adriatic or in the Danube. He told me with much feeling how the Italian Government had thrown into prison on several occasions Jugo-Slav aviators who had [flown] across the Adriatic to give the Italian naval officers valuable information about the Austrian fleet. He declared that as long as the London agreement of April 1915 remained in force whereby Jugo-Slav [seacoast] and territory had been bargained to Italy, his people would retain possession of the Austrian fleet now committed to their charge but instead [omission]. I shall confer with Colonel House tomorrow upon this new situation.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/3134

*The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, *October 21, 1918.*[*Received November 2, 1.46 p. m.*]

149. I am officially requested to transmit the following to Department with request to transmit to President Wilson and Professor Masaryk:

Ekaterinburg, October 12. The Czecho-Slovak National Council, Russian branch, and all the Czecho-Slovak Army after four months of fighting in Russia during which they were separated from all the world gladly welcomed the information that the Government of the United States of America and all the Allied Governments recognized the Czecho-Slovak Nation to have a state of independence and the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the Government of the Czecho-Slovak Nation. With satisfaction we accepted the information seeing this as an argument that the endeavors of our supreme organ the Czecho-Slovak National Council with Professor Masaryk as its president and to which we absolutely subject ourselves were rightly estimated by the Allies. We assure you that all the doings of the Czecho-Slovak Nation in our oppressed home and on the Allied fronts are directed by one will to deliver ourselves from the German oppression and to stay faithfully as a free nation side by side with the Allies in the fight for victory of the truth and right. The Czecho-Slovak Nation never forget who in the heavy moment gave it a helping hand to the way of liberty.

The Czecho-Slovak Council, Russian branch. Signed, Vice President Jesensky, countersigned, Secretary Richter.

[HARRIS]



File No. 763.72/13376

*The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 2, 1918, 11 p. m.

[Received November 2, 7.33 p. m.]

37. For the President:

The following telegram was despatched this morning:

Messrs. Tressic, Pavisic, Bugsck, Koch, commander of the fleet at Pola. In reply to your telegram with salutations of friendship we notify you to proceed immediately to Corfu under a white flag to place yourself at the disposal of the commander in chief of the Allied forces. Notify the commander in chief at Corfu by wireless of the moment of your departure and your arrival. Signed, Clemenceau, House, Lloyd George, Orlando.

This telegram is addressed to the Jugo-Slav committee at Pola. At the same time it was agreed that the French, British, Italian, and the United States Governments should each send the following instructions to their naval commandants in chief in the Adriatic:

Until further notice you are not to attack the ships of the Austro-Hungarian fleet in port. Take measures to insure the passage of those ships which may come to Corfu under the white flag to place themselves at your disposal. You may expect to receive [from] Pola a confidential telegram advising you of their departure.

EDWARD HOUSE

File No. 763.72/12043

*The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

ROME, November 2, 1918, 1 a. m.

[Received November 3, 2.20 a. m.]

2274. An intercepted radio message reported to me by naval attaché:

To Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, and to the champions of liberty throughout the world. At midnight of October 30-31, the National Jugo-Slav Committee, after having broken the chains of age-long oppression, and acting in accord with the officers and soldiers of the Czecho-Slovaks, Poles, and the Italian element of the inhabitants of Pola, appeal to the sublime idealism of the President.<sup>1</sup> From this moment we consider ourselves comrades of those fighting for justice and for the liberty of the peoples and we would esteem ourselves happy to be able to salute with grateful hearts both as an ally and friend a naval division of the United States or of an Allied Power not interested in our national problems

<sup>1</sup> Jumbled phrases rearranged.

which will arrive shortly in the fortified port of Pola. Signed for the National Council at Zagreb, the local committee of Pola, *per* Lozre Scalieza as President and captain of frigate *Metod*, Koch, as head of the national defense. Postscript: Koch is a Jugo-Slav.

Colosimo, Minister of the Colonies, who represents Orlando as Premier in the latter's absence, has just shown me a copy of the foregoing radio and appears to be much disturbed by it. He has requested me to bring matter to the attention of my Government as it is one which concerns Italy deeply; that Italy is the Allied Power interested in the problems referred to in the message; and that it would be [proper] to reply that on the basis of the deliberations of the Paris conference the Austrian fleet will be subject to the conditions adopted there and consequently it will be the Italian fleet which will present itself at Pola to take the appropriate measures.

No one knows whom this committee at Pola represents and it can hardly be expected that Italy in the moment of victory will sit by and see a new flag hoisted on the ships of her defeated enemy by those who have been hitherto members of the enemy's forces.

I learn further that Italy has just torpedoed Austria's largest dreadnaught and that some committee of Jugo-Slavs have protested claiming that the Austrian vessels are now ships of a friendly power.

NELSON PAGE

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[For a description of political conditions in Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, see telegram from the Minister in Switzerland, No. 5543, November 2, 1918, received November 3, *ante*, page 445.]

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File No. 763.72119/2744

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

CORFU, November 3, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received November 4, 9.07 p. m.]

My October 16, 10 a. m.,<sup>1</sup> your October 2, noon,<sup>2</sup> regarding Bulgarian armistice. A note just received from Minister of Foreign Affairs states Servian Government agrees with the Government of United States and has no intention of asking for the settlement of Balkan questions before final treaty of peace.

DODGE

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<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>*Ante*, p. 334.

File No. 763.72119/2469

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

BERNE, November 3, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received November 5, 5.20 a. m.]

5559. Members of Legation have just had exhaustive discussion with Kramárz, Czech leader. . . . He insists that German Austria must not be united with Germany because such a union would menace Czechs and Yugo-Slavs. He declares that he cannot understand the sentimental friendliness to German Austrians; as those responsible for the war they should not receive same consideration as Slav races of Austria who had supported Allies and their union with Germany should be declared a *casus belli* by the Entente and America. He insists on vital necessity for a common frontier between the Czechs and Yugo-Slavs even at expense of Magyar nationality, advocates territorial junction of Ruthenians to Slovaks and a common frontier with Transylvanian Roumanians in order that railways may connect Bohemia with Black Sea and Adriatic over Slav territory. The Germans within Bohemia will, he states, be glad to remain in Czech state to avoid German commercial competition. He shows little confidence in power of league of nations to enforce peace. . . .

STOVALL

File No. 763.72/12055

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

No. 6706

PARIS, October 21, 1918.

[Received November 5.]

SIR: Referring to my telegram No. 5492 of the 19th instant, 12 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> I have the honor now to enclose copies of the statement left by Dr. Ante Trumbich, to which reference was therein made. It may be of interest to the Department to know that after the Doctor left me at the Chancery, inasmuch as he was to depart for London early the following morning, he spent the whole of that evening until 6 o'clock in the morning preparing this statement, which, however, his secretary was not able to get typewritten for delivery for some days thereafter.

In the light of recent events, all of the Doctor's observations as to the rebellion among the Yugo-Slavs against Austria, and their

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

willingness to fight with the Allied armies, would seem to be fully confirmed.

References to the hostile feeling exercised by the Italian Government toward his people reflect the feelings which the Yugo-Slavs—and, for that matter, the Serbians also—have toward Italy. It is one of distrust and dislike. The Albanians have much the same prejudice, and it might be said that all the peoples living on the eastern coast of the Adriatic look with jealous eye toward any encroachment of Italian authority on that soil.

In a subsequent despatch I will forward a very instructive and interesting map<sup>1</sup> which Doctor Trumbich left with me, and which shows the section of that coast which, by the London agreement in 1915, Great Britain, Russia and France stipulated should be given to Italy as the price of her entrance into the war.

I have [etc.]

WM. G. SHARP

[Enclosure—Extract]

*Memorandum of the President of the Jugo-Slav Committee in London (Trumbić)*

#### ITALO-YUGOSLAV CONFLICT

Italy would not enter the war on the side of the Allies until Russia, England and France refused [*agreed?*] to sign the memorandum guaranteeing Italy that she was to get the shores of the Adriatic Sea; with all the islands—(just as it is pointed out with red pencil on the added geographical card.<sup>2</sup>) That memorandum was signed by those great powers and by Italy, in London, on April 25 [*26*], 1915.<sup>3</sup>

The Italian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Sonnino, is still adhering to the clauses of that convention. It was given out in Austria at the time the Bolsheviki published it in Petrograd. That convention caused the greatest dissatisfaction and profoundest apprehension among the Yugoslavs who desire their freedom and do not want to come from under the Austrian yoke into the Italian one. That is one of the main causes of the distrust of the Yugoslavs in their dealings with Italy.

France and England are bound by their signature to please Italy, and the Yugoslavs are to-day looking toward America, who stands for the self-determination of nationalities, that she will liberate them and enable them to choose a government of their own.

<sup>1</sup> Not reproduced.

<sup>2</sup> Not transmitted with this despatch.

<sup>3</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I, pp. 497-500.



If Italy will get those Yugoslav territories there will never be peace between Italy and the Yugoslavs. And sooner or later that would be one of the causes of a new war.

The whole territory north and east of that part of the Adriatic Sea that belongs to Austria is inhabited by the Slavonic people and only in a few small town centers, for instance Trieste, and some towns on the western shores of Istria, are there inhabitants of Italian extraction. Those town centers depend for everything they need upon the surrounding countries that are thoroughly Slavonic. Here there are no Italian villages. The fight of the Yugoslavs against the Italian pretensions is a fight of the Slavonian democracy against small numbers of Italian *bourgeoisie* and against the imperialistic aspirations of Italy.

It is a very threatening struggle because the Yugoslav democracy is self conscious and civilized and wants to achieve in this war its main aim. . . .<sup>1</sup> their liberation from Austro-Hungary and the union of the whole race of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—including the Serbians of Serbia proper and Montenegro proper—into one democratic state of their own. That state with their 12,000,000 population and with the territory of 260,000 square kilometres stretching between the Danube and the Adriatic Sea will be the natural barrier and bulwark against German expansion into the Balkans, Constantinople and Asia Minor.

The Austro-Hungarian and the Balkan problem cannot be solved successfully if in the first place the Yugoslav problem (which represents the bridge between Central Europe and Asia Minor) fails to receive most serious attention from the Allies' diplomats.

As a seafaring nation the Yugoslavs are known to the whole world. The majority of the sailors of the Austrian commercial fleet, officers as well as men, are Yugoslavs from the Adriatic. Five hundred thousand tons of that commercial fleet belong to the Yugoslavs.

The Yugoslav Nation wants to maintain its independent position on the sea and will fight with all its powers against Italy and anyone who would try to dispossess them.

#### THE RÔLE AMERICA IS TO PLAY BETWEEN ITALIANS AND YUGOSLAVS

America must offer her protection to the Yugoslavs in accordance to the principles laid down by President Wilson, in accordance to its traditions and against the imperialistic pretensions of Italy. If the Allies want the Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary to give their

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<sup>1</sup> Punctuation as in the original.

support an attempt must be made to convince Italy that her claims are unjust.

In France and England there exists at the moment a disposition to accede to these just demands. But the convention of London still binds them. America has free hands and possesses the power to influence Italy by her support in money, food stuffs and war materials.

Italy is asking America for military assistance. Contrary to this demand America asks nothing from Italy. If America makes her opinion clear to Italy [on] the problem of the Yugoslavs, the success is assured.

The foremost Italian newspapers have already published the facts that America does not entertain great sympathies for Italy and does not want to send troops to Italy on account of the Yugoslav question. So the Italian public opinion is ready and prepared to accept the American decision in the Italy-Yugoslav conflict. We need to-day a strong official policy and influence brought upon the Foreign Minister, Sonnino, who is one of the conservative politicians of the old school, and who has made manifest his Germanophilism.

Sonnino kept away from the Congress of Oppressed Nationalities of Austro-Hungary which took place in Rome in April, 1918. And the press, inspired by him, is still showing an indisposition toward the new political constellation. Sonnino opposes the fighting of the Yugoslav war prisoners in the Serbian Army. It has also been proven that he was against the enrolling of the Czecho-Slovak war prisoners with whom he has no territorial disagreements. The pact between the Czecho-Slovak National Alliance for the formation of a Czecho-Slovak Legion was made and signed by Minister President Orlando, without the cooperation of Mr. Sonnino.

#### WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

Italy should be willing to reconsider the policy of the resolutions, adopted at the convention at London, April 25 [*April 26, 1915?*].

#### THE MEANS POSSESSED BY AMERICA

Italy, mobilized, has, as authentic figures show, about 5,200,000 men. In spite of this Italy will not undertake an offensive against the Austria-Hungary Army—but asks America for 200,000 men.

America's answer to Italy should be that Italy will get all the help whenever she renounces her imperialistic pretensions. If Italy

renounces the London convention, influenced to do so by America, America will have done much for the oppressed Yugoslavs.

#### HOW TO HASTEN THE END OF THE WAR

A well prepared and well conducted naval and military campaign against Sebenico will facilitate and hasten the destruction of the Austrian Army and Navy. That would mean the inner political collapse of Austria. After that is done the surrendering of Germany will be the matter of short delay.

#### WHAT DO THE JUGOSLAVS EXPECT OF AMERICA?

The Yugoslav question is a part of the Austro-Hungarian problem.

The Czecho-Slovaks and the Poles succeeded in getting their recognition and the promise for their independent future.

America, France and England see in the Czecho-Slovak National Alliance and the Polish National Council the representatives and chief organs of the respective nationalities.

The Yugoslavs of Austria-Hungary deserve and should receive the same recognition.

England and France, though favourably inclined, failed to do so on account of the Italian activities.

It is necessary that America, bound by no convention to Italy, come forward with an independent recognition of the Yugoslavs of Austria Hungary and their representative the Yugoslav Committee in London.

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File No. 763.72/12159

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, November 7, 1918, 12 noon.

[Received November 8, 10.14 a. m.]

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me last evening three delegates, the Dalmatian Tressic, Pavisic, an Agram Socialist, and a Triestian, accompanied by Yugo-Slav military and naval officers, presented themselves to the Servian Government with credentials from the Serb-Croat-Slovene or Yugo-Slav National Council of Agram. Delegates declared: They desired to confer with Servian Government and ask its advice as to how to proceed; they had themselves received the surrender of Austro-Hungarian fleet now held at Allies' disposal; National Council had authority over all Yugo-Slavia and received best news, all population being united and excellent disposition prevailing; there was much feeling, however, because of the Allies' troops only Italians had so far occupied their

territory; Italians had sunk *Viribus Unitis* while flying Yugo-Slav colors; food conditions alarming throughout Yugo-Slavia; other conciliator [*delegate*] on the way from Bosnia.

Cabinet Minister greatly elated. Crown Prince expected shortly.

DODGE

File No. 763.72/12038

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, November 9, 1918, 7 p. m.

6236. Your 5666, November 1. The Department is somewhat disturbed at the possible dangers involved in the Italian Jugo-Slav situation. The Serbs are reported to have crossed into Hungary and it is feared that the Italians may in a few days occupy certain points on the Dalmatian coast. Please consult with Colonel House and cable report of situation as regarded in Paris.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/12195

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, November 8, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received November 10, 9.30 a. m.]

Following is substance of radio sent yesterday by Jugo-Slav delegates to National Council, Agram:

On arrival called immediately on Entente naval commander in chief, who informed us of armistice conditions, requesting our opinion. Cannot telegraph these as still secret. We answered had no authority to give binding reply, but would reply until your authorization received and Trumbitch arrives. Fearing he cannot come, are telegraphing him and Zashitch our reply to commander in chief. We ask recognition of our state, and of treaty of Pola regarding surrender of fleet, recall of Italian troops from contentious regions, gulfs and cities. We place our whole Navy as far as not needed by us at Entente's disposal, also commercial fleet, arsenal Pola fort, and other forts, railways, on condition all returned at peace, Entente bearing expense; that we be represented equally at peace congress by plenipotentiaries nominated by us or with Serbia as single state; that Entente revictual us against payment and grant loan for state improvement. Countersigned with commander in chief who drank to prosperity of Yugo-Slavia. All going on better than would appear. Hope to save all fleet, and for favorable settlement other contentious questions. Reassured, unanimous in opinion.

DODGE



File No. 763.72/12196

*The Special Agent at Corfu (Dodge) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

CORFU, November 9, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received November 10, 5.25 p. m.]

French naval commander in chief informs through the French Chargé d'Affaires that in response to request of Yugo-Slav delegate at Cattaro for transports for Austro-Hungarian Army and protection of Yugo-Slav transports, he is sending cruiser to enter Cattaro as soon as entrance cleared. Invites Entente forces to be represented there. Commander in chief has received letter from Yugo-Slav provisional government of Dalmatia at Spalato drawing attention to landing of Italian troops in Dalmatia and requesting notification by Entente that this may provoke unfortunate outbreaks and that if an occupation is necessary, it may be collective in the name of Entente.

Conferences here considering the form of relationship between the Agram [National] Council and Servian Government. Formation of a joint committee including members of both Governments is being considered on account of difficulties of constitutional nature in Servia preventing immediate union. Servian Government has no objection to Entente [omission] Agram National Council. Foreign Office has shown me certified copy of formal act dated October 31 of surrender by Austro-Hungarian Government of fleet to delegates of National Council of Agram.

Does the Department desire me to repeat my information telegrams to Embassy Paris for the American representatives?

[DODGE]

File No. 861.00/3150

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Commissioner of the Czecho-Slovak National Council (Pergler)*

WASHINGTON, November 12, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. PERGLER: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your personal letter of the 6th instant,<sup>1</sup> and to inform you that the Secretary of State has advised Doctor Masaryk that your appointment as Commissioner in the United States of the Czecho-Slovak National Council will be acceptable to this Government, and that he will be pleased, after Doctor Masaryk's departure from the United States, to conduct with you any business of interest to the Czecho-Slovak National Council.

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM PHILLIPS

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE POLISH NATIONAL  
MOVEMENT: RECOGNITION OF THE POLISH ARMY AND NATIONAL  
COMMITTEE AS AUTONOMOUS AND COBELLIGERENT

File No. 860c.01/90

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, *March 8, 1918.*

[*Received March 9.*]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government has just informed me that, in its opinion, the Allied Powers should not, without uttering a joint protest, witness the events which tend to culminate in another partition of Poland and to deliver up to Austro-German domination integrant parts of that ancient Kingdom.

Continued silence on this point would be contrary and harmful to the rights of the peoples which we have ceaselessly affirmed and to the fundamental requirements of a just and lasting peace. Again we should not turn a deaf ear to the appeals that come to us from the Polish patriots.

It is, to my Government's mind, the duty of the Allies to uphold the claims that have ever been formulated with respect to Poland and have been particularly so formulated with so much eloquence and accuracy by the President of the United States. It is likewise advisable in every respect to promote and encourage the resistance of a people whose rôle in the midst of our enemies may prove of the highest importance for the very outcome of the war.

In compliance with instructions received, I have the honor to inquire of Your Excellency whether the American Government would not be disposed to join in a declaration a draft of which is herein enclosed. The text would of course be modified wherever it may be deemed advisable so to do. The early publication of such a document however is regarded as extremely desirable by my Government.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

[Enclosure—Translation]

*Draft of a Declaration Concerning Poland*

The Governments of \_\_\_\_\_ and of \_\_\_\_\_ continue to consider the constitution of an independent Polish state as one of the prime conditions of the organization of a Europe constituted in accordance with the principle of nationalities and secure from the surprises of another war; they regard as null and void peace treaties imposed by force which ignoring the right of peoples to dispose of themselves, assign to Ukraine or to the Central Empires territories that are unquestionably Polish from the ethnographic as well as from the historic standpoint.

They again proclaim their resolution to pursue the creation of an independent, autonomous and free Poland capable of insuring its economic, political and military development, with access to the sea.

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File No. 860c.01/90

*The Counselor for the Department of State (Polk) to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

WASHINGTON, March 12, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of March 8, 1918, in which you inform me of the opinion of your Government that the Allied Powers should not, without uttering a joint protest, witness the events which tend to culminate in another partition of Poland and to deliver up to Austro-German domination integrant parts of that ancient Kingdom, and in which you inquire whether the Government of the United States would not be disposed to join in a declaration, a draft of which you enclose. I have with interest noted your statement that the early publication of such a document is regarded by your Government as extremely advisable.

In reply, I take pleasure in informing you that the Government of the United States fully concurs in the opinion of the Government of France that the publication of such a statement is desirable at the present time and is disposed to join with the Governments of its co-belligerents in a declaration similar to the one which you have been good enough to bring to my attention.

I venture to transmit to you herewith a draft of such a declaration in a form which would be satisfactory to this Government, having slightly modified the last paragraph to read as follows:

They again proclaim their resolution to pursue the creation of an independent autonomous and free Poland capable of insuring its independent, economic and political development, with access to the sea.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

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File No. 860c.01/81

*The Secretary of State to the Representative of the Polish National Committee (Paderewski)*

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1918.

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 26, 1918,<sup>1</sup> wherein you advise this Department that Doctor Francis

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

Fronczak, of Buffalo, New York, has been selected by the National Polish Committee of Paris, as a member of that body to sit as a representative of the Polish immigration in the United States, and state that it is your desire that this Department give its approbation to this selection.

In reply I take pleasure in advising you that the Department of State approves of the selection of Doctor Fronczak to serve in the capacity mentioned, and that it has so informed him by letter of this day's date.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

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[For the declaration of the Allied Governments, published June 6, 1918—"The creation of a united and independent Polish State with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace, and of the rule of right in Europe,"—see telegram from the Diplomatic Liaison Officer with the Supreme War Council, No. 82, June 4, 1918, *ante*, page 809.]

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File No. 860c.01/125

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, August 16, 1918, 3 p. m.

[Received August 18, 7.15 p. m.]

4353. Telegraphic report in local press that Polish Council of State has made formal proposals to Central Empires relative to formation Polish state on the basis alliance with Central Powers. Proposals said to contain eight following points:

- (1) Customs union and military convention with Central Powers;
- (2) Unification of traffic and liberty of navigation on Vistula, with right of Poland to use Danzig as free port;
- (3) Extend frontier for Poland conforming to ethnographical conditions;
- (4) Suppression of line of demarcation between territories administered by Germany and by Austria;
- (5) Autonomy of Polish internal administration as regards financial policies;
- (6) Central Powers to preserve permanent control with seat of administration at Warsaw;
- (7) Question of Polish dynasty to be settled in near future;
- (8) Poland to form an army organized by German officers and by Polish officers trained by former; Poland considers it necessary to have an army to assure its independence.

From confidential source believed to emanate from Polish Regency Government: Prince Radziwill and Count Ronikier have proceeded



to German General Headquarters on behalf of Polish Regency, not at summons of German Government. Polish question in general aspect will not be discussed but German views on partition Galicia will be sought, since general Polish policy depends thereon. Poles wish suppression of German-Austrian internal economic administration and equal voice with Germany for Austria-Hungary in Polish affairs and to learn German views as to White Russia and eastern frontier of Poland.

At conference in Berlin representative of Lithuanian Taryba and Count Ronikier signed on behalf of Polish and Lithuanian Governments provisional agreement [whereby] Poland agrees to help in creation of great historical Lithuania, including all White Russia. In return Lithuania will support Polish aspirations in other quarters. Relations between the two as foreshadowed to be so close that frontier would practically cease to exist. From information at hand possibility seems foreshadowed that Germany hoped to gain Polish and Lithuanian sympathy by conceding Cholm and southern Galicia to Poles, portions of White Russia to Lithuania. Germany thus would abandon Ukraine and Bolshevik Russia hoping to erect defense in east by well-disposed barrier states and perhaps thus be able to withdraw German division now in east. Weakness of such policy would be present disorder in Poland and future uncertainty of this state in view of its traditional antagonism to Germany and sympathy for Entente.

STOVALL

File No. 860c.01/129

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, August 23, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received August 26, 2.52 a. m.]

4450. Following received through reliable Pole from persons who have just arrived from Berlin and who conferred with Polish delegates, Prince Radziwill and Count Adam Ronikier. Polish delegates to German Headquarters were furnished with limited powers by Polish Government being assigned simply the task of informing themselves relative to solution which the Germans proposed as substitute for Austro-Polish solution. They found that Germany has no proposal entirely prepared but was intransigent in opposition to Austro-Polish solution which Polish Government continues to regard as sole acceptable project. Discussion therefore turned on question as to how Poland should be compensated for non-inclusion of Galicia which would remain Austrian. My telegram No. 4353, August 16, 3 p. m., reported eight proposals said to have been submitted by Polish delegates. I learn that these proposals were in fact first presented April 29 but revived at recent conference and

served as basis for discussion. Results of conference may be summed up as follows:

- (1) No definite proposals submitted or decisions reached.
- (2) Germany desires alliance with Poland and declares itself satisfied with proposals made April 29, with certain modifications.
- (3) Germany not yet decided as to compensation to be granted Poland in return for alliance and abandonment of Galicia but discussed favorably Polish expansion toward east and guarantee of independent Poland with Danzig as free port.

The question of Polish throne was only considered in a general way and is regarded by [Germany] as of secondary importance. All statements in German press in this regard were merely try-out resulting from direct orders to press from German Foreign Office in order to observe reaction to such announcements in Central Empires. It was intimated to Polish representatives that in case of revolution in Austria, Polish Army which might have been previously formed under agreement with Germany could occupy Galicia.

Attitude of Polish Government reported to be that although Austro-Polish solution still desired, renouncement of [garbled group] negotiations contemplated in return for vast territorial compensations in the east. Polish Government believes that never again will similar opportunity arise to obtain German aid for expansion in Lithuania and Russia and desires to take advantage of occasion to enlarge its frontiers through alliance with Central Powers.

In reporting above, desire to point out that present Polish Activist Government represents, according to last elections, only minority of Polish people. I shall report at early date reception in Poland of outline.

German attitude toward Poland is barometer of condition of German military success. When Germany victorious, Poland is neglected politically and exploited economically. When situation less advantageous, Germany tries to allure Poland with political concession.

STOVALL

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File No. 860c.01/132

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, August 26, 1918, 4 p. m.

[Received August 28, 9.11 a. m.]

4470. Jan Perlowski, a reliable Pole with whom Department is familiar, informed Wilson that he received message from Warsaw from reliable circles to following effect.

Von Hintze is anxious to show immediate settlement with Poland as tangible result of his activities as opposed to Kühlmann's dilatory policy. Hintze therefore pressing Austria hard to obtain acceptance of German solution of Polish problem. Austria in no shape to resist because of internal condition. Poland's game is to play one against the other and endeavor at all costs to prevent Austrian and German Governments coming to accord over Poland. They submit therefore following question: "If independent united Poland, with access to the sea, desired to contract a voluntary union with a neighboring state, Germany excepted, if that union were the price of concessions which that state needs make elsewhere to assure a general peace, would the principles of your Government be opposed thereto?" Perłowski explained that a favorable answer to this question would enable the Poles in Vienna to stiffen auspicious resistance to German demands and spoil Hintze's endeavors toward a solution. Perłowski stated matter was most urgent.

Wilson felt he had no right to give even an expression of personal opinion in this connection.

If Department desires to give an expression of opinion Perłowski could transmit it as views of the Department or personal views of Wilson according as Department desires.

In addition to and entirely separated from the foregoing, I respectfully suggest that this furnishes a good opportunity to allay uneasiness instigated by Germany's propaganda in Poland as to Poland's [danger from] reconstituted Russia. Some such informal message as following might be given: "Recent events in Russia have caused no change in the principles governing the action of the American Government toward Poland's future, principles which have already been clearly stated by President Wilson." In this connection consult my telegram No. 4450, August 23, 5 p. m.

STOVALL

File No. 860c.01/132

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1918, 5 p. m.

2647. Your 4470, August 26, 4 p. m. Department does not consider that the moment is opportune to answer the question contained in your second paragraph.

You are nevertheless authorized to bring to the attention of the Polish Committee and to make public the following informal declaration on behalf of this Government:

Recent events in Russia have caused no change in the principles governing the action of the Government of the United States toward Poland's future, principles which have already been clearly stated by President Wilson.

LANSING

File No. 860c.01/150

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, *October 11, 1918, 11 a. m.*

[*Received October 13, 11.54 p. m.*]

5150. Following received from local representative of Regency:

On October 7 the Regency Council issued a manifesto in which they declare that the wishes of the Polish Nation at the present time are clear, unanimous and resolute. Recalling the programme of President Wilson, which has been accepted by the whole world as the basis of the international relations of the future, the Regency Council declare:

In respect of Poland, this programme promises the creation of an independent Polish state composed of all the Polish territories with access to the sea. The political and economic independence and the integrity of this territory ought to be guaranteed by international treaties.

For the realization of this programme, the Polish Nation ought to act unanimously and to employ, all alike, its forces, so that its unshakeable will should be recognized by the whole world.

With this end in view we hereby decree as follows:

1. The Council of State is dissolved.
2. A Government composed of the representatives of all the classes of the population and of all political parties is to be created.
3. This Government is to elaborate in common with the representatives of the political parties an electoral law for the convocation of the Polish Diet. This electoral law is to be based on the most democratic principles and is to be presented to us for our assent and promulgated within one month.
4. Immediately after the convocation of the Diet and the committee on supreme authority of state, the preliminary council will place their powers in the hand of this authority in accordance with the oaths which they took.

Poles, the lot of our country is at the present to a great extent in your own hands. Let us all show ourselves worthy of these high aspirations which were the dreams of our fathers and forefathers during a century of oppression and misery. Let all which could divide us vanish and let us all unanimously arise [with] one powerful cry: Long live Poland united and independent!

STOVALL



File No. 860c.00/10

*The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of State*

October 14, 1918.

Mr. Dmowski came to see me this morning and pointed out that if the Germans carried out their plan of evacuating all occupied territory the position of Poland would be desperate unless Allied troops could come in and take the place of the German troops, who at least were keeping the Bolsheviks from gaining the upper hand throughout Poland. If all military forces are removed from Poland, the Bolsheviks will enter, with the most terrible consequences; yet, if German troops do not leave Poland when the general evacuation begins, Mr. Dmowski fears that they will never leave. He went on and talked at length about the Polish needs, which I believe he has already submitted in writing to you and the President. It was the question of evacuation, however, which disturbed him the most at the present moment.

Sincerely,

W. PHILLIPS

File No. 763.72/12496

*The President of the Polish National Committee (Dmowski) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1918.

SIR: In the course of our conversation this morning, I had the honor of presenting to you the subject of the Polish Army in France, the position of which has undergone an essential change within the last few weeks.

On the 4th of June, 1917, the President of the French Republic issued a decree creating an autonomous Polish Army, fighting under its own national colors.

The French Government undertook the organization of that Army by the French military authorities and out of its own funds. As there was at that time no Polish political body which could exercise the supreme authority over that Army, and no Polish ranking officers who could command it, the Army, though composed of Poles, remained under the authority of the French Government, and all appointments were made by the French Ministry of War. Under these conditions, the successful organization of the Army, its thorough training and the introduction of a model discipline was accomplished. But from the national and political point of view, the situation of the Army remained abnormal.

This situation changed gradually as a result of the constitution of the Polish National Committee now recognized as the Polish official

organization by the Governments of France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States.

On the basis of an agreement with the French Government, the Polish National Committee undertook the direction of the political side of the Army. Lastly, some ranking Polish officers, among them General Joseph Haller, arrived in France and offered their services to the Polish National Committee. This made possible to accomplish the organization of the Polish Army, as an autonomous national army, under the Polish political authority and Polish military command.

On August 7, 1918, the Polish National Committee addressed to the French Government a proposal that the Polish National Committee be recognized by France and other governments as the supreme political authority of the Polish Army and that the said Committee should appoint a commander-in-chief of the Polish Army in France and of all Polish military forces wherever they might be organized.

The French Government agreed to the proposal of the Committee: The Polish National Committee has been recognized by France as the supreme political authority of the Polish Army, and General Joseph Haller appointed by the Polish National Committee as commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, took oath on the Polish colors on October 6, 1918. The military representatives of France, of the United States, Great Britain, and Italy were present at the ceremony.

The Government of Great Britain by an official act of October 15, 1918, recognized the Polish National Army as autonomous, allied and co-belligerent.

I have the honor to beg the Government of the United States to associate itself with the Governments of France and Great Britain by recognizing the Polish Army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, as autonomous, allied, and co-belligerent.

I am [etc.]

ROMAN DMOWSKI

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File No. 763.72/12497

*The President of the Polish National Committee (Dmowski) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *October 25, 1918.*

SIR: In connection with my letter of the 18th instant, in which I have respectfully submitted to the decision of the Government of the United States the question of recognizing the Polish Army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, as autonomous, allied and co-belligerent, I now have the honor to communicate the contents of the letter dated October 15, 1918, from

Mr. Balfour to the representative of the Polish National Committee in London :

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 25th instant, in which you announce the creation of a single Polish National Army and the appointment by the Polish National Committee of General Joseph Haller as its commander in chief. At the same time you request His Majesty's Government to recognize Polish forces engaged in fighting the Central Powers as possessing status of a co-belligerent army. I have the honor to state that His Majesty's Government gladly acceded to this request and they henceforth recognize the Polish Army as autonomous, allied and co-belligerent.

I take this opportunity of informing you that His Majesty's Government have not failed to follow with interest and appreciation the unremitting efforts which the Polish National Committee has made since its recognition by the Allied countries in fortifying its compatriots throughout the world in their resistance to Central Powers and to all compromise with them in the solution of the Polish question. The confidence of His Majesty's Government in the loyalty of the Committee to the Allied countries remains unshaken.

His Majesty's Government have repeatedly announced their desire to see the creation of a united and independent Polish state and they were glad to join in the declaration by the great powers at Versailles on June 3, 1918, that the creation of such a state with free access to the sea constitutes one of the conditions of a solid and just peace. I need hardly assure you that the sympathies of this country have been and are with the people of Poland of whatever politic class or creed, in all the sufferings to which they have been subjected during the war. It admires their firm refusal to allow Germany and Austria-Hungary to dictate the future status and boundaries of their country and it looks forward to a time when the present provisional arrangements will come to an end and a Poland free and united will shape its own constitution according to the wishes of its people. That this happy moment may be near at hand is the most earnest wish of His Majesty's Government.

I have the honor, etc.

I have also the honor to inform you that Baron Sonnino, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a letter to the Polish National Committee, recognized the Polish troops fighting on the side of the Allies as a single, autonomous, allied and co-belligerent Polish Army.

I remain [etc.]

ROMAN DMOWSKI

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File No. 763.72/12651a

*The Secretary of State to the President of the Polish National Committee (Dmowski)*

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1918.

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of October 18 and October 25 requesting the Government of the United States

to associate itself with the Governments of France and Great Britain by recognizing the Polish Army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, as autonomous, allied and co-belligerent.

In reply I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States has not been unmindful of the zeal and tenacity with which the Polish National Committee has prosecuted the task of marshalling its fellow-countrymen in a supreme military effort to free Poland from its present oppressors.

This Government's position with respect to the Polish cause and the Polish people could hardly be more clearly defined than was outlined by the President in his address before the Congress of January 8, 1918.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, feeling as it does a deep sympathy for the Polish people and viewing with gratification the progress of the Polish cause, this Government experiences a feeling of genuine satisfaction in being able to comply with your request by recognizing the Polish Army, under the supreme political authority of the Polish National Committee, as autonomous and co-belligerent.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 860c.00/8

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, *October 31, 1918.*

[*Received November 1, 10.25 a. m.*]

5647. [Seyda]<sup>2</sup> requests transmittal of following statement from Polish Press Bureau for publication.

The German authorities now occupying Russian Poland in order to revenge themselves upon the Polish press for its pro-Ally stand is preventing shipments of print paper from being made to those publications, especially those issuing daily. The German military authorities are still requisitioning food in Russian Poland and they have been especially active in this direction within the last several weeks in the Gubernia of Plock. This had caused considerable unrest among the local population. The provincial military governor General Wangenheim thereupon issued a proclamation stating that in the event of any further dissatisfaction on the part of the populace he will order the entire community destroyed. In the village of Budkowo a military bridge over the river Sierpienica was destroyed; the German military authorities arrested all of the inhabitants of the village, courtmartialled the local school

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> Marjan Seyda, director of the Polish Press Bureau.



teacher and condemned the man to death, carrying out the edict at once. In consequence of the tremendous patriotic manifestation arranged by the Polish people in Warsaw October 14, the *Deutsche Warschauer Zeitung* issued a statement to the effect that any further similar manifestations will be forcibly suppressed by the German military authorities. The statement is concluded with the announcement that requisitions of food by the Germans will be continued.

The Cracow *Glos Narodu* announced that the German Government has decided to institute proceedings for treason against all of the individuals and officers of organizations who signed the recent Polish manifesto published in German Poland to the effect that in view of President Wilson's declarations and notes the Polish people regard all the parts of Poland as a free and independent entity. The manifesto was signed by all of the Polish Deputies to the German Reichstag and Prussian Diet, the publishers and editors of the several publications, and the officers of various Polish political organizations, in all about 1,000 persons.

The Regency Council at Warsaw has approved the new Polish Ministry headed by Premier Swierzynski. [Besides] those already named, General Pilsudski, the former commander of the Galician Legions, was named Minister of War, and Englich, the well known Polish banker from the Province of Posen was made Minister of Finance. On behalf of the new Ministry Premier Swierzynski informed the German Government that the Polish people expect Pilsudski to be released at once from the military prison in which the Germans are retaining him since the time when the Legionaries refused to take the Austro-German military oath. As yet the German authorities did not reply. The new Ministry at its first meeting approved in its entirety the program as presented by Premier Swierzynski; they also commenced the discussion over tentative plan of raising an internal loan. The heads of the political parties in Galicia selected Tetmajor and Witos, deputies to the Austrian Reichsrat, representatives of Galicia in the new coalition ministry. In view of the fact that the new coalition ministry is composed of and controlled by Polish leaders of pro-Allied sympathies, Alexander Lednicki and Count Ronikier, representatives of the old Ministry at Berlin and Moscow respectively, have resigned. Both Lednicki and Ronikier are in sympathy with the program of entering into an understanding with the Central Powers. It is expected that the representatives of the old Ministry at Vienna and Berne, both of whom are men of similar tendencies, also will resign at once.

SHARP

File No. 860c.00/9

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 2, 1918.

[Received November 3, 3.07 p. m.]

5690. [Seyda] requests transmittal of following for publication. The press bureau of the Polish National Committee informs as follows:

Stockholm, November 1. The *Socialdemokraten* announces that Radek-Sobelsohn, the well known Bolshevik leader, is endeavoring to create in Poland an organization through which he intends to spread a Bolshevik revolution. As the basis of his proposed organization, he uses the newly organized group of Independent Socialists. This group, though numerically very small, is in the possession of very large sums of money to be used for agitation and propaganda purposes. It has the support of the German authorities now occupying Poland and it is on this subject that Radek bases his hopes of success in carrying on his work.

The Cracow *Glos Narodu* publishes an authentic despatch that in the territory between Irkutsk and Omsk in Siberia the Polish divisions and Bolshevik Red Guards fought a bloody battle. The Red Guards suffered a very severe defeat which resulted in their dispersment. The Polish divisions are continuing their march towards European Russia.

The three largest Polish political parties in Galicia, the People's Party, the National Democratic and the Socialists, created a joint liquidation commission charged with the work of conducting Polish governmental affairs in territory now controlled by Austria, liquidating interests with Austria and preparing the way for annexing to Poland all of the Polish territory now controlled by Austria. This commission is to be composed of representatives of all Polish political parties in Galicia and of a representative of Austrian Silesia. It will be composed in all of seventeen members and will be charged with governmental administration and all other duties pertaining to the army, militia, demobilization, agriculture, education, finance, justice, public works, public charities, food control, commerce, labor, and mining. Representation will be distributed as follows, four People's Party, three National Democrats, three Socialists, two Democrats, one Progressive, one Nationalist-Unionist, one Conservative, one representative of the People's Catholic Party, and one representative of Silesia.

SHARP

File No. 860c.01/162

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, November 8, 1918.

[Received November 9, 12.35 a. m.]

5776. [Seyda] requests transmittal of following for publication.

The Cracow *Kurjer Codzienny* carries a despatch from Warsaw to the effect that the new Polish Government has entered into an agreement with the new Bohemian Government on the strength of which the Skoda [factories] are to furnish munitions to the Poles.

German agents posing as representatives of the police visited a number of Polish shops and homes under the pretext that they were looking for hidden firearms; these same men, however, took away with them various articles of apparel; the articles thus stolen within a few days represent a value of over 1,000,000 marks.

The German Government asked the present Polish Government in Warsaw for assurances that General Pilsudski, the former commander of the Legionnaires, now held prisoner of war by the Germans, will restrain himself from further anti-German activities in the event that the Germans release him and thus permit him to accept the office Minister of War to which he was chosen in the new Polish coalition ministry in Warsaw. The Polish Ministers and Pilsudski himself answered that the release must be unconditional.

The Germans ordered the Polish papers in Russian Poland to refrain from writing anything concerning Prussian Poland. Those papers were ordered at the same time not to publish the order itself.

In Skierniewice near Warsaw the Polish people held a tremendous patriotic demonstration in commemoration of the recent political and military events. A number of Poles residents of Russian Poland participated in the event. The Germans thereupon ordered the Poles, still technically subject to Prussian authority, to leave at once Russian Poland and return to Prussian Poland.

Stockholm reports state that Wilhelm, the son of Charles Stephen, the unsuccessful candidate for the Polish crown in the Polish state as the Central Powers wanted to create it, is leading the Ukrainian troops that invaded eastern Galicia and the provinces of Cholm and Podlasie. This item needs further verification.

The correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* sends in an item from Kiev to the effect that Szulzinow, the Ukrainian representative at Sofia, appealed to the representative of Spain to intercede with his Government to ask the United States and the Allies not to insist that the German armies must evacuate Ukrainian territory. The Ukrainians claim that the German armies are needed to maintain order and prevent the spread of Bolshevism. The Ukrainians de-

sire that the Germans leave the country only after the organization of a Ukrainian Army. It is very peculiar the Ukrainians make the claim of desiring to maintain order and prevent Bolshevism and at the same time are forcing their Army composed principally of Germans and pro-Germans into eastern Galicia and the provinces of Podlasie and Cholm thus trying to keep in their possession the Polish lands given them by the terms of the German Brest Litovsk peace pact. The people in these provinces are 86 per cent Polish, 11 per cent Ukrainian and 3 per cent German.

According to advices just received from confidential sources, the Regency in Warsaw has caused the resignation of Swierzynski, the Premier of the new coalition cabinet in Warsaw which represented all of the Polish parties except the extremely Radical Socialists and decided pro-Germans. The real cause of the friction that brought about this serious turn of affairs is not yet known in detail though it should not be forgotten that Swierzynski on behalf of the new Ministry issued an *exposé* of the policies of the Ministry which to say the least was very displeasing to Germans.

[SHARP]

File No. 860c.01/161

*The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

BERNE, November 10, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received November 11, 4.28 a. m.]

5693. Vienna Press Bureau 9th reports from Lublin that Socialist government has been formed proclaiming Polish Republic. Participation in the movement of Polish Populist Party is so far not assured.

STOVALL

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THE ARMENIAN  
NATIONAL MOVEMENT

File No. 867.22/16

*The French Ambassador (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State*

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, March 16, 1918.

[Received March 19.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: My Government informs me that with the object of having France represented in the military operations that are taking place in Syria where her physical and moral interests are recognized by her allies and where she has been regarded for centuries as their appointed protector by the people, it has decided to increase the French contingent now in Palestine.



As the corps of Armenian volunteers assembled in Cyprus is to form part of that contingent, it would be important to facilitate to the utmost the departure of Armenian volunteers from the United States.

In that end I am asked by the Government of the Republic to inquire of the Federal Government whether it would not be willing to let the Armenians who have enlisted in the American Army join their fellow countrymen in Cyprus and fight for the liberation of their coreligionists in Turkey.

I should be thankful to Your Excellency if you would take up this question with the proper Federal authorities and acquaint me with the decision that shall be reached on this request of my Government.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

JUSSERAND

File No. 867.22/15

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 16, 1918, 9 p. m.

3586. Department has received urgent appeal on behalf of the Armenians in the Caucasus from the Washington special envoy of the Catholicos of all Armenians. It is represented that if substantial monetary help were afforded by the Allies, an army of 150,000 Armenians and Georgians could be raised.

In view of the seriousness of the situation in the Caucasus, the Department will be glad to be advised of the attitude of the Allied War Council in regard to the whole question of assistance to the Armenians.

LANSING

File No. 867.4016/383

*The President of the Armenian National Delegation (Nubar) to President Wilson*

[Telegram—Translation]

PARIS, undated.

[Received April 17, 1918, 9.35 a. m.]

Armenia is passing through the most tragic days of its history. The Turks, who have already massacred nearly a million Armenians in Turkey, are reoccupying the Armenian provinces abandoned by the Russians and invading the Caucasus itself, threatening the two million Armenians of Russia. They are displaying anew their implacable hatred of the Armenians, not only by fresh crimes, but also by their treacherous zeal in spreading throughout neutral countries

the foulest slanders against the Armenians, charging them with perpetrating atrocities upon Musulmans, with the sole object of attempting to excuse in advance the further massacres which they will not fail to represent as justifiable reprisals. Therefore, in order to avert, before it is too late, the final and fatal blow which will annihilate a Christian nation, the Armenian National Delegation appeals to your holiest sentiments of justice and humanity, proclaimed in your utterances which have been like the cry of the conscience, not only of the American people, but of all civilized peoples, to prevent the complete extermination of a whole people which has known glorious days since the remotest antiquity and which, by its toil and its natural gifts, has been the most potent civilizing factor in the East.

BOGHOS NUBAR

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File No. 867.22/20

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, April 20, 1918, noon.

[Received 5.35 p. m.]

3675. Department's 3586, April 16, 9 p. m. General Bliss informs me that he is studying this question with the British section of the Supreme War Council, who will notify me as soon as possible of their conclusions. He adds that he has already a good deal of information about subject but has asked the British Government for a complete statement its plans of assistance in the Caucasus, as to what has been done financially and otherwise, the necessity for further financial [assistance] in addition to what Great Britain has given and is giving, and the practicality of getting actual money into that country under existing conditions. General Bliss promises to communicate with me again upon receipt of the required information.

SHARP

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File No. 867.22/22

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 25, 1918, 5 p. m.

3706. Your 3675, April 20, noon. Department has received telegrams from Tiflis via Teheran dated 10th, 11th and 12th of March,<sup>1</sup> representing the situation in Caucasus as most critical, Turks advancing, Armenians in real danger of extermination, stating that if properly led and financed latter possess great potential military

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

force, and that British mission must use more adequate efforts if situation is to be saved.

Tiflis consul states German plan of utilizing native Moslem population being accomplished. Tartars and Turkish troops disguised as natives, pro-Turk Moslem leaders supplied with abundant cash, feverishly active in creating disturbances. Fighting between Moslem tribes and Terek Cossacks. Armenian villages and detachments constantly attacked by armed Moslems, although latter usually repulsed. Situation aggravated by inactivity of Allies. Turkish demand of part of Caucasus brought Georgians' desire to join hands with Armenians. Defense of front depends entirely on latter whose present forces are 15,000 Ottoman subjects and 25,000 Russian subjects. With proper assistance probably force of 30,000 Georgians can be raised. Prime Minister requests help and states Armeno-Georgians will resist Turkish advance, but without instant financial aid and hope of future British military assistance, Turks may occupy as much Caucasian territory as they please. Without most urgent measures such occupation and massacre of Armenians within two months practically certain.

Prime Minister stated Black Sea Russian fleet offering to sell his Government cruisers, torpedo boats, transports and supplies, and that these would be sold to Turkish Government unless purchased by Allies.

Consul suggests placing in London to the credit of head of British mission at Tiflis, 2,000,000 roubles to be used at his discretion for military purposes and possible purchase of Black Sea and Caspian fleets. Dunsterville, Tapping, or other tactful person could be charged with negotiations. Also credit of 2,000,000 roubles should be placed in London at disposal of Tiflis American consul, to be used at his discretion to provide for safety of Armenian people and prevent total extermination. The plan suggested is to provision and supply the three mountain fastnesses in Russian Armenia, where, in case of disasters, troops at front may fall back and hold out probably for six months. If above is done Prime Minister promises hold Baku to keep open communications with British and north Caucasians.

The Washington special envoy of the Armenian Catholicos has suggested that if American consul at Tiflis be authorized to guarantee a loan it would probably be possible to raise it from local Armenian financial and commercial firms which would probably seize the opportunity to place their cash beyond the reach of extreme Socialists as well as of Turco-Germans.

Please inform Allied War Council of the above, drawing attention to the stated number of Armenian volunteers. It is reported

here that since above dates number of Armenian soldiers has increased. If they have really recaptured Van and successfully fought against Tartars at Baku the reports may be true.

LANSING

File No. 867.4016/383

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1918, 3 p. m.

3799. Please inform Nubar Pasha, President of the Armenian National Delegation, 12 Avenue du Trocadero, that his telegram of the 17th instant [*ultimo*] to the President has been received. You can assure him of the deep sympathy which the President, the Government and the people of the United States feel for the Armenians at this critical point of their history.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/13362

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, May 6, 1918, 11 p. m., and May 7, 11 a. m.

[Received in sections, May 7, 7.30 a. m. and 2.28 p. m.]

3816. The following is the reply of General Bliss to the Secretary of State's telegram received by him on the afternoon of April 18 from the American Ambassador in Paris, where it was received on April 17, and the one dated in Washington April 25, which was handed to General Bliss by the American Ambassador at 8.30, April 27.

(a) When I received the first of the above telegrams I discussed it at once with my British colleagues. It was evident that certain information must be obtained from London, which was immediately called for. This information was received by me from the British War Office yesterday, May 5. It was accompanied by a statement that it was much desired that the matter should not be formally discussed by the body of military representatives at Versailles. I infer that this desire is due to possible diplomatic differences with the French. The statement of British War Office is as follows:

1. Early in December it became apparent that the Russian armies in the Caucasus could no longer be relied on for the defense of Armenia, and on the 18th of December an armistice was declared on the whole Caucasus, pending the conclusion of peace. Meantime, on the 19th of December as an outcome of the meeting of the War Cabinet held on the previous day the Caucasus military agent was instructed to authorize the Armenian and Georgian authorities to buy arms and equipment from the Russians for such forces as they were likely to be able to put in the field and to promise such financial assistance as they might require in rouble notes.



[Beginning of section 2:]

[Believing] that the only hope of success lay in uniting the various elements—Armenians, Georgians and Tatars—in common opposition to the Turks, every effort was made to effect this purpose through the national councils and the national leaders both in Trans-Caucasus and abroad, but to no avail. The Baku Tatars were openly pro-Turk while many of the Georgians shared the same sympathies. The Armenians alone were on the whole sincere, but even Andronik himself eventually declared that he was surrounded by “traitors and betrayers.” Erzerum fell on the 11th March and Batum on the 13th April. The peace negotiations which were being conducted at Trebizond have been broken off by the Trans-Caucasian Government contrary to the wishes of the Georgian delegates. The end, however, is near and inevitable but, although the occupation of Armenia by the Turks can only be regarded as one of the tragedies of the war, it should be recognized that all possible efforts were made to save the Armenians from the Bolshevik revolution and the [collapse of] the Russian Army which was protecting them.

(b) As to the above, I have conferred further with my British colleagues here and they express the positive opinion that every aid has been given to the Armenians and Georgians that it is possible to give under existing circumstances. It is probable that the military representatives at Versailles will agree today upon a formal joint opinion that it is desirable that the United States should declare the existence of a state of war between them and the Ottoman Empire but not for the present with Bulgaria. I hope to be able to give the American Ambassador the formal opinion of the military representatives to-night.<sup>1</sup> This action, if taken, may have beneficial effect upon Armenian situation. I further suggest that until British Government withdraws its opposition to formal consideration of Armenian question by the military representatives better results may be obtained for the present by direct diplomatic correspondence between the Government at Washington and that of Great Britain. Bliss.

SHARP

File No. 867.22/18

*The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)*

No. 2132

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: In reply to Your Excellency's note of the 12th of April last<sup>2</sup> with further reference to the matter of permitting Armenians who have enlisted in the American Army to join their fellow countrymen in Cyprus to fight for the liberation of their co-religionists in Turkey as a part of the French contingent now being assembled in Cyprus, I have the honor to state that the War Department informs me that many of the Armenians in the American Army, who have declared their intention to become American citizens, now form a part of the United States forces, and that their removal from their present organizations can not be effected without seriously impairing the efficiency of the units with which they are connected by making unexpected replacements necessary and thus delaying the process of training.

<sup>1</sup> See *ante*, pp. 227–228.

<sup>2</sup> Not printed; see note of Mar. 16, *ante*, p. 885.

With reference to Armenians who have not declared their intention to become American citizens, I beg to state that while the United States Government finds it impracticable to comply in form with so much of the request of the French Government as pertains to the actual transfer of such persons, it is able and willing to comply with it in substance by granting prompt discharges to all non-declarant Armenians on condition of their desire for discharge and their volunteering for service in the French Army. It is suggested that action by the War Department upon requests of your Government for the discharge of such Armenians would be greatly facilitated if the requests were accompanied by information as to the names of the persons and the numbers of their respective companies and regiments.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72/10680

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain*  
(Page)

No. 6059

WASHINGTON, July 31, 1918.

SIR: I have received Mr. Laughlin's telegram No. 287, July 12, 4 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> transmitting to the Department substance of an informal communication you received from the Foreign Office, concerning the Armenian situation in the Caucasus.

I have also received two letters from Dr. G. Pasdermajian, special envoy at Washington of the Armenian Catholics,<sup>1</sup> pointing out the critical situation in the Caucasus; the advantages which the Allies might derive in preventing the Germano-Turks from occupying that country; the service which the Armenians and Georgians might render the Allies if properly assisted, and requesting the pecuniary assistance of the United States Government for that cause.

On the 16th of April the Department telegraphed the Embassy in Paris, asking to be advised of the attitude of the Allied War Council with regard to the matter.

The Department received General Bliss' reply dated May 6 and 7. I send you herewith for your information and not for communication to the Foreign Office, copies or paraphrases of the above and other documents connected with the matter.<sup>1</sup>

For more than one reason the American people and Government are interested in the Caucasian situation, the Armenian question, and the condition of the Christians in the East.

1. For nearly a century the people of America have withheld no effort for the moral and educational welfare of the Christians with-

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

in the Turkish Empire. In those countries there are several hundred American religious, charitable and educational institutions supported by American contributions, and whose work has been practically limited to the Christians.

2. The American people could not be indifferent at the treatment to which the non-Turks of Turkey, more especially the Armenians, were subjected since 1915. The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, whose charitable work has the President's approval, appealed to the public, and has raised to date more than \$11,000,000.

3. As one of the belligerents the United States Government is naturally interested in the steps which the German Government is taking with a view to acquiring a dominant position in the Near East.

After the Russian Revolution, Germany improved her position first in European Russia, then in Transcaucasia.<sup>1</sup> She helped her ally Turkey not only to reoccupy the provinces of Trebizond, Erzeroum and Van, which the latter had hopelessly lost, but she even secured for her at Brest-Litovsk, the cession of the Russian provinces of Batoum, Kars, and Ardahan. The Germano-Turks without great difficulty invaded those provinces, occupied others and even entered Persian territory. In the eyes of Islam and of the people of the Central Powers, these Germano-Turkish advances constitute moral victories, at the same time giving the invaders strategic and material advantages. These advances may jeopardize the very existence of the Christians of those countries—whom the Germano-Turks may consider in the way of their ambitions and aspirations towards the East—and create serious difficulties for the Entente Allies.

While at Tiflis, Mr. Smith, the American Consul, drew the attention of the Department to the critical condition of affairs in the Caucasus and made certain definite recommendations which were brought to the attention of His Britannic Majesty's Government. I am under the impression, however, that the Foreign Office believed that Mr. Smith merely desired to secure for the Armenians some assistance from the Allies (see your 8500, February 4, 3 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> and the above-mentioned telegrams from Paris).

Mr. Smith's aim, however, was not solely to help the Georgians and Armenians. He was anxious to warn the Allies of the danger in the Near East, and to induce them, in the interest of the Entente itself, to utilize these Christian peoples and their potential military

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

force by properly leading and financing them in order to prevent the Central Powers from further improving their position in the Near East and in Asia.

The Department has no reliable detailed information as to the actual situation in the Caucasus. But that situation has entirely changed since Mr. Smith's departure from Tiflis, inasmuch as Germano-Turks have gained further ground in the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and British forces have advanced in Persia.

Judging from Dr. Kühlmann's speech of June 24, as quoted by the *Journal de Genève*, the German Government has recognized the "independence" of Georgia. Dr. Kühlmann is reported to have stated that Georgia sent her Minister for Foreign Affairs to Berlin, with whom the Germans started "cordial" negotiations, and that, in order to have an exact idea as to the situation in the Caucasus, the Germans sent General von Krese to Tiflis on a diplomatic mission. Amid cheers, Dr. Kühlmann declared: "We wish the state of Georgia, its brave people, and its rich country a happy future. As far as we are concerned, we shall willingly do what depends on us to consolidate the good relations between Georgia and Germany." The contrast, however, is significant when he speaks of Armenia. He says while new national groups of little importance were joining Georgia, "Armenia was undertaking its transformation into an autonomous state." With the exception of that statement, Armenia and the Armenians seem to be entirely ignored.

The tone of the Turkish press also is significant. It speaks sympathetically of the Georgians, but in unfriendly terms of the "Armenian bands."

Dr. Kühlmann's statements, the tone of the Turkish press, and other facts seem to indicate that the Central Powers have succeeded in bringing the Georgians entirely under their aegis, while the Armenians remain outside of their pale, and, according to certain reports, keep up the struggle.

With the information contained in this instruction and the accompanying enclosures, you are requested to see Mr. Balfour, and to say to him that in view of the historic interest which the people of the United States have for the Armenians and the anxiety on their behalf, the Department would be grateful if it could be advised of the importance which His Britannic Majesty's Government attaches to the situation in the Caucasus and would greatly appreciate being kept informed from time to time of the steps which are taken to preserve the cooperation of the Armenians in the Allied cause.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK



File No. 763.72/11903

*The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

PARIS, October 25, 1918, 7 p. m.

[Received October 26, 2.20 a. m.]

5575. Boghos Nubar Pasha, President of the National Armenian Delegation, has asked me to transmit to the Department a request which they are making to the Allied Governments that Armenia be recognized as a belligerent as have been the Czecho-Slovaks. The request is based in part on the fact that many thousands of Armenians have been fighting for the Allies in France in the Foreign Legion, in Palestine under General Allenby, in the American, British, and Canadian armies, in addition to those serving on the Turkish and Caucasian fronts. He also points to the fact that hundreds of thousands of his people have been massacred for their loyalty to the Allied cause. I will forward full text in the next pouch.<sup>1</sup>

SHARP

File No. 763.72/12246

*The Special Envoy of the Armenian Catholicos (Pasdermadjian) and the Representative of the Armenian National Delegation (Sevasly) to the Secretary of State*

SIR: Having regard to the impending surrender of Turkey as a belligerent to the Entente Powers, we respectfully beg leave to invite your attention to the case of the Armenians, whose vital interests are involved in all questions connected with such capitulation, and respectfully take occasion to solicit that in case of an armistice with Turkey, that the United States Government should bring to bear the weight of its influence with the Allied Governments, in order that the right of the Armenians be effectively safeguarded by the adoption of the following measures, viz:

1. The withdrawal of all Turkish troops not only from the Transcaucasian Armenian provinces, but also from the six Armenian vilayets of Turkey and from Cilicia;
2. The occupation of all strategic points by the Allied troops in the above mentioned territory;
3. The adoption of measures of a nature to prevent the Turkish Government from organising an influx of Turkish and Mohamedan immigrants into the Armenian territory;
4. The immediate organisation of an inter-Allied commission of relief having for its purpose to help the Armenian refugees scattered throughout Turkey and elsewhere, and the adoption of effective measures to secure the repatriation of all

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

such refugees and deported Armenians to within the boundaries of the future Armenian state.

5. Pending the deliberation of the peace congress and until the final settlement of the Armenian question, all Armenian territory to be administered by a provisional inter-Allied government.

We are [etc.]

G. PASDERMADJIAN  
MIRAN SEVASLY

BOSTON, *October 30, 1918.*

[*Received November 1.*]

#### RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH PERSIA'S NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS

File No. 763.72119/2618

*The Persian Minister (Mehdi Khan) to the Secretary of State*

WASHINGTON, *December 17, 1917.*

[*Received December 18.*]

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The war aims and noble sentiments of the United States Government, so eloquently set forth by His Excellency, President Wilson, in his message to Congress on December 3 [4],<sup>1</sup> wherein a permanent peace is defined as one based upon international justice and guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of every nation, have encouraged and actuated the Imperial Persian Government to appeal to the Government of the United States to assist Persia to share in the benefits of these great blessings.

The Persian Government has therefore advised this Legation by cable to officially seek the assistance of the United States Government in securing for Persia representation in the peace conference which will convene at the termination of this great war. It is the ardent desire of Persia to place her sovereignty and independence upon a firm foundation without in any way infringing upon the rights of others.

It is a regrettable fact that in spite of her efforts from the beginning of the war to protect her neutrality, both of the belligerent groups have time and again violated Persian neutrality, and her territory has not been free from the forces of both sides. These forces have repeatedly inflicted severe losses upon the subjects of Persia in the north and in the south, as is well known by Your Excellency and by the United States Government.

Besides the heavy losses resulting from actual battles between hostile troops, who have burned and destroyed towns and villages, the Russian troops of both the former and recent *régimes* have perpetrated great intentional wrongs upon the people of Persia, and

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1917, pp. IX-XVI.

have levied large sums upon various communities, not to mention large supplies of food which they have requisitioned and extorted from the people. A detailed list of these losses will be submitted for the information of the United States Government.

Persia feels that these losses and wrongs necessitate and justify her to have representation at the peace conference, in order that the obstacles interposed through foreign interference with her internal affairs, which have threatened her independence and retarded her progress and development, may be wholly removed. These include certain treaties and conditions which foreign powers have forcibly imposed upon Persia. Another obstacle which has resulted in internal disorder and a violation of Persia's sovereignty is the illegal activities of the military forces of the neighboring powers on Persian territory. The Legation therefore feels impelled to request the United States Government to use its good offices to the end that the forces of foreign powers who have wrought such illegal acts should evacuate the territories of Persia. The Legation, likewise, in view of recent developments in the Near East, requests the United States Government to make a declaration which will guarantee the sovereignty and independence of Persia. The granting of such help to Persia at this time will not only confirm and establish the principles of humanity and justice, which the United States so nobly advocates for all nations, but it will secure the foundation of that lasting peace which constitutes the chief aim for which America entered the war.

Furthermore, it is my personal belief that, in view of the recent important events in Russia and the Near East, a favorable answer by the United States Government to the request from Persia will produce an immediate good effect in Persia and yield useful results for all concerned.

The Legation begs to submit herewith a memorandum containing the several requests made by Persia of the United States Government.

Please accept [etc.]

MEHDI KHAN

[Enclosure—Extract]

*The Persian Legation to the Department of State*

#### MEMORANDUM

. . . The just aims for the attaining of which Persia seeks the help and good offices of the United States are expressed in the seven following paragraphs:

1. Persian participation in the peace conference.
2. To guarantee Persia's independence and sovereignty.
3. The evacuation of Persian territory by foreign troops.
4. To indemnify Persia for the losses inflicted upon her.
5. To eliminate foreign influence from the north and the south.

6. To respect the neutrality of Persia.

7. To revise the treaty of Turkomanchai (1828) and to abolish all other arrangements and agreements which have been forcibly imposed upon Persia, especially the forcible impositions of recent times.

File No. 763.72119/2618

*The Secretary of State to the Persian Minister (Mehdi Khan)*

WASHINGTON, *January 3, 1918.*

SIR: I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of December 17, in which you state that the Persian Government advised you by cable to seek officially the assistance of the United States Government in securing for Persia representation in the peace conference which will convene at the termination of this great war, and also to assist Persia to maintain the rights belonging to her as independent and sovereign state.

Your note has been read with great interest and deep sympathy and the requests contained therein are being very carefully studied by officials of the Department. The magnitude of the problems involved has precluded a hasty answer to the questions contained in your note. It is hoped, however, that it will be possible to reply to your note in the very near future.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72111/6862

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *January 19, 1918, 8 a. m.*

[*Received January 21, 7.10 a. m.*]

Persian Government protests to this and other Allied Legations against an alleged violation of the sovereignty and independence of Persia, claiming military forces under British and French officers financed by the United States and Allies are being organized at Urumiah. Have replied that this Legation is without information about the matter. Our enemies are endeavoring to make capital of the accusation.

CALDWELL

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain  
(Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 21, 1918, 7 p. m.*

6310. You may confidentially and orally say to Mr. Balfour that Persia has appealed to the United States to guarantee Persia's inde-



pendence and sovereignty and to secure the evacuation of Persian territory by foreign troops, and that the Department is being pressed for a prompt and explicit reply. The Department has received reports from many reliable sources that an active propaganda is being carried on in Persia by Turks and Germans, as part of the Pan-Turanian movement, and that if the United States, which at present Persia considers its most disinterested friend, fails to comply with the requests made by Persia, that country will turn to Germany and Turkey. The Department considers the situation serious.

Ascertain Mr. Balfour's views on general Persian situation, and whether in his opinion United States could help in any way towards preserving the independence of Persia and improving relations between Persia and the Entente Powers.

POLK

File No. 763.72111/6862

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell)*<sup>1</sup>

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, January 24, 1918, 10 a. m.

Your January 19, 8 a. m. Deny emphatically to Persian Government that United States is financing any military forces being organized at Urumiah. Also inform Persian Government that United States strongly sympathizes with desire of Persia to maintain its freedom and sovereignty and would not be a party to any act which would infringe thereon.

POLK

File No. 763.72/8632

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, January 24, 1918, midnight.

[Received January 25, 3.16 a. m.]

8390. Your 6310, January 21, 7 p. m. A full report on British action touching Persia will be given to me by Mr. Balfour in a few days prepared with reference to your inquiry. British wish and effort is to uphold Persian independence and any help we may give will be appreciated. Before report is ready the only practical suggestion thrown out was sending American officers to stiffen up Persian Army. They . . . can be greatly helped by good military leaders.

PAGE

<sup>1</sup>The texts of this telegram and of the one which it answers were repeated on the same date to the Ambassador in Great Britain, in telegram No. 6340, referring to No. 6310 of Jan. 21, *supra*. The substance of the declaration was also reiterated to the Persian Legation in a memorandum of Feb. 14 (not printed), replying to further representations.

File No. 763.72111/6874

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *February 1, 1918, 11 a. m.*

[Received 11.35 p. m.]

Your January 24, 10 a. m., was given newspapers by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Publication has created a deep impression of good feeling.

Famine conditions unabated.

Envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the Bolshevik Russian Government has arrived. Not yet received officially by Persian Government but he harangues multitude and gives out interviews and *communiqués*.

American Consul, Tabriz, reports:

Organization by the British and French Consuls of Armenian force at Urumiah and Tabriz is intended for local protection and to assist Caucasus movement directed from Tiflis. Persians strongly opposed to this military force and Governor General protests against organization. Consuls, including myself, receive anonymous letters threatening our lives. I have not participated in affair.

There is nothing of importance to report.

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72/8739

*The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

LONDON, *February 4, 1918, 2 p. m.*

[Received 5.10 p. m.]

8493. Your 6310, January 21, and my 8390, January 24. Mr. Balfour has shown me the declaration upholding independence and integrity of Persia, made by British and French Governments, and submitted for participation of our Government through British Ambassador at Washington. This he thinks is all that can be done at present.

PAGE

File No. 763.72/8741

*The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State*

No. 138

WASHINGTON, *January 30, 1918.*

[Received February 5.]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In connection with the present situation in Persia, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recently addressed a note to the Persian Minister in London giving him the

assurance that His Majesty's Government were, as indicated in their previous declarations on the subject, genuinely anxious to assist the Persian Government to maintain the independence and integrity of Persia. It was further stated that the British Minister at Teheran would be instructed to discuss with the Persian authorities the manner in which this object could be carried out in such a way as to be acceptable to Persian public opinion.

I have been instructed to inform you that His Majesty's Government think that it would be of value if instructions could be given to the French and American Ministers at Teheran to inform the Persian Government that their respective Governments had been informed by His Majesty's Government of their views, and had authorised their representatives to associate themselves officially in making a declaration, of which the following is a suggested draft:—

His Majesty's Government have repeatedly expressed to the Persian Government their desire and intention to uphold the independence and integrity of Persia.

They wish now to renew to Your Excellency their assurance, in conjunction with the Governments of the French Republic and the United States of America, whose views in this matter are in entire harmony with their own, that it is the desire and determination of the three Governments to respect the integrity of Persia and to promote the development of the country on independent and self-determined lines as soon as the abnormal conditions created by the present war have been removed.

I should be much obliged if you would be good enough to inform me in due course whether the United States Government concur in the above procedure and whether they will be prepared to instruct the American representative at Teheran to associate himself with the British and French Ministers in making the proposed declaration to the Persian Government.

A similar enquiry is being made of the French Government.

Believe me [etc.]

COLVILLE BARCLAY

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File No. 763.72/8741

*The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador on Special Mission (Reading)*

WASHINGTON, February 14, 1918.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have received your Embassy's note of January 30, No. 138, stating that His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs recently addressed a note to the Persian Minister in London giving him the assurance that the British Government was genuinely anxious to assist the Persian Government to maintain the independence and integrity of Persia and that the British Minister at Teheran would be instructed to discuss with the Persian

authorities the manner in which this object could be carried out in such a manner as to be acceptable to Persian public opinion; and enquiring whether the United States Government would be willing to instruct the American representative at Teheran to associate himself with the British and French Ministers in making a joint declaration to the Persian Government to the effect that it was the "desire and determination of the three Governments to respect the integrity of Persia and to promote the development of the country on independent and self-determined lines as soon as the abnormal conditions created by the present war have been removed."

In reply I beg to state that it does not seem advisable for the United States Government to instruct the American Minister at Teheran to associate himself with the British Minister in making the proposed declaration to the Persian Government. As I have already indicated to the British Government, this Government is genuinely desirous of assisting in the restoration of a normal condition of affairs in Persia on account of its friendship both for Great Britain and for Persia, but in view of the very different positions which Great Britain and the United States occupy towards Persia, I cannot but feel that a joint declaration by Great Britain and the United States would not be the wisest procedure at this time. Moreover, I feel that a declaration to the effect that the British, French and American Governments were ready to promote the development of Persia on self-determined lines "as soon as the abnormal conditions created by the present war have been removed" might be misinterpreted in Persia.

On January 19 the Department was advised by the American Minister at Teheran that he had received a protest from the Persian Government against an alleged violation of Persian sovereignty and independence through the organization in Persia of military forces financed by the United States and the Entente. On January 23 [24] this Government instructed the American Minister at Teheran to deny emphatically that the United States was financing any military forces being organized in Persia and at the same time to inform the Persian Government that the United States strongly sympathized with the desire of Persia to maintain its freedom and sovereignty and would not be a party to any act which would infringe such freedom and sovereignty. Inasmuch, therefore, as the United States has already indicated to Persia its attitude toward Persian sovereignty and independence, I feel that it would be perhaps superfluous at the present time for the United States to make any further declaration in this respect.

The note which His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has addressed to the Persian Minister in London gives an



assurance that His Majesty's Government are anxious to assist the Persian Government to maintain the independence and integrity of Persia, and it seems to me, therefore, that the first important step will have been taken when the instruction mentioned in Mr. Barclay's note under acknowledgment is sent to the British Minister at Teheran.

If you will be good enough to let me know when this instruction is sent, I shall be happy to instruct the American Minister at Teheran to keep in touch with his British colleague and advise me of the results of the discussions between the British Minister and the Persian authorities.

May I repeat once more that I shall also be glad to receive any further views which you may have on the Persian situation, more especially if, in your opinion, this Government can help in any way, with the exception of the joint declaration above referred to, towards preserving the independence of Persia and improving the relations between Persia and the Entente Powers.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

File No. 763.72/8867

*The Consul at Tiflis (Smith) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TIFLIS, February 14, 1918, 6 p. m.

[Received February 15, 12.46 p. m.]

I have dispatched today the following telegram to the United States Minister in Persia:

Have been requested by commander in chief and Trans-Caucasian Government to inform you that it instructed your Russian colleague to protest against closing of Persian frontier to Allied forces and individuals and to request you, in view of the danger involved in such measure to Christian and foreign population, to join in such protest. Active German propaganda and danger to our missions in Persia would appear to justify such protest, notwithstanding the traditional policy of the Government of the United States in regard to integrity Persia.

The prohibition referred to leaves Turkish-Persian front undefended and endangers British position in Bagdad. Have advised unofficially Trans-Caucasian Government to modify protest by holding out to Persian Government the hope of a friendly settlement of Russian-Persian financial and customs problems. Is the Department in communication with Embassy and other consulates Russia? Order of Maximalist Government of February 10 regarding cessation of war with Central Powers and Turkey and general disbanding of army is bound to affect situation on Turkish front. Last instruction

in reference [from] the Department of State was dated January 24, 11 a. m.<sup>1</sup> Please telegraph only via India.

SMITH

File No. 763.72/8900

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *February 18, 1918, 9 p. m.*

[*Received February 19, 9.35 a. m.*]

Have been requested through our American Consul, Tiflis, by Russian commander in chief and Trans-Caucasus to "join Russian colleagues in protest against Persian Government closing frontiers to Allied forces and individuals in view of the active German propaganda and the danger that such measures might bring to our missions, Christians and foreign population." I have discussed matter unofficially with the Persian Government who advise that frontier closed against all military persons only, and Armenians recruited from the Caucasus. I have requested timely measures to safeguard American and Christian lives and property but in view of the policy of the United States, have refrained from making formal protest pending instructions.

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72/8900

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 20, 1918, 6 p. m.*

Your telegrams February 18, 3 p. m.<sup>1</sup> and 9 p. m., surprising in view of your recent report that there was no important news in Persia. The Department must have an immediate and complete report on Turkish and German propaganda in Persia. By what means is it being carried on, what success is it making, and how can it be guarded against? Is present Persian Government pro-Ally, pro-German, or truly neutral in its sympathies? Is Persia seeking the withdrawal of English troops from Persia in good faith or for the purpose of aiding Germany and Turkey as soon as this is done? What does Persia really want and expect America to do? Investigate these matters very discreetly, but also very thoroughly, and reply.

The situation in Persia may become a matter of vital importance. It is essential that you realize its importance and keep the Department fully informed of actual situation.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72111/6905

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *March 13, 1918, 1 p. m.*

[Received March 14, 4 a. m.]

His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Teheran yesterday delivered to Persian Government note announcing intention of Great Britain to bring troops temporarily into northwest Persia to maintain order and protect the interests of the Allies; to welcome Persian representative to any future international conference to which non-belligerents are invited; to maintain [South Persian Rifles] as at present, but to have same after the war officered by foreigners to be agreed upon by Great Britain and Persia; and revision of the tariff of Persia, etc. Copy of the note mailed. Some excitement prevails.

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72111/6905

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 21, 1918, 5 p. m.*

31. Your March 13, 1 p. m. How many British troops have been sent to northwest Persia? Where have they come from? Is it probable that all or part of them will pass on into Caucasus? Is the object of these troops to protect lives of Armenian and Assyrian Christians, Azerbaijan and Caucasus? Are they necessary for this purpose? What effect has British note had on Persian Government and public opinion? Is there any danger Persia breaking relations with Great Britain, or entering war on side of Germany and Turkey? If she did so, could she be of any material assistance? What, if anything, can you suggest United States could do to aid situation? Have Bolsheviki referred to in your March 8, 6 p. m.,<sup>1</sup> arrived Teheran? What is attitude Bolsheviki in Persia towards Armenians?

LANSING

File No. 763.72111/6909

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *March 23, 1918, 4 p. m.*

[Received March 25, 6.54 a. m.]

Your March 21, 1 [5] p. m. Allied forces Urumiah district under British and French officers consist of armed and collected Armenians

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

and Syrians numbering 5,000 to 7,000. British forces Kermanshah and Hamadan were sent from Bagdad, number under 2,000 but more coming. British Minister says that none will pass on into the Caucasus and that object of troops is to prevent hostile jungle tribes and German agents, sympathizers and such from tampering with or stirring up populace, incidentally protection of India. Protection of Armenians and Syrians is being considered but our Tabriz Consul reports that they are in great danger. Nevertheless both Armenians and Syrians are not free from blame, according to my best accounts, and feeling of hostility towards them prevails. Russian subjects informed me confidentially that the unfortunate recent affair at Urumiah (see my telegram of March 1, 11 a. m.<sup>1</sup>), according to their best judgment based on full details, was very evidently fault of Syrians; this is confirmed from other sources.

British note was kept from the public a few days but it has produced some bad feeling since its publication; public indignation meetings were held, Persian Government replying at length. Will telegraph substance soon. Personally I do not believe that there is slightest danger of Persia breaking off relations with Great Britain, much less entering into war which would be almost impossible at present, but the British Minister does not altogether share this view but feels that arrival of British forces may prevent such break or declaration of war.

I do not know of anything in particular United States could do to aid situation except to continue helpful assurances, guaranteeing, if practicable, representation at the peace conference, expression of intention to assist Persia in any proper manner, etc. British Minister believes that it is important to force Cabinet change, but I do not altogether agree as to this view.

Bolshevik soldiers remain at Resht, not particularly hostile to Armenians.

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72111/6916a

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 29, 1918, 3 p. m.*

34. It is reported in the newspapers that a Persian delegation has left Teheran for Berlin via Constantinople to arrange a permanent alliance between Persia and Germany based upon a large loan by Germany to finance Persian railroads and to equip the Persian Army with German instructors.

Please investigate and report immediately upon this matter.

LANSING

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.



File No. 763.72111/6916

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *March 30, 1918, 10 p. m.*

[Received March 31, 12.17 p. m.]

No change in Persia. Persian Government replying to British note (see my telegram of March 13, 1 p. m.). Allege inconsistency in assurances given to respect independence of Persia and presence of British forces; protest against presence of British forces and ask their withdrawal; express satisfaction that Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 should be considered null and void; refuse suggestion in British note that after the close of the war the two Governments should agree upon some European officers for the present military forces known as South Persian Rifles, saying that suggestion and acceptance thereof inconsistent with independence; insist on participation in peace conference on account of the belligerents' violation of the neutrality of Persia and the community of interest; allege responsibility for arrest and detention of British Vice-Consul and citizens at Resht by tribesmen rests on British soldiers, [who] had previously arrested Persian subjects in Persia; request British Imperial Bank to pay over customs receipts wrongfully withheld from and belonging to Persia; express desire to continue existing friendly relations. Translation of the note mailed.<sup>1</sup>

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72111/6917

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *April 1, 1918, 10 a. m.*

[Received April 2, 5.11 a. m.]

Your telegram March 29, 3 p. m. No truth in the report. I am reliably informed that no such delegation has left Teheran. If such had taken place, you may be assured that I should have known of and would therefore have reported same by telegraph.

Newspaper accounts probably originated from a telegram recently received by Shah of Persia from the rulers of Central Powers proclaiming that they guarantee the independence of and the sovereignty of Persia and expressing sympathy with and desire to assist her.

CALDWELL

<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

File No. 763.72111/6962a

*The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1918, 11 a. m.

7474. For your information and guidance. Recently the Department has had several conferences with the British Embassy regarding the Persian situation, at which the Department expressed its anxiety regarding the alarming spread of German propaganda in Persia resulting in a growing sentiment unfavorable to the British in that country. The Embassy was advised of a personal suggestion made by Sir Cecil Spring Rice during one of his last calls at the Department, to the effect that the British Government might be glad to place the United States Government in such a position that it could assure the Persian Government that British assurances regarding the future integrity and independence of Persia would be fulfilled. While this Government is not in a position to approach the British Government with any such suggestion, the peculiarly favorable position which the United States holds in Persia should, in the Department's opinion, be availed of in the present crisis. You will, therefore, continue to express to the Foreign Office this Government's concern in the whole Persian situation.

LANSING

File No. 763.72111/7012

*The Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan) to the Secretary of State*

No. 48

WASHINGTON, June 15, 1918.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to submit the following for Your Excellency's information:

Some months ago, I heard of an alleged report in the German newspapers, attributing to the Persian Minister at Berlin certain statements which were derogatory to the neutrality of Persia. This I reported to the Persian Government by cable.

This Legation has now received by mail the copy of a long cablegram in cipher, which the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Teheran had sent in reply to my message mentioned above. A translation of that cablegram, which did not reach me at the time, follows:

Ali-Kuli Khan,

Legation of Persia, Washington.

In view of the Persian Government's neutrality, it cannot at all be imagined that our Minister at Berlin may have expressed any inclination towards one side. Nay, he is endeavoring to preserve neu-

trality. Nor has any step been taken at Teheran which is in any way unneutral. Only because of the unfavorable policy of Russia and England people are offended. This annoyance will then be removed when those powers readjust that policy. You must make efforts in order that the American Government may kindly give effective advice to England. Here too we have fully notified the American Minister of the matter. We send you through the official mail of the American Legation, a second copy of memorandum containing important questions which should be carried out, and especially when peace comes. These will reach you duly. The object of this Government is to preserve complete neutrality and protect the sovereignty and integrity of Persia, and to declare as void and null all harmful agreements and concessions, a copy of which has been formerly sent you,—especially to declare null and void the capitulations and to make new commercial treaties which may be in conformity with the present needs of Persia. I expect you to do all you can and by the various means which are available to you in America to render a worthy service to the Empire. I await the result of your activity, and reports from you.

The original copy of the cablegram is enclosed herein.

May I request that Your Excellency will be kind enough to use your good offices in assisting Persia to fulfill all her just hopes and aspirations, to the end that her sovereignty and future prosperity be secured upon a firm basis.

Accept [etc.]

MIRZA ALI-KULI KHAN, N. D.

File No. 761.91/53

*The Consul at Teheran (Southard) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, August 1, 1918, 1 p. m.

[Received August 2, 10.46 a. m.]

Referring to the action taken five days ago by the Persian Government in abrogating all existing Russian treaties and concessions. Members of Persian Cabinet have expressed to me their desire that American interests [be] informed of the favorable [opportunity] existing to apply for many of the Russian concessions thus canceled, and that American applications would probably be received with favor.

I am informed by a member of the Cabinet that in the meeting at which was determined the action with reference to Russian treaties and concessions, the question of taking similar position with reference to the British was seriously considered, but decided as inopportune because of their present occupation of Persia. Such action is considered, however, a future possibility.

Many Persian officials fear that European powers will nearly all misinterpret this act of Persia, particularly as the Russian treaty of Turkomanchai is that upon which the rights secured by most

favored nation clause of many Persian treaties with other countries are created [*based*], and are particularly concerned that the American Government [be] informed of the real motives, which are to free Persia from treaty obligations deemed infringements of its sovereignty and to secure internal development in making concessions free to be given to those without political interests in Persia. The Legation will report fully on the abrogation act referred to.

SOUTHARD

File No. 761.91/54

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, August 1, 1918, 10 a. m.

[Received August 2, 9.19 p. m.]

Persian Cabinet who themselves expect to fall within a week, in order to obtain popularity with public opinion have issued decree announcing in effect abolition of capitulations, extraterritorial rights, etc., and annulling certain Russian concessions, treaties and conventions such as treaty of Turkomanchai under which we claim the most favored nation privilege. Text of decree reads as follows in substance:

July 30, 1918.

Since all concessions, treaties and agreements with the Russian Government and her subjects during the last one hundred years have been wrung from Persia either by force, oppression or illegal proceedings such as threats, temptation and inducements, and to her great disadvantage;

Since all the great countries of the world from the beginning of the present war have been announcing to the public their consideration for the economic and political independence of weak nations;

Since the new Russian Government has made the liberty and perfect independence of all nations her ideal and the object of her aspirations, having often specially announced both formally and informally the abolition of certain treaties and concessions wrung from Persia;

Since said concessions, treaties and agreements, in addition to their having been taken by force and oppression to the great disadvantage of Persia, and those taken after the establishment of Constitutional Government, [are] against the express provisions of the Constitution, and have either not been put into execution or in a very imperfect manner and against the plain provisions of said treaties, agreements and concessions, whereby not only the designated rights of the Government have been disregarded, but by transferring concessions and agreements and making bad use of their provisions, great [and] injurious political and economic abuses have followed, affecting the rights and independence of this nation;

Since Persia has, like all countries, a perfect rightful interest in its own economic resources and natural liberty, therefore these chief officials of the Persian Government have decided to abolish and annul all said treaties, agreements and concessions, and hereby an-



nounce this decision to all foreign representatives residing in our capital, and to our representatives residing in other countries, and to the public. Signed, Cabinet of the Ministers.

I beg to request full telegraphic instructions. [Literal] text and newspaper comment follow by mail. The Persians consider this move most important, and in a note to this Legation the Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses a desire to enter into new treaty relations appropriate to present day needs with all friendly nations.

CALDWELL

File No. 761.91/55

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, August 4, 1918, 11 a. m.

[Received August 5, 12.47 p. m.]

I hear that the Shah, under British pressure, has asked resignation of Persian Cabinet but they refuse to give their resignations.

My colleagues, the ministers of the Allied Powers, together with Spanish Minister, are obtaining an audience with the Shah for the purpose of demanding resignation of Persian Cabinet and to request the Shah to set aside recently enacted order annulling Russian treaties and conventions and concessions. See my telegram of August 1, 10 a. m. My Allied colleagues have asked me to go with them to see the Shah and to join these demands. I have refused to do so or to commit Department to such course until instructed by my Government, believing that such action would be likely to impair if not destroy our favorable position and prestige and would be opposed to Department's instruction and policy.

I am informed that present Cabinet rather expect and hope that the United States will acquiesce in, if not consent to and encourage, said decree of abrogation. Allied ministers are much opposed to said annulling decree and it is understood that Lenine, Premier of Russia, has suggested the step to Persian Cabinet. I have the honor to ask full instructions by telegraph.

CALDWELL

File No. 761.91/55

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 7, 1918, 6 p. m.

72. Your August 4, 11 a. m. Avoid taking any action or committing this Government for present. Keep Department fully and promptly informed and await developments.

POLK

File No. 761.91/55

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1918, 6 p. m.

75. Your 10 a. m., August 1, and 11 a. m., August 4, and Department's 6 p. m., August 7. Ascertain discreetly and report fully and promptly attitude all foreign legations, particularly German, Austrian and Turkish, relative to decree of Persian Cabinet. Department desires to receive all possible facts and suggestions relative to this matter. Instruct Southard also to investigate and report his views.

LANSING

File No. 761.91/55

*The Secretary of State to the Minister in Persia (Caldwell)*

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1918, 5 p. m.

76. Department's August 13, 6 p. m. Does new Persian Cabinet support decree and attitude of late Persian Cabinet? Was action of late Persian Cabinet relative to treaties instigated by Germans? Instruct Southard also to investigate and report his views.

LANSING

File No. 761.91/56

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, August 20, 1918, 2 p. m.

[Received August 22, 12.21 a. m.]

Your instruction of August 13, 6 p. m., and August 16, 5 p. m. New Cabinet has not taken action nor have they adopted any position nor made known their attitude on the question of abrogating recent attempt to annul Russian treaties and conventions, but on the other hand they are likely to procrastinate for fear of wrath of the populace likely to follow in the event of decree of abrogation. A Persian commission is investigating certain legal phases of the decree and will report. Local public sentiment favors action of late Cabinet. Confidentially I am inclined to think that decree may be annulled only if and when strong pressure is brought to bear . . .

I am reliably informed that Germany, doubtless in order to obtain popular sympathy here, and in her usual glittering generalities, has repeatedly informed Persia that she is ready and willing to enter into new treaty relations with Persia based on latter's complete economic and political independence, but aside from this and that

the real course of action is said to have been taken at the suggestion of Trotsky, this showed movement was instigated by Germany. Better class Persians favor course pursued.

Allied colleagues awaiting instructions from their respective governments; only protest so far is from Russian and Spanish Legations. It is generally believed that Central Powers will not protest.

Compliance with your instruction of August 13, 6 p. m., requires time but I shall investigate and report by telegraph at earliest possible date.

Southard left here on the 14th instant intending to visit Kasbin, Resht, Hamadan, Kermanshah and Bagdad. Communication with him very difficult but I shall endeavor to get in touch with him.

CALDWELL

File No. 761.91/57

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, August 31, 1918, 5 p. m.

[Received September 2, 11.35 a. m.]

Treaties of seven powers besides Russia contain provisions for extraterritorial rights as reported in civil cases, which privileges accrue to the United States by reason of most favored nation treatment. The Russian commercial treaty of Turkomanchai is the only one, however, which provides for criminal jurisdiction of foreigners and this privilege would seem to be lost to all countries by the abrogation of all Russian treaties. In view of the very unsatisfactory system of justice in Persia I consider it essential for safeguarding our rights that Americans should not be brought before a Persian criminal court.

Present Cabinet inclined to approve action of late Cabinet but will not attempt to interfere with treaties of other nations.

Russian concession contracts were very onerous to Persia and in view of this and the friendly attitude of Persians of all classes [garbled passage] it would not seem expedient to protest against this part of the abolition. As regards treaties, criminal jurisdiction is only important matter modified as far as America is concerned, and if Department does not think we can continue to claim this by right of present and immemorial use, a *modus vivendi*, by an exchange of notes or other means, could doubtless be arrived at. British Legation has informed Persian Government that matter has been referred to London but in meantime has signified its refusal to acquiesce in any unilateral abrogation by Persia of her treaties. Should the Department adopt similar views I should suggest reserving criminal jurisdiction privileges of Russian treaty to Ameri-

can citizens. German Legation has agreed to suspend article 13 of her treaty of 1873 giving her extraterritorial rights in civil cases; it is likely that such offer is merely to gain popular sentiment here during the war.

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72/11205

*The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State*

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *September 1, 1918, 8 a. m.*

[*Received September 2, 12.30 p. m.*]

Department's confirmation of February 20, 6 p. m.<sup>1</sup> Original not received. There is no reason to believe that there has been since 1915 any actual Turkish or German propaganda in this part of Persia. Only reliable report of such a movement was from north-western Persia, Legation's information which has been forwarded you—see my telegram of February 14, 6 p. m.<sup>2</sup>—and the reports of Consul Paddock.<sup>3</sup> Department will observe that my report on the German propaganda referred to alleged happenings in the Caucasus. I am convinced that the Persian Cabinet of that date was quite truly neutral, that the withdrawal of British forces was sought in good faith and not for the purpose of aiding Germany.

Persia hopes from America moral support and financial aid and a firm stand for Persia's independence, integrity and her permission of [participating] when peace conference convenes.

The policy of the United States Government, as it was outlined by Department's telegram January 24, 10 a. m.,<sup>4</sup> has greatly enhanced American prestige in Persia. Department's telegram 30, March 12, 6 p. m.<sup>5</sup> Legation here has been unable to procure any further detailed report or any information which has not already been forwarded.

CALDWELL

File No. 763.72111/7190

*The Persian Chargé (Ali-Kuli Khan) to the Secretary of State*

No. 177

WASHINGTON, *October 5, 1918.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to submit for the information of your Government translations of recent communications received

<sup>1</sup> *Ante*, p. 903.

<sup>2</sup> Not found.

<sup>3</sup> Gordon Paddock, Consul at Tabriz; reports on the subject mentioned were made in his telegrams of Mar. 8 (File No. 891.00/929) and Apr. 18 (File No. 891.4016/30).

<sup>4</sup> *Ante*, p. 898.

<sup>5</sup> Not printed.



from the Persian Government,<sup>1</sup> pertaining to the occupation of Persian territory by the troops of the belligerent powers, which, in violating the neutrality of Persia, has resulted in offending the public feeling and provoking a desperate situation, of which the ravaging famine is but one aspect. In presenting the enclosed data, I beg to state that Persia looks to America to insure her, after the war, against a recurrence of such hopeless conditions, which have afflicted the people of that ancient land. We have full confidence that the great principles of humanity and justice enunciated by your Government will in the day of peace extend their blessings towards Persia, as one of the countries which has endured long years of manifold trials with patience and long suffering.

Accept [etc.]

MIRZA ALI-KULI KHAN, N. D.

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<sup>1</sup> Not printed.

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